


•^oo"* 



,-N 7*. 



.^^ 






,-.v <u. 



■"-* <■ •>>. c!* 







^^^. 


•x^' 






...^^ 


\ 






1 ^ f 


n? 


0^ 






^^^ 


'""--. 







x^- 



> -^• 



\0 p^ 



•?/•,"' 






.\^^ 



■'b 









^^■■ 



XN^^~ 



'-^A V^ 



c-0~ 









X. .c^^' 






X^^ "^ 






X^" 



,\ r. 






'>- >:^' 



.^^ 






^ 






>..^^ 



<-i^ 












i^ 



^^ 



j.r 




i 



\^'-". ...♦«;^JiJ*is?«i*«i»5s*yrt-'w:«wuH^a!n 



'4i 




STORY OF THE WAR. 



PICTORIAL HISTORY 



OP 



THE GREAT CIVIL WAR: 



EMBRACING 



FULL AND AUTHENTIC ACCOUNTS 

BATTLES BY LAND AND SEA, 



WITH 



Graphic Descriptions of Heroic Deeds Achieved by Armies and Individuals; 

Narratives of Personal Adventure ; Thrilling Incidents ; Daring 

Exploits ; Wonderful Escapes ; Life in Camp, Field and 

Hospital ; Adventures of Blockade Life, etc. 



CONTAINING 



GAr^BPULLY PI^BPAI^BD BIOGr^APHIES 

OF- 

the . Leading Qenerals and J\[aval eommanders. 

John Laird Vv^ilson, 



Special Correspondent of the New York Herald. 



EMBELLISHED WITH NUMEROUS FINE STEEL-PLATE ENGRAVINGS OF BATTLE- 
bCENES. AMD WITH PORTRAITS OF LEADING GENERALS. 



e^ 



u^ 



VJI-^ 



Copyright, lS7u, by John Laird Wilson, 



Copyright, 1881, by .1 R, Jomes. 






^ ^ ^ 



/o 



DEDICATION 



To our brave and heroic countrymen who in the fierce struggle of 
our Great Civil War battled in the cause of patriotism, whether 
they marched under the Stars and Stripes or followed the ensigns 
of the "Lost Cause;" whether they wore the Blue or the Gray; and 
who still survive to enjoy honors from their admiring countrymen; 

To the memory of those who sleeping on battle-field or in cemetery 
await the trumpet sound of the great resurrection; 

To Grant of the North, to Lee of the South — to the followers of 
both — and to every patriotic 5on of America — who would have the 
true story of this great fratricidal struggle chronicled by an impartial 
hand with justice to all, extolling virtue, heroism and patriotic devotion 
to principle wherever found, 

This Volume is reverently 

DEDICATED 

BY THE AUTHOR 



PREFACE. 



IN oflfering to the public a new History of the Great Civil "War, a few words oi 
explanatiou are necessary. Of histories, general and special, relating to the 
late struggle a number have been published, but they were nearly all written at a 
period so close to the war that the writers were unconsciously biassed by the strong 
feelings which they shared in common with their fellow-citizens during the occur- 
rence of the events they relate. Time had not softened their prejudices sufficiently 
to enable them to write with the judicial calmness necessary to the proper treat- 
ment of such a subject. It is hoped that in the long years that have elapsed since 
the return of peace enough has been made plain, and sufficient calmness has been 
gained, to enable the writer to prepare a history which shall do impartial justica 
to the struggle itself and to the actors engaged in it. 

It has been my aim to present a continuous narrative covering the entire area 
of operations, both military and naval, and free from those interruptions which in 
general history are unavoidable. I have endeavored to carry the reader with me 
over sea and land, wherever the sounds of war were heard, and to present to him in 
a series of vivid and faithful pictures the events which marked the progress of the 
great struggle. Of the movements of the hostile forces, and of the commanders 
under whom at different times and at different places these movements were 
made, I have expressed my opinion with great freedom, awarding praise or 
blame as truth or justice seemed to call for the one or the other. I do not expect 
that my judgments will find favor from all classes ak leaders, but I know that 
they are the judgments of an unbiassed mind, solicitous for the truth and con- 
strained only by the irresistible logic of facts. 

My information I have drawn from sources too n'."nerous to be mentioued in 
detail. Contemporary magazines and pamphlets, private letters and documents 
of various kinds which have been kindly placed at my disposal, — all have been 
consulted with more or less profit. In cases of doubt, where testimony was absent 
or conflicting, I have corresponded with some of the principal leaders in the 



ni 



iV PREFACE. 

strife ; and the information thus derived from both Northern and Southern sources 
has been to me of incalculable value. Of the results of the labors of others in 
the same field, it is hardly necessary to say, I have taken full advantage. To the 
exhaustive history of the war by Dr. Lossing, and to the scarcely less exhaustive, 
but in some respects more philosophical, work of Dr. Draper, I confess myself 
under great obligations. I have perused with profit and with pleasure Prof. Wil- 
liam Swinton's " Decisive Battles of the War ;" and in his " Campaigns of the 
Army of the Potomac " I have found much with which to illumine and adorn 
these pages. Of the " History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de 
Paris, so far as it has advanced, I cannot speak too highly; and in the preparation 
of some of the earlier chapters of this work I have found it a useful book of 
reference. In terms of similar praise I desire to speak of the " Memoirs of Gen- 
eral Sherman " and of Badeau's " Military Life of General Grant." From among 
the many other works which I have consulted with advantage, and to which I 
cannot refuse to admit my indebtedness, I would mention the " Rebellion Record," 
" The Great Civil War " by Tomes and Smith, " Grant and his Campaigns " by 
Dr. Henry Coppee, Tenney's "Military and Naval History of the Rebellion," 
" The Battle of Gettysburg " by Samuel P. Bates, Pollard's " Lost Cause," and 
" Chancellorsville " by Hotchkiss and Allan. 

As it is, this work is now given to the public ; and if it shall be found that, 
while doing reasonable justice to all the parties concerned, I have in any degree 
been able to render such disastrous struggles impossible for the future, I shall feci 

that the hours spent over these pages h.-^ve not been spent in vain. 

J. L. W" 



PICTORIAL HISTORY 



THE GREAT CIVIL WAR. 



CHAPTER I. 

Ihe Aim and Object of this History.— The Causes of the War.— State Eights.- The Tariff and Slavery.— Diverge 
ing Interests of North and South. — Effect of the Abolition of Slavery in the British Colonies on American 
Sentiment. — Tlie Missouri Compromise. — The Fugitive Slave Bill. — Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.— 
Formation of the Republican Party. — Kansas Struggle. — Triumph of the Anti-Slavery Party. — The Campaign 
of 1856. — Buchanan elected President. — The Kansas-Nebraska Struggle. — Buchanan's Unfortunate Admin- 
istration.— The Dred Scott Decision. — The John Brown Raid.— The Sale of Arms to the South.— Secession and 
Organization of the Confederacy. — Election and Inauguration of President Lincoln. — His Address. — The Firing 
npon Fort Sumter. 



In many respects the American Civil 
War was the most momentous struggle 
that ever marked the history of the 
world. Not only did it employ larger 
armies and fleets than were ever called 
for by other combatants; not only did 
it exceed the immortal campaigns of 
Frederick and Napoleon in the magni- 
tude and brilliancy of its operations; 
not only did its theatre comprise an 
area larger than the whole continent of 
Europe, embracing as many varieties of 
climate, and presenting as many natural 
obstacles to be overcome ; not only did it 
inaugurate a new era and a new mode 
of warfare, — but it also served to develop 
the strength and resources of the coun- 
try it was supposed to be wasting, and 
to make plain to the world the true 
character, the immense resources, and 
the especial genius for war of the Amer- 
ican people, and to offer a convincing 



proof of the imperishable nature of free 
institutions when entrusted to the keep- 
ing of a race of men trained to under- 
stand and value them— men willing and 
resolved to maintain them even at the 
cost of their lives. The magnitude and 
grandeur of the events of this great 
struggle give to them a picturesqueness, 
so to speak, which must make a faithful 
account of them deeply interesting to 
our people. 

To write the history of such a struggle 
must be no easy task, for while lauding 
the glory of the conqueror the virtues 
of the vanquished must not be for- 
gotten. In such a task passion and 
prejudice, sectional pride and intoler- 
ance of opposition, have no place; the 
faithful historian must record events as 
they occurred. Such a task we propose 
to ourselves in the work now before us. 

In the following pages it will be oui 



CAUSES OP THE WAE. 



aim and endeavor to caiTy the reader 
with us, as we follow the contending 
armies and mark the progress of the 
conflict ; to halt, from time to time, as 
the embattled hosts confront each other, 
listening to the roar of battle and wit- 
nessing the wild work of war — the de- 
vastation of fields, the desolation of 
homes, the carnage, the slaughter, the 
tortured agony of the wounded, and the 
ghastly features of the dead ; to rejoice 
with the triumphant defenders of the 
right, without being ungenerous to the 
erring and the vanquished ; and finally, 
to point out the blessed results which 
flowed out of the terrible struggle, not 
to the United States alone, but to all 
nations and to all peoples. 

Preliminary to this, however, and in 
order to enable the reader intelligently 
to follow us in our descriptions of the 
different battle scenes, it is necessary 
to recount briefly, but clearly and im- 
partially, the remote and proximate 
eauses of the rebellion and the events 
which immediately preceded the out- 
break of hostilities. The antagonism 
between North and South which came 
to a head in December, 1860, in 
the secession of South Carolina 
from the Union was not new. It was 
old almost as the Union itself. It had 
its roots deep down in the nation's his- 
tory. It might be interesting, if it lay 
within the scope of this work, to show 
how much of this antagonism was due 
to race, how much was due to climate, 
how much was due to interest, and 
the pursuits of life. In all these par- 
ticulars, it could be easily shown, there 
was difference between North and 



1860. 



South. But to enter into these details 
with any degree of fulness would be 
foreign to our plan. From the very 
commencement of our national history 
difference of opinion prevailed as to the 
nature of the bond which held the 
States together. It was held by one 
class of statesmen that the Federal 
Union was a league or confederation 
which might be dissolved at will by 
any of the States. It was held by an- 
other class of statesmen that the Fed- 
eral Union constituted a nation, with 
a national government, and that no 
one State coxild secede from the Union 
without the consent of all the others. 
This was the radical difference out of 
which ultimately grew the rebellion. 
It was not until certain material ques- 
tions arose that any serious practical 
point was given to this difference of 
opinion. In course of time such ques- 
tions did arise. Chief among these 
were those which related to the tariff 
and to slavery. The South, which de- 
pended on the products of the soil, de- 
manded free trade. The North, which 
derived its wealth from the manufac 
tuiing industries, called for protection. 
And while great statesmen advocated 
these conflicting views, Congress wit- 
nessed many a stormy scene. The ques- 
tion, however, which was a pennanent 
source of division, and on which agree- 
ment was found to be impossible, was 
that of slavery. 

At the time of the formation of the 
Union, slaveiy was more or less common 
in all the States. It was more common 
in the South than in the North, but it 
existed in all the States. The invention 



THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 



of the cotton-gin by Whitney, in 1793, 
rendering, as it did, the cultivation of 
cotton the leadino; branch of Southern 
industry, hxrgely increased the demand 
for slave labor. While slavery, for a 
variety of reasons, had ceased to be a 
source of wealth in the North, and was 
gradually dying out, it had become a 
source of great wealth to the Southern 
planters and a conspicuous feature of 
Southern life. In the year 1860, the 
negro population of the Southern States 
had increased to about four millions. 
In the North, slavery had completely 
died out, and in the States of the North- 
west, which were now being rapidly 
filled up with free immigrants, it never 
found a place. Slavery was thus found 
to be a root of bitterness. It deter- 
mined and rendered permanent the nat- 
ural antagonism between North and 
South. Yeai' by year the gulf was 
widening; and it became more and more 
apparent that if the South were not to 
be allowed to maintain its peculiar and 
favorite institution, and would not be 
permitted to secede, a gigantic civil 
war was one of the certainties of the 
not distant future. 

The slavery question, as we have 
said, was a cause of division from the 
beginning of om* history. The anti- 
slavery agitation in England, and the 
passing of the memorable law in 1807, 
abolishing the slave trade in the British 
colonies, had naturally enough a pow- 
erful influence on this side of the At- 
lantic. It helped to determine the pur- 
pose of the North, and it infused new 
life into all those who were in favor of 
abolition. It was not, however, until 



about the year 1820 that the real po- 
litical struggle began. With the famous 
Missouri Compi'omise began that polit- 
ical contest out of which grew the civil 
war. It was the first of a series of 
steps which led up to the act of seces- 
sion and the firing on Fort Sumter. The 
Missouii Compromise, it was supposed, 
was a complete and satisfactory settle- 
ment of the dispute between the North 
and the South. It turned out to be a 
great source of trouble. Its history is 
as follows : Missouri formed part of the 
Louisiana purchase. After the organ- 
ization of the " Territory of Orleans," 
in 1803, Missouri fonned part of the 
"District of Louisiana." Later it took 
the name of " Missouri Territory." The 
State of Missouri was a part of that 
Territory. In 1820, Missouri applied 
to Congress for admission into the Union 
as a State. It was proposed that the 
application be granted only on condi- 
tion that slavery be prohibited in the 
new State. The pro-slavery party were 
indignant. Both in and out of Congi-ess 
party feeling ran high. The discussion, 
which was conducted with great bitter- 
nees, resulted in what was called a com- 
pramise. It was agreed that slavery be 
allowed in Missouri, but prohibited in 
all the ten'itory of the United States 
north and west of the northern bound- 
ary of Arkansas. On these terms Mis- 
souri entered the Union as a State. 
The compromise, from which so much 
was expected, settled nothing. The 
Southern people continued to feel and 
act as if they had been hindered in the 
exercise of their rights. In 1850, 
they succeeded in passing the- 



CAUSES OF THE WAR. 



Fugitive Slave B^il , ^yhicli enabled mas- 
ters to recover theii' slaves who might 
have escaped to a freo State. This act 
gave great umbrage to the North. In 



1854. 



1854 the South gained another 



triimiph by the ivpeal of the Mis- 
souri Compromise. Th:s act, which had 
for its object the oi'gainzation of a ter- 
ritorial govei'nment in Kansas and Ne- 
braska, provided that the people of the 
Territories should be at liberty to adopt 
or exclude slavery, as they thought fit. 
State Rights were thus again in the as- 
cendant; and the Southern planters were 
left at liberty to establish their favor- 
ite institutions all over the Southwest. 
At this juncture was formed the Re- 
publican party — a party whose princi- 
pal doctrine was opposition to the ex- 
tension of slaveiy. The organization of 
the Republican party made it plain to 
all the world that the struggle between 
the South and the North — between the 
pro-slavery party on the one hand and 
the anti-slavery party on the other — 
meant war to the knife. A truce was 
now no longer possible. 

These preliminary remarks would be 
incomplete Avithout a passing reference 
to what is known as the Kansas struggle. 
Kansas, like Missouri, originally formed 
part of that immense territory which 
went by the name of Louisiana, It will 
be remembered by the reader that the 
Missouri Compromise left the south- 
western provinces open for the introduc- 
tion of slaveiy. The repeal of that act by 
Mr. Douglas's bill did not destroy the 
hopes of the southern planters with re- 
gard to Kansas. From the date of the 
Missouri Compromise it had been the 



battle-groxmd of the two contending 
parties. Both the pro-slavery party 
and the anti-slavery party did their 
best to colonize it. From the East and 
the Northwest freemen poured into the 
new territory, and " emigrant aid soci- 
eties" were formed in all the Free 
States to lend the freemen a helping 
hand. The South was not less indus- 
trious in its efforts. " Bordei- ruffians," 
as they were called, rushed in from the 
neighboring State of Missouri, and a 
reign of violence ensued almost if not 
entirely unparalleled in the history of 
the country. The Kansas struggle, as 
can easily be imagined, deeply embit- 
tered feeling on both sides, and had 
a powerful influence in hastening the 
" in'epressible conflict." At last, after 
some years of weary fighting, the anti- 
slavery party triumphed, and Kansas 
was admitted a free State 30th Januaiy, 
1861. While this struggle was at its 
height, took place the presidential elec- 
tion of 1856. It was one of the 
keenest contests in the history of 
the country. Mr. Fremont, the Repub- 
lican candidate, polled a large number 
of votes ; but the Democrats carried 
the day, and Mr. Buchanan, a warm 
friend of the South, came into power. 
The election of a Democratic president 
was more an apparent than a real gain 
to the South. Mr. Buchanan, with all 
his immense influence, could not hinder 
the admission of Kansas as a free State ; 
and the settlement of the Kansas diffi- 
culty was justlj^ regarded as an anti- 
slavery triumph. "The Kansas-Nebras- 
ka struggle," as Dr. Draper well puts 
it, " marks an epoch in the great contro- 



BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION. 



versy between the North and the South. 
It closes the period of parliamentary or 
congressional debate between them, and 
introduces one of violence and open 
war. The South clearly perceived that 
nothing more was to be hoped for from 
peaceful measures, and that, if it were 
its intention to perpetuate or even to 
protect African slavery, it could do so 
only by force." 

The history of the next four years is 
the history of a war of opposing views 
and conflicting aims. The South was 
becoming more embittered, the North 
raore resolute. The Buchanan admin- 
istration was in fact a great misfortune 
to the country. Of all the pul>lic men 
of his time, he was perhaps least fitted 
for the stern duties which devolved up- 
on the chief of the State. Men like 
Cromwell or Napoleon or General Jack- 
son would have been equal to the sit- 
uation ; but Buchanan was neither a 
Cromwell nor a Napoleon, nor is he to 
be mentioned in the same breath with 
General Jackson. Admirably adapted 
for the high position in times of peace, 
he was altogether ime(iual to the stirring 
times in which he found himself. A 
strong hand would have seized the helm 
and acted with decision. The prospect 
of war unnerved him; he hesitated, and 
the vessel floated to destruction. His 
term of ofiice was marked by four great 
events — the Dred Scott decision in 
1857 ; the John Brown raid in the 
fall of 1859 ; the sale of arms to 
the South, and the organization and re- 
tirement from the Union of the Southern 
Confederacy. The Dred Scott decision 
vvaw very properly regarded in the 



1857. 



North as the virtual establishment of 
slavery throughout all the States of the 
Union, and converting it from a local 
into a national institution. According 
to the decision given by Judge Taney 
of the Supreme Court in this case, a 
slave owner might carry his slaves with 
him into any State of the Union. Some 
of the Northern States resented this 
decision by passing " Personal Liberty 
Laws," declaring freedom to every 
slave who came within their borders. 
The bitter feelings engendered on both 
sides by the Dred Scott affair were ag- 
gravated by the John Brown raid. It 
was no doubt a foolish affair, which 
never had the approval of any large or 
influential st ct'iDU of the Northern peo- 
ple ; but it was felt by the South to be 
a demonstration of Northern sentiment^ 
and it was treated accordingly. The 
execution of Brown and his associates 
was no doubt justified by the law of 
the land, but it was nevertheless a great 
blunder. It exalted a foolish filibus- 
tering raid into the character of a cru- 
sade for liberty, and it transformed a 
crazy old man into a hero and a martjr. 
Blood had now been shed, and recon- 
ciliation had become impossible. 

In the midst of the heat and excite- 
ment occasioned by the Dred Scott de- 
cision and the John Brown raid, the 
South was secretly and busily prepar 
ing for Avar. Through the indifference 
of the government at Washington, and 
through the treacheiy of the secretary 
of war, large stores of arms and am- 
munition were transferred to the South; 
and while the North was dreaming of 
war only as a probability, the South 



10 



CAUSES OP THE WAR. 



1860. 



was armed to the teeth. Such was the 
condition of things North and South 
when the time came to nominate a can- 
didate for the presidency in the spring 
of 1860. The people were di- 
vided into four parties. Each 
party had its own candidate, and each 
candidate had his own platform. The 
candidates were Breckenridge, of the 
Southern Democracy; Douglas, of the 
Northern Democracy ; Lincoln, of the 
Republican party; and Bell, of the 
Union Constitutional party. On the 
platform that "there is no law for 
slavery in the Territories, and no 
power to enact one ; and that Congress 
is bound to prohibit it in or exclude 
it fi'om every Federal Territory," the 
Republicans carried the day. The elec- 
KoT. tion of Lincoln on the 6th of No- 

*• vember, 1860, crushed the hopes 
of the South. It was the signal for 
secession. South Carolina was the first 
to move. At a special convention, held 
Dec. on the 20th of December, 1860, 

20» her connection with the Union 
was dissolved by an unanimous vote. 
The example of South Carolina was 
promptly followed by Mississippi, Ala- 
bama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, 
and later by Texas. As Buchanan held 
the opinion that neither he nor Con- 
gress had the right to coerce a State 
into submission, nothing was done 
to hinder the progress of seces- 
sion. On the 4th of February, 1861, a 
F*b« convention of the seceded States 

4« was held at Montgomery, Alaba- 
ma; and there a constitution was adopt- 
ed and a government organized, under 
the name of the Confederate States of 



1861. 



America. Jefferson Davis, late United 
States senator from Mississippi, was 
elected president, and Alexander H. 
Stephens of Georgia vice-president. 
The seceders took possession of all the 
forts, arsenals, custom-houses, ships, 
and all other Federal property within 
their boundaries. In the South, iu the 
possession of the United States there 
remained only Fort Sumter, in Charles- 
ton Harbor, Fort Pickens, near Pensa- 
cola, and the forts off the southern 
extremity of Florida. 

On Mareli 4th, 1861, Abraham Lin- 
coln was inaugurated. In his ad- Mar. 
dress, the president declared it to *• 
be his duty to "hold, occupy and pos- 
sess the places and property " belong- 
ing to the Federal government in the 
South. This was accepted by the South- 
ern leaders as a declaration of war. 
Several of the southern-born officers ia 
the United Stares army and navy, who 
had not yet declared themselves, now 
entered the Confederate service. With- 
out delay, General Beauregard was 
placed at the head of the forces, about 
four thousand men, who were already 
investing Fort Sumter, in Charleston 
Harbor. Fort Sumter was held by a 
garrison of about eighty men under 
Major Anderson, whose name will be 
memorable in American history. At 
the time of the secession of South Caro 
liua, in December, 1860, Anderson was 
stationed at Fort Moultrie, but for 
greater security he removed to Fort 
Sumter. It was known that the garri- 
son was reduced to great straits, and 
must soon surrender, unless supplies 
and reinforcements came from Washing- 



CHAELESTON HARBOK. 



11 



ton. It was believed that the president 
and his advisers were disposed to with- 
draw the garrison. Early in April, 
however, it became known that the 
government had decided to send a fleet 
with supplies to Major Anderson and 
bis garrison. Beauregard received in- 
structions from the authorities at Mont- 
gomery to demand the surrender of the 
iort; and, if his demand was not com- 



plied with, he was to reduce it by 
force. On the afternoon of the Apnj 
11th of April, 1861, the demand !»• 
to surrender was made. Major Ander- 
son refused to comply. Early on the 
following morning the threat which 
was made was carried out, and fire was 
opened on Fort Sumter by the Confed- 
erate land batteries. The American 
Civil War had commenced. 



CHAPTER II. 



Iffanrleston Harbor. — Fort Sumter. — Gardiner and Floyd. — Major Anderson. — Adjntant-General Cooper. — Evidence 
of Conspiracy. — Transfer of Arms from Northern to Southern Arsenals. — Jefferson Davis' ' ' Little BUI. " — 
Captain Foster's 'Workmen. — General Scott becoming alarmed. — Conspirators in the Cabinet. — Anderson 
moves from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter. — Great Excitement all over the Conntrj'. — Indignation in the 
Sonth. — Resignation of Floyd. — Action of the Secession Convention. — Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie 
occupied by the Secessionists. —Seizure of the Custom House and Post-Office. — The Southern Commissioners 
in Washington. — Their Extraordinary Demands Refused. — President Buchanan Aroused. — More Energy on 
the part of the Government. — The Star of the West. — Preparations for Attacking Fort Sumter. — The Star of 
the West seen in the Outer Harbor — Fired upon — Compelled to Retire. — Anderson called upon to Surrender 
Fort Sumter. — Secession Spreading. — The Peace Conference. — Election of Lincoln. — His .Journey to Wash- 
ington. — His Life in Danger. — His Inauguration. — His Address. — Anderson more Hopeful. — Disappointment. — 
Lincoln ' ' Putting His Foot Down Firmly. " — The Relief Squadron. — Anderson again called upon to Surrender 
the Fort.— His Reply. — The First Shot.— The Bombardment. —The Relief Squadron Sighted.— Hope.— The 
Garrison Reduced to Extremities. — Red-Hot Shot. — Fort Smnter in Flames. — The Last Three Cartridges. — 
The Flag Staff Shot Down. — The notorious Wigf all.— Wigf all's Deception Discovered. — Anderson Indignant. — 
Surrenders on his own Terms. — Anderson and his Men safe on board the Baltic. 



J860. 



Before the close of 1860, public at- 
tention was centered on Charles- 
ton Harbor. It was here that the 
first indications of actual war were re- 
vealed. The harbor of Charleston is 
one of the finest on the South Atlantic 
seaboard. Duiing the years of peace 
and prosperit)^, great care had been 
taken of it by the State and Federal 
authorities ; and when South Carolina, 
yielding to the fierce impulses of rebel- 
lion, took the bold step of retiiing 



from the Union, it was one of the best 
guarded harbors in the States. It had 
the advantage of four powerful fort- 
resses — Castle Pinckney, Fort Moul- 
trie, Fort Johnson, and Fort Sumter. 
Castle Pinckney was situated upon the 
southern extremity of a tract of marshy 
land known as Shute's Folly Island, 
and was near the city of Charleston. 
Fort Moultrie stood on Sullivan's Island, 
distant from Charleston between three 
and four miles, and not far removed 



i2 



vOET SUMTER. 



from the famous little palmetto-log fort 
of that name, made memorable during 
the Wai' of Independence by its heroic 
defiance of the British fleet in 1776. 
Fort Johnson stood on James Island, and 
to the west of Fort Sumter. As a forti- 
ficati' a it was of comparatively little 
accc .nt. Fort Sumter was by far the 
largest and most important of these 
strongholds. Its position gave it an 
immense advantage over all the others. 
It was built in the middle of the en- 
trance to the harbor piope ■; and its 
walls of defiance towered up on the 
southwestern edge of the ship channel. 
Fort Sumter was about three and a half 
miles from the city. A truncated pen- 
tagonal in form, its walls were of solid 
brick and concrete masonry. The island 
on which the fort was erected rested on 
a mud bank. The materials of which 
the island was composed were chips of 
granite from the quarries of New Eng- 
land. In the conveyance of these ma- 
terials and in the construction of the 
island ten years were consumed, and 
the actual cost amounted to over half 
a million of dollars. The fort itself cost 
another half million. The walls, which 
were sixty feet high and from eight to 
twelve feet thick, were pierced for three 
tiers of guns on the north, east and west 
sides. The two lower tiers were under 
bomb-proof casemates. The first tier 
was intended for forty-two-pounder 
Paixhans, the other two were intended 
for eight and ten-inch columbiads. 
The full complement of guns was one 
hundred and forty, but when the war 
broke out there were only seventy-five 
guns in the work. 



In 1860 Colonel Gardiner was com- 
mander in Charleston Harbor. A va- 
riety of circumstances encouraged the 
belief that Gardiner was in league with 
the enemy. The strange conduct of 
War Secretary Floyd and the cunning 
efforts of Jefferson Davis to secure anns 
for the South, had created a spirit of 
watchfulness, and Gardiner having re- 
vealed an inordinate amount of anxiety 
to have his supply of ammunition in- 
creased, iucuiTed the displeasure of the 
government and was removed. The va- 
cant place was filled without delay by 
Major Robert Anderson, a native of Ken- 
tucky, and an officer who had won some 
distinction in the Mexican campaigns. 
On the 20th November Anderson jfoy, 
arrived and assumed the com- 20t 
mand, his head-quarters being at Fort 
Moultrie. It would have been strange 
if a man of his discernment had been 
deceived by the peculiar state of things 
which prevailed all around him. An- 
derson was not deceived. On the 23d 
of November he wrote to Adju- jf^y, 
tant-General Cooper, describing 28. 
the situation. In that letter he uses 
the following remarkable words : "That 
there is," he says, "a settled determina- 
tion to leave the Union and to obtain 
possession of this fort is apparent to 
all." All the forts in the harbor, he 
assured General Cooper, were in a 
wretched condition, Fort Moultrie par- 
ticularly inviting attack by its weak- 
ness. " Fort Sumter and Castle Pinck- 
ney," he went on to say, "must be gar- 
risoned immediately, if the government 
determines to keep command of this 
harbor," Major Anderson's letter to 



SALE OF ARMS TO THE SOUTH. 



13 



General Cooper, which contained much 
more to the same effect, must ever be 
regarded as one of the most important 
official documents connected with the 
early history of the Civil War. 

Anderson did not know — did not 
even suspect — that the ears to which 
he addressed his appeals were deaf, and 
that the heart which he hoped to touch 
was callous, by reason of rank treason. 
Adjutant-General Cooper, who was a 
native of the State of New York, but 
who had married a sister of Senator 
Mason of Virginia, was already sold to 
the Confederate cause. At the very 
moment that Major Anderson was writ- 
ing his memorable letter, Cooper was 
making use of his position to obtain 
and communicate valuable information 
to the authorities at Southern head- 
quarters. Three months later, he left 
his office at Washington, hastened to 
Montgomery, Alabama, and was made 
adjutant - general of the Confederate 
forces, then busily preparing for war. 
Cooper, however, was not alone in his 
iniquity. The national capital had be- 
come a hotbed of treachery. Weak, 
undecided, and in the last months of 
his four years of office, the president 
would do nothing. The people of the 
North little imagined that the entire 
machineiy of the government at Wash- 
ington had been Avorked for an entire 
year in the interests of the Southern 
Dec. malcontents. On the 31st of De- 
3*« cember. Senator Wilson of Mas- 
sachusetts offered a resolution in the 
Senate, asking the secretaiy of war to 
furnish information concerning the dis- 
position of ai-ms manufactured in the 



1859. 



national armories or purchased for the 
use of the government during the past 
year. Mr. Holt was now at the head 
of the War Department, and the need- 
ed information was not long delayed. 
From the report submitted to the Sen- 
ate, it appeared that as early as 
the 29th of December, 1859, Sec- 
retary Floyd had ordered the transfer 
of seventy-five thousand percussion mus- 
kets, forty thousand muskets altered 
to percussion, and ten thousand percus- 
sion rifles from the armory at Spring- 
field, Massachusetts, and the arsenals at 
Watervliet, New York, and Watertown, 
Massachusetts, to the arsenals at Fay- 
etteville in North Carolina, Charleston 
in South Carolina, Augusta in Georgia, 
Mount Vernon in Alabama, and Baton 
Rouge in Louisiana. These arms, it 
appeared, were distributed in the 
spring of 1 860. Only eleven days 
after this order had been issued by 
Floyd, Jefferson Davis introduced into 
the Senate a bill " to authorize the sale 
of public arms to the several States 
and Territories, and to regulate the ap- 
pointment of superintendents of the 
national armories." The i-eal object of 
this bill was not at first or at all gen- 
erally perceived. It was not until the 
Senate was asked by Davis, on Feb.Vj 
the 21st of February, to take up 21. 
what he called " a little bill," which he 
hoped would "excite no discussion," that 
treachery began to be suspected. On 
the 23d, two days afterward, Mr. peb. 
Fessenden, senator from Maine, 23. 
asked for some explanations on the sub- 
ject. Davis was ready with his reply. 
'' The secretary of war," he said, " had 



I860. 



t9S 



u 



FOET SUMTER. 



recommended an increase of the appro- 
priation for arming the militia of the 
country, and he thought it best for vol- 
unteers to have aims made by the 
government, so that in case of war the 
weapons would all be uniform." Fessen- 
den offered an amendment, but the bill 
was cariied by a strict party vote. It 
was smothered, however, in the House 
of Representatives. The southerners 
were not to be driven fiom their pur- 
pose. An old law, bearing the date of 
March 3d, 1825, authorized the secre- 
tary of war to sell amis, ammunition, 
and other military stores which were 
no longer suitable for the public ser- 
vice. Under cover of this law, Floyd 
sold to States and individuals over thir- 
ty-one thousand muskets, altered from 
flint to percussion, for two dollars and 
fifty cents each. On the very day Major 
Anderson addressed the letter pre- 
viously mentioned to Adjutant-General 
Cooper, Floyd sold ten thousand of 
these muskets to G. B. Lamar of Geor- 
gia; and, some eight days before, he 
had sold five thousand of them to the 
State of Virginia. It was openly boast- 
ed by a Southern newspaper that during 
the year which preceded the outbreak 
of hostilities, one hundred and thirty- 
five thousand four hundred and thirty 
muskets had been quietly transferred 
from the northern arsenal at Springfield 
alone to the Southern States ; and Sec- 
retary Floyd was thanked for the fore- 
sight he had displayed in thus disarm- 
ing the North and equipping the South 
for the emergency. A similar boast 
was made by a prominent Virginian, 
who declared that, what with the arms 



distributed by the Federal government 
to the States in preceding years and 
those purchased by the States and by 
private citizens, the South entered upon 
the war with one hundred and fifty 
thousand small arms of the most ap- 
proved modern pattern, and the best in 
the world. According to a statement 
made by General Scott, Rhode Island, 
Delaware, and Texas had not drawn, at 
the close of 1860, their annual quota of 
anns, and Massachusetts, Tennessee, and 
Kentucky had drawn only in part; 
while Virginia, South Carolina, Geor- 
gia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mis- 
sissippi, and Kansas were, by order of 
the secretary of war, supplied with 
their quotas for 1861 in advance. For 
some reason, possibly as a blind, partial 
advances had also been made to Penn- 
sylvania and Maryland. This, however, 
did not exhaust the demands of the 
South, nor the intentions of the secretary 
of war. On the 20th of Decem- oec. 
ber, 1860, Floyd ordered forty 20. 
columbiads and four thirty-two pound- 
ers to be sent immediately from the 
arsenal at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to 
the unfinished fort on Ship Island, off 
the coast of Mississippi ; and seventy- 
one columbiads and seven thirty-two- 
pounders were ordered to be sent from 
the same arsenal to the embryo fort at 
Galveston, which could not be ready 
for its armament in less than five years. 
This bold attempt was happily frus- 
trated by the vigilance and prompt ac- 
tion of the people of Pittsburg. Floyd 
fcoju afterwards fled to Virginia, and the 
order was countermanded by his suc- 
cessor, Joseph Holt. 



EFFORTS AT REINFORCEMENT. 



15 



Such being the state of things general- 
ly, it is not difficult to understand the 
desperate situation in which Anderson 
was placed. From such men as Floyd 
and Cooper he had certainly small hope 
of succor. The reply given to his letter 
was worthy of men who had been work- 
ing so zealously in the interests of the 
South. It was contained in fewer than 
a dozen lines, and permission was given 
him to send a fe.w workmen to repair 
Castle Pinckney. In the futui'e, he 
was told, he was to be careful to ad- 
dress all communications to the ad- 
jutant-general's office or to the secretary 
of war. Anderson, as we have seen, 
had his head-quarters in Fort Moultrie. 
It became daily more manifest that, 
unless some unexpected aid arrived, he 
would be entirely at the mercy of the 
enemy. He had abundant evidence that 
the Carolinians regarded the forts as 
their own, and that they were making 
vigorous preparations to get ready for 
the attack. In a conference which he 
had with some of the leadins: citizens 
of Charleston, he was assured that the 
forts "must be theirs after secession." 
Secretary Floyd was still playing into 
the hands of the enemy. One of his 
latest orders to Anderson was that he 
should deliver over " any of Captain 
Foster's workmen, should a demand be 
made for them." The avowed reason 
for this order was that " they had been 
enrolled into the service of the State." 
The actual reason was that the conspir- 
ators might have the benefit of the ex- 
perience of men who thoroughly under- 
stood the forts. Anderson felt that his 
position was becoming daily more des- 



perate. His communications to the gov- 
ernment were frequent, and his calls 
for help were urgent. To his entreaties 
were now added the recommendations 
of General Scott, who had become 
fully alive to the perils of the situa- 
tion. While Anderson was informing 
the government that " Fort Sumter was 
certain to be attacked on an early day, 
and that if Fort Sumter was lost all 
was lost," the commander-in-chief of 
the army ui'ged the president to " rein- 
force the forts ou the coasts of the 
slave-labor States." On the 31st oct. 
of October, he asked permission 31. 
to admonish the commanders of south- 
ern forts to be on their guard against 
surprise or sudden assault. All was in 
vain. It seemed as if nothing could 
arouse the government to a sense of 
the imminence of the danger. General 
Scott's advice was unheeded ; his re- 
quest was disregarded ; and Anderson 
was advised to be prudent — to avoid 
any attempt which might seem like 
forcing hostilities, but "to hold posses- 
sion of the forts, and, if attacked, to 
defend himself to the last extremity." 
Poor comfort, certainly, in the circum- 
stances ! After long and vexatious de- 
lays, and after a treacherous attempt 
had been made by Floyd to weaken 
the garrison at Fortress Monroe, under 
the guise of strengthening the forts at 
Charleston, the authorities began to 
feel that the situation was critical. 
The president, however, was weak as 
water ; the Cabinet was full of conspir- 
ators; and so resistance was made in 
every conceivable way to prompt and 
effective action. At this moment Gen- 



16 



FORT SUMTEK. 



eral Cass, who will ever be honorably 
mentioned in American histoiy for the 
bold stand he made at this particular 
junctui'e, urged the president to order 
reinforcemeDts to be sent at once, not 
Dnly to Charleston but to other menaced 
points. His advice was not taken, and 
he retii'ed from the Cabinet. 

During the night of December 26, 
BeCi Anderson, with his small gam- 
26» son, moved into Fort Sumter. Of 
his own volition, Andei'son undertook 
the responsibility of abandoning the 
weaker and of occupying the strongei- 
fort As commander of all the forts, 
he had a perfect right to do so. It was 
a difficult task to peifonn, but it was 
done with skill and caution, and with 
complete success. His first care was 
bestowed on the women and children. 
It was given out that they were to be 
removed to Fort Johnson, because he 
wished the helpless ones, with sufficient 
food, to be in a place of safety. The 
stratagem was successful. The t<uspi- 
cions of the people of Charleston were 
disarmed. Anderson's course was ap- 
proved of as ^vise and piiident. Secret 
instructions had been given that the 
women and childien were not to be 
landed at Fort Johnson, but, at a given 
signal, to join the remainder of the gai"- 
rison and enter Fort Sumter. The eve- 
ning t^vilight was just passing away, 
and the full-orbed moon had scarcely 
taken her place as Queen of the Night 
when the evacuation began. At the 
proper time the signal was given, and 
the vessels containing the women and 
children moved away fi-om before Fort 



Johnson, the entiiv 



garrison 



being 



quickly and without any mishap landed 
at Fort Sumter. At eight o'clock the 
same evening, Anderson wrote to the 
adjutant-general, " I have the honor to 
report that I have just completed, by 
the blessing of God, the removal to this 
fort of all my garrison, except the sur- 
geon, four North Carolina officers, and 
seven men." Long, however, before 
this letter arrived, the intelligence had 
passed along the wires ; and while 
dismay, indignation, wrath filled the 
minds of all conspirators, the hearts of 
loyal men everywhere were thrilled 
with delight. Of course Secretaiy 
Floyd was indignant. A telegraphic 
message was sent to Anderson, asking 
him to explain. The reply was prompt 
and to the point. " The report quoted," 
said Anderson, "is correct. I aban- 
doned Fort Moultrie because I was cer- 
tain that, if attacked, my men must 
have been sacrificed, and the command 
of the hai'bor lost. I spiked the guns 
and destroyed the carriages, to keep 
the guns from being turned against us. 
If attacked, the garrison would never 
have surrendered Avithout a fight." 

Excitement now ran high. The con- 
spirators at Charleston and at Washing 
ton were filled with rage. Floyd de- 
clared that " the solemn pledges of the 
government had been violated," and 
demanded permission of the president 
to withdi'aw the garrison from Charles- 
ton Harbor. The president refused, 
and Floyd resigned. Postmaster-Gen- 
eral Holt assumed the duties of the 
War Office, and telegraphed to Ander- 
son without delay that his movement 
in transferring the ganison from Moul- 



EXCITEMENT IN CHARLESTON. 



17 



trie to Sumter was " in every way ail- 
mirable, alike for its humanity and 
patriotism, as for its soldiership." In 
all parts of the loyal North, Anderson's 
conduct was warmly and loudly ap- 
proved ; and five days after the flag 
had been raised over Fort Sumter, the 
Legislature of Nebraska, two thousand 
miles away, greeted him by telegraph 
with a " Happy New Year." Praise 
of Anderson was on every lip; and it is 
not too much to say that no public ser- 
vant ever received more spontaneous 
pi'aise from a gi'atef ul people. 

Anderson's position, from the mo- 
ment he entered Fort Sumter with his lit- 
tle band, was one of extreme peril. The 
brief visit made to him at this period 
by his heroic wife, who brought to him 
his old and faithful servant, Peter Hart, 
forms one of the most agreeable episodes 
in the eai'ly history of the war. The 
people of Charleston became wild -with 
rage when they learned what had hap- 
pened. The fire and smoke which they 
saw arising from the burning mateiial 
in Fort Moultrie, on the moining of 
DeCi the 2 7th, was to them a mysteiy, 
27. which was quickly dispelled by 
the arrival of some workmen fi-om the 
neighborhood of the abandoned fort. 
The truth was out. Anderson was safe 
with his ganison, including even the 
women and children, in Fort Sumter. 
What was to be done? The ciy for 
immediate action was loud and genei'al. 
Some of the more excited of the multi- 
tude wished to be led immediately to 
the attack of Fort Sumter. Governor 
Pickens was at once requested by the 
South Carolina Convention to take pos- 



session of Forts Moultrie and Johnson 
and Castle Pinckney. The order was 
speedily given. Meanwhile the public 
squares of Charleston wei'e filled with 
armed men. An excited populace 
thronged the streets. The Citadel 
Academy, the great military school of 
the State, opening as it did on one of 
the squares, was made the place of ren- 
dezvous. The government arsenal, con- 
taining some seventy thousand stands ^^ 
of arms and a vast amount of military 
stores taken from Massachusetts and 
New York, was seized in the name of 
the State. Within three hours after the 
old banner of the republic had been 
raised over Fort Sumtei', two armed 
steamers, the General Clinch and the 
Nina, with about four hundred men on 
board, left the city for the purpose of 
taking possession of Castle Pinckney and 
Fort Moultrie. One half of these, led by 
Colonel J. J. Pettigrew, made for Castle 
Pinckney. A landing was easily effect- 
ed. The ganison, the commander of 
which fled to Fort Sumter, made but 
little resistance. On entering the fort, 
it was found that it was worthless alike 
for attack or defence. The guns were 
spiked, the carriages were ruined, the 
ammunition removed, and the flag-staff 
laid prostrate. A palmetto flag was 
brought from one of the steamers, and 
Pettigrew unfui-led it over the Castle. 
It was the first secession flaa: which 
waved over a national fortification. The 
remainder of the troops, about two hun- 
dred and twenty-five in number, under 
the command of Colonel Wilmot G. 
DeSaussure, proceeded towards Fort 
Moultrie. Of coiu"se there was no r©. 



18 



PORT SUMTEK. 



sistance. The sentinel, following instrac- 
tions, surrendered the fort at once. Here 
again the palmetto flag was raised ; but 
as the darkness rendered it invisible, 
the ascent of three rockets intimated 
to the people of Charleston that the ex- 
pedition had been a success. Ander- 
son's position was one of peculiar deli- 
cacy. He might have opened fire upon 
the insurgents when they landed on 
Sullivan's Island; and a few shots fi'om 
the guns at Fort Sumter would have 
been sufficient to drive DeSaussure and 
his men out among the sand-hills. But 
his hands were tied. He could not 
open fire without incurring grave re- 
sponsibilities. It was well, as the result 
proved, that he acted as he did. On 
the same day that Fort Moultrie was 
seized, Anderson had the further humil- 
iation to learn that the revenue cutter 
William Aiken, then lying in Charles- 
ton Hai'bor, had been surrendered to 
the insurgents by its faithless command- 
er, N. L. Coste. His subordinate offi- 
cers, behaving like true men, refused to 
follow him, and at once reported them- 
selves for duty at "Washington. This 
was the defection of a naval officer 
who had been bom in the slave-labor 
States. 

On the afternoon of the 27th, Governor 
Pickens sent a message to Anderson, 
requiring him to leave Sumter and re- 
turn to Moultrie. Anderson refused. 
On the day following, he sent his post- 
adjutant to Fort Moultrie to ascertain 
from the commander there by what 
authority he and armed men M-^ere in 
that fort of the United States. The 
answer was, " By the authority of the 



sovereign State of South Carolina, and 
by command of her government." 

Governor Pickens henceforth treated 
Anderson as a public enemy within the 
domain of South Carolina. It was bold- 
ly declared by the Charleston press that 
the "holding of Fort Sumter by United 
States troops was an invasion of South 
Carolina." In a letter written to Adju- 
tant-General Cooper on the 28th, Dec, 
Anderson expressed regret at the 28. 
course the governor had taken. "He 
knows," he said, " how entirely the city 
of Charleston is in my power. I can 
cut his communication off from the sea, 
and thereby prevent his reception of 
supplies, and close the harbor, even at 
night, by destroying the light-houses. 
These things, of course, I would never 
do, unless compelled to do so in self- 
defence." On the same day the South 
Carolina authorities seized the custom- 
house and the post-office. For three 
weary months more, until the close of 
Buchanan's administration, Anderson 
and his little band remained locked up 
in Fort Sumter, not permitted to fire a 
shot, although he knew the insurgents 
were gathering by thousands in Charles- 
ton, and saw daily fortifications rising 
up around him, and other works intend- 
ed for his destruction. So much self- 
denial has rarely been exercised. 

Durinff the interval from the close of 
December, 1860, to the first week of 
April, 1861, the struggle was going on; 
but the fighting was done in Washing- 
ton rather than in Charleston Harbor. 
The secession contagion continued to 
spread; a great defalcation had been 
discovered in the Indian trust fund oi 



SOUTH CAEOLINA COMMISSIONERS. 



1» 



$830,000., and Thompson, secretary of 
the interior, and Floyd, secretary of 
war, were openly charged as accomplices 
in the fraud, if not for personal advan- 
tage, at any rate for the advancement 
of southern interests ; but the most im- 
portait event of that period was the 
arrival in "Washington of the " commis- 
Bioners " from South Carolina, Messrs. 
Uec, Barnwell, Adams, and Orr. On 
28" the 28th of December, 1860, they 
addressed a formal diplomatic note to 
the president, claiming that they were 
authorized and empowered to treat with 
the government of the United States 
for the delivery of the forts, magazines, 
light-houses, and their real estate, vnth 
their appurtenances, in the limits of 
South Carolina; and also for an appor- 
tionment of the public debt, as well as 
for a division of all other property held 
by the government of the United States 
as agent of the confederated States of 
which South Carolina was recently a 
member. In brief, they claimed to act 
as plenipotentiaries having the right to 
negotiate as to all measures and ar- 
rangements proper to be made and 
adopted in the existing relations of the 
parties. They furnished the president 
with a copy of the Ordinance of Seces- 
sion. They loudly complained of Ander- 
son's conduct in transferring his garri- 
son from Moultrie to Sumter — an event, 
they said, which had seriously altered 
the condition of affairs under which 
they came. They urged the president 
to withdraw immediately all the na- 
tional troops from Charleston Harbor, 
as, under present circumstances, they 
were "a standing menace," rendering 



negotiations impossible, and threaten^ 
ing to " bring to a bloody issue ques- 
tions which ought to be settled with 
temperance and judgment." The letter 
was felt to be arrogant and insulting in 
the last degree. The president, in his 
reply, was firm ; but he was cau- Dec. 
tious, perhaps, to a fault. He SO. 
referred them to his Message for a defi- 
nition of his policy, to the instructions 
given to Major Anderson, to the fact 
that the South Carolinians had al- 
ready committed an act of war by seiz- 
ing two forts and by supplanting the 
old flag of the Union. "It is under all 
these circumstances that I am urged to 
immediately withdraw the troops from 
the harbor of Charleston, and am in- 
formed that without this negotiation 
is impossible. This I cannot do; this 
I will not do^ To this the com- 
missioners replied by a letter 
more arrogant and xnofe, insulting than 
the first. It concluded as fol- jan, 
lows : " By your course you have *• 
probably rendered civil war inevitable. 
Be it so. If you choose to force this 
issue upon us, the State of South Caro- 
lina will accept it, and, relying upon 
Him who is the God of Justice as well 
as Lord of Hosts, will endeavor to per- 
form the great duty which lies before 
her bravely and thoroughly." This let- 
ter was returned to the " commission- 
ers," endorsed with these words, " This 
paper, just presented to the president, 
is of such a character that he declines 
to receive it." 

The year 1.S61 opened gloomily on 
the land, and perhaps New Year's Day 
never was so dull. On the 5th of Jan- 



30 



POET SUMTEE. 



uary the "commissioners," crestfallen 
and enraged, left Washington. War, 
it was now felt, was all but inevitable. 
The loyal people of the North, however, 
began to have more faith in the govern- 
ment. Under wiser and more patriotic 
counsellors, the president seemed to 
have gathered courage. It was resolved 
to strengthen the garrisons of the forts 
on the coasts of the slave-labor States, 
and particularly those in the forts of 
Charleston Harbor. With this end in 
view, it was agi-eed to send south the 
steam-corvette Brooklyn, which had 
just arrived at Norfolk after a three 
years cruise. It is said that the secre- 
tary of the navy refused to give the 
order, and that the president yielded. 
Under the influence of General Scott 
and Secretai-y Holt, the president was 
aroused again, and orders were given 
that the Brooklyn should be ready to 
start at a moment's notice. The secret 
was betrayed. Information was re- 
ceived that the Virginians were pre- 
pared to seize any vessel which might 
attempt to leave Norfolk with troops. 
It was reported at the same time that 
the lights of the shore-beacons in 
Charleston Harbor were extinguished, 
and that the channel buoys had been 
removed. The order was, in conse- 
quence, countermanded. There was 
treachery committed by some one. 
General Scott and Secretary Holt con- 
tinued to urge the president. If the 
Brooklyn could not be sent, some other 
means must be adopted to accomplish 
the end in view. The Star of the West, 
Captain John McGowan, a well-known 
merchant steamer, was chartered by the 



government and quickly laden Avith 
supplies. To prevent suspicion, she 
was cleared for New Orleans and Ha- 
vana. At sundown on the 5th jan, 
of January she left her wharf at 5i 
New York, and when well down the 
bay she took on board, under cover of 
the night, four officers and two hundred 
and fifty artillerists and marines, with 
their arms and ammunition. At nine 
o'clock the same evening she crossed 
the bar at Sandy Hook, and proceeded 
to sea. Government purposes were des- 
tined once more to be disturbed, and 
the fates seemed to stand in the way of 
the mission of the Star of the West. 
Intelligence was received from Ander- 
son that he regarded his position as se- 
cure, and that the insurgents had erect- 
ed at the mouth of Chai'leston Harbor 
powerful batteries, which made it un- 
safe for an unarmed vessel to enter. 
In consequence of this intelligence, the 
order for the sailing of the Star of the 
West was countermanded. It was too 
late ; the vessel was well on her voy- 
age. 

Meanwhile every preparation was be- 
ing made by the insurgents for an early 
attack on Fort Sumter. Every able- 
bodied man in Charleston, liable to do 
military duty, was put under arms. 
Fort Moultrie was strengthened. Fort 
Johnson was garrisoned by a company 
of the Charleston Rifles. New batteries 
were hurried forward, commanding the 
ship channel and bearing heavily on 
Fort Sumter. No boat was allowed to 
approach the wharf-head except by per- 
mission. The city was placed under 
military control ; lookout boats scouted 



THE STAR VF THE WEST. 



SI 



the outer harbor at night; the tele- 
graph was placed under the strictest 
surveillance, and Anderson for the first 
time found himself cut off from all 
communication with his government. 
The news that the "commissioners" 
had completely failed in their mission 
had roused the people to the highest 
pitch of furious excitement; and the 
wildest language was used and the 
^vildest schemes for revenge were sug- 
jrested and encouraged. 

On the morning of the 9th of January 
Jau. the Star of the West was seen by 
9. the imprisoQed garrison of Fort 
Sumter, coming over the bar and mak- 
ing her way tow ard the fort. It was a 
tjladsome si^'ht to Anderson and his 
little company ; for now, as we have 
seen. Fort Sumter was completely iso- 
lated. Anderson, however, had no 
means of kno^\^ng whether his appeals 
for supplies and reinforcements had 
reached the government, or whether 
they had been heeded. The appear- 
ance of this vessel inspired hope ; but 
it was hope clouded by despair, for An- 
derson knew well the difficulties which 
lay in her waj^ before she could bring 
him any relief. Having reached the bar 
and found all the lights extinguished, 
the Star of the West extinguished her 
own, and lay there until the morning. 
As the day broke she was sighted by the 
scouting steamer General Clinch, which 
at once burned colored litjhts as sicr- 
nals, and ran for the innei- harbor. 
McGowan ordered all his men below, 
and steered after the little steamer, liop- 
iug that the Star of the West might be 
regarded as a mere merchant vessel. 

196 



It was a vain hope. The authorities at 
Charleston were M^ell informed. The 
name of the vessel was known, noi 
was the object of her visit any secret. 
Thompson, secretary of the interior, a 
man whose character was afterward* 
fully revealed, had telegraphed to one oi 
his friends, " The Star of the West ia 
coming; with reinforcements." It is said 
that Thompson ordered another de- 
spatch to be sent, in these words^ 
"Blow the Star of the West out of the 
water." This despatch was prudently 
■withheld. The General Clinch was 
moving on, about two miles ahead, the 
Star of the West following. When the 
latter was a little short of two miles 
from Fort Moultrie and about the same 
distance from Fort Sumter, a masked 
battery on Mon-is Island, from which a 
palmetto flag was flying, opened fire; 
and a shot came ricochetting across her 
bow. The national flag was flying over 
the Star of the West at the time the 
first shot was fired. Quick as lightning 
McGowan hoisted, in addition, a large 
American ensign. It was no use ; these 
emblems were no longer respected. The 
shot from Mori-is Island fell thick and 
fast. Several balls passed clear over 
the steamer ; one passed between the 
smoke-stack and the walking-beam, 
one struck the ship just abaft the fore- 
rigging, and stove in the planking ; and 
"one," said the captain, "came within 
an ace of carrying a^vay our rudder " 
Some shots were fired from Fort Moul- 
trie, but without producing any serious 
damage. Duiing the few minutes this 
firing lasted, McGowan saw moving out 
fi'om Fort Moultrie two steam-tugs, one 



22 



FOET SUJVTTBE. 



of them with an armed schooner in 
tow. The purpose was unmistakable. 
McGowan perceived that his position 
was one of imminent peril. Hemmed in 
by the forts and about to be overhauled 
by an armed vessel, his own unarmed, 
there was no prospect for him, if he 
persevered in his course, but capture or 
destruction. After seventeen shots had 
been fired at the Star of the West, the 
captain steered the vessel around, put 
to sea, and retm-ned to New York. It 
was only seven days since she had 
cleared from the same harbor. It was 
in some respects an inglorious voyage ; 
yet it caimot be said that the captain or 
his crew were to blame. If there was 
faidt or guilt anywhere, it lay with the 
government. It would have certainly 
been a nobler and more dignified poli- 
cy to send a war vessel to reinforce 
Fort Sumter. Such a course would no 
doubt have been resented by the South, 
and it might have given a different 
shape to the "irrepressible conflict;" 
but it might also have been better for 
all concerned. Anderson's conduct in 
the matter is above all reproach. He 
was ignorant of the character of the 
vessel when he first saw her in the har- 
bor. He was equally ignorant of her 
errand. When the first shot was fired 
he took her to be a relief ship. When 
the old ensign was raised aloft, there 
was no longer any mysteiy. The na- 
tional flag had been dishonored. His 
guns were shotted; his men desired 
him to -open fire; but his instructions 
were peremptory — he had not been at- 
tacked. Anderson's self-restraint and 
long-suffering patience are to be com- 



mended ; but less caution and more 
daring, whatever might have been the 
result othenvise, would not have es- 
tranged from him the sjinpathy of his 
countrymen, or lost him any of his well- 
won laurels. 

Undeniably the firing upon the Star of 
the West was an act of war. It touched 
every principle which was involved in 
the assault made at a later date on Fort 
Sumter. The national flag was wantonly 
insulted. It was so regarded by An- 
derson, who promptly sent a letter un- 
der a flag of truce, borne by Lieutenant 
Hale, asking Governor Pickens whether 
the outrage had been committed under 
his orders. He notified the governor 
that if this act was not disclaimed, he 
would regard it as a cause of war, and 
should not, after a reasonable time was 
allowed for the return of his messen- 
ger, permit any vessel to pass within 
range of his guns. He was anxious to 
avoid, as far as was possible, the shed- 
ding of blood ; but he asked the gov- 
ernor to take note of his decision, for 
the good of all concerned. Governor 
Pickens refused to make any apology. 
It was the act of South Carolina; and 
he assured Anderson that any attempt 
to reinforce Fort Sumter would be stub- 
bornly resisted. He left him to decide 
for himself whether he would carry out 
his threat in regard to intercepting ves- 
sels, and stated that he would regard 
such action as an attempt to "impose 
on the State the conditions of a con- 
quered people." Anderson felt that 
the responsibility was grave ; and, ob- 
taining a promise from the governor 
that his messenger would not be hiu 



SECESSION SPKEADING. 



33 



clered, he sent Lieutenant Talbot to 
Washington, as the bearer of messages 
in which the whole subject was sub- 
mitted to the government. Talbot was 
the first to caiTy north the full tidings 
of the outrage. His report, as was to 
have been expected, created the wildest 
excitement in all the free-labor States. 
Two days after the attack on the Star 
of the West, Governor Pickens sent his 
secretary of state, McGrath, and secre- 
taiy of wai', Jamison, to make a formal 
demand on Major Anderson for the im- 
mediate surrender of Fort Sumter to 
the authorities of South Carolina. An- 
derson's answer was firm and decided. 
" No," said he, " sooner than suffer such 
humiliation, I would fire the masrazine 
and blow fort and garrison in the air." 
The commissioners returned to the gov- 
ernor impressed with the conviction 
that, only starvation or assault could 
reduce the fortress. Preparations for 
attack were, therefore, carried on with 
energy. 

Tlie action of Governor Pickens was 
approved by the State Legislature, 
which learned with pride and pleasure 
of the successful resistance made by the 
troops of the State to the reinforcement 
of Fort Sumter. The newspapers howled 
vrith delight. Said one of them, " The 
expulsion of the Star of the West from 
Charleston Harbor yesterday morning 
Jan. was the opening of the ball of the 
••• revolution." The article referred 
to concluded with these words, "If the 
red seal of blood be still wanting to 
the parchment of our liberties, and 
blood they want, blood they shall have, 
and blood enough to stamp it all in 



red." In this trying position, shut out 
from his friends, without hope of suc- 
cor, and surrounded by these hostile 
elements, we must leave Anderson for 
a space. 

It is not a part of our plan to follow 
out and describe all the minute details 
which occun-ed in the interval between 
the assault on the Star of the West and 
the fatal firing on Fort Sumter. Some 
facts, however, it is impossible to omit 
without disturbing the continuity of 
the narrative. From week to week 
public indignation was waxing fiercer 
in the North, while in the South the 
secession sentiment g-rew stronijer and 
took more practical shape. Before the 
2d day of February, six States pej,, 
of the Union had followed the 2. 
example of South Carolina, having 
passed ordinances of secession and ap- 
pointed delegates to a general conven- 
tion : Mississippi on the 9th of January, 
Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 
11th, Georgia on the 19th, Louisiana 
on the 26th, and Texas on the 1st of 
February. On the 4th of Feb- peb. 
ruary, 1861, the delegates of the ^• 
seceded States met in general Congress 
at Montgomery, Alabama. In the pef), 
course of a few days, a provision- S« 
al government was formed and a Consti- 
tution agi'eed upon, after the adoption 
of which, the Congress proceeded at 
once to the election of a provisional 
president and vice-president. On the 
18th Jefferson Da^^s of Missis- Yeh, 
sippi was inaugui'ated president, ^^' 
and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia 
vice-president of the "Confederate 
States of America." The Confe<leracy 



u 



FOKT SUMTER. 



lost no time in seizing all the forts and 
arsenals in their respective States. The 
South was becoming more and more a 
unit, and, in spite of differences of opin- 
ion here and there, it was evident that 
the great North, realizing its duty and 
becoming conscious of its strength, was 
about to lise iu its might and majesty. 
The debates in Congress- in the early 
weeks of the year were protracted and 
keen; and they were conducted with 
great ability. The atmosphere of Wash- 
ington became too hot for the conspira- 
tors; and they departed in great num- 
bers to fling themselves into the South- 
ein cause. Love of the Union lingered 
Feb, in many hearts. On the 4th of 
*• February, a convention known as 
the Peace Congress or Conference assem- 
bled in Willard's Hotel, Washington. 
In this Congress twenty-one of the States 
w*e represented — fourteen of the free 
and seven of the slave-labor States. 
It was all in vain. In spite of the 
hopes which it created, it resulted in 
complete failure. Such was the state of 
things generally when a new man was 
about to appear on the scene — a man 
who had not hitherto figured greatly in 
the political arena, but who will ever 
be ]-emembered as the saviour of his 
country and one of the world's greatest 
heroes. 

On the 14th of February, Abraham 
Feb, Lincoln of Illinois and Hannibal 
14' Hamlin of Maine were declared 
duly elected president and vice-presi- 
dent of the United States, for four 
years commencing on the 4th of March, 
186L 

Lincoln bade farewell to his friends 



and fellow-citizens in Spi'ingfield on t)ie 
11 th, and set out for Washington, peb. 
His progress Avas one continued *•• 
ovation. Eveiywhere throughout his 
long journey of many hundreds of miles, 
in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, he was gi'eeted with demon- 
strations of the most profound I'espect. 
During the course of his journey, he 
was frequently called upon to address 
the assembled multitudes. His words 
were always well chosen, generally 
hopeful and encouraging, but some- 
times tinged with sadness, as if he felt 
the terrible responsilnlity which rested 
upon his individual shoulders. He was 
studiously noncommittal, yet there was 
a firmness in his utterances which left 
the public in no doubt that he was a 
man of strong will and decided charac- 
ter. He was in Philadelphia on Wash- 
ington's Birthday. In the course ppj,, 
of a short address, speaking of --• 
the principle of liberty embodied in the 
Declaration it Independence, he said, 
"If this country cannot be saved with- 
out giving up this principle, I would 
rather be assassinated on this spot than 
surrender it." At Trenton, while ex- 
pressing himself in favoi- of peace, he 
said, "The man does not live who is 
more in favor of peace than I am — no 
one will do more to preserve it ; but it 
may be necessary to put the foot down 
firmly." The feelings entertained re. 
garding him by the slave-holding oli- 
garchy of the South may best be under- 
stood from the fact that by some of 
them it was resolved that he should 
never reach the national capital alive. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 



25 



The secret oozed out, and the conspii-a- 
tors, for the time being, were foiled. 
At Baltimore, it is now understood, ar- 
rangements were made for the assassi- 
nation of the president elect; and there 
is every reason to believe that but for 
the timely discovery made by Lincoln's 
friends and their subsequent watchful- 
ness, the ])lot might have succeeded. 
As it was, he and his party reached 
Washington in safety. 

Mt)nday, the 4th of March, will long 
Mar. l^e remembered in the national 
*• capital, and, indeed, throughout 
the length and breadth of the republic. 
On that day Abraham Lincoln was in- 
augurated sixteenth president of the 
United States of America. The inau- 
guration ceremonies were performed 
quietly, and the day, contrary to the 
expectations of many, passed off with- 
out disturbance. It was known that a 
conspiracy existed, having for its object 
the capture of the city and the person 
of the president, and the placing in the 
executive chair some one devoted to 
Southern interests ; but General Scott 
had taken ample precautions, and the 
project failed. The inaugural address, 
which was impatiently awaited, gave 
abundant satisfaction to the adherents of 
the Union cause. It was an able and ex- 
haustive document. The president stood 
firm on the Constitution. The union of 
the States he said was perpetual. It was 
older than the Constitution. It pre- 
ceded the Declaration of Independence 
in 1776. It was formed, in fact, by the 
Articles of Association in 1774. It 
was not competent, therefore, for any 
one State or for a niunber of States to | 



retire from the Union at will. He h.eld 
that in view of the Constitution and th< 
laws the Union was not broken. lie 
would take cai'e that the law should be 
executed in all the States. He wouh; 
avoid violence, unless it was forced up- 
on the national authority. He would 
not interfere with slavery in the South. 
In accordance with the trust reposed ii. 
him, he would feel it to be his duty to 
" hold, occupy and possess the pi'operty 
and places belonging to the govei'n 
ment." Addressing his dissatisfied fel- 
low-countrymen, he said, "We are not 
enemies, but friends. We must not be 
enemies. Though j^assion may have 
strained, it must not break our bond? 
of affection. The mystic cords of mem- 
ory, stretching from every battle-field 
and patriot grave to every living heart 
and hearthstone all over this broad land, 
will yet swell the chorus of the L^nion, 
when again touched, as surely they will 
be, by the better angels of our nature." 
These are thoughts that breathe, words 
that burn. There was a man now at 
the helm of the shiji of state. 

Anderson could not long be left un- 
heeded now. The attention of the pres- 
ident and his cabinet was first called to 
the condition of public affairs. Matters 
had come to a wretched pass. The 
treasury was empty, and had to be at- 
tended to. The army and navy were 
found to be cdmpai-atively useless. 
There were but sixteen thousand men 
in all and these were mostly in tne 
West. Sixteen forts had fallen into 
the hands of the Confederates. Of the 
southern forts, f)nly Fortress Monroe, 
Forts Jefferson, Taylor, and Pickens 



26 



iOitr HLiviTjiiv 



remained to the government. Fort 
Sumter, of com-se, was not yet lost; 
but for government use it was not now 
available. 

On the day of inaugiu'ation a letter 
was received from Anderson, of a j-ather 
discouraging kind. He could not see 
how any effective assistance could be 
rendered him by a force of less than 
" twenty thousand good, well-disci]ilined 
men." This letter was laid before the 
president and his cabinet on the follow- 
ing day. The government was not in 
a position to send any such aid — all the 
more that it was wanted at once or not 
at all. It was suggested that Ander- 
son should be advised to make terms 
with the enemy and pi'ovide for his 
own safety and for that of the garrison. 
The president was urged to adopt this 
course, for the sake of peace ; and for a 
time it was the hope and belief of the 
South that this would be liis final 
conclusion. Better counsels pi'evailed. 
Gustavus G. Fox had suggested a feasi- 
ble plan for the relief of Fort Sumter. 
He urged the president to take imme- 
diate action, as any attempt to succor 
Anderson must be made before the 
middle of April. At last the president 
did "put down his foot firmly." Fox 
was sent for ; preparations, in spite of 
some ofiicial hindrances, were hurried 
April forward, and on the 9th April 
*• he sailed with two hundred re- 
cruits in the steamer Baltic, commanded 
by Captain Fletcher. The relief squad- 
ron consisted of the Baltic, the United 
States sloops -of -war Powhatan, Paw- 
nee, and Pocahontas, with the cutter 
Hairiet Lane, the tugs Yankee, Uncle 



Ben, and Fi'eeborn. The order was to 
rendezvous off Charleston. The expe- 
dition might have had better luck if it 
had been sent at an earlier day. As it 
was, some of the vessels came to grief. 
Only the Baltic, the Pawnee, and the 
Harriet Lane succeeded in reaching th« 
place of meeting. 

Events had taken place in Charleston 
Harbor before the arrival of the relief 
ships which had not been calculated upon 
by the government at Washington. As 
soon as it became known that an attempt 
was to be made to sustain Major Ander- 
son and his garrison, all counuunication 
between the people and the fort was at 
once stopped. On the arrival of the Fed- 
eral messenofer, announcing the intelli- 
gence, Beauiegai'd telegraphed to the 
ConfederiTte secretary of war, Leroy P. 
Walker. "An authorized messenger," 
wrote Beauregai'd, " has just informed 
Governor Pickens and myself that provis- 
ions will be sent to Fort Sumter peace- 
ably, or otherwise by force." The sec- 
retary's reply was to the effect that if 
Beauregard had no doubt of the author- 
ized character of the agent, to demand 
the surrender of Fort Sumter, and in 
case of I'efusal to proceed to reduce it. 
" The demand will be made to-morrow 
at twelve o'clock," M^as Beauregard's 
answer. On the 11th of April, Aprji 
about two o'clock in the Jiiter- *•• 
noon, Beauregard sent Colonel James 
Chesnut, Colonel Chisholm, and Captain 
Stephen D. Lee, with a letter to Ander- 
son, demanding the surrender of the 
fort. Anderson was not taken by sur- 
prise. He had been expecting some 
such demand. In his reply to iJeaure- 



PREPARING TO OPEN FIRE. 



27 



gard, which he handed to the aids, he 
said that " his sense of honor and his 
obligations to his government would 
not allo\v him to comply." To the gen- 
tlemen themselves, however, he made 
no secret of the fact that the condition 
of his supplies was such that he could 
only hold out a few days more. These 
latter words were immediately commu- 
nicated by Beauregard to Walker, who 
without delay telegraphed back to 
Beauregard that if Anderson would 
state the time when he would evacuate, 
and if he would agree meanwhile not 
to use his guns against them, unless 
theirs were used against Fort Sumter, 
they would wait, and thus the useless 
effusion of blood would be avoided. 
To this prcposal, which was conveyed 
to him by Roger A. Pryor and the 
three gentl'jmen above named, Ander- 
son agreed, stipulating that he would 
leave tlie fort by noon of the 15th, 
should he not before that time "receive 
contrary iastructions from his govern- 
ment or additional supplies." 

Here \it it be remembered that An- 
derson had no knowledge of Avhat his 
government had been doing for him 
tor some days. That they intended 
to send him assistance and supplies 
he Avas sure; but as the authorities 
at Charleston had prevented his spe- 
cial messenger, Talbot, who had been 
to ^'ashington, from returning to the 
fort, he knew nothing of the mission of 
Fox oi of the fact that a squadron had 
sailed to his assistance. In this respect 
his adversaries had the advantage. Of 
the sailing of the squadron intended to 
' elJ <ve Anderson they were fully aware, 



and its appearance in Charleston waters 
had been awaited with considerable 
anxiety. On the evening of the 11th, 
and even before the aids left with the 
message to Anderson, the Harriet Lane 
and the Pawnee had been sighted by 
scouts outside the harbor, and Beaure- 
e:ard had been notified of the fact. His 
aids were therefore invested with dis- 
cretionary authority. If not satisfied 
with Anderson's reply, they were to act 
as they thought fit. Before leaving the 
fort, and after a few minutes' consulta- 
tion, they addressed a note to Anderson, 
saying, " By authority of Brigadier- 
General Beauregard, commanding the 
provisional forces of the Confederate 
States, we have the honor to notify you 
that he will open the fire of his bat- 
teries on Fort Sumter in an hour from 
this time." This note is dated April 
12,0.20 A.M. They immediately April 
left the fort. Anderson accepted '2. 
the situation. The flag was raised, the 
postern was closed, the sentinels were 
Avithdrawn, and the men were ordered 
not to leave the bomb-proofs until they 
received further instructions. 

It was known in Charleston on the 
evenincr of the 11th that the bombard- 
ment was about to begin. From an 
early hour, therefore, the streets A\^ere 
crowded ; and what with the roll of 
the drum, the marching of armed men^ 
the tramp of horses and the I'umbling 
of wagons, the utmost excitement })i'e- 
vailed. All was still within Fort 
Sumter. The passing minutes of that 
hour were counted one by one. At 
twenty minutes past three o'clock, pre- 
cisely one hour from the receipt of the 



ss 



FORT SUMTER. 



last letter by Andorson, the dull boom- 
ing of a gun Avas heard on Jami's Island, 
and from a signal battery there a shell 
came ■\vhizzina; throuirh the darkness 
and exploded over Fiirt Sumter. It 
y\ as the signal gun. Immediately there- 
liter, from all the batteries around, a 
deadly iire was opened. Full thirty 
heavy guns and mortars opened their 
throats at once. The extent of the en- 
emy's tire greatly surprised the gari'i- 
son. The most destructive Avork was 
being done by a battery on Sullivan's 
I-land, of which formerly they had no 
knowledge. Tiiis battery had been 
masked by brushwood and other mate- 
rials. It was constructed with great 
skill, and heavily mounted, showing sev- 
uteeu mortars throwing ten-inch shells, 
and thirty-three heavy cannons, most 
^f which were columbiads. The firing 
rvas maintained with vigor; and the 
shots from some of those powei-ful guns 
struck the walls of Fort Sumter with a 
"terriHc crash,'' as the defenders said, 
some of the shells bui-sting inside the 
fort. For two houi-s this firing contin- 
ued, Fort Sumter remaining silent as 
the grave. At half-past six the men 
were summoned to breaktast, A\luch 
they ate "leisurely and calmly," as if 
undisturbed by the terrible uprom- 
iU-ound them. 

It was now broad daylight. Break- 
fast over, Andei-son arranged the officere 
and men, about eighty in all, into three 
reliefs. The first was \mder the com- 
mand of Captain Doubleday, the second 
was under Sursreon Crawford, and the 
third under Lieutenant Snyder. The 
^.jsurison labored imder many serious 



disadvantages. They had plenty of 
powder, but few carti'idges. They had 
ho scales for -weighing the powder, and 
only some six needles for sewing cail- 
ridge bags. They Avere also without 
instruments for sighting the guns. The 
first gun Avas fired at seven o'clock in 
the morning, by Captain Doubleday. Il 
Avas folloAved immediately by a genera) 
firing from the fort on all the principal 
attackiuiT batteries. For four hours the 
firing Avas kept up so vigorously by 
Fort Sumter that the enemy for a time 
suspected that it had been reinforced 
during the night. The fire told Avith 
effect on Fort Moultrie, the embrasures 
of Avhich Avere considerably damaged. 
On the battery on Cumming's Point, 
Avhich seemed invulnerable, it had little 
eft'ect, the shot and shell t^lanciuLr hai-m- 
lessly off. 

As the hours rolled on, the filing ol 
the assailants Avas becomin<r more effect- 
ive. Their guns Avere under complete 
control. Every shot told. The Avails 
and parapets of Fort Sumter began to 
grive evidence of their destructive Avork. 
It seemed to be the purpose of the ene- 
my to destroy the barbette guns. ^Vith 
this end in vieAV, they poured their 
heaviest fu-e on the parapet of the fort. 
A large portion of the parapet Avas car- 
ried aAvay; several of the heavy guns 
Avere dismounted or otherAvise disabled, 
and .the garrison Avas thus limited to 
the use of the two loAver tiers of guns, 
Avhich Avere protected by casemates. 
About the same moment it Avas discoA*- 
ered that the barracks Avere on fire. 
It Avas noAA' about noon. Surgeon Craw- 
ford, Avho hud volimteered to ascend 



NO HOPE. 



29 



the parapet for the purpose of making 
observations, and who had succeeded, 
in spite of the tempest of shot and shell 
which raged around him, on returning 
below reported, to the delight of the 
now almost despairing garrison, that 
through the fog and blinding rain he 
saw two vessels, bearing the dear old 
flag. It was part of Fox's relief squad- 
ron. Thj Pawnee, ten guns, the Har- 
riet Lane, five guns, and the transport 
Baltic, were lying outside the bar. 
They could not cross. The buoys had 
been removed, and ships laden with 
stones hiid. been sunk in the channel. 
The vessels dipped their flags V)y way 
of greeting; but Sumter could not re- 
spond. Its ensign was still flying, but 
it was entangled in the halyards, which 
had been cut l^y the enemy's shot. In 
the afternoon the enemy's fire had been 
(Particularly severe; shot came rattling 
into the embrasures ; and severe injuries 
were inflicted by flying splinters of ma- 
sonry. The shells bursting in rapid 
succession against all parts of tlie fort, 
scattered the loosened brick and stone 
in every direction, broke the windows, 
and set fire to the woodwork. The men 
in the fort worked with a will. The 
day, however, had told sadly on their 
strength. Their firing had become less 
rapid. Their cartridges were now well- 
nigh exhausted; and before sunset it 
had been found necessary to abandon all 
the guns but six. When darkness came 
on, Anderson ordered the port-holes to 
be closed. Some of the men were per- 
mitted to rest while others watched. 
So ended the first day of the war. 
The storm, which had lasted all daj-. 



continued throughout the night. The 
firing of the insurgents was maintained 
at intervals, until the morning. Every 
fifteen minutes the little garrison cooped 
up in Fort Sumter heard another shot 
or shell rattling against their shattered 
■walls. It was a weary night for An- 
derson and his men. But there Avas no 
murmur, no complaint. The provisions 
were all but exhausted. In a few hours 
more the last parcel of rice would be 
cooked, and nothing would be left for 
the garrison but salt pork. The relief 
ships were outside the bar ; but the 
storm made it impossible for them to 
complete their mission of mercy. 

The sun of Saturday morning rofe in 
splendor. The storm had ceased Aprij 
before the early dawn. The bora- l^t 
bardment was resumed with tremen- 
dous energy. It seemed to be the pur- 
pose of the assailants to force matters 
to an early conclusion. Red-hot shot 
was now freely used. On Friday the 
buildings in the fort had Ijeen on fire 
four times. Four times the flames had 
been extinguished. Now the barj'acks 
and the oflficers' quarters were again on 
fire. The situation of Anderson had 
become desperate. Yet he clung to the 
skirts of hope with undying tenacity. 
There Avas provision to last for three 
days, and for three days more he was 
anxious to hold out. With the excep- 
tion of the magazine, the buildings 
were left to their fate. No attempt 
was made to extinguish the flames. The 
red-hot shot which the enemy were 
pouring in upon them made such efforts 
useless. The conflagration spread rap- 
idly. It was feared that the magazine 



107 



FORT SUMTER. 



might explode, and its doors were 
locked. The main gate took fire and 
was soon destroyed ; and the sally-port 
was now open to the besiegers. The 
heat had become intolerable ; and the 
clouds of smoke were suffocating. The 
crashing of the shot, the bursting of 
the shells, the falling of walls, and the 
roaring of the flames were terrific, and 
made, says an eye-witness, "a pande- 
monium of the fort." The garrison 
was now reduced to its last three cart- 
ridges. Still no thought of surrender. 
The flag still waved. Eight times its 
staff had been hit by the enemy's shot, 
without serious injuiy. At twenty min- 
utes before one o'clock it was hit again, 
and this time with success. "The flag 
is down — it has been shot away," was 
the cry, when Lieutenant Hall rushed 
out and snatched it from the glowing 
embers, before it could take fire. Car- 
ried immediately by Lieutenant Snyder 
to the ramparts, he handed it to Sergeant 
Hart, who, springing upon the sand- 
bags, and with the assistance of one 
Lyman, a mason from Baltimore, plant- 
ed again the broken staff, and left the 
soiled banner flying proudly and defi- 
antly, in spite of the shot and shell 
which fell like hail around. 

Soon after the flag had fallen, and 
towards the close of the day, a man 
presented himself at one of the embra- 
sures of the fort, with a white handker- 
chief tied to the point of his sword. Pri- 
vate Thompson of the fort was the first 
to whom he addressed himself. " I am 
General "Wigfall," he said, "and I want 
to see Major Anderson. For God's 
sake," he added, as Thompson left him 



to find his commander, " let me in. I 
can't stand it out here in the firing." 
On being admitted, he met Captain J. 
G. Foster, Lieutenant J. C. Davis, Sur- 
geon J. W. Crawford, and Lieutenant 
B. K. Meade. " I am General Wigfall," 
he repeated, under great excitement; 
" I come from General Beauregard, who 
wants to stop this bloodshed. You are 
on fire, and your flag is down; let us 
stop this firing." "Our flag is not 
down," was the reply. " It is yet flying 
from the ramparts." 'Well, I want to 
stop this," he said ; and holding out his 
sword and handkerchief to one of the 
officers, he added, " will you hoist this?" 
"No, sir," was the answer. "Will any 
of you hold this out of the embrasure?" 
he asked. Receiving no reply, he asked, 
" May I hold it, then ? " "If you wish." 
Springing into the embrasure, he waved 
the white flag several times. The firing 
did not abate ; and Wigfall, frightened 
out of his wits by a shot which struck 
near him, abandoned his position. The 
handkerchief was taken up and waved 
out of the port-hole by Corporal Bring- 
hurst ; but he, too, finding that no heed 
was paid to it, sprang from the peril- 
ous ]:03t. Addressing Lieutenant Davis, 
Wigfall said, "If you will show a 
white flag from your ramparts, they 
will cease firing." "It shall be done," 
said Davis, " if your object is to hold a 
conference with Major Anderson." At 
this point Anderson appeared. " I 
come from General Beauregard, who 
wishes to stop this, sir." "Well, sir,'' 
said Anderson, eyeing Wigfall keenly. 
" You have defended your flag nobly, 
sir," continued Wigfall. "You have 



FALL OF SUMTER. 



3] 



done all that can be done, sir. Your 
fort is on fire. Let us stop this. On 
what terms will 3^ou evacuate the fort, 
sir?" " My terms arc already known 
to General Beauregi>,rd," replied the 
Major. "Instead oi noon on the 15th, 
[ will go now." '■ I understand you to 
Bay," said Wigf*i!i, ''that you will evac- 
uate the fort 'jow, sir, xipon the terms 
proposed the o*her day." "Yes, sir, 
on thofe terras only." Then said Wig- 
fall, " I understand the fort is to be 
ours." "Yes, sir," said Anderson, "on 
those conditions only." "Very well," 
said Wigfall, " I will return to General 
Beaurescard. " Believins: that Wiojfall 
Was telling the truth, Anderson caused 
a white flag to be hoisted over the fort. 
The Major was not undeceived until a 
little before two o'clock, when Colonels 
Chesnut, Pryor, Miles, and Lee arrived 
at Fort Sumter, with instructions from 
their chief to ascertain the meaning of 
the white flag. When they stated the ob- 
ject of their mission, Anderson observed 
that there was somethinfr wroner. There 
was confusion on both sides. Wigfall, 
it appeared, had not seen Beauregard 
in two days. He had no instructions 
from him. He had acted on his own 
responsibility. Having been on Morris 
Island, he had, by false misrepresenta- 
tions, obtained leave from the command- 
er there, to visit the beleaguered fort. 
Anderson, fired wdth indignation, at 
the deception played upon him, threat- 
ened to haul down the white flag;. 
"That wliite flag," he said, "shall come 
down immediately." He was entreated, 
however, to leave matters as they were, 
to put in writing what Wigfall had 



said, and to wait till they saw Beaure 
gard. This he consented to do; and 
the firing ceased. Several deputations 
waited upon Andei-son during the 
course of the afternoon, to obtain, if 
possible, better terms. He was not to 
be moved. At last, between seven and 
eight o'clock, Major D. R. Jones, ac- 
companied by Colonels Miles and Pryor 
and Captain Hartstene, ai'rived at the 
fort and announced that Beauregard 
had accepted Anderson's terms. The 
garrison was to be allowed to dejiart, 
with company arms and property, -wdth 
all private property, and with the privi- 
lege of saluting and retaining their flag. 
Thus ended the bombardment of Fort 
Sumter. 

One of the most extraordinary cir- 
cumstances connected with this remark- 
able siege was that not a single man had 
lost his life either at Fort Sumter or in 
the ranks of the Confederates. It de- 
serves to be remembered, too, that the 
fort had been evacuated, not surren- 
dered. Anderson retained the flag, and 
exactly four years afterwards, as Major- 
General in the armies of the United 
States, raised the same old tattered flag 
over tlie fortress, then a heap of ruins. 

On Sunday morning, the Isabel came 
down from Charleston and an- April 
chored near Fort Sumter. The *■*• 
steamer Clinch lay alongside the wharf, 
to convey Anderson and his men to the 
larger vessel. An unfortunate circum- 
stance occurred at tlie last moment. 
The baggage had all been put on bo.ard 
the Clinch. Of the soldiers who were 
.still inside the fort, a number were de- 
tailed to salute the flag of the United 



33 



BULL ETTir. 



States. At the firing of the fifteenth 
gun, a premature explosion took place, 
killing one man, seriously wounding an- 
other, and inflicting upon other two inju- 
ries moj'e or less dangerous. They were 
the first casualties of any moment from 



the beginning of the conflict. On Mon- 
day Anderson and his men were trans- 
ferred to the Baltic and sailed for jvprji 
New York, where they were des- *5. 
tined to receive the plaudits and the hon 
ors of a delighted and grateful people 



CHAPTER III. 



i'he Fall of Fort Sumter the First Link in a Chain of Great Events. — War now a Necessity. — The Gnef and Rage 
of the North, — Lincoln's Proclamation. — Congress Summoned to Meet. — Secession Sentiments finding Expres- 
sion. — The probable Theatre of War. — Conspiracy to Seize Washington. — Confederate Troops on the March. — 
Manassas Junction. — Arlington Heights. — What the President could see from the White House. — Military 
Movements. — Delay. — The Impatience of the People of the North. — "On to Richmond." — Genei'al Irwin 
McDowell. — The two Armies. — General Joseph E. Johnston. — General Beauregard. — CentrevUle. — The On- 
ward Movement. — Tyler's Mistake. — McDowell's Delay. — The Three Months' Term of Service Expiring. — 
The Battle Ground. — The Relative Strength of the two Armies. — McDowell's Plan.— Sunday Morning. — The 
Battle Begun. — The Fii-st Hour of the Fight. — The Confederates Driven Back. — McDowell's Mistake. — " Stone- 
wall" Jackson. — The Tide of Battle Turned. — Noon. — The Second Phase of the Battle. — The Confederate 
Position. — The Rising Ground near the Henry House. — Terrific Struggle for the Plateau. — Ellsworth's 
Zouaves. — The Seventy-Ninth and Sixty-Ninth Regiments. — Death of Colonel Cameron. — The Critical Mo- 
ment. — Arrival of Kirby Smith. — Panic among the National Trooi3.s. — The Battle Lost. — A Rout. — Terrible 
Losses. — Reflections. — The 'Victory Complete, but the Battle not Decisive. — Effects of the Battle North and 
South.— The President's Call for Half a Million of Men. — McDowell Superseded by McClellan. 



1861. 



It is useless now to discuss the ques- 
tion whether Fort Sumter could 
or could not have been reinfoi'ced. 
Our experience to-day is very different 
to what it was when the relief ships 
anchored in the outer harbor; and the 
presumption is that if the attempt at 
reinforcement had to be made now, it 
would be made with more daring and 
perhaps with complete success. 

As it was, the fall of Fort Sumter 
constituted the first link in a chain of 
great events which culminated in one 
i)f the most gigantic revolutions in mod- 
*>i'n times. Its immediate effect was to 



make an end of all possibility of com- 
promise. War was now a necessity. 
There was but one arbiter possible ; 
and that was the sword. In the South 
the intelligence was received with a 
wild yell of delight. In the North, the 
news produced generally a feeling of 
sadness. Momentarily there was si- 
lence — not the silence of despair, but 
that silence which comes from surpri.se, 
from vexation, from an overburdened 
heart. Soon, however, the strong man 
recovei'ed himself ; and from the con- 
fines of the British provinces to the 
waters of the broad Ohio there arose 



SECESSION SPREADING. 



33 



that hearty cheer — a cheer which can 
only come from Anglo-Saxon throats 
and from men devoted to trath, to riglit, 
to liberty — a cheer deep-toned and firm, 
full of hope and full of confidence. 
Hencefoi'th the division was complete. 
Minor differences among the population 
on either side were overlooked ; and 
the waters of the Ohio rolled between 
two powerful confederations, united and 
prepared for battle. 

On Sunday, the 14th day of April, 
April tli6 garrison of Fort Sumter low- 

'i- ered their flag and marched out 
of the work. On the day following, 
April President Lincoln issued a pro- 

'5' clamatiou calling for seventy-five 
thousand men to serve for three months. 
At the same time, in consideration of 
the gravit}' of the situation, he sum- 
moned an extra session of Congress — 
senators and representatives being in- 
structed " to assemble at their respect- 
ive chambers in Washington City, at 
noon on Thursday, the 4th day of July 
next ensuing, then and there to con- 
sider and determine such measures, as 
in their wisdom the public safety might 
seem to demand." Tlie authorities at 
Moutgomeiy were equally active. A 
fall was made fos thirty-five thousand 
.'tdditional troops ; and the call was re- 
sponded to Avith alaci-ity and enthusi- 
asm. Up until the date of the bora- 
Itardment of Fort Sumter, the Southern 
Confederac}'- consisted only of the seven 
cotton St.<ites. The other eight slave 
States— Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, 
North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Missouri nnd Arkansas, embracing the 
'-argi'r lialf of the population of the 



South, had stood aloof from the seces- 
sion movement. Their sympathies were 
illy concealed ; but they had resolved 
not to declare themselves until circum- 
stances rendered a decision necessary. 
The proclamation of President Lincoln 
left them no choice. Being still in the 
Union, these several States were called 
upon to furnish their proportion of 
troops. From almost all of them came 
replies of the most defiant kind. Mary- 
land and Delaware were less pronounced 
than some of the others. Secession went 
on apace. Virginia openly joined the 
Confederacy on the 17th of April, two 
days after the proclamation ; she was 
followed by Arkansas on the 6th of 
May; by North Carolina on May the 
20th ; and by Tennessee on the 8th of 
June. Li the remaining slave States — 
Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Mis- 
souri — sentiment was divided; and al- 
though the contest was protracted and 
keen, it was found possible to retain them 
in the Union. The cause of the South 
was immensely strengthened by the ad- 
hesion of the above-mentioned States; 
and Virginia was justly regarded as a 
great acquisition. As soon as that State 
withdrew from the Union, Richmond 
was made the head-quarters of the 
Confederate government. In the loyal 
States of the North the proclamation 
of President Lincoln was hailed with 
rapturous enthusiasm ; from the pulpit, 
from the platform, and through the press 
burning words went forth to the people ; 
and, Avithin a few days, the militia of 
the different States were out in force, 
and large bodies nf men were converg- 
ing towards the national capital. 



34 



BULL KUN. 



It soon 'became manifest that Virginia 
in the east, and the border States, Ken- 
tucky and Missouri in the west, would 
be the principal theatre of the war. 
Towards those States a general move- 
ment was made by the forces of both 
North and South. From the moment 
that Virginia joined the Southern Con- 
federacy, and that Kichmond became the 
rival capital, it was seen and felt that 
the war struggle in the first instance at 
least, would be limited to a compara- 
tively narrow area. The fall of Fort 
Sumter inspired the South with, per- 
haps, a little too much confidence, " No 
man," said Walker, the Confederate war 
secretary, " can foretell the events of the 
war now inaugurated ; but this, I will 
venture to predict that the Confederate 
flag will, before the 1 st of May, float over 
the dome of the capitol at Washing- 
ton." AValker was not ignorant of the 
fact that a conspiracy existed having 
for its object the capture of Washing- 
ton, the seizure of the government ofii- 
cers, and the inauguration of a provis- 
ional government, in the interests of 
the South. Of the existence of some 
such conspiracy there can be no doubt. 
Southern men, supposed to be in the 
secret, have since confessed that if 
Washington could not be held, after it 
fell into their hands, the intention was 
to fire it, destroy the national archives 
and leave the city a mass of I'uins. 
"If Maryland secedes," said Alexander 
H. Stephens, " the District of Columbia 
falls to her by reversionary right, as 
Sumter fell to South Carolina." The 
designs of the Confederates on Wash- 
ington while they determined the move- 



ment of Southern forces, gave zeal 
and energy to the North. To protect 
Washington became the great primary 
object of the North. Manassas Junc- 
tion, a point on the railroad between 
Washington and Richmond, where a 
branch comes in from the Shenandoah 
Valley, was singled out as the rendez- 
v^ous for the South ; and thither their 
troops were hurried forward with all 
possible rapidity. Manassas Junction 
is only thirty miles from Washington ; 
and it was doubtless selected, because 
it threatened Washington, rather than 
because it might cover Richmond. It 
was a daring movement on the part of 
the South. If they were able to make 
their position good at Manassas, their 
next move would have been to occupy 
Arlington Heights, which overlook and 
command the national capital. Arling- 
ton Heights secured, it was not unnatu- 
ral for them to conclude that Washing- 
ton might be in their hands, before the. 
4th of July, wlien Congress was sum- 
moned to meet. It was a splendid 
vision — it can hardly be called a 
dream; had it been realized, the Civil 
War, if not prematurely brought to a 
close, would certainly have rolled on in 
other channels, and the condition of the 
United States to-day would have been 
different. 

While the South was b asy, the North 
was not idle. After not a little difii- 
culty and some bloodshed, the loyal 
forces found themselves in considerable 
strength in Washington. Maryland had 
foolishly interfered with the passage of 
the loyal troops through her territory. 
It was a bad blunder : but force and 



"ON" TO RICHMOND." 



33 



persuasion ultimately prevailed, and 
the right of way was resumed, not 
again to be called in question. Towards 
the end of May, a large army, under 
General Scott, was assembled in and 
around the capital. Notwithstanding 
all that had happened, Lincoln was ex- 
tremely unwilling to invade the South. 
Delay, however, had been perilous in 
the extreme. From the window of his 
chamber in the White House, the pres- 
ident could see, on the other side of the 
Fotomac, the waving folds of the South- 
ern flag ; and with the aid of his field- 
glass, he might observe the Confederate 
engineers at work. By night their 
camp-fires lit up with a lurid light the 
southern sky. A forward movement 
was resolved upon. On the 23d of May, 
5Iay fi strong column, under the com- 
23. mand of General McDowell, was 
thrown across the Potomac, and Ar-' 
lington Heights and the town of Alex- 
andria were occupied. Before the end 
of the month. General Butler, with a 
body of twelve thousand men, held pos- 
session of Forti-ess Monroe; General 
Pattei'son, with another column, was 
posted near Harper's Ferry ; while Gen- 
eral G. B. McClellan, with another pow- 
erful body, had crossed the Ohio River 
and taken a strong position in Western 
Virginia. The main body of the Con- 
federates was stationed at Manassas 
Junction, and was under the command 
of General Beauregard. General Ma- 
gi'uder held General Butler in check on 
the Peninsula. General J. E. Johnston 
confronted Patterson in the valley of 
the Shenandoah. Another strong force 
waa posted in the high lands of West 



Virginia, prepared to meet any aggres- 
sive movement on the part of the Union 
soldiers. 

Such was the state of affairs in 
June and the early days of July, 1861. 
McClellan's West Virginia campaign — 
including the battle at Philippi, June 
3d, the later action at Rich Mountain, 
July 11th, and the subsequent encoun- 
ters at Carrack's Ford and at Beverly — 
all-important as they weie, must be re- 
garded as forming part of the prelude 
to the first great battle which was soon 
to be fought. The same may be said of 
General Butler's less successful effort 
at Big Bethel, June 10th. Patterson 
was still idly confronting Johnston in 
the Shenandoah Valley. 

Public impatience, at length, reached 
a climax. The new regiments were 
coming in slowly ; and the term for 
which the three months' troops had 
been called out would expire about 
the end of July. The people felt that 
if something was not done at once, the 
Confederates, having opposed to them 
only raw and undisciplined recruits, 
would have all things their own way. 
The soldiers themselves were disgusted 
with their life of inaction. The cry 
became general, "On to Richmond"; 
and it was echoed as loudly by the men 
in the field as by the public. 

Arrangements had been made to 
make a forward movement on the 8th 
day of July ; but it was deemed unsafe 
to break up the camp before the 15th. 
General Scott, the commander-in-chief, 
in consequence of age and infirmity, 
did not feel himself equal to the task of 
taking command in the field. For this 



36 



BULL KUN. 



highly responsible position, he select- 
ed Brigadier-General Irwin McDowell. 
McDowell was a native of Ohio, a 
graduate of West Point ; he had seen 
service in Mexico under General Wool, 
and had acquired the reputation of be- 
ing an excellent soldier. He had al- 
ready been placed at the head of the 
Union forces in Virginia, and as we 
have seen had made himself master 
of Arlington Heights, where were his 
head-quai'ters. 

The forces on the one side a:.d on 
the other were disposed as follows. 
The main body of the Northern army, 
under McDowell, numbering about for- 
ty-five thousand men, lay in front of 
Washington, its back upon the Poto- 
mac, and extended from Alexandria to 
the Chain Bridge. At Martinsburg, 
toward the northwest, and beyond the 
Blue Ridge, with its back also on the 
Potomac, there was the army of General 
Patterson, numl^ering some eighteen 
thousand men. The position was strong. 
The three bridges which span the Poto- 
mac at Washington City were well 
guarded by batteries and earthworks. 
The fortifications on Arlington Heights 
covered all the positions which com- 
manded Washington and Geoi-getown. 
The Confederate forces, numbei'ingsome 
twenty thousand, and under the com- 
mand of Beauregard, already familiar 
to the reader as the commander-in-chief 
in Charleston Harlior, were strongly 
posted at Manassas Junction — a place 
of great natui'al sti'ength, and made al- 
most impregnable by the Confederate 
engineers. Manassas is situated about 
half-way between the eastern spur of 



the Blue Ridge and the Potomac below 
Alexandria ; and it had the advantage 
of being connected by railroad with 
Richmond and the valley of the Shenan- 
doah. Regarding Manassas as their 
centre, the right swung out and rested on 
the Potomac, below Alexandi'ia, hold- 
ing the forts which blockaded the rivei'. 
Their left consisting of some eight 
thousand men under Joseph E. John- 
ston, lay at Winchester, confronting the 
Federal army under Patterson. Such 
were the relative positions of the rival 
armies on the eve of the battle of Bull 
Run, or as the Southerners prefer to 
name it, the battle of Manassas. In 
point of numerical strength, the advan- 
tage most certainly lay with the North ; 
but the South had chosen a splendid 
position and made admirable use of its 
natural advantages. 

On the 15th of July McDowell re- 
ceived instructions to advance and juiy 
attack the Confederate position *5. 
at Manassas Junction. It deserves to 
be remarked here that Patterson, who, 
as we have seen, was stationed at Mar- 
tinsburg, received strict orders not to 
abandon his position, but to hold the 
Confederates imder Johnston in his grip, 
and to prevent them by every possible 
means from coming to the aid of Beau- 
regai'd at Manassas. This was part 
of the battle-plan ; and although, aw 
we shall see presently, it led to dif 
astrous results, it was at once well 
conceived and well-intended. On th« 
16th the forward movement be- juij 
gan. Leaving some fifteen thou- '6. 
sand men to guard the seat of govei'n- 
ment, McDowell, at the head of some 



TYLER'S MISTAKE. 



3"? 



thirty thousand men, arranged in four 
divisions, and commanded respectively 
by Brigadier-General Taylor, Colonels 
Hunter, Heintzelman and Miles, ad- 
vanced towards Fairfax Court House. 
This place was about ten miles distant 
and was known to be in the possession 
of the Confederate forces. The army 
moved in four columns — Tyler with 
the right wing taking the Georgetown 
road ; Hunter with the centre taking 
the Leesburg and Centreville road ; 
Heintzelman with one portion of the 
left taking the Little River turnpike, 
and Miles with the remaining portion 
of the left proceeding along the old 
Bi'addock road, which, as it passes 
through Fairfax Court House and Cen- 
treville, becomes the Warrenton turn- 
pike. The movement was made in good 
order, and with complete success. It 
was a success, however, coupled with 
disappointment ; for at Fairfax Court 
House, where they expected to find the 
enemy in strength and ready to offer 
battle, they found on./ a deserted camp 
and an almost ruined village. The 
Confedei'ates, hearing of their approach, 
had retired hastily but in good order 
through Centreville to Bull Run, a 
stream flowing in front of their position 
at Manassas Junction. The national 
forces were naturally enough elated with 
easy victory. Some little excesses were 
indulged in ; but they were promptly 
rebuked and they were not repeated. 

On hearing that the enemy had evac- 
nated Centreville, McDowell's first in- 
tention was to make a vigorous demon- 
Btration on their front with a view of 
turning their right. On a closer exam- 

198 



ination of the situation, he saw that 
this course was beset with some peril. 
He deemed it expedient, therefore, to 
change his plan, and resolved to turn, 
if possible, the Confederate left, and 
seize the railroad in their rear. While 
thus engaged, McDowell's plans were 
well-nigh frustrated by the rash enthu- 
siasm of one of his subordinates. About 
noon of the 18th, General Tyler, july 
believing that he could, without l^- 
much difficulty, march directly on Man- 
assas, moved down from Centreville 
towards Blackburn's Ford. He took 
with him Richardson's Brigade, a squad- 
ron of cavalry and Ayres' battery, 
Sherman's brigade being held in re- 
serve. Beauregard, who had been well 
advised of all that was taking place, 
was there in position and ready to re- 
ceive him. The ground was thickly 
wooded ; and the opposing forces were 
concealed from each other's view. Open- 
ing an artillery fire on the forest in 
front, Tyler soon perceived the glitter- 
ing points of the bayonets of the ene- 
my ; and a rattling discharge of artillery 
and musketry taught him the danger of 
his position. The affair was brief ; but 
it was bloody. In vain Tyler attempted 
to dislodge the enemy. In vain he push- 
ed forward his regiments. In vain he 
brought up Sherman's brigade. After 
an hour's ineffectual efforts he was com- 
pelled to retire. The skirmish at Black- 
burn's Ford, called by the Confederates 
the battle of Bull Run, was justly 
claimed by them as a victory. The 
Nationals lost about one hundred men : 
the Confederate loss was about twenty. 
The losses, it is true, were not great; 



«8 



BTTLL RUN. 



but the lesson was emphatic. It nat- 
urally enough emboldened the South; 
while it taught the military politicians 
and enthusiasts of the North that the 
putting down of the rebellion was not 
to be a mere holiday exercise. 

McDowell felt the necessity for im- 
mediate and vio-orous action. The situ- 
ation had become critical. Every hour 
was increasingly pi'ecious. In a few 
days more, he knew he would lose the 
flower of his army. The three months' 
term of service for which the first call 
of volunteers was made, had all but ex- 
pired. In his own report the General 
says, " In the next few days, day by 
day, I shall have lost ten thousand of 
the best armed, drilled, officered and 
disciplined troops in the army." The 
Confederate army meanwhile was stead- 
ily increasing in numbers. Adhering 
to his plan to turn the Confederate 
left, he concentrated his forces at and 
around Centrevdle, and made instant 
preparations for an attack. In addition 
to a force of five thousand men within 
call, he had around him and ready for 
immediate action some twenty-eight or 
thirty thousand men, Avith forty-nine 
guns. On the lOtli a reconnoissance 
July ^^^ made ; and it was intended 
19« to make tlie attack on the follow- 
ing day. His supplies, however, came 
late ; and another day was lost. The 
July 20th was Saturday. On the eve- 
20. ning of that day McDowell's ar- 
my began to melt away. The term of 
service of the Fourth Pennsylvania and 
Varian's Batteiy of the New York 
Eighth having expii'ed, those troops 
could not be induced to remain; and 



the historian must regretfully chronic] 
the fact that on the following morning 
they "moved to the rear to the sound 
of the enemy's cannon." 

At this stage it is necessary for the 
reader to form something like a clear 
and accurate conception of the ground 
on which the impending conflict was to 
take place. Bull Run, it is to be re- 
membered, flows from the northwest to 
the southeast. Dm-ing a part of its 
course, it is equidistant about three 
miles from Centreville and Manassas 
Junction, the head-quarters respectively 
of the Union and Confederate armies. 
There are three roads running out of 
Centreville, which cross the stream at 
different points. There is the Warren- 
ton tui'npike which crosses by the Stone 
Bridge. There is another road which 
crosses at Blackburn's Foi-d. There is 
a third road further to the south, which 
crosses at Union Mills Ford. These 
are the three principal fords; and in 
the order in which we have named 
them, they mark consecutively the Con- 
federate left, centre and right. In ad- 
dition to these are Sudley's Spring 
Ford about two miles to the northeast 
of the Stone Bridge, Red Hill Foi'd, 
between the Stone Bridge and Sudley's 
Spring, and McLean's Ford, between 
Blackburn's and Union Mills. Cub 
Run, a branch of Bull Run, and flow- 
ing from north to south, is another 
feature of the landscape which deserves 
to be noted. Along the line of Bull 
Run, over a distance of eight miles, the 
Confederates were posted as follows, 
There were six brigades — Ewell's ai 
Union Mills Ford; Jones' at McLean'^ 



READY FOR BATTLE. 



39 



Ford ; Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford ; 
Bonham's at Mitchell's Ford; Cocke's 
at Ball's Ford ; and Evans' at the Stone 
Bridge. The brigades of Holmes and 
Early were held in reserve in the rear 
of the right, as were those of Jackson 
and Bee on the left. The total strength 
of the Confederate army was about 
twenty-two thousand men. In numeri- 
cal strength, it was inferior to the army 
under McDowell ; but in the strength 
of their position and their thorough 
knowledge of the ground the Confede- 
rates had immeasurably the advantage. 
We have seen already that Patterson 
was stationed in the valley of the Shen- 
andoah, and that it was his special busi- 
ness to hold Johnston at Winchester 
and prevent him from joining Beaure- 
gard at Manassas. When McDowell 
advanced to Fairfax Court House on 
the 17th, information of the fact was 
conveyed to the Confederate War De- 
partment ; and Johnston was immediate- 
ly telegraphed to join the army of the 
Potomac -^Nnth all his forces. The de- 
spatch was received on the 18th in the 
morning ; and by noon of the 20th, hav- 
ing eluded Pattei'son, Johnston reached 
Manassas Junction, with six thousand 
men. He had marched unmolested 
through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont ; and 
thence by railroad he hurried forward 
his infantry to Manassas, leaving the 
cavali-y and artillery to pursue their 
journey as before. The arrival of John- 
ston was an immense gain to the Con- 
federates. Being senior officer, he im- 
mediately took command of the aiToy, 
without interfering in the least, how- 
ever, with Beauregard's plans. The 



Confederates were now as eager to join 
battle as were the Unionists, because 
they feared that unless they struck at 
once, Patterson, discovering that John- 
ston had outgeneralled him and made 
good his escape, would hurry forward 
and reinforce McDowell. It was a 
groundless fear, as the residt proved ; 
l:)ut it was surely most natural in the 
circumstances. 

McDowell's plan, as Ave have seen, 
was to tui'n the Confederate left, drive 
them from the Stone Bridge and from 
the Warrenton turnpike, and so make 
himself master of the Manassas Grap 
railroad in their rear. By this means, he 
hoped to prevent the junction of the 
forces of Johnston and Beauregard. 
He did not know that through the 
blundering of Patterson the junction 
had already been effected. To can-y 
out his plans, Tyler was instructed to 
move along the Warrenton turnpike 
and open fire on the Confederate left 
at Stone Bridge. Hunter and Heintzel- 
man were to follow him for a certain 
distance, then to make a detour north- 
ward, crossing Bull Run near Sudley's 
Spring, and fall upon the flank and rear 
of the Confederates, when already under 
fire from Tyler's men. Miles with Rich- 
ardson's brigade attached, was to I'emain 
at Centreville and guard the position. 
The movement was to commence at 
half-past two o'clock on the morning of 
Sunday, the 21st. By midnight every- 
thing was in readiness. The night had 
been more than oi'dinarily beautiful. 
The surrounding country was in al] 
the glory of midsummer. Innumerable 
camp-fires shed a strange light on the 



»0 



BULL RUN. 



dense foliage of the neighboring forests. 
The air was fresh, and not a breath 
rustled the lightest leaf. The moon 
was full ; and from the blue vault of 
the cloudless heavens it diffused over 
the scene below a soft, mellow light. 
As night wore into early morn, and the 
summer sun began to gild tlie summits 
of the distant hills, Natuiv, beautiful in 
her brightest robes, seemed all-uncon- 
scious of the terrific straggle which was 
to disturb the stillness of that Sabbath 
day. 

The onward march of the three divis- 
ions from Centi-eville, was, as we have 
seen, to begin at half-past two o'clock 
on Sunday morning. It was calculated 
by McDo^vell that, if his orders were 
faithfully carried out, Tyler woidd 
reach the Stone Bridge about four, that 
Hunter and Heintzelman having accom- 
plished their semicii'cular detour, would 
be at the appointed spot about six, and 
that when Tyler had fairly engaged 
the attention of the enemy in front, the 
other two divisions should unexjDectedly 
make a vigorous attack on his flank and 
rear. That demon of delay ■which had 
prevented him reaching Centreville un- 
til the 18th, a day later than he had 
intended, and \vhich hindered him from 
offering battle on the 2()th, was again 
fatal to McDowell's plans. It was six 
or a little later ^\■hen T3-ler reached 
the Stone Bridge; and it was nearly 
four hours later, tbe hot July sun be- 
ing already high in the heavens, when 
Hunter and Heintzelman arrived at 
their destination. McDowell, who was 
ill, had followed in a carriage; ]»ut im- 
patient of the ruinous delay, he mounted 



his horse, and, followed by a few at- 
tendants, M^as the first on the battle 
ground. Before the battle began, he 
saw that his plans had been frustrated. 
The discharge of a shell from a thirty- 
pounder Pairott gun, which fell among 
a band of Confederates, seen in a jniy 
meadow below Bull Run, and 21. 
scattered their ranks, was the signal foi- 
battle. Although other shells were 
fired in quick succession, the Confede- 
rates were slow to reply. McDowell 
dreaded that an attack was contem- 
plated on his left, further down the 
stream. He therefore held in reserve 
one of Heintzelman's brigades (How- 
ard's), in case, as he said, "he should 
have to send any ti'oops back to rein- 
force Miles' division." Colonel Evans, 
who, with a very small force, held the 
Stone Bridge for the Confederates, nat- 
urally enough believed at first that the 
attack made in fi'tmt by the force under 
Tyler was the real one. He ^vas soon, 
however, undeceived. As early as half- 
past nine, he was made aware that a 
lai'ge force of the enemy was passing 
through the Avoods on his left and tow- 
ards his rear. By ten o'clock, the ad- 
vance brigade of Hunter's column, com- 
manded by Burnside, had reached the 
open fields. In the interval, however, 
he had found time to send foi- reinforce- 
ments, to wheel around, making an en- 
tire change of front, and to post himself 
in a first class position to receive the 
enemy. His right rested in a long 
and narrow grove in front of Young's 
Blanch — a petty tributary of Bull Run ; 
his centre crossed the Sudley road to 
the north of the Warrenton turnpike ; 



A FURIOtrS STRUGGLE 



4i. 



and bis left was concealed among the 
outhouses, sheds, haystacks and fences 
of a neighboring farm. Tlie position 
was somewhat elevated, enabling him 
to pour a destructive fire of artillery 
and musketry on the forces of the ene- 
my, as soon as they emerged from the 
woods, and while yet distant many hun- 
dred yards. 

The appearance of the head of Burn- 
side's column at the edge of the wood 
ivas the signal for the opening of the 
Confederate fire. It was sharp and 
severe, and well fitted to produce con- 
fusion among comparatively raw re- 
cruits, as yet but little experienced to 
the severities and sudden surprises of 
the battle field. But the men under 
Burnside were full of purpose ; and 
having enjoyed half-an-hour's rest at 
the ford, where they filled their can- 
teens with water, they Avere well re- 
freshed. Not waiting to form proper 
line of order, they sharply responded. 
The Second Rhode Island, under Colonel 
John Slocum, was. the first under fire. 
Burnside M^as not slow in getting his 
troops in hand ; while Porter's brigade, 
(juickl}' emerging from the wood, form- 
ed on his right, Griflin's battery also 
getting into position and replying with 
effect to the Confederate artilleiy. The 
Ijattle was now fairly begun. Evans 
was already sorely pressed, when he 
received some welcome assistance. Gen- 
eral Bee, Avho was next in what had 
now become his rear, with detachments 
of his men and Burton's Georgia bri- 
gade, and ca]-i-}ing with him six guns 
of Imboden and Richardson, rushed 
down the slope towards the turn])ike. 



It was a critical moment for the National 
troops. Burnside, realizing the situa- 
tion, called for help. Sykes' battalion 
was promptly huriied forward from 
Porter on the right. The national line 
was thereby greatly strengthened. The 
battle I'aged fiei'cely, the Confederate 
artillery, particularly from its superior 
position, telling with deadly effect oh 
the Union ranks. Colonel Hunter fell, 
severely wounded, and had to be carried 
fi'om the field. Colonel Slocum was 
mortally wounded; and his major, Sul- 
livan Ballou, had his horse killed luider 
him, and his leg badly crushed by a 
cannon ball. The battle had lasted an 
houi" ; and the result was still doubtful, 
when Porter, having ai-rived on the 
scene, poured a heavy fire on Evans' 
left, making his whole column waver 
and bend. Almost at the same moment, 
Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division, 
which had been ordered forward, suc- 
cessfully crossed the ford just above 
the Stone Biidsje, and added its strensrth 
to the Union forces. Hunter's success, 
howevei', was ali'eady assured ; the Con- 
federates were in retreat ; and Sherman 
was ordered, his troops being still fresh, 
"to join in the pursuit of the enemy, 
who was falling back towards the Sud- 
ley's Spring road." The first part of 
McDowell's plan had been carried out 
with success. He had turned the ene- 
mj-'s left ; he had forced him from the 
Warrenton turnpike ; he had uncovered 
the Stone Bridge ; he had pressed the 
opposing lines at least a mily and a 
half, and had occupied the vacated 
ground. 

At this stage occurred McDowell's 



I 



t2 



BULL RUN. 



mistake — a mistake which, with the 
light we now enjoy, we can afford to 
call fatal. The left wing of the Con- 
federates had been turned and broken, 
and was now in full retreat. We have 
already given a general view of the 
ground on which the opposing forces 
were encamped ; and we have already, 
in a passing Avay, referred to Young's 
Branch. At this point, it will be well 
for the reader to form an accurate con- 
ception of Young's Branch or Creek and 
the plateau on which the final struggle 
took place. Young's Branch flows fi'om 
the west in a valley which forms a curve 
concave to the south, and joins Bull 
Run a short distance below the Stone 
Bridge. It was down the northern 
slope of this valley that the national 
troops had descended. It was up the 
southern slope that the Confederates 
were being driven. On the summit of 
this southern slope, and about the 
height of a hundred feet, there is a 
piece of table land or plateau, oblong 
in form, a mile in length from northeast 
to southwest and about half-a-mile in 
width. On the eastern and southern 
brows of this plateau, there is a pine 
forest; Avhile to the west there is a 
broad belt of oaks through which runs 
the Sudley road. On the plateau there 
Ye three houses — Robinson's to the 
. vfth, Henry's to the southwest of Rob- 
inson's, and Lewis's or the "Portico," 
as it was called, still further to the 
south. Across the Warreuton turnpike 
and up towards this plateau, the defeat- 
ed Confederates rushed ; and by the aid 
of Colonel Hampton's splendid legion, 
tvhich had come from Richmond too 



late to take part in the furious struggle, 
the retreat was conducted in good or- 
der. Up towards the plateau McDowell 
pursued his flying antagonists. When 
Bee's discomfited troops reached the 
summit of the slope, there stood a full 
brigade, solid, strong and immovable^ 
in line, and ready for battle. It was 
the brigade of General T. J. Jackson 
who had just arrived and taken a posi- 
tion behind Bee. "They are beating 
us back," exclaimed Bee. " Well, sir,''* 
said Jackson, with the utmost coolness, 
"we Avill give them the bayonet." Bee 
rallied his men. " Form ! fonn ! " he 
cried. "There's Jackson, standing like 
a stone wall." The words were electric. 
" Stonewall Jackson," shouted the sol- 
diers. The name which was yet to be 
a watchword and a rallying cry on many 
a bloody batthi field, was from that 
moment immortal. The circumstance 
turned the tide of battle. In the opin- 
ion of many, if McDowell, instead of 
pursuing the Confederates up to the 
hill forest, had moved direct for Manas- 
sas Junction, the day Avould have been 
decided and the victory his. This oi 
course implies that the effect of " Stone- 
wall " .lackson's stubborn I'esistance 
checked the tide of victory M'hich had 
ali'eady set in in McDowell's favor, and 
gave the Confederates the opportimity 
which they needed. We incline to this 
view of the case ; but we are unwilling 
to forget that we judge the situation 
with a larger knowledge than McDowell 
at the time possessed. He was ignor- 
ant of the position of General Jackson ; 
and even if he had known that such a 
force under such a man stood firm and 



THE SECOKD PHASE OF THE BATTLE. 



iS 



fresh on the heights, he might have 
doubted whether a routed army could 
be so easily checked and forced to turn 
around and face the pursuing foe. 

It was noon. The heat had become 
intense. Clouds of dust and smoke 
filled the air and blinded the assailants 
as they rushed up the sloping hillside. 
Johnston and Beauregard, alarmed by 
the heavy firing, and by the intelligence 
Avhich they had received of the success- 
ful movements of the national troops, 
ordered Generals Holmes, Early and 
Ewell to hurry forward with their 
troops in the direction of the sound of 
the battle, while they themselves gal- 
loped from their position, four miles 
distant, to the plateau. They found 
upon it a force of seven thousand men, 
with fourteen guns ; but they were well 
sheltered in a dense thicket of pines. 
The battle was all but lost ; the situa- 
tion was desperate ; but the brigades 
of Holmes and Early and Ewell and 
Bonham, with the batteries of Pendle- 
ton and Alburtis, would soon be on 
hand. Johnston rallied the shattered 
regiments on the right ; Beauregard 
those on the left. This done and some- 
thing like order restored, Beauregard 
took command of the field, and John- 
ston retii'ed and established his head- 
quarters at the house of Mr. Lewis, 
called "The Portico," from which he 
had a full view of the entire field of 
t-iattle, and where he could exercise a 
general supervision. When the battle 
entered upon its second phase and the 
struggle began for the possession of the 
plateau, the Confederate strength was 
increased to ten thousand men and 



twenty-two guns. It was discovered 
that at the lower fords nothing was in- 
tended by the enemy. Every available 
man was, therefore, hurried foi-ward to 
the "focus of the fight." 

On the national side, the most vigor- 
ous measures were adopted to make the 
attack a success. It was felt that the 
Confederates had an immense advant- 
age in the position which they occupied. 
To drive them from that position was 
the task now on hand. The attackinir 
force consisted of five briijades. Porter 
being in command on the right, Frank- 
lin and Wilcox in the centre, and Sher- 
man and Keyes on the left. Howard's 
brigade was upon the Run. Burnside's 
brigade, whose ammunition had been 
exhausted in the morning battle, had 
been withdrawn into a wood for the 
purpose of being supplied, and had not 
yet returned to the scene of action. 
Schenck was on hand and ready to cross 
the bridge. With the attacking force 
were Griffin's, Rickett's and Arnold's 
batteries, and a body of cavalry tinder 
Major Palmer. The entire strength 
was thirteen thousand men and sixteen 
guns. Eighteen thousand men still re- 
mained on the west side of Bull Run. 
The five brigades, the batteries and the 
cavalry moved boldly and steadily up 
the slope south of the Warrenton turn- 
pike, McDowell being present in per- 
son, with Heintzelman, who acted as 
his chief lieutenant on the field. They 
were exposed to a raking fire from the 
Confederate batteries. Onward, how 
ever, they pressed ; and having out- 
flanked the enemy, they were soon in 
possession of the western edge of the 



44 



BULL RTTIV 



plateau. A little to the southeast of 
the Henry house, to which we have al- 
ready made reference, there was a swell 
of rising ground which, it was seen, at 
once, commanded the field of action. It 
was the key of the position. Whoever 
held it had command of the entire pla- 
teau. Orders were given to Rickett's 
and Griffin's batteries to advance and 
plant themselves upon it. The bat- 
teries were supported by the Eleventh 
New York, the Twenty-seventh New 
York, Fifth and Eleventh Massachu- 
setts, the Second Minnesota, and Cor- 
coran's Sixty-ninth. The attack was 
bravely made. The artillery, with the 
New York Eleventh (Ellsworth's Fire 
Zouaves), who were in immediate sup- 
port of the batteries, in the face of a 
terrific cannonade moved gallantly for- 
ward. All of a sudden, an Alabama 
regiment emerged from behind a clump 
of pines, and poured a deadly fire on 
their flank. This surprise was all the 
more demoralizing that the attacking 
reginient was mistaken at first for one 
of their own. When staggering under 
this deluge of fire in front and on flank, 
two companies of Stuart's Black Horse 
Cavalry rushed furiously upon their 
rear. The regiment was ruined. The 
batteries, the horses of which had been 
killed, were in utmost peril. Other 
regiments were sent forward, but in 
vain. Three times were tlie batteries 
overrun by Confederates; and three 
times were the troops of the enemy re- 
pulsed and the batteries reclaimed. 
While this struggle was raging with al- 
ternate success and defeat on the right, 
an attempt was also being made by 



McDowell's left to carry the plateau. 
The fighting in this direction had been 
equally severe. Sherman had been or 
dered to charge the batteries of the 
Confederates with his entire brigade, 
and sweep them from the hill. In the 
encounter the riflemen of Quimby's 
Thirteenth New York, the Seventy- 
ninth (Scotch) New York, and the Sixty- 
ninth (Irish) New York, especially dis- 
tinguished themselves. The gallant 
Cameron of the Seventy-ninth was 
killed when, for the third time, he led 
his brave Higlilandera to the charge. 
Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth, had his 
horse shot under him, and was made 
prisoner. Keyes had little better suc- 
cess on the extreme left. He had forced 
his way up the slope, and reached the 
Robinson house ; but the fire from the 
enemy's batteries was so severe that he 
was compelled to retire. 

The critical moment had arrived. The 
slaughter had been terrible on both 
sides. The Union advance had been 
checked; but the Confederate strength 
was well-nigh exhausted. Several of 
_ their best officers were killed, and not a 
few were disabled. Bee and Baxter had 
fallen in the heat of the fight, near the 
Henry house. Hampton and Jackson 
had been wounded. Beauregard had his 
horse shot under him. McDowell liad 
still two brigades fresh, l)esides Burn- 
side's, in reserve. It was now three 
o'clock, and there was no appearance 
of Early and his three fresh regiments. 
The order had been sent him at eleven, 
but by some mishap it had not reached 
him till two " Oh, for four regiments," 
cried Johnston to Colonel Cocke. His 



Alk INGLORIOm ROITI 



45 



wish was soon to be gratified. The 
mistake made by Patterson in allowing 
Johnston's army to escape from Win- 
chester is now to be revealed. A cloud 
of dust \\a3 seen in the direction of 
Manassas Gap. Johnston's first fear 
was that it might be Patterson ; but 
no ; it was the remainder of his own 
army, Elzey's brigade, led by Kirby 
Smith. They were about three thousand 
strong. Hearing the sound of battle, 
they had stopped the cars before they 
reached the Junction. Hurrying np 
at the supreme moment, they struck 
the National right full on its flank. The 
fate of the day was decided. The bat- 
tle was won. The cross fire of the 
newly arrived troops was irresistible. 
The cry went up from the National 
ranks, " Here's Johnston from the Val- 
ley." In a moment the battle was ended. 
There was no more fight in the Union 
men. Helter skelter they ran down the 
plateau. It was not a repulse. It was 
a rout. Never was victory more com- 
plete. Never was rout more disgrace- 
ful. In vain did McDowell tiy to rally 
his men. They would not, they could 
not, hear. At Cub Run the rout be- 
came a panic. Arms and all encum- 
brances were flung away. Everything 
was left on the field. Soldiers, citizens 
and camp followers rushed to Centre- 
ville and thence on to Washington, there 
to describe to the astonished and bewil- 
dered multitude another than the holi- 
day scene which some of them had 
gone forth to witness. At night Jeffer- 
son Davis, who had witnessed the great- 
er part of the fight, telegraphed to his 
Congress, "Night has closed upon a 

199 



hard fought field. Our forces were vic- 
torious. The enemy was routed, and 
fled precipitately, abandoning a larg« 
amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks 
and baggage. The gi'ound was strewed 
for miles with those killed, and the 
farm houses around were filled with 

wounded Our force was fifteen 

thousand; that of the enemy estimated 
at thirty thousand." The report did 
not speak the truth ; but it bespoke the 
triumph of the situation — the pride and 
spirit of the man. 

The loss on the part of the Confede- 
rates was 378 killed, 1489 wounded. 
The national loss was 481 killed, 1011 
wounded, and 1460 piisoners. 

Not one of all the battles of the war 
has been so variously, and in some in- 
stances so unjustly, commented on ai 
Bull Run. It is not our business ir 
these pages to combat or endorse the 
opinions which have been expressed. 
There are, however, some things which, 
in justice to the one side and the other, 
must be said. It is not to be denied 
that on both sides there was dif^played 
much bravery and not a little skill. 
Never, perhaps, before, in the whole 
history of the world, was such fighting 
done by comparatively raw and inexpe- 
rienced men. On the part v>f the South, 
the battle was skillfully fought and fair- 
ly won. In a better cause, Beauregard 
and Johnston would have covei'ed them- 
selves with glory. On the part of the 
North, there was certainly bad manage- 
ment. Some serious blunders were 
made. General Scott blundered by the 
disposition he made of his forces. He 
had eighty thousand men at his dis- 



-«6 



MiJNUK -BATTLEiS. » 



posal ; he had divided them into three 
paiis, and had foolishly allowed one of 
these parts to be flung unsustained on 
the enemy. Patterson blimdered when 
he allowed Johnston to escape from 
him at Winchester. He blundered still 
more when he remained idle in his po- 
sition after he discovered that the ene- 
my had escaped. Patterson has since 
endeavored to explain ; but, in spite of 
all explanation, he wiU forever remain 
accused before the bar of history of 
culpable inaction. McDowell blundered 
by not taking pains to make himself 
master of the topographical features of 
the ground before he commenced his 
march from before Washington. He 
blundered on three different occasions 
^»y losing time. He blundered most of 
ill in not bringing his three fresh bri- 
gades into action before the arrival of 
Kirby Smith. Even at the last critical 
moment, the appearance of so many 



fresh troops might have prevented the 
rout, and nailed victory to the Union 
standards. The retreat was unusually 
well conducted ; but this was due large- 
ly to the fact that the Confederates were 
too exhausted and too fearful to con- 
tinue the pursuit. The battle of Bull 
Run, decisive as it was, settled nothing. 
The South gained the victory, but they 
failed in their purpose. Washington 
was more safe than before. The South 
was jubilant. The North was humbled ; 
but it was also more determined than 
ever to prosecute the war. It was evi- 
dent to all that a protracted struggle 
was before the country. Both sides 
began to raise and organize armies on 
a gigantic scale. President Lincoln 
called for half a million of men. 
General McDowell was removed; and 
General George B. McClellan was 
placed in command of the army around 
Washington. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Importance of some of the Minor Battles. — Where they were Fought. — The Border States. — Armed Neutrality. — 
Lincoln's Message. — Maryland and Delaware. — Virginia, the Focus of the Rebellion. — Occupation of Harper's 
Ferry. — The Capture of Komney. — Beverley. — Cari'ack's Ford. — Change of Commanders. — McClellan. — His 
Past Career. — Rosecrans. — Floyd. — Camifex Ferry. — Drainsville. — Ball's Bluff. — A Butchery. — Death of 
Colonel Baker. — Fremont in Missouri. — Dug Springs.- — Lyon. — Sigel. — Lyon Wounded. — Colonel Mitchell 
KiUed. — Battle of Wilson's Creek. — Capitulation of Lexington. — Halleck Supersedes Fremont. — Kentucky. — 
Governor Magoffin. — Kentucky in favor of the Union. — Lincoln's Reply to Magoffin. — The Yoimg Men of 
Kentucky. — The Older Men. — Kentucky Forced into Secession. — General Polk. — Fort Columbus. — Polk's 
Invasion of Kentucky. — Grant in Command at Cairo. — Grant's Determination, — His Proclamation. — Battle of 
Belmont. — The Attack. — Terrible Fire from Fort Columbus. — The Victory of the Nationals. — The License of 
the Soldiers. — The Victors Compelled to Retreat. — Showers of Bullets. — The Retreat Successfully Made. — 
The Confederates Claim the Victory. — It Might Have Been Different. — General Grant Learns a Lesson. 



The year 1861, subsequent to the 
battle of Bull Run, was not mark- 
ed by any great or decisive bat- 
tle. There were, however, numerous 



l!$61. 



engagements of a minor character, each 
of which was attended with conse- 
quences of greater or less importance, 
and all of which tended to fan into 



ARMED NEUTRALITY. 



4? 



more furious flame that growing war 
sentiment which was soon to find devel- 
opment on a more gigantic scale. These 
engagements can hardly be said to have 
been the result of any general plan, or 
to have formed essential links in the 
chain of events which were soon to cul- 
minate in what may be called the great 
campaigns. But because of the hero- 
ism with which they were illustrated, 
and the examples of self-sacrifice which 
they called forth, as well as for the in- 
fluence which they exerted in their sev- 
eral sections, they cannot, in a work 
like this, be passed over in silence. 

These minor battles occurred princi- 
pally in the border States, Kentucky, 
Missouri, and Virginia. We have seen 
already that the five border States, in- 
cluding, in addition to those just men- 
tioned, Maryland and Delaware, were 
eagerly coveted by both North and 
South. It was evident from the first 
that in those States the great struggle 
for supremacy should take place. With 
the border States secured, and bearing 
the principal burden of the war, it was 
the hope of the Southern leaders that 
the cotton crop might be raised without 
molestation. It might still be possible 
for the National government to establish 
a blockade by sea and by river; but 
England needed cotton ; and the South 
counted with confidence alike on Eng- 
lish sympathy and on English necessity. 

Situated midway between the rival in- 
fluences of North and South, and placed 
necessarily in the very front of the 
conflict, it was very natural that among 
the inhabitants of those States there 
should be great division of sentiment. 



Every effort was made by the Southern 
leaders to excite the slaveholding inter- 
est, by making it appear that the North 
had at last entered upon a crusade 
against slavery, and that the Republican 
party, now in power at Washington, 
were bent upon the most tyrannical 
measures. The National government 
was just as anxious that the border 
States should remain steadfast in their 
loyalty. How to deal with slavery was 
the great difficulty which lay in the way 
of the North. To pronounce against 
slavery, it was felt, would be to fling 
the entire slaveholdins; interest into the 
arms of the Confederacy. All through 
the summer of 18(il every precaution 
was taken to avoid giving offence to 
the slaveholding interest. As the sit- 
uation became more pressing, different 
views began to be entertained and ex- 
pressed by those in power. General 
McClellan, who was in command in 
Northeastern Virginia, declared it to be 
his purpose not only not to interfere 
with the slaves, but to crush with a 
hand of iron any attempt made by 
them at insurrection. General Butler, 
on the other hand, who was in command 
at Fortress Monroe, decided, on the same 
day, to regard them as " contraband " 
of war. Armed neutrality found favor 
with not a few ; but President Lincoln, 
in his message to Congress at its extra 
session in July, clearly pointed out that 
armed neutrality would be more a gain 
to the South than to the North. " In 
the Border States, so called, in fact, the 
Middle States," he said, "there are 
those who favor a policy which they 
call ' armed neutrality ' ; that is, an arm^ 



48 



MINO^ BATTLEt 



ing of these States to prevent the Union 
forces passing one way or the disunion 
the other, over their soil. This would 
be disunion completed. Figuratively 
speaking, it would be building an im- 
passable wall along the line of separa- 
tion — and yet not quite an impassable 
one, for under the guise of neutrality, it 
Avould tie the hands of Union men, and 
freely pass supplies from among them 
to the insurrectionists, which could not 
be done if they were open enemies. At 
a stroke, it would take all trouble off 
the hands of secession, except only what 
proceeds from the internal blockade. 
It would do for the disunionists that 
which of all things they most desire — 
feed them well, and give them disunion 
without a struggle of their own. It 
recognizes no fidelity to the Constitu- 
tion, no obligation to maintain the 
Union." 

The geographical positions of Mary- 
land and Delaware, as well as their 
special interests, prevented them mak- 
ing any very strong demonstration of 
Southern sympathy. Delaware was too 
weak and too thoroughly hemmed in to 
be allowed to think either of secession 
or of neutrality ; and General Butler's 
vigorous eiforts, at the commencement 
of the war, had effectually secured 
Maryland to the Union. It was quite 
otherwise with Virginia, Missouri and 
Kentucky. 

Virginia, as we have seen, and as had 
been evident from the first, had become 
the focus of the rebellion. The Rich- 
mond authorities had seized Harper's 
Ferry, immediately upon the passage of 
the ordinance of secession. Occupying 



it with as large a force as the)?^ could 
spare for the purpose, they held the line 
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and 
thus cut off all communication be- 
tween Western Virginia and Washing- 
ton along that line. No movement was 
made by the National government until 
the ordinance of secession had been rat- 
ified, the general feeling at Washington 
being that every care should be taken 
to do nothing which was capable of 
being interpreted as interference with 
the Border States. 

Immediately after the ratification of 
the ordinance, General George B. Mc- 
Clellan, to whom had been as- May 
signed the command of the De- *1' 
partment of the Ohio, including West- 
ern Virginia, was ordered to cross the 
Ohio and advance along the line of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as far a^ 
Harper's Ferry. Having issued ad- 
dresses to the people and to his soldiers, 
in one of which he denounced " the in- 
famous attempt of the traitorous con- 
spiracy dignified by this name of the 
Southern Confedei'aey," he moved for- 
ward and occupied Parkersburg, the 
terminus of the railroad on the Ohio 
River. There was a Confederate force 
at Grafton Junction, not far distant. 
There was another Confederate force of 
12,000 men at Romney. In addition to 
these. General Joseph E. Johnston, at 
the head of a large army, lay at Har- 
per's Ferry. 

The force at Grafton was under the 
command of General G. A. Porterfield. 
On the appearance of McClellar at Par- 
kersburg, Porterfield issued an address 
in which he called on the people to arise 



CARRACK'S FORD. 



4« 



aii'l resist the intruders, who, coming 
from other States, sought to rule over 
thi^ni. McClellan having ordered an 
advance to Philippi, Purterfield vpas 
pressed back, first to Beverley and then 
to Huttonsville, where he was joined 
by Governor Wise, who came up with 
large reinforcements and assumed com- 
mand. In this engagement at Philippi, 
Colonel Kelly, who performed deeds of 
great valor, was severely wounded. 

In the meantime an encounter took 
place at Romney, which shed some little 
glory ou the National arms. Early in 
June General Patterson, who was in 
command of the Department of Penn- 
sylvania, was making preparations for 
an attack ou Maryland Heights, which 
overlook and command Harper's Ferry. 
Colonel Lewis Wallace had been di- 
rected to join Patterson. As he drew 
near the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
June Wallace learned that the Confed- 
*7» erates were assembled in some 
strength at Romney. In twenty-four 
hours Wallace had accomplished a 
march of eighty-seven miles, forty-six 
of which were on foot. Coming up with 
the Confederates at Romney, some se- 
vere fighting took place. The Confed- 
erates were driven from the place ; and 
Johnston was so alarmed that he evacu- 
ated Hai-jier's Ferry, having first burned 
the railroad across the Potomac, spiked 
the guns he could not carry ofF, and 
obstructed in every possible way the 
railroad and the canal. W hatever glory 
resulted from the captui-e of Romney 
nnist be set down to the credit of 
Colonel Lewis Wallace. It was he who 
conceived and carried out the enterprize. 



The evacuation of Harper's Ferry, if 
not directly caused by it, was at least 
an almost immediate and perhaps neces- 
sary consequence. 

McClellau's forces were still at Graf- 
ton. His army, since his encounter 
with Porterfield, had been greatly in- 
creased ; and by the 4th of July he had 
under him twenty thousand men. Por- 
tei-field had been superseded by General 
Gai'uett, an officer who had won dis- 
tinction in the Mexican war. The Con- 
federates were afraid that MeClellau 
might make an effort to push his way 
through some of the mountain passes 
which lead into the Shenandoah Valley, 
and so effect a junction with Patterson. 
Garnett was ordered so to dispose of 
his forces as to guard the mountain 
gaps and make this junction impossible. 
Garnett, with the main body of his ar- 
my, had taken a position at Laurel Hill, 
near Beverley. A detachment im- jQiy 
der Colonel Pea;ram was stationed 7. 
at Rich Mountain. McClellan saw that 
his forces greatly oiitnumbered those of 
the enemy, and concluded to take action 
at once. On the 11th of July, jujy 
therefore, Rosecrans, with eight- H* 
een hundred men, fell upon the detach- 
ment, which was about nine hundred 
strong. Pegram was put to flight, and 
lost nearly half of his men. McClellan 
now came up with his main army. 
Garnett, who liad been joined by some 
remnants of Pegi'am's force, ofFei'ed re- 
sistance ; but his rear being exposed to 
Rosecrans, he was speedily compelled 
to abandon his camp and his cannon 
and fall back towards Beverley. Mc- 
Clellan, however, had reached that place 



50 



MINOR BATTLES. 



before him ; and Garnett turned his 
face from the foe and made a precipi- 
tate flight toward the north. Pegram, 
cut off from all support and reduced to 
great extremities, having been two days 
without food, surrendered with six hun- 
dred of his men. Garnett was pursued 
and overtaken by General Morris at 
Carrack's Ford. Here the Confederates 
were brought to bay. Turning upon 
their pursuers, they offered a spirited 
resistance. It was impossible, however, 
to withstand the onward rush and the 
overwhelming numbers of the triumph- 
ant Nationals. General Garnett, who 
fought like a true hero, was shot through 
the heart while vainly attempting to 
rally his men. When the general fell, 
the Confederates broke and fled. The 
pursuit was continued for two miles, 
when the exhausted troops were re- 
called. 

Before proceeding with oiu' narrative, 
it is necessary to notice certain changes 
which took place in the principal com- 
mands of the army. General George B. 
McClellan, in his campaign in Western 
Virginia, had been singularly successful. 
Hitherto he had been the most fortunate 
or the most skilfid of all the generals 
of the North. After the battle of Bull 
Run, there was a universal desire that 
he should take the place of McDowell 
and reorganize the shattered army 
which was principally depended upon 
for the protection of the capital. On the 
July 25th of July McClellan took com- 
25. mand of the Departments of 
Washington and of Northeastei'n Vir- 
ginia, his head-quarters being at Wash- 
ington City. At the time of his ap- 



pointment to this high position McClel- 
lan was only thirty-five years of age. 
He was born in Philadelphia in 1826. 
At the age of sixteen he entered the 
Academy at West Point, where, among 
others who rose to distinction on both 
sides during the war, he had for fellow 
students " Stonewall " Jackson and A. 
P. Hill. After four years' study at 
West Point, he graduated as second- 
lieutenant of engineers. Before the 
close of the Mexican wai he had won his 
captaincy. His Manual for the Army, 
and his Introduction to the Bayonet 
Exercise, published a few years after- 
wards, and while stationed at West 
Point as director of field labors and in- 
structor of infantry, gave proof at once 
of his military skill and of his devotion 
to his profession. Having filled various 
military ppsitions under the govern- 
ment, he was appointed in 1855 one of 
the United States Military Commission- 
ers to the Crimea. His report, which 
contained some sharp criticisms on the 
operations before Sevastopol, was gen- 
erally well received, and showed that 
he had studied the art of war to no 
small advantage. Some years before 
the war broke out he had I'esigned his 
commission, and occupied himself with 
the management of railroads. He had 
been three years vice-president of the 
Illinois Central; and at the beginning 
of the year 1861 he was general super- 
intendent of the Ohio and Mississippi. 
The war furnished hira the opportunity 
for which he had been longing. His 
successful career in Western Virginia 
fully justified his promotion in July;^ 
and his appointment a little later, on 



CAKNIFEX FERRY. 



51 



the occasion of the resignation of Gen- 
eral Scott, as commander-in-chief of the 
armies of tlie United States, was hailed 
with universal satisfaction. 

After the encounter at Carrack's 
Ford, McClellan in his despatch to the 
government was able to make the proud 
boast : " We have completely annihi- 
lated the enemy in Western Virginia. 
Our loss is about 13 killed and not 
more than 40 wounded, while the en- 
emy's loss is not far from 200 killed ; 
and the number of prisoners we have 
taken will amount to at least 1000. 
We have captured seven of the enemy's 
guns in all." There was still, however, 
some hard work to be done before the 
campaign was completed. On the ap- 
pointment of General McClellan to the 
command of the Federal forces on the 
Potomac, General Rosecrans succeeded 
him and took charge of the troops 
which had done so well in Western Vir- 
ginia. Rosecrans was a graduate of 
West Point ; and for four years, from 
1843 to 1847, he had filled some of the 
most important chairs at that institu- 
tion. At the outbreak of the war he 
was engaged in business; but he lost 
no time in volunteering his services ; 
and to his skill and energy not a little 
of the success which had attended the 
array of Western Virginia was due. 

General J. B. Floyd, formerly secre- 
tary of war under Buchanan's adminis- 
tration, had, since the death of Garnett, 
who was killed at Carrack's Ford, as- 
sumed the command of the Confederate 
forces. A plan of campaign had been 
agreed upon at Richmond ; and it was 
confidently expected that the Confede- 



rates would be able not only to drive 
the Federals out of Western Virginia, 
])ut to" menace both Pennsylvania and 
Ohio. Floyd was to sweep down the 
Kanawha Valley and force Cox of Ohio 
beyond the border, while General Rob- 
ert E. Lee, who now appears for the 
first time prominently on the scene, was 
to scatter the Union army under Rose- 
crans. The plan was Lee's ; and it has 
been admitted by the most competent 
strategists that the rules of war, as 
shown by the finished drawings, never 
found more perfect illustration. The 
scheme, however, was not to succeed, 
Floyd, who, as we have seen, had taken 
the command of the Confederate forces 
in Virginia after the death of Garnett, 
moved forward with a view to carry 
out the part of the plan assigned to 
him. He relied with confidence on be- 
ing joined by Wise before he encoun- 
tered the Federals in any foi-ce. He 
had encountered Tyler, and having han- 
dled him somewhat severely, scattered 
his forces. He had hoped to gain the 
rear of Cox, and inflict upon him simi- 
lar punishment. But Rosecrans was 
hurrying forward. Over the western 
spurs of the Alleghanies, through the 
ravines and up the rugged hillsides, he 
had, with almost incredible rapidity, 
led his little band. At noon on Ang. 
the 9th of August he had reached 9» 
the summit of Powell Mountain, which 
looks down upon one of the most beau- 
tiful scenes of that lovely region. It 
was no time, however, to halt and 
admire the beauties of nature. The 
two armies sighted each other. \ag. 
On the following day, about three •*• 



63 



MINUR BATTLES, 



o'clock in the afternoon, the firing com- 
menced. For nearly four hours the bat- 
tle ra.ged, both sides performing deeds 
of great valor. The Federal forces suf- 
fered severely at the commencement of 
the conflict. Colonel Lytle of the Ohio 
Tenth was wounded in the leg and 
had his horse shot nnder him. Colonel 
Ijowe of the Ohio Twelfth, while hurry- 
ing forward his regiment, was shot 
through the head and killed instantly, 
Floyd, however, was outmmibered ; and 
Wise failing to come to his support, he 
was unable to do more than hold his 
gi'ound. At twilight, when McCook's 
German brigade, although exposed to 
a terrific fire, seemed on the point of 
carrying the Confederate batteries, Rose- 
crans, fearful for the safety of his men, 
ordered a recall. The onward move- 
ment was thus checked in mid-career. 
It was the intention of Rosecrans to re- 
sume the attack on the following morn- 
Auffi "ig- When the morning dawned 
i'» the enemy was gone, Floyd hav- 
ing retired and taken a strong position 
on Big Sewell Mountain, some thirty 
miles distant from the battle field. But 
for the caution of Rosecrans the pre- 
vious evening, the Confederates might 
have been completely I'outed. As it 
was, the battle at Carnifex Ferry was 
a substantial victory to the Federal 
arms. 

Lee was not more successful in carry- 
ing out his part of the plan. At a 
critical moment, when the enemy, 25,000 
strong, had entrenched themselves at 
Big Sewell and called it " Camp Defi- 
ance," and were threatening an aggres- 
sive movement, Rosecrans contrived to 



effect a retreat and was not pursued. 
After some other uuimpoj-tant engage- 
ments, winter intervened and the cam- 
paign was ended. Lee was recalled and 
sent to take charge of the coast defenses 
of South Carolina; Wise was ordered to 
report at Richmond, and Floyd was 
sent to the West. This campaign added 
fresh lustre to McClellan's name, who, 
although he was not personally in com- 
mand at Carnifex Ferry, nor indeed 
since the encounter at Carrack's Ford, 
was supposed to be giving a general 
direction. It was temporarily greatly 
discouraging to the Confederates, who 
har. expected much from General Lee. 
Later in the year a serious disaster 
befell the National forces at Ball's Bluff. 
The Nationals and Confederates were 
confronting each other on opposite sides 
of the Potomac between Washington 
and Harper's Ferry. A slight skirmish 
had occurred at the latter place on the 
8th of October. On that occasion Oct. 
the Nationals, imder Colonel John ^' 
W. Geary, gained a decided advantage. 
About the middle of the month. Gen- 
eral McClellan, deeming it desirable to 
ascertain the Confederate strength in 
the neighborhood of Drainsville, caused 
a reconnoisance to be made by General 
McCall. From Major-General Banks, 
whose troops held the river on the 
Maryland side, from Darnestown to 
Williamsport, McClellan received a 
despatch saying that the enemy had 
moved away from Leesburg, the capital 
of Loudon County, Virginia, On the 
strength of Banks' despatch, McClellan 
notified General Stone, who was at 
Poolesville. of the movement of McCall, 



iiiipiiipiiipl^^ 






« ' '' flMll 






!!i»^^^^ 





J.* I 

J, I 




OS 

<: 

h 

< 

X 

o 

o 
« 
u 

2 

O 

H 

S 
M 
O. 
X 

en 

Q 

Z 
OS 

D 




PICKETS ON DUTY. 




illl|i|Mtol«l!l!3'y!li«aMli!l9l]lttlilJilBll|::IIIM^^^ 





IVAT£KS SOAf SC 



CHARLESTON HARBOH AND ITS APPROACHES, SHOWING FORTS SITVITER AND 
WAGNER, JAMES ISLAND. Etc., Etc. 




MAP ILLUSTKAfING THE CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGNS. 



DIAGBAM 1. 




wiTrps-sonnr I 



■ DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF 

CHICKAMAUGA. 




DIAGRAM SHOWING POSITIONS DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD DAYS 




, ii liilliRliiiM " 



^^^ liiv.M m WV-^ v^:rf:AA\\ ^ \ . ,\\ \\-. 




MAP SHOWING VICKSBl'?G AND ITS APPROACHES. 



BALiL'S BLUFF. 



53 



iiid suggested that while keeping " a 
iTood lookout on Leesburg, a slight de- 
monstration on his part might have the 
elTect of moving the enemy." Both 
McCall and Stone acted promptly and 
Oct. ^s deeired. Ou the night of the 
20. 20th Stone telegraphed to the 
chief that he had made a feint of cross- 
ing the river during the afternoon, at 
two places, and that he had sent out a 
reconnoitering party toward Leesburg, 
adding, " I have means of crossing one 
hundred and twenty-five men once in 
ten minutes, at each of two points." 
This despatch brought no reply. 

In obedience to instructions from 
Stone, Colonel Devins, in two flat-boats 
from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 
carried over to Harrison's Island four 
companies of his Massachusetts Fif- 
teenth. One company was on the island 
already. A reserve of about three thou- 
■jand men. including what was called 
the First California Regiment, imder 
Colonel E. D. Baker, was held in read- 
iness to co-operate, should any difficulty 
arise. After landing his troops, Devins 
sent a detachment to the Virginia shore 
to make an exploration towards Lees- 
burg. A scouting party of about twenty 
men, inider Captain Philbrlck, having 
ascended the steep bank on the Virginia 
side opposite the island, and known as 
Ball's Bluff, believed they saw a small 
canij) of Confederates, about a mile 
from Leesl turg. This being made known 
to Stone, he ordered Devins to land on 
Ball's Bluff, and proceed at dawn to 
surprise the camp. The order was 
promptly executed. He set out about 
midnight. By daylight his men had 



all worked their way up the wet and 
slippery sides of the bluff, and stood on 
the summit. Without delay, he ad- 
vanced towards Leesburg, in the direc- 
tion of the supposed camp ; but no 
trace of the foe could be seen ; what' 
seemed a camp in the distance was only 
an illusion due to certain openings iu 
the woods. Here Devins halted his men 
and sent to Stone for orders. 

Meanwhile Devins' movements had 
been carefully watched by the Confed- 
erates, who, under Evans, lay in consid- 
erable force ou Goose Creek. It was 
not long until the National troops began 
to have glimpses of the Confederate 
cavalry and riflemen. Perceiving that 
the enemy were gathering around him, 
Devins, after a slight skirmish, fell 
back towards the bluff, and halted his 
men in an open field surrounded by 
woods. Here he i-eceived orders to re- 
main, Stone promising, at the same time, 
to hurry forward reinforcements. About 
noon a fiei'ce attack was made upon 
Devins' little band (about six hundred 
and fifty men) Ity the Confederates under 
Colonels Jenifer and Hunton. Pressed 
by the cavalry in front and by the infant- 
ry on the left, Devins was com])elled to 
fall back towards the edge of the bluff. 
He rutired about sixty paces, and took 
a position about half a mile in front of 
Colonel Lee, who had advanced and 
occupied Harrison's Island and the 
heights after the departure of Devius 
in the morning. Meanwhile Baker, 
who had been ordered forward to rein- 
force Devins, if he judged such a course 
desirable, otherwise to Avithdraw alJ 
the troops to the Maryland shore, had 



54 



MINOR BATTLES. 



arrived on the scene. In circumstances 
of almost unparalleled difficulty, he had 
succeeded in getting his men across the 
river. At a glance he saw that he had 
no choice. It was too late to attempt 
to withdraw the troops Outranking 
Devins, he immediately took command, 
and assumed the responsibility of carry- 
ing on the fight. He had reason to 
believe that McCall was close at hand ; 
and he naturally enough concluded that 
on hearing the sound of musketry he 
would hurry to the scene of action. 
He did not know that McCall, having 
been ordered to withdraw his troops 
from Drainsville, was already on his 
way back to his camp near the Chain 
Bridge, and that General Smith, who, 
with one of McCall's divisions, was 
within supporting distance, was without 
any special instructions. Getting his 
men into battle order. Baker put forth 
almost superhuman efforts to resist the 
attack of the enemy. But the ground 
was unfavorable, and the opposing 
force was strong. About three o'clock 
in the afternoon the firing became gen- 
eral. Bramhall and French had scarcely 
got their guns into position when they 
were both wounded and carried from 
the field. Shortly afterwards a greater 
calamity followed. Baker, who seemed 
everywhere present, encouraging the 
men by word and deed, fell dead upon 
the field, pierced by many bullets. The 
battle had lasted two hours. On the 
death of Baker, first Lee, then Coggs- 
well, his superior, took the control of 
afPairs. The situation had become des- 
pei'ate ; and there M^as no sign of rein- 
forcements. Presised on flank and front 



with an OTerwhelming force, and with 
the deep waters of the turbulent river 
in their rear, Coggswell resolved to 
move to the left and cut his way through 
to Edwards' Ferry. At this moment, 
and just as the movement was about to 
be made, the Tammany Regiment, mis- 
taking a Confederate ofiicer for a Na- 
tional one, made a rush in the direction 
indicated by his signs. Thrown out of 
position, a decimating fire was poured 
upon the whole column by the Thir- 
teenth Mississippi. Coggswell's plan 
was now impossible. The enemy was 
closing in upon them at every poin'.,. 
A retreat was now ordered to Harri- 
son's Island and thence across to the 
Maryland shore. The retreat soon be- 
came a rout. The Confederates pressed 
forward, and driving the Nationals be- 
fore them with bayonet and bullet, they 
quickly took possession of the heights. 
Down the slippery sides of the bluff 
the Nationals rushed in the wildest con- 
fusion ; and while the struggling mass, 
crowding to the water's edge, sought 
for boats in vain, some of them plunging 
into the water and attempting to swim 
to the island, others floating on logs, 
the enemy continued to pour down up- 
on them the most destructive fire. It 
was no longer a battle. It was a butch- 
ery. Of the National troops at least 
300 were killed; and more than 700 
were wounded or made prisoners. At 
least one-half of Coggswell's command, 
including himself and Colonel Lee, fell 
into the enemy's hands. Colonel Devins 
escaped on horseback and swam across 
the river. Ball's Bluff can only be 
regarded in the light of a tempoiajy 



WILSON'S CEEEK. 



» 



naiisfortime. It did not seriously affect 
the future of the war. The mishap 
was brought al)Out partly by the rash- 
ness of General Stone and partly by 
the imperfect arrangements made by 
Genei'al McClellan. It was a misfor- 
tune, however, redeemed by the bravery 
exhibited by the National troops. The 
army of the Potomac did much on that 
sad day to wipe out the disgrace in- 
curred by the battle of Bull Run. By 
the death of General Baker the Union 
cause lost one of its ablest men — a 
man as brave in the field as he was 
skilful at the bar and powerful in the 
Senate. 

While these events were taking place 
in Virginia, thei'e was some severe fight- 
ing going on in Missouri. The Confed- 
erates had put forth their best eiforts 
to secure the State. When the battle 
of Bull Run was fought. General Lyon, 
who had succeeded General Harney in 
the chief command of the National forces 
in the West, was lyiiig at Springfield 
waiting for reinforcements. Meanwhile 
General John C. Freraont, who had 
been prominently before the people as 
the Republican candidate for the presi- 
dency in 1856, in obedience to a popu- 
lar call, had been appointed to the com- 
July mand of the Western Department. 
*• Great things were expected from 
Fremont. It was the general belief that 
those qualities which he had revealed 
as an explorer would stand him in good 
stead on the battle field. Whether 
from incapacity or from radical differ- 
ence of opinion between himself and 
the government at Washington, Fre- 
mont proved a failure. The high hopes 



which had been formed of him were 
not to be fulfilled. Towards the close 
of July, Lyon, dreading that if he 
should wait longer he would soon be 
overwhelmed by the Confederate troops 
which were pouring over the southern 
frontier of Missouri, resolved to strike 
at once ^vith the forces at his disposal. 
He had not more than five thousand 
five hundred men. The enemy num- 
bered at least twelve thousand. On 
the 1st of August a skirmish oc- j\u<r, 
curred at Dug Springs. Lyon !• 
gained some slight advantage ; but he 
found it impossible to hinder the junc- 
tion of the two columns of the enemy. 
Retreat in the circumstances would 
have been attended with great peril. 
He therefore resolved to resume the 
offensive. Audacity he thought might 
compensate for the want of numbers. 
Ordering Colonel Sigel, with 1200 men 
and six guns, to gain the enemy's real 
by the right, he was ready by the earlj 
dawn to strike the meditated blow, 
Sigel was at the appointed place ii 
time. It was the 10th of August. \na^ 
At five o'clock in the morning the '^" 
line of battle was formed. The forward 
movement was towards the extreme 
northern point of the Confederate camp. 
The first onset was terrific. The Con- 
federates' pickets were driven in ; and 
Totten's battery being hurried forward, 
the enemy yielded and were driven by 
Lyon's infantry to the adjoining heights. 
No such hand to hand fighting had oc- 
curred since the commencement of the 
war. But the enemy had the advantag's 
in numbers. Lyon behaved admirably. 
He was twice wounded, and his horse 



56 



MINOR BATTLjiS. 



was shot under him. Colonel Mitchell 
of the Second Kansas was killed when 
leading his men to the charge. As 
Mitchell fell, the cry was raised by his 
troops, " Who shall lead us now ? " "I 
will lead you. Come on, brave men," 
said the wounded and bleeding Lyon. 
A few moments aftenvards he was shot 
through the heart. The battle contin- 
ued to rage, Major Sturgis having 
taken command. Meanwhile Sigel's 
brigade had been overwhelmed. He 
had lost five of his guns and more than 
one-half of his men. Like a rock in mid- 
ocean the Union men stood tirm, the 
Confederate forces dashing against them 
in vain. At one moment, it seemed as 
if the line would break. But Dubois' 
battery dashed forward from the rear, 
and poured a destructive volley into the 
Confederate right wing. The entire 
line was thrown into confusion ; and in 
broken masses they fell back to the 
shelter of the wood. At the same 
time their wagon train was seen to 
be on fire. It was now eleven o'clock. 
The battle had lasted nearly six hours. 
A retreat was ordered to Springfield, 
about nine miles distant. Tlie ene- 
iiy did not pursue. On the follow- 
ing morning at three o'clock the en- 
tire army under General Sigel retreat- 
ed to Rolla, one hundred and twenty- 
five miles distant, in a government train. 
The battle of Wilson's Creek, as this 
fight was called, is claimed as a Confed- 
erate victory. It would be more cor- 
rect to call it a di'awn battle. The Na- 
tionals lost 223 killed, 721 wounded, 
292 missing. The Confederate loss was 
correspondingly great. 



The capitulation of Lexington, after a 
seige of eight days by General g^p. 
Sterling Price, followed close up.- 20. 
on the battle of Wilson's Creek; and 
Fremont, partly because he failed to 
come to the aid of Colonel Mulligan and 
his heroic gari'ison at Lexington, and 
partly for other reasons, was relieved 
from his command. General H. jjot. 
W. Halleck arrived at St. Louis, 18. 
and took charge of the Western Depart- 
ment on the 18th of November. 

Kentucky, as may readily be im- 
agined, was eagerly coveted by the Con- 
federacy. The slaveholJing interests 
were large ; and it was necessary for 
the welfare of the secession movement 
that they should be protected. The oc- 
cupation of this State was in fact con- 
sidei'ed a military necessity. From the 
first, however, Kentucky had manifested 
great un\^'illingness to sever itself from 
the Union. But the gov<;rnor, Magoffin, 
who had been elected ais a Democrat in 
1859, was a retl-hot se«*essionist. To 
President Lincoln's call for troops he 
had rudely responded, i-efusing to fur 
nish the quota required of the State. 
On two successive occasions — on Janu- 
ary 18th and on April 28th, 1861— he 
summoned an extra session of the Legis- 
lature for the purpose of calling a State 
Convention. On both occasions the 
Legislature refused to call a Convention 
or in any way comply with his wishes ; 
on the latter occasion going so far as to 
resist his demand for three millions of 
dollars for the purpose of arming the 
State, and even amending the militia 
laws so as to require the State Guard 
to take an oath of allegiance to the 



KENTUCKY AND MAGOFFIN. 



6t 



Union. At a meeting held in Louisville 
April 18th, immediately after the cap- 
ture of Fort Sumter, it was resolved 
that Kentucky Avas in sympathy with 
those who have an interest in the pro- 
tection of slavery, but that she acknowl- 
edges her fealty to the United States, 
until its government becomes regardless 
of her rights in slave property. The 
loyal sentiments of Kentucky were still 
furt'ier manifested at the election of del- 
egates to the Peace Convention (May 
4th). On this last occasion Kentucky 
gave a Union majority of fifty thousand 
votes. 

Kentucky, it is thus seen, had by 
large majorities, and on repeated occa- 
sions, declared her xinwillingness to join 
in the secession movement ; but Gov- 
ernor Magoffin, being in perfect sympa- 
thy with the rebel cause, was the willing 
and useful instrument in the hands of 
the Confederate leaders. In a letter to 
Aug. President Lincoln, dated August 
'9. 19th, he declared that the people 
of his State earnestly desired to avoid 
any war entanglements, that they had 
been guilty of no rebellion, and that 
therefore the National troops now en- 
camped oa their soil ought at once to 
be removed. In his reply, the president, 
after reminding him that the troops 
complained of were all Kentuckians, 
said, " I most cordially sympathize with 
your Excellency in the wish to preserve 
the peace of my own native State, Ken- 
tucky ; but it is with regret I search 
for and cannot find in your not very 
short letter any declaration or intima- 
tion that you entertain any desire for 
the preservation of the Federal Union" 



On the 3d of September, in a message 
to the Legislature, the governor Sep, 
again complained of the aggres- ^' 
sions of the North, and declared it to 
be his opinion that Kentucky would 
never renounce her sympathy with her 
aggrieved sister States of the South. 
The Legislature was not to be moved. 
They resolved that the neutrality of 
Kentucky had been violated by the 
Confederate forces, requested the gov- 
ernor to call out the militia to expel 
them, and at the same time invoked the 
United States to grant aid and assist- 
ance. These resolutions the governor 
had the hardihood to veto ; but the 
Legislature returned to the charge, and 
passed them over his veto by large and 
overwhelming majorities. 

The young men of the State had most 
of them, yielding to the enthusiasm of 
the moment, adopted the cause of seces- 
sion ; but the older men, the fathers of 
the State, true to the principles of their 
youth, and wisely fearful of the risks 
of rebellion, remained faithful i) the 
Union. Crittenden, the United Hates 
senator from Kentucky, who had persist- 
ed so devotedly in his well-meant effort 
to avert civil war by conciliation and 
compromise, now that he despaired of 
peace, did not hesitate to take a firm 
stand for the Union. By this action his 
house was divided. One of his sons had 
taken up arms in behalf of the Southern 
Confederacy, a cause which his father 
proclaimed to be unholy, and its pro- 
moters deserving of the severest punish- 
ment. Prentiss, too, the veteran editor 
of the Louisville Journal, while man- 
fully serving his country with all the 



58 



MINOR BATTLES. 



power of his vigorous pen, was foi-ced 
into a conflict with his own child, who 
fought in the ranks of the Confederates. 
These are but two illustrations of the 
effects of the unhappy civil struggle in 
Kentucky, where it had not only de- 
ifitroyed political harmony, but domestic 
concord. "Thousands of other exam- 
ples," wrote one who was deeply grieved 
by the state of things around him, 
" might be readily gathered in the Bor- 
der States. Those at the extreme North 
and South, though they may be suffer- 
ing from the ordinary evils of war, have 
no conception of its horrors as waged in 
Kentucky and Missouri." 

As if impatient of further delay, the 
Confederates resolved to disregard the 
sentiments of the people of Kentucky, 
and take a firm footing in the State. If 
they could not use it as a bulwark, they 
were resolved to use it as a battle field. 
It had always been the favorite plan of 
the Confederate General Pillow to seize 
Columbus, a commanding position about 
twenty miles below the mouth of the 
Ohio, and so fortify it as to make it 
command the Mississippi, and blockade 
that river completely. The position 
was all the more advantageous that 
from Columbus to Bowling Green there 
was a railroad connection. General 
Polk, who had formerly been a bishop 
of the Protestant Episcopal Church, but 
who had exchanged his ecclesiastical 
restments for those of the soldier, and 
abandoned the crosier for the sword, 
resolved to carry out this plan. In his 
first general •rder he showed that, al- 
though he had temporarily retired from 
the sacred oflice, he had not forgotten 



how to use his spiritual weapons. " The 
invasion of the South," lie said, "by the 
Federal armies has brought with it a 
contempt for constitutional liberty, and 
the withering influences of the infidelity 
of New England and of Germany com- 
bined." Polk had previously been as- 
signed to the command of a department 
which extended from the mouth of the 
Arkansas uoilhward on both sides of 
the Mississippi. On the 4th of sep. 
September he advanced and seized *• 
Hickman and Columbus. A pretense 
of opposition was made by the C.:>nfed- 
erate secretary of war. Walker, who 
ordered Polk to withdraw his troops 
from Kentucky ; but from Jefferson 
Davis, whom Polk had notified of the 
movement, a telegram was received say- 
ing, "The necessity justifies the act." 
On the same day that Polk invaded 
Kentucky on the west, General Zollikof. 
fer entered it on the east, on the ground 
that the step was necessary for the safe- 
ty of Tennessee. In a brief space of 
time Polk was successful in converting 
Columbus into an almost impregnable 
fortress, having got into ])Osition not 
fewer than one hundred and twent}' 
heavy guns, and having gathered around 
him from 25,000 to 30,000 men. At 
this time Anderson, of Fort Sumter re- 
nown, was in command of the army of 
the Cumberland. General William T. 
Sherman was Anderson's lieutenant. 
It was the earnest desire and hope of 
the loyal people of Kentucky that An- 
derson would promptly come to their 
aid and drive out the invader. Neither 
Anderson nor Sherman came up to tlie 
requirements of the situation. Ander- 



BELMONT. 



59 



«on fell sick ; and the command devolved 
upon Sherman, who brought upon him- 
self some ridicule by declaring that it 
would require an army of two hundred 
thousand men to expel the Confederates 
from Kentucky. An attempt at relief 
was to come from another source. 

As soon as it became known that 
General Polk had invaded Kentucky 
with the ti'oops of anothei' State, General 
Ulysses S. Grant, then in command of 
the district around Cairo, made up his 
mind to disregai'd the delusive neutral- 
ity which had been so long maintained, 
and to take possession of Paducah, a 
town situated at the junction of the 
Ohio and Tennessee rivers, and some 
forty-seven miles east of Cairo. The 
strong position which the enemy had 
taken at Columbus and Hickman on 
the Mississippi, and the advance of 
troops from Tennessee into other parts 
of Kentucky, had rendered the posses- 
sion of Paducah absolutely necessary 
for the protection of Cairo. In his pro- 
clamation. Grant said he had come sole- 
ly for the purpose of defending the 
State from the aggressions of the Con- 
federate troops and to protect the rights 
of all citizens. If, however, it should 
be manifest tbat tbey were aljle them- 
selves to maintain the authority of the 
government, he promised to withdraw 
the forces under his conunand. The 
foresight and promptitude exhibited by 
Grant in making himself master of Pa- 
ducah were characteristic of the man. 
The same qualities were destined to se- 
cure him victory on many a battle field, 
and to carry him afterwards to the high- 
est position in the land. In obedience 



to instructions from General Fremont 
to make some co-operative movements, 
Grant, who had already greatly strength- 
ened Paducah by erecting fortifications, 
had thrown a pontoon bridge across 
the Ohio, half a mile below the town, 
had seized and occupied Smith Bend, 
and had thus cut the Confederates off 
from two important sources of supply, 
resolved to threaten Columbus by at- 
tacking Belmont, a small village and 
landing place on the Missouri side of 
the river and directly opposite Colum- 
bus. He had learned that the Confed- 
erate General Price was receiving rein- 
forcements from Polk; and he hoped 
that, by making himself master of Bel- 
mont, he would break up the connection 
between them. Having arranged some 
side movements for the purpose of dis- 
tracting the attention of Polk, Grant, 
with about three thousand troops, in 
four steam transports, and having for 
convoy the two wooden gunboats Tyler 
and Lexington, commanded respectively 
by Captains Walke and Stemble, sailed 
down the Mississippi from Cairo on 
the evening of November 6. At iVor, 
Island No. 1, eleven miles above <>• 
Columbus, they halted for the night. 
There Grant learned that Polk was 
sending ti'oops across to cut off Oglesby, 
whom, in compliance with Fremont's 
request, he had previously sent off to 
assist Carlin in driving Thompson into 
Arkansas. At an early hour on the 
following morning he landed his jfo^j 
forces at Hunter's Point, on the ?• 
Missouri side of the river, and about 
three miles above Belmont. A battalioi» 
was left to guard the transports. Tbi' 



60 



MINOR BATTLES. 



remainder advanced and formed in line 
about two miles above the village. The 
gunboats meanwhile moved down and 
opened fire on the Confederate batteries 
on the Iron Banks. The centre of the 
attacking colunni was under Colonel 
Fouke, the right under Colonel Buford, 
the left under Colonel Logan. It was 
evident that Polk had been taken by 
siu'prise. General Smith, whom Grant 
had sent ahead the day before, was 
threatening him at Mayfield, in his rear, 
and he had been making his prepara- 
tioris to resist an attack in that direction. 
DoUins and Delano's cavalry were or- 
dered forward to scour the woods. It 
was not long before they encountered 
the enemy, in considerable force. About 
a mile and a half from the enemy's camp 
the line of battle was formed. Behind 
an abatis of felled trees which smTound- 
ed the camp lay the Thirteenth Arkan- 
sas and Ninth Tennessee. There was 
also opposite Gi'ant's left a battery of 
seven guns, commanded by Colonel 
Beltzhoover. This battei-y was pro- 
tected by Colonel Wright's Tennessee 
regiment. In the face of a destructive 
fire, on the National forces rushed. 
Meanwhile the batteries of Columbus 
had shifted the heavy fire from the gun- 
boats to the advancing line. The guns, 
however, were not in range, and as yet 
they did no harm. Nothing daunted, 
Grant pressed forward his men. In 
spite of the galling fire, onward they 
moved, charging over the fallen timber, 
capturing the battery and driving the 
enemy back across the low ground to- 
wards the river, and compelling some 
of them to take to their boats. In a 



brief space of time the heavy guns at 
Columbus were got into range, and 
the deadly bullets crashed through the 
woods, over and among the advancing 
and triumphant Federals. A second 
and a thii'd time was the retreating foe 
overtaken ; and although reinforced and 
disposed to resist to the last, they were 
ultimately routed, some of them seeking 
shelter behind buildings near the river, 
some in the woods above the camp, and 
others imder cover of the batteries at 
Columbus. It was a complete victory. 
The National troops gave themselves 
up to the wildest excitement. As yet 
discipline in the army was loose. In 
the face of Polk's batteries, three cheers 
were given for the Union ; and while 
some of the soldiers were delivering 
stump speeches, others were rifling the 
baggage or supplying themselves with 
the arms which the discomfited rebels 
had thrown down in their flight. 

Although the victory was complete, 
the place was untenable, commanded 
as it Avas by the heavy guns of Colum- 
bus. While these were brought to l)ear 
upon the National troops in the midst 
of their wild abandonment, Polk or- 
dered General Cheatham to cross the 
river above with his regiments, for the 
purpose of cutting Grant off from his 
flotilla. At the same time he himself 
crossed with two regiments to take part 
in the pursuit. I'ive thousand fresh 
men were thus at hand to hinder or 
harass the retreat. Grant, however, was 
equal to the situation. Getting his men 
in order, he pressed forward to the 
lauding place. Wliile compelled to cut 
his way through the ranks of the ene- 



GEANT'S LESSON. 



61 



my, be "was exposed to a raking five 
ii'om the Confederate batteries on the 
Iron Banks. The fighting was terrific. 
After severe suffering, the landing place 
was reached; and under cover of the 
gunboats, which had come up, and which 
kept the enemy at bay, the embarkation 
was completed. By five o'clock in the 
afternoon, the flotilla, with the entire 
force on board, was on its way back to 
Cairo. Grant carried with him, in ad- 
dition to all his own men, two of Beltz- 
hoover's heavy guns. The estimated 
National loss was 480 men in killed, 
wounded and missing. That of the ene- 
my was 642. The Confederates claimed 



the victory at Belmont, and exulted 
accordingly. " Accept for yourself," 
wrote Jefferson Davis to General Polk, 
"and the officers and men imder your 
commar;d, my sincere thanks for the 
glorious contribution you have just 
made to our common cause." Belmont 
was nevertheless abandoned as untena- 
ble the day after the battle. It is no 
disparagement to the men who fought 
on the Confederate side to say that if 
the opposing forces had been equal,' 
the result might have been different. 
Belmont taught General Grant a lesson 
which he never afterwards forgot — ^the 
value of numbers. 



CHAPTER V. 

jjioekade of the Southern Ports.— Naval and Coast Operations. —General Butler.— Big Bethel and Little Bethel. — 
Death of Winthrop and Greble.— Butler Believed of his Command. — General John E. Wool. — The Hatteras 
Expedition. — Butler and Stringham in Command. —Forts Hatteras and Clark. — Landing the Troops. — The Bom- 
bardment.— The Monticello Aground.— The Nationals in Fort Clark. — The Mistake. —The Second Day.— Decep- 
tion on the part of the Confederates.— The Bomb-Proof.— The White Flag.— The Forts Occupied by the Nation- 
als.— Great Joy in the North. — Colonel Hawkins Closing up the Passages to the Sound. — Roanoke Island. — The 
Scheme of the Ocracoke. — Chicamaeomico. — The Steamtug Fanny. — Capture of the Fanny by the Confede- 
rates. — The Failure of the Expedition to Chicamaeomico. — The Confederates Land on Hatteras Island. — Brown's 
Ketreat. — The Confederates Driven from Hatteras Island. — Gulf of Mexico. — Fort Pickens. — "Billy" Wilson 
and His Zouaves. —Warrington Navy Yard. — Burning of the Dry Dock. — Burning of the Juda. — Battle of Santa 
Kosa. — "Death to Wilson. " — The Confederates Defeated. — "Billy" Wilson's Letter. — Fort McRae. — General 
Braxton Bragg. — Fort Pickens Opens Fire on Bragg's Works. — Two Daj's' Bombardment. — The Mouths of 
the Mississippi. — The Southwest Pass. — The Boast of HoUins. — The Manassas. — Her Attack on the Rich- 
mond. — What She Might Have Done. — The Port Royal Expedition. — General T. W. Sherman. — Samuel F. 
Dupont. — Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Roads. — A Magnificent Spectacle. — Sealed Orders. — The 
Storm.— The Fleet Dispersed. — Saved from the Perils of the Deep. — Place of Destination Known. — The 
Confederates Forewarned. — Port Royal. — Forts Walker and Beauregard. — Preparations for the Attack. — The 
Flan.— The Attack.— The Forts Abandoned.— A Great Victory. — Negro Misrule.— Bay of St. Helena.— Warsaw 
Sound. — The Union Flag floating over Georgia. — Port Royal Ferry. — Naval and Laud Expedition to Port Royal 
Ferry. — Heavy Cannonading by the Gunboats. — The Fort Abandoned. — The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders.- - 
The Eighth Michigan. —A Flag of Truce. —Sunset. —The End of the First Day.— The Enemy Reappears in 
the Morning.— The Gunboats Rake the Woods.— The Battle Ended.— The Coast Expeditions so far Successful 



Almost immediately after the inau- 
guration of President Lincoln, the 
attention of the government was 



directed to the necessity of blockading 
the southern ports. A proclamation 
was accordingly issued, announcing that 



aoi 



62 



NAVAL AND COAST OPEKATIONS. 



an insurrection had broken out in South 
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, that 
in those States the revenue dues could 
no longer be collected, that the persons 
combined in this insun-ection had threat- 
ened to grant letters of marque against 
the commerce of the United States, and 
that therefore the ports of the aforesaid 
States were forthwith blockaded. A 
April little later, on the 27th of April, 
27' another proclamation was issued ; 
and the ports of Virginia and North 
Cai'olina were included. This was fol- 
lowed on the part of the South by the 
authorization of privateers. The at- 
tempt to effect a blockade on the part 
of the North, and the authorization of 
privateers on the part of the South, 
necessarily gave birth to land and naval 
encounters of greater or lesser impoi"t- 
ance. In a history of the Battles of 
the Civil War, these cannot be omitted 
vpithout marring the completeness of 
the work. It will, therefore, be our ob- 
ject in this chapter to group together a 
few of the more important of these na- 
val and coast opei-ations. 

Attention is first called to the coast 
of North Cai'olina. At the commence- 
ment of the war, General Butler made 
himself conspicuous by his vigorous 
conduct in suppressing the Baltimore 
riots, and by so establishing order in 
Maryland that that State never again 
wavered in its loyalty to the government 
at Washington. Butler's conduct of 
affairs at Baltimore, successful as it was, 
did not meet the approval of General 
Scott. It could hardly have been other- 
wise. General Scott had spent a long 



lifetime in camp and field. He was a 
strict disciplinarian, and, from natural 
instinct as from training and lifelong 
habit, a man of order. General Butler 
had purpose and will ; but he was to- 
tally without military experience ; and it 
was of all things the most natuial that, 
judged by the high standard of such a 
man as General Scott, he should be 
found wanting. Butler was or- jfay 
dered to take command at Fort- 22. 
ress Monroe. Soon after his arrival 
there, he found himself at the head of 
twelve thousand troops. Magruder lay 
in front of him at Yorktown, having 
outposts at Big Bethel and Little Bethel, 
with a force amounting in all to not 
more than eight thousand. With the 
exception of the fortress, the entire pen- 
insula was in the hands of the Confed- 
erates. Butler being considerably rein- 
forced, resolved to extend the area of 
his authority. He had but little difficul- 
ty in making himself master of Hampton 
and Newport News. His subse- May 
queut efforts against Little Bethel 27. 
and Big Bethel were less fortunate. 
Little acquainted with the ground — lit- 
tle acquainted, indeed, with the art of 
war, and influenced by the counsels of 
men who were less experienced than 
himself, he fell into a series of blunders, 
the veiy reverse of creditable to the 
National army. There was no lack of 
heroism on the part of the troops ; but 
the management was wretched. In 
Major Theodore Winthrop and in June 
Lieutenant Greble, both of whom ^^' 
were killed, the North lost two promis- 
ing young officers ; but Big Bethel and 
Little Bethel will be remembered ii' 



HATTERAS INLET. 



63 



connection with National disaster and 
National disgrace. It was an ill-fated 
expedition ; and it was visited with the 
worst of all kinds of punishment — con- 
demnation by the whole people. 

Butler was relieved of his command, 
Major-General John E. Wool having 
been appointed to take his place. 
Butler had no duty assigned to him. 
Wool, as generous as he was far-seeing, 
gave him command of all the volunteer 
troops outside the fortress. Butler 
again found his opportunity. Informa- 
tion had, some short time before, been 
conveyed to Commodore Stringham, 
then commanding at Hampton Roads, 
that Hatteras Inlet was being freely 
used by English blockade runners, 
which were supplying the Confederates 
with arms, ammunition, and clothing. 
Stringham communicated the fact to 
Butler ; and Butler reported to Wash- 
,ington, suggesting that land and naval 
forces should be sent to capture the 
forts at the inlet, and close up the pass- 
age. The suggestion was acted upon ; 
and a squadron of vessels, on which 
were to be conveyed some nine hundred 
men, noAV lying in Hampton Roads, 
was got in immediate readiness. To 
General Butler was assigned the com- 
mand of the troops. Commodore String- 
ham took command of the squadron. 

Silas H. Stringham was born at New- 
burg, New York, in the year 1796. 
His first naval service was as midship- 
man, on board the frigate President, 
Commodore Rodgers, in ISOf). In 1830 
he commanded on the West India sta- 
tion. From 1835 to 1837 he held a 
command in the Mediterranean. He 



subsequently commanded the Porpoise, 
the Independent, and the Ohio. When 
the Mexican war broke out, he was in 
command at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
He again took charge of the Ohio ; and 
in the successful bombardment of Vera 
Cruz and in the capture of the Castle 
of San Juan d'Ulloa, it was he who led 
the squadron. From 1852 to 1855 he 
was in command of the Mediterranean 
squadron. From the time of his return 
to the commencement of the war, he 
was in charge of the Charlestown Navy 
Yard, Massachusetts. He left that post 
to take chief command of the naval 
force blockading the hostile States. 
While on this service, he was called to 
take charge of the first naval expedi- 
tion. Stringham, it will thus be seen, 
was a man of large experience ; and it 
was everywhere felt that the expedition 
was safe in his hands. 

Butler took passage by the Minne- 
sota. His troops were on the transports 
George Peabody and Adelaide. In addi- 
tion to these vessels there were the Paw- 
nee, Monti cello, and Hamet Lane. The 
frigate Cumberland also was ordered to 
join the squadron. On the afternoon 
of Tuesday, August 27th, the jvujr^, 
ships were brought to anchor, 27. 
about eighteen miles from the cape ; 
and preparations were made for land- 
ing the troops early on the following 
morning. On the west end of Hat- 
teras Island, and commanding the in- 
let, were two forts, named respectively 
Hatteras and Clark. It was an'anged 
that the troops should land a short dis- 
tance up the beach, so as to be able to 
attack the forts in the reai', while the 



a 



navai. and coast operations. 



vessels should advance and assail them 
in front. Breakfast was served at four 
o'clock. The Cumberland, a sailing 
vessel, was taken in tow by the Wabash 
and dragged to her position. Both 
vessels opened fire about a quarter to 
ten o'clock. The flag-ship Minnesota 
shortly afterwards passed inside the 
other two and joined in the fight. Latei', 
the Susquehanna, which had also joined 
the expedition, came up and opened 
fire. Great difliculty was experienced 
in landing the troops. The breakers 
were high and beating heavily. The 
boats were dashed against the beach 
with great violence ; and one of them, 
belonging to the Pawnee, was actual- 
ly capsized. Fortunately no one was 
drowned. About three hundred men 
succeeded in effecting a landing, under 
cover of the guns of the Monticello and 
Hari'iet Lane. After four hours con- 
tinuous work, the firing ceased on both 
sides. The flags of the forts were taken 
down. It was believed by the Nation- 
als that both works were about to be 
surrendered. The Monticello moved 
cautiously into the inlet, followed by 
the Harriet Lane. As they entered, 
fire was immediately opened by Fort 
Hatteras; and it fell heavily on the 
Monticello. The other vessels, the Min- 
nesota, Susquehanna, and Pawnee now 
reopened fire. The contest was contin- 
ued until half-past six o'clock, when the 
whole squadron, with the exception of 
the Harriet Lane and the Pawnee, was 
withdrawn for the night. During the 
fight the Monticello unhappily ran 
aground ; and although she kept up a 
most vigorous fii'e on Fort Hatteras, dis- 



charging fifty-five shells in fifty minutes, 
it seemed for a time as if she could not 
escape destruction. At the close of the 
day's struggle she got off, and floated 
out of range of the guns. She had re- 
ceived seven eight-inch shot in her 
hull. The damage done, however, was 
not serious ; nor had she sustained the 
loss of a single man. Meanwhile some 
of the troops who had got on shore had 
had a singular experience. When the 
forts ceased firing, and the flasjs were 
taken down, they discovered that Fort 
Clark was abandoned, the men having 
fled to Fort Hatteras. Taking posses- 
sion of the abandoned fort, they raised 
over it the Union flag. Seeing the 
flag again raised, but unable to recog- 
nize it as their own, the war ships re- 
opened fire upon Fort Clark, and the 
National troops were compelled to re- 
tire to the landing. There they spent 
the night as best they were able. In 
the morning they did some good service 
by turning their rifled howitzer, which 
they had managed to carry with them, 
on some Confederate steamers which 
were lying off in the bay, compelling 
them to retire, and thus preventing 
any other than signal communications 
with Fort Hatteras. They were again 
placed in peril by the firing of the 
Pawnee ; and it was not until the white 
flag was hoisted that they were perfect- 
ly safe. 

In the morning the ships resumed 
the bombardment. An eleven- ^ug. 
inch shell was flung from the 2®- 
Susquehanna. Her example was fol- 
lowed by the Minnesota and the Wa- 
bash. The guns were admirably man- 



BC 



■ R'cf bi/CCESS. 



65 



aged; and it Avas yeen that e/ery shell 
was falling and exploding inside Fort 
Hatteras. The Hai'i'iet Lane ancl the 
Cumberland came up a little later, and, 
taking pai't in the fight, greatly added 
to the severity of the fire. For a time 
the Confederates continued to resist 
Avith great spirit. Once again they at- 
tempted to deceive by hauling doAvn 
the flag. This time, however, the Na- 
tionals were not to be caught. The fir- 
ing fi-om the ships continued, the shell 
falling thick and fast within the fort, 
and working terrible destruction. The 
garrison, unable any longer to endure 
the tremendous punishment they were 
receiving, had taken refuge inside the 
bomb-proof. Here, however, they were 
not long to be safe. An eleven-inch 
shell found its way through the ventila- 
tor and exploded in the midst of them. 
This was the determining shot of the 
day. Resistance now was no longer pos- 
sil)le. The Avdiite flag Avas raised and 
the firing ceased. General Butler, on 
board the tug Fanny, landed at the fort 
and demanded au unconditional surren- 
der. To this the Confederate command- 
er. Commodore Banon, objected, and 
Butler yielded so far as to agree that 
the ofiicers a)id men should be treated 
as prisoners of wai-. A treaty Avas 
signed by Cnmmodoi'e Stringham and 
Genei'al Butler on the one hand and by 
Commodore Bairoii, Colonel Martin, 
and Major Andrews on the other; and 
the Union flag floated once more over 
the forts conimamling Hatteras Inlet. 
Although the filing had been severe, 
there was little loss of lifc^. The loss 
*vas all on the s'uU^ of tlic Confederates. 



On the National side, according to Gen- 
eral Butler's report, not a man Avas 
killed or injured. 

The result of the Hatteras expedition 
Avas a great triumph for the North. All 
over that section the intelligence was 
received with transports of delight. It 
had, as was natural, a correspondingly 
depressing influence on the South. It 
was a gain to General Butler. He had 
redeemed his reputation, or rather he 
had made it. His instructions Avere to 
destroy the forts and not to hold them. 
Convinced that the forts should be held, 
he hurried to AVashington, and explain- 
ed his views to the government in per- 
son. The forts were held ; and Butler 
was commissioned by the secretary of 
AA'ar to go to NeAV England and "raise, 
arm, uniform, and e(£uip a volunteer 
force for the Avar." 

It Avas confidently expected that the 
success of the Hatteras expedition 
AA-ould enable the Nationals to seize 
and hold the Avhole coast of North Car- 
olina Avashed by the waters of Pamlico 
and Albemarle Sounds. This expecta- 
tion was not to be realized. On Butler's 
departure for Washington Colonel Hav/- 
kins Avas left in charge of the post at 
Hatteras. He h^d Avith him a portion 
of the Ninth Ncav York, a Zouave regi- 
ment. In September he Avas joined by 
Colonel Brown and the Twentieth Indi- 
ana regiment. Hawkins held the island 
of Hatteras and guarded the inlet. He 
proceeded to close uj) the passages from 
the sea to the tAvo sounds. Attention 
Avas first given to Ocracoke Inlet, a few 
miles down the coast from Hatteras. 
Lieutenant J. T. Maxwell was sent 



66 



NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 



thither, ■s\ith a detachment of marines 
and soldiers, on board the tugboat 
Fanny. An earthwork called Fort 
Ocracoke and the older Fort Morgan 
had been abandoned. Maxwell de- 
stroyed the forts and returned. 

Another expedition, to which even 
Sep. greater importance was attached, 
29' was sent up the island to a ham- 
let named Chicamacomico. It had be- 
come known that the Confederates had 
taken possession of Roanoke Island with 
three thousand men, and it was believed 
that their intention was to land on Hat- 
teras and make an attempt to recover 
what they had lost. Colonel Brown, 
with his Twentieth Indiana, was ordered 
to Chicamacomico to hold the enemy in 
check. The regiment, which was land- 
ed in small boats, was destitute of eve- 
r}'thing except a small quantity of pro- 
visions. All the supplies, camp equip- 
age, and intrenching implements had 
been put ou board the steamtug Fanny. 
This vessel was detained at the forts a 
day beyond the appointed time. She 
Oct, did not sail before the 1st of Oc- 
•• tober. On the evening of that 
day she appeared off the point; and 
when she was about to land her stores, 
three gunboats hove in sight and opened 
fire iipon her. The Fanny had time 
lu'ither to land her stores nor to make 
!ier escape. One boat only, with ten 
persons on board, had put off for land. 
These ten escaped. All the others, to 
the number of thirty-one, including sol- 
diers and sailors, together with the tug- 
boat and its precious freight, the latter 
equal in value to one hundred and fifty 
^i'ousand dollars, fell into the hands of 



the Confederates. The enterprise was 
completely defeated. Encouraged by 
this success, the enemy grew more 
bold ; and on the 4th of October oct. 
a squadron of six steamers, hav- ^« 
ing on board over two thousand men, 
appeared off Chicamacomico. Shells 
were immediately flung into the Nation- 
al camp ; and under cover of the fire, 
two bodies of men were landed, one 
above and one below the encampment, 
the object evidently being to surround 
the regiment and cut off its retreat. 
Brown succeeded in eluding the vigi- 
lance of the enemy and carried off his 
men ; but it was not until he had reach- 
ed the lighthouse at Cape Hatteras, 
after having marched twenty-eight miles 
and experienced great privation, that 
he felt himself perfectly safe. It was 
not without good reason that the Con- 
federates boasted loudly of this victory. 
It was a real victory, and was, besides, 
a positive gain. It enabled them to 
hold on to Roanoke Island — a posses- 
sion which, so long as they held it, gave 
them control of Loggerhead and Oregon 
Inlets, and thus neutralized to a large 
extent the victory won by Stringham 
and Butler. They were not, however, 
long permitted to remain on the island 
of Hatteras. Under the heavy firing of 
the Monticello and Susquehanna, they 
were soon compelled to take to their 
boats and fly for their lives. The great 
mistake committed in this expedition 
was in allowing the steamtug Fanny to 
sail without a pro}>er convoy. Skilful 
manafrement should have made such a 
disaster impossible. 

Movement.^ of this description were 



SANTA ROSA. 



67 



not confined to the. coast of North Caro- 
lina. Events quite as thrilling were 
taking place in the neighborhood of 
Fort Pickens, on the waters of the gulf 
of Mexico. That place had narrowly 
escaped being seized by the Pensacola 
insurgents in the spring ; and the island 
of Santa Rosa, on which Fort Pickens 
is built, had since June been guarded 
by the New York Sixth, known as Wil- 
son's Zouaves. Besides these troops 
there was a small blockading squadi-ou, 
with a garrison in the fort. Colonel 
" Billy " Wilson was somewhat of a 
character. His regiment, which had 
been raised almost entirely in New 
York, was composed of men who were 
never indisposed to a little riotous sport, 
and who knew nothing of feai-. For 
some months life was rather tame at 
Santa Rosa. Wilson and his men had, 
/however, contrived to make themselves 
specially obnoxious to the Confederates 
on the mainland. Descents on the coast 
were frequently threatened ; and the 
Confederate supply boats were al- 
ways in danger. It was not till the 
Sep. night of the 2d of September that 

2« anythhig of a serious nature oc- 
curred. On that night a party from 
Fort Pickens, under Lieutenant Shepley, 
crossed over and burned the dry dock 
at the navy yard at Warrington. On 
Sep. the night of the 13th the experi- 

'3« ment was repeated. At the head 
of about one hundred men. Lieutenant 
John H. Russel, of Commodore Mer- 
win's flag-ship Colorado, reached the 
navy yard; and before morning had 
boarded a large schooner called the 
Juda, then being fitted out as a pri- 



vateer, had spiked a ten-inch colum- 
biad with which she was armed, and 
bmTied the vessel to the water's edge. 
With the help of muffled oars, they 
managed to reach the ship, accomplish 
tlieir purpose, and get out of the reach 
of danger before the Confederates were 
aware of what had happened. 

Naturally enough, these repeated acts 
of daring and of violence roused the 
Confederates to a high pitch of excite- 
ment and of indignation. Such doings 
were no longer to be tolerated. The 
Nationals must be driven from Santa 
Rosa. Wilson's troops especially must 
be captured or destroyed. With this 
end in view, General Anderson, assisted 
by General Ruggles, gathered together 
about fifteen hundred men, mostly vol- 
unteers for this si^ecial service, from th(i 
various camps in the neighborhood of 
Pensacola. Embarking this force on 
the night of October 8th, on sev- oct. 
eral steamers, Anderson landed '^' 
next morning at Deer Point, Santa Rosa 
Island, some four or five miles to the 
east of the Zouave encampment. Ar- 
ranging his force into three divisions, 
he marched immediately upon the camp. 
The jiickets were driven in; and the 
Zouaves, little dreaming of their danger, 
found themselves beset by their furious 
antagonists. "Death to Wilson," "No 
quarter " — such were the cries which 
intimated too plainly the near presence 
and the deadly purpose of the Confed- 
erates. The night was unusually dark. 
The Zouaves, however, were not found 
wanting. Offering a stout resistance, 
and contesting the ground as they re- 
tired, they fell back in good order, 



68 



NAVAL AXD COAST OPERITIONS. 



under covl'v <>f the two batteries Lincoln 
iUKl Totten, situated on either side of 
the island, and about four hundred 
yards from Fort Pickens. Here they 
wei-e met by reinforcements from Foi't 
Pickens^two companies under Major 
Yogdes and other two under Major 
Arnold; and the combined force turned 
and charged upon the Confederates. The 
latter, meanwhile, had been rifling the 
camp and setting fire to the tents and the 
ban-acks. Not suspecting the sudden re- 
turn of the Nationals, Anderson's men 
were somewhat disorganized. It was 
their turn now to be taken by surprise. 
in the wildest confusion they rushed 
towards the boats, the Nationals pursu- 
ing and pouring volley upon volley into 
their disordered ranks. While embark- 
ing and making sail they suffered se- 
verely, one of their launches, loaded 
with men, being so riddled with bullets 
that it sank. The Confederates, it was 
estimated, lost l>y this affair about one 
hundred and fifty men. The National 
loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 
amounted to sixty-four men. Among 
the prisoners carried off was Major 
Vogdes. In a chai'acteristic letter, sent to 
General Arthur of New York, " Billy " 
Wilson says, "They are exhibiting my 
head and hair in Pensacola. The i-e- 
ward is already claimed ; also, an old 
flag which I nailed to a flagstaff on the 
Fourth of July, which has been left 
there ever since ; nothing left, however, 
but the stars. The ladies have cut it 
up in pieces, and have it pinned on 
their bosoms as a trophy. Every one 
in Pensacola has my sword and uniform. 
I must have had a large quantity of 



hair, plenty of swords and iniiforms. 
They say if I Avas to be taken alive, 1 
was to be put in a cage and exhibited.' 
Such was the battle of Santa Rosa. 

During the course of the next month 
Colonel Harvey Brown, who had charge 
of the gai'rison at Fort Pickens, acting 
in conjunction with flag-oflacer McKean, 
who was in command of the little block- 
ading squadron in the neighborhood, 
opened fire upon the Confederate works 
which lined the shore from the navy 
yard tii Fort McRae. After a bom- 
bardment of two days, November x^y. 
22-2?), the firing ceased, but not 22. 
until the village of Warrington was 
biu'ned. Fort McRae practically silenced, 
and great damage done to the navy 
yard. The Confederate fortifications on 
the mainland surrounding the harbor 
of Pensacola and in front of Fort Pick- 
ens were in charge of General Braxton 
Bragg. 

Still following along the coast in a 
westerly direction, we come to the 
mouths of the Mississippi. Here, late in 
the year 1861, occurred one of the most 
memorable, if not one of the most im- 
portant, of those coast engagements to 
which in this chapter we have been con- 
fining our attention. On the 1 2th Oct. 
of October the following despatch 12. 
startled alike North and South : 

•' FoKT Jacksost, October 12, 1861. 
" Last night I attacked the blockaders 
with my little fleet. I succeeded, after 
a very shoi't struggle, in driving them 
all aorround on the Southwest Pass bar, 
except the Preble, which I sunk. I 
captiu-ed a prize from them, and after 



HOLLINS' BOAST. 



69 



they Avere fast in the mud, I ]»eppered 
thera well. There were no casualties 
on GUI' side. It was a complete suc- 
cess, HOLLINS." 

What were the facts in this case? 
The Confederates had extempoiized a 
flotilla, consisting of a steam-ram called 
the Manassas, mounted with one sixty- 
foui'-pounder DaLlgren ; the steamer 
Calhoun, with one twenty-four-pounder 
Dahlgren ; the steamer Ivy, with an 
eight-inch thirty-two-pounder, ritled ; 
the steamer Jackson, with two eight- 
inch columbiads and a twenty-four- 
pounder, ritled ; and the cutter Pickens, 
with an eight-inch columbiad and four 
twenty-four-pound carronade.s. The Ma- 
nassas was originally the steamer Enoch 
Train, but had been completely recon- 
structed. In her new form she had a pe- 
culiar "ram "-like shape, and altogether 
had a formidable appearance. She was 
douV)le planked all over Avith wood of 
six feet in thickness. Her bow extended 
to a length of nine feet, and was made 
of the thickest and the strongest oak. 
The whole surface of the vessel was 
covered with iron plates two inches 
thick. Her hull rose above the water 
only about two feet and a quarter ; and 
her deck was covered in with a slantintr 
roof of heavy wood covered with iron 
plates. Below the water-mark, and pro- 
jecting from her bow, was an iron prow 
or borer, as thick as a man's arm, in- 
tended to pierce and sink any vessel 
she might choose to strike. She was 
one of the first of the ironclads ; and to 
the only ships which the National gov- 
ernment could as yet oppose to her, she 

X03 



was most undoubtedly a dangerous an- 
tagonist. 

This flotilla was put under the com- 
mand of Captain Hollins, an officer of 
immense pretension, })ut one who was 
remembered chiefly in connection with 
an exploit at San Juan, where he had 
indulged his vanity and passion for au- 
thority by burning an unoffending town. 
The blockade fleet on which Hollins 
intended to operate was composed of 
the war steamer Richmond, fourteen 
guns ; of the Vincennes, a sloop-of-war, 
twenty-one guns ; of the Preble, another 
sloop-of-war, sixteen guns ; and of the 
Water-Witch and Nightingale, both 
small steamers of one gun eacli. Hollins 
chose a dark night for his experiment. 
The Manassas was close to the Richmond 
before she was discovered ; and by the 
time the watch could give the alarm, 
her iron prow struck tlie Richmond 
"abreast the port fore-channels," tear- 
ing a coal schooner that was alongside 
from her fastenings, and penetrating 
the ship's side, making a hole about 
Ave inches in circumference and about 
two feet below the water-line. The 
]'am drew ofF, and falling aft, made an 
attempt to strike with her prow the 
Richmond's sterQ. The attempt was 
unsuccessful. Meanwhile, as the mon- 
ster passed, the Richmond gave it a 
volley from the port battery. The 
other sloops had been notifled of the 
appearance of the Manassas; and hav- 
ing slipped their cables, they ran down 
to the Pass, the Richmond covering their 
retreat. At about eight o'clock in the 
morning, the other vessels being inside, 
the Richmond and Vincennes grounded 



70 



NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 



while attempting to pass the bar. There 
they were bombarded by the Manassas ; 
and fire rafts were sent down to burn 
them. The fire rafts proved perfectly 
harmless; and at ten o'clock the Con- 
federate commodore withdrew, ran up 
to Fort Jackson, and sent news of his 
splendid victory to Richmond. After 
a fashion, Hollins had no doubt won a 
victory ; but he had done little damage 
to the National ships. A coal schooner 
had been bruised ; a boat had been 
sunk ; and Captain Pope's gig had been 
staved in. That was all. It was not 
wonderful, therefore, that when the 
true facts of the case became known, 
Hollins' famous exploit was made the 
subject of much merriment and ridicule. 
The Manassas, at this date, was by far 
the most powerful and efficient ship of 
war in North American waters; and, 
in capable hands, she might have anni- 
hilated the small blockading squadron, 
cleared the gulf, and swept the coast 
from Florida to Maine. As it was, she 
did little harm and some good. She 
taught the government at Washing- 
ton that other than wooden walls were 
now necessary, and that if the battle 
was to be fought at sea with any hope 
of success, ironclad must be confronted 
by ironclad, if not of equal tonnage, at 
least of equal power for resistance and 
attack. 

Later, in the fall, Hampton Roads 
presented a spectacle not unlike, but in 
some respects more imposing than, that 
witnessed towards the close of August, 
when Butler and Stringham set sail for 
Hatteras. It was also a land and naval 
annament, but on a grander scale, and 



was fitted out for the purpose of mak- 
ing a descent on the borders of lower 
South Carolina. The land force of the 
expedition had been assembled at An- 
napolis, in Maryland. It was about 
fifteen thousand strong, and was placed 
in charge of Brigadier-General T. W. 
Sherman. The fleet, which consisted of 
some seventy-seven vessels in all, in- 
cluding fourteen gunboats, thirty-four 
steamers, and twenty-six sailing vessels, 
was placed under the command of Com- 
modore S. F. Dupont. 

The commanders to whom this expe- 
dition was entrusted were well chosen. 

Thomas W. Sherman, not to be con- 
founded with W. T. SheiTQan, was a 
native of Rhode Island. He graduated 
at West Point in 1836, taking a high 
place in his class, and was appointed 
second lieutenant in the Third U. S. 
Aitillery in July of the same year. In 
1837 he was promoted to a first lieuten- 
ancy; and on May 28th, 1846, on the 
outbreak of the Mexican war, he was 
made captain. For his gallant conduct 
at Buena Vista, February 23d, 1847, 
he was brevetted major. On the form- 
ation of the Fifth Artillery, he was ap- 
pointed lieutenant-colonel, and in this 
capacity took part in the battle of Bull 
Ran. He was advanced to the rank of 
brigadier-general May 17th, 1861. 

Commodore Samuel F. Dupont waa 
born at Bergen Point, New Jersey, in 
1803. His father, a Frenchman, as the 
name indicates, came to the United 
States in 1799. The Delaware Mills, 
where is manufactured the famous 
"Dupont powder," were founded by 
an uncle ; and the works still remain in 



"THE GREAT ARMADA." 



n 



the possession of the family. Young 
Diipont entered the United States navy 
December 19th, 1815, having received 
from President Madison his warrant as 
a midshipman. His fii'st cruise was in 
the Franklin. When the Mexican war 
broke out, he was in command of the 
frigate Congress, but was transferred to 
the Cyane. It was he who transported 
Colonel Fremont, with his band of trap- 
pers and Indians, to San Diego, the 
Cyane bei»ig the first United States 
man-of-w»r to enter that harbor. After 
liis return from the Pacific, he was em- 
ployed in various ways and in different 
capacities, his high character, his knowl- 
edge of his profession, his powers of 
oi'ganization, and his business habits 
always revealing themselves and justi- 
fying the confidence reposed in him. 
In 1857 he sailed for China in the Min- 
nesota ; in 1860 he was placed in charge 
of the navy yard at Philadelphia ; and 
now, at the close of 1861, we find him 
at the head of this great naval expedi- 
tion. 

The fleet, with the troops on board, 
sailed out of Hampton Eoads and pro- 
Oct. ceeded to sea on the morning of 
29. the 29th of Octobei-. Never did 
any such expedition leave port under 
auspices, to outward appearances, more 
favorable. The sun rose and shone with 
unusual splendor, revealing the rich 
robes with which, in the late fall, na- 
ture ill those regions clothes herself. 
From an early hour the rampai'ts at 
Fortress Monroe were crowded with sol- 
diers; hearty hurrahs gi-eeted each vessel 
as it took its position ; while the military 
bands on the transports, striking up a 



succession of favorite tunes, intensified 
the general excitement and inspired all 
with hope. Sherman's troops were di- 
vided into three brigades, and were com- 
manded respectively by Generals Egbert 
L. Viele, Isaac I. Stevens, and Horatio 
G. Wright, each of the commanders, 
like Sherman himself, being a graduate 
of West Point Military Academy. The 
flag-ship Wabash led the way, the others 
following in three parallel lines, and 
from the vast space which they covered, 
as well as fi"om the order which they 
preserved, presenting a most magnificent 
spectacle. The weather continued good 
all day. It was a glorious night. The 
next day was all that could be wished. 
The vessels were still in the same order 
in which they started. On the second 
night it was still calm. There was no 
moon ; but the stars shining bright and 
clear, looked down upon a scene of 
rare and matchless beauty. With such 
weather dawned the morning of the 
third day ; and so clear was the atmos- 
phere and so uniniflHed the water, that 
a passenger on the Atlantic was able to 
count no fewer than thirty-eight of the 
vessels of the fleet. 

The objective point of the expedition 
had been studiously concealed from the 
public ; and it was unknown to the mas- 
ters and men of the different ships. It 
was known only to the govei'nment and 
to those in immediate command. To 
provide against mishap, however, sealed 
orders were on board every vessel. The 
great object of this secrecy was to ena- 
ble them to strike the intended point 
by surprise, and to accomplish their 
mission before the Confederates should 



NAVAL Ai\D COAST OPERATIONS. 



h 



have time to make preparations for 
their arrival. Such a course had been 
deemed advisable ; as recent experi- 
ence had shown that, from the number 
and efficiency of Southern spies, male 
and female, in the National cajiital, the 
plans of government were known to 
the authorities at Richmond before they 
were known to the public at Washing- 
ton. It even seemed as if the Richmond 
spy had found his way into the very 
council chamber of the president and 
his ministers. The precaution unfor- 
tunately was doomed to fail of its pur- 
pose ; but the failure itself disclosed 
the wisdom and foresight with which 
all the arrangements had been made. 

Toward the evening of the third day 
heavy clouds gathered and darkened 
the face of the sky, the wind began to 
rise, and everything indicated a coming 
storm. Come it did, and quickly ; and 
such a storm as has seldom raged along 
the southern coast. It literally scat- 
tered the ileet to the winds; and for a 
time it was feared that the '• Great Ar- 
mada," as it was fondly but somewhat 
ominously called, had been completely 
Nov. desti-oyed. On the morning of 
2» the 2d of November only one 
vessel could be seen from the deck of 
the Wabash. The first intelligence of 
the disaster reached the North through 
Southern sources, and, of course, was 
highly colored. The South was jubilant. 
The North, it w^as said, was Gp])osing it- 
self to fate. The elements were fighting 
in the interests of the Southern cause. 
"The stars in their courses fought 
against Sisera. The winds of heaven 
Were now fighting foi- th.' good cause of 



Southern independence. Let the De])0 
rahs of the South sing a song of deliv- 
erance." Such w^as the highly-wrought 
style in which Southern enthusiasm 
found expression. Affairs, however, 
were not quite so desperate as they 
seemed. The fleet, although dispersed, 
was not I'uined. In the isolated state in 
which the different vessels found them- 
selves, the sealed orders were opened ; 
and it was found that Port Royal was the 
place of rendezvous. On Sunday morn- 
ing, the 3d of Novembei', the stoi'ni be- 
gan to abate ; and the scattered vessels 
one by wne gathered around the flag- 
ship. On the following morning, jjov^ 
as early as eight o'clock, the Wa- *• 
bash anchored off Port Royal, accom- 
panied by twenty-five vessels, and being 
rapidly joined by the rest of the fleet. 
It was found that, during that fearful 
storm, some of the war-ships were saved 
by throwing their heavy guns over- 
board, that four transports Aveut down, 
but that, hapi)ily, not more than a dozen 
persons lost their lives. 

Saved from the perils of the deep, 
they were now to encounter perils of a 
different but not less alarming kind. 
The Confederates had done their best 
to niakt^ the navigation of the coast dif- 
ficult, if not impossible. All the light- 
houses were destroyed ; and all the 
l)eacons and buoys had been removed. 
Scientific skill, however, soon overcame 
these difficulties ; and with the help of 
Commander Charles H. Davis, the chief 
of staff, and Mr. Boutelle of the Coast 
Survey, the entrance to Poi't Royal 
Sound was found, and so marked ofl 
with Inioys that Dupont was able tc 



fORT ROYAL. 



73 



enter with his fleet. He was told that 
he could count with confidence on eight- 
een feet of water. The movement com- 
menced shortly after three o'clock ; and 
hy twilight all the vessels, which had 
arrived, were, with the exception of 
the Wabash, over the bar and anchored 
in the roadstead of Port Royal. Other 
difficulties, however, had to be encoun- 
tered. The Confederates, in conse- 
quence of the mishap which had be- 
fallen the fleet, had had ample time, 
after they became aware of the destina- 
tion of the expedition, to strengthen 
the works in the neighborhood of Port 
Royal, and otherwise to prepare them- 
selves for a vigorous and stubborn re- 
sistance. The time had not been lost. 
On the right of the entrance, on St. 
Philip's Island, at what is called Bay 
Point, stood Fort Beauregard. This 
was an earthwork; but it was carefully 
built, and mounted some twenty guns, 
several of them heavy rifles. It had an 
outwork, toward the sea, mounting five 
guns. On the left, on Hilton Head, 
stood Fort Walker. This was a regular 
work, with bastions and curtains. Built 
upon a bluff eight feet high, and mount- 
ing twenty-three guns, with an outwork 
on the sea front having a rifled gun. 
Fort Walker commanded not only 
Port Royal entrance, but the approach 
to the town of Beaufort by the Beau- 
fort River. Of the two works, it was 
by far the moi'e formidable. When 
che expedition arrived, Fort Walker 
was manned by some six hundred and 
twenty men, and was in charge of Gen- 
eral T. F. Drayton, a rich land-owner 
of the neighborhood. At Camp Look- 



out, about six miles from Fort Walker, 
was a small body of Scriven's guer- 
rillas, which was ultimately increased 
in strength to the number of nearly 
two thousand men. There were over 
six hundred men at Bay Point, under 
Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant. C»f this 
force one hundred and forty-nine gaiTi' 
soned Fort Beauregard, under the com- 
mand of Captain Stephen Elliott, jr., of 
Beaufort. Two miles further up, at 
the junction of the Beaufort and Broad 
Rivers, there was a fleet of five ov six 
gunboats, under Commodore Josiah Tat- 
nall, a veteran of the w^ar of 1812. 

A reconuoisance of the Confederate 
works was made on the 5th by the ]Vof 
Ottawa, supported by the Curlew, 5» 
Seneca, and Smith, when it was ascei-- 
tained that of the two forts. Fort Walkei 
was greatly the more powerful. The 
Wabash, which had been unable to cross 
with the other vessels, was now safely 
over the bar, and everything was ready 
for a movement against the enemy and 
his works. " The order of battle," to 
quote froniDupont's report, "comprised 
a main squadron, ranged in a line ahead 
and a flanking squadron, which was to 
be thrown off on the northern section 
of the harbor, to engage the enemy's 
flotilla, and prevent them taking the 
rear ships of the main line, when it 
I turned to the southward, or cutting off 
a disabled vessel." If this plan could 
be ■carried out, it would be impossible 
for Tatnall with his gunboats to hindev 
or in any way annoy the main body 
while carrying out instructions. " The 
plan of attack," to quote from the same 
authority, " was to pass up midway be- 



■u 



NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIOISI S. 



tween Forts Walker and Beauregard, 
receiving and returning the fire of both, 
to a distance about two and a half miles 
north of the latter. At that point, the 
line was to turn to the south around by 
the west and close in with Fort Walker, 
encountering it on its weakest flank, 
and at the same time enfilading in near- 
ly a direct line its two water faces." 
" When abreast of the fort, the engine 
was to be slowed, and the movement 
reduced to only as much as Avould be 
just sufficient to overcome the tide, to 
preserve the order of battle, by passing 
the batteries in slow succession, and to 
avoid becoming a fixed mark for the 
enemy's fire. On reaching the extrem- 
ity of Hilton Head, the line was to 
turn to the north by the east, and pass- 
ing to the northward, to engage Fort 
Walker with the port battery nearer 
than when first on the eame course. 
These evolutions were to be repeated." 
The ships were to pass the forts at eight 
hundred yards when moving to the 
south for the first time, but when mak- 
ing the second circuit they were to sight 
their guns for five hundred and fifty 
yards. This arrangement would make 
it next to impossible for the guns of 
the fort to strike the vessels. The latter 
would be in motion ; and they would be 
three hundred yai'ds nearer than when 
they passed at first. 

The captains were summoned on 
board the Wabash and received their 
'Nov. instructions. It was the 7th of 
?• NovemV)er. At eight o'clock the 
signal was made to get under way. 
At nine o'clock the signal was made 
for "close order." At about half-past 



nine the action was commenced, the 
first shot being fired from Fort Walker. 
The Wabash responded promptly. The 
Susquehanna quickly followed. The 
first prescribed turn having been made, 
the signal Avas given at a quarter past 
ten for "closer action." The Wabash 
came up, and passed Fort Walker at 
the distance, when abreast, of eight 
hundred yards. The Susquehanna and 
the others followed. A second time 
was the elliptical movement performed, 
the ships this time passing the fort and 
firing at a distance of less than six hun- 
dred yards. About this time, half -past 
eleven, the enemy's flag was shot away. 
Meanwhile good and effective work was 
being done by some of the smaller ves- 
sels, which had taken their stations at 
the enfilading point. It was evident 
that the garrison was becoming exhaust- 
ed. The firing was ali'eady feeble, from 
few guns, and at long intervals. After 
the third circuit, "the enemy had en- 
tirely ceased to reply, and the battle 
was ended." At a quarter past one 
P. M. the Ottawa signalled that the 
fort was abandoned. It was discovered 
a little later in the day that Fort Beau- 
regard, whose guns had been silent for 
some time, was also abandoned. At 
twenty minutes past two o'clock. Cap- 
tain John Rodgers, who had been sent 
on shore with a flag of truce, hoisted 
the Union flag over the abandoned work. 
At sunrise on the following morning 
the old flag was raised also over Fort 
Beauregard. The National loss during 
the engagement was thirty-one, of whom 
eight were killed. The Confederates 
reported a loss of fifty in all^of whom 



PORT ROYAL FERRY. 



75 



ten were killed. No life was lost in 
Fort Beauregard. Both forts were form- 
ally taken possession of, Fort Walker 
on the day of the battle by General 
Wright's brigade, Foi't Beauregard on 
the morning of the 8th by the brigade 
of General Stevens. The great object 
of the expedition had thus been accom- 
plished. 

It was of all things most natural that 
there should be great joy and rejoicing 
in the North. Over the soil of South 
Carolina, which was the first State to 
raise the standard of rebellion, the 
Union flacr was ao-ain floatinof. It was 
just as natural that the loss of Port 
Royal should have been felt to be an 
irreparable blow by the South. The 
feeling was universal that an important 
step had been taken on the part of the 
Nationals towards the recovery of the 
entire southern coast. 

General Sherman was not slow to 
take advantage of his victory. Hilton 
Head was greatly strengthened, and 
made a depot for supplies. An im- 
mense wharf was constructed; build- 
ings of various kinds were midtiplied ; 
and Hilton Head and Port Royal Island 
soon became great centres of life and 
industry. Beaufort, a delightful little 
town on Port Royal Island, and the fa- 
vorite summer reti-eat of the aristocracy 
of South Carolina, where some of them 
had built luxurious homes, hid from 
view by vine-covered verandahs, em- 
bosomed in groves of orange and lemon, 
and surrounded on all sides by the gor- 
geous plants and rich fruitage of the 
tropics, was entirely abandoned by the 
white population. For a few days 



Beaufort was entirely at the mercy of 
the negroes, who, in the homes of their 
former masters, gave themselves up to 
all manner of licentiousness, indulging 
in scenes of wildest revelry and waste- 
fulness. Beaufort was soon occupied 
by the National troops; and military 
order was substituted for barbarous li- 
cense. Meanwhile Dupont had sent his 
vessels in various directions, up the riv- 
ers, among the islands, and along the 
coast. Everywhere, it was found, the 
whites had fled, the slaves who had re- 
fused to accompany them remaining 
behind and occupying the plantations 
and houses. Expeditions were sent 
north towards the bay of St. Helena 
and south towards Warsaw Sound. 
Both were completely successful. The 
Confederates in truth having disappear- 
ed, there was no one to offer resistance. 
Both positions were of great strategic 
value, in view of future operations. 
The possession of the bay of St. Helena 
secured the command of large rivers 
communicating with the interior of 
South Carolina, as well as an excellent 
harbor — a harbor almost equal to that 
of Charleston itself. The possession of 
Warsaw Inlet and Sound secured the 
command of an enti'ance to the Savan- 
nah River, with a passage little inferior 
to that of Tybee, a little more to the 
north. Some days later, on the jfov, 
25th, Big Tybee Island was also 25. 
seized ; and Dupont was able to write 
to the secretary of war : " The fl;ig of 
the United States is flying over the ter- 
ritory of the State of Georgia." Al] 
along the coast, from Warsaw Sound, 
below the mouth of the Savannah, 



76 



NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 



northward as far as the North Edisto 
River, the National authority was su- 
preme. With ])ut two exceptions, every 
fort on the islands throughout that re- 
gion had been abandoned. Forts Pu- 
laski and Jackson, the one on Cockspur 
Jsland, at the mouth of the entrance, 
the other on the mainland of Georgia 
and above the other approaches from 
the sea, still remained in the hands of 
the Confederates, and eflfectually guard- 
ed the I'iver and city of Savannah. 

At one place only did the Confede- 
rates make a stand in defence of the 
islands off the coast of South Carolina 
and Georgia. It was known that they 
had a fortified camp at Port Royal 
FeiTy, on the Coosaw, and that they 
had collected a force there, under Gen- 
erals Gregg and Pope, some eight thou- 
sand strong. It was evidently their 
intention to shut up the Nationals in 
Port Royal Island — at least so to shut 
them up as to prevent them crossing to 
the mainland in the direction of Savan- 
nah. To this end they had placed ob- 
structions in the Coosaw River and the 
other streams and creeks which sep- 
arate the island from the mainland, 
and erected batteries at Seabrook, at 
Boyd's Creek, at Port Royal Ferry, 
and at other commanding positions. 
Dupont had already made an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to reach the Savannah 
River by way of Augustine Creek, 
in the rear of Fort Pulaski. This 
accomplished, he might have been able 
to cut off all communication with the 
tort, and take possession of the city 
of Savannah. The Confederates, how- 
ever, had been on their guard ; and the 



expedition failed. It Avas felt to be 
necessary to break up the fortified ca ap 
at Port Royal Ferry ; and with this t nd 
in view a joint land and naval force, vm- 
der Brigadier-General Stevens and Com- 
mander C. R. P. Rodgers was organized. 
The troops under Stevens consisted of 
Colonel Frazier's Forty-Seventh !»n(l 
Colonel Perry's Forty-Eighth New Yoik 
regiments; the Seventy-Ninth New 
York Highlanders, Major Morrison ; the 
Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Colonel Crist; 
the Eighth Michigan, Colonel Fenton; 
and the One Hundredth Pennsylvania 
(Roundheads), Colonel Leasure ; in all 
about five thousand men. The naval 
force assembled at Beaufort, and was 
composed of the Ottawa, Seneca, Pem- 
bina, and Hale, with the ferryboat Helen 
and four boats belonging to the Wa- 
bash, each of these last carrying a V2 
pound howitzer. 

The expedition moved on the evening 
of the 31st of December. The pec. 
greater portion of this fleet went S'- 
up the Broad River, on the west side of 
Port Royal Island, their purpose being 
to approach the ferry by Whale Creek. 
The land forces made their way to a 
point where the Brick- Yard Creek, a 
continuation of the Beaufort River, 
unites with the Coosaw. There Com- 
mander Rodgers met Stevens with 
launches ; and the troops were embark- 
ed. It was the first morning of the 
new year 1862. Some of the troops 
landed at Haywood's plantation, and 
the remainder at Adams' plantation, the 
next landing. A forward march against 
the Confederates was at once begun. 
The Eighth Michigan were thrown out 



A FLAG OF TRUCE. 



V 



as skirmishers, the gunboats opening a 
liHsk fire into the woods in their front. 
The Seventy-Ninth New York (High- 
landers) were in front of the main body. 
They were now near the ferry, when a 
concealed battery opened upon them 
with grape and cannister. The brunt 
of this fire was borne by the Highland- 
ers and the Eighth Michigan. The Fif- 
tieth Pennsylvania rushed forward to 
iheir sup])ort. The boats, coming up 
one after the other, brought so heavy 
a fire to bear on the works that they 
were soon abandoned. Immediately 
after the Ottawa was anchored the ferry 
was opened ; and the Pennsylvania 
Roundheads passed over and took pos- 
session of the abandoned fort. At four 
o'clock they were joined by General 
Stevens with the advance guard. About 
this time the Confederates appeared in 
force and in line of battle on the Na- 
tional right. The Ottawa and the Pem- 
l)ina were ordered to move a short dis- 
tance down the river, where they opened 
fire with their 11-inch and Parrott gims, 
Hinging their shells into the midst of 
the Confederates, driving them through 
the woods and clearing the National 
liank. It was now sunset. There was 
a pause in the battle. 

A messenger from the Confederates 
appeared at one of the outposts, bearing 
a flag of ti'ucQ, and asking permission 

203 



to carry off their dead and wounded. 
At this moment the gunboats reopened 
fire ; and before General Stevens' mes- 
senger could convey his I'eply, granting 
one hour to carry oif the wounded, the 
officer ^vho brought the flag of triiee had 
galloped off. The enemy reappeared 
in the morning, when the gunboats 
Ottawa, Seneca, Pembina, Helen, and 
Hale all opened fire, flinging shot and 
shell into the woods. It was, however, 
but of short duration. At forty minutes 
past nine o'clock the troops, having 
demolished the works and fired some 
houses in the neighborhood, began to 
recross the ferry. The Confederates 
made no further demonstration. By 
noon the troops were all over ; and the 
field guns, at the request of General 
Stevens, were landed for the purpose 
of covering the rear of the returning 
column. So ended the attack on Port 
Royal Ferry. General vStevens lost 
nine men. Major Watson of the Eighth 
Michigan was mortally woundec. 

So far these coast expeditions had 
been successful. The Nationals were 
masters of Ilatteras Inlet ; and on the 
southern borders of South Carolina 
and the northern borders of Georgia 
the Confederates had been driven 
from every stronghold, with the two 
exceptions. Fort Jackson and Fort Pu- 
laski. 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



CHAPTER VI. 



Vhe Beginniiig of 18G2.— State of Public Feeling.— The Army of the Potomac a Splendid Toy.— McClellsaVi 
Reasons for Delay. — Kesignation of General Scott. — The War Office. — Stanton succeeds Cameron. — New Life 
in the Government. — The Army Ordered to Move. — The Protection of Washington. — The West. — Halleck and 
Buell. — Sidney Johnston. — Mill Spring. — ZoUikoffer Killed. — General Thomas. — The Confederate Line of 
Defense. — Halleck's Plan of Attack. — Where to Strike. — The Army at Cairo. — General Grant in Command. — 
Port Henry. — Foote and His Flotilla. — The Army in Motion. — A Thunder-Storm. — Fire Opened upon the 
Fort by the Gunboats. — Tilghman Lowers His Flag. — Fort Henry Occupied by the Nationals. — The Union 
Flag Floats again over the Soil of Tennessee. — The Fall of Fort Henry a damaging Blow to the South. — Joy 
m the North. — Fort Donelson. — Its Position. — Its Strength. — General Albert Sidney Johnston. — Pillow, 
Floyd, and Buckner. — The March on Donelson. — Foote's Flotilla on the Cumberland. — Fire Opened upon the 
Fort.— The Nationals Repulsed. —The Night of the Thirteenth of February. — Two separate Attacks and Two 
Failures. — The Confederates full of Confidence. — Sally of the Garrison. — McClemand vigorously Attacked. — 
The Nationals Forced Back. — General Lewis Wallace makes a determined Stand. — A Lull. — Grant Arrives. — A 
general Attack ordered. — The Confederates Driven Back within their Entrenchments. — Lost Ground Re- 
claimed. — A Fearful Night. — Humanity of Wallace. — Floyd and Pillow make their Escape. — Buckner Proposes 
to Surrender. — Grant's Terms. — " Unconditional and Immediate Surrender." — Buckner Indignant. — Fall of 
Donelson. — A Great Victory and Great Rejoicing. 



The year 1862 opened rather gloom- 
ily. The campaigns of the pre- 
vious year had not been particu- 
larly encouraging to the Northern cause. 
At Washington there was much excite- 
ment, not a little activity, but no re- 
joicing. The aimy of the Potomac had 
been reconstructed and put in splendid 
condition. Never was army more thor- 
oughly drilled or more perfectly equip- 
ped for battle. It retlected the highest 
credit on General McClellan, and gave 
abundant evidence that, whatever might 
be his qualities on the field of actual 
warfare, he had as a military organizer 
few, if any, equals among the command- 
ers of his time. But armies are not 
intended to be splendid toys, magnifi- 
cent playthings. When the army of 
the Potomac was brought up to a fight- 
ing condition, no haste was made to 



turn it to account. The enemy, who 
had mightily increased his strength, was* 
all but knocking at the gates of the 
capital ; but the general-in-chief seemed 
to have no other use for his well trained 
and gorgeously equipped army than to 
exhibit its skill in evolution, to the daily 
delight of the people of Washington. 
The toy was splendid ; McClellan seem- 
ed unwilling to mar its beauty. It was 
not all at once that these thoughts 
entered the minds of even the more 
thoughtful and reflective of the people 
of the North. For a time they approved 
and applauded. As the army of the 
Potomac grew in beauty and in strength, 
it was as much a source of delight and 
hope to them as it was evidently a pride 
to its .commander. Hope deferred, how- 
ever, maketh the heart sick. Delay 
gave birth to impatience. Before the 



EDWIN M. STANTON. 



19 



end of October the previous year, the 
army under the immediate care of 
McClellan had reached a strength of 
i>early one hundred and twenty thou- 
sand men. It was his opinion that the 
advance upon Manassas should not be 
postponed beyond the 25th of Novem- 
ber ; and it was his desire that, as far 
as was possible, all the other armies 
should make sacrifices, so as to add to 
the actual strength under his command. 
In the interval, on the 31st of October, 
he was made commander-in-chief, on 
the resignation of General Scott. With 
the change in his position there came a 
change in his views. Up until this 
time he had undervalued the importance 
of possible effort in the West. Now he 
wished to make a simultaneous move- 
ment in East Tennessee and Virginia, 
and capture Nashville contemporane- 
ously with Richmond. In order to 
bring up the armies of the West to the 
same high standard with the army of 
the Potomac, further delay was neces- 
sary. So the month of November rolled 
past, the weather having been fine and 
the roads in excellent condition for mil- 
itary movements ; and to the impatient 
millions scattered over the Northern 
States, who hourly expected to hear of 
a dashing movement and a brilliant 
victor}^, no other message came but 
the same wearisome iteration, "All 
quiet on the Potomac." Impatience at 
last reached its height. "When will 
McClellan move?" "What does he 
mean to do ? " These and such like ques- 
tions were in every mouth; and by 
many the opinion began to be enter- 
tained that the commander-in-chief 



either had no plan or was afraid to 
move. 

Such was the state of things in the 
opening weeks of the second year of the 
war. In the second week of January 
an important change was made in the 
War Office. On the 13th Mr. jan. 
Edwin M. Stanton took the place ^^' 
of Mr. Secretary Cameron, who was 
offered the position of Minister to Russia. 
The change was not intended in any way 
to reflect on Secretary Cameron. On 
the contrary, it v/as his own desire, as 
well as the desire of the other members 
of the government, that the position, 
which was onerous and exacting in the 
extreme, should be filled l)y some man 
who to more than ordinary intellectual 
ability and force of character added 
great powers of endurance. Of all the 
available men at that moment, as the 
result proved, Stanton was the man iu 
whom those qualities were most united. 
He had ali-eady made himself conspicu- 
ous, during the administration of Bu- 
chanan, by exposing and defeating the 
schemes of the conspirators who plotted 
the seizure of Washington. It was 
said of Stanton by some of his jealous 
rivals that he was a man of only one 
idea. The remark, though otherwise 
intended, actually conveyed a compli- 
ment. The times preeminently required 
concentration of thought and purpose ; 
and if Stanton was a man of one idea, 
his idea was the preservation of the 
Union — the grandeur and immortality 
of the Republic. Stanton was one of 
those whose patience was completely 
exhausted by the inactivity of McClel- 
lan. It was at his suggestion that the 



8(1 



POiti'S HENEY AND DONELSON. 



president issued the order that on the 
2 2d of February a general forward move- 
ment of tlie land and naval forces of the 
Union should take place ; that "especial- 
ly the army at or about Fortress Monroe, 
the army of the Potomac, the army of 
Western Virginia, the army near Mum- 
fordsville, Kentucky, the army and flo- 
tilla near Cairo, and the naval force in 
the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move 
on that day ; that all other forces, both 
land and naval, vs^ith their respective 
commanders, obey . existing orders for 
the time, and be ready to obey addi- 
tional orders when duly given ; that 
the heads of departments, and especially 
the secretaries of war and the navy, 
with all their subordinates, and iiie gen- 
erals-in-chief, with all other command- 
ers and subordinates of land and naval 
forces, will severally be held to their 
strict and full responsibilities for the 
prompt execution of this order." A 
special order, which in some particulars 
was afterwards modified, was issued on 
Jau. the Slst of January, to the effect 
^*' " that all the disposable force of 
the anny of the Potomac, after provid- 
ing safely for the defense of Washing- 
ton, be formed into an expedition for 
the immediate object of seizing upon 
the railroad southwestward of what is 
known as Manassas Junction ; all de- 
tails to l)e in tlie discretion of the com- 
mander-in-chief, and the expedition to 
move before or on the 2 2d day of Feb- 
ruaiy next." These orders were too 
plain to be misconstrued. If they did 
not imply mistrust of McClellan, they 
certainly contained a rebuke. His dila- 
tory conduct had not only disappointed 



— it had disgusted all ranks and classes 
of the people. 

The war, in what might be called 
systematic form, was now about to be- 
gin. Hitherto the forces had been scat- 
tered, and the battles fruitless of result 
as they had been Avithout plan or pur- 
pose. Now there was a recognized 
central authority, tliere was a general 
plan, and arrangements were made for 
concerted action. A variety of circum- 
stances had made it evident as well as 
necessary that the first battles of 1862 
should be fought in the West. General 
Halleck, as we have seen already, was 
now in command in Missouri, and Gen- 
eral Buell had charge of the Department 
of the Ohio. The Confederates, under 
Albert Sidney Johnston, held a strong 
defensive line running from the Missis- 
sippi River eastward to the Cumberland 
Mountains. The left was at Columbus 
on the Mississippi. Forts Henry and 
Donelson guarded the Cumberland and 
Tennessee Rivers. An intrenched camp 
at Bowling Green, with a considerable 
army, covered the great railroad lines 
southward to Nashville. The right 
flank was held by a force posted at Mill 
Spring, Kentucky. General H?,lleck, 
who had divided his large command into 
districts, had assigned to General Grant 
the District of Cairo, which ircluded . 
Paducah, in Kentucky. General Buell ' 
who had a large force iinder bjm, ar 
ranged it into four grand divisions, 
himself, with a portion of his troops, . j 
threatening Bowling Green, and Genera! ' 
George H. Thomas, one of hia subordi- 
nates, threatening the Confederate force 
at Mill Spring. A glance at the ma^ 



MILL SPRING. 



81 



will show that on the part of the Con- 
federates these positions were singu- 
larly well chosen. If they could hold 
this line, the great cotton-producing 
States would be comparatively safe ; 
and while the sinews of war would thus 
be provided for another year, they 
would be the more easily able to con- 
centrate their strength against the army 
which threatened them in the east. 

Early in the month of January, Gen- 
ei'al Thomas came into collision with 
the Confederate forces stationed at Mill 
Spring. The battle lasted the greater 
Jan. P'^^rt of Sunday, the 18th, and was 
•8i fought with great spirit on both 
sides. Early in the fight the Confede- i 
rate General Zollikoffer was killed, and 
before the close of the day the National ' 
arms were completely victorious, the 
Confederates being driven from their 
position and compelled to retreat to- 
wards their camp in the wildest confu- 
sion. In the struggle the Nationals lost 
two hundred and forty-seven men, of 
whom thirty-nine were killed, the re- 
mainder wounded ; the Confederates 
lost three hundred and forty-nine, of 
whom one hundred and ninety-two were 
killed, sixty-two wounded, and the re- ; 
mainder made prisoners. As the spoils | 
of ^^ctory, General Thomas captured 
and carried with him twelve pieces of 
artillery, with their caissons packed, | 
two army forges, one battery wagon, a 
large quantity of arms and ammunition, 
over a thousand horses and nuiles, to- 
gether with wagons, commissary stores, 
intrenching tools, and a considerable 
amount of camp equipage. It was felt 
to be a damaging blow by the South, 



as it broke their line in Kentucky and 
opened a door of deliverance for East 
Tennessee. It was hailed as a great 
victory by the North, and called forth 
a spirited proclamation from the secre- 
tary of war, who declared it to be the 
purpose of the war " to pursue and 
destroy a rebellious enemy, and to de- 
liver the country from danger." "In 
the prompt and spirited movements 
and daring at Mill Spring," he said, 
"the nation will realize its hopes. It 
will also delight to honor its brave 
soldiers." 

In ZollikofPer the Confederates lost 
one of their ablest generals. Of Swiss 
origin, he was born in North Carolina 
in 1812. At an early age he emigrated 
to Tennessee, where he worked as a 
printer and afterwards became an ed- 
itor. In 1834 he edited and published 
the Columbian Obsa-ver; and from 1835 
to 1837 he held the proiltable place of 
state printer of Tennessee. In 1842 he 
had editorial charge of the Nashville 
Bamier ; and thi-ough the influence of 
that partisan journal he succeeded in ob- 
taining several political ofiices. At the 
beginning of the secession movement in 
Tennessee, Zollikoffer was opposed to 
it ; but he was finally induced to yield ; 
and on joining the array he was ap^ 
pointed a brigadier-general. He had 
only joined the secession force at Mill 
Spring a few hours before the battle. 
The chief in command was General 
Crittenden ; but the attack at Mill 
Spring has generally been attributed 
to Zollikoffer, who was a man of great 
energy and courage. 



82 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



General George H. Thomas, wlio on 
that day at Mill Spring first chained 
vdctory to the Union standard, and be- 
gan that series of brilliant and substan- 
tial achievements with which his name 
is associated, was a man of another 
mould. A Virginian by birth, he was 
educated at West Point, and in 1841 
was appointed a lieutenant of artillery. 
During the Mexican war he rose to the 
rank of major. In 1850 he accepted 
the position of teacher of artillery and 
cavalry at West Point. At the begin- 
ning of the war, Thomas, who held the 
rank of major of the Second Cavalry, 
was promoted to the lieutenant-colonel- 
cy of his regiment, and a little later he 
became coloneL On the 17th of August, 
1861, he was made brigadier-general; 
and after having served under Generals 
AWerson and Sherman, he was appoint- 
ed by General Buell to the command 
of the Tenth Division. 

It will be observed that the battle of 
Mill Spring was fought and won before 
the date of the president's general order 
for the forward movement of all the ar- 
mies ; and there can be little doubt that 
the spirited conduct of the National 
troops on that occasion gave the spur to 
that impatience of further delay which 
President Lincoln shared with the rest of 
the Northern people. The president was 
not more anxious for immediate action 
than were the officers in the field and 
the rank and file under their care. We 
have seen that the victory at Mill 
Spring broke the Confederate right, 
and by opening a door of deliverance 
for East Tennessee, prepared the way 
for the aggressive and successful efforts 



which were to follow. The Confede- 
rate line, however, remained strong and 
intact from Bowling Green to Colum- 
bus. The ground was also well guarded 
from Bowling Green to Nashville, fur- 
ther to the south. At Bowling Green 
there was an intrenched camp. Fort 
Henry, on the east bank of the Tennes- 
see, and Fort Donelson, on the west 
bank of the Cumberland, were bastioned 
earthworks, about twelve miles apart 
and connected by a well constructed 
road. There were redoubts on Island 
No. 10, in the Mississippi River; and 
Columbus, which was still in charge of 
General Polk, had been so strengthened 
as to be proudly spbken of as the Gib- 
raltar of America. To defend this line 
the Confederate commander had under 
him at least 60,000 men. The forcing 
of this line by the National armies had 
become a necessity, if any serious effort 
was to be made to bring the South back 
to its allegiance. The question was 
how to strike and where. Various plans 
had ali'eady been suggested ; but there 
is some difference of opinion as to who 
is entitled to credit for the plan which 
was ultimately adopted, and which 
proved completely successful. It is 
known that General Buell had suggest 
ed some such plan as that adopted, ic 
a communication made to General Hai- 
leck eaily in the month of January, 
1862. It is also known that about the 
same time or shortly afterwards, Gene- 
ral Grant, without any knowledge of 
what Buell had done, wrote to Halleck 
and asked permission to carry out the 
plan which was afterwards accomplish- 
ed. It is recorded that one eveninar 



THE FLOTILLA AND AKMY IN MOTION. 



83 



late in December, 1861, Generals Hal- 
leck, Sherman, and Cullum were to- 
gether at the Planters' Hotel in St. 
Louis, when the conversation turned up- 
on the proper line of invasion. "Where 
is their line ? " asked Halleck. " Why, 
from Bowling Green to Columbus," re- 
plied Sherman. "Well, then, where 
is the true point of attack ? " " Natu- 
rally the centre." "Then let us see in 
what direction it should be made." A 
map was at hand. With a blue pencil 
Halleck drew a line from Bowling 
Green to Columbus, past Forts Donel- 
son and Henry. He drew another line 
perpendicular to its centre. The latter 
line coincided nearly with the Tennessee 
River. "There," said Halleck, "that 
is the true line of attack." After all, 
it was the natural and obvious course 
to follow ; and it is more than probable 
that to the minds of each of these men, 
educated in military tactics and expe- 
rienced in military affairs, the same 
plan at the same time was independently 
suggested. One thing is absolutely 
certain regarding this matter : Grant 
had written his second letter to Hal- 
leck, urging the propriety of his allow- 
ing him to proceed at once by land and 
water against Fort Henry, to take and 
hold it as a base for other operations, 
before the order of the 30th came au- 
thorizing the desired movement. 

It has already been shown that the 
Confederate line stretched from Bow- 
ling Green to Columbus, and that the 
strength of the entire force holding the 
line was about sixty thousand men. 
The Confederate general in command 
^as Albert Sidney Johnston, one of 



the oldest and most experienced officers 
on the American continent. The garri- 
son of Fort Henry, which was 2734 
strong, was under the immediate charge 
of General Tilghman. The armament 
of the fort consisted of seventeen guns. 
Johnston's headquarters were at Bow- 
ling Green, where he was confronted 
and held in check by General Buell, 
an able officer, who held the chief 
command of the army of the Cumber- 
land. 

Immediately on receiving permission 
from Halleck to proceed with his pro- 
posed plan, Grant made arrangements 
for the attack on Fort Henry. He had 
at his disposal some seventeen thousand 
men. It was arranged that flag-officer 
Foote, with a flotilla of seven gunboats, 
should move along the Ohio, steer up 
the Tennessee, and open the attack, 
while Grant, on the land side, should 
render what assistance was necessary 
and cut off all retreat. On Mon- peb, 
day, the 2d of February, Foote 2. 
left Cairo, and on the morning of Tues- 
day he was a few miles below Fort 
Henry. Grant, in the meantime, with 
the divisions of McClernand and C. F. 
Smith, had embarked in transports 
which were convoyed by the flotilla. 
These landed a few miles below the 
fort ; and Foote proceeded up the river, 
having orders from Grant to move slow- 
ly and shell the woods, in order to dis- 
cover whether there were any concealed 
batteries. On the morning of the peb 
6th it was understood that every *• 
thins: was in readiness for the a'ca^k. 
which was to be made simultaneously 
on land and water. A heavy thunder 



84 



FOKTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



stjrm had raged the previous night; 
and, as a consequence, the roads were 
heavy and the streams so svi^ollen that 
bridges had to be built for the passage 
'vf the artillery. The land forces, thus 

neountering unlooked-for obstacles, 
ivere considerably delayed. Shortly 
after 12 o'clock Foote opened fire upon 
the fort. Beginning at a thousand yards 
distance, he gradually ran his vessels to 
within six hundred yards of the enemy. 
The firing for a time was vigorously 
returned ; but Foote pressed forward 
with irresistible bravery, and his men 
worked with a will and as if they meant 
to win. It was evident to Tilghman 
from the fii'st that it was next to impos- 
sible for him to hold the fort. He nev- 
ertheless exerted himself to the utmost, 
encouraging his men alike by word and 
example, going so far as to work one of 
the guns himself. A series of accidents, 
meanwhile, occuiTed inside the fort. 
A rifled 24-pounder burst, killing and 
wounding a number of the men. A 
42-pounder burst prematurely, and kill- 
ed three of the gunners. In a short 
time the well-directed fire from the 
gunboats had dismounted seven of the 
guns and made them useless ; the flag- 
staff also was shot away. The garrison 
became completely demoralized. It was 
in vain that Tilghman attempted to 
^•eplace the exhausted gunners. The 

|i-oops in the camp outside the fort 
made good their escape, some by the 
Dover road, leading to Fort Donelson, 
others on Ijoard a steamer which was 
lying a little above Fort Henry. Foote 
had promised to reduce the fort Avitliin 
an hour. When he made that promise 



he counted on assistance from the forces 
on the land side. Without any aucn 
aid — for the land forces had not yet 
arrived on the scene — he made good 
his word ; for the hour had scarcely 
expired when the white flag was raised. 
There was no unnecessary delay. The 
main body of his troops having made 
good their escape, Tilghman, with his 
staff and some sixty artillerists, surren- 
dered to the victorious Foote. In killed 
and wounded the Confederate loss was 
twenty-one men. The only serious dam- 
age sustained by the fleet in the river 
was on board the ironclad Essex. A 
shot from the enemy had penetrated her 
boiler ; and some twenty-nine ofiicers 
and men, including Commander Porter, 
were seriously scalded. 

The capture of Fort Henry was felt 
by the South to be a damaging blow ; 
and it led to bitter murmuring and 
even loud complaints against the author- 
ities at Richmond. It was justly re- 
garded by the North as a victory of 
great importance. It was full of in- 
struction, inasmuch as it proved the 
value of gunboats on the narrow rivers 
of the West, especially when acting in 
conjunction with land forces. It in- 
spired hope, inasmuch as it reclaimed 
lost territory and restored the old flag. 
" Fort Henry is ours ! " said Halleck in 
his despatch to McClelian. "The flag 
of the Union is re-established on the 
soil of Tennessee. It will never be re- 
moved." Foote Avas formally thanked 
by the secretary of the navy. " The 
country," he was told, '' appreciates 
your gallant deeds, and this Depart- 
ment desires to convey to you and your 



A COUNCIL OF WAR 



85 



brave associates its profound thanks for 
the service you have rendered." 

After the fall of Fort Henry, prepara- 
tions were made foi- an attack on Fort 
Donelsou with as little delay as possi- 
ble. General Halleck felt it to be his 
duty to do his utmost to strengthen the 
army under Grant's command ; and ac- 
cordingly reinforcements Avere hurried 
forward from Buell's army, from St. 
Louis, Halleck's headquarters, from 
Cincinnati, and from Kansas. 

Fort Donelson, as has already been 
stated, was distant from Fort Henry 
about twelve miles, and was situated 
near the town of Dover, on the west 
bank of the Cumljerland, on a platform 
of elevated ground, which at its hi<fhest 
point rises from the river about one 
hundred feet. It was about forty miJas 
above the point where the Cumboi-land, 
after draining the highlands of south- 
eastern Kentucky and northeastern 
Tennessee, empties its waters into the 
Ohio. The entire work covered one 
hundred acres. The country around 
was I'ugged and heavily wooded. Nat- 
ui'ally a sti'ong position, everything 
had been done which art and science 
could accomplish to make it impregna- 
ble. On the water side it was especially 
strong, the battei'ies being admirably 
planted and well mounted. Including 
the light artilleiy, there were in the 
fort at the moment of the attack not 
fewer than ninety-five pieces. With 
the men who had made good their 
escape thither from Fort Heniy, the 
strength of the gai'rison amounted to 
twenty-one thousand men. All aiouud 
♦ he Avorks on the Luid sid", abatis had 

:i04 



been formed by felling timber and half 
chopping off the smaller trees. 

As soon as it became e\adent that 
Fort Donelson was likely to be attacked, 
Johnston exerted himself to the utmost 
to make the position invulnerable. Re- 
inforcements were hurned forward from 
Bowling Green ; the work was pushed 
day and night ; and a fortified line two 
and a half miles in length, enclosing 
the town of Dover, was drawn along 
the high ground, which commanded the 
avenues of approach. Gideon J. Pillo\f 
arrived witk his command on the peb 
10th and took control. Simeon '*• 
B. Buckner, at the head of the rein- 
forcements from Bowling Green, arrive(? 
on the 11th. On the 13th John B, 
Floyd, who had fled from Virginia with 
his followers, in obedience to orders re-- 
ceived from Johnston, appeared upon 
the scene, and, outranking Pillow, took 
the chief command. 

Meanwhile Grant was not idle. On 
the evening of the day which witnessed 
the capture of Fort Henry, a flotilla 
under Lieutenant Phelps sailed up the 
Tennessee River, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the condition of the banks 
in the upper waters. The reconnoisance 
was completely successful. It was found 
that there was no Teal hindrance to a 
southward movement. Tlie country 
was comparatively unprotected ; and 
the people seemed impatient to be de 
livered from the dreadfid tyranny luider 
which they were groaning. On Feb. 
the nth a council of war was *•• 
held ; and the question Avas put, " Shall 
we mai'ch on Donelson, oi- sliall we wait 
for further reinforcements '{ " The de- 



86 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



cision was in favor of immediate action. 
Foote was Inisy getting ready with his 
gunboats; and the delay hitherto was 
mainly on that account. It was all-im- 
portant that the gunboats should parti- 
cipate in the attack ; but it was felt that 
every hour was adding to the enemy's 
strength. At the head of fifteen thou- 
Feb. sand men, on Wednesday, the 
12. 12th, Grant moved from Fort 
Henry upon Donelson. The foremost 
brigade advanced by the telegraph road ; 
che others moved by the road which 
leads to Dover. For the month of Feb- 
ruaiy, the day was beautiful. The atmos- 
phere Avas warm and balmy, like a day in 
spring. In their march over the hilly 
country, the advancing troops experi- 
enced but little difficulty. Before sun- 
down Grant was before the fort; and 
what remained of daylight he spent 
in bringing his troops into position. 
During the night there was little idle- 
iiess. Batteries were posted, and the 
line of battle was fomied. Meanwhile 
Foote Avas moving up the Cumberland 
with his gunboats, convoying transports 
which Avere to constitute LeAvis Wal- 
lace's Third Division. It was Grant's 
intention, should the gunboats arriA^e, 
to begin the attack in the morning. 
McClernand's Division, consisting of 
the four brigades of Oglesby, Wallace, 
Mc Arthur, and Morrison, was posted 
on the right. C. F. Smith's Division, 
composed of the brigades of Cook, Lan- 
man, and M. L. Smith, Avas posted on 
the left. LeAvis Wallace's Division, so 
soon as it arrived, was to take its j)osi- 
tion in the centre. The line extended 
some four miles, the right sweeping 



round almost to Dover, the left resting 
on Hickman's Creek, Avhere, at the 
house of a Mrs. Crisp, Gi-ant established 
his headquarters. 

Moi'ning daAvned, but there was no 
sign of the gunboats. Grant was peb. 
unwilling to hazard a general en- *3' 
gagement until the expected forces ar- 
rived. Early in the forenoon, hoAvever, 
a cannonade was opened ; and some 
lively work Avas done by Berge's sharp- 
shooters, Avho, concealed behind the 
trees, picked oif not a feAV of the Con- 
federate gunners. About noon an at- 
tempt was made to efFect a lodgment 
upon the Confederate intrenchments. 
McClernand ordered Colonel Wallace 
to capture a formidable battery, knoAvn 
as the Middle Eedoubt. The troops 
employed for this purpose were Illi- 
nois regiments — the Seventeenth, Major 
Smith ; the Forty - Eighth, Colonel 
Hayn ; and the Forty-Ninth, Colonel 
Morrison, McAllister's battery covering 
them. Hayn, being the senior colonel, 
took command of the attacking party. 
The attack Avas made in the most spirited 
manner. But the enemy Avas strongly 
posted ; and although the National 
troops behaved with the utmost gal- 
lantry in the presence of overAvhelming 
numbers and under a most galling tire, 
they Avere ultimately repidsed. An 
equally unsuccessful effort was made on 
the left by a portion of Lanman's bri- 
gade. In both cases the National loss 
Avas heaAy. When the darkness came on, 
the troops, not a little dispirited, had 
fallen back to the groimd occupied by 
them in the morning. 

The night of the 13th presented & 



ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS. 



87 



striking contrast to the beautiful spring- 
like morniuo:. The afternoon had be- 
c-ome chilly ; and towards evening rain 
fell in torrents. The rain was succeed- 
ed by sleet and snow ; and at midnight 
a severe frost set in, the mercuiy falling 
to ten degrees below zero. The be- 
sieging force was without tents; and 
many of the soldiers were not even pro- 
vided with blankets. Fires were not 
permitted, as they would prove marks 
for the enemy's guns. Scantily supplied 
with food, and with the pitiful cries of 
the AV'ounded callins: for v/ater I'esound- 
ing in their ears, they were compelled 
to spend the weary hours, resting ou 
their arms. It was one of those sad 
nights, often, alas ! repeated before the 
war reached its close. 

The morning of the 14th dawned 
Feb. "with apparently brightening pros- 
j '4« pects for the Federal arms. Fully 
realizing the peril of the situation and 
the necessity of using every available 
man, Grant had, at the close of the con- 
test the night previous, sent a courier 
to General LeAV-is Wallace, who had 
been left behind with a small garrison 
at Fort Heniy, commanding him to 
hasten, at once to the scene of action. 
Wallace, with his garrison, which con- 
sisted of the Eleventh Indiana, the 
Eighth Missouri, and Company A, Chi- 
cago Artillery, in chai'ge of a battery, 
was ready by the Itreak of da}-. After 
such a night, the ground was not in the 
best condition for the movement of in- 
fantry and artilleiy ; but the men were 
in excellent spirits ; and in spite of the 
drifting frost which blew in their faces, 
they made good time, Wallace being 



able to report at Grant's headquarters 
before the hour of noon. On their arrival 
Lewis Wallace's little band found the 
Union soldiers in high hope and expecta- 
tion. During the course of the night 
Foote, vpith the gunboats and trans- 
ports, the latter bringing the Third or 
Wallace's Division, about ten thousand 
strong, had arrived. Their landing had 
been safely efFected ; they were already 
around Grant's headquarters ; and when 
Wallace appeared on the scene he was 
immediately placed in command and 
took his position in the centre, with 
Smith on the left and McClernand ou 
the right. By this fresh accession of 
strength, Grant was enabled to com- 
plete the investment of the fort and its 
outworks ; and for the first time since 
he commenced to grapple with the ene- 
my, he had the advantage of superior 
numbers. Supplies having arrived in 
abundance, rations were liberally sup- 
plied to the half-famished men, and 
preparations were made for a general 
assault. 

The experience of the previous day 
had been such that, even with largely 
increased foi'ces, General Grant was un- 
willing to make any rash attack from 
the land side. The fort was powerfully 
mounted ; and without the aid of earth- 
works and trenches, an attack made 
from the land side, whether upon a par-' 
ticular point or on the entire enemy's 
works, however it might result finally, 
could not fail to be attended by an enor- 
mous sacrifice of life. Grant's instruc- 
tions to his generals were that they 
should preserve the line of investment 
intact, being ready to repel any attempt 



88 



FOETS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



which the enemy might make, either in 
the way of assault or escape. 

The gunboats had done so well at 
Fort Henry that perhaps too much was 
expected of them at Fort Donelson. At 
all events, it was airanged that the gun- 
boats should have the honor of opening 
the assault. At three o'clock in the 
afternoon Foote moved forward with 
four ironclads and two wooden boats. 
In addition to these, there was the gun- 
boat Carondelet, Commander Walke, 
which had anived two days before. 
The armored vessels moved in front. 
While yet a mile and a half distant, 
the gunboats opened fire, the batteries 
on the fort remaining perfectly silent. 
It was not the silence of a helpless, par- 
alyzed foe : it was the silence of con- 
scious strength — of a determined and 
deadly purpose. Onward the little fleet 
moved, still belching forth destruction, 
but meeting with no response. Sud- 
denly, however, when within four hun- 
dred yards of the batteries, a plunging 
fire was opened upon it by twenty heav^' 
guns, placed high on the hillside, the 
shot falling with dreadful precision and 
effect In face of this terrific fire, Foote 
pressed closer and closer. The well- 
directed fire of the gunboats had silenced 
the upper battery of four guns. The 
fighting, however, was not equal. The 
columbiad and 32-pound rifle now told 
with fatal effect on the ironclads ; while 
the shot and shell from the ships fell 
powerless on the heavy sand-banks 
which protected the enemy's guns. A 
heavy shot had cut away the iiidder- 
chains of the Louisville, and she di-ifted 
helplessly down the current. The flag- 



ship St. Loius was soon in a similar 
plight, Commodore Foote himself being 
wounded. The other two armored ves- 
sels had suffered severely; a heavy rifled 
cannon having burst on board the Car- 
ondelet. The battle had lasted one 
hour and a half. It was useless to pro- 
long the struggle. Orders were given 
to with<lraw ; and as the flotilla moved 
back down the river, it received some 
severe parting blows from the shore 
batteries, some of the fugitives from 
which had I'eturned and resumed their 
guns. It was another failure. The 
strength of the place had not been pro])- 
erly gauged. What was practicable and 
easy at Fort Henry was impossible at 
Fort Donelson. In the attack the Na- 
tionals lost fifty-four men in killed and 
wounded. The Confederates lost not u 
man, nor were their batteries in any wa}' 
injured. Fifty-nine shots had struck thi^ 
St. Louis ; thirty-five the Louisville ; 
thirty-five the Carondelet, and twenty- 
one the Pittsburg. 

Two daj-s had now been wasted ; and 
two experiments in the way of attack 
had been made, with signal want of 
success. All had been done on the river 
side which could be done with the 
means now at Grant's command. Any 
fresh attempt made on the land side 
was certainly as perilous as ever ; nay, 
it seemed to involve even greater risks, 
for the Union commander could no 
longer count with confidence on the 
gunboats, which he had hoped would 
greatly aid him in the accomplishment 
of his diflicult task. The original plan 
had failed. A new plan had become 
necessary. It was accordingly arranged 



ATTACK ON THE NATIONAL EIGHT. 



89 



in a conference between Grant and 
Foote, on the evening of Friday, that 
the Commodore should return to Caij-o, 
repairand augment his fleet, and return 
with a naval force adequate to the re- 
quirements of the situation. Grant re- 
solved meanwhile to go on perfecting 
his line of investment, so strengthening 
his weak points as to shut the Confede- 
rates effectually within their intrench- 
ments, and so cutting off their supplies 
as possibly to starve or frighten them 
into a surrender. 

While the Union commanders were 
thus deploring their ill fortune and 
making arrangements for future and 
more effective operations, events had 
taken a peculiar turn inside the Confed- 
erate lines. Floyd, the commander-in- 
chief, was not in the least elated by the 
effective resistance which he had been 
able to offer to McClernand's attack on 
the 1 3th, or by the defeat of the gun- 
boats on the 14th. He felt that, in 
spite of his strength, he was effectually 
hemmed in. There was not a point 
within the intrenchments which might 
not be reached by the enemy's artillery 
fiom the boats on the river or from the 
batteries on land. It would be easy, 
by passing a column above him on the 
river, to cut off at once his only source 
of supply and his only means of egress. 
Moreover, he had seen that day a fleet 
of transports arrive, bringing a power- 
ful addition to the ranks of the enemy ; 
and he knew that the whole available 
Union force in the Western States could 
be speedily concentrated against Fort 
Donelson. It was Floyd's opinion that 
the fort could not be held with a gar- 



rison of less than fifty thousand men. 
At a council of war, held on the evening 
of the 14th, it was unanimously resolved 
to abandon the place, force a way past 
Grant's right, and pass into the open 
country around Nashville. 

From the position enclosed within 
the Confederate lines two roads led to 
wards Nashville — the Wynn's Ferry 
road, running fi'om Dover through 
Charlotte ; and the other an obscure 
and at best an undesirable road, cross- 
ing the flats of the Cumberland. The 
latter road was submerged by the over- 
flow of the river. There remained, 
therefore, but the one way of escape, if 
escape was to be attempted, and that 
was the Wynn's Ferry road. But this 
road was effectually covered by McCler- 
nand's Division, the right wing of the 
Union army. What was the Confede- 
rate plan of attack ? Pillow's Division, 
which formed the Confederate left, was 
to make a vigorous attack upon the 
Union right flank ; and Buckner's Di- 
vision, drawn from the right, a few men 
being left in the intrenchments to main- 
tain an appeai'ance, was to strike at the 
same time the right flank of the Union 
centre, which rested upon the Wynn's 
Ferry road. It was hoped that if Pil- 
low's attack should prove successful, 
McClernand's Division, the Union right, 
would be foi'ced back upon Wallace's 
Division, the Union centre, and that 
Buckner, striking the divided masses in 
flank, would roll both divisions back in 
confusion on that of Smith, the Union 
left. In such a case, the Wynn's Feciy 
road would be effectually opened as a 
way of escape, and possibly Grant's 



90 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



forces might be routed and driven to 
tbeir ti-ansports. It M^as a daring and 
well-conceived plan ; and, as we shall 
by and by see, so far as it was faithfully 
executed, it was a complete success. 

On the morning of Saturday, the 
Feb. loth, at the early hour of five 
*3« o'clock. Pillow's column, eight 
thousand sti'ong, accompanied by For- 
rest's cavalry, thirty heavy guns, and a 
full complement of artillery, was al- 
ready in motion. Pillow w^as resolved, 
as he said in his high-sounding style, 
" to roll the enemy in full i-etreat over 
upon General Buckner," and then, by 
an attack in flank and rear, to " cut up 
the enemy and put him completely to 
rout." He went to his work with a 
will, and as if he meant to make his 
purpose good. McClernand was well 
})osted to resist the assailants ; but, al- 
though this point has been disputed, 
there can be no reasonable doubt that 
he was taken by surprise. His division 
was arranged in three brigades — McAr- 
thur's on the right, Oglesby's in the 
centre, W. H. L. Wallace's on the left. 
Pillow's onslaught was swift and furi- 
ous. It fell mainly upon the two right 
l»rigades, McArthur's and Oglesby's. 
The Confederate line covered the front 
of these brigades, and extended some 
distance beyond the right flank. In the 
struggle which ensued, there M^as no 
lack of heroism on either side. At a 
critical moment, timely and effective 
assistance was rendered by the sister bri- 
gade of W. H. L. Wallace, Colonel John 
A. Logan, at the head of his brave regi- 
ment, the Thirty-First Illinois, exerting 
liimself by word and deed to sustain 



and cheer the men. In such a strug- 
gle, however, enthusiasm is V)ut a sor- 
ry compensation for lack of numliers. 
The soldiers did their best. Inch by 
inch the ground was contested. Over- 
powered, however, and outflanketl, the 
two brigades were turned and forced 
from their position. Meanwhile Buck- 
ner, who had moved his troops over 
from the extreme Confederate right, 
formed them in front of McClernand's 
left brigade, Colonel W. H., Wallace. 
It will thus be seen that the whole 
hostile mass — the entire concentrated 
strength of the Confederate army-;— was 
pressing upon McClernand's Division, 
the right wiiig of the Union army. The 
left brigade soon followed the example 
of the other two — it fell back from ite 
position ; and by nine o'clock the entire 
position occupied in the 1/eginning of 
the contest by the right Aving of the 
National army was in the possession of 
the Confederates. The Wynn's Ferry 
road was open. 

The tide was still in favor of the 
Confederates. So far they had boldly 
carried out their plan, and successfully 
accomplished their purpose. The Na- 
tional ai'niy Avas, indeed, at this partic- 
ular moment in a A'ery critical condition. 
The situation was all the more alarming 
that the general-in-chief, who had not 
been jjresent all the morning, was not 
yet on the field. At 2 A. M. he had 
gone on board a gunboat to hold a con- 
sultation with Commodore Foote, Avho, 
it will be remembered, was wounded in 
the struggle the day previous. It is 
more than possible that if Grant had 
been on the field from the commence- 



GKANT ON THE FIELD. 



91 



ment of the contest, McClernand would 
have been able to hold his ground. In 
the absence of the general-in-chief there 
was no officer, during all those preg- 
nant hours, who could assume the right 
to combine and direct the entire forces 
in the field. The division next to 
McClernand was that of Lewis Wallace. 
When Wallace fii'st heard the firing, 
he concluded that McClernand had re- 
sumed the attack. At about 8 A. M. 
he received a message from McClernand 
asking assistance. Not knowing Avhat 
to do, he sent the message to headquar- 
ters; but General Grant was still ab- 
sent. Later he received another mes- 
sage from McClernand, disclosing the 
fact that his men were being pressed 
back by overwhelming numbers. There- 
upon Wallace detached two brigades, 
and sent them under Colonel Cruft. 
Cruft, ho\\'evei', Avas in some way misled 
too far to the right, and l)eing forced 
to fight his way, he arrived only in time 
to share the fate of the whole rie:ht 
wing. Seeing flocks of fugitives crowd- 
ing up ill the rear of his own line, Wal- 
lace promptly put in motion his remain- 
ing brigade under Colonel Thayer. Tlie 
column had marched V>ut a short dis- 
tance when McClernand's brigades were 
met, retiring to the left — retiring in 
good ordei' and slowly, complaining of 
many things, but complaining most of 
ftll that their ammunition was exhausted. 
The brave fellows seemed to feel as if 
they had no right to be in that position. 
The enemy was following but slowly. 
Wallace had time to deploy his brigade 
on the crest of a hill which crossed the 
line along which the enemy was moving 



towards the left. Here he presented a 
firm front at right angles to his former 
front, and behind him the defeated 
troops of the right wing rallied and re- 
formed. In this position they awaited 
the approach of Pillow and Bucknen 
Mortified with the defeat of the morn 
ing, the troops of tlie right wing had 
no sooner filled their cartridges than 
they took their places and were ready 
for action. When, therefore, the Con- 
federates advanced and began to ascend 
the crest, so terrific was the fii-e that 
they reelt,i and staggered and broke, 
falling back in wild confusion. A sec- 
ond time they attempted to charge; 
but the second repulse was more disas- 
trous than the first. The men could 
not again be brought into line. Some of 
them fled precipitately to their works ; 
the remainder were brought to a stand 
on the ground occupied by the National 
right wing in the early morning. 

Grant had now appeared on the field 
It ^vas about noon when the Cohfede 
rates were driven back to their trenches 
The battle had lulled; but ever}i:hin'; 
was yet in confusion. The chief must 
have bitterly regretted the fact of his 
own absence from the scene of action in 
the early part of the day. But it was no 
time now for idle and worthless lament- 
ation. It was action that was needed — 
prompt, decided, vigorous action. Grant 
was not slow to come to a conclusion, 
although it is simply absurd to say that 
in this instance he made up his mind 
at once. About three o'clock in the 
afternoon he called McClernand and 
Wallace aside for consultation. They 
were all on horseback. Grant held in 



92 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



his hand some despatches, to which now 
and then he nervously turned his eyes. 
His face was flushed and revealed high 
excitement He was evidently swayed 
by strong emotions. He said something 
about the necessity of falling back and 
intrenching — about waiting for rein- 
forcements and Foote's new flotilla It 
was suggested by one of the other two 
that in consequence of McClernand's 
defeat the road to Clarksville was un- 
covered, and that the enemy might es- 
cape if he chose. Whether Grant had 
merely been sounding the opinions of 
his subordinates, or whether new light 
at the moment dawned upon him, we 
know not ; but all of a sudden he gave 
orders that the right wing should re- 
take the ground which it had lost in 
the morning, and that the left wing, 
under Smith, should make a simultane- 
ous attack on the Confederate right. 
General Grant has since given us his 
own reason for the course which he I'e- 
solved to pursue. " On riding upon the 
field," he says, " I saw that either side 
was ready to give way if the other 
showed a bold front. I took the oppor- 
tunity, and ordered an advance of the 
whole line." 

The orders were promptly executed. 
Wallace took charge of the troops which 
had been engaged and which had suf- 
fered so much in the morning and early 
part of the day, and whose duty it was 
to resume lost ground. The ground 
was rough and badly blocked with 
wood. There were, besides, bloody 
memorials of the morning's struggle. 
The Nationals, however, pressed on, 
the Confederates vigorously resisting. 



For more than an hour the conflict raged 
fiercely, and the result seemed doubtful. 
Ultimately, however, the Confederates 
yielded to the fierce energy of their as- 
sailants, and were compelled to retire 
within their own intrenchments. In the 
hour of victory almost complete, when 
within one hundred and fifty yards 
of the enemy's works, Wallace was 
astonished by an order from the gen- 
eral-in-chief, commanding him to halt 
and retire his troops, as a new plan 
of operations had been arranged for 
the morrow. He felt satisfied that 
Grant M^as ignorant of the success 
which had attended his movement. 
Darkness, however, was at hand. He 
contented himself, therefore, with hold- 
ing the ground he had taken, and dis- 
obeyed orders only to the extent of bi- 
vouacking on the field of victory. Smith 
was equally successful in his attack on 
the Confederate right. Buckner, who 
in abandoning the left made it the easy 
prey of Wallace, arrived too late at his 
old position on the right to save it from 
the dashing energy of Smith. In spite 
of all that he could do, the Confederates 
were forced from their intrenchments 
and driven inside the work. 

All along the line, the gi'ound lost in 
the morning had been reclaimed. Nay, 
more : — On both the left and the right 
the enemy had found it necessary to 
abandon his oavu chosen gi'ound and to 
retire more and more under the workj. 
of the fort. When darkness fell. Grant 
had reason to feel satisfied. He had by 
his single will converted a day of dis- 
aster into a day of triumpli. The fruit 
of victory was not yet in his hands, but 



THE SURRENDER 



93 



it was ripe and ready to fall. So ended 
the third day at Fort Donelson. 

The niijht which followed was one of 
the saddest yet experienced in the his- 
tory of the war. The cold was intense, 
the thermometer indicating more than 
twenty degrees below the freezing 
point. The ice-covered branches of the 
trees swayed and crackled in the night 
breeze. Camp life had not yet become 
a luxury. There were no tents, and 
even the blanket had not become a 
necessary part of the soldier's equipage. 
General Grant found a sleeping-place in 
a negro hut. General Smith lay down 
on the frozen ground. The soldier 
slept as he best might, leaning on his 
musket or resting on his knapsack. 
Four thousand brave Americans lay 
scattered over the battle field, many of 
them dead, some of them freezing to 
death, the feeble but piteous cries of 
the latter filling the weary hours with 
woe. It is in scenes such as these that 
true humanity stands forth conspicuous 
and commands universal admiration. 
With such a background, goodness, 
pure, true, and unselfish, shines as if 
with a heavenly light. General Lewis 
Wallace, to his honor be it said, with 
many of his men, who, filled with his 
spirit and fired by his example, worked 
far into the morning hours, ministering 
to the wounded on both sides, and with 
kindly hands burying the dead. 

Grant had made all necessaiy arrange- 
ments for resuming the attack al()ng the 
whole line on the following (Sunday) 
moming. Such attack, however, was 
not to be necessary. A council of war 
was held at Pillow's headquarters, late 



on Saturday night. Floyd, Pillow, 
Buckner, and their staff -officers were all 
present. Some bad temper was reveal- 
ed ; and on many points there was dif- 
ference of opinion. On one point they 
were agreed — that another sortie would 
be absolutely disastrous. Buckner did 
not believe that he could hold his posi- 
tion half an hour after daylight. In his 
judgment there was no escape from a 
suiTender. Floyd and Pillow were 
equally of opinion that the situation 
w^as desperate, and that there was noth= 
ing for them but immediate capitulation. 
The one absorbing question with Floyd 
and Pillow was "How shall we es- 
cape ? " Floyd knew what he had done, 
and he trembled to fall into the hands 
of the enemy. " You know," he said, 
"the position in which I stand." Pil- 
low seemed to feel himself in a similar 
plight, although he perhaps somewhat 
overestimated his individual importance. 
It was ultimately agreed that Buckner 
should assume the command, and that 
Floyd and Pillow should be allowed 
to make their escape, Floyd taking with 
him his Virginia brigade. Floyd sur- 
rendered the command. Pillow, who 
was next in rank, said "I pass it." 
Buckner called for writing materials 
and a bugler; and Floyd and Pillow 
hastened off to save their precious lives. 
Pillow crossed the river in a scow. Floyu 
and his men went on board a steamer 
at the wharf, and steered off amid the 
curses and hisses of their former com- 
panions in arms. It was a shameful 
transaction ; but Buckner's conduct was 
honorable throughout. Floyd had now 
appeared in his true character. 



MS 



34 



POETS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



When on the morning of -Sunday, the 
Feb, 16 th of February, the light broke 
'*• along the lines, there was no con- 
9'iction more general among the Nation- 
al soldiers than that the stirring scenes 
of the previous day were about to be re- 
peated, and repeated, perhaps, in more 
aggravated and bloody form ; nor was 
there disposition anywhere to shirk the 
ordeal. Suddenly, however, the clear 
notes of the bugle were heard soimding 
a parley ; and as the gray dawn passed 
away before the brighter light of the 
; pening day, a white flag was seen wav- 
. ng over the fort. It was a token of a 
willingness to surrender. We can read- 
ily imagine that the altered situation 
was gladly welcomed by all. A letter 
was received by Grant from Buckner, 
asking for the appointment of commis- 
sioners to settle upon terms of capitula- 
tion, and suggesting an armistice till 
noon. To this Grant returned his char- 
acteristic reply, "No terms other than 
an unconditional surrender can be ac- 
cepted. I propose to move immediately 
on your works." Buckner regarded 
these terms as " ungenerous and unchiv- 
aJric"; but he was nevertheless obliged 
to accept them. The old flag was im- 
mediately raised ; and the stars and 
stripes floated over the stronghold of 
the Cumberland. About 15,000 pris- 



oners, 17,600 small arms, and 65 guns 
constituted the prize which fell into the 
hands of the National commander. His 
losses were 2041, of whom 425 were 
killed. Grant paid a high compliment 
to his soldiers. He told them that " for 
four successive nights, without shelter 
during the most inclement weather 
known in this latitude, they had faced 
an enemy in large force, and in a posi- 
tion chosen by himself, and had com- 
pelled him to surrender without condi- 
tions, the victory achieved being not 
only great in the effect it must have in 
breaking down the rebellion, but also 
in this, that it had secured the greatest 
number of prisoners of war ever taken 
in any battle on this continent." 

The investment of Donelson had been 
followed by the evacuation of Bowling 
Green ; its fall was followed by the 
abandonment of Nashville. This, how- 
ever, was not all. Polk found it neces- 
sary to evacuate Columbus and fall back 
on Island No. 10. The so-called Gib- 
raltar of the West was forthwith occu- 
pied by National troops. The Southern 
line of defense was completely broken 
down. General Gi'ant had nobly accom- 
plished the task which he had under- 
taken. Henceforward he was regarded 
as one of the strongest nillars of the 
National cause. 



ISLAND No. 10 SURRENDEES. 



95 



CHAPTER VII. 



tie Effects of the Fall of D(jnelscm. — Johnston's Mistake. — The Enemy's Centre Broken. — Evacuation of Colum- 
bus. — Island No. 10 and New Madrid. — Surrender of Island No. 10. — Vexation of the South. — National 
Victories in the West. —Popularity of Grant. — The Importance of Corinth. — Grant Preparing to Advance.^ 
Grant Removed from Command. — C. F. Smith put in Charge of the Army. — Halleck Gives His Reasons. — 
Grant's Answer. — Movement up the Tennessee. — Crump's Landing. — The Gunboats. — Sherman in Advance. — 
Pittsburg Landing. — The Confederates at Corinth. — Description of the Ground at Pittsburg Landing. — Shiloh 
Church. — The Illness of General Smith. — General Grant again in Charge. — Disposition of the National 
Troops. — The Confederates. — How Disposed. — Their Plans and Prospects. — General Beauregard. — Arrival of 
Johnston. — Buell Ordered to Join Grant. — Johnston's Proclamation. — The Confederates Moving Forward.— 
Grant's Plans Well Laid, but the Troops Scattered. — The Morning of the Sixth of April. — The Nationals 
Attacked. — A Tremendous On.slaught. — Grant not on the Field. — His Arrival. — Sherman's Bravery. — Sherman 
and Prentiss Driven from their Ground. — The Battle Doubtful. — The Confederates Gaining Ground. — The 
Ammunition Train. — Four Division Camps Plundered. — Three Divisions Routed. — W. H. L. Wallace Comes 
to the Rescue. — Wallace Mortally Wounded. — The Situation Desperate. — Neither Lewis Wallace nor Buell yet 
on the Field. — Driven to a Corner of the Field. — Will Grant Surrender? — Both Armies Exhausted. — Johnston 
Wounded and Carried from the Field. — A Lull in the Fight. — Beauregard in Command. — The Ravine. — The 
Battery on the Crest of the Hill.— The Gunboats. —The Terrible Struggle.— The Slaughter.— A Valley ot 
Death. — End of the First Day. — The Second Day. — The Battle Resumed. — Wallace and Buell now on the 
Field. — Beauregard Attempts to Turn the National Left.- An Artillery Duel. — The Confederates Pressed 
Back. — The Nationals Gaining Ground all along the Line_. — A Cheer of Victory. — The Battle Ended.— Re, 
flections. — Unexampled Bravery on Both Sides. — Magnanimity of General Grant. 



1862. 



The fall of Fort Donelson, as we 
mentioned at the close of the last 
chapter, completely brokt; up that 
line of defense stretching from Bo-wliiig 
Green to Columbus — a line of defense 
■which the Confederates fondly imag- 
ined to be invulnerable. It carried the 
whole Union fi'ont forward two hun- 
dred miles. It had the immediate effect 
of driving the insurgents completely out 
of Kentucky. It thi'ew them back into 
the centre of Tennessee, and brought 
the capital of that State under Union 
authority. It practically unbound both 
the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers 
— an immense gain to the Union com- 
manders, as they fully appreciated the 
great advantage of gunboats on those 
inland rivers. 



There can now be no doubt in any 
mind at all familiar with the subject, 
that the Union victories at Forts Henry 
and Donelson were rendered compar- 
atively easy by the bad management 
of the Confederate commander-in-chief. 
Had Ofeneral Johnston, in place of at- 
taching so much importance to the pro- 
tection of the two forts ou the Tennes- 
see and the Cumberland respectively, 
concentrated his various armies and 
forced either Grant or Buell or both to 
risk the chances of battle in the open 
ground, the result might have been very 
different. Johnston saw this iiimself 
when it was too late ; and in a remark- 
able letter addressed from Murfiees- 
boro' to Jeffei'son Davis, he saitl, "If J 
join this corps to the forces of Generai 



9tf 



SHILOH. 



Beauregard, then those who are now 
declaiming against me will be without 
an argument." 

Bowling Green had been evacuated 
before Fort Donelson fell ; for, believ^- 
ing it to be untenable, Johnston had 
moved on towards the south. Nash\nlle 
was thrown into a perfect panic by the 
report of the capture of Donelson ; and 
as Johnston had declared that he fought 
for that city while endeavoring to save 
this fort on the Cumberland, the capital 
of Tennessee fell an easy prey to the 
troops of General Buell. Six days after 
Mar. the capture of Nashville, General 
i' Halleck telegraphed to General 
McClellan from St. Louis, " Columbus, 
tlie Gibraltar of the West, is ours, and 
Kentucky is free. Thanks to the bril- 
liant strategy of the campaign by which 
the enemy's centre was pierced at Fo'rts 
Henry and Donelson, his wings isolated 
from each other and turned, compelling 
thus the evacuation of his stronghold 
of Bowling Green first, and now Colum- 
bus." Driven from all these strong- 
iiolds, it became necessary for the Con- 
federates to select some defensive posi- 
tion further to the south. In obedience 
to instructions from Richmond, Polk 
fell back some miles, still clinging to 
the shores of the Mississippi, and estab- 
lished himself at Island No. 10 and at 
New Madrid. These places, although 
fortified with gi-eat strength. Island No. 
10 particularly, having had the special 
attention of General Beauregard, and 
l>eing deemed the most impregnable of 
all the posts on the Mississippi, the 
Confederates were compelled in succes- 
sion to evacuate. The attack on Island 



No. 10 reflected the highest credit ou 
the skill of the Union commanders and 
on the bravery of the Union troops. 
It was not until a canal had been cut 
across Donaldson's Point, between Isl- 
and No. 8 and New Madrid, that the 
Nationals had any hope of dislodging 
the enemy. The canal was twelve miles 
long and fifty feet wide ; and nineteen 
days Avere consumed in cutting it from 
point to point and making it navigable 
for the largest of the gunboats. Com- 
mander Foote reported to his govern- 
ment that Island No. 10 was " harder 
to conquer than Columbus, its shores 
being lined with forts, each fort com- 
mandino; the one above it." Beaureo;ard 
telegraphed to Richmond that the Na- 
tional guns had "thrown three thousand 
shells and burned fifty tons of gunpow- 
der," his batteries being uninjured and 
only one man killed. The canal made 
a complete change in the situation. 
New Madrid had been evacuated on 
the 12th of March; and on the jvprii 
8th of April, four days after the 8. 
completion of the canal, Island No. 10 
had ceased to be a Confederate strong- 
hold. The defenders of the batteries 
had fled in confusion; but they were 
pursued by Pope and compelled to sur- 
render. The garrison on the island, 
learning what had taken place and be- 
lieving the situation to be hopeless, sent 
a flag of truce to Commander Foote, 
offering to surrender. The immediate 
fruits of victojy were some seven thou- 
sand prisoners, including three gene- 
rals and two hundred and seventy 
field and company officers, one hundred 
heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of 



J^EA KIDGE. 



d? 



field artillery, a large quantity of am- 
munition, several thousand stands of 
i^raall arms, ^^^ith tents, horses, and wag- 
ons innumerable. " No single battle 
field has yet afForded to the North such 
visible fruits of victory as have been 
gathered at Island No. 10." Such was 
the language used by the high officials 
at Richmond. The Mississippi was now 
open as far south as Fort Pillow. 

While these events were follo\^'ing 
each other in rapid succession in Middle 
Tennessee and Western Kentucky, suc- 
cesses of a scarcely less substantial kind 
were attending the National arms in 
Arkansas, in the grand movement, con- 
ducted by Curtis, Sigel, and others, 
down the Mississippi valley toward the 
gulf. Early in February the Confede- 
rate General Price had been compelled 
to retreat from Missouri into Arkansas. 
Feb. Oi the 18th of that month he was 

•8. closely followed by the Nationals 
under General Samuel R. Curtis of 
Iowa. On the same day, joy was created 
throughout the Union by a telegram 
sent by General Halleck to General 
McClellan. " The flag of the Union," 
said Halleck, " is floating in Arkansas. 

. . . The army of the Southwest is do- 
ing its duty nobly." Curtis foresaw, 
however, that he was certain soon to be 
taken at a disadvantage, as the Confed- 
erates, in retreating, had really been 
falling l)ack upon reinforcements. He 
therefore took post upon Sugar Creek. 
His entire force consisted of twelve thou- 
sand five hundred men, with forty-nine 
guns. The enemy, under General Earl 
Van Dorn, a dashhijr Confederate officer, 

Was at le:ist twenty t! ^usnild strong. On 



the morning of the 7th of March Mar. 
the two armies came into collision. ?• 
Thei-e had been much previous manoeu- 
vreing ; and in consequence of a skilful 
and successful flank movement made by 
VanDorn, Curtis was compelled, almo.'?t 
at the last moment, to change his front. 
When the struggle began, the First and 
Second Divisions, under Sigel and As- 
both, were on the left, the Third, under 
Davis, was in the centre, and Carr's 
Fourth Division formed the right. The 
line extended between three and four 
miles, fi'ora Sugar Creek to Elkhorq 
Tavern. On the opposite side of a r&- 
vine called Cross Timber Hollow, the 
Confederate line was stretched out be- 
fore them, with Price on the right, 
Mcintosh in the centre, and McCulloch 
on the left. The attack fell heavily 
upon Carr's Division, which during the 
course of the day was driven back near- 
ly a mile, but was not disorganized. 
An attempt was made by McCulloch, 
by a movement of his force to the left, 
to join VanDorn and Price in their at- 
tack on Cui'tis' rio;ht. To arrest this 
movement, Sigel pushed foi-ward three 
pieces of artillery, with a body of cav- 
alry to protect and support them. The 
cavalry were immediately overwhelmed 
and the guns captured. Davis huiTied 
to the assistance of Sigel ; a desperate 
struggle followed, victory oscillating 
like a pendulum, the Nationals and 
Confederates recoiling and recovering 
alternately; ultimately, however, the 
Confederate right was broken and rout- 
ed, and among those left on the field 
were Generals McCulloch and Mcintosh, 
mortally wounded. At the close of the 



SHILOH. 



fighting on the 7th, Price was on the 
Fayetteville road, in Curtis' rear. Vau- 
Doi'n had his headquarters at Elkhorn 
Tavern. On the right the National ar- 
my had been defeated ; it was cut off 
from its line of communication ; its pro- 
visions were all but exhausted. The 
Confederates, however, had been de- 
feated on their right, and nearly driven 
from the field. During the night the 
Confederates united their forces on the 
ground held by their left Aving. A 
change was also effected in the National 
line, Davis taking the right, Carr the 
centre, and Sigel the left. At sunrise 
the battle was resumed, Sigel opening 
a heavy cannonade, and advancing 
round the enemy's right, Davis at the 
same time turning the enemy's left. It 
was a daring and skilful movement, and 
had all the effects of a surprise. All 
at once the Confederates found them- 
selves exposed to a destructive cross 
fire. They made a brave i-esistance, but 
in two hours, such was the precision 
and rapidity of Sigel's gunners, they 
were in full retreat through the defiles 
of Cross Timber Hollow. Thus ended 
what is known as the battle of Pea 
Hidge. In the two days the Nationals 
lost over thirteen hundred men. The 
Confederate loss must have been great- 
er. This battle had no direct connec- 
tion with the movements more immedi- 
ately under consideration. It did not 
result from the fall of Forts Henry and 
Donelson. It did not in any way affect 
the impending struggle at Pittsburg 
Landing. But inasmuch as the move- 
ments of the army under Curtis were 
part of Halleck's general plan, as that 



plan contemplated quite as much th« 
opening of the Mississippi fi-om Cairo 
to the gulf as the driving of the enemy 
out of Kentucky and Tennessee, and as 
the battle of Pea Ridge was noted for 
skill on the part of the officers and 
bi'avery on the part of the men, it hae 
been deemed wise, the more especially 
as it occurred simultaneously with the 
events now under review, to give it a 
place in these pages, which are intended 
to be preliminary to the most gigantic 
effort yet made on either side since the 
commencement of the war. 

After the fall of Donels(m, it was 
only natural that General Grant should, 
for a time at least, become the popular 
favorite. All over the Union his praises 
were liberally sounded; and by not a few 
who had acquired an insight into his 
character he was hailed already as the 
coming man. His sjjhere of action had 
been greatly enlarged. General Halleck, 
as if to mark his appreciation of Grant's 
noble services, had assigned him to the 
command of the new District of West 
Tennessee, a command wliich extended 
from Cairo to the northern borders of 
Mississippi, and embraced the entire 
country between the Mississippi and 
Cumberland Rivers. Ireneral Grant 
took immediate steps to turn to account 
the victories which he had won, and 
to press the enemy still further to the 
south. He established his headquarters 
at Fort Henry, where General Lewis 
Wallace was in command. We have 
seen already that Foote's flotilla was 
withdrawn from the Cumberland, that 
part of it had gone up the Tennessee 
River, and that Foote himself, with a 



GRANT REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 



99 



powerfiil naval armament, had gone 
down the Mississippi for the purpose 
of co-operating with the land troops 
against Columbus, Hickman, Island No. 
10, and New Madrid. 

It seems to have been the conviction 
of all the Union commanders — of Hal- 
leck, of Buell, of Grant — that a lodg- 
ment should be made at or near Corinth 
in Northern Mississippi. The posses- 
sion of Corinth or Florence or Tuscum- 
bia, but particularly Corinth, would 
give the National forces control of the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the 
key to the great railway comnumica- 
tions between the Mississippi and the 
East, as well as the border slave States 
and the GuLf of Mexico. It would fa- 
cilitate the capture of Memphis, because 
it would place it more completely at 
the mercy of the troops now moving 
down the Mississippi ; and it would 
render effective assistance to General 
Curtis, who, as Ave have seen, was at 
this moment carrying on important op- 
erations in Arkansas. While adopting 
vigorous measures for the purpose of 
giving effect to the general plan. Grant 
had the mortification to receive an order 
from Halleck, instructing him to turn 
over his command to General C. F. 
Smith, and to remain himself at Fort 
Henry. 

In such circumstances such an order 
must have been humiliating in the last 
legree to General Grant ; and it is not 
surprising that, stung to the quick as 
he must have been, he shoidd have 
asked to be entirely relieved from duty. 
As a general rule, it is unwise to attach 
too much importance to individuals in 



a great national contest. No one man 
is absolutely indispensable. It is unde- 
niable, however, that the retirement of 
General Grant at this particular junc- 
ture might have materially affected the 
future history of the great national 
struggle now fairly begun, and already 
bearing upon it somewhat of the impress 
of his character and genius. The story 
of this short-lived difficulty is easily 
told. Complying with a request for an 
interview, Grant had on the 27th of 
February gone on a visit to Buell, up 
the Cumberland to Nashville. In the 
meantime Halleck had ordered him to 
ascend the Tennessee, then in full flood, 
and establish himself on the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad at or near 
Corinth. On the 1st of March, jjar. 
Halleck ordered him to fall back *• 
from the Cumberland to the Tennessee, 
with the view of caii-ying out the orders 
previously given. It was supposed at 
this moment that the Confederates had 
retreated to Chattanooga. Sherman 
meanwhile received orders to seize all 
steamboats passing Paducah, and to send 
them up the Tennessee for the trans- 
portation of Grant's army. On hearing 
that Grant had gone up the Cumberland, 
Halleck telegraphed to him : " Why 
don't you obey my orders ? Why don't 
you answer my letters ? Turn over the 
command of the Tennessee expedition 
to General C. F. Smith, and remain 
yourself at Fort Henry." At the same 
time Halleck wrote complainingly to 
McClellan at Washington, saying he 
could get no reports from Grant, whose 
troops were demoralized by their vic- 
tory. To Grant himself Halleck wrote. 



103 



SHILOH. 



and a still wider gap of about two and a 
half miles between his centre and his 
left. Hurlbut's Division was put in 
line on the left of the main Corinth 
road, and Smith's own division, under 
General W. H. L. Wallace, was on 
Hurlbut's right. Lewis Wallace's Di- 
vision was detached and stationed at 
Crump's Landing, to observe any move- 
ments which might be made by the 
Confederates at Purdy, and to cover 
the river commimications between Pitts- 
burg Lauding and Savannah. McCler- 
nand'a Division was about a mile in 
front of W. H. L. Wallace, with that 
of Prentiss to his right. These two di- 
visions — that of McClernand and that 
of Prentiss — formed the real line of 
battle. The entire force was about 
thirty-three thousand men. In estimat- 
ing the possilile strength of the Union 
army, the aid whicli might come from 
Buell must be taken into account. This 
general, after repeated solicitations that 
he might be permitted to abandon 
Nashville, cross Tennessee and join his 
forces to those of Grant, wdth a view to 
counteract the Confederate concentra- 
tion at Corinth, had at last obtained 
Halleck's consent. The ai-my of the 
Ohio, which numbered some forty thou- 
safld men, was therefore already on its 
mar. march ; and by the 20th of March 
20. it had reached Columbia. The 
roads were bad and the weather stormy 
in the extreme ; but it was not um-eas- 
onable to conclude that Buell would be 
able to accomplish the distance in time. 
Should this large increase of strength 
arrive before tlie commencement of hos- 
tilities. Grant could have but small 



reason for any misgivings as to the issue 
of the contest. 

Let us now glance at the position of 
the Confederates, and consider their 
plans and their prospects. When the 
first line of the Confederate defense had 
been swept away by the capture of Fort 
Donelson, Johnston retired first of all 
to Murfreesboro' ; but the great object 
aimed at both by him and Beauregard 
was to concentrate the Confederate 
forces and establish a second line of 
defense on the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad. Concentration had for some 
time past been the favorite idea of 
Beauregard. If his advice had been 
taken in time, Donelson might not yet 
have fallen. Beauregard selected Co- 
rinth as the most desirable point for 
concentrating the scattered forces of the 
Confederacy. Here the two great rail- 
roads which connect the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Mississippi with the Atlantic 
Ocean form a junction. It is the key 
of the railroad system of Mississippi. 
Orders were issued to the commanders 
of all the outlying positions ; and Beau- 
regard was soon joined by Bragg from 
Pensacola, by Polk from the Mississippi, 
Johnston also coming up with his en- 
tire army from Murfreesboro'. Corinth, 
therefore, became a great military camp; 
and, in addition to its other advantages, 
it affoi'ded complete protection to Mem^ 
phis. In three weeks the Confederate 
strength had risen from eleven thousand 
to forty-five thousand men. This, how- 
ever, was not all. VanDorn and Price, 
whom we recently saw retiring before 
Curtis and Sigel at Pea Ridge, were 
known to be coming up from Arkansas 



THE CONFEDEEATE PLAIf. 



103 



with other thirty thousand men. Since 
the commencement of the war the Con- 
federates never found themselves in cir- 
cumstances more favorable for striking 
a bold and decisive blow. After the 
junction with Johnston, that general 
took the command, Beauregard being 
nominally second, but remaining really 
the soul of the movement. 

It had been the intention of Halleck, 
under whose instructions the entire 
movement on the part of the Nationals 
was conducted, to intervene between 
Johnston and Beauregard. When, there- 
fore, he heard that Johnston had dis- 
appeared from Murfreesboro', and that 
his object AA'as to join Beauregard at 
Corinth, he ordered Buell to hurry for- 
ward to the aid of Grant, and counter- 
act as far as possible the Confederate 
concentration. There had been un- 
necessaiy delay, which permitted the 
Confederate generals to unite their 
strength ; and now the weather and 
the roads were such that, although 
Buell's army was at Columbia on the 
20th, it took full seventeen days to 
reach Pittsburg Landing, a distance of 
only ninety miles. 

To the Confederate general two c|ues- 
tions presented themselves. Shall I 
wait for VanDorn and Price ? or shall 
I strike Grant at once, before Buell has 
time to come up ? At tliis time Breck- 
enridge, with the Confederate right, 
^hich consisted of eleven thousand 
men, was stationed at Burnsville ; Har- 
dee and Bragg, with more than twenty 
thousand men, formed the centi-e at 
C'Oi'inth ; and Polk and Hindman, with 
ten thousand men, were on the left, to 



the north of the Memphis and Charles- 
ton Raili'oad. Johnston, on assuming 
command, had issued a flaming procla- 
mation : " You are expected," he said 
to the soldiers, " to show yourselves 
worthy of your valor and courage, 
worthy of the women of the South, 
whose noble devotion in this war has 
never been exceeded in any time." On 
the 3d of April, their available April 
strength lieing forty thousand 3. 
men, the Confederates commenced their 
onward march. Their plan was first to 
destroy Grant and then to fall with all 
their M^eight on Buell. The roads were 
in a terrible condition, and in conse- 
quence the progress made w^as slow. It 
was intended to attack the National ar- 
my on the 5th; but the attack was de 
layed in consequence of a heavy rain- 
storm Avhich fell in the afternoon. They 
were the less unwilling to delay the 
attack that information had just reached 
them that the troops from the west, 
under VanDorn and Price, would cer 
tainly join them the next morning. 
That night they were distant from the 
National pickets only about three-qnar 
ters of a mile. Hardee was in front 
Bragg was in a second line behind 
Polk was behind Bragg ; and Brecken 
ridge brought up the rear. During the 
course of the evening a council of war 
was held. There was a disposition to 
wait for VanDorn and Price. But there 
was peril in waiting. If Buell should 
arrive, Johnston would lose his golden 
opportunity. It was the general con- 
viction that their forward movement 
was unknown to Grant ; and, after a 
consultation of some two hours, it was 



102 



SHILOH. 



and a still wider gap of aboiit two and a 
half miles between his centre and his 
left. Hurlbiit's Division was put in 
line on the left of the main Corinth 
road, and Smith's own division, under 
General W. H. L. Wallace, was on 
Hurlbut's right. Lewis Wallace's Di- 
vision was detached and stationed at 
Crump's Landing, to observe any move- 
ments which might be made by the 
Confederates at Purdy, and to cover 
the river communications between Pitts- 
burg Landing and Savannah. McCler- 
nand's Division was about a mile in 
fi-ont of W. H. L. Wallace, Avith that 
of Prentiss to his right. These two di- 
visions — that of McClernand and that 
of Prentiss— formed the real line of 
battle. The entire force was about 
thirty three thousand men. In estimat- 
ing the possible strength of the Union 
ai'my, tlie aid which might come from 
Buell must be taken into account. This 
general, after repeated solicitations that 
he might be peiTnitted to abandon 
Nashville, cross Tennessee and join his 
forces to those of Grant, with a view to 
counteract the Confedei'ate concentra- 
tion at Corinth, had at last obtained 
Halleck's consent. The army of the 
Ohio, which numbered some forty thou- 
safld men, was therefore already on its 
Mar. march ; and by the 20th of March 
20' it had reached Columbia. The 
roads were bad and the weather stormy 
in the extreme ; but it was not luu'eas- 
onable to conclude that Buell would be 
able to accomplish the distance in time. 
Should this large increase of strength 
ariive before the commencement of hos- 
tilities. Grant could have but small 



i-eason for any misgivings as to the issue 
of the contest. 

Let us now glance at the position of 
the Confederates, and consider their 
plans and their prospects. When the 
first line of the Confederate defense had 
been swept away by the capture of Fort 
Donelson, Johnston retired first of all 
to Murfreesboro' ; but the great object 
aimed at both by him and Beauregard 
was to concentrate the Confederate 
forces and establish a second line of 
defense on the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad. Concentration had for some 
time past been the favorite idea of 
Beauregard. If his advice had been 
taken in time, Donelson might not yet 
have fallen. Beauregard selected Co- 
rinth as the most desirable point for 
concentrating the scattered forces of the 
Confederacy. Here the two great rail- 
roads which connect the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Mississippi with the Atlantic 
Ocean form a junction. It is the key 
of the railroad system of Mississippi. 
Orders were issued to the commanders 
of all the outlying positions ; and Beau- 
regard was soon joined by Bragg from 
Pensacola, by Polk from the Mississippi, 
Johnston also coming up with his en- 
tire army from Murfreesboro'. Corinth, 
therefore, became a great military camp; 
and, in addition to its other advantages, 
it afforded complete protection to Mem- 
phis. In three weeks the Confederate 
strength had risen from eleven thousand 
to forty-five thousand men. This, how- 
ever, was not all. VanDorn and Price, 
whom we recently saw retiring before 
Curtis and Sigel at Pea Ridge, were 
known to be coming \ip from Ai'kansas 



THE CONFEDERATE PLAlSr. 



103 



with other thirty thousand men. Since 
the commencement of the war the Con- 
federates never found themselves in cir- 
cumstances more favorable for striking 
a bold and decisive blow. After the 
junction with Johnston, that general 
took the command, Beauregard being 
nominally second, but remaining really 
the soul of the movement. 

It had been the intention of Halleck, 
under whose instructions the entire 
movement on the part of the Nationals 
was conducted, to intervene between 
Johnston and Beam-egard. "When, there- 
fore, he heard that Johnston had dis- 
appeared from Murfreesboro', and that 
his object was to join Beauregard at 
Corinth, he ordered Buell to hurry for- 
ward to the aid of Grant, and counter- 
act as far as possible the Confederate 
concentration. There had been un- 
necessary delay, which permitted the 
Confederate generals to unite their 
strength ; and now the weather and 
the roads were such that, although 
Buell's army was at Columbia on the 
20th, it took full seventeen days to 
reach Pittsburg Landing, a distance of 
only ninety miles. 

To the Confederate general two ques- 
tions presented themselves. Shall I 
wait for VanDorn and Price ? or shall 
I strike Grant at once, before Buell has 
time to come up ? At this time Breck- 
enridge, with the Confederate right, 
which consisted of eleven thousand 
men, was stationed at Burnsville ; Har- 
dee and Bragg, with more than twenty 
thousand men, formed the centre at 
Coiinth ; and Polk and Hindman, with 
ten thousand men, were on the left, to 



the north of the Memphis and Charles- 
ton Raib-oad. Johnston, on assuming 
command, had issued a flaming procla- 
mation; "You are expected," he said 
to the soldiei's, "to show yourselves 
worthy of your valor and courage, 
worthy of the women of the South, 
whose noble devotion in this war has 
never been exceeded in any time." On 
the 3d of April, their available ^prj, 
strength being forty thousand 3. 
men, the Confederates commenced their 
onward march. Their plan was first to 
destroy Grant and then to fall with all 
tlieir weight on Buell. The roads were 
in a terrible condition, and in conse- 
quence the progress made was slow. It 
was intended to attack the National ar- 
my on the .5th; but the attack was de^ 
layed in consequence of a heavy rain- 
storm which fell in the afternoon. They 
were the less unwilling to delay the 
attack that information had just reached 
them that the troops from the west, 
under VanDorn and Price, would cer 
tainly join them the next morning. 
That night they were distant from the 
National pickets only about three-quar 
ters of a mile. Hardee was in front 
Bragsr was in a second line behind 
Polk was behind Bragg ; and Brecken 
ridge brought iip the reai-. During the 
course of the evening a council of war 
was lield. There was a disposition to 
wait for VanDorn and Price. But there 
was peril in waiting. If Buell should 
arrive, Johnston would lose his golden 
opportunity. It was the general con- 
viction that their forward movement 
was unknown to Grant; and, after a 
consultation of some two hours, it wae 



104 



SHILOH. 



resolved to strike a blow before dawn 
of the coming day. " Gentlemen," said 
Beauregard at the close of the coun- 
cil, while jjointing iu the direction of 
Grant's army, "we sleep in the enemy's 
camp to-morrow night." 

The Confederate generals made a 
mistake in supposing that Grant was 
ignorant of the fact that they were 
moving forward upon him with the 
view of making an attack. That the 
enemy was massed at Corinth he was 
well aware ; but he was in the enemy's 
country, and information was not wil- 
lingly obtained from the people of the 
neighborhood. That he expected to be 
attacked is proved by the instructions 
which he gave to his officers, particu- 
larly to Lewis Wallace and Sherman. 
But he had no means of knowing the 
enemy's strength. He did not know 
that concentration was taking place so 
rapidly ; and a vague idea prevailed in 
the Union camp that the force opposed 
to them did not exceed ten thousand 
men. Of the forward march of the en- 
emy he could not be ignorant; for on 
April tt^ 4th an infantry picket belong- 
4» ing to Colonel Buekland's bri- 
gade, having been captured, Sherman 
took that brigade, with some cavalry, 
and drove back the Confederate horse- 
men some six miles from the front of 
the camp. The firing of cannon was 
heard in the evening. On the same day 
Lewis Wallace reported eight regiments 
of infantry and twelve hundred cavalry 
at Purdy, and an equal force at Bethel. 
It is not to be denied, however, that 
Grant was in doubt from what direction 
the onslaught would be made. They 



might attack his main camp ; or they 
might cross over Snake Creek to the 
north and west of him, establishing 
themselves on the Tennessee below and 
forcing him to fight or cross to the east 
side of the river. Grant had his feel- 
ers out all around ; and, aa the result 
proved, he did best to risk a battle on 
the ground which had been chosen and 
on which he stood. 

The uncei'tainty which prevailed in the 
Union camp as to the point which might 
first have to bear the shock of battle, 
proved an immense gain to the Confed- 
erates. It enabled them to mass them- 
selves in great force and fall with de- 
structive effect on one part of the Union 
line. So great, indeed, was the advan- 
tage which they thus obtained that the 
wonder is not so much that victory lean- 
ed to their standards during the greater 
part of the first day's fighting, but that 
they did not succeed, in a few hours, 
in completely sweeping the Union army 
from the field. Their plan was to pen- 
etrate the Union centre, divide the ar- 
my in two and cut it up in detail. This 
done, it would not be difficult to make 
short, sharp work with Buell. The 
plan was good enough ; but in their 
calculations the Confederate generals 
made one mistake — they did not take 
into account the cool pluck and skill of 
the Union commanders and the stern 
courage and determination of the UnioH 
men. 

The night of the 5th was, as we have 
seen, wild and stormy. The next Aprji 
morning (Sunday) rose bright and ®' 
clear. The recent rains, while they had 
filled the creeks and streams, had given 



THE BATTLE BEGUN. 



105 



an air of freshness to the surrounding 
country. The breath of spring was 
eveiywhere. The trees were I'obed in 
the most delicate green ; and the sweet, 
rich voices of the morning songsters 
filled the air with melody. In the 
Union camp it was still unknown to- 
wards what point the enemy might be 
moving; but there was watchfulness 
everywhere. Prentiss' grand guards 
had been doubled the night before ; 
and his pickets were out one mile and 
a half. Sherman's troops had already 
breakfasted, and were formed into line. 
With the early dawn Hardee's corps, 
which formed the first Confederate line, 
was in motion. Quickly but silently 
they passed across the ravine of Lick 
Creek and the ground which separated 
it from the outlying divisions of the 
Union army. It was the more easy for 
them to move noiselessly that the fallen 
leaves, being soaked with rain, made 
no rustling sound under the footsteps 
of the men. The onslaught was ti-e- 
mendous. Avalanche-like, it overcame 
all resistance. The Union outposts were 
driven like chaff before the wind. On 
Hardee moved, falling heavily on Sher- 
man's left, and then, as if rebounding 
from that fii'in phalanx, his entire force 
rolled with resistless and crushing weight 
upon Prentiss' division. The fierce yells 
of the charging regiments, the sharp, 
shrill sounds of musketry, the booming 
of cannon, the bursting of shells, the 
crashing of timber, and the clouds of sul- 
phurous smoke which filled the woods, 
too plainly told that the battle of Shiloh 
had begun. 

When the first shots were fired, Gi-ant, 



unfortunately, was not on the ground 
He had gone down the river to Savan- 
nah, some nine miles off, to have ap 
interview with Buell. Soon as he heard 
the first guns, he hastened to the scene 
of action, xieaving a letter for Buell, 
and ordering Nelson, who had arrived 
with a portion of Buell's forces, to hur- 
ry forward, he took a steamboat for 
Pittsburg Landing. Halting at Crump's'' 
Landing, he gave directions to Lewis 
Wallace to follow at once, unless it 
should turn out that the firing they 
heard was intended to deceive and that 
the real attack was to be made upon 
him. In the latter event he was to de- 
fend himself to the utmost, and to rely 
with confidence on reinforcements being 
sent him with the least possible delay. 
The attack had been made at the first 
streak of early dawn. It was eight 
o'clock before Grant reached the field 
of Shiloh. He saw that he had to fight 
the combined Confederate force, and 
vidthout the aid of Buell. What the 
Confederate strength -was Grant could 
only guess. We know that the com- 
bined army was over forty thousand 
strong. Grant had an available force of 
thirty-three thousand men. He believed 
he could depend upon Lewis Wallace, 
who had five thousand more. Some se- 
vere work, however, had already been 
done. There was a considerable gap be- 
tween Prentiss' right and Sherman's left 
It was into this gap that Hardee tried to 
force himself, his object being to out- 
flank and turn both lines. In the begin- 
ning of the conflict Sherman's left, as we 
have indicated, was sorely pressed and 
suffered terribly. But that active and 



106 



SHILOH. 



skilful general was present in the 
thickest of the fight ; and by his cheer- 
ing words and personal bravery, as 
well as by the admirable manner in 
which he handled his men, he laid that 
day the foundation of a fame which 
the American people will not willingly 
let die. Hildebrand's brigade, which 
had been driven fi'om its position by 
•the first onset of the enemy, he tried in 
vain to rally. While thus engaged, he 
received a severe bullet wound in the 
band. Nothing, however, co-ild daunt 
his energy or induce him to relax his 
efforts. MeClernand pushed forward a 
portion of his troops to aid the smitten 
Hildebrand ; and these for a time bore 
the shock of battle. 

All, however, was in vain. In poured 
ihe Confederates in ever-increasing num- 
bers. Bragg had come to the aid of 
Hardee ; and Polk, with the third Con- 
federate line, was already moving to- 
ward Sherman's rear. By nine o'clock 
a very large portion of Sherman's di- 
vision was virtually out of the fight ; 
and before ten Prentiss had been forced 
from his ground, his camp captured and 
plundered, his division thrown into con- 
fusion, and he himself isolated from his 
men. But for the pluck and skill of 
Sherman, the battle at this stage might 
have been lost, although it cannot be 
said that there was any lack of bi'avery 
on the part of any of the Union divis- 
ions. Oificers and men everywhere vied 
with each other in deeds of daring. But 
Sherman showed strategy as well as 
pluck. Feeling the pressure of the ene- 
my and in danger of being caught in 
the rear, he swung round upon his right 



as upon a pivot, coming out at a right 
angle and taking entirely new ground. 
Here he took a firm position and held 
it tenaciously for several hours, the re- 
peated and vigorous attacks of the ene- 
my falling upon the solid front of his 
well arranged battalions as upon a 
shield of shining steel. 

The falling back of Sherman, while 
it enabled him to pi'olong the contest 
and successfully to prevent attack in 
the I'ear, left McClernand's division^ 
completely exposed. On this, there- 
fore, the Confederate forces fell with 
tremendous energy. For a time McCler- .^ 
nand boldly and even successfully re- 
sisted, most effective aid being rendered 
by Dresser's powerful rifled cannon. 
Regiment after regiment of the Confed- 
erates rushed through the abandoned 
camps and pressed forwai'd only to be 
cut to pieces by the deadly rifle shot. 
Ultimately, however, the force of over- 
whelming numbers began to tell on 
McClernand's lines. He was forced to 
retire, not, however, except in the most 
perfect order, fighting as he went, and 
bravely contesting every inch of groimd. 
By eleven o'clock this division was on 
a line with Hurlbut, close to W. H. L. 
Wallace, with Sherman to the right. 

Meanwhile Stewart's brigade, of Sher 
man's division, which was posted on 
the extreme left of the National line, 
about two miles from Pittsburg Land- 
ing, on the Hamburg road, near Lake 
Creek, where Buell was expected to 
land, was, in consequence of the falling 
back of the other divisions, in an ex- 
tremely perilous position. The scream- 
ing of a shell in its passage through the 



THE NATIONAL SITUATION DESPEilATE. 



107 



Vn'anclies of the trees overhead apprised 
Stewart of the approach of the enemy 
in his direction. It turned out to be a 
column of cavalry and infantry, com- 
posed for the most pai't of Brecken- 
ridge's reserves. They were moving 
along the road leading from Corinth to 
Hamburg. Notifying W. H. L. Wallace 
of his difficulty, and calling for aid, he 
ealmly awaited the attack. It was fierce- 
ly made and gallantly resisted. Wallace 
sent McArthiu' to the aid of Stewart ; 
but McArthur missed his way, and 
came dii'ectly on the Confederates under 
Withers. It was impossible for Stewart 
to maintain his position ; l)ut so vigor- 
ously did McArthur engage the enemy 
that Stewart managed to avoid capture, 
and succeeded in reaching a place of 
comparative safety, where he restored 
liis shattered force to something like 
order. 

The battle had raged since the early 
morning. It was fiercest about ten 
o'clock. There was but little intermis- 
sion, however, until two. About ten 
Grant visited Sherman's camp, and find- 
ing that the supply of cartridges was 
short, he organized a train of ammuni- 
tion wagons to run between the camp 
and the Landing — an arrangement beset 
with great difficulty, in consequence of 
the large number of fugitives who were 
forcing their way through the narrow 
road. By twelve o'clock noon, the Con- 
federates had possession of the ground 
occupied in the morning by the first 
line of the National army; and the 
camps of Sherman, McClernand, Pren- 
tiss, and Stewart had been captm-ed and 
plundered. Three of the five divisions of 



that army had been completely routetL 
The ground being entirely cleared be- 
fore them — Prentiss' brigade, as we have 
seen, being demolished and Stewart hav- 
ing been compelled to retreat, McCler- 
nand, too, and Sherman having- both 
yielded on the right — the Confederates, 
apparently resolved to push matters to 
a crisis, rushed with tremendous fury 
upon Hurlbut, who still maintained his 
original position, and who hud Ijeen 
joined by Prentiss and some two thou- 
sand of his men. W. H. L. Wallace 
flew to the aid of Hurlbut, taking with 
him the Missouri batteries of Stone, 
Richardson, and Webber. Hurlbut, 
who had hitherto been in the oj)en 
fields, now fell back into the woods 
which lay between his camp and the 
river, and thei-e, nobly aided by Wab 
lace, who fought like a hero of old, 
gallantly resisted the foe foi- several 
weary hours. Upon this compact body 
of National troops, Avho kne^v that if 
they had death in front they had cer- 
tain death in the rear, three most des- 
perate charges were made, as if upon a 
wall of ii'ou. In one of these encoun- 
ters General W. H. L. Wallace fell, 
mortally wounded. McArthur took the 
command ; but in spite of their best 
efForts, both he and Hurlbut were com- 
pelled to retire a little further down 
and towards the river. In the confu- 
sion, Prentiss and his company getting 
isolated, were captured, sent to the Con- 
federate rear, and finally marched to 
Corinth as prisoners of war. 

The situation now seemed desperate. 
It was between three and four o'clock. 
Sherman and McClernand, all but ut 



108 



SHILOH. 



terly exhausted, and having lost many 
of their guns, had fallen back and taken 
a position in front of the bridge which 
crosses Snake Creek It was over this 
bridge that General Lewis Wallace was 
momentarily expected to come. Grant 
had been pressed into a corner of the bat- 
tle field, his army at this time occupying 
a space of not more than four hundred 
acres on the very verge of the river. 
As yet there were no signs of Wallace, 
nor any exjjlanation of his delay. Buell, 
too, had failed to come to time. Five 
of the Union camps had been captured ; 
and many guns and prisoners had fallen 
into the enemy's hands. Fatigue and 
disorder had done and were still doing 
their teri'ible work. Cooped up in this 
narrow corner of the field, with the tri- 
umphant enemy in front and the dark 
rolling waters of the Tennessee in the 
rear — death before and death behind- — 
what more can Grant do ? Will he sur- 
render ? No. The word had no place 
in his system of tactics. 

The Confederates, however, were less 
strong than they seemed. Success had 
broken their ranks ; and the hard work 
of the day had produced its natural 
fruit. The men wei'e completely worn 
out. Some of their best men had pei'- 
ished. Generals Gladdon and Hindman 
had been killed; and about half-past 
two o'clock, when pressing his men to- 
wards the Landing, and almost I'eck- 
lessly exposing himself, Commander-in- 
chief Johnston received a rifle bullet in 
the leg, which proved fatal. There was 
a lull in the fight after Johnston fell ; 
but Beauregard assumed command ; and 
the struggle for possession of Pittsbui-g 



Landing was resumed with fresh en- 
ergy. Beauregard felt that there was 
no time to lose; for night and Buell 
were coming. 

The entire strength of the Confed- 
erate army was at this stage being 
pressed against the National left. It 
seemed to be the object of Beauregard 
to turn the National line or force them 
into the river. In any case, he was de- 
termined to seize the Landing. Hap- 
pily, as the result proved, a deep ravine 
lay between the Confederates and the 
Nationals, M^ho, cooped up as they were, 
still covered the Landing. This ravine 
was impassable for artillery and cavaby. 
In consequence of the heavy rains, the 
bottom was wet and the sides slippeiy. 
The ravine led down to the river ; and 
at its mouth the two gunboats Tyler 
and Lexington had taken position, their 
connnanders having obtained permission 
from General Grant to exercise their 
discretion in shelling the woods and 
sweeping the ravine. On the brow of 
his side of the laviue General Grant 
had hastily flung up some earthworks 
in the form of a half-moon. To several 
siege guns which wei-e parked there, 
Colonel Webster, Grant's chief of staff, j 
added a number of guns which had be- 
longed to light batteries, now broken 
up, and thus secured a semi-circular de- 
fense of about fifty cannon. This hur- 
riedly-improvised batter}^ reached round 
nearly to the Corinth load. The wretch- 
ed condition to which the National ar- 
my had been reduced may be gathered 
from the fact that it was with the ut- 
most difliculty men could be got to 
work the guns. The men were uxhausfc 



A VALLEY OF DEATH. 



109 



ed and demoralized. Volunteers were 
called for ; and Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of 
the First Missouri Artilleiy, having 
offered his services, his example was 
quickly followed. The Confederate 
assault was led by Chalmers, Withers, 
Cheatham, Ruggles, Anderson, Stuart, 
Pond, and Stevens. It was a perilous 
attempt, but it was bravely made. 
Down the steeji sides of the ravine 
they rushed, uttering their favorite and 
familiar ciy. For a moment it seemed 
as if all was lost, and as if Beauregard 
was about to crown the day's work by 
a final crushing blow. But no. It was 
destined to be otherwise. The slippery 
sides of the ravine, and the slush and 
mud at the bottom, gi-eatly hindered 
the movements of the attacking party. 
Once in the deadly hollow, there was 
literally no way of escape. At a signal 
given, Wsbster's guns from their fifty 
mouths opened fire in front ; while the 
Tyler and Lexington, striking the Con- 
federates on the flank, swept the ravine 
with their eight-inch shells. It was 
now a most unequal contest. The Con- 
federates had fallen into a trap. Every 
onward movement was vigorously re- 
pulsed. The National troops began to 
rally, and finding position, contributed 
to the work of destruction by the un- 
en'ing aim of their rifles. Again and 
again and yet again did the Confede- 
rates face the terrible fire, rushing across 
the ravine as if they would storm the 
batteiy in front ; but it was only to be 
mowed down like grass or driven back 
like sheep. The ravine was filled with 
the wounded and the dead. So dense 
'\ as the smoke that the entire scene was 



Avrapped in almost midnight darkness — 
a darkness relieved only by the swift- 
recurrinw rifle flash and the cannon's 
blaze. It was a virtual hell — a real, a 
veritable valley of death itself. The 
tide had turned. The crisis was past. 
Beauregard, seeing that it was useless 
to prolong the struggle, withdrew his 
men. He professed himself satisfied 
with what he had done; and, as it was 
near nightfall, he thought he might rest 
for the night and give the finishing 
touch in the morning. The firing now 
ceased, and Grant was left master of 
the ground. Before the close of the 
sti'uggle, Nelson, with Buell's advance, 
had arrived on the field; and Lewis 
Wallace, having at last found his way, 
was coming up with his five thousand 
men. For the National cause, the first 
day at Shiloh had ended not inglorious- 
ly; and with these fresh accessions of 
strength, the prospect was bright for 
the coming day. 

The dreary hours of the night were 
sufficiently filled with horrors. The 
gunboats kept up an incessant cannon- 
ade, in some places setting the woods 
on fire. The wounded on both sides 
vainly sought to escape from the grasp of 
this new and terrible destroyer. Hajv 
pily a heavy rain-storm fell upon the 
scene of agony, and the fire was extin< 
guished. Shortly after the firing had 
ceased, Grant visited Sherman ; and aa 
it was the opinion of both that the Con- 
federates were exhausted, it was agreed 
that the attack should be resumed early 
in the morning. Subsequently Grant 
visited each of the division command- 
ers, giving the necessary instructions, 



V07 



no 



SHILOH. 



and then flung himself on the wet 
ground and snatched a few hours' rest, 
with his head resting on the stump of 
a tree. During the night Lewis Wal- 
lace came up, and Buell arrived in per- 
son. All night through, steamboats 
kept busily plying between Savannah 
and Pittsburg Landing, bringing up 
the remaining divisions of Buell's army. 
Nelson's Division was all on the field 
l^y nine o'clock, P. M. Crittenden's 
arrived a little later ; and by five in the 
morning McCook's division, which was 
the last to come up, having had to wait 
for boats, was all safely disembarked. 
Twenty-seven thousand men were thus 
added to the National army. 

With the early light of the morning of 
April the 7th, which came in with a 
7* drizzling rain, the troops were in 
position and ready to make the attack. 
The fresh troops were placed in line, as 
they came upon the field, considerably 
in advance, and upon the ground aban- 
doned by Beauregard after the failure 
of his last attack. Nelson was on the 
left ; then in order, Crittenden, McCook, 
Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and 
Lewis Wallace. Thomson, of Wallace's 
division, with his field guns, was the 
first to disturb the silence of the morning 
and to awaken the echoes of the foi'est. 
The response was vigorous ; but the 
fresh troops of Wallace stood bravely 
to their work. At this moment Grant 
arrived, and ordered Wallace to press 
forward and attack the Confederate left 
■ander Bragg, who, since the death of 
Johnston, was second in command. 
This was gallantly done, the Confede- 
rates being compelled to abandon the 



high ground, which was soon occupied 
by Wallace's troops. Here a halt was 
made, Wallace expecting Sherman to 
come to his aid. 

Meanwhile the two armies had come 
into collision at the other extremities of 
their lines. From what has been said 
above, it Avill be seen that Buell's force, 
which lay nearest to Pittsburg Landing, 
composed the centre and left of Grant's 
new line of battle. The divisions of 
Nelson and Crittenden only were ready, 
when Wallace's guns were heard boom- 
ing to the right. They moved forward 
at once. Nelson's division leading. 
Their artillery had not yet arrived; 
but the batteries of Mendenhall and 
Terrill, of the regular service, were 
placed at their disposal. Nelson had 
moved half a mile, at least, before he 
felt the enemy. At the first touch he 
seemed to yield; but it was only for 
a moment. At this point Beauregard 
had gathered up his strength and was 
resolved to strike a deadly blow. If he 
could turn the National left, he might 
still accomplish his purpose of yester- 
day, and make himself master of the 
Landing. His onslaught was tremen- 
dous. For a second Nelson's troop.< 
wavered ; but it was only for a second. 
Mendenhall's battery was hurried into 
action ; and the advancing Confederates 
were driven back in confusion by a 
tempest of grape and canister. Hazen's 
brigade charged, captured one of Beau- 
regard's batteries, and turned it with 
deadly effect on the foe. Once more 
the Confedei-ates came up, with re- 
doubled strength, and Hazen fell back 
before the advancing tide. Terrill's 



A WALL OF IKON. 



Ill 



battery of McCook's division was now 
got into position. Pouring forth shell 
from his ten-ponnders and grape and 
canister from his brass twelves, Terrill 
did splendid and effective woi'k. For 
two hours tlie artillery conflict raged. 
Crittenden was on Nelson's right, and 
McCook was to the right of Crittenden, 
fi'ontiug the Confederate centre. Buell 
had taken general command of his own 
troops. The terrible artillery duel be- 
gan to tell on the Confederate line. 
Nelson, becoming more daring, began 
to move forward. Crittenden and Mc- 
Cook advanced abreast at the same 
time; but every inch of ground was 
keenly contested ; and victory, now 
leaning to one side and now to the 
other, seemed undecided as to which to 
award the palm. 

Sherman's captured camp was still in 
the Confederate rear ; and to this as an 
objective point the National line kept 
slowly but steadily advancing. Sher- 
man and Wallace, canying out Grant's 
instnictions to the letter, have advanced 
under a terrible fire and have reached 
the ridge occupied by the former on 
Sunday morning. The little log church 
in Shiloh has again become a conspicu- 
ous object in the battle field. Around 
it the tempest of battle is again to rage. 
Beauregard, despairing of success on 
the left, had, by countermarching his 
troops, greatly strengthened himself in 
front of the enemy's right. The strug- 
gle at this point was protracted and 
severe. Sherman and Wallace held their 
ground ; and it soon became apparent 
that Beauregard's strength was all but 
exhausted. 



At the same time tliat the Confede- 
rate general had concentrated his troops 
against the National right, he did not 
neglect an opportunity which seemed 
to present itself moi-e towards what 
might be called the National centre. 
Noticing a slight gap between Critten- 
den and McCook, he endeavored to 
force a passage between them. Here 
he made his last effort — his last decided 
stand. It was all in vain. McCook's 
division stood like a wall of iron. The 
Confedei'ate centre now began to yield. 
All along the line from Nelson on the 
left to Sherman and Wallace on the 
right, the Nationals were pi-essing for- 
wai-d. Everywhere the eneiuy was seen 
retiring. " Cheer after cheer," says 
Wallace, " rang through the woods, 
and every man felt that the day was 
ours." The battle of Shiloh was ended. 
"Don't," said Beauregard to Brecken- 
ridge, as ie ordei-ed a retreat, " don't 
let this be converted into a rout." It 
was now half-past five o'clock ; and the 
wearied National troops being in no 
mood to pursue the foe, the retreat was 
the more easily conducted. The two 
days' fighting had resulted in the loss 
of over twenty thousand men — the Con- 
federate killed and wounded amountina; 
to more than ten tho^isand, the Nation- 
als to nearly twelve thousand. 

Cxeneral Halleck only did what was 
right when he thanked Generals Grant 
and Buell, " and the officers and men 
of their respective commands, for the 
bravery and endurance with which they 
sustained the general attack of the ene- 
my on the 6 th, and for the heroic man- 
ner in which on the 7th they defeated 



113 



SHILOH. 



and routed the entire rebel army." 
General Grant showed his magnanimity 
when, in writing to the War Depart- 
ment, he said, " Sherman held with raw 
troops the key-point of the Landing. 
It is no disparagement to any other offi- 
cer to say that I do not believe there 
was another division commandei" on the 
field who had the skill and enterprise 
to have done it. To his individual 
efforts I am indebted for the success of 
the battle." 

Lewis Wallace was greatly blamed 
for liis non-appearance on the field of 
battle on the 6th. It was not difficult, 
however, for that l)rave officer, who did 
such effective work on the 7th, to give 
sufficient and satisfactory explanations. 
He had, it appeared, oljeyed his first 
orders, which were that he should join 
the right of the army, but not knowing 
that it had fallen back, he had wasted 
the whole afternoon in a fruitless march. 

There has been much useless discus- 
sion as to ho^v much Grant was indebt- 
ed to BueJl for the victoiy at Shiloh. 
What did happen we know. What 
might have been we cannot tell. Some 
of the facts of the case are plain, and 
admit of no double interj^retation. Dur- 
ing the greater part of Sunday, the Con- 
federates marched triumphantly from 
point to point. The Nationals were 
driven back entirely from their original 
gi'ound; five of their division camps 
were overrun and captured ; and Grant, 
with his whole army, was pressed into 
a corner of tlie field. The situation 
was desperate. One blow more, and it 
seemed as if Beauregard would reap a 
glorious victory. Of all this there can 



be no doubt. It is as little to be denied, 
however, that at the last moment Grant 
snatched victory from his triumphant 
rival. The advancing Confederates were 
not only successfully resisted, but driv- 
en back in confusion and compelled to 
give up the struggle. All this Grant 
accomjjlished before any effective assist- 
ance ari'ived from Buell. It would 
simply be absurd to deny that the ar- 
rival of reinforcements, which, includ- 
ing Wallace's division, amounted in all 
to twenty-seven thousand men, made 
victory on the following day compara- 
tively more easy. But we are not at 
liberty to say that, without the aid of 
Buell, Grant might not have accom- 
plished his purpose and di'iven the ene- 
my from the field. We simply cannot 
tell. We know that both Grant and 
Buell did their best, and that their best 
was needed. From earliest dawn till 
half-past five in the afternoon the battle 
raged without intermission. It was no 
easily won victory ; and if praise is 
due to the Union commanders, justice 
compels us to be equally generous to 
General Beauregard. If for the moment 
we could forget the cause, and think 
only of the skill and heroism displayed, 
we should say that on those two days 
he covered himself with glory. In Beau- 
regard the Union commanders found a 
foeman worthy of their steel. He was 
by far the ablest general who had yet 
appeared in the Confederate ranks. 

There is one other point on which it is 
necessary to make a. remark before clos- 
ing this chapter. It is to be borne in 
mind that Grant was not responsible 
either for the selection of the battle 



THE THIRD LINE OP DEFENSE. 



113 



ground or for the disposition of the 
ti'oops. Whatever praise or blame re- 
sulted from the one or the other was due 
to General C. F. Smith. When Grant 
was restored to the chief command of the 
array of the Tennessee, it was only a few 
days before the commencement of the 
fight ; and any attempt to make radical 
changes in the arrangements, carried 
out, -iS these must have been, in the pre- 
seucMi of a vigilant and powerful enemy, 



would have been perilous in the ex- 
treme. If the battle of the 6th had 
ended differently, General Grant might 
have been justified in making some com- 
plaint as to the circumstances in which 
he found the enemy on resuming com* 
mand. As it is, his mouth has been 
shut. He has shown himself a true 
man by nobly respecting the memory 
of General Smith — a capable command- 
er and a brave man. 



CHAPTER VIII 



''be Confederate Lines of Defense. — The Second Line all but Abandoned. — Beauregard's Retreat to Corinth. — 
First-rate Strategy. —Beauregard Strengthening His Position. — Position and Importance of Corinth. — Mitchell 
•t Shelby ville and Hiintsville. — Stevenson, Decatxir, and Tuscumbia. — Mitchell's Address to His Soldiers. — 
Mitchell Promoted to the Rank of Major-General. — Sherman at Bear Creek. — The Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad. — Halleck at Corinth. — Grant Second in Command. — Halleck's Complaint against Grant. — Halleck 
too Cautious. — The Position of the two Armies. — The Confederates in High Hopes. — The National Army 
Resolved to Win. — The Composition of the National Army. — The Nationals Move Forward. — Marmaduke's 
Retreat. — Farmington Reoocupied. — Russell's House. — The Nationals Win and Hold the Position. — The 
National Ar-my in Line. — Beauregard's Delay. — Corinth Evacuated. — The Retreat equal to a Victory. — The 
Pursuit. — Beauregard at Tupelo. — The Pursuit Abandoned. — The National Army in Corinth. — Repairing the 
Railroads. — BueU sent to Chattanooga. — Halleck the Rising Man. — Beauregard had Reason to be Satisfied. — 
A good General, but given to Extravagance of Language. — Remarks upon Shiloh and Corinth. — Their Import- 
ance. — Remarks on some of the Principal Generals. — Beauregard, Halleck, Grant, and Sherman. 



The victory at Shiloh broke down 
the second line of Confederate de- 
fense, as the fall of Donelson had 
broken down the first. In view of the 
general plan of the campaign — which 
was to drive the enemy out of the val- 
ley of the Mis.sissij)])!, and to" reopen 
that river to the gulf — it will be seen 
that the National forces were steadily 
marching on toward the full accomplish- 
ment of their purpose. The first line 
of defense stretched from Columbus on 
thw west, through Fort Henry, Fort 



Donelson and Nashville, including Bow> 
ling Green and Mill Spring, and east- 
ward toward the Alleghanies. That 
line broken, the Confederates had no 
choice but fall back on the line formed 
by the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
road. There was still a tliird line on 
which it was possible for them to retire 
and make a resolute if not successful 
resistance. Of this third line the stra- 
tegic points were Vicksburg, Jackson, 
Meridian, and Selma. From all the 
points of the second line, with the ex- 



114 



CORINTH. 



ceptions of Corintli and Fort Pillow, the 
enemy had been forcibly driven or had 
voluntarily retired. Fort Pillow was 
now useless, and was soon abandoned. 
All over the North and throughout the 
\rmj and navy there were enthusiastic 
demonstrations of joy and gratitude ; 
and the action of the government at 
Washington was in perfect harmony 
with the sentiments of the people when 
it recommended a general thanksgiving 
for the victories gained at Pea Ridge, 
at New Madrid, at Island No. 10, and 
at Shiloh. 

After his defeat on the 7th of April, 
April Beauregard retired, and, as we 
7» have seen already, in good order, 
to Corinth, The retreat was conducted 
in circumstances of great inconvenience 
and hardship ; and the successful man- 
ner in which it was accomplished Avill 
•^ver be regarded by impartial judges as 

?/iumph of military genius on the part 
«f the Confederate commander. The 
principal way of escape from the field 
was along a narrow and all but impassa- 
ble road, some seven or eight miles in 
length ; and all the difficulties insepara- 
ble from the attempt to preserve order 
in a routed army, burdened with the 
care of wagon-loads of wounded and 
dying men, were aggravated by a pit- 
iless storm, which, beginning about 
nightfall, raged with unrelenting sever- 
ity for several houi's. It is not to be 
wondered at that many of the wounded 
perished by the way. The wonder 
rather is that the losses during the re- 
treat did not amount to several thou- 
eanda in place of a few hundreds. The 
retreat from Shiloh on the night of the 



7th furnished a strange commentary to 
Beauregard's boastful language, on the 
night of the 5th ; l)ut it is not the busi 
uess of the historian to load with abuse 
a defeated general who narrowly es- 
caped rea2:)ing a great and signal victory, 
and who, in the hour of unlooked-foi 
misfortune, proved himself equal to the 
emergency. 

Arrived at Corinth, Beauregaid lost 
no time in making all needed jjrepara- 
tions for Avhatever attack might be made 
upon him. If he could hold this posi- 
tion and successfully repel the onslaught 
of the National troops, he might even 
yet convert defeat into a victory, and 
re-establish in some form his second 
line of defense. If unable to hold Co- 
rinth, he had no choice but fall back 
upon his third line, thus leaving the 
entire valley of the Mississippi, as far 
south as Vicksburg, in the hands of his 
enemies. While Beauregard was busy 
strengthening his position, the Nationals 
were making all necessary preparations 
to advance iipon the Confederate lines. 
Corinth, it thus became manifest, was 
to be the point at which the arniies of 
the North and South, each of them 
greatly increased in numbers and efli- 
ciency, were next to come into deadly 
collision. A small and insignificant 
village, and at that time unmarked on 
common maps, Corinth owed its mili- 
tary importance to tlie fact that it was 
situated at the intersection of two gi-eat 
arterial railroads — the "Mobile and 
Ohio" and the "Memphis and Charles- 
ton." The importance of these railroads 
is indicated by their names. Corinth 
was about forty miles east of the Grand 



HALLECK TAKES COMMAND. 



lis 



Junction, and some twenty odd miles 
from the closing scenes of the last great 
struggle. It is built upon a low and 
clayey plain, but has for natural de- 
fenses ridges at some distance outside. 
The country beyond, to the banks of 
the Tennessee, is very much broken by 
ridges, valley streams, and marshes. 
The approach was rendered more diffi- 
cult from the fact that, in his retreat 
from Pittsburg, the bridges over the 
'.•reeks had been destroyed by Beaure- 
gard, and the roads heavily obstructed 
by timber. Farmmgton, on the east, 
and College Hill, on the north, are 
the highest points in the immediate vi- 
cinity of Corinth ; and these were occu- 
pied by the eneffy as the signal out- 
posts of his vast intrenchments, encir- 
cling the town. 

As a strategic point, for the South at 
least, Corinth had already been shorn 
of much of its value. When Buell set 
out from Nashville to reinforce Grant 
at Shiloh, he sent General Mitchell 
southward, with instructions to destroy, 
as far as possible, the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad. On the 4th of 
April Mitchell was at Shelbyville, 
whence he hastened forward by forced 
marches to Huntsville, taking the town 
\pril ^^y surprise at an early hour on 
*!• the morning of the 11th, and cap- 
turing seventeen locomotives, more than 
one hundred passenger cars, a large 
amount of supplies of every kind, with 
aljout one hundred and sixty prisoners. 
At Huntsville the railroad lines were 
torn up both to the east and west of tlie 
town. From Huntsville he sent one 
expedition eastward as far as Stevenson, 



and another expedition westward as far 
as Decatur and Tuscumbia, the oljject 
of both expeditions being to capture 
what could be had and to destroy the 
railroads. On the 16th of April Mitchell 
could say to his soldiers : " You have 
struck blow after blow with a rapidity 
unparalleled. Stevenson fell, sixty miles 
to the east of Huntsville. Decatur and 
Tuscumbia have been in like manner 
seized and are now occupied. In three 
days you have extended your front of 
operations more than one hundred miles, 
and your morning guns at Tuscumbia 
may now 1)e heard by your comrades 
on the battle field made glorious by 
their victory before Corinth." Mitchell 
had placed his army midway between 
Corinth and Nashville, had opened com- 
munication with Buell, and had added 
another hundred miles of the Tennessee 
to the free navigation of the North. It 
was Mitchell's intention to move east- 
ward as far as Chattanooga, to destroy 
the railroads there, especially that lead- 
ing to Atlanta, and to burn the foun- 
dries and machine shops at Rome. This, 
however, he was unable to accomplish 
without reinforcements; and as these 
were not to be had, he was compelled 
to retire before the superior strength of 
General Kirby Smith. Mitchell, how 
ever, had already done great things, 
and shown what might have been ac- 
complished if his spirit had been shared 
by some of his superiors. Under date 
of May 1st, writing to the secretary of 
war, he could say : " The campaign is 
ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in 
perfect security ; while all of Alabama 
north of the Tennessee River floats no 



ll'j 



COEINTH. 



flag but that of the Union." It was 
not without good reason that Mitchell 
was commissioned a major-general of 
volunteers. The importance of Corinth 
had been fully recognized by Halleck 
and Grant as well as by Buell and 
Mitchell. A few days after the battle 
of Shiloh, General Sherman, with some 
fresh ti'oops from Buell's army, moved 
up the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear 
Creek, and there destroyed the railroad 
bridge which spans the river at that 
place. It will thus be seen that before 
the struggle, suspended on the field of 
Shiloh, was resumed in the immediate 
neighborhood of Corinth the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad, broken in 
many places, had ceased to be useful 
as a line of communication between the 
Mississippi and the Atlantic States. In 
proportion as Corinth became a railroad 
centre in name only and not in reality, 
so did it lose its value as a strategical 
point in the estimation of the Confede- 
rate general. A proper appreciation of 
this fact will help the reader to under- 
stand the issue of the siege. 

As soon as the battle of Shiloh had 
been fought and won, Halleck made up 
his mind that the occupation of Corinth 
was the next necessary step in the on- 
ward movement against the enemy. On 
the 9th of April he left St. Louis for the 
April scene of action. On '.he 12th he 
12. ai'rived at Pittsburg Landing and 
took command in person of the " Grand 
Army of the Tennessee"; for such now 
was its style and title. Grant was 
placed second in command, without any 
real duty. The manner in which he 
had fought the battle of Shiloh was not 



satisfactory to his chief ; and the great- 
est captain in the Northern army, as 
the result proved, was compelled for a 
second time to submit to uncalled-for 
humiliation. Grant bore his punish- 
ment — for punishment it was — with the 
best grace possible. Halleck, as if on 
second thoughts, did what he could to 
reassure him, informing him that no 
censure was intended, and that his 
strangely anomalous position was that 
which was due to his rank. Halleck's 
objection to Grant's conduct in the late 
contest was that he had not shown suf- 
ficient caution — that he had erred, in 
fact, in not throwing iip whatever forti- 
fications were possible in the circum- 
stances between himself and the enemy. 
As if to justify his complaint, and to 
show what should have been done at 
Shiloh, Halleck moved forward with a 
caution which became painful, intrench- , 
ing himself at every step. Blame now' 
fell upon him in turn. He was cau- 
tious overmuch. It was tauntingly said 
that it took him six weeks to march 
fifteen miles ; and there are not a few 
who, to this day, incline to the opinion 
that Halleck's excessive care robbed 
the National forces of the proper fruit 
of the victory at Shiloh. 

Let us see now what were the rela- 
tive positions of the two armies. The 
Confederate defenses were very strong ; 
and considering their strength, it was 
not wholly without reason that Halleck 
advanced with cautious and well-guard- 
ed steps. In one continuous line, and 
occupying the brow of the first lidge 
outside of the town, the intrenchmeuts 
extended over fifteen miles. All the 



FARMIAGTON AND RUSSEL'S HOUSE. 



117 



roads and bridges which could facilitate 
the approach of the National troops had 
been destroyed. On the east there was 
a ravine, and Philip's Creek in front. 
On the north there was a heavy abatis, 
with a cleared space in front. At every 
road-crossing, along their exterior lines 
there were either strong redoubts or bat- 
teries with massive epaulments. Beau- 
regard was nothing if not an engineer ; 
and it is not at all unreasonal^le to con- 
clude that in throwing up those power- 
ful works around Corinth, he bore in 
mind that he was about to test the skill 
of an engineer like himself and a fellow 
West-Pointer. 

The Confederate army concentrated 
at Corinth was composed of first class 
elements. There were the " soldiers of 
Shiloh," the army which had fought 
at Pittsburg Landing; those of "Elk- 
horn," the combined army of VanDorn 
and Price, from Arkansas and Missouri ; 
and the forces under General Lovell, 
which had evacuated New Orleans 
Avhen, on the 28th of April, the gun- 
boats appeared before it. In addition 
to these, a large militia force had been 
hastily sent forward from Alabama, Mis- 
sissippi, and Louisiana. Bragg, as second 
in rank, had command of the "Army of 
tlie Mississippi." The old oi'ganization 
f)f the coi'j)s — under Hardee, Bragg, 
Breckenridge, and Polk — was retained. 
Breckenridge commanded the reserve, 
and VanDorn the reinforcements. The 
whole foice was about sixty-five thou- 
sand men, most of them the best troops 
in the Confederacy. The retreat from 
Shiloh had discouraged, no doubt, but 
it !.ad not damped the hopes of the au- 
goa 



thorities at Richmond ; neither had the 
Confederate soldiers lost their spirit. 
High hopes, therefore, were entertained 
that the efforts about to be put forth at 
Corinth would turn the tide of battle 
and cloud, if not efface, the memory of 
Pittsburg Landing. 

Confronting this large and well-ap- 
pointed army, the very flower of the 
Confederacy, and resolved to expel it 
from its stronghold and to capture it, if 
possible, General Halleck had under 
him over one hundred thousand men, 
not all of them experienced, but all of 
them imbued with the spirit which is 
inseparable from a righteous cause, and 
determined once again to chain victory 
to their standards. There were three 
armies — the army of the Tennessee, ori- 
ginally Grant's, now confided to General 
George H. Thomas, and containing the 
divisions of Hurlbut, Sherman, Smith,' 
and Davies ; the army of the Ohio, com- 
manded by Don Carlos Buell, and com- 
posed of the divisions of McCook, T. J. 
Wood, Nelson, and Crittenden ; the 
army of the Mississippi, General John 
Pope, oi'iginally containing three divis- 
ions, and reinforced by one division from 
General Curtis. Thomas formed the 
right wing, Buell the centre, and Pope 
the left. Grant, being in orders second 
in command, had a general supervision 
of the right wing, under Thomas, and 
the reserves of McClernand and Wal- 
lace's divisions, commanded by McCler- 
nand. 

On the 23d of April General Halleck 
commenced a caiitious forward April 
movement. On the 3d of May 23. 
his advance under General Sherman, 



118 



CORINTH. 



was in the vicinity of Monterey, within 
six or seven miles of Beauregard's lines. 
May On the same day, Pope sent 
3» Paine's division to reconnoitre, 
and, if possible, occupy Farmington, 
one of the most important outposts of 
the enemy. Mar ma duke, who had un- 
der him some fom* thousand five hun- 
dred men, made but little resistance. 
On the contrary, he retired rapidly to 
Corinth, leaving his camp with all 
its supplies, and only thirty dead. At 
the time it seemed as though his orders 
had been to withdraw, but the subse- 
quent efforts of the Confederates to re- 
cover Farmington prove that this could 
not have been so. An artillery recon- 
noissance, well supported by cavalry, as 
far as Glendale, on the Memphis and 
Charleston Raih'oad, Avas successful in 
destroying the track and breaking up 
two important trestle-bridges. In the 
meantime. General Wallace had sent out 
General Morgan L. Smith, with three 
battalions of cavalry and a brigade of 
infantry, upon the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad. They met and fought the 
Confederates in a wood, destroying a 
bi'idge and the track not far from Pur- 
dy, and thus cut off Beauregard from 
Jackson, Tennessee, whence supplies and 
reinforcements were expected. Hal- 
leck's scheme Avas working well; the 
National troops were gradually ap- 
proaching in front, and at the same 
time cutting and I'ecutting the comniu- 
oications on both flanks. 

Pope M'as not to be allowed to hold 
the position which he had so easily won. 
He had miscalculated the enemy's vigi- 
lance, and underestimated the value 



which they attached to Farmington. 
Generals Paine and Palmer, who were 
left in charge, had under them only £ 
single brigade. On the 9th of jfay 
May the Confederates, some twen- *• 
ty thousand strong, fell upon this ad. 
vanced brigade with terrific force. It 
resisted the attack for several hours, 
but at length fell back, because it was 
believed that General Halleck did not 
desire, by supporting it, to bring on a 
general engagement. The front attack of 
the enemy was conducted by VanDorn, 
while Price had been ordered early in 
the day to make a detour to the left, 
and get into the rear of these isolated 
troops. Either he was too late, or 
VanDorn too early. The combination 
was a failure ; they did not capture any 
portion of Pope's army, although they 
occupied Farmington, and found a small 
quantity of baggage there. Eight days 
afterwards Pope reoccupied the post 
with his whole force. 

On the 17th, and while the army was 
imjiatient to be led to the attack, jjay 
there was a lively fight for the *'• 
capture of what was called Rnssel's 
house, an important eminence command- 
ing the junction of the roads three 
hundred yards beyond, and only a mile 
and a quarter from the outer intrench- 
ments of the enemy. The project was 
Sherman's. General Harlbut sent for- 
ward two regiments and a battei'y 
under General Denver and General 
M. L. Smith. The attack was success- 
ful; and the position, which was one 
of great natural strength, was imme- 
diately fortified and occupied by 9 
large force. 



BEAUREGAED RETREATS. 



119 



Gradually the National lines began 
to di'aw nearer the Confederate out- 
works, Halleck cautiously fortifying his 
May position as he advanced. On the 
2'* 21 st of May the National army was 
fairly in line three miles from Corinth, 
\\nth detached works in front, corre- 
sponding with the general direction of 
May those of the enemy. On the 28th, 
28. still drawing closer and closer, it 
was within thirteen hundred yards of 
the enemy's outer line. Heavy siege 
guns Avere now in position ; and recon- 
noisances in great force were being 
made on both flank and centre. On the 
May 29th Pope di-ove them fi'om their 
29« advance batteries, and Sherman 
planted heavy guns within a thousand 
yards of Beauregard's left. It was not 
possible now that the end could be 
long delayed. Beauregard's position 
was such that his delay in making a 
vigorous attack was simply inexplicable. 
He had allowed the National troops, 
comparatively unmolested, to get within 
easy fighting distance of his lines, and 
to establish themselves behind fortifica- 
tions quite as strong as his own. He 
had allowed himself to be completely 
isolated from all possible sources of as- 
sistance. His railroad communications 
had been cut north, south, east, and 
west. It was General Halleck's confi- 
dent belief on the night of the 29th 
that Beauregard would ofPer battle in 
the morning. The battle might be san- 
guinary, but he was confident of success; 
for he knew he had a superior force, and 
that retreat would be impossible, as all 
the railroad communications had been 
cut. He did not know that retreat had 



already been accomplished. In the early 
morning the skirmishers sought the foe 
in vain. Suddenlj^ the earth was shaken 
as if by an earthquake; and dense clouds i 
of smoke rolled up over Corinth. The 
enemy was gone. Beauregard had fled. 
For days ahead he had been sending on 
his sick and his most valuable stores 
towards Mobile. Some twenty four 
hours before, a part of his effective 
force and nearly all his ordnance had 
been moved off in the same direction. 
The rear-guard had left for the south 
and west the nic^ht before. Some 
wretched creatures had willingly or 
Tuiwillingly been left behind to fire the 
town. So ended the siege of Corinth. 
After all his labor and patience, Hal- 
leck reaped a bloodless ])ut compara- 
tively barren victory. Beauregard was 
compelled to retire ; but he had the 
proud satisfaction of having saved his 
army and all his munitions of war. His 
retreat was in some respects equal to a 
victory. 

No time was lost in following up the 
retreating foe. At seven o'clock on the 
morning of the 30th, Pope's ad- May 
vance drove the small rear-guard ^^' 
of the Confederate cavalry through the 
town ; while the brave Gordon Gran- 
ger, setting out with a brigade and a 
battery on the Boonesville road from 
Farmington at noon, pushed the flying 
foe through the former place, and keep- 
ing up the pursuit, crossed Twenty-mile 
Ci-eek the following day, the main army 
being close upon his heels. On June 
the 10th of June the pursuit end- *®' 
ed, the National advance having reached 
Baldwin and Gumtown, and still on the 



120 



CORINTH. 



railroad. Beauregard had established 
himself at Tupelo, a few miles below, 
where the railroad is crossed by Old 
Tom Creek, an affluent of the Tombig- 
.bee. Halleck, thinking that he had 
risked enough, and fearing for the safe- 
ty of his communications, ordered a 
halt ; and so the biief campaign of Co- 
rinth was brought to an end. 

The National army returned to Co- 
rinth, where it remained making busy 
preparations for a new movement. The 
watei's of the Tennessee were already 
low ; and as for months to come they 
would become lower and lower, and 
therefore useless as a means of com- 
munication, the I'ailroad was repaired 
and put in good condition as far as 
Columbus. General Buell, with the 
army of the Ohio, was sent on the 10th 
of June to Chattanooga, while General 
Grant, with the army of the Tennessee, 
held possession of the new strategic 
line of railroad between Memphis and 
luka. Halleck had already accom- 
plished much ; and at Washington, as 
we shall soon have occasion to see, he 
was regarded as the rising man. Much 
as he had done, he might have done 
more. We have ah-eady expressed the 
02)inion that a little more dash and dar- 
ing, and a little less caution, when he 
took command in person after the battle I 
of Shiloh, might have resulted in the 
complete defeat if not capture of Beau- 
regard's army, before that general was 
able to surround himself with fortifica- 
tions at Corinth. As it was, the fate of 
the great States of Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee had to all appearance been de- 
cided ; and the entire northwest of the 



Confederacy, a vast space of many thou- 
sand square miles, had been wrenched 
away. The plan, the execution of 
which commenced with the attack on 
Fort Henry, had worked adniii-ably; 
and although some hai'd fighting had 
yet to be done before the enemy was 
completely driven out of the valley of 
the Mississippi, and before the Father 
of Waters was open through to the sea, 
the Noi'th had reason so far to be well 
satisfied with Halleck's services and 
success. 

Beaui'egard had much less reason to 
feel satisfied with the position in which 
he found himself. He had no doubt 
done his best. If he had not made at 
Corinth so bold and vigorous a stand as 
was expected by friend and foe alike, 
it was because he correctly measured 
his strength, and took in the true value 
of his position. If he had been better 
supported by the authorities at Rich- 
mond, the results might have been dif- 
ferent. Most unquestionably he showed 
greater wisdom in retreating as he did, 
than he would have done by risking a 
battle in the later days of the siege. 
His forces had not been sufiiciently in- 
creased ; and Coi'inth had been rendered 
not only worthless but dangerous by 
the destruction of the railroads. For 
some time he had been ill ; and at Tu- 
pelo he took the liberty of retiring to 
Bladdon Springs, about twelve miles 
distant, for the purpose of recuperating, 
leaving General Bragg in command, 
with instructions to put the army in 
condition to take the field on his return. 
On hearing this, Davis became wild 
with rage, telegraphed Bragg to assume 



BEAUEEGARD, GRANT, AND SHERMAN. 



i-4. 



perinauent command, and declared that 
nothing could ever induce him again to 
entrust the army to Beauregard. It was 
not long until Davis had sufficient rea- 
son to alter his determination. While 
saying this much for Beauregard, we 
cannot at all hold him excusable for 
the grossly exaggerated and sometimes 
false reports which he was in the habit 
of sending to his government. He 
claimed a " great and glorious victory " 
when he had been defeated and driven 
from Shiloh. He declared Corinth to 
be the "strategic point of that cam- 
paign," and assured his government 
that he was able to hold it; and yet 
from Tupelo, whither he had found it 
necessary to retreat, he could write that 
he had " accomplished his purposes and 
ends." Human nature often reveals 
such inconsistencies ; and this weakness, 
on the part of the Confederate com- 
mander, stands out in stiiking contrast 
with other and unmistakably great qual- 
ities which the man possessed. This 
particular weakness is and must ever 
remain a source of regret to all who, 
from any cause, learned to admire the 
better part of one of the greatest gene- 
rals pi"oduced on either side during the 
civil conflict. 

It would not be easy to overestimate 
the importance of Shiloh and Corinth 
on the general character of the struggle. 
Taken together, they constituted a turn- 
ing point in the progress of events. In 
retiring from Corinth, the enemy aban- 
doned his second line of defense. As 
he must now fall back upon his third 
line, it was manifest to all that the next 
great struggle would be around Vicks- 



burg. In consequence of events which 
will be detailed in a future chapter, 
this was now the one remaining strong- 
hold of tbe Confederates on the line of 
the Mississippi. Vicksburg captured, 
the great river would again be open to 
the sea. The capture of Vicksburg — 
this was the purpose which now filled 
the minds of Halleck and Grant, and to 
this end all their energies Avere hence- 
forth directed. Extensive preparations 
must be made, and some hard work 
must be done, before the next great 
struggle ; but Vicksburg became the 
objective point of all the efforts of the 
army of the Tennessee. 

At the close of this chapter, it can 
hardly be deemed out of place to notice 
the influence of Shiloh and Corinth on 
the fortunes of some of the principal 
actors. Among the Confederates, Beau- 
regard was the man principally affected. 
He had the greatest opportunity He 
sustained the greatest loss. The effect 
of Shiloh and Corinth was undou'otedly 
injurious ; but it was not lasting. Beau- 
regard suffered the less that neither at 
Shiloh nor at Corinth did any rival of 
equal capacity come to the front. On 
the National side three men shared 
largely of the favors of fortune — Hal- 
leck, Grant, and Sherman. Halleck 
reaped a glory Avhich was scarcely all 
his own. Grant, in spite of a treat- 
ment which must be pronounced un- 
just, not only preserved his reputation, 
but secured the opportunity of making 
himself what he soon aftei-wards was 
recognized to be, the leading represent- 
ative on the field of the Northern cause. 
Sherman, in the one battle and in thw 



122 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1863. 



other, surpassed himself in deeds of 
skill and daring, and earned his right 
and title to a place in the front rank 



of the great military men whom the 
war was gradually developing — a plac^ 
which he never afterwards lost. 



CHAPTER IX. 



The Thir<3 Great ExpatUtion. — Burnside and Goldsborough. — Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Eoads. — Ter- 
rific Storm. — Disaster to the Fleet. — Hatteras Inlet. — Roanoke Island. — Fort Barton. — The Bombardment. — 
The Confederatft Flotilla. — Landing of the National Troops. — The Battle of Roanoke. — National Victory. — The 
Confederates Discouraged. — Albemarle Sound. — Elizabeth City Captured. — Edentown. — The Dismal Swamp 
Canal. — Winton. —Plymouth. — Burnside and Goldsborough's joint Address to the People of North Carolina. — 
Governor Clark's Counter-Proclamation. — New Berne. — Expedition against. — Landing Troops at Slocum's 
Creek. — Disposition of the Forces. — The Battle of New Berne. — Severe Fighting. — The Confederate Right 
Driven in.^A Panic. — The Retreat of the Confederates. — Capture of New Berne. — Buruside's Order. — His 
Report.— Compliment to McClellan. — Expedition against Fort Macon. — Preparations for Bombardment. — 
Arrival of Burnside. — CaU for Surrender. — The Bombardment. — Splendid Work. — Description of the Fight. — 
The Fort Surrenders. — Beaufort. — Reno at South Mills. — Burnside's Good Fortune. — He is Summoned to 
Washington. — The Savannah Blockade. — Dawfuskie Island. — Jones' Island. — Big Tybee. — Fort Pulaski. — 
Preparations for the Bombardment. — Commander Dupont. — General Quincy A. Gillmore. — The Erection 
of Batteries on Venus Point and on Long Island. — The Siege Batteries on Big Tybee. — Colonel Olmstead 
called upon to Surrender. — General Hunter Supersedes Sherman. — The Opening of the Fire on the Fort. — 
The Walls of the Fort Honeycombed. — The 'White Flag. — The Surrender. — The Blockade of Savannah Com- 
plete. — Along the Florida Coast. — Commander Dupont and General Wright. — Fort Clinch. — Femandina.— 
Brunswick. — Jacksonville. — Fort Marion and St. Augustine. -^Pensacola. — Forts McRae and' Barrancas. — On 
the Gulf and along the Atlantic Seaboard, the National Power Supreme. — New Orleans Expedition. 



In a previous chapter of this work 

we have described the character 
i862a 

and traced the progress of two 

great naval and military expeditions, 
both of them fitted out in Hampton 
Roads, and both of them sent forth for 
the pui'pose of rendering more effective 
the blockade of the southern ports. 
One of these was under the command 
of General Butler and Commodore 
Stringham, and was successful in driv- 
ing the Confederates from Harrison's 
Inlet, and in retaining possession of the 
inlet and of the island of the same 
name. The other, which was fitted out 
somewhat later and on a larger scale. 



was entrusted to the care of General T. 
W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont 
We have seen how, after a severe stonn, 
that expedition succeeded in reaching 
Port Royal, capturing Foi'ts Walker 
and Beauregard and taking possession 
of Warsaw Sound to the south and Big 
Tybee to the north, thus driving the 
Confederates from eveiy stronghold on 
the southern shores of South Carolina, 
and on the northern shores of Georgia, 
with the exceptions of Fort Pulaski, at 
the mouth of the Savannah, and Fort 
Jackson, further up the river. 

In the beginning of 1862 another ex- 
pedition was fitted out on a grand scale, 



THE THIRD GREAT EXPEDITION. 



123 



and was intended not only to operate 
on the southern coast, but to advance 
into the interior and act in conjunction 
with the Federal armies. This expedi- 
tion was put in charge of General Am- 
brose Everett Burnside and Flag-officer 
Louis M. Goldsborough. The military 
force, like that of Butler, had been 
gathered at Annapolis. It was com- 
posed of fifteen regiments and a battal- 
ion of infantry, a battery of artillery, 
and a large number of gunners capable 
of serving either on land or sea. The 
whole force was divided into three Ijri- 
gades, which were commanded respect- 
ively by Generals John G. Foster, Jesse 
L. Reno, and John G. Parke. The fleet 
comprised over one hundred steam and 
sailing vessels, consisting of gunboats, 
transports, and tugs. It was divided 
into two columns for active service, in- 
trusted respectively to the care of Com- 
manders S. G. Hazard and Stephen H. 
Rowan. The troops to be conveyed in 
these vessels numbered in all about six- 
teen thousand. 

The commanders were well chosen; 
and there coidd be no reason to doubt 
that, so far as their ability and fidelity 
were concerned, the expedition would 
not fail of success. General Burnside 
was born at Liberty, Union County, 
Indiana, on the 2.3d of May, 1824. In 
1842, at the age of nineteen, he entered 
the Military Academy at West Point, 
and graduated in 1847, when he became 
a second-lieutenant in the United States 
Artillery. He served under General 
Patterson in Mexico, where he remained 
till the end of the war. In August, 
1849, he distinguished himself in a skir- 



mish with the Apaches at Los Vegas; 
and for his gallantry on that occasion 
he was promoted to a first-lieutenancy. 
He was one of the commissioners ap- 
pointed to settle the boundary line be- 
tween Mexico and the United States; 
and in 1851 he performed, aa the bearer 
of despatches from Colonel Graham to 
President Fillmore, the marvellous feat 
of riding on horseback, in seventeen 
days, over a space of one thousand two 
hundred miles, through a country beset 
with hostile Indians. Burnside, like 
many others of the military men of that 
day, grew tired of a life of inactivity ; 
and in 1853 he resigned his commission 
in the army. For some yeai's he was 
engaged in I'ailroad management. He 
was a trained child of the republic; 
and when the war broke out, he was 
naturally expected to give his country 
the benefit of his training and experi- 
ence. Appointed by Governor Sprague 
to the conunand of the First Rhode 
Island Volunteers, he responded to the 
call of duty, and marched with his reg- 
iment to Washington. His conduct at 
Bull Run won for him the highest 
praise both from the government and 
from the people. No fitter man could 
have been found for the leadership of 
such an expedition. Flag-officer Golds 
borough was a man of equal worth and 
of even greater experience. He had 
been in the navy since 1812. He had 
been at sea for eighteen years ; had been 
on duty on shore for twelve years; and 
for some eighteen years he had been 
without active employment, when he 
was appointed to tlie command of the 
frigate Congress. From the Congreaa 



134 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1863. 



lie was transferred to the Minnesota, 
taking command of one-half of the At- 
lantic blockading squadron. Goldsbor- 
oiigh had been for some time stationed 
in Hampton Roads, when he was in- 
structed to take charge of the fleet in 
the third joint military and naval expe- 
dition. It is thus seen that the com- 
mand of the expedition was placed in 
thoroughly competent hands. 

On the 11th of January, after two 
Jan, months' preparation, mth the 
*'• troops all on board the transports, 
the magnificent fleet sailed out of Hamp- 
ton Roads, and proceeded to sea. It 
Was Sunday; and the scene witnessed 
in the neighborhood of Fortress Monroe 
was much tke same as that which had 
been witnessed in October of the pi-e- 
vious year, on the occasion of the de- 
parture of the expedition under Sher- 
man and Dupont. As in the former 
case, the destination of the fleet was 
kept a profound secret. The instruc- 
tions, which had been given to General 
Burnside on the 7th of January, were 
that he should unite with Flag-officer 
Goldsborough, in command of the fleet 
at Fortress Monroe, and 2:)roceed to Cap- 
ture New Berne, seize the Weldon Rail- 
road, and reduce Fort Macon. It was 
not, however, deenied advisable that 
these instructions should have the effect 
of putting the Confederates on their 
guard ; and hence care was taken that 
the objective point of the expedition 
should be known only to the govern- 
ment and to the two commanders. The 
secret was well kept ; but the govern- 
ment at Richmond was not ignorant of 
the necessities of the situation or of the 



general policy in favor with the authori- 
ties at Washington. With characteristic 
shrewdness the Confederates divined 
the direction of the intended blow, and 
were not wholly unprepared for it when 
it fell. The public had not had tim« 
to forget the terrific storm which scat- 
tered Dupont's fleet in the first days of 
November; and, considering the season 
of the year, there were many fears and 
some forebodings of evil. The fears, as 
the result proved, were not groundless. 
The forebodings were too literally real- 
ized. No great difficulty was experi- 
enced until the vessels were off the 
stormy Hatteras. The advance had 
reached the stiller waters of the inlet, 
when, on Monday night, a dreadful 
storm broke out, striking the vessels in 
the rear with terrific fury. Four trans- 
ports, a gunboat, and a floating battery 
were wrecked. Among these the fine 
steamer City of Ne\v York, with four 
hundred barrels of gunpowder, one 
thousand five hundred rifles, eight hun- 
dred shells, and other stores and sup- 
plies, valued in all at about a quarter 
of a million dollars, went down in sight 
of the shore. Some of the vessels, which 
had been purchased in New York, were 
evidently unfit for such service; and 
the opinion was very generally enter- 
tained that the ship merchants of that 
city had taken advantage of the necessi- 
ties of the government to dispose of 
worthless stock. Happily, in the first 
instance at least, no human lives were 
lost. On the 14th, however, a Jan. 
party went ashore from one of **• 
the transports, yet outside ; the boat, 
on returning, was capsized, and three of 



ROANOKE ISLAND. 



1^5 



the party were drowned. These were 
Colonel J. W. Allen of Burlington, New 
Jersey, commander of the Ninth Regi- 
ment from that State; Surgeon F. S. 
Waller ; and the mate of the transport. 
Grreat difficulty was experienced in get- 
ting the vessels tkrough the inlet, as 
the weather continued boisterous, and 
the vessels crowded each other and ob- 
structed progress. It was the end of 
January before all the vessels were 
through the inlet ; and it was not until 
Peb. the 7th of February that the reor- 
y^ ganized expedition, having moved 
forward over the still waters of Pam- 
lico, had reached the entrance to Croa- 
tan Sound. 

It can readily be imagined of what 
advantage the storm proved to the Con- 
federates. It did seem once more as if 
the winds of heaven were enlisted on 
their side and fighting their battles. 
Information leaked out through the 
neAvspapers ; and what with their own 
knowledge of the coast and the general 
purpose of the government at Washing- 
ton, they had no gi-eat difficulty in ar- 
riving at the conclusion that Roanoke 
Island, which lay behind Bodies' Island 
and between Pamlico and Albemarle 
Sounds, and about thirty miles from 
Hatteras Inlet, was to be the first point 
of attack. The island, which was well 
fortified and gairisoned, completely pro- 
tected the entii'e northeastera coast of 
North Carolina from invasion by sea; 
.and it effectually guarded the rear ap- 
proaches to Norfolk and Portsmouth in 
Virginia. It was scarcely second in im- 
portance to Fortress Mom-oe. The isl- 
and and its vicinity were now under 



the command of Biigadier-General H. 
A. Wise. In consequence of the illness 
of Wise, Colonel H. M. Shaw, of the 
Eighth North Carolina Regiment, was 
performing the duties of commander-in- 
chief on the island. He had under him 
his own regiment; the Thirty-First 
North Carolina Volunteers, Colonel J. 
V. Jordan ; three companies of the Sev- 
enteenth North Carolina, Major G. H. 
Hill ; and four hundred and fifty men,; 
Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson. On all 
the prominent points of the shores of 
Roanoke, batteries had been erected 
commanding Croatan Sound on the one 
side and Pamlico Sound on the other. 
On the narrowest part of the island, 
between Shallowbag Bay and Croatan 
Sound, there was an intrenched camp 
with a strong redoubt, extending across 
the road which traversed the middle of 
the island. All these fortifications wei'e 
well mounted and well manned. In 
addition to those on the island, there 
were powerful batteries on the main- 
land, commanding the channels of Croa- 
tan Sound. This, however, was not all. 
The principal channel of Croatan Sound 
was blocked with sunken vessels ; and 
the entire waters at Pork Point, from the 
island to the mainland, were filled with 
stakes and other obsti'uctions. Above 
th^se, and towards Albemarle Sound, 
was a flotilla of email gunboats, eight 
in number and carrying eleven guns, 
under the command of Lieutenant W. 
F. Lynch, now charged with the defense 
of the coast of North Carolina. 

As early as the 5th of Februaiy Com- 
modore Goldsborough had made y^)^ 
a reconnoissance with thirty of his 5« 



UQ 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 



gunboats towards Croatan Sound ; and 
Feb. on the 7th he began to move on 
'• the forts on either side. The 
morning of that day was dull and un- 
promising ; but later the sun burst forth 
in splendor; and Groldsborough, at 
about ten o'clock, hoisted the signal, 
" This day om- country expects every 
man to do his duty." The gunboats 
advanced in three columns. The first 
was led by the Stars and Stripes, Lieu- 
tenant Worden; the second by the 
Louisiana, Commander Alexander Mur- 
ray ; and the third by the Hetzel, Lieu- 
tenant H. R. Davenport. Goldsborough 
was on board the Southfield, which he 
made his flag-ship, and was accompa- 
nied by the gunboat Underwriter. At 
eleven o'clock, a bombardment was 
opened on Fort Barton, on Pork Point ; 
and within thirty minutes afterwards 
the battle had become general. The 
Confederate gunboats took part in the 
fight; but they were soon driven be- 
yond the range of the National guns; 
and the Curlew, their largest steamer, 
was so badly damaged that she began 
to sink, and was saved by being beached 
under the guns of Fort Forrest on the 
mainland. The fleet thus put out of 
the way, Goldsborough concentrated 
his fire on Fort Barton, at a range of 
about three-quarters of a mile, as close 
as the depth of water would permit him 
to advance. Soon the flagstaff of the 
fort was shot away ; the barracks were 
set on fire ; and the entire works began 
to fall to pieces, under the weight of 
the shot and the terrific explosions of 
the shells. 

The transports were now brought 



forward ; and preparations were made 
for landing the troops at Ashby'a Har- 
bor, on Roanoke Island, about two 
miles below Fort Barton. The Confed- 
erates had anticipated this movement; 
and a force of two thousand men, with 
a battery of three pieces, lay concealed 
in the woods in front of the landing. 
In the meantime the Confederate flotilla 
returned to the attack. A shower, of 
shot and shell from the National gun- 
boats quickly cleared the woods ; and, 
after an houi-'s vigorous firing on both 
sides, the Confederate flotilla again re- 
tired. About midnight the troops were 
got on shore. The landing, however, 
had been accomplished in circumstances 
of more than ordinary difficulty. The 
night was extremely cold; there was a 
heavy rain-storm ; and to add to the dis- 
comforts of the situation, such was the 
shallowness of the water that the boats 
could not effect a landing, and the men 
were compelled to wade waist-deep, for 
a quarter of a mile. Early on the peb, 
morning of the 8th the troops, 8. 
about eleven thousand in number, who 
had spent the dark hours as best they 
could without any shelter, were moved 
forward to attack the enemy's intrench- 
ments in the interior of the island. The 
advancing column was under the com- 
mand of General Fostei", the next in 
rank to General Bui-nside, who remained 
at the landing. The main body fol- 
lowed, and was led by Generals Reno 
and Parke. About eight o'clock Foster 
reached the enemy's position. Their 
ground was well chosen. On either 
side was a morass. A narrow causeway 
was the only approach to their works; 



THE ZOUAVES. 



«7 



and this they had protected by an earth- 
work mounting three guns. Inside the 
intrenchments there were some three 
thousand troops, under command of 
Colonel Shaw. Foster had brought 
from the naval launches some six or 
eight boat-howitzers. These were un- 
der the immediate command of Mid- 
shipman B. F. Porter. Foster contin- 
ued to press forward ; but the ground 
being swampy and bordered with woods, 
the march was conducted slowly and 
with great caution. With musketry 
and cannon the battle was begun on 
both sides. The Twenty-Fifth Massa- 
chusetts, Colonel Upton, supported by 
the Twenty-Third Massachusetts, Col- 
onel Kurtz, were the fii'st engaged. 
These were soon joined by the Twenty- 
Seventh Massachiisetts, Colonel Lee, 
and the Tenth Connecticut, Colonel 
Russell. The battle now raged fiercely, 
the Confederates firmly holding their 
ground and making a most gallant de- 
fense. Reno, with the Twenty-First 
Massachusetts, Colonel Maggi, the Fif- 
ty-First New York, Colonel Ferrero, 
the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Colonel 
Harti-anft, and the Ninth New Jersey, 
now came up to the aid of Foster. 
Pushing through the tangled swamps, 
he took a position on Foster's right. 
While Reno thus advanced to the right, 
Parke, with the Fourth Rhode Island, 
Colonel Rodman, the first battalion 
Fifth Rhode Island, the Eighth Con- 
necticut, and Ninth New York, the last 
under Colonel Hawkins, pressed to- 
wards the left. At this moment the fight- 
ing was terrific, both sides performing 
deeda of gi'eat valor ; while among the 



Nationals, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsyl- 
vania, each emulous of all the others, 
strove for the prize of the day. Not- 
withstanding the immensely superior 
numbei's by which they were attacked, 
the Confederates stubbornly held their 
ground. The Nationals, who had suf- 
fered severely from the Confederate 
fire, now began to experience a scarcity 
of ammunition. It was evident to Gen- 
eral Foster that a bold stroke must be 
made vigorously and at once. The maia 
battery which commanded the causeway 
must be silenced. A bayonet charge 
was resolved upon. Major E. A. Kim- 
ball of Hawkins' Ninth New York 
(Zouaves) volunteered to lead the at- 
tack. " You are the man," said Foster; 
"the Ninth is the regiment; and this 
is the moment. Zouaves, storm the 
battery ! Forward ! " With a leap and 
a yell, they went bounding across the 
causeway. " Make way for the red- 
caps! " resounded on every side; while 
the cry of " Zou ! Zou ! " rent the air. 
It was the work of a moment. The 
Zouaves rushed into the battery, fol- 
lowed closely by the Tenth Connecticut, 
the Fifty-First New York, and the 
Twenty-First Massachusetts. The col- 
ors of the Fifty-First and the State flag 
of Massachusetts, planted on the cap^ 
tured battery, revealed the rapidity of 
the attack and the completeness of the 
victory. The Confederates, after the 
first shot, abandoned their guns and 
fled to the northern part of the island. 
Reno, with the Twenty-First Massachu- 
setts and Ninth New York, started off 
in vigorous pursuit. Foster, having 



m 



COAST OPEKATIONS IN 1862. 



re-formed his men, quickly followed. 
Hawkins, with his Zouaves, hui'ried to- 
ward Shallowbag Bay, where, it was 
understood, the Confederates had a two- 
gun battery. After a chase of some five 
or six miles, Foster was met by a flag of 
truce in the hands of Colonel Pool, of the 
Eighth North Carolina, who bore a mes- 
sage from Colonel Shaw, the command- 
ant of the island, asking on what terms 
capitulation would be granted. There 
was but one answer possible. " Uncon- 
ditional and immediate surrender," was 
Foster's prompt reply. Two thousand 
men laid down their arms and became 
prisoners of war. Among them was 
Colonel Shaw. Meanwhile Reno, who 
had turned toward Weir's Point, forced 
the surrender of some eight hundi-ed, 
who, with Colonel Jordan at their head, 
were vainly attempting to escape from 
the island ; while Hawkins found easy 
possession of the battery at Shallowbag 
Bay, and captured some two hundred 
who were seeking a chance to escape to 
Nag's Head on the mainland. 

"While success was thus attending the 
land forces, Goldsborough was making 
good use of his gunboats. He had re- 
newed his fire on Fort Barton, at Pork 
Point. Towards the close of the day, 
and in order to complete the conquest 
of the island, Foster sent a detachment 
to capture the fort. The guns were al- 
ready silenced ; it was found that the 
garrison had I'etired ; and shortly after 
four o'clock, Goldsborough, on seeing 
the National colors floating over the 
stronghold, signalled to his fleet, " The 
fort is ours." About the same time the 
Confederate steamer Curlew, which had 



been beached under the guns at Red- 
stone Point, was blown up ; and the 
barracks at that place were set on fire. 
The Confederate flotilla retired into the- 
M^aters of Albemarle Sound ; and what 
is known as the battle of Roanoke was 
ended. 

From Fort Barton, where he took up 
his headquarters, General Burnside sent 
a report of the day's proceedings to 
Washington. He had captured six 
forts, forty guns, most of them of 
large calibre, three of them being 100- 
pounders, and about three thousand 
prisoners. With a magnanimity which 
is characteristic of true greatness, he 
gave all the credit of the victoiy to 
Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke. In 
fitting terms he lamented the deaths of 
Colonel Charles S. Russell and Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Vigeur de Monteuil, both 
of whom fell when gallantly leading 
the attack in the centre of the island. 
His entire loss was fifty killed and two 
hundred and twenty-two wounded. The 
'Confederate loss was much less, as they 
fought for the most part under breast- 
works. According to Pollard, there 
were twenty-three killed, fifty-eight 
wounded, and sixty-two missing. 

The capture of Roanoke was justly 
regarded by the South as a damaging 
blow to their cause. Pamlico Sound was 
now completely wrenched from their 
grasp ; Albemarle Sound must soon 
share a similar fate ; and then nearly 
the entu-e seaboard of Virginia and the 
better part of that of North Carolina 
would be in the hands of the Nationals. 
This, however, was not all. Roanoke 
Island was indissolubly associated with 



ELIZABETH CITY 



129 



the early history of America. North 
Carolina was proud to own it. It was 
the scene of Sir Walter Raleigh's colo- 
nizing experiment in 1585; and it was 
here that the first attempt was made to 
establish a titled and privileged aris- 
tocracy in the New World. After two 
imsuccessful attempts at colonization, 
Manteo, a native chief, was, by com- 
mand of Raleigh, and with the apjiroval 
of Queen Elizabeth, made Lord of Ro- 
anoke. The loss of the island implied 
the dismemberment of one of the oldest 
and proudest of the Southern States. 
The people of the South veiy properly 
complained that Roanoke was not bet- 
ter fortified, and that the island should 
have been allowed to fall so easily a 
prey to the enemy. General Huger, 
who had charge of that department, 
with his headquarters at Norfolk, and 
Secretary of War Benjamin, were both 
greatly blamed. Although the battle 
of Roanoke was won by the Nationals 
with comparative ease, and although 
I here was no great loss of life on either 
side, few of the battles of the war were 
conducted, on the one side or the othei', 
with more ability or with greater deter- 
mination. The Nationals were vastly 
superior in numbers; and for this reason 
llie issue, from the commencement of 
the contest, was not doubtful. 

The Confederate flotilla had crossed 
feb. Albemarle Sound, and had sailed 
9- up the Pasquotank River as fai' 
AS Elizabeth City, in the neighborhood 
of the Great Dismal Swamp. Elizabeth 
City is the capital of Pasquotank Coun- 
ty, Nortli Carolina. It is situated on 
the right bank of the Pasquotank River, 



about thirty miles from its mouth. It is 
a post town, and contains a court-house, 
jail, and several churches. Vessels 
drawng seven feet of water can come 
up close to the city with the greatest 
ease. It has a water communication 
with Norfolk by means of the Pasquo- 
tank River and the Dismal Swamp 
Canal. Into these waters the Nationals 
resolved to follow; and Goldsborough, 
the day after the capture of Roan- 
oke, detailed some fourteen vessels, 
under Commander Rowan, for that pur- 
pose. Rowan had some difficulty in get- 
ting his fleet past the sunken vessels, 
piles, and other obstructions in Croatan 
Sound ; but on the morning of the peb. 
10th he had so far accomplished '®» 
his purpose as to have his entire fleet in 
the harbor of Elizabeth City. There 
he found the Confederate fleet, consist- 
ing of seven steamers and a schooner 
ai-med with two 32-pounders. A four- 
gun battery had been planted on shore. 
There was also one heavy gun in the 
town, in fi'ont. The entire arrangement 
was in charge of Commander Lj^nch. 
Rowan lost no time in getting his ves- 
sels in ordej'; and about nine o'clock 
he opened fire upon the enemy's fleet 
and also upon the batteries. The fight 
was of short diu'ation. The Confederate 
vessels Avere run aground. The one 
gun was silenced ; so also were the bat- 
teries. The vessels were set on fire and 
abandoned. The fight had l.'fsted only 
forty minutes. Lynch fled, and waa 
not again heard of during the war, until 
he reappeared at Smithfield, on the oc- 
casion of the capture of Fort Fislier, in 
18G5. In his report of the engagement, 



130 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862, 



Rowan said that he had destroyed or 
captured the entire naval force of the 
enemy, that he had silenced and de- 
stroyed his batteries, and that the only 
vessel saved was the Ellis, whose cap- 
tain, J. M. Cook, was wounded and a 
prisoner. His own loss was "two or 
three killed and some wounded." Eliz- 
abeth City was promptly taken posses- 
sion of, but not before a most barbarous 
attempt had been made by the retreat- 
ing Confederates to destroy it by fire. 
Happily the flames were got under; 
and the lives of many helpless Avomen 
and children were saved. 

Burnside did not allow himself to 
rest upon his laurels. The advantages 
gained, to be made secure, required that 
the Confederates be rendered powerless 
for evil all along the coast of North 
Carolina. The capture of Elizabeth 
City was followed by similar move- 
ments into the harbors and bays which 
branch off Albemarle Sound. The first 
movement Avas towards Edentown, a 
flourishing little place at the head of 
'.he bay of the same name, near the 
western end of the sound. It is a post 
town, a port of entry, and the capital 
of Chowan County. Edentown was 
Feb. settled as far back as 1716. On 
'-• the day after the capture of Eliza- 
lieth, Lieutenant A. Maury, with part of 
Rowan's fleet, took possession of Eden- 
town, the Confederates offering no re- 
sistance. A body of flying artillery, as 
soon as they saw the gunboats, made a 
precipitate retreat, without firing a shot. 
Maury found a schooner on the stocks, 
and some cannon, which he destroyed, 
and passed on, capturing other vessels 



in the sound. Next day (February 13), 
Lieutenant Jeffers, with a portion peb. 
of the fleet, proceeded to the '3« 
mouth of the Chesapeake and Albe- 
marle Canal — the canal whicli traverses 
the Great Dismal Swamp, connecting 
the Pasquotank with the Elizabeth 
River. It was the intention of the 
Nationals to destroy the canal ; but 
when Jeffers arrived, he found that this 
work had ali'eady been accomplished by 
the Confederates themselves. He saw 
two small steamers and three schooners 
about a mile and a quarter up the canal. 
Some pickets stationed near the en- 
trance fii-ed their muskets as a signal; 
and what seemed a large body of men 
got under cover close by the vessels. 
At about a hundred yards from the 
mouth of the canal the National gun- 
boats grounded. The "Whitehead was 
ordered to open fire with her nine-inch 
guns. After thi'ee shells had been flung 
at them, the Confederate troops fled 
precipitately, and the vessels moved 
further up the canal. On landing, Jef- 
fers found that a schooner had been 
sunk about fifty yards from the canal's 
mouth, and that, to prevent it changing 
its position, it was well supported by 
piles, logs, and other material. A largfj 
dredging machine had been left behind. 
This, after destroying its machinery, 
the Nationals sank diagonally across 
the canal, thus effectually blocking the 
way for even the smallest vessel. Still 
another movement of a similar kind was 
made before Burnside girt himself foi 
the heavier work which had to be pebi 
accomplished further to the south. I^' 
On the 19th the combined fleet set out 



NEW BERNE. 



131 



from Edentown on a reconnoisance. One 
portion of the fleet sailed up the Chowan 
River as far as Winton, while another 
portion proceeded up the Roanoke to 
Plymouth. At neither place was any 
attempt made to land ; but as in both 
cases they were fired upon from the 
laud, the gunboats responded with 
shells; and Winton was partially and 
Plymouth almost com^iletely destroyed. 
In a joint address to the people of 
North Carolina, Burnside and Golds- 
borough stated the object of their mis- 
sion, and rejielled the unfounded charges 
made against them by the Confederate 
leaders. After assuring them that they 
were Christians like themselves, and 
that they realized the obligations which 
that sacred name implied, they thus 
concluded, " We invite you, in the name 
of the constitution, and in that of virtu- 
ous loyalty and civilization, to separate 
yourselves at once from these malign 
influences, to return to your allegiance, 
and not compel us to resort further to 
the force under our control. The gov- 
ernment asks only that its authority 
may be recognized ; and we repeat, in 
no manner or way does it desire to in- 
terfere with your laws, constitutionally 
established, your institutions of any 
kind whatever, your property of any 
sort, or your usages in any respect." 
This document was signed by both com- 
Feb, manders, and bore date February 

I**' 18, 1862. Such a proclamation 
xiaturally enough alarmed and irritated 
the Confederate leaders ; and on the 

Peb. 2 2d a violent counter-proclama- 

22. tion was issued by Henry T. 

Clark, the governor of North Carolina. 



The tone of Governor Clark's proclama- 
tion was as bellicose as that of Burnside 
and Goldsborough was peaceful. It 
denounced the expedition as an attempt 
to deprive the inhabitants of their most 
sacred rights. It proclaimed the war 
as waged by the North to be one ol 
subjugation — " a war forced upon us in 
Avrong, and prosecuted without right and 
in a spirit of vengeful wickedness, with- 
out a parallel in the history of warfare 
among civilized nations." It was a war 
of "avarice and ambitiou." "I call," 
said the governor, " upon the brave and 
patriotic men of our State to volunteer 
from the mountains to the sea." Such 
were the sentiments which, at this stage 
of the Avai', prevailed respectively in the 
North and in the South. It was useless 
to cry " Peace " ; for there was none, and 
there was to be none for three weaiy and 
sadly eventful years. 

New Berne was the next place singled 
out for attack. For that purpose all 
necessary preparations were made. Ro- 
anoke Island was now the basis of ope- 
rations. There the troops concentrated ; 
and there the scattered vessels of the 
fleet congregated. As Goldsborough 
had been ordered back to Hampton 
Roads, the naval portion of the new 
expedition was entrusted to the care of 
Commodore Rowan. On the 11th Mar. 
of March, after taking on board !'• 
some fifteen thousand troops. Rowan, 
with Burnside on board, rendezvoused 
at Hatteras Inlet. Early the following 
morning the entire fleet, including the 
transports, sailed from the inlet, mak- 
ing for Slocum's Creek, about twelve 
miles above which, on the Neuse Rivei'. 



13% 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 



where it is joiued by the Trent, stands 
the to^vn of New Berne. 

New Berne is a small township, the 
capital of Craven County. It contained 
at that time about six thousand inhab- 
itants. It had a good harbor, leading 
to the Atlantic Ocean, through Ocracoke 
Inlet ; and as it was connected with the 
great commercial centres by railroad, it 
did a good business both by land and 
sea. It was very justly regarded by 
the North as a point of considerable 
strategic importance. 

Early on the morning of the 1 3th, the 
Marl entire force having arrived the 
*5« night previous, the troops began 
to land off Slocum's Creek, under cover 
of the gunboats. The landing was ef- 
fected " with the greatest enthusiasm 
on the part of the troops," wrote Bum- 
side in his report. "Many, too impa- 
tient for the boats, leaped into the water 
and waded waist-deep to the shore, and 
then, after a toilsome march through the 
mud, the head of the column marched 
within a mile and a half of the enemy's 
stronghold, at eight P. M., a distance of 
*^welve miles from the point of landing, 
where we bivouacked for the night, the 
rear of the column coming up with the 
boat howitzers about three o'clock next 
morning, the detention being caused by 
the shocking condition of the roads, 
consequent upon the heavy rain that 
had fallen during that day and the 
whole of the night, the men often wad- 
ing knee-deep in mud, and requiring a 
rt^hole regiment to drag the eight pieces 
which had been landed from the navy 
and our own vessels." The gunboats 
moved up the river abreast of the army, 



the flag-ship Delaware leading the way. 
The main body of the Confederates was 
under the command of General Branch, 
and consisted of eight regiments of in- 
fantry, five hundred cavalry, and three 
batteries of field artillery of six guns 
each. These were posted within a line of 
intrenchments, extending from near the 
river across the railroad and turnpike, 
of more than a mile in length. On their 
left they were protected by Fort Thomp- 
son, which was armed with thirteen 
heavy guns. This work commanded, 
also, the channel of the river. On the 
light there was a long succession of 
rifle-pits, curvettes and i-edans terminat- 
ing in a two-o^un redoubt. These works 
were a little over four miles from the 
town of New Berne. Burnside marched 
his army in three divisions. General 
Foster, with the first brigade, marched 
along the main county I'oad, to attack 
Fort Thompson and the Confederate 
left. General Reno, with the second 
brigade, followed more upon tlie line 
of railroad, with the view of striking 
the Confederate right. General Parke, 
with the third brigade, followed in such 
a manner that he might be able to at- 
tack in front or sujiport either or both 
brigades, as circumstances might re- 
quire. 

About seven o'clock, on the morning 
of the 14th, the skirmishers of the Mar, 
National army came into contact !*• 
with the Confederate outposts. Gen- 
eral Burnside rode to the front with his 
staff. Scarcely had he appeared in view 
of the enemy's breastwork, when a shell 
fell within a few feet of himself and 
party, splashing them with mud, but, 



NEW BERNE. 



133 



as it did not explode, doing no further 
damage. The regiments were quickly 
in their respective positions. General 
Foster arranged his brigade in line of 
battle along the fringe of the woods, 
skirting the edge of the field before the 
breastwork. The Twenty-Fourth Mas- 
sachusetts, Colonel Stevenson, was on 
the extreme right. The Twenty-Fifth 
Massachusetts, Colonel Upton, was 
next, with its left resting on the road. 
Next to this again was the Twenty- 
Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, with 
its right resting on the road. The 
Twenty-third Massachusetts was on the 
extreme left of the brigade, with the 
Tenth Connecticut in reserve. The 
National artillery had only partially 
arrived on the battle-ground ; and con- 
sequently there were only a few pieces 
with which to oppose the numerous and 
powerful guns of the enemy. On the 
extreme right of Foster's position was 
McCook's battery of boat howitzers, 
manned by Lieutenants McCook, Ham- 
mond, Daniels, and Tillotson, with ma- 
rines and a detachment of the Union 
Coast Guard. In the centre, and near 
the road, was a 12-pounder steel gun 
from the Cossack, manned by Captain 
Bennett and twenty of his ship's crew. 
On the left was Captain Dayton's bat- 
tery, from the transport Highlander. 
The second brigade, under General 
Reno, and the third brigade, under 
General Parke, maintained the positions 
as^^igned to them in the line of march, 
as above described. 

It was about eight o'clock when the 
V)attle was fairly begun. Foster's bri- 
gade was the first to feel the effect of 



the enemy's fire. After the first shot 
the Confederates ran their flag defiantly 
lip over the ramparts; and from the 
many mouths of their powerful guns 
they poured forth a perfect storm of 
round-shot, grape, canister, and shell, 
Their infantry, which were stationed in 
front of the works, and extended the 
entire length between the river and the 
railroad, kept up a brisk and steady 
fire of musketry. The fight from the 
commencement was severe. It was not 
long until several of the regiments lost 
some of their principal officers. At the 
place where the Confederate intrench- 
raents crossed the railroad, the struggle, 
for a time, was terrific. For nearly 
four hours the brigade of Foster bore 
the brunt of the battle, the regiments 
one and all covering themselves with 
glory. General Parke, with his third 
brigade, following out the instructions 
of Burnside, had been supporting Fos- 
ter. It was now evident that the latter 
could hold his ground against the ene- 
my; and Parke, still carrying out jhe 
original arrangement, withdrew his 
troops and moved to the support of 
Reno, who, with his brigade, was suc- 
cessfully cariying out his flank move- 
ment against the Confederate right. It 
deserves to be noted here that General 
Reno experienced unexpected difficulty 
in carrying out his part of the plan of 
attack. It was not known that the line 
of intrenchments extended beyond the 
railroad, at least to any distance. When, 
therefore, the National troops attempted 
to get to the rear of the enemy, they dis- 
covered not merely all but impassable 
swamps, but redoubts and rifle-pits 



»io 



134 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 



which temporarily checked their pro- 
gress. Happily, an attack on the right 
had not been suspected by the Confede- 
rates, their whole strength being centred 
on the left wing. As soon, however, as 
they discovered what was going on an 
,the right, they hurried forward a suffi- 
<'ient number of men to reinforce the 
Jedoubts and to defend the rifle-pits, 
a-lter he had been joined by Parke, 
^eno resolved to make a bold advance 
on the enemy's works. The Twenty- 
First Massachusetts, Colonel Clarke, 
was ordered to charge. With the speed 
of lightning they rushed forward, and 
were soon inside the intrenchments. 
They had taken possession of the guns 
and were actually attempting to turn 
them against the enemy, when, the Con- 
federates being reinforced, they were 
driven back, with the loss oi some of 
their men, who were made prisoners. 
The repulse, however, was but moment- 
ary. Re-forming, and being joined by 
the New York Fifty-First, the Fourth 
Rhode Island, and the Ninth New Jer- 
sey, with the Fifth Rhode Island in re- 
serve, they returned to the assault ; and 
after a terrible hand-to-hand fight, in 
which victory trembled in the balance, 
the works remained in the hands of the 
Nationals, the Confederates being com- 
pletely routed and chased at the point 
of the bayonet back out of sight. In 
the fierce struggle over the ramparts, the 
Twenty-First Massachusetts especially 
distinguished themselves ; and in making 
the victory complete, gallant service was 
rendered by the Fifth Rhode Island and 
the Eighth and Eleventh Connecticut. 
While this struggle was going on, Reno 



was greatly annoyed by another batterj 
which was doing most destructive work. 
Calling up his reserve regiment, the 
Fifty- First Pennsylvania, Colonel Hart 
ranft, he ordered it to charge. The or- 
ders were promptly obeyed, and the 
work was gallantly done. Meanwhile 
the cheering on the National left had 
attracted the attention of Foster on the 
right. It was impossible for him any 
longer to restrain his men. Cotning out 
from their position along the edge of 
the woods, they dashed across the fields 
and assailed the enemy at the very muz- 
zles of their guns. It was a perilous 
movement. It might have resulted in 
terrible slaughter. But the retreat on 
their right flank had created a panic in 
the Confederate ranks. There was no 
more fight in them. Leaving their guns 
unspiked, their caissons and their unex- 
pended ammunition, with a number of 
horses, they fled ingloriously towards 
the Trent. Foster pursued ; but when 
he reached the verge of the river, the 
enemy had crossed and burned both the 
railroad and turnpike bridges in their 
rear. Such was what is known as the 
battle of New Bei'ne. The captin-e of 
the town of that name followed as a 
matter of course. 

The National squadron had taken an 
active part in the contest, and contrib- 
uted not a little towards securing the 
victory. It lent effective aid in driving 
the Confederates out of Fort Thompson 
and the other batteries on the shoi'e. 
These being evacuated, and the National 
flag left floating over them, the gun- 
boats passed the obstructions in the 
river and moved up toward the town. 



FORT MACON. 



135 



On tlieir arrival they found that it had 
been fired in no fewer than seven places 
by the fleeing Confederates, and that it 
was almost completely deserted. On 
the day of the battle the teiTor-stricken 
inhabitants had fled by the thousand. 
General Foster's brigade was taken over 
to the city wharves by some of Rowan's 
gunboats. General Burnside established 
his headquarters at the fine old mansion 
of the Stanley family, in the suburbs 
Mar. of the town. On the following 
'5t day he issued an order appointing 
General Foster military governor of the 
place, and ordered that the churches be 
opened on Sunday, the Kith, in order 
that the chaplains of the difi^erent regi- 
ments might hold divine service therein. 
The bells were to ring as usual. On 
the same day he issued an oi'der con- 
gratulating his troops on their "bril- 
liant and hard- won victory," and di- 
recting every regiment to place the name 
of New Berne on its banner. In his 
report he gave General McClellan the 
credit of planning the expedition. " I 
have endeavored," he said, " to carry 
out the very minute instructions given 
me l)y him before leaving Annapolis, 
and thus far events have been singu- 
larly coincident with his anticij^ations." 
In a work in which McClellan's conduct 
is fairly and candidly criticised, it gives 
us pleasure to be able to record this 
ti'ibute to his genius. 

By this victory the Nationals not only 
captured New Berne, and secured all 
the advantages which the possession of 
such a place implied, but eight batteiues, 
mounting forty-six heavy guns, three 
batteries of light artillery, twd a large 



amount of stores of all kinds. Burn- 
side's loss was ninety-one killed and 
four hundred and sixty-six wounded. 
The Confederate loss, according to their 
own statement, was ninety-four killed, 
one hundred and one wounded, and 
four hundred and thirteen missing. Ita 
moral effect on both sides was gi-eat. 
It cheered the hearts of the Northern 
people. It greatly discouraged the 
South. 

Burnside's next movement was against 
Fort Macon. This was an old fortress 
of the United States. It had be^n 
seized by the authorities of North Caro- 
lina at the commencement of the war. 
It stands on a long ridge of sand, called 
Bogue Island, and is separated from 
the mainland by Bogue Sound, which 
is navigable for vessels of light ton. 
nage. On the side of Beaufort harlior, 
at the terminus of the railway from Ne\^ 
Berne, is Morehead City. On the op 
posite or northern side of the harboi' in 
Beaufort, the capital of Carteret County, 
an old and pleasant town, and, as al 
ready described, a favorite summer re 
treat for the aristocracy of North Caro- 
lina. Fort Macon commanded the har- 
bor of Beaufort; and as the Confede- 
rates had been making free use of the 
harbor in introducing contraband goods 
by means of foreign vessels, it was 
deemed necessary, in oixier to the effi- 
ciency of the blockade, that that sti 'ig- 
hold should be reduced. 

Immediately after the capture of IS !W 
Berne, Burnside made all necessary ar- 
rangements for the reduction of the 
fort. He placed the expedition in 
charge of General Parke, General Reno 



136 



COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 



havins: been sent to make some further 
demonstrations in the rear of Norfolk. 
Mar. Nine days after the fall of New 

2't» Berne, Parke having been con- 
veyed, with his troops, by water to 
Slocum's Creek, and having marched 
thence acioss the country, proceeded to 
Mar. invest Morehead City. On the 

25. 25th of March, a detachment com- 
posed of the Fourth Rhode Island and 
the Eighth Connecticut entered Beau- 
fort without opposition. A flag was 
gent to Fort Macon, demanding its sur- 
render. The place was in charge of 
Colonel Moses T. White, a nephew of 
Jefferson Davis. White declared that 
he would not yield until he had eaten 
his last biscuit and slain his last horse. 
Parke made immediate and vigorous 
preparations to take the fort by storm. 
A reconnoisance was made in force on 
Ipril the 11th of April; and suitable 

*J» points Avere selected for jslanting 
siege guns. The garrison was closely 
watched, as it was feared that in their 
desperation they might make a fierce 
sortie. Ordnance and ordnance stores 
were brought over on rafts fi'om Caro- 
lina City ; and batteries were construct- 
ed behind sand hills on Bogue Spit. 
Gunboats liad been provided; and it was 
arranged that they should co-operate 
with the batteries on the island. There 
were three batteries. The fii'st was 
under Lieutenant Flagler of the New 
York Third Artillery. It was fourteen 
hundred yai'ds from the fort, was well 
covered by a large sand hill, and mount- 
ed four ten-inch mortars. The second 
was under Captain Lewis J. Morris of 
the Fu-st Regular Artillery. It was 



about two hundred yards in advance of 
the first, and mounted three long thirty- 
pound Parrott guns. The third was in 
charge of Lieutenant Prouty of the 
Third New York Artillery. It was 
one hundred yards nearer the fort than 
the second, and mounted four eight-inch 
mortars. Communications between the 
batteries were established by cutting 
trenches in the sand and skirting the hil- 
locks. To guard against any sortie which 
the garrison might be tempted to make,* 
sharpshooters were posted in rifle-pits on 
both flanks and in front. The gunboats 
which were to take part in the attack 
were the Daylight (flag-ship), Commanti- 
er Lockwood ; the State of Georgia, 
Commander Armstrong; the Chi])pewa, 
Lieutenant Bryson ; and the barque 
Gemsbok, Lieutenant Cavendish, 

When the arrangements were com- 
pleted, Burnside came doAvn from New 
Berne. On the 24th, under a flag April 
of truce, he had an interview with 24. 
Colonel White, and summoned him to 
surrender. White peremptorily refused, 
declaring that he had been placed in 
command of the fort, and that he would 
defend it to the extent of his abil- April 
ity. On the morning of the 25th, 25. 
at six o'clock, Burnside ordered the 
gunboats within range of the fort. Or- 
ders were then given for both gunboats 
and batteries to open fire. For half an 
hour no response came from the fort. 
Suddenly, howevei', thei'e were a series 
of flashes, a succession of loud reports, 
and the deadly missiles fell thick and 
fast among the gunboats and close by 
the batteries. From that time till four 
o'clock in the afternoon the firing c<ju- 



FORT PULASKI. 



13? 



tinued on both sides without iutermis- 
ision. For a time it was wild and inef- 
fective ; but gradually the range on 
either side was attained with increasing 
accuracy ; and the shot and shell began 
to strike more frequently in the near 
neighborhood of the hostile positions. 
By midday the effect of the fire from 
the batteries was distinctly visible on 
the fort. The gunboats, after the first 
hour and a half, were withdrawn, a 
southwest wind disturbing the waters 
and making it difficult for them to ma- 
noeuvre \vith ease and accuracy. During 
the course of the day there was some 
splendid work done by the National 
gunners, Lieutenant Prouty, with his 
eight-inch mortar battery, particularly 
distinguishing himself by the accuracy 
of his aim. An eye-witness tells us 
that the scene was grandest about two 
o'clock. " A flash and a puff of smoke 



betokened a dischar 



-ge; 



an interval 



elapsed, which terminated with the re- 
port of the piece ; then came the sonor- 
ous hum of the shell as it flew through 
the air; another puff of smoke, soon 
followed by a second report, and the 
deadly missile had exploded." Shortly 
after four o'clock a white flag was dis- 
played on the fort ; and the firing ceas- 
ed. Before ten o'clock next morning 
Fort Macon was in the possession of 
the National forces, and General Burn- 
side had the double gratification of see- 
ing the old banner of the republic and 
the new colors of his own Fifth Rhode 
Islanders, just presented them by the 
women of Providence, unfurled over its 
battered walls. 

Burnside had, indeed, much to be 



proud of. For the present, at least, he 
seemed to lee a favorite child of fortune. 
Since the day he left Annapolis every- 
thing had gone well with him. He had 
restored thf^ supremacy of the Union 
in Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and 
in their adjoining creeks and bays ; 
he had captured New Berne, and, by 
the I'eduction of Fort Macon, he had 
destroyed the Confederate power in the 
harbor of Beaufort. Good luck seemed 
to attend his generals as well as him- 
self; for while Parke was nailing vic- 
tory to the National standard at Bogue 
Island, Reno, equally sucoessful, had 
won a splendid victory over the Con- 
federates at South Mills, near Camden 
Court House. The occupation of the 
different places from Beaufort and New 
Berne in the south to Wiuton and Ply- 
mouth and Washington, at the head of 
the Pamlico River, in the north, greatly 
scattered Burnside's troops, and made 
it impossible for him, unless reinforced, 
to make any further aggressive efforts. 
In the present condition of things at 
Washington, reinforcement for such a 
purpose was out of the question. Mc- 
Clellan, who had been compelled to 
fall l)ack from before Richmond, was 
lying Mt Harrison's Landing ; and such 
men as Burnside were needed nearer 
headquarters. He was summoned to 
Fortress Monroe, with all the forces he 
could collect, on July 17th. General 
Foster was left in command of the de^ 
partment. 

In a previous chapter we have given 
an account of the expedition under 
General T. W. Sherman and Commodoi-e 
Dupont. At fii'st this expedition wa» 



J8 



COAST OPEKATIONS IN 1862. 



attended Avith great success. With the 
exception of two forts — Foirt Pulaski, 
at the mouth of the Savannah River, 
and Fort Jackson, up the river and near 
the town of Savannah — the entire coast 
from Warsaw Sound below the Savan- 
nah River to the North Edisto, well up 
towards Charleston, was, at the close of 
18G1, under the control of the National 
forces. At the same time, this expedi- 
tion did not fulfill its high promise. 
In place of moving against the enemy 
in the interior, and making a bold effort 
to captiu'e Savannah and Charleston, 
Sherman remained in his encampments 
in the neighborhood of Port Royal, 
busying himself with the construction 
of iutrenchments, as if defense had been 
the main object of the expedition. It is 
l)ut just, however, to say in vindication 
of Greneral Sherman that he had not 
been instructed to press his advantages, 
and that, with the forces at his com- 
mand, he was not in a position to attack, 
with any great hope of success, either 
Savannah or Chai-leston. Still, the 
panic which followed the fall of Port 
Royal and the victory at Port Royal 
FeiTy was such that more daring meas- 
ures might have been crowned with 
greater victories. 

Dupont had made several unsuccess- 
ful attempts to reach Savannah by way 
of Warsaw Sound, and by means of the 
creeks which al)ound in that region. 
He had at last succeeded in getting 
possession of Dawfuskie Island, which, 
in its southeastern extremity, commands 
the entrance to the Savannah River. 
Here he had stationed some gunboats, 
with a detachment of troops. It was 



felt, however, that the one thing to be 
done was the reduction of Fort Pulaski. 
How was this to be accomplished ? It 
was, as we have had occasion to remark, 
in a previous chapter, one of the strong- 
est works on the Atlantic seaboard. 
Its peculiar position made bombard- 
ment extremely difficult. It was the 
opinion of General Quincy A. Gillmore, 
General Sherman's chief engineer, that 
the place could be successfully attacked 
by batteries of rifled guns and mortars 
placed oh Big Tybee Island, which lies 
to the southeast of Cockspur, on which 
the fort stood, and on the opposite side 
of the narrow channel. It was also his 
opinion that very effective aid might 
be given from a battery on Venus Point, 
on Jones' Island, two miles from Cock- 
spur in the opposite direction. Big 
Tybee Island, as we have already seen, 
was occupied by the Nationals towards 
the close of 1861. The question now 
was, how to get to Venus Point, on 
Jones' Island, the entire entrance being 
so completely commanded by the guns 
of the fort. Information was given by 
some negroes to the effect that there 
was a channel which connected Cali- 
bogue Sound with the Savannah River. 
The information was found to be cor- 
rect, the two being connected by an 
artificial channel, some two hundred 
yards in length, called Wall's Cut. 
This channel had been obstructed by 
three rows of piles and by a sunken 
brig. At high tide, however, the 
water rose above these obstructions 
some ten feet. The reconnoitring par- 
ty had, therefore, no difficulty in get 
ting over. Aixangements wei'e imnie 



THE SURRENDER. 



139 



diately made for the removal of these 
obstructions. 

It was also ascertained that the Sa- 
vannah River might be reached by way 
of' Warsaw Sound, Wilmington Nar- 
rows, and St. Augustine's Creek, al- 
though the creek was greatly obstruct- 
ed. Means of access to the Savannah 
River, in the rear of Fort Pulaski, hav- 
ing thus been discovered, Sherman pro- 
ceeded at once to construct batteries on 
all the available points. A body of 
men under the immediate command of 
General Viele succeeded in reaching 
Jones' Island by way of Wall's Cut, and 
there, on Venus Point, they built an 
earthwork, mounting it with heavy 
guns, and giving it the name of Battery 
Vulcan. Jones' Island is a mere marsh ; 
and the guns, which were three tons 
each, had to be brought across its entire 
width. It was a labor of extreme dif- 
ficulty. The weather was stormy ; and 
the nights were dark. Not unfrequently 
did the men work waist-deep in the 
slushy morass ; and it was no uncommon 
thing for the guns to slip off the rough 
corduroy road and sink deep in the 
mire. In spite of all difficulties, how- 
ever, the work was completed at Venus 
Feb. Point, on the 11th of February, 
'1' It was found that this single bat- 
tery did not completely command the 
Savannah River. Two other batteries 
were therefore erected — one on the 
northeast extremity of Long Island, 
and another on flats at the north of 
Mud River. These batteries so com- 
manded the' Savannah as to completely 
cut off all communications between Sa- 
vannah City and Fort Pulaski The 



Confederate gunboats also found it con- 
venient to remain at a distance. As 
early as the 2 2d of February, peb, 
when these works were all com- 22. 
pleted. Fort Pulaski was in a condition 
of absolute blockade. 

The next thing to be done was the 
erection of siege batteries on the north- 
west face of Big Tybee Island, opposite 
the fort. Tybee Island, like all the 
ground in the neighborhood, is a huge 
marsh. Its soil, where not actually un- 
der water, is a species of mud jelly. 
All the difficulties experienced on Jones 
Island were experienced here in an ag- 
gravated form. The guns, which were 
all heavy— eight and ten-inch colum- 
biads, ten and thirteen-inch mortars, 
and rifles of large calibre — had to be 
di'agged two miles over such ground. 
Difficulties, however, did not hinder the 
progress of the work. On the 9th jprji 
of April General Gillmore, who 9. 
was in command, had completed his 
preparations. Eleven batteries, mount- 
ing in all some thirty-six guns, were in 
readiness to open fire on the fort; and 
on that day the commanding general 
gave minute instructions as to the work- 
ing of the guns, and notified his troops 
that, if the garrison did not in the mean- 
time surrender, he should open fire at 
daybreak the following day. 

General Hunter had succeeded Gen- 
eral Sherman in command of the depart- 
ment. On the evening of the 8th he 
arrived at Tybee. On the morning of 
the 10th, at sunrise. Lieutenant April 
J. H. Wilson was sent to the fort **• 
with a message from the general-in- 
chief to the commander of the garrison. 



140 



COAST OPERATIONS IN" 1862. 



1 



Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, calling 
upon him to surrender. The answer 
was as prompt as it was brief. "1 am 
here," said the colonel, " to defend this 
fort, not to surrender it." At a quarter 
past eight o'clock the batteries opened 
fire. Fort Pulaski, as we have already 
said, had the reputation of being one of 
the strongest forts on the Atlantic coast. 
It was well mounted ; and its walls 
were seven and a half feet thick. The 
National batteries were planted at dif- 
ferent distances — the nearest being 
about a mile from the fort, the most 
distant about two miles. Three min- 
utes after the first shot was fired by 
the Nationals, the Confederates replied 
from a ten-inch barbette gun. The fir- 
ing then became general; and for the 
remainder of the day it was maintained 
with great spirit on both sides. The 
day was not far advanced when it be- 
came manifest that the masonry of the 
fort could not long resist the terrible 
pounding of the batteries. Long before 
night came on, the rifles had honey- 
combed the walls, the sho^ at sixteen 
hundred and fifty yards, the distance 
of the nearest rifle-battery, penetrating 
the walls to a depth, of from twenty to 
twenty-six inches ; and the ten-inch sol- 
id shot, which struck with less velocity, 
fell, as an eye-witness puts it, like a 
trip-hammer, battering to pieces the 
damaged masonry. It was Gillmore's 
opinion, after he had seen the efi^ect of 
his guns, that, if he had known, he 
might have completed his preparations 
in one week instead of two, and con- 
tented himself with placing his nearest 
battery at twenty -five hundred yards. 



When darkness fell, five of the guns of 
the fortress were silenced, and the fir- 
ing generally had become feeble. All 
night long four of Gillmore's guns fii-ed 
at intervals of fifteen or twenty min- 
utes. On the morning of the 11th, \pf\\ 
at sunrise, the firing from the bat- "• 
teries was commenced afresh, and con- 
tinued with great vigor. A yawning 
breach began to be visible in the south- 
east angle of the fort ; y6t the garrison 
gallantly maintained the fight until two 
o'clock. A practicable breach had been 
made ; and Olmstead perceived that 
" it was impossible to hold out any 
longer, as the rifle-shots were fast work- 
ing their way into the magazines, and 
as many of his guns were disabled." 
He accordingly raised the white flag, 
and placed himself and garrison uncon 
ditionally at the mercy of the conqueror. 
Forty-seven guns, a large supply of fixed 
ammunition, forty thousand pounds of 
powder, large quantities of commissary 
stores, and three hundred and ninety 
prisoners, constituted the spoils of victo- 
ry. The Nationals had one man killed. 
The Confederates had thiee wounded. 
At Fort Pulaski a striking illustration 
was given of the power and efficiency 
of modern artillery. It had always been 
supposed that such walls could not be 
successfully breached at distances great- 
er than eight hundred yards. The near- 
est battery, as we have seen, was dis- 
tant from the fort at least sixteen hun- 
dred and fifty yards. 

It was the general expectation at 
Savannah that Fort Jackson would be 
immediately attacked, and that the fort 
and Savannah itseli would both be sur» 



THE NATIONAL POWER SUPREME. 



141 



rendered. Nothing of the kind was 
intended. It would have been a useless 
waste of the National forces to employ 
them in garrisoning Fort Jackson and 
in occupying Savannah. With Fort 
Pulaski in their possession, the Nation- 
als commanded the entrance to the 
river — the blockade of Savannah was 
complete ; and this was all that was im- 
mediately contemplated. 

While these events were progressing 
at the mouth of the Savannah, Commo- 
dore Dupont and General Wright were 
making rajiid and easy conquests along 
ihe coast of Florida. Dupont had left 
Feb. Port Royal on the 28th of Feb- 

28. ruary, with twenty armed vessels 
and six transports, filled with troops ; 
Mar. ^iid on the 1st of March he ar- 

i' rived in St. Andrew's Sound, 
north of Cumberland and St. Andrew's 
Islands. As but little if any resistance 
was offered, it is unnecessary in a work 
of this kind to do more than note the 
lesults of this expedition. Fort Clinch 
;ind the adjoining village were found 
deserted ; and Duj)ont was able to write 
to the secretary of the navy, "We cap- 
tured Port Royal, but Fernandina and 
Fort Clinch have been given to us." 
Brunswick, the terminus of the Bruns- 
wick and Pensacola Railroad, were 
taken possession of with equal ease. 
Jacksonville followed, but not until a 
wicked attempt had been made by the 
Confederates to destroy it by fire. Fort 
Marion and the ancient city of St. Au- 
gustine, a little further do^vn the coast, 
Mar. were sun-endered to Commander 

»»• C. R. P. Rodgers, on the 11th of 
March. Pensacola was soon after aban- 



doned by the Confederate General T. 
N. Jones, who burnt whatever he could 
at the navy yard, at the hospital, and 
in Forts McRae and Barrancas, before 
he retreated into the interior. On the 
2 7th of March Dupont returned to Mar, 
Port Royal, when he found that 27. 
Skiddaway and Green Islands had been 
abandoned by the Confederates, thus 
leaving Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds 
and the Vernon and Wilmington Rivers 
open to the National foi'ces. Edisto 
Island had been captured as early feh, 
as tlie 11th of February. Thus !'• 
it was that on the first anniversary of 
the attack on Fort Sumtei', the entire 
Atlantic and Gulf coast, from Cape 
Hatteras to Perdido Bay, excepting only 
the harbor of Charleston and its imme- 
diate surroundings, had been abandoned 
by the Confederates, and that along 
that whole line the National power was 
supreme. 

In a previous chapter we have men- 
tioned the fact that after the ca])ture of 
Hatteras Island, Genei'al Butler hurried 
to Washington for the purpose of in- 
ducing the government not to abandon 
the conquest which he had made, but 
to leave a certain numljer of troops on 
the island. General Butler's advice was 
taken, as we have seen ; and he himself 
was commissioned by the secretary of 
war to go to New England and "raise, 
arm and uniform a volunteer foi'ce for 
the war," to be composed of six regi- 
ments. In this the general was com- 
pletely successful. As early as Jan. 
the 13th of January, 1862, he had 13. 
a conference with Secretary Stanton, 
then newly installed as war secretary ip 



2il 



143 



MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 



room of Mr. Cameron. The result of 
this conference was a determination on 
the part of the government to make a 
vigorous effort to capture New Orleans, 
and so take possession of the Lower 
Feb. Mississippi. On the 25th of Feb- 
25. ruary, General Butler embarked 
at Hampton Roads, accompanied by his 
wife, his staff, and fourteen hundred 
troops, in the steamship Mississippi. 



On the 20th of March, after a stormy 
and penlous voyage, he reached jjap. 
Ship Island, and commenced those 20. 
preparations which resulted, through 
the united efforts of himself and Com- 
modore Farragut, in the capture of the 
Queen City of the South. The story 
of the capture of New Orleans, how- 
ever, must be reserved for another 
chapter. 



CHAPTER X. 



Memphis and New Orleans. — Island No. 10. — Confederate Grief. — Fort Pillow. — General Villepigue. — Jeff. 
Thompson. — Foote and His Flotilla. — General Pope. — Hollins. — Pope Recalled to Corinth. — Foote Left Alons 
at Fort Pillow, — Foote's Wound making Retirement Necessary. — C. H. Davis takes Command of the Flotilla.^ 
Activity of Hollins.— The Fight Commenced.— The Boiler of the McRae Penetrated.— The White Flag.— The 
Losses on Both Sides. — EUet and His " Ram "-Squadron. — Flight of the Confederates. — The Effect of the Fall 
of Corinth. — The Fort Occupied by the Nationals. — Occupation of Fort Randolph. — Memphis Unprotected on 
the North. — The Gunboats at the Levee. — The Memorable Sixth of June. — The National Fleet in Motion.—- 
The Opening of the Fight. — The Queen of the West. — The Monarch. — The Queen and the Price. — The Fighting 
General. — The Queen badly Injured. — The Lovell Shattered to Pieces and Sunk. — One Half-Hom-'s Work. — A 
Grand and Impressive Scene. — The Last Hope of Memphis Perished. — Surrender of Memphis. — Memphis 
Occupied by the Union Troops. — Fitch Appointed Provost-Marshal. — Another Obstruction. — New Orleans. — 
The Key-Position of the Great Valley. — Naval Expedition. — David G. Farragut. — Stanton's Energy. — Farragut 
at Ship Island. — His Instructions. — Butler and the Land Force. — Porter and His Gunboats. — All things Ready 
for a Combined Movement. — The Difficulties. — Forts St. Philip and Jackson. — The River Chain. — The 
Louisiana. — The Manassas. — Twiggs and Lovell^Higgins. — The Confidence of the South. — All things in 
Readiness for an Assault. — The Plan. — Porter's Device. — The Bombardment Commenced. — Fort Jackson 
Fires the First Shot. — Terrible Fighting. — Farragut's Resolve. — The Chain Across the River Cut. — One Thou- 
sand Shells. — The Fleet Pas.ses the Obstructions. — Farragut on the Fore-Rigging of the Hartford. — Passing 
the Forts. — The Ram Manassas. — The Fire-Rafts. — Bailey and Boggs. — The Varuna. — The Battle Ended.^ 
Brief, but Desperate and Destructive. — The Evacuation of the Forts. — The Louisiana Set on Fire by Her 
Commander. — The Intention. — The River in Flames. — New Orleans Hemmed In. — A Thunder-Storm. — Call 
for Surrender. — The Mayor's Reply. — Landing of the Marines. — The National Flag Waving over New 
Orleans. — Butler in Charge of the City. — Honor to the Brave. 



(662. 



Rightly to appreciate the actual state 
of things in the valley of the Mis- 
sissippi, and intelligently to fol- 
low the events Avhich will be recorded 
in the immediately succeeding chapters, 
the reader must now give his attention 



to certain naval operations which, in the 
interest of the National cause, had been 
successfully conducted on two separate 
portions of the lower section of the 
great western river. Memphis, as we 
have already had occasion to remark. 



FORT PILLOW. 



143 



Bad fallen ; and General Wallace had 
May there established his headquarters. 
•• On the 1st of May, two days after 
the occupation of Corinth by the Nation- 
al troops, New Orleans had yielded to 
the strategy and daring of Farragut; and 
the old flag was floating over the largest 
and in some respects most important city 
of the Confederacy. After the capture 
of New Orleans and the fall of Mem- 
phis, Vicksburg was the one remaining 
stronghold of any importance which 
obstructed the free navigation of the 
Mississippi from St. Louis to the sea. 
Let us see how it came to pass that 
both Memphis and New Orleans were 
Wrenched from the hands of the Con- 
federates. 

In a previous chapter we have given 
a somewhat detailed account of the op- 
erations, by land and water, which re- 
sulted in the capture and occupation of 
Island No. 10. The fall of that island 
was felt by the Confederates to be one 
of the deadliest blows which they had 
yet received. It was one of the strong- 
est places on the river, richly supplied 
with all the material of war ; and eveiy- 
thing fell into the victors' hands. It 
was openly confessed by the Confede- 
rates themselves, amid much grief and 
lamentation, that no single battle had 
yet afforded the North such visible 
fruits of victory as had been gathered 
at Island No. 10. It was not, however, 
solely on account of the number of men 
who had been made prisoners, or be- 
cause of the vast quantity of arms and 
ammunition which had become the spoil 
< )f the victorious Nationals, that the Con- 
federates were filled with grief. They 



had another cause for sorrow. Memphis, 
the most important city on the Mississip- 
pi between St. Louis and New Orleans, 
was virtually left undefended. Fort 
Pillow, it is true, remained ; but Fort 
Pillow, strong as it was, could scarcely 
be expected long to resist the captors 
of Forts Henry and Donelson and Co- 
lumbus, now flushed with success from 
their fresh triumph at Island No. 10. 

The Confederates, however, were nei- 
ther without the means nor without the 
spirit to offer the invaders a stubborn 
resistance. Fort Pillow, whose M^orks 
occupied a line of seven miles in cir- 
cumference, was very sti'ong, and was 
under the excellent superintendence of 
General Villepigue, a New Orleans 
Creole, a West-Pointer, and, as an en- 
gineer, regarded second only to Beau- 
regard himself. It had forty heavy 
guns in position. There were nine gun- 
boats under Hollins ; and Jeff. Thomp- 
son was there with about six thousand 
troops. 

After the fall of Island No. 10, Com- 
modore Foote lost no time in pushing 
his way down the Mississippi. General 
Pope followed, in transports, with his 
army, numbering some twenty thousand 
men. Pope arrived on the 13th April 
of April ; and preparations were *^' 
immediately made for an attack. Foote 
opened fire and moved against the gun- 
boats on the following day, :uid with 
such vigor that Hollins found it neces- 
sary to seek the shelter of the fort. 
Pope had landed his troops on the 
Arkansas shore, but so greatly was the 
land overflowed with water that he 
could render no assistance. On the 



144 



MEMPHIS AND KEW ORLEANS. 



17th he was recalled with his entire 
force, to join Halleck, who was then 
advancing on Corinth. Foote was thus 
left to prosecute the work alone ; and 
soon afterwards, in consequence of the 
painfulness of the wound which he had 
received in his ankle at Fort Donelson, 
he was compelled to retire from active 
duty, leaving the command in the hands 
of Captain C. H. Davis. 

HoUins, meanwhile, had not been 
May idle; and on the 10th of May, 

**• having re-formed his flotilla, he 
came out from under the guns of the 
fort, sweeping around Point Craighead, 
on the Arkansas shore, with armored 
steamers. Some of the steamers were 
fitted with strong bows, plated with 
iron. Davis was ready to receive him. 
The fight was commenced by Hollins' 
largest gunboat, the McRae, which, 
ai'med with a strong iron prow, rushed 
at the mortar boat No. 16. The com- 
mander of the mortar boat, Acting- 
Master Gregory, made a gallant fight, 
firing his single mortar no fewer than 
eleven times. The gunboats Cincinnati 
and Mound City came to Gregory's as- 
sistance, when the fighting became gen- 
eral. The fight had lasted the better 
part of an hour, -^vhen a shell from the 
Boston penetrated the boiler of the 
McRae. This was the end. Clouds of 
eteam enveloped the ill-fated vessel, and 
torrents of boiling water were doing 
moie effective work among the men on 
board than the shells from the National 
gunboats. The flag was raised in token 
of surrender. The National gunboats 
were in uo condition to pursue and cap- 
ture. Some of them were much injured, 



the Cincinnati particularly, which soon 
went to the bottom of the river. As 
their steam power was too weak to 
enable them to resist the powei-ful cur- 
rent of the river, it was wisely con- 
cluded not to grapple the disabled ves- 
sels of the enemy, lest by so doing they 
might be dragged iinder the guns of 
the fort. The National loss wag four 
men wounded. The Confederate loss 
must have been considerably greater. 
The damage sustained by the McRae 
alone, through the bursting of her boil- 
er, must have exceeded that sustained 
by the entire National fleet. In some 
respects it was a barren victory ; but it 
afterwards proved more fruitful than at 
first it seemed. 

Three weeks were allowed to pass 
without any attempt being made, on 
either side, to renew the conflict. About 
the beginning of June, Davis was rein- 
forced by Colonel Charles Ellet, jr., 
with his famous " i-am "-squadron — a 
fleet of boats of a peculiar model, of 
which he was the inventor. Thus 
strengthened, Davis concluded to re- 
peat the trial of strength. It was too 
late. The enemy had fled. Fort Pillow 
was deserted. Hearing of the disaster 
which had befallen Beauregard, and of 
his flight from Corinth, the garrison, 
oflScers and men, were filled with alarm; 
and having first blown up their maga- 
zines and fired their barracks and stores, 
they went down the river in transports, 
accompanied by the Confederate fleet. 
The evacuation and retreat took place 
under cover of the night of the June 
4th. On the following day the ^• 
National flag floated over Fort Pillow 



A TERRIFIC SCENE. 



145 



and over Fort Randolpli. a place of 
some sti'ength but of less iiiijjoi'tance, 
further down the river. Believing in 
the strength of the forts on the river 
above and below, the authorities had not 
thought it necessary to fortify the town 
itself. On the northern side, Memphis 
was now entirely unprotected. The 
only defense that now remained was 
the flotilla of gunboats, now lying close 
to the levee. 

The situation of Memphis on the 
June morning of the memorable 6th 
*»• of June was peculiar in the ex- 
treme. The inhabitants had before 
them a great sensation, and the al- 
most certain expectation of a great sor- 
row. In their immediate presence, in 
the broad sea-like waters which rolled 
past their city, a great naval engage- 
ment Avas about to take place ; and the 
result, which could hardly bring to 
them any permanent advantage, might 
in a few lioui's or minutes place them- 
selves, their property, and their institu- 
tions entirely at the mercy of the enemy. 
At the early dawn the National fleet, 
with th-s Cairo in advance, was moving 
in battle order toward the levee. The 
Confederate fleet, which, as we have 
seen, lay there, consisted of eight ves- 
sels. The National flf.et, it will be re- 
membervjd, had been strengthened by 
four ram boats under iCUet. While the 
National boats were moving forward, 
and only as yet vp'thin long range, the 
Confederate Little^ ilebel hurled a rifled 
shot at the C-Jj'O. The Cairo replied 
with a broAiiside. Thus the conflict 
began. For a time the battle was con- 
fined to Jihe gunboats. Suddenly, how- 



ever, two of the Confederate rams (Beau- 
regard and Price) pushed forward and 
joined in the fray. Ellet observed the 
movement ; and watching for his oppor- 
tunity, he bi'ouglit the two rams Queen 
of the West (his flag-ship) and Monarch 
right in fi'ont of the gunboats. He 
made a dash at the Confederate rams, 
the Queen being brought down toward 
the Beauregard with ti'emendous force, 
but missing her. Rushing at the Price, 
the Queen struck the w'heel-house of 
that vessel with her iron proAv, and so 
damaged her that, to avoid sinking, she 
was compelled to seek the opposite 
shore. The Beauregard now turned 
upon the Queen ; and, both vessels, 
rushing together at full sjjeed, the lat- 
ter received a crushing blow, which dis- 
abled her. The Monarch, hastening to 
the aid of the Queen, struck the Beau- 
regard fair in the bow, causing her to 
sink almost immediately. A white flag 
was raised on the Beauregard ; and the 
ram fight having ceased, the Monarch 
towed the badly wounded Queen of the 
West to a place of safety. Meanwhile 
the struggle was going on between 
the gunboats. The Confederates, being 
hard pressed by the Nationals, were 
steadily falling back. The fighti\ig was 
conducted with great spirit, and the 
destruction was terrific. The Confede- 
rates, however, were the only sufferers. 
The boilers on some of their boats.Avere 
burst and the crews scalded. A fifty- 
I)oand ball, hurled from the Benton by 
a rifled Parrott gun, hit the Lovell 
with such foi'ce that she was shattered 
almost to pieces, and sunk in a few 
minutes, in seventy-five feet of water. 



11 



146 



MEMPHIS AND NEW OELEANS. 



carrying with her the greater portion of 
her officers and crew. Such had been 
the destructive work done in the brief 
space of half an hour that only four 
Confederate vessels remained • afloat — 
tLie Thompson, the Bragg, the Sumter, 
and the VanDorn ; but these were all 
badly injured and nnuk^ for the shore. 
They were all abandoned except the 
V-^anDoni, which made good its escape 
down the river. Not a man had been 
killed on board the National gunboats. 
When the bi'ief conflict was at its height 
Ihe scene was grand and impressive in 
a high deijree. The l)attle had been 
witnessed by many thousands of the in- 
habitants of Memphis. The firing of 
the first gun had roused them from their 
slumbers; and anxious multitudes soon 
lined the shores and crowded the roofs 
of the houses. The dense smoke, which 
gathered cloud-like around the ships, 
concealed from view much of the actual 
fighting; but the wild war of jarring 
sounds — the booming of cannon, the 
rattling of musketry, the bursting of 
shells, the explosion of boilers, the 
crashing of timbei's as the rams rushed 
together in fierce embrace — all attested 
the severity of the conflict Avhicli was 
raging behind. When the cloud of 
smoke arose and the wreck was re- 
vealed, the last hope of Memphis had 
perished. 

There was no further resistance To 
the request of Commodore Davis that 
he surrender the city, the mayor politely 
replied that he had no means of defense, 
and that the city was in his hands. 
Jeff. Thompson, who had command of 
the city, and who had witnessed the 



fight, when lie found that the fleet wa* 
defeated, beat an immediate retreat. The 
old Union flag was hoisted on the public 
l)uildings ; and Mempliis was taken pos- 
session of by the National troops. Col- 
onel Fitch, of the Forty-Ninth Indiana, 
being appointed pi-ovost-marshal. The 
I'eader n(>\v knows ho\\' it came to pass 
that Memphis had been ^vi'enched from 
the Confederates, and how it Avas that 
General Lewis "Wallace, of Gi-ant's ar- 
my, entered and occupied that city with- 
out encountei'ing any resistance. The 
fall of Memphis left the Mississippi 
comparatively unobstructed as fai- down 
as Vicksburg. 

Let us now give our attention to what 
liad happened on the same watei'S to 
the south of Vicksburg and nearer to 
the sea. Very early in the histoiy of 
the war the attention of the National 
government Iiail been directed to New 
Orleans; and it was felt that so long 
as the city remained in the possession 
of the Confederates there could l)e no 
free navigation of the Mississippi. It 
was the key-position ; and whoever was 
strong enough to hold that position was 
master of the great valley. In the au- 
tumn of IHGl it was resolved not to 
wait until the military combinations 
had forced a jjassage down the river, 
l)ut to send a naval expedition, which, 
fitted out in the Athuitic ports, should 
move up from tlie gulf. The command 
of this expedition was assigned to Cap- 
tain David G. Farragut, a Tennessean 
by birth, and an officer who had seen 
service and done gootl work both in the 
Mexican campaign and in the naval 
operations of 1812. It was not, how- 



READY FOR ATTACK. 



147 



ever, until early in 18(52 that this expe- 
dition showed any feigns of vitality. By 
that time Stanton had succeeded Came- 
ron as head of the War Department ; 
and the energy of the new chief was 
making itself everywhere felt. 

On the 2d of February Farragut 
Feb. sailed from Hampton Roads in the 
2> armed steamer Hartford. Having 
heen detained by sickness at Key West, 
he did not reach Ship Island, his point 
Feb. of destination, until the 20th of 
20. the same month. Farragut's in- 
etructions were of the most positive 
kind. He was to proceed with all ])os- 
sible despatch to the Grulf of Mexico, 
and assume command of the western 
gulf scjuadron, relieving Flag -officer 
McKean. The gulf squadron, wliich 
was employed in enforcing the block- 
ade, was to be considerably strength- 
ened; and in addition, there was to 
be attached to the squadron a power- 
ful bomb flotilla, under Connnander 
David Portei'. With these mortar ves- 
sels, as soon as they were ready, and 
with such othei's as might be spared 
fi'om the blockade, he was to reduce 
the defenses which guarded the ai> 
proaches to New Orleans, take posses- 
sion of that city, under the guns of the 
squadron, and hold it until troops should 
be sent to his aid. K the expedition 
from Cairo should not yet have got 
down the river so far, he was to push a 
strong force up the stream past the city, 
and destroy tlic defenses in tlie rear. 
Thus instructed, and having lu'cn pro- 
vided with plans of the pi-iiicipal works 
on the lower Mississippi^ Farragut set 
about the accomplishment of his task. 



Arrangements had been made to back 
up the efforts of the fleet by a powerful 
land force. An army of eighteen thou- 
sand men was furnished and placed 
undei- the command of Major-General 
Butler. Farragut, we have seen, ar- 
rived at Ship Island on the 20th of 
February. On the 25th of the peb, 
same month. General Butler, his 25. 
ti'oops on l)oard five transports, sailed 
from Hampton Roads. Porter's fleet 
of mortar boats, which were to rendez- 
vous at Key West, arrived in due time. 
It was a formidable flec^t. Fitted up in 
the Brooklyn Navy Yard, it liad for 
months been the su])ject of not a little 
speculation ; and it was generally ex- 
pected that with such instruments Por- 
ter and Farragut would be able to do 
some effective work. There were in all 
twenty-one vessels, of from two hun- 
dred to three hundred tons each, of 
great strength, and constructed so as to 
draw as little water as possil)le. They 
were armed with moi'turs eight and a 
half tons in weigiit, and capable of 
throwing a 15-incli shell. Each vessel 
carried also a 82-pounder rifled caimon. 
Before tlie middle of Apiil the fleet 
was in perfect order; Butlei', too, had 
arrived ; and all necessaiy pi'ej)ai'ations 
had been made for a combined move- 
ment against the enemy. 

Strons: as the National forces now 
undoubtedly were, Farragut had a task 
on hand fitted to unnerve the strongest 
arm and to appal the stoutest heart. 
New Orleans was well fortified ; and the 
numerous narrow and, in some places, 
shallow outlets by which the Missis- 
sippi seeks the sea, make its approaches 



i48 



MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 



exceedingly perilous to ships of heavy 
tonnage. These outlets are five in num- 
ber, and are named respectively Pass ^ 
I'Outre, Northeast Pass, Southeast Pass, 
South Pass, and Southwest Pass. At 
a bend about thirty miles up the river 
there were two powerful forts — one on 
the right or south bank, Fort Jackson, 
and the other on the left or north bank, 
Fort St. Philip. These barred the ap- 
proach to the city from the gulf ; and 
the Confederates had armed them with 
one hundi-ed and twenty-six guns of 
long range and large calibre. At this 
point a large chain, sustained upon eight 
hulks, was stretched across the river. 
Close to Fort Jackson there was a for- 
midable water-battery; and under the 
gims of the forts there was a fleet of 
thirteen gunboats, a powerful ironclad 
floating batteiy, called the Louisiana, 
carrying sixteen guns, and the steam- 
ram Manassas. In addition to all these 
tremendous war appliances, there were 
numerous rafts and fire-ships. Further 
up the river and to the southwest of the 
town, on the bayous and lakes, there 
were elaborate and powerful works, 
which Beauregard had greatly strength- 
ened. In and around the city of New 
Orleans there was a force of at least 
ten thousand men. General Twiggs, of 
somewhat questionable reputation as a 
soldier, had been entrusted by the Con- 
federates with the defense of the city. 
His position, by this time, however, 
had been assumed by Mansfield Lovell, 
formerly a politician and otfice-holder 
in New York. Lovell had for his as- 
sistant General Ruggles, a man of abil- 
ity and energy. The general command 



of the river defenses was entrusted to 
General J. K. Duncan, another New 
York oflice-holder. Forts Jackson and 
St. Pliilip being under the immediate 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ed- 
ward Higgins. Lovell had made appli- 
cation to the governor of the State for 
ten thousand men ; but such had been 
the drain upon the army by the neces- 
sities of the Border States that not 
more than three thousand could be 
spared him as a reinforcement. As it 
was, however, it was not wholly with- 
out reason that the Confederate strength 
around New Orleans was believed by 
some to be sufficient to " beat off any 
navy in the world." "Our only fear," 
said one of the New Orleans journals, 
" is that the Northern invaders may not 
appear. We have made such exten- 
sive preparations to receive them th.it it 
were vexatious if their invincible ar- 
mada escapes the fate we have in store 
for it." 

On the 8th of April the National 
fleet, consisting of four sloops-of- April 
war, seventeen gunboats, twenty- 8t 
one mortar schooners, and t^vo sailing 
vessels, but having no ironclads, had 
been, with great labor, carried over the 
bar. The Brooklyn had been dragged 
through the mud of the Southwest Pass. 
At the shalloAvest part, the water was 
barely fifteen feet deep, the mud having 
greatly increased in the channel since 
the commencement of the blockade 
By the ITth all things were in jvpril 
readiness for an attack. Not only '7« 
were the two fleets now fully in thu 
river : Butler, with his troops, was at 
the Southwest Pass, immediately below. 



THE "CHAIN" CUT. 



149 



ready to take what action might be ne- 
cessary. A fire-raft, which came sailing 
down the river, gave the Nationals an 
idea of the species of tactics the enemy 
April ■^'^'is disposed to adopt. On the 

'8. following day the movement be- 
gan in earnest. According to the plan 
agreed upon at Washington, and which 
formed part of the instructions given to 
Farragut, Porter was to attemj)t to re- 
duce the forts by his mortars, and if he 
failed, Farragut was to inin past them 
with his heavy vessels. In the event 
of the latter course being attended with 
success, Butler was to land his troops 
in the rear of St. Philip and carry it by 
assault. 

The south bank of the river for sev- 
eral miles below Fort Jackson was 
thickly wooded. At some distance be- 
low the bend, and in order to enable 
the guns of the fort to sweep the river 
and prevent the vessels from ascending, 
a large opening was cut through the 
wood. It was impossible, however, to 
rob the Nationals of all the advan- 
tages which the trees afforded. XJnder 
covei' of the woods, fourteen of the 
mortar boats, their masts and rigging 
being clothed with leafy boughs, to 
make them indistinguishable from trees, 
moved up the river and were moored 
at desirable points without being dis- 
covered. The remainder of Porter's 
boats were on the other side of the 
river; but as it was found that they 
were within the range of the guns of 
the forts, they too were brought, on the 
morning of the second day, under cover 
of the woods. Early on the morning 

»£ the 18th the bombardment com- 



menced. The first shot was fired from 
Foi't Jackson. Porter was ready co re- 
ply ; the mortar vessels opened fire im- 
mediately ; and the effect was terrific. 
From a position on board the Harriet 
Lane, Porter watched the effect of the 
shells, and directed their range accord- 
ingly. In Fort Jackson the barracks 
were set on fire soon after the bom- 
bardment opened. The guns were fre- 
quently silenced, the men being terror- 
stiicken by the shells which were ex- 
ploding all around them. It was ob- 
served that the shells were bursting in 
the air, in consequence of the badness 
of the fuses. The fuses were, therefore, 
put in full length, to delay the explo- 
sion. The change had the desired ef- 
fect. The shells, penetrating the earth 
eighteen or twenty feet, and then ex- 
ploding, tearing up the ground and 
scattering it all around, had the effect 
of a constantly repeating earthquake. 
The firing fi'om the forts, in spite of all 
this, was kept tip with gi-eat energy, 
shot and shell coming crashing through 
the woods and tearing up the trees by 
the roots. During the first twenty-four 
hours fifteen hundred bombs must have 
been flung by Porter's mortars, the en- 
emy replying with equal spirit ; and 
for six weary days and nights this ter- 
rible work went on. " No such continued 
and heavy fighting had been witnessed 
since the days of Nelson. At the dis- 
tance of thirty miles from the scene of 
action, window panes were broken by 
the concussion ; and fish, stunned by 
the dreadful ex])losions, were floating 
about on the surface of the watei'. 
On the third day of the bombard- 



912 



150 



MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 



ment, Farragut, seeing tliat no decisive 
results were likely to be attained unless 
bolder measures were adopted, called a 
council and announced his determina- 
tion to cut the barricade, ran the gaunt- 
let of the forts, and pass up to the city 
of New Orleans in spite of their guns. 
Butler was at hand, with at least ten 
thousand troops, ready to land and as- 
sist in the capture of the forts, all his 
transports, with the exception of the 
Great Republic, having entered the 
Mississippi on the 18th. If this move- 
ment was to be carried out, the first 
thing to be done was to remove the 
obstructions from the river. On the 
April Jiight of the 20th, therefore, un- 
20. der cover of the darkness, a fierce 
north Avind blowing at the time. Com- 
mander Bell, with the Pinola and Itaska, 
supported by the Iroquois, Kennebec, 
and Winona, ran up to the boom. The 
Pinola attempted, but unsuccessfully, 
to blow up one of the hulks, by means 
of a petard. The Itaska was lashed to 
the hulk adjoining. A rocket thrown 
up from Fort Jackson revealed her pres- 
ence, and a heavy fire was immediately 
opened upon her from the fortress. 
Nothing daunted, the men kept at their 
work ; and by means of cold-chisels, 
hammers, sledges, and saws, the chain 
was cut. The river being in full flood, 
the powerful current swung around 
both hulk and gunboat, the latter being 
grounded in the mud in shallow water. 
The Pinola came promptly to the res- 
cue, and, after some difliculty, succeeded 
in carrying her consort back in safety 
to the fleet. Some two hours after- 
wards a fire-raft came blazing down the 



stream. It was caught, however, in 
time, and rendered harmless. Mean- 
time the firing never ceases, either on 
board the mortar boats or in the forts ; 
and night after night those blazing fire- 
rafts are let loose on their errands of 
destruction. There were no signs aa 
yet that the forts Avould surrender. 
One thousand shells at least .had burst 
within Fort Jackson ; twenty-five thou- 
sand had been hurled against it; yet 
General Duncan could say : " God is 
certainly protecting us. We are still 
cheerful, and have an abiding faith in 
our ultimate success." 

The arrangements for the onward 
movement up the river were now com- 
pleted. The chain was broken ; and 
Farragut Avas ready. On the April 
night of the 23d the Itaska, Avhich 23. 
had run up to the boom, signalled that 
all was right — that the channel was 
clear, with the exception of the hulks, 
which, with care, might be easily passed. 
The fleet had been arranged in three 
divisions, under Farragut, Captain Bell, 
and Gaptain Theodoras Bailey. Six 
gunboats were to engage the water- 
battery below Fort Jackson, but were 
not to proceed further. Farragut had 
charge of the first division, which con- 
sisted of the tkree large ships, the Hart- 
ford (flag-ship), the Richmond, and the 
Brooklyn. This division was to keep 
to the right bank of the river and fight 
Fort Jackson. The second division was 
under Bailey, and Avas composed of the 
Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varu- 
na, Katahdin, Kineo, Wissahickon, and 
Portsmouth. This diAnsion was to keep 
to the left bank and fight Fort St. Phil'© 



THE "MANASSAS." 



151 



The third division, which comprised 
the Scioto, Winona, Iroquois, Pinola, 
Itaaka, and Kennebec, and was under 
Bell, who was ordered to press on neg- 
lectful of the forts, and attack the Con- 
federate fleet above. At one o'clock on 
April the morning of the 24:th all hands 
24, were called, hammocks stowed, 
and everything put in readiness to weigh 
anchor at two o'clock. The night was 
dark, and a heavy fog rested upon the 
river. 

At two o'clock precisely, two red 
lights were hung out. They were the 
signal for going into action. In less 
than an hour, the whole fleet was un- 
der way. There was an ominous si- 
lence at the forts, as if they were fully 
aware of what was going on, and were 
preparing to give the fleet a warm re- 
ception. Meanwhile Porter's boats had 
opened a terrific fire, literally filling the 
air with shells, and making night hid- 
eous with their noise. As if redoubling 
their efl^orts, the men kept up the firing 
with unceasing vigor until Farragut's 
vessels were all fairly in the heat of 
the conflict. The waning crescent of 
the moon revealed itself just as Far- 
ragut, struggling with the fierce current, 
safely passed the broken chain, itu pale 
light blending strangely with the fierce 
glare of the hissing shell& As the ves- 
sels under his care slowly but steadily 
approached Fort Jackson, Farragut, 
from the fore-rigging of the Hartford, 
eagerly watched, with the help of his 
night-glass, the movements of Bailey 
and Bell. When within a little over a 
mile of Fort Jackson, the guns of both 
forts opened upon him with great force 



and with singular precision of aim. 
Farragut was in no haste to reply, al- 
though the Hartford was hit several 
times. Drawing closer and closer, and 
waiting fully fifteen minutes after the 
first volley had been aimed at him, he 
began vnth two heavy guns which he 
had mounted on the forecastle ; and 
then, when within half a mile of Foii 
Jackson, and having that work fairly 
within I'ange, he sheered around and 
poured forth such broadsides of grape 
and canister that no living thing could 
stand before them. The men were 
driven from the barbette guns, and the 
"wildest confusion prevailed. The firing 
from the casemates continued ; and the 
conflict raged with tremendous fury. 
The Richmond, which had successfully 
passed the barricade, soon came up and 
took part in the fight. The Brooklyn 
had been less fortunate. In passing 
through the opening made by the 
breaking of the chain, she became eu' 
tangled with one of the hulks; and 
while in this position she was exposed 
at once to the fire of the forts and to 
attacks from the Confederate ii'onclads. 
Scarcely was the Brooklyn extricated 
from this peril when the iron ram Ma- 
nassas came down upon her with great 
fury, firing from the trap-door a heavy 
bolt at the Brooklyn's steam drum. 
Happily the shot lodged in some sand 
bags and did no harm. The next mo- 
ment the ram butted into the ship'>^ 
starboard ; but the impetus was iasufli- 
cient to make any impression on the 
Brooklyn, whose sides were bound 
round and round with chain armor. 
As the Manassas glided away and wa« 



152 



MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 



lost in the darkness, and while still 
under the fii'e of Fort Jackson, the 
Brooklyn encountered another steamer. 
The struggle with this one was short 
and sharp. One hearty broadside, at 
the distance of fifty or sixty yards, and 
the strange vessel was no more. The 
Brooklyn was then abreast of Fort St. 
Philip, and her guns were within easy 
range. "I had the satisfaction," said 
Captain Craven, in his report, " of com- 
pletely silencing that work before I left 
it, my men in the tops witnessing, in 
the flashes of the bursting shrapnel, the 
enemy running like sheep for more com- 
fortable quarters." 

Farragut, meanwhile, was having 
enough to do on board the Hartford. 
While engaged with the forts, a huge 
fire-raft was pushed against him by the 
Manassas. In attempting to avoid the 
blazing raft, the Hartford ran aground ; 
and in a moment, the incendiary having 
come crashing alongside of her, the ship 
was in flames on the port side and half- 
way up to the main and mizzen-tops. 
While the flames raged, the Hartford did 
jot discontinue her cannonading. " All 
the time," says Farragut, "we were pour- 
ing shells into the forts, and they into 
us, and now and then a rebel steamer 
would get under our fire and receive 
our salutation of a broadside." The 
flames were soon extinguished ; and the 
Hartford, being released, sailed up the 
stream. Half an hour more and Farra- 
gut had successfully passed through the 
fiery stoi'm, having done his work ef- 
fectually as he moved along. 

Bailey, \^^th his second division, had 
had, if possible, even a harder experi- 



ence ; but his success was scarcely less 
marked. In crossing the river obstmc- 
tions he encountered the fire of both 
forts ; and scarcely had he passed 
through, when, owing to the great 
speed of the Cayuga, he found himself 
ahead of his fiiends and alone in the 
midst of the Confederate fleet. His 
situation was one of extreme peril. 
The Manassas, the floating battery Lou- 
isiana, and at least sixteen other armed 
vessels, all turned upon him ; and his 
vessel seemed doomed. The swiftness 
of the ship came to his aid ; and he 
handled her with exquisite skill. While 
completely successful in so keeping out 
of the way of the Confederate ironclads 
that they could neither butt nor board 
him, he so used his guns that he com- 
pelled three of them to surrender before 
any aid came to him. Meanwhile the 
Varuna, Captain Boggs, and the Oneida, 
Captain Lee, came up and engaged the 
enemy. The Cayuga had been hit forty- 
two times, and was so damaged that 
Bailey deemed it prudent to retii'e. 
The Varuna was the next object of at- 
tack. Boggs found himself, all at once, 
after passing the forts, as he said in his 
report, " amid a nest of rebel steamers." 
The brave captain did not hesitate as 
to what he should do. Rushino: at once 
into the midst of them, he "worked 
both his sides, loaded with grape," pro- 
ducing terrible havoc among the Con- 
federate ships, which were strangely 
overcrowded. "An explosion, terrific 
yells, a careen, and that fellow is done 
for." Such is the language of an eye- 
witness. And so the fearful work goes 
on, until the Varuna has sunk, one after 



PAST THE FORTS. 



153 



another, six of the enemy's vessels. 
Meanwhile she was badly hurt herself. 
The heavy shot of the ironclads had 
told on her rigging and on her timbers. 
One raking discharge from one of them 
had killed four and wounded nine of 
her men. Four times she had been 
butted by the powerful rams of her an- 
tagonists. The last time she was struck, 
her side was crushed in ; but before the 
ram could get out of her way, she put 
through her unarmored stern five 8-inch 
shells " that settled her, and she went 
ashore in flames." In fifteen minutes 
after she was struck the Varuna went 
to the bottom ; but in the interval she 
had settled her antagonist. It was no- 
ble fighting, conducted in the true spirit 
of the sea kings of ancient times. 

The Moore was the last vessel which 
the Varuna had to encounter. Badly 
disabled as the Varuna was, Boggs 
kept up the fight, with his vessel 
aground and her bow tied to the trees. 
It was not until" the water was up over 
the gun-trucks that the captain gave 
his attention to the saving of his men. 
Happily all the survivors, including the 
wounded, were got out and saved be- 
fore the vessel went down. At the last 
moment the Oneida, Captain Lee, came 
up to the aid of the sinking Varuna. 
Boggs "waved him on" after the 
Moore, which was in flames but trying 
to get away. In a little while the 
Moore was suiTendered to the Oneida 
by the second oflicer, the captain hav- 
ing fled, after setting the vessel on fire. 
But for her timely capture, fifty of her 
men, maimed and wounded, must have 
perished in the flames. 



Bell had been less fortunate than 
either Farragut or Bailey in bringing 
his ships into action and accomplishing 
the task assigned him. The Scioto, 
Iroquois, and Pinola passed the foi'ts; 
but the Itaska, being disabled, drifted 
down the river. The Winona recoiled 
from the terrible fire which had proved 
fatal to her companion. The Kennebec 
got entangled in attempting to pass the 
obstructions, and finally, having lost 
her way in the darkness, returned to 
her moorings. 

The fight was now ended. It had 
been as brief as it had been desperate. 
It was little more than an hour and a 
half since the fleet had left its mooi'- 
ings; and in that brief space of time 
all that it was intended to do had been 
successfully accomplished. The forts 
had been passed and the Confederate 
navy was destroyed. The ironclad Ma- 
nassas, from which such great things 
were expected, shared the fate of the 
smaller vessels. Commander Porter's 
description of the last moments of this 
naval monster are well deserving of I'e- 
production. We have seen that he kept 
up a continuous fire from the mortar 
boats while Farragut was pressing ou 
his way. " It was reported to me," he 
says, "that the celebrated ram Manas- 
sas was coming out to attack us, and 
sure enough, there she was, apparently 
steaming along shore, ready to pounce 
upon the defenseless mortar vessels ; 
but I soon discovered that she could 
harm no one again. She was beginning 
to emit smoke from her ports or holes ; 
she Avas on fire and sinking. Her pipes 
were twisted and riddled with she*; 



154 



MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 



her Lull was cut up. She had evidently 
been used ujj by the squadron as she 
passed along. I tried to save her as a 
curiosity by getting a hawser around 
her and securing her to the bank; but 
just after doing so, she faintly exploded. 
Her only gun went off, and, emitting 
flames from her bow-port, like some 
huge animal she gave a plunge and dis- 
appeared mider the water." The de- 
scription of the closing scenes of the 
fontest, from the same pen, is equally 
graphic. After the Manassas had gone 
down, there " came a steamer on fire ; 
after her, two others, burning and float- 
ing down the stream. Fires seemed to 
be raging all along the 'up livei',' and 
we supposed that our squadron was 
burning and destroying the vessels as 
they passed along. The sight of this 
night attack was awfully grand. The 
river was lit up by rafts filled with 
pine knots; and the ships seemed to 
be literally fighting among flames and 
smoke." 

The Cayuga, Captain Bailey's flag- 
ship, had, as we have seen, when re- 
lieved by the Varuna and the Oneida, 
and after having been struck at least 
forty-two times, and consequently been 
considerably damaged, sailed up the 
river. It was the advance boat. It had 
not sailed far when Bailey discovered 
the camp of the famous Chalmette regi- 
ment. On the approach of the Cayuga, 
the regiment attempted to effect its es- 
cape. Bailey opened fii'e ; a volley of 
canister was sufficient to compel a halt, 
which was soon followed by an uncon- 
ditional suri'ender. By this time Bailey 
was joined by Farragut; and the Nar 



tional fleet, consisting of thirteen ves- 
sels, was ready to steam up to New 
Orleans. On reaching the quarantine 
ground, Farragut concluded to halt for 
the night, and to move on the city on 
the following morning. 

Let us see what was taking place in 
the rear of the National fleet. Farragut 
had passed the forts, but he had not 
silenced them. Where was Porter, with 
his moi'tar boats ; and what was General 
Butler doing with his soldiers? We 
shall see. Butler, with his staff, had 
witnessed from the deck of the Saxon 
the contest between the fleet and the 
forts. Half an hour after he had 
reached the quarantine, Farragut sent 
Captain Boggs in a smallboat, through 
the bayous, with despatches for Butler 
and Porter. Butler had already joined 
his transports. With the least delay 
possible they were moved to Sable 
Island, whence the troops were, with 
very considerable difliculty, conveyed 
in smallboats and landed successfully a 
short distance above Fort St. Philip, 
and under cover of the guns of the Mis- 
sissippi and Kineo. A portion of them 
Avere sent across the river, to be i-eady 
to take possession of Fort Jackson. 
Meanwhile Porter, who had remained 
behind the fleet, had not been idle. On 
Fort Jackson particularly he had kept 
up an incessant fire ; ■ the shells from his 
mortars giving terrible annoyance to 
the enemy, although not producing any 
visible impression on the works. On 
the 26th he sent a flag of truce, April 
demanding its surrender, stating 26. 
that he had information of the capture 
of New Orleans. Colonel Higgins, who 



FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS. 



155 



had command of the forts, refused to 
surrender, stating that he had no in- 
formation of the fall of New Orleans, 
and that until he had such information, 
from what he should consider a reliable 
source, the thoui^ht of surrender was 
not for a moment to be entertained. 
Meantime it began to be known to the 
soldiei's that Butler was in the rear of 
Fort St. Philip ; and in spite of the en- 
couraging words of General Duncan, 
the commander of the coast defenses, 
then in Fort Jackson, that they were as 
capable of repelling the enemy to-day 
as they were before the bombardment, 
the garrison began to mutiny. Spiking 
their guns, some of them sallied out and 
sui'rendered to Butler's pickets, stating 
that they had been impressed and com- 
pelled to fight against their will. It 
was now evident to the Confederate 
officers that it was useless to prolong 
the struggle; and Colonel Higgins, feel- 
ing that he had done his best, accepted 
Porter's not ungenerous terms. While 
the treaty was being signed on board the 
Harriet Lane, the huge battery, the Lou- 
isiana, was set on fire by its commander, 
and let loose in the strong current of the 
river, with all its guns shotted. It was 
the evident intention of its officers to 
destroy by this means Porter's fleet of 
mortar boats. Their calculation proved 
a failure. The monster blew up when 
abreast of Fort St. Philip, a flying frag- 
ment killing one of its garrison. It 
was a barbarous proceeding ; and it was 
with great propj'iety that Mitchell and 
his subordinates were sent close pris- 
oners to the North. The treaty of sur- 
render being completed, the forts were 



turned over by Porter to General 
Phelps. It was found that the works 
were comparatively uninjured. The 
actual number of the Confederate killed 
and wounded has never been correctly 
given. The whole number of prisoners 
surrendered, including those of the 
Chalmette regiment and the men from 
the gunboats, amounted to nearly one 
thousand. 

On the morning of the 25th, Farragut 
proceeded up the river with nine April 



vessels. Owing to the slowness of 



25. 



some of the boats, and to a want of 
knowledge of the river, it was 10.30 
A. M. before the fleet had reached what 
is called the English Turn. " All the 
morning," says Farragut in his official 
report, " I had seen abundant evidence 
of the panic which had seized the people 
in New Orleans. Cotton-loaded ships on 
fire came floating down, and working in- 
struments of every kind, such as are used' 
in shipyards. The destruction of prop- 
erty was awful. The levee in New 
Orleans was one scene of desolation. 
Ships, steamers, cotton, coal were all in 
one common blaze, and our ingenuity 
was much taxed to avoid the floating 
conflagration." On his way up, and 
when about three miles from the city, 
fire was opened upon him by the Chal- 
mette batteries, one being on each side 
of the river ; but the vessels were now 
well together, and a few vigorous and 
well directed broadsides soon silenced 
the guns and scattered the men in all 
directions. New Orleans was now ut- 
terly defenseless ; and the water in the 
river was so high that a gunboat could 
easily be taken up as far as Renner'3 



156 



MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 



plantation, ten miles above the city, 
and thus, by commanding the narrow 
neck of land across which the railroad 
passes, and which connects the river 
and the swamp, completely enclose the 
city, shutting off all means of egress 
and every source of supply. In the cir- 
cumstances, and seeing that he had no 
hope of saving the city, Lovell, with 
the sanction of the municipal authori- 
ties, who were anxious to avoid the hor- 
I'ors of a bombardment, sent off his mu- 
nitions and a large portion of his troops, 
and, having disbanded the rest, turned 
the city over to the mayor. 

At one o'clock, on the afternoon of 
the 25th, and in the midst of a fierce 
thunder-storm, Farragut anchored his 
squadron off New Orleans. The excite- 
ment was tremendous. The inhabitants, 
who believed that the defenses of the 
city were invulnerable, gave way to 
the most frantic rage, invoked venge- 
ance on Higgins and Lovell, and de- 
manded that the city be given to the 
flames rather than surrendered. On 
board the National ships the sailors 
were wild with delight. They had 
seen the end of their mission ; they had 
nobly and successfully done their work ; 
and cheer after cheer went sounding 
from the ships to the shore. Fairagut 
sent Bailey to the city authorities, with 
a flag, demanding the immediate sur- 
render of the city, and informing them 
that no flag but that of the United 
States would be allowed to float in 
presence of the fleet. The mayor, John 
T. Monroe, in a foolish letter, refused 
to surrender or take down the Confede- 
rate flag, declaring that the city was 



defenseless, that he was no military 
man, and knew neither how to com- 
mand an army nor to surrender an un- 
protected place; that there was not a 
man in the city whose heart would not 
be palsied by the mere thought o£ 
hoisting any flag but the flag of their 
adoption; and that he would seek in 
vain for " so wretched and desperate a 
renegade as Avould dare to profane with 
his hand the sacred emblem of our as- 
pirations." In the meantime a party 
had landed from the Pensacola and 
hoisted the National flag over the gov- 
ernment mint ; but it was quickly torn 
down and dragged in derision through 
the streets. A gambler named Mum- 
ford, who was chiefly responsible for 
this rash act, afterwards paid the pen- 
alty with his life. Farragut, patient as 
he was, and merciful as he wished to 
be, was not to be hindered in the dis- . 
charge of his duty by the querulous 
protestations of the mayor. He notified 
the mayor to remove the women and 
chikb'en from the city within forty-eight 
hours, as he had no desire that the in- 
nocent and the helpless should suffer, 
in the event of a bombardment. An- 
other letter, more ridiculous than the 
former, came back from the mayor. 
" Do your woret, but don't speak about 
humanity. If the Confederate flag must 
be taken down, and the National flag 
raised, the work must be done by other 
hands than ours." Such was the bur- 
den of the mayor's I'eply. Farragut, 
having learned of the surrender of the 
forts below, and knowing that General 
Butler would soon be on hand and 
ready to take possession, felt that, not 



BUTLER IN caAacrn 



157 



ivithstanding the irritating conduct of 
Mayor Monroe, lie could afford to act 
with caution and patience. Next day 
April Captain Bell landed with a hun- 

26" dred marines; and the National 
flag was raised over the mint and the 
custom-house. To these no violence 
was offered. The people had become 
aware of the fact that Butler was com- 
ing up the river with his transports. 
April Oil the 30th, Farragut informed 

30. the city authorities that he should 
hold no more intercourse with them, 
and that as soon as General Butler 
arrived he should turn over the charge 
May of the city to him. On the 1st 

'• of May, General Butler, with his 
transports, bearing two thousand armed 
men, appeared off the levee in front 
of New Orleans. On the afternoon of 
the same day the debarkation took 
place, and New Orleans was formally 
occupied by United States troops. Be- 
fore the middle of the month. Baton 
Rouge and Natchez had also been occu- 
pied ; and the Mississippi was free both 
above and below Vicksburg. The cap- 
ture of New Orleans, which was accom- 
plished at the small sacrifice of 40 killed 
and 177 wounded, was justly regarded 
as one of the greatest victories yet 
achieved by the North. The people 
were jubilant ; and President Lincoln, 
in a cheerful proclamation, and as if to 
give the world assurance of the com- 
pleteness of the National victories, de- 
Jane clared the termination, on June 

*• lat, of the blockade of the ports 



of Beaufort, of Port Royal, and of New 
Orleans. It was justly felt to be a heavy 
loss to the South. " It annihilated us in 
Louisiana," says Pollard, "diminished 
our resources and supplies by the loss 
of one of the greatest grain and cattle 
countries within the limits of the Con- 
federacy ; gave to the enemy the Missis- 
sippi River, with all its means of naviga- 
tion, for a base of operations, and finally 
led by plain and irresistible conclusion 
to our virtual abandonment of the great 
and fruitful valley of the Mississippi." 
We have thus answered the questions 
which we put to ourselves at the com- 
mencement of this chapter. We have 
told the stoiy of the occupation of 
Memphis and the story of the capture of 
New Orleans, and have explained why it 
w us that at the date of the Confederate 
retreat from Corinth and its occuj)ation 
by General Halleck and the National 
foi'ces, Vicksburg alone remained to ob- 
struct the free navigation of the waters 
of the Mississippi. We leave General 
Butler in possession of New Orleans; 
but the consideration of his adminstra- 
tion of the affairs of that city forjus no 
essential part of the plan of this work. 
The naval operations which resulted in 
the occupation of Memphis on the oa& 
hand and the capture of New Orleans 
on the other, were in the highest degiV'^ 
creditable to the officers of the Nortl 
Farragut covered himself with glory, 
so did Bailey; so did Boggs; but where 
all did so well, it is invidiour Uj singh 
out and bestow special praise 



)fIS 



158 



lUKA AND CORINTH. 



CHAPTER XI. 



Dui Army of the West. — The Army Inactive. — Halleck made Commander-in-Chief. — Buell Sent to Chattmioogi. • ■ 
The Army of the West Weakened. — Grant in Command. — Pope Sent' to Virginia. — Rosecranz takes Poperi 
place under Grant. — The Position of the Army of the AVest. — Price and VanDom. — The Confederate Army 
Preparing to Strike. — Grant's Caution. — The Object of the Confederates. — luka. — Amistrong's Raids. — Colonel 
Murphy in Command at luka. — Price at luka. — Grant Watchful and Ready. — Time Precious. — Generals Ord 
and Ross. — Rosecranz's Army in Motion. — The Confederates Well Posted. — The Battle-Ground at luka. — 
The Battle Begun.— The Battery of the Eleventh Ohio. —Fearful Fighting.— Colonel Eddy Killed.— The 
Battery Captured. — Ord Deceived. — Too Late on the Field. — A. Great Misfortune. — Defeat and Retreat of 
the Confederates. — Corinth. — Preparations for another Fight. — The Old Battle-Ground. — The Place Greatly 
Strengthened. — Major Prime. — Chewalla Road. — Beginning of the Fight. — Terrific Onslaught of the Confed* 
rates. — The First Day a Victory for the Confederates. — The Confederates Reinforced. — Resolved to Capture 
Corinth. — The Confederates Open Fire. — A Deceptive Movement. — The Movement Defeated. — The Confede- 
rates Come Up in Force. — Great Bravery and Great Slaughter. — A Temporary Panic among the Nationals. — 
Fort Powell Captured. — At Rosecranz's Headquarters. — Are they to Win? — Victory turned into Defeat. — The 
Confederate Right Driven Back to the Woods. — The Confederate Left. — Their Advance on the National Works. — 
A Terrible Reception. — " Gorgeous Pyrotechnics. " — A Murderous Fire. — The Confederates Fall Back. — Another 
Attack.— The Battle Ended.— A National Triumph.— The Pursuit.— The Battle of the Hatchie.— The Confede. 
rates Defeated. — Hurlbut and Ord. — Ord Wounded. — Pursuit Discontinued. — Promotion of Rosecranz. — Hi£ 
Order of the Twenty-Fourth of October. — The First Praise Due to Grant. — Grant's Command Enlarged. 



1842. 



Before proceeding to call the read- 
er's attention to the important 
events which were already taking 
place on the Atlantic coast, we have 
deemed it ad-visable, for the sake of 
unity, to remain a little longer with 
the army of the West, and to describe 
somewhat in detail the operations of 
that army, and the Avork generally 
which had to be done after the capture 
of Corinth and before Genei'al Gi-ant 
was in a fit condition to march upon 
Vicksbiu'g. 

Corinth was evacuated on the 30th 
May of May, and on the same day was 
3®' occupied by the National troops. 
"From a variety of causes, the concpier- 
ors of Shiloh remained comparatively 
inactive from June to September. Hal- 
leck remained in command until the 



1 1th of August, when he was summoned 
to AVashington, and by general Ang. 
orders from the War Department J'« 
assigned to the command of " the whole 
land forces of the United States, as 
general-in-chief." During that time he 
employed hira.self in strengthening the 
fortifications of Corinth and repairing 
the raib'oads betAveen that place and 
Columbus. General Buell was detached 
on the 10th of June, and sent to jnne 
C'hattanooga to oppose Bragg ; '*• 
for the Confederates, encouraged by 
the success A\'hich had attended their 
arms in the East, Avere making super 
hmnan efforts, not only with the view 
of marching upon Washington, but foi 
the purpose, also, of I'ecovering Avhat 
they had lost in Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky. Should Bragg succeed in moving 



GEANT'S PLAN. 



259 



along the west flank of the Cumberland 
Mountains and in cajituring Louisville, 
he would undo all that Halleck had 
done in his southward march along 
the Tennessee. In order to strengthen 
Buell, and so enable him to counter- 
check Bragg, the Shiloh army was 
robbed of some of its ablest and most 
experienced soldiers. On the departure 
of Halleck for "Washington, General 
Grant succeeded to the chief command 
of his old army ; but, from the causes 
above mentioned, its ranks were consid- 
erably thinned. 

When Grant assumed the command. 
General Pope hatl been ordered to Vir- 
ginia, and General Rosecranz had taken 
chai-ge of that leader's forces under 
Grant. Rosecranz's division was known 
as the army of the Mississippi, and was 
charged with the occupation of Northern 
Mississippi and Alabama, in the vicin- 
ity of Corinth and eastward to Tus- 
cumbia. The entire army under Grant 
was stationed fi"om Memphis to Bridge- 
port, Tennessee, along the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad. His headquar- 
ters were at Jackson, Tennessee, where 
the Central Mississippi Railroad unites 
with the Mobile and Ohio. In conse- 
quence of the low water of the Tennes- 
see, it was necessary for him to hold 
the railroads from Corinth and Bolivar 
north to Columbus. 

In Grant's immediate front lay the 
Confederates, in considerable force, un- 
der Pi'ice and VanDorn. B(;coming 
aware of the fact that Grant's army 
had been greatly weakened by the 
transfer of troops to Buell, these officers 
moved their armies toward the Ten- 



nessee River at the beginning of Sep' 
tember. Of this forward movement 
General Grant was fully aware; but 
with a caution which was fully justified 
by the result, he refrained fi'om any 
precipitate action, his attention being 
mainly devoted to ascertain the plans 
of his opponents. It was evidently the 
object of the Confederate generals to 
get possession of Corinth, the key to 
the military jiossession of Tennessee. 
This in their hands, they could render 
effective aid to Bragg ; they might even 
resume possession of their lost territory, 
and bring Kentucky and Tennessee 
once more within the limits of the Con- 
federacy. There can be little doubt 
that Bragg expected Price and VanDorn 
to follow him ; and there is every reason 
to believe that these two officers felt 
confident of their ability to measure 
swords with Grant and Rosecranz. 
Thej^ hoped, however, that Grant would 
be tempted to abandon Corinth ; in this 
showing that they shared the feeling 
which was commonly entertained at 
Richmond, that Bragg's march on Lou- 
isville would compel the National com- 
mander to release his hold on the Mis- 
sissippi. They did not know their man. 
Grant's character, in fact, Avas not yet 
fully understood. 

Of the appi'oach of the enemy, and 
of two unsuccessful raids made by a 
cavalry force under General Aimstrong, 
Grant duly informed Rosecranz, who 
was at the time at Tuscumbia. Rose- 
cranz hastened to luka, a sweet village 
on the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
road, in Tishamingo County, Missis- 
sippi, noted for its mineral springs and 



160 



ItTKA AND CORINTH. 



the beauty of its suiToundings. At 
luka there was collected a large amount 
of stores. Leaving the place in charge 
of Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the Eighth 
Wisconsin, with orders to remove the 
property to Corinth or destroy it, Rose- 
cranz hurried westward, with Stanley's 
division, to Clear Creek, some seven 
miles east of Corinth, and there en- 
Sep, camped. On the 1st of Septem- 
'• ber, Price, with twelve thousand 
men, reached Jacinto, when the small 
National force stationed there retired 
and fled to Corinth. Tuscumbia and 
luka were in like manner abandoned ; 
and Price, unresisted, established his 
lu'.adquarters at the latter place, taking 
])()ssession of the National property 
which Murphy had failed to destroy. 

The time had now come for Grant to 
act. He had watched the movements 
of the enemy with great earnestness. 
He had now divined their meaning. 
He had also found his ojiportunity. 
What the Confederate leaders intended 
was now clear. Price wished so to en- 
gage the attention of Grant as to tempt 
him to draw his forces out of Corinth. 
VanDorn, meanwhile, was to be ready 
to spring upon the abandoned or poorly 
garrisoned stronghold, and secure it 
for the Confederacy. From his scouts 
Grant had learned that VanDorn could 
not reach Corinth for at least four days. 
Price, as we have seen, had established 
his headquarters at luka ; and VanDorn 
was at Holly Springs. There was time, 
therefore, to punish Price, and to be 
back at Corinth ready to give Van- 
Dorn a warm reception. But the time 
was precious. Not an hour was to be 



lost. Every second delayed was a pos- 
itive gain to the enemy. The instruo- 
tions were promptly given. General 
Ord was directed to move on the left 
of the railroad, through Burns ville, to 
luka, taking care, of course, to leave 
garrisons at Corinth and other points 
that required protection. General Ross 
was ordered by telegraph to come at 
full speed from Bolivar on the same 
route, and, leaving a small rearguard at 
Burnsville, to join Ord with three thou- 
sand four hundred men. This force, 
six thousand five hundred in all, was to 
attack Price from the north. Rosecranz 
was ordered to send one division of 
Stanley's, with Mizner's cavalry, by 
way of Jacinto, to strike the enemy's 
flank, while Hamilton should move 
round by the Fulton road, to cut off his 
southward retreat or turn it into a rout. 
The force under Rosecranz amounted to 
nine thousand. This, with the three 
thousand under Ord and the three thou- 
sand four hundred under Ross, made 
the army of Grant in the field larger, 
by three thousand, than that of Price. 
The choice of position made by the 
Confederates more than compensated 
for the difference in actual strength. 
The combined movement of the Na- 
tional troops began at four o'clock in 
the morning of the 18th of Sep- sjp, 
tember. That night, after having J8. 
marched through a terrible rain-storm, 
the troops of Rosecranz bivouacked at 
Jacinto, about twenty miles south of 
luka. 

On the following morning they push- 
ed on in light marching order to- Sep. 
ward luka, with Mizner's cavalry. 



19. 



DEFEAT OF PKICE. 



161 



At Barnett's Corners they encountered 
some Confederate outjiosts, driving them 
in, after a sharp skirmish. Early in the 
afternoon, when about two miles from 
luka, Hamilton's division, while mov- 
ing cautiously and expecting every mo- 
ment to hear the gans of Ord, came 
suddenly upon the enemy, in strong 
force and well posted on the side of a 
hill which flanked a deep ravine. Ham- 
ilton immediately formed line of battle. 
The ground was so broken, so tangled 
with thickets, so interlaced with creeks 
and ravines, that it was impossible to 
bring the troops into action in large 
bodies. The men formed themselves 
wherever the ground Avould permit 
them. The line was thus broken at 
frequent intervals ; and the fighting 
seemed to be done by a number of 
small armies. The fighting, however, 
was severe. After much exertion, and 
in spite of a most destructive fire of 
grape, canister and shell from the ene- 
emy's guns, the Eleventh Ohio battery 
was put in position on the crest of the 
hill. This battery was supported by 
the Fifth Iowa, Colonel Matthias, and 
the Twenty-Sixth Missouri, Colonel 
Boomer; and commanding the road in 
front, it did excellent and effective 
work. Colonel Eddy, with the Forty- 
Eighth Indiana, was holding ground a 
little in front of the battery, where the 
fighting was most fierce, and where the 
Confederates were led by General Piice 
in person ; and although assistance was 
given him by the Fourth Minnesota, 
Captain LeGro, and by the Sixteenth 
Iowa, Colonel Chambers, he was diiven 
again and again back upon the baltery. 



Around the battery of the Eleventh 
Ohio, the battle raged most fiercely. 
Three or four times the guns of this 
battery were taken and retaken. The 
commander of the battery. Lieutenant 
Sears, did noble work. At length Cob 
onel Eddy fell mortally wounded ; and 
his regiment being hurled back in dis- 
order, the guns — every horse having 
been killed, seventy-two of the men and 
nearly all the oflicers either killed or 
wounded — were seized and carried ofF 
by the Confederates. While this strug- 
gle lasted, Stanley's division came up; 
but such was the nature of the ground 
that only the Eleventh Missouri could 
be pushed to the front. This regiment 
I'endered most effective assistance, and 
helped to drive the Confederates back 
into the ravine. The fight lasted until 
nightfall ; and, the Confederates having 
been compelled to take shelter in the 
hollow toward the village, darkness fell 
upon the combatants and made an end 
of the carnage. 

The reader will observe that Ord waa 
not present to take any part in the con- 
test. Why was this ? He had, it seems, 
spent the greater part of the day watch- 
ing the movements of a Confederate 
force which appeared to be advancing in 
the direction of Corinth. This proving 
to be only a feint, he hastened to Burns- 
ville, where he found Ross waiting with 
his three thousand men. Grant ordered 
him forward, with five thousand men, 
with directions to halt within four miles 
of luka until he should hear Rosecranz's 
guns. A high north wind, which blew 
all the afternoon, prevented him from 
bearing the sound of the cannon. It 



162 



lUKA AND CORINTH. 



was not until next morning that he heard 
the expected signal; but it was too 
late. When he reached luka, the en- 
emy had disappeared. As illustrative 
of the difficulties of the situation, it de- 
serves to be noted that, at half-past ten 
o'clock on the night of the 19th, Rose- 
cranz sent a dispatch to General Grant, 
stating that he had been engaged for 
several hours, and had lost three pieces 
of artillery, and requesting the assist- 
ance and co-operation of the troops un- 
der Ord. This dispatch should have 
been in Grant's hands within two hours. 
It did not reach him until thirty-five 
minutes past eight the next morning. 
Mortified by the delay, and dreading 
the possible result, Grant wrote to Ord 
in the most urgent language. " Rose- 
cranz," he said, " may find his hands 
full. Huriy up your troops — all possi- 
ble." Happily, the character of Ord 
was well known, and there was no rea- 
son to suspect his bravery or his willing- 
ness to take part in the fight. 

The Fulton road had not been cov- 
ered, as Grant had ordered, and Price 
was able during the night to make good 
his escape. As soon as his flight was 
known, a pursuit was made ; but Price 
had too much the start to be overtaken. 
Although Grant had reason to sympa- 
thize with Rosecranz, in consequence of 
the nonappearance of Ord, he was ill 
satisfied with the result of the fight. 
He had counted on the destruction or 
capture of Price's army. As it was, 
luka was a victory, and his plan had 
been amply justified. Price lost one of 
his best generals, Little, who was killed. 
At least a thousand of his men were 



made prisoners; the number of his killed 
•and wounded was large ; and he was 
unable to caiTy with him the captured 
guns. The National loss was about 
seven hundi-ed and thirty men killed 
and wounded. On the 22d Grant sep« 
withdrew his forces and returned 22. 
to Corinth to prepare for the reception 
of VanDorn. 

Corinth again comes prominently into 
the foreground. In May it was the 
theatre of great and stirring events 
which commanded the attention of both 
continents; and now, in October, it is 
to be the theatre of events even more 
momentous and greatly more enduring 
in their results. Price joined VanDorn 
at Ripley; and, little daunted at the 
failure of their plan to get hold of Co- 
rinth by stratagem, they made up their 
minds to take it by force. It was known 
that VanDorn was already approaching 
from the west ; but it was not known 
what point he might first attack. It 
might be Jackson ; it might be Bolivar ; 
it might be Corinth — the latter most 
like])^ Grant took all needful precau- 
tion to make his different points of 
strength secure, knowing that it would 
not be difficult to concentrate, once the 
enemy was encountered and his pur- 
pose fully understood. Rosecranz was 
marched back through Jacinto to Co. 
rinth, which he reached on the sepi 
2Gth. Ord was stationed at Boli- 26. 
var; and Grant returned to his head- 
quarters at Jackson. General Hurlbut 
was thrown out with his division to- 
wards Pocahontas. The united Con- 
federate forces moved northward to 
Pocahontas, striking tLe Memphis and 



THE FIRST DAY AT CORINTH. 



163 



Charleston Rjiilroad about halfway be- 
tween Corinth and Grand Junction. 
There they met the troops of Mansfield 
Lovell, whose acquaintance, the reader 
will remember, we made in the last 
chapter, when describing the capture 
of New Orleans. Thus strengthened, 
the Confederate army numbered about 
twenty-two thousand men, and was un- 
der the immediate command of General 
VanDorn, who ranked both Price and 
Oct. Lovell. On the night of the 2d 
2' of October, the united forces bi- 
vouacked at Chewalla, ten miles from 
Corinth. Early on the morning of the 
Oct. «^d, the Confederates came up in 
^' force ; and Rosecranz had no lon- 
ger any reason to doubt that the object- 
ive point aimed at by VanDorn was 
Corinth. Rosecranz disposed of his 
troops accordingly. Hamilton he placed 
on the right, Davis in the centre, and 
McKean on the left; while Colonel 
Oliver, with three regiments and a sec- 
tion of artillery, was stationed on the 
Chewalla road, beyond the old works 
of Beauregard. Mizner's cavalry was 
disposed in every direction around the 
town, watching the roads at Burnsville, 
Boneyard, Kossuth, and also in the 
front. On the Confederate side, the 
left, under Price, was on the Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad, to the north of Co- 
rinth. VanDorn had charge of the 
centre, a little more to the west, on the 
Chewalla road ; and the right was held 
by Lovell. It was evident that the 
attack was to be made upon the north- 
west side of Corinth — the point which 
VanDorn had been led to understand 
was tlie most vulnerable. He did not 



know that this defect in the original 
fortifications of Beauregard had been 
completely obviated, Grant having caus- 
ed to be constructed here four powerful 
redoubts. Corinth, in truth, was a very 
different place in these first days of 
October to what it was when Beaure- 
gard abandoned it in May. 

When the National forces, after the 
retreat of Beauregard, entered Co- 
rinth, the defenses, which had been con-t 
structed by the Confederate chief, were 
found to extend fifteen miles. To de- 
fend so extended a line would have 
required an enormous army. To obvi- 
ate this difficulty, and in order to make 
the place defensible by a much smaller 
force. General Halleok had constructed 
an inner line of defenses. Grant, how- 
ever, was not satisfied with these. Ma- 
jor F. E. Prime, the chief engineer of 
General Grant, under his direction, 
threw uj) a line of batteries on the north 
front, far inside of Halleck's line, and 
close to the town of Corinth, ha^^ng an 
enfilading fire upon the Bolivar and 
Chewalla roads, and a sweeping cross- 
fire upon all assailable parts of the en- 
tii-e fi'ont. On the extreme right were 
the old works of Beauregard; and from 
that point the chain of forts reached 
to the extreme left. On succeeding to 
the command of all the forces in the 
District of West Tennessee and North- 
ern Mississippi, Grant examined the de- 
fenses of Corinth, which were then be- 
ing constructed under the superintend- 
ence of General Cullum, and expressed 
the opinion to Genei-al Halleck that 
they would be appropriate if there w&s 
an army of one hundred thousand men 



164 



lUiA AND CORINTH. 



to defend them, but that they were of 
too great extent for the force at his dis- 
posal. Immediately upon General Hal- 
leck's departure for "Washington, Prime's 
works were pushed forward -wath ener- 
gy, and by the 25th of September, when 
Rosecranz took command, they were 
nearly completed. To Major Prime, 
under General Grant's orders, belongs 
the credit of laying out and construct- 
ing the fortifications against which the 
enemy was now about to hurl his masses 
with impetuous but unavailing valor. 

The first pressure of the Confederates 
was felt by Colonel Oliver, who, as we 
have seen, was somewhat in advance on 
the Che walla road. It was the van- 
guard of the Confederate army, under 
Mansfield Lovell. Lovell pushes his 
men forward with such energy that 
Oliver finds his position one of consid- 
erable difficulty. Hard pressed, he is 
joined by General McArthur, who in 
turn finds himself overmatched and in 
danger of being outflanked. McAr- 
thur is strengthened by four regiments 
from McKean's division. In spite of 
this assistance, McArthur is pushed 
back, as Oliver had been before him. 
The battle now becomes general. Davis 
is hard pressed; and, an interval ap- 
pearing between him and McArthur, 
the Confederates make a desperate rush 
to fill up the gap. The onslaught was 
ti'emendous. Davis, to save his flank, 
was compelled to retire a thousand 
yards, and in so doing lost two guns. 
It was evident that the Confederates 
were in earnest, and that they meant 
to capture Corinth. New dispositions 
were therefore made of the National 



troops, bringing them nearer the town. 
These were being carried out when the 
darkness ended the conflict. The strug- 
gle had been severe ; and not a few 
brave men on the National side had 
fallen. General Oglesby was severely 
wounded ; and General Hackelman was 
killed. It was not without reason +Kat 
VanDorn was jubilant. He had pressed 
the National army back with compara 
tive ease. When night fell, he had en- 
veloped Rosecranz's front. If he tele- 
graphed to Richmond, announcing a 
victory, he was only stating what was 
a fact. Perhaps he was too jubilant, 
and too confident that Corinth ^vould 
be his before the rising of the sun on 
the following morning; but this was 
because he was ignorant of the strength 
of the works behind which the National 
forces were able to entrench themselves. 
By the break of day on the morning 
of the 4th of October, the battle octt 
was resumed. The Confederate *• 
line was closed up to ^vithin a thousand 
yards of the outer works which guarded 
the town. The night had not been 
spent by them in slumber ; for it was 
observed that they liad thrown up sev- 
ei-al batteries in front of the National 
line. Besides VanDorn, Price, and 
Lovell, there were present on the Con- 
federate side Generals Villepigue, Rust, 
Maury and L. Hebert; and the troops 
were of the best possible material. The 
Nationals had been equally on the alert. 
All the batteries around the town were 
well manned ; and a new one, called 
Fort Richardson, and mounting five 
guns, had been constructed by the sap 
pers and miners during the dark hours 



TEMPESTS OF IRON. 



169 



of the night. The ground which lay 
between the combatants was of a varied, 
irregular character. Hill and swampy- 
land alternated; and the whole was 
covered by forest trees and brushwood. 
On the north and west there were fields 
interspersing the woods ; in front of 
the i-ight centre, a swamp ; and in front 
of the left centre,- impracticable hills. 
The National left, held by Stanley's di- 
vision, was protected by Battery Rob- 
inett on the left and Battery Williams 
on the right. The centre was on a 
slight lidge, just north of the houses of 
Corinth, and consisted of Davies' divis- 
ion, slightly retired, with sharp-shooters 
in front, and having Battery Powell on 
the right. Hamilton's division was on 
the right, Avith Dillon's batteiy, ad- 
vanced beyond Davies, and having two 
regiments in rear of his left. 

The first shot was fired from one of 
the newly erected Confederate batte- 
ries, the one most in advance, and dis- 
tant only from Battery Robinett some 
two hundred yards. This was the open- 
ing of the fight. The shells fell in the 
streets of Corinth, producing the wild- 
est consternation amonij the inhabitants. 
For a time this batteiy was unanswered. 
It was not until daylight when Captain 
Williams, of Battery Williams, opened 
his 2()-pounder Parrott guns upon it, 
silencing it in three minutes. Clearly 
it was the intention of the Confederate 
commander to attract the attention of 
tlie Nationals by tliis cannonading ; and, 
by keeping them employed in this di- 
rection, to give Lovell an opportunity 
to storm the works on their left. The 
silencing of this advanced battery ne- 



cessitated a change of plan. There was, 
however, no delay. Shortly after nine 
o'clock. Price came down on Rosecranz's 
centre with tremendous force. Moving 
in heavy masses, and marching rapidly 
along the Bolivar road, tlie Confederates 
came up in wedge-like form, and fell 
fiercely upon Davies and Fort PowelL 
Never was advancing column more 
warmly received. The road was swept 
by a direct, cross and enfilading fii-e. 
As the column advanced, it was literal- 
ly torn through and through. At each 
successive volley, huge gaps appeared 
in the ranks. The men were mowed 
down like grass. There had been no 
such destruction of human life since the 
commencement of the war. It put into 
the shade the massacre at Ball's Bluff 
and the Valley of the Shadow of Death 
at Pittsbiu'g Landing. Undismayed by 
this storm of grape and canister, which 
covered the ground with the bodies of 
their comi'ades, the Confederates pressed 
gallantly on. An eye-witness of thia 
attack has told us that they " came up 
bending their necks downward, and 
with th^ir faces averted, like men striv- 
ing to protect themselves against a 
driving storm of hail." Are they to 
win the day ? Davies' division yields ; 
and there is a temporary panic. On- 
ward push the brave Confederates, 
They capture Fort Powell ; and, in 
spite of the guns of Fort Richardson, 
they penetrate to the public square and 
make themselves masters of tlie head- 
quarters of Rosecranz. In a better 
cause, such bravery ought to have been 
rewarded with victory. As it was, the 
triumph was short-lived, Rosecranz, see- 



1«6 



lUKA AND COEINTH. 



ing the panic which had seized Davies' 
men, ruslied into the midst of the wa- 
vering battalions ; and, what with en- 
treaty and threats and the flat of his 
sabre, he succeeded in restoring order. 
" The ragged head of the column " 
which had forced its way into the town, 
was assailed by a section of Immel's 
batteiy, supported by the Tenth Ohio 
and the Fifth Minnesota, and driven to- 
ward the forest. Fort Powell was re- 
taken by a splendid charge of the Fifty- 
Sixth Illinois. Meanwhile, the guns of 
Hamilton, who had fallen back with 
Davies, being in full command of the 
avenues of. advance and retreat, were 
spreading death and destruction in the 
Confedei'ate ranks. What for a mo- 
ment seemed a victory was now con- 
verted into a rout. Price's men Avere 
driven back at all points. In the wild- 
est confusion, they fled to the shelter of 
the woods, the victorious Nationals 
closely pursuing. Price's attack thus 
jiroved a complete failure. 

The attack on the left was conducted 
by VanDorn in person. It was intended 
that the attack on the right and that on 
the left should be made at the same 
moment. VanDorn, however, was de- 
layed by the difliculties of the grotmd; 
and Price had been engaged some twen- 
ty minutes before he was able to bring 
his men into action. Arranging his 
regiments in four columns, and placing 
his heavy artillery in the rear, VanDorn 
marched forward under the fire of the 
guns of the two forts, Robinett and 
Williams. From the moment they came 
in sight, they were mowed and torn and 
shattered by grape and shell and canis- 



ter. On, however, they moved, with 
an audacity which compelled the ad- 
miration of the National troops. Now 
were witnessed those " gorgeous pyro- 
technics," of which Rosecranz speaks in 
his official despatch, and the description 
of which he leaves "to pens dipped in 
poetic ink." Never in the history of 
warlike movements was there exhibited 
cooler determination or greater bravery 
on the part of the rank and file. On 
they move, in spite of the tempest of 
iron. It seems as if nothing will hinder 
them. They are now within fifty yards 
of Fort Robinett. Suddenly the Ohio 
brigade, which has been lying flat, rises 
at a signal and pours so murderous n 
fire upon the advancing columns that 
they stagger, break, and fall back into 
the woods. The battle, however, is not 
yet ended. The Confederates re-fonn ; 
and again, as if convinced that a more 
daiing effort will give them the victory, 
they come up gallantly to the charge, 
led by Colonel Rogers, of the Second 
Texas. This time they succeed in reach- 
ing the ditch. Rogers, revolver in hand, 
has leaped the ditch and scaled the par- 
apet. At this moment the Ohio bri- 
gade, again springing up, pours its mur- 
derous volleys upon the assailants. The 
efPect was terrific. Rogers, with five 
equally brave companions, falls inside 
the fort. The word " charge " is given 
by the National biigade commander. 
Taken up and repeated by the men, 
it rings loud above the din of battle ; 
and the Eleventh Missouri and the 
Twenty-Seventh Ohio rush bounding 
over the parapet, and, after a severe 
hand to hand fight with the assailants. 



BATTLE OP THE HATCHIS. 



167 



chase "their broken fragments back to 
the woods.'' By noon the battle was 
ended. It was, beyond all question, 
one of the bloodiest contests since the 
commencement of the war. On both 
sides the greatest bravery was exhib- 
ited ; and although the Nationals were 
victorious, they had little cause to dis- 
esteem the prowess of their opponents. 
On the morning of the 5th, the men 
Oct. having been allowed to rest for 
5> the night, the pursuit of the Con- 
federate army was begun. It was con- 
tinued for forty miles by the infantry, 
and for sixty miles by the cavalry. 
During the coiu-se of that day, a severe 
engagement took place between a body 
of the Nationals and a detachment of 
Confederates who had been sent to 
guard the crossing of the Hatchie. In 
this engagement, which is known as the 
battle of the Hatchie, the Confederates 
had a largely superior force ; but they 
were broken in spirit, battle-worn and 
weary, and made, in consequence, but 
a poor resistance. Driven back across 
the river toward Corinth, they were 
compelled to make a wide circuit, and 
recross the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, six 
miles above. In their retreat they left 
behind them two guns ; and three hun- 
dred of their men were made prisoners. 
The glory of this \actory must be di- 
vided between Hurlbut and Ord, who 
in succession held the chief command. 
In the course of the sti-uggle Ord 
was severely wounded, and Hurlbut 
resumed the command, which he had 
relinquished in the early part of the 
day, on the arrival of his superit)r. At 
Ripley, whither the great body of the 



National army had pursued the retreat- 
ing Confederates, the pursuit was dis- 
continued. Grant deemino; it advisable 
not to advance further for the present. 
Eosecranz was j ustly proud of the vic- 
tory which he had Avon ; and it was 
only a just reward for the services 
which he had rendered at luka and Co- 
rinth, when, a few days after his return, 
he was promoted to the chief command 
of the army of the Ohio, now called the 
army of the Cumberland, thus super- 
seding Buell. In an order issued to 
his troops on the 24tli of Octo- oct, 
ber, Rosecranz said : " The enemy 24. 
numbered, according to their own au- 
thorities, nearly 40,000 men — almost 
double your own numbers. You fought 
them in the position we desired on the 
3d, punishing them teixibly; and on 
the 4th, in three hours after the infantry 
entered into action, they were beaten. 
You killed and buried one thousand 
four hundred and twenty-four officers 
and men. Their wounded, at the usual 
rate, must exceed five thousand. You 
took two thousand two hundred and 
sixty-eight prisoners, among whom were 
one hundred and thirty-seven field offi- 
cers, captains, and subalterns, represent- 
ing fifty-three regiments of infantry, 
sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen ^^ 
batteries of artillery, and seven battal- 
ions, making sixty-nine regiments, thir- 
teen batteries, seven l)attalions, besides 
several companies. You captured three 
thousand three hinidred and fifty stand 
of small arms, fourteen stand of coloi-s, 
two pieces of artillery, and a large quan- 
tity of equipments. You pursued hia 
retreating columns forty miles in iofce 



IS8 



lUKA AND COEINTH. 



with infantry, and sixty miles with cav- 
alry. " 

The entire National loss, including, 
of course, luka and Corinth, was 315 
killed, 1812 wounded, and 232 prison- 
ers and missing. 

General Grant, although he had some 
reason to complain that the array of 
VanDorn had not been completely de- 
stroyed, had just cause to be gratified 
with these fresh successes. His plans 
had worked admii'ably. His calcula- 
tions had been perfect. It was a piece 
of great daring, and, in other hands, 
would have implied tremendous risks, 
to march first on luka to whip Price, 
and then to find time to return to Co- 
rinth to demolish VanDorn. His suc- 
cess must have strengthened his faith 
in his own judgment. It certainly con- 
vinced the authorities at Washington 
and the people at large that in Grant 
the National cause had found a defender 
whose ability was equal to his daring, 
au' I whose judgment was thoroughly to 
hi trusted. His abilities did not find 
full scope, nor did he get credit for 
what he actually accomplished, so long 
as TIalleck held the chief command. 
Now that he was free to act on his own 
responsibility, the true character of the 
man revealed itself ; and it began to be 
•een that it was to General Grant, more 



than to any other man, that the nation 
was indebted for that series of brilliant 
victories which, begun at Forts Henry 
and Donelson, had swept the Confede- 
rates out of Kentuck)' and Tennessee. 
Too much praise can hardly be bestowed 
on General Rosecranz; nor can it be 
denied that Ord did well according to 
his limited opportunity. Price and Van- 
Dorn revealed all the qualities of brave 
and dashing generalship ; but there was 
a visible absence from the management 
of the Confederate troops of that cool 
and calculating head which du'ected the 
movements of the Nationals. 

By a general order of the 16th of 
October, the department of which Q^t, 
General Grant had command was I^ 
largely extended and named the Depart- 
ment of the Tennessee, with the head- 
quarters at Jackson. The Confederates 
having been again repulsed, and the 
com'se so far cleared, Gi'ant began to 
make vigorous preparations for the car- 
lying out of the original intention of the 
campaign inaugurated at Donelson, but 
Ijrought into temporary abeyance by 
the abstraction of so many of his troops. 
Vicksbui'g I'emained the chief obstacle 
to the free navigation of the Missis- 
sippi; and to the reduction of Vicks- 
burg all the energies of Grant were 
now directed- 



KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE. 



169 



CHAPTER XII. 



rhe Army of the Ohio. — Buell Sent to Chattanooga. — Vicksbnrg. — Delay in Marching on. — The Reason. — Con. 
federate Boldness. — The Invasion of Maryland and Kentucky. — General Bragg. — Kirby Smith. — Cumlierlancl 
Gap. — Smith's Eaid through Kentucky. ^Excitement in Ohio. — The Importance of Chattanooga. — The Kaca 
for Chattanooga. — Bragg Wins. — Bragg's Army. — Buell Follows Bragg. — Intercepted Despatches. — Buell 
First at Louisville. — Reinforcements from Grant.— Buell 's Blunder. ^Relieved of His Command. — The Order 
Recalled. — Bragg's Proclamation. — The Confederate Committee on Foreign Affairs. — A Bribe to the North- 
west. — Attempt to Inaugurate a Confederate Government in Kentucky. — A Political Failure but a Successful 
Raid. — Bragg's Retreat with His Booty. ^BueU Pursues. — Concentration at Perryville. — Scarcity of Water.— 
Preparing for Battle. — Bragg Preparing to Retreat. — He Resolves to give Battle. —The Battle of Perryville 
Commenced. — Severe Fighting. — Colonel McCook Sorely Pressed. — Reinforced. — The Confederates Pressed 
Back into the Woods. — Major-General McCook Comes Up. — He Takes Position. — Advance of Rousseau. — 
Chaplin's Creek. — A Commanding Position. — General McCook Surprised. — A Terrific Blow Dealt by the Con- 
federates. — Death of Jackson. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Terrill Mortally Wounded. — Rousseau also Falls 
Back. — Mitchell and Sheridan. — Sheridan's Opportunity. — Terrific Slaughter. — Reinforcements Wanted. — 
Crittenden Ordered Forward. — The Battle of Perryville Ended. — Retreat of Bragg. — Bragg and Buell both 
Blamed. — Buell Removed. — Rosecranz takes His Place. — His Promptitude. — Preparations for another Strug- 
gle. — Murfreesboro'. — Rejoicings at Bragg's Headquarters. — Bragg Over-Confident. — Trying to Annoy Grant. — 
Rosecianz Moves Southward. — The Battle-Ground. — Stone River.- The Two Armies in Position. — Bragg's 
Army the Stronger. — Rosecranz's Plan of Attack.- Bragg's Plan. — The Battle Begun. — A Terrific Onslaught. — 
A Temporary Defeat. — Plan of Battle Changed. — Critical Position of Sheridan. — Terrible Loss of Life. — 
Sheridan Exhausted. ^Negley and Thomas. — The Battle all but Lost. — Hazen and His Brigade. — Rosecranz's 
new Arrangements Completed — A Tempest of "Double-Shotted Iron Fire." — The Tide of Battle Turned. — 
Stubbornness of the Confederates. — Rosecranz in the Front. — ' ' Forward Now. " — Darkness. — A Drawn Battle. — • 
Burying the Dead. — The Battle Resumed on the Third of January. — The Confederates Driven Back. — Terriblt 
Havoc. — Rosecranz in Murfreesboro'. — A Great National Victory. — Rosecranz Complimented. 



On the lOtli of June, as we have seen 
in a previous chapter, General 
Buell, at the head of his old army 
— the army of the Ohio — was ordered 
by General Halleek to move towards 
Cha'ttanooga. This was almost imme- 
diately after the retirement of Beaure- 
gard fi'om Corinth and the oceupation 
of the same by the National troops. 

What was it that rendered necessary 
this breaking up of the army of the 
West at this particular junctiu'e ? In a 
space of time which hardly justified the 
result, that army had marched from 
Henry to Donelson, from Donelson to 
Shiloh, from Shiloh to Corinth, had 



opened the Mississippi as far south a? 
Memphis, and had swept the Confede 
rates out of Kentucky and Tennessee. 
Farragut had already pushed his way 
beyond New Orleans ; and that city 
had been restored to the Union. At 
the time that the victorious army was 
divided, and Buell with his forces was 
sent towards Chattanooga, it seemed to 
be the plain duty of Halleek to nioT« 
southward and capture Vicksburg, the 
one remaining barrier of any conse- 
quence to the free and unrestricted navi. 
gation of the great river from St Louis 
to the sea. Moreover, the capture of 
Vicksburg formed part of that grand 



170 



PERRYVILLE AND MURFRBESBORO'. 



plan which was inaugurated at Fort? 
Henry and Donelson. There must have 
been good and substantial reasons why 
this plan was not followed out — why 
what seemed a plain duty was not per- 
formed. What were those reasons ? 

To answer this question, it will be 
Qecessary for us to take a brief retro- 
spect of the situation. It deserves here 
to be noted that the successes of Hal- 
leck, Grant and Buell in the West had 
been more than counterbalanced by the 
victories of the Confederates in the 
East. The government at Richmond had 
made tremendous efforts to strengthen 
their armies ; and conscription had suc- 
cessfully accomplished their purpose. 
McClellan, as we shall see more fully 
in the next chapter, had been driven 
back from Richmond ; and his peninsu- 
lar campaign had totally failed. Noth- 
ing daunted by the succession of defeats 
sustained in the West, it was resolved 
by the Confederate authorities to give 
effect to the clamor of the South, " to 
carry war into the enemy's country, 
and relieve us from its intolerable bur- 
dens." With this end in view, Lee was 
directed to move into Maryland ; and 
Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard 
in command, was ordered into Ken- 
tucky. It was believed that these slave- 
holding States would be easily reelaim- 
?d, and that from them it would be 
■iasj to invade the North, and wring 
peace from it in one or other of the 
nrreat cities. Of Lee and his movements 
we shall have occasion to treat in a sub- 
sequent chapter. Our attention for the 
present must be given to Bragg, and to 
the events which wei'e taking place, 



or were about to take place, in Ken- 
tucky. 

The southward movement of the Na- 
tional forces, and their concentration for 
a time at Shiloh and Corinth, had left 
Kentucky and Tennessee to a large ex- 
tent unprotected. Taking advantage of 
this, Morgan, Forrest, and other guerilla 
chiefs, had overrun those States, produc- 
ing terror and dismay among the inhab- 
itants and working tenible destructior ,. 
The successful raids by those band . '■ 
greatly encouraged the Confederates in 
their determination to make bold and ag- 
gressive efforts in the North ; and Gene- 
ral Kirby Smith, an officer who, the read- 
er will remember, played an imjjortant 
part at the first battle of Bull Run, con- 
trived to unite those iri'egular bands, 
and make use of their experience in fur- 
thering the plans of the Confederate 
government. At the head of these men, 
as the advanced guard of Bi'agg's army, 
this general marched thiough Rogers' 
and Big Creek Gaps of the Cumberland 
Mountains into Kentucky. At Rich- 
mond, in this State, he encountered a 
body of Unionists under the command 
of Major-Geueral Nelson, and defeated 
them, two thousand of the Union troops 
being captured and two hundred killed 
and wounded. Among the latter was 
General Nelson himself. After their 
success at Richmond, they found little 
opposition at Lexington, at Frankfort, 
at Shelbyville, at Paris, and at Cynthi- 
ana. It was not long until they were, 
on the banks of the Ohio. The people 
of that State became wild with excite- 
ment; and the citizens of Cincinnati 
made vii):orous efforts to be in readiness 



CHATTANOOGA. 



171 



for the daring invader. When within 
one day's march of the city, Kirby Smith, 
Sep. on the 12th of September, fell 

'■^' back on Frantfort and Lexina- 
ton. Later, liaving been reinforced by 
troops from South^\'estern Virginia, un- 
der Humphrey Marshall, he manoeuvred 
so as to accom])lisn his original purpose, 
which was to effect a junction with 
Bragg. 

Chattanooga, the citadel of the moun- 
tain fastness of Tennessee, and the jyoint 
iVappui for operations towards Atlanta, 
was justly regarded by Halleck as a 
strategic point of the first importance. 
Chattanooga held by a strong National 
force, it would be impossible for the 
Confederates to make any very effective 
inroad into Kentucky. But the import- 
ance of Chattanooga for certain pur- 
poses was as Avell known to Bragg as 
it was to Buell. It was the object of 
the Nationals to possess themselves of 
Chattanooga, and so prevent such in- 
vasion. It was the object of the Con- 
federates to enter Kentucky in force 
before Chattanooga was in the hands of 
their enemies. Hence Chattanoofca was 
so far the objective point of both com- 
manders. The National commander de- 
sired to take advantage of the concen- 
tration of the Confederate forces on the 
Mississippi line by seizing Chattanooga; 
the Confederate commander desired to 
take advantage of the concentration of 
National forces on the same line by an 
June advance towards the Ohio. On 

"• the 1 1 til of June Buell commenced 
his march from Coi'inth. Following the 
route prescribed by Halleck, which 
was the direct route through North 



Alabama, by way of the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad, the divisions 
moved forward in close succession by 
marches of fourteen miles a day. The 
distance from Corinth to Chattanooga 
by this railroad is two hundred miles. 
When joined by Mitchell, whom he had 
left behind him to guard Middle Ten- 
nessee, and General Morgan, who had 
seized Cumberland Gap, Buell had un- 
der him some forty thousand men. Cau- 
tiously and carefully providing for all 
contingencies by the way, he had by 
the end of July thrown forward two 
divisions, under McCook and Critten- 
den, to Battle Creek, some twenty-five 
miles from Chattanooga; and all pre- 
j^arations for an advance on the latter 
place were complete. 

Bragg, however, had reached Cha*-- 
tanooga in person on the 28th of jg!« 
July ; his troops wei'e ali-eady 2S, 
well in hand ; and, what with the so- 
called army of East Tennessee, number- 
ing thirteen thousand men, and which, 
under the command of Kirby Smith, 
covered his right at Knoxville, he could 
count on an effective force, for immedi- 
ate use, of fifty thousand men. Bragg's 
army was organized in three corps — 
one under Kirby Smith, as we have 
seen, at Knoxville, and the two others, 
under Hardee aijd Polk, at Chatta- 
nooga. With the two latter, Bragg 
moved northward, directing his nuurli 
towards the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad. Forestalled in the occupation 
of Chattanooga, Buell was dependent 
upon Louisville foi- supplies, and hence 
had to guard nearly three hundred miles 
of railroad. As Bragg inarched north- 



172 



PEREYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO' 



ward, he had no choice but execute a 
parallel march and fall back upon Nash- 
ville. Bragg, who had struck the rail- 
road at Mumfordsville, moved thence 
to Fi'ankfort, whei-e he was joined by 
Smith. Buell had by this time dis- 
covered, thi'ougli some intercepted de- 
spatches, that their true object was 
Louisville, and not Nashville, as their 
movements seemed to indicate. Leav- 
ing a garrison at the latter place, he 
hurried on to Louisville, which he 
Sep, reached on the 2.5th of Septem- 
2''»' ber. Bragg's movements had been 
slow. It had taken him six weeks to 
march from Chattanooga to Frankfort. 
Slow, however, as his march had been, 
he would certainly have been first at 
Louisville, had it not been for a burnt 
bridge near Bardstown, which obstruct- 
ed his progress and caused considerable 
letention. As it was, Louisville was 
secure. The arrival of Buell was an 
immense relief to the panic-stricken cit- 
izens, who had become aware of the 
near approach of the Confederates. 

At Louisville Buell received large 
reinforcements. Some of these were in 
the shape of new levies ; but not a few 
of them were veterans, sent up the Mis- 
sissippi and the Ohio from the army of 
Grant. His entire force, after he had 
been joined by General Nelson, was 
estimated at about one hundred thou- 
sand men. The National force thus 
greatly outnumbered the Confederate 
force, which, including that of Kirby 
Smith, did not exceed sixty-five thou- 
sand men. Buell had conducted the 
retrograde movement from the Tennes- 
see to the Ohio with marked ability; 



he was entitled to no little praise for 
anticipating Bragg at Louisville ; but 
he had made a grand mistake in not 
being first at Chattanooga. He had 
allowed the enemy to invade Kentucky 
by not being forward in time at that 
strategic point ; and considering the ir- 
j'itable mood in which the Northern 
mind was at the moment, it is not won- 
derful that the cry of incapacity was 
loudly raised, and a demand made for 
his recall. This feeling being yielded to, 
Buell, just as he had got his army in 
order and was about to march from 
Louisville against the Confederates, re- 
ceived from Washington an order reliev- 
ing him of his command, and appointing 
General G. H. Thomas to act in his 
stead. Thomas, who had the highest 
respect for the military talent of Buell, 
refused to supersede him. At Thomas's 
urgent request, the order was revoked 
and Buell remained in command. 

Bragg, meanwhile, had commenced 
to carry out his instructions in regard 
to the organization of Kentucky on 
Confederate principles. On the gep, 
18th of September he issued a i^' 
proclamation from Glasgow, declaiinj: 
that the Confederate army had come its 
the liberators of Kentuckians "from tlic 
tyranny of a despotic ruler, and not as 
conquerors or despoilers." " Your gal- 
lant Buckner," he said, "leads; Mar- 
shall is on the right; while Breckin- 
ridge, dear to us as you, is advancing 
with Kentucky's radiant sons to receive 
the honor and applause due to their 
heroism." He told them that he must 
have supplies for his army, but that they 
would be fairly paid for. " Kentuck 



CONFEDERATE CONCILIATION. 



!;» 



ians," he concluded, " we have come 
with joyful hopes. Let us not depart 
in sorrow, as we shall if we find you 
wedded in your choice to your present 
lot. If you prefer Federal rule, show 
it by your frowns, and we shall retire 
whence we came. If you choose rather 
to come within the folds of oiu' brother- 
hood, then cheer us by the smiles of 
your women, and lend your willing 
hands to secure yourselves in your her- 
itage of liberty. "Women of Kentucky ! 
your persecutions and heroic bearing 
have reached our ears. Banish hence- 
forth forever from your minds the fear 
of loathsome prisons or insulting visit- 
ations. Let your enthusiasm have free 
rein. Buckle on the armor of your kin- 
di'ed, your husbands, sons and brothers, 
and scoff to shame him who would prove 
recreant in his duty to you, his country, 
and his God." Bragg was giving ex- 
pression to sentiments then common at 
Richmond. It was evidently his opin- 
ion that the dominant feeling was in 
favor of the South, and that the Ken- 
tuckians would gladly welcome his ap- 
pearance as that of a friend and lib- 
erator. It would be absurd to deny 
that there were among these people 
many who s}^npathized warmly with 
the Southern cause. But they were not 
the majority, nor were they as a rule 
tlie better class of citizens. Kentucky 
had fairly and squarely cast in her lot 
with the North, and she was not to be 
shaken in her purpose or tempted from 
the path of duty. At this juncture 
the Confederates, elated wath their suc- 
cesses in the East, began to indulge in 
the wildest day tbeams. It was not 



Kentucky or Tennessee alone that 
would gladly join and make common 
cause with the South. Why sliould 
not the Northwestern States do the 
same? Duty and interest alike pointed 
them in that direction. On the same 
day that Bragg issued his proclamation, 
the Committee on Foreign Affaii-s made 
a repoi't to the Confederate Congress 
with respect to the propriety of a pro- 
clamation with a view to influence the 
States of the Northwest. In the free 
navigation of the Mississippi and its 
tributaries, the Northwest and the 
South had a common interest. As a 
reward for the alliance of these North- 
western States, the Hichmond authori- 
ties were willing to cede the free navi- 
gation of the Mississippi and to open 
to them the markets of the South. The 
NorthAvest, however, equally with Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee, had decided upon 
their course of duty, and had such a 
proclamation been issued, the sturdy 
men of the West might have been 
justified in reminding their generous 
friends that the oAvnership of the Mis- 
sissippi and its tributaries was no longer 
an open question. Still further, in car. 
rying out the instructions he had re- 
ceived, Bragg, while with Kirby Oct. 
Smith, at Frankfoi-t, inaugurated !• 
on the 4th of Octobei', a provisional 
governor of the State of Kentucky. 

The Confederate commander, howev. 
er, had made good use of his time and 
opportunities for other purposes as 
well. His guerrillas and foraging par- 
ties had scoured the country round and 
round, and had carried off thousands of 
hogs and cattle, with bacon and bread 



i:4: 



PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 



stuffs of every kind. In every town the 
shops and stores were forced open, and 
whatever was wanted Avas taken and 
paid for in worthless Confederate mo- 
ney. A little later than this, when the 
Confederates were driven out of the 
State, the boast was made by the Rich- 
mond newspapers that " the wagon train 
of supplies brought out of Kentucky 
by Kirby Smith was forty miles long. 
It brought a million yards of jeans, 
with a large amount of clothing, boots 
and shoes, and two hundred wagon- 
loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of 
pork, fifteen hundred mules and horses, 
eight thousand beeves, and a large lot 
of smne." It ought to be added here 
that his tender feelings towards the un- 
fortunate Kentuckians did not prevent 
him from enforcing the Confederate 
conscription act wherever his influence 
extended, and thus largely increasing 
the effective strength of his army. 

Anticipated in the occupation of Lou- 
isville, and feeling convinced that he Avas 
already defeated in the main purpose of 
his campaign, Bragg prepared to retreat 
and to protect the large booty which 
he had collected. It was certainly the 
next most important thing for him to 
do in the premises. He moved back- 
ward with great deliberation, his object 
being to cover his supply trains until 
they got a good start toward Tennessee. 
QcU On the 1st of October, Buell, his 
'• army reinforced and reorganized, 
moved out of Louisville in pursuit of 
his antagonist. His army was arranged 
in three corps, commanded respectively 
by Generals Gilbert, Crittenden, and 
McCook. General George H. Thomas, 



who was Buell's second in command, 
had charge of the right wing. It was 
known that Bragg was at Bardstown. 
Towards Bardstown, therefore, Buell 
directed his divisions. Crittenden, who 
was in immediate command of the right, 
marched by way of Shepherdsville. The 
left moved in a line nearer to Frankfort. 
The other columns, marching by differ- 
ent I'outes, fell respectively into the 
roads leading from Mt. Washington, 
Fail-field and Bloomfield to Bardstown. 
Arrived at Bardstown, it AA'as found 
that Bragg had retired some eight hours 
before, and that he had moved in a di- 
rection which suggested that he would 
probably concentrate at Harrodsbui'g. 
After leaving Bardstown, Buell learned 
that the force of Kii'by Smith had 
crossed to the west side of the Kentucky- 
River, and that the enemy was moving 
to concentrate either at Harrodsburg or 
Perryville. The centre, under Gilbert, 
was accordingly ordered to march on 
PeiTyville, where it arrived late on the 
afternoon of the 7th, finding the Oct. 
Confederates apparently assem- ?• 
bled in strength, BuelJ^ and his staff 
moved with this corps. " The advanced 
guard," General Buell tells us in h'.s 
report, " under Captain Gay, consisting 
of cavalry and artillery, supported to- 
wards evening by two regiments of in- 
fantry, pressed successfully upon the 
enemy's rearguard to within two miles 
of the town, against a somewhat stu1)- 
born opj^osition." The National army 
had suffered greatly, for the three pre- 
vious days, from the scarcity of water. 
In the bed of Doctor's Creek, a tribu- 
tary of Chaplin River, about two and a 



JACKSON KILLED. 



m 



half miles from Perryvilk-, some pools 
of water were found ; and the thirty- 
sixth brigade, from General Sheridan's 
division, iinder Colonel D. McCook, 
was ordered to seize and hold a com- 
manding position which covered these 
pools. The order was promptly exe- 
cuted ; and a supply of bad water, al- 
though the best that could be had, was 
obtained for the wants of the army. 
Determined to offer battle early on the 
following morning, Buell sent orders to 
General McCook and General Critten- 
den to march at three o'clock in the 
morning, so as to close up on his right 
and left, and, if possible, surround the 
foe. 

McCook did not receive his orders 
antil half-past two o'clock, and he 
marched at five. Crittenden, failing to 
find water, had gone off his path some 
six or seven miles ; and he was late, 
in consequence, several hours. Bragg 
had already seen the peril of his posi- 
tion, and had commenced to retreat. 
Perceiving, however, that the centre 
onder Gilbert and McCook had out- 
marched Crittenden, he resolved to give 
battle at once. It was, at least, worth 
making the effort. If he could defeat 
Gilbert and McCook before the arrival 
of Crittenden, he might be able either 
to make good his retreat in the interval, 
or failing that, he could fall upon him 
in tui'n. Bi'agg's army was arranged in 
five divisions — two under Hardee, and 
one each under Anderson, Cheatham, 
and Buckner — the whole being under 
the immediate command of Major-Gen- 
eral Polk. Smith had already retreated 
further to the west, carrying with him 



the "provisional government," in the 
person of Governor Hawes. 

Early in the morning of the 8th, the 
fight, which had been interrupted Oct, 
by the darkness of the night pre- **• 
ceding, was resumed. Colonel McCook. 
as we have seen, had taken a position 
on a height which commanded Doctor's 
Creek ; and this secured a supply of 
water, such as it was, for the National 
army. At the break of day an attempt 
was made to draw Colonel McCook 
from his position. For a time he had 
to bear the whole weight of the Con- 
federate attack alone. When being: 
somewhat pressed, the Second Missouri, 
a regiment which did memorable service 
at Pea Ridge, with the Fifteenth Mis- 
souri as a support, came to his aid, and 
the Confederates were compelled to re- 
tire into the woods. WJiile retirino- 
they were heavily smitten on the flank 
by the Second Minnesota battery. 

Buell, who, as we have seen, was with 
the central corps, under the immediate 
charge of General Gilbert, dreaded an 
attack on that body, all the more so 
that neither McCook nor Crittenden 
had yet arrived. The engagement with 
Colonel MeCook's brigade at Doctor's 
Creek had, to all appearance, sufficiently 
engaged the attention of the Confede- 
rate chief ; and between ten and eleven 
o'clock, when Colonel McCoctk had re- 
pelled the enemy and fii'ndy established 
himself, the first corps, under Major- 
General McCook, came up on the Max- 
ville road. After the arrival of thin 
corps, no formidable attack was appre- 
hended. McCook was ordered to get 
promptly into position on the left o! 



176 



PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESRORO'. 



tlie centre coips, and to make a recon- 
noissance to his front and left. The 
reconnoissance was still being continued 
by Captain Gay toward his front and 
right, and shai-]) firing with artillery 
was going on. 

The head of McCook's column reached 
the point des<iguated shortly after ten 
o'clock. It Avas about tlu'ee and a half 
miles from Perryville, his line being 
abreast of Gilbert's corps. Only two 
of McCook's three divisions — those, 
namely, of Rousseau and Jackson — 
were present, that of Sill having been 
sent toward Frankfort. Rousseau ad- 
vanced with his cavaliy, and secured his 
ground, and the batteries of Loomis and 
Simonson were placed in commanding 
positions. General Jackson's two bri- 
gades were stationed on high ground to 
the right of the Maxville and Peny ville 
Toad, and his instructions were to hold 
them there in column so that they might 
be easily moved in whatever direction 
the occasion might require. McCook 
was- under orders to report to General 
Buell in person. Having made these 
dispositions, he rode off to Buell's head- 
quarters. He was not long absent ; 
but v^hen he returned he found that the 
Confederates had put in position three 
batteries, and that an ineffectual artil- 
leiy duel was going on between them 
and the batteries of Loomis and Simon- 
son. Seeing no infantiy near, he gave 
instructions to the commanders of these 
last mentioned batteries to discontinue 
filing and to husband their ammunition. 
Water was extremely scarce, and his 
men were suffering terribly in conse- 
quence. Following out instructions re- 



ceived fpom Buell, McCook proceeded 
to make a reconnoissance toward Chap- 
lin's Creek. Here he found high com- 
manding gi'ound, altogether a better po- 
sition, and not far from the river. Hav- 
ing sent for Generals Jackson and 
Terrill, he showed them the water, 
marked their line of battle, and ordered ] 
a battery to be posted on this line, with 
strong suppoi-ts. Terrill at the same 
time received instructions to advance a 
body of skirmishers cautiously down 
the slope of the hill to the water, as 
soon as his line was formed. Not ap- 
prehending any immediate danger at 
this point. General McCook now moved 
toward the right of his line. At this 
very moment the Confederate force was 
moving stealthily upon him. Cheat- 
ham's division had stolen up to Jack- 
son's left, which was under the imme- 
diate command of General Terrill, and 
which consisted chiefly of raw ti'oops. 
McCook had scarcely completed his 
general arrangements, when the enemy 
fell upon him like a thunderbolt. The 
Confederate general had made himself 
familiar with the position of his antago- 
nist. McCook's right rested firmly on 
Gilbert's left ; but his left was compara- 
tively weak and altogether unprotected. 
It was on the left, therefore, that the 
Confederates fell with the greatest fury. 
Their charge was terrific ; and their 
horrid yells filled the air. At the first 
volley Jackson was killed, a bullet or 
a fragment of a shell having hit him 
in the breast. Terrill, who showed 
great bravery, did everything that man 
could do to steady his troops ; but, de- 
moralized by the fall of Jackson, and 



CHAPLIN'S HILLS. 



177 



being vastly outnumbered, they broke 
and fled in the wildest confusion. Ter- 
rill himself fell mortally wounded. He 
died the same evening. McCook's left 
was thus driven back, and the Confede- 
rates fell with equal fury on Rousseau's 
division. Starkweather's brigade, aided 
by the batteries of Bush and Stone, 
made a gallant resistance, and held the 
enemy at bay for nearly thi'ee hours. 
It was found impossible, however, to 
repel the fierce and determined attack. 
Bush's battery had lost thirty- five 
horses ; the ammunition of both infant- 
ry and artillery was all but exhausted ; 
and Rousseau's left was compelled to 
fall back. On the Confederates pi'essed, 
Rousseau's centre and right, commanded 
respectively by Colonels L. A. Harris 
and W. H. Lytle, yielding in succession. 
[n the struggle, Lytle was seriously 
wounded, and, believing his wound to 
be mortal, refused to allow himself to 
be carried from the field. Gilbert's 
left flank was now exposed, and Bragg 
was leading the attack in person. The 
situation had become critical in the ex- 
treme. The position here was held by 
R. P. Mitchell and Philip H. Sheridan. 
Sheridan had now a chance to show the 
metal of which he was made. He held 
the key of the National position, and 
he knew it. If he must relinquish the 
position, it will not be without a strug- 
gle. He had been more or less engaged 
all the foi'enoon, and had just repelled 
an assault on his front. Turning his 
guns upon the victorious Confederates, 
who had just thrown back Rousseau's 
right, he opened upon them a most ter- 
rific fire, which checked their advance ; 



and while fighting valiantly and hold« 
ing the enemy back, he was joined by 
Carlin's brigade, which Mitchell pushed 
forward to the support of his right. 
This force, charging at the double quick, 
broke the line of the Confederates and 
drove them back through Perry ville, 
capturing two caissons, fifteen wagonn 
of ammunition, with the guard, which 
consisted of three officers and omi 
hundred and thirty-eight men. Mean 
while Colonel Gooding, who had been 
sent to the aid of McCook, liad for over 
two hours been fighting with great per- 
sistence against a superior force. He 
lost one third of his men ; and his horse 
having been shot under him, he was 
made prisoner. It was about four 
o'clock in the afternoon before General 
Buell became aware that a sevei'e Ijattle 
had been raging for hours. The fact 
was made known to him by General 
McCook's aide-de-camp, who came to 
him with a request for reinforcements. 
These were pi-omptly sent. Orders 
were also sent to General Crittenden 
to huriy forward, and with all expedi- 
tion possible, to seud one division to 
strengthen the centre, and " to move 
Avith the rest of his corps energetically 
against the enemy's left flank." Such, 
however, was the distance from one 
flank of the amiy to the other — six 
miles — that before the orders could be 
delivered, and action taken, night came 
on and terminated the battle. Such 
was the battle of Perryville, or, as it is 
sometimes called, Chaplin's Hills. 

All the necessary arrangements were 
made for resuming the contest early on 
the following morning. It was Buell's 



178 



PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 



expectation that the Confederate gen- 
eral would endeavor to hold his posi- 
tion. Orders, in consequ :!nce, were 
given to the commanders of corps to be 
prepai'ed to attack at daylight. Gilbert 
and Crittenden were to move forward 
at six o'clock and attack the Confed- 
erates^ on their front and also on theii' 
left flank. In obedience to orders these 
commanders moved early in the morn- 
ing; but Bragg, with his entire army, 
had fled. They retired first to Har- 
rodsburg, where they were joined by 
Kirby Smith and General Withers; 
thence they hurried to Camp Dick Rob- 
inson ; and from Camp Dick Robinson 
they hastened back to Chattanooga 
through Cumberland Gap. The retreat 
was conducted by General Polk, covered 
by the cavaliy of Wheeler. At Har- 
rodsburg they left behind them about 
twelve hundred sick and wounded. 
Buell pursued as far as London, and 
then returned. During the pursuit the 
Confederates were compelled to aban- 
don at various points as much as twenty- 
five thousand barrels of pork. The 
Confederate loss in this engagement 
must have amounted to 2500. Buell's 
loss was 916 killed, 2943 wounded, 489 
missing, and 10 guns. Eight of the 
captured guns were left behind. 

The Confederates had been driven 
out of Kentucky ; Init they had re- 
treated with scarcely any loss, and they 
had carried off immense booty. The 
main body of the National army, under 
General Thomas, was moved towards 
Nashville. Buell went to Louisville. 
He had shown but little generalship 
in this campaign. His movements had 



been singularly and inexplicably slow. 
If he had been afraid or unwilling to 
fight, he could hardly have acted other- 
wise. He blundered, fiist of all, when 
he allowed Bragg to reach Chattanooga 
before him. He blundered again when, 
having reached Louisville before his an- 
tagonist, and been reinforced, he did 
not strike the Confederates at once, and 
before Kirby Smith had time to retire 
with his booty. He blundered in his 
ari-angements at Perry ville, where he 
ought to have cut Bragg's army to 
pieces. He blundered worst of all 
when, after Perryville, he allowed the 
enemy to escape. It is not wonderful 
that his conduct gave great dissatisfac- 
tion at Washington, and that he was 
supplanted by General Rosecrauz, who 
had covered himself with so much glory 
at luka and Corinth. Rosecranz took 
command on the oUth of October ; ©ct. 
and the army of the Ohio became, ^®' 
from that date, the army of the Cum- 
berland. 

The Confederate government was as 
little satisfied with Bragg, as the gov- 
ernment at Washington was with Buell. 
His expedition had been a failure. He 
had, in reality, accomplished nothing. 
He had collected some valuable booty, 
it is true ; Ijut that was a small result 
from a campaign from which such gieat 
things were so confidently expected. 
He had gained no brilliant victory. He 
had failed to make any impression on 
the Northwest ; and but few Kentuck- 
ians had voluntarily joined his army. 
On the contrary, his seizure of their 
property had done more to alienate the 
people of Kentucky from the Confed«- 



CHRISTMAS REJOICINGS. 



179 



rate cause than anything which had 
hitherto happened. Bragg was not re- 
moved from his command, but he was 
ordered, almost as soon as he reached 
Chattanooga, to return and move again 
to the north. 

On assuming the command of the 
army of the Cumberland, known also 
as the fourteenth army corps, Rose- 
cranz found that the task he had under- 
taken, while it involved serious respon- 
sibilities, was beset with difficulties of 
no ordinary kind. The army was in a 
dilapidated condition. Its ranks had 
been thinned. The men had to be 
clothed and supplied with all the neces; 
saries for another campaign. This, 
however, was not all. The railroad 
between Louisville and Nashville was 
badly injured, and could not be used 
for transport ; and, as was the case on 
the occasion of Bragg's former march 
northward, the country was overrun by 
Confederate raiders, who, well mounted, 
»pread everywhere terror among the 
inhabitants, and otherwise worked infi- 
nite inconvenience. Rosecranz knew 
well the temper of the government and 
the people. Both were impatient to 
see his army in motion. Nothing could 
justify delay. Out of the war levy of 
six hundred thousand men called out 
by the government, he received rein- 
forcements ; and the work of reorganiz- 
Octt ation went rapidly on. It was on 
50. the 30th of October he assumed 
the command; and on the 7th of No- 
NoTt vember the advance corps of his 
'• army was at Nashville, one hun- 
dred and eighty-three miles distant. 
Nashville, which had been held by 



General Negley, and which for a time 
had been in great peril, had been re- 
lieved ; and here Rosecranz established 
his headquarters. The work on the 
raib'oad was carried on with great ener- 
gy ; and by the 26th of November iVof„ 
the connection Avas complete and 26. 
the cars were running. From this date 
on to the 26th of December, Rosecranz 
tells us, " every effort was Vjent to com- 
plete the clotliing of the army, to pro- 
vide it AA-ith ammunition, and replenish 
the depot at Nashville with needful 
supplies, to insure us against want from 
the longest possible detention likely to 
occur by the breaking of the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad ; and to insure 
this work, the road was guarded by a 
heavy force posted at Grallatin." All 
this looked like business. It revealed a 
man of energy and activity, and pre- 
sented Rosecranz in striking contrast 
with Buell. 

Bragg evidently expected that Rose- 
cranz would take up his winter quarters 
at Nashville ; and so he prepared his 
own winter quarters at Murfreesboro'. 
Possibly he hoped, as Rosecranz sug- 
gests, to make them at Nashville before 
the winter was ended. It was about 
the season of Christmas ; and there was 
evidently a feeling of security in the 
ranks of the Confederates. The Con- 
federate president, Jefferson Davis, was 
on a visit to Bragg at his private resi- 
dence in the fine mansion of Major 
Manning. The occasion v/as celebrat- 
ed with much festivity and rejoicing. 
There was a famous wedding. Mor- 
gan, the guerrilla chief, was married to 
the daughter of Mr. Charles Ready, 



180 



PEKRYVILLE AND MUEFREESBORO'. 



who had been a member of Congress 
in 1853. Davis was at the wedding. 
Most of the principal army officers were 
present. The ceremony was performed 
by General Polk, who put on the cas- 
sock for the occasion ; and the merry 
party found a means of increasing their 
pleasure by dancing upon a floor car- 
peted with American flags. 

During the time that Rosecranz was 
completing his arrangements, there oc- 
curred certain minor engagements, such 
as that at Lavergne and that at Harts- 
ville, but on these we cannot afford to 
dwell. They were but preliminaries to 
the great struggle which was now im- 
pending. Bragg, over-confident, had 
sent a large cavalry force into West 
Tennessee to annoy Grant, and another 
lai'ge force into Kentucky to break up 
the raib'oad. Evidently he had not 
foi'med a proper judgment on the man 
who was eagerly watching his every 
movement. In the absence of these 
forces, and now that he had abundant 
supplies in Nashville, the National com- 
mander deemed the moment opportune 
to make a dash ou his antagonist. Ear- 
Dec, ly in the morning of the 26th of 
26. December, and amid a heavy, 
chilling rain, the National army began 
it? southward march. The Confederate 
outposts yielded as it advanced. It 
was not possible for them, so vigorous 
was the pressure of the National ad- 
vance, to destroy the bridges on the 
Jeffeison and Mui'freesboro' turnpikes. 
Dec. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he 
3^« was about to be attacked, had 
concentrated his army some two miles 
'n front of Murf reesboro'. Stone River, 



which rises in the high lands south of 
Murfreesboro', flows towards the north- 
west, and passes that town about a 
mile to the west. A few miles above 
Nashville, it empties itself into the 
Cumberland. Bragg's army, some six- 
ty-two thousand strong, was arranged 
in the following order. Four divisions 
— those of Withers, Cheatham, Cle- 
burne, and McCown — were on the west 
side of the river, the line running slight- 
ly in a southwesterly direction. One 
division — that of Breckinridge — was on 
the east side of the river, and there held 
the approaches to the town. The Na- 
tional army, forty-three thousand strong, 
was arranged in a line as nearly as pos- 
sible parallel to that of Bragg, the en- 
tire force being on the west side of the 
river. The line extended between three 
and four miles. Crittenden was on the 
left, with three divisions — those of 
Wood, VanCleve, and Palmer. Thomas 
was in the centre, with two divisions- ~ 
those of Negley and Rousseau, the latter 
in reserve. McCook was on the right, 
with three divisions — those of Sheridan, 
Davis, and Johnson. The left wing 
touched the river; the right stretched 
a little beyond the Franklin road. Such 
was the disposition of the rival forces 
on the morning of the last day of the 
year 1862. 

It was the intention of Rosecranz to 
attack with his left ; and consequently 
he had concentrated two-thirds of his 
force on that wing. His plan was to 
throw his left and centre hurriedly on 
Breckinridge at daybreak, to drive him 
from his position, to wheel rapidly 
round and strike the Confederates in 



THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK. 



181 



front and flauk, and pressing through 
Murfreesboro' to cut off their line of 
retreat, and so destroy their army in 
detail. The plan was bold and daring, 
and well fitted to inspire sanguine hopes. 
On the east side of the river are com- 
manding heights. These taken posses- 
sion of and covered with artillery, the 
Nationals would be able to strike in re- 
verse the works fronting the centre of 
their line ; and it was expected that the 
artillery fire would so shake the Con- 
federates that the rest of the plan would 
be easy of execution. While Thomas 
and Palmerwere to open with skirmish- 
ing, and so engage the attention of the 
Confederate centre and left towards the 
river, VanCleve and Wood, of Critten- 
den's division, were to cross the river 
further to the north, fall upon Breckin- 
ridge, and cany out the plan as pro- 
posed. The necessity to cross the river 
was the one disadvantage which Rose- 
cranz liad to contend with. Meanwhile 
McCook, whose divisions, as we have 
seen, were on the right, was to maintain 
Ills position and hold the hostile left in 
rheck. 

Singularly enough, Bragg had also 
resolved to take the offensive ; and he, 
too, meant to deal the first effective 
blow with his strong left arm. There 
was thus on both sides a similar inten- 
tion and a not dissimilar disposition of 
force. Both were strongest on the left 
wing; and, as a natural consequence, 
each was weakest at the point of attack. 
It was Biagg's plan to rest on Polk's 
right, as on a pivot, and, by a constant 
wheeliniT of his whole line towards the 
light, to force the National right and 



centre back upon Stone River, and so 
make himself master of the turnpike 
and the railroad to Nashville, their 
lines of communication in the rear. 
The plan was not less daring — not less 
striking — than that of Rosecranz. It 
was evident that two capable generals 
were confronting each other, that each 
had found in the other a foeman worthy 
of his steel, and that each was mak- 
ing the best of his position and of the 
means at his command. On the night 
of the 30th both armies lay on their 
arms. 

On the following morning, before sun- 
rise — a mild and pleasant morn- Dec, 
ing for the season of the year — 31. 
the National movement began. Van- 
Cleve's division took the lead, as di- 
rected. Two of his briirades had made 
the passage in safety and without any 
interruption. Wood, with his division, 
was ready to follow. While thus cross- 
ing the stream with haste and high 
hopes, and w-hile the movement was 
making satisfactory progress, suddenly 
there bui'st forth the roar of battle on 
the far-off right, and so violent was the 
shock that it was felt by the moving 
column on the extreme left. Emerging 
from a thick fog which had settled over 
the ground, his troops massed in ovei- 
whelming force, Bragg had fallen furi- 
ously upon Johnson's division, which 
was on the extreme National right ; and 
so unexpected was the attack that two 
of its batteries were captured before a 
gun could be fired. It was a decisive 
blow. It came down like the crash of 
a thunderbolt. Johnson's division was 
instantly swept away. One of his bri* 



916 



183 



PERBYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 



gade commanders, Kirk, was severely 
wounded ; another, Willick, had his 
horse killed under him, and was made 



prisoner ; 



and 



a large 



number of his 



men were surrounded and made prison- 
ers. Davis, whose division stood next, 
was assailed in front and on his uncov- 
ered flank. The shock was irresistible. 
Spite of his bravery, he, too, was com- 
pelled to give way, with the loss of 
many guns. Sheridan's division was 
next to that of Davis, and still to the 
right. On this the victorious Confede- 
rates fell with accumulated power, and 
with an energy and purpose increased 
and intensified with success. And now 
came the opportunity for a man who 
had in him the true military instinct. 
All was lost, if Sheridan could not 
prolong the resistance. But Sheridan 
again, as he had done before at Periy- 
ville, proved himself equal to the emer- 
gency and rose to the grandeur of the 
occasion. 

Rosecranz had been slow to abandon 
his plan or stop his aggressive move- 
ment. It was not until he had received 
a second message from McCook that he 
comprehended the gravity of the situa- 
tion. To the first call for help by that 
general, he returned for answer that he 
was to dispose his troops to the best 
advantage and hold his ground obsti- 
nately. "Tell him," said Rosecranz, 
" to contest every inch of the ground. 
If he holds them, we will swing into 
Murfreesboro' with our left and cut 
them off." The second message, which 
informed him that the right wing was 
being driven, " a fact which was becom- 
ing apparent by the rapid movement of 



the noise of battle toward the north," 
opened the eyes of the commander-in- 
chief ; and while General Thomas was 
ordered to despatch Rousseau into the 
cedar brakes to the right and rear of 
Sheridan, and General Crittenden was 
ordered to suspend the movement acrossi 
the river by VanCleve and Wood, Rose- 
cranz began to feel and confess that his 
forward movement on the foe was al- 
ready paralyzed, and that a change of 
plan was necessary. If he would save 
his right and defend his communica- 
tions, he must withdraw his left — he 
must, in fact, establish a new line. 
Whether he could do this, depended 
much on Sheridan. 

Sheridan's position had become criti 
cal in the extreme. So, in truth, had 
that of the whole National army ; for, 
if Sheridan had given way easily, the 
Confederates would have pressed up- 
on both flank and rear, driven it to- 
ward the river and cut it off from its 
lines of commimication. In consequence 
of the defeat and overthrow of Johnson 
and Davis, Sheridan's division was com- 
pletely uncovered on his right flank, 
and absolutely unprotected in front. 
On his front, therefore, he was attacked 
by the Confederate division of Withers, 
and on his right the victorioiis bands of 
McCown and Cleburne, flushed with 
success, rushed with tremendous fury. 
The fii'st onslaught was made by With- 
ers. The approach was made over an 
open cotton field. Sheridan had three 
batteries advantageously posted along 
his line ; and as the Confederates came 
forward in column closed in mass seve- 
ral regiments deep, they were received 



"HERE'S ALL THAT IS LEFT" 



188 



with a destructive fire. Severe as was 
this fire, it was powerless to check the 
torward march of the foe. On, steadily 
on, came the mighty mass, until within 
fifty yards of the edge of the timber in 
which lay Sheridan's troops. Springing 
to their feet, the infantry poured such 
a shower of bullets in the faces of the 
Confederates that they were compelled 
to halt. Volley succeeded volley in ever- 
increasing power and degitructiveness. 
It was a very tempest of iron. The 
Confederates wavered, broke, and fled. 
Sheridan's men charged and drove them 
across the open field and behind their 
intrenchments. The tide of battle had 
now turned. It was not, however, with- 
out great loss that this partial victory 
was won. The young and chivali-ous 
Sill, one of the most promising officers 
in the National army, was killed while 
leading the charge. By this time the 
divisions of McCown and Cleburne 
were on Sheridan's right ; and outflank- 
ing him, exposed him to attack in the 
rear. Sheridan was entitled to retire, 
on the ground that his flank was unpro- 
tected. But he did better. Retiring 
his right and reserve brigades, and 
charging with the left into the woods, 
he caused the Confederates to recoil, 
and thus found time to swdng around so 
as to bring his line perpendicular to its 
former direction. He now faced south 
instead of east, and his line ran parallel 
to the Wilkinson turnpike. He was 
now in a better position to withstand his 
opponents. But he was opposed by 
mighty odds ; and the divisions which 
had driven Johnson and Davis from the 
field overlapped his right by nearly 



their whole length. It was not possible 
for Sheridan to repel them ; but he 
could hold them in check. To reach 
the Nashville road, they must put Sher* 
idan out of the way ; but to do this 
implied hard fighting and time ; and 
time was salvation. Doubling in to« 
wards their right, the Confederates 
rushed upon him with all their might. 
But it was all to little purpose. His 
troops and his batteries gathered around 
him ; there he stood like a rock in mid- 
ocean against which the tempestuous 
billows surge and foam and spend their 
fury in vain. An hour had now been 
saved. The Confederates crowded 
around him in increasing numbers. A 
change of front was again necessary. 
Pivoting, so to speak, on the right flank 
of Negley's division, he wheeled round 
his line so as to face the west, and 
planted his batteries on the salient of 
his front. In his new position he cov- 
ered Negley's rear, and with that com- 
mander he was now forming a wedge- 
shaped mass. Here again he was sav- 
agely assailed. The full weight of the 
four divisions of Hai'dee and Polk was 
hurled against him and Negley. Thrice 
they came forward with impetuous fury, 
and thrice were they received with 
a fire so biting and so merciless that 
they staggered and fell back. Another 
hour had been gained — another precious 
hour for Rosecranz. But Sheridan had 
done his utmost. His ammunition was 
spent ; and there were no means of ob- 
taining a fresh supply, as, in the dis- 
comfiture of the right, the ammunition 
train had fallen into the hands of the 
enemy. Nor was this all. Sill, Roberlm 



1S4 



PERRYVTLLE AND MURFREESBORO', 



Shaeifer, his three brigade commanders, 
had been killed. Even he now must 
fall back. But he must do so in a man- 
ner worthy of the glorious resistance 
he has been able to make; and, if he 
has not powder, he ha* steel. Covered, 
therefore, with the bayonets of his re- 
serve, he retired unconquered out of 
the cedar thicket toward the Nashville 
road. It was eleven o'clock when he 
went out of the fight. He had lost 
1630 men; but with their heroic lives 
he had won three hours for Rosecranz, 
and turned the fortunes of the day. 
" Here's all that is left," he said sadly 
as he joined his chief. 

After the retirement of Sheridan, the 
brunt of the battle fell upon Thomas. 
His command was chiefly in and near 
the cedar brakes. He had done his 
best, as we have seen, through Negley's 
division, to sustain Sheridan. Negley 
was now exposed to the attacks of the 
Confederates both in flank and rear. 
Rousseau, at the head of Thomas' other 
division, was sent to the front to the 
assistance of Negley. The Confede- 
rates, however, continued to press fur- 
ther to the National rear ; and by and 
by, having reached a commanding posi- 
tion, they poured a concentrating cross- 
fire on those two divisions. It waa im- 
possible longer to resist the fury and 
concentrated strength of the enemy. 
Thomas, therefore, withdrew his troops 
from the cedar woods and formed his 
line between them and the Nashville 
turnpike. It was a perilous operation, 
and was attended with great loss of life, 
one brigade alone — that of Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Shepherd — losing twenty- 



two officers and five hundred and two 
men in killed and wounded. In his 
new position Thomas held his ground 
fii'mly. It seemed, however, as if thft 
battle was lost. The right wing of the 
National army was gone. The centre 
had been dreadfully cut up and driven 
from the field. All now depended on 
the left. 

While these events were taking place 
on his right and centre, Rosecranss was 
not idle. The stubborn resistance ot 
fered by Sheridan and the two divisions 
of Thomas had given him time to make 
good use of his left wing, and to re- 
form his line of battle. We have seen 
that the National right had not only 
been turned, but driven oif the field. 
We have seen that a similar fate had 
befallen the National centre. In their 
victorious march, therefore, describing, 
so to speak, a circle drawn to the right, 
the Confederates were moving steadily 
on to what would have been the rear 
of the National left, if the dispositions 
of the early morning had remained im- 
changed. It was the possibility of such 
a calamity that lent such importance to 
the heroic endurance of Sheridan and 
Negley and Rousseau and the men un- 
der their commands. It was this possi- 
bility which gave such value to those 
precious three hours which, so to speak, 
had been arrested in their course. When 
the victorious Confederates had borne 
down all opposition, and reached the 
National left, Rosecranz had all but 
completed his new formation. On a 
commanding knoll which overlooks the 
plain west of the Murfreesboro' road, 
he had massed his batteries, somewba* 



HAZEN'S BRIGADE. 



185 



hirei the fashion of Napoleon at Auster- 
litz. With this as a point d'appui, he 
was fi_»i'ming his new line, which was to 
face no longer to the west, as in the 
original disposition of the troops, bat 
to the southwest, with the Nashville 
turnpike in its rear. His object, of 
course, was to bring his army into such 
a position that he should be able to pre- 
sent his front to tlie enemy. It requires 
but little knowledge of the military art 
to understand how difficult, how peril- 
ous even, it is for an army in such cir- 
cumstances (o pass from one formation 
to another. While the chanoje is being; 
made, it is necessarily disjointed and 
helpless. At the last moment it seemed 
as if the experiment of forming a ne\v 
line might fail. Palmer's division held 
the right of the National left wing. 
After Sheridan had been compelled to 
retire, and when Thomas's two divisions 
under Negley and Rousseau had been 
driven through the cedar w^oods, the 
Confederates fell upon Palmer like an 
avalanche. His two right brigades were 
swept a^vay at once. If his left brigade 
could not prolong the resistance, Rose- 
cranz would be struck before his new 
line was completed ; and the day would 
in all probability be lost. But this 
brave brigade, with the gallant Colonel 
W. B. Hazen at its head, was equal to 
tiie emergency. The role of Sheridan 
was repeated. Once and again and yet 
again the foe came down upon this bri- 
gade with all its force, every time doing 
tremendous damage, but eveiy time re- 
pulsed with teirible loss. Some twelve 
hundred men thus kept thousands at 
bay until Rosecranz, having adjusted 



his new front, was ready for the Con- 
federate charge. It is no disparagement 
to any of the other division or brigade 
commanders, or to the men whom they 
led, to say that to Hazen and his brigade 
must be freely accorded the honor of 
having saved the day. It was not, 
however, without a great sacrifice ; for 
nearly one half of the brigade had per- 
ished. 

The struggle, however, was not yet 
ended. Bragg's entire army, with the 
exception of a portion of the division of 
Breckinridge, which was on the other 
side of the river, having issued from the 
cedar thickets which they had won, was 
advancing over the plain in one magnifi- 
cent column. Victory seemed to be in 
theu- shout, and triumph in their firm 
and steady footsteps. It was a glorious 
sight, but it lasted only for a moment. 
Rosecranz was fully prepared. There 
WRS the loud roar of artillery and the 
sharp rattling sound of musketry all 
alongf the National line. It was a tem- 
pest of "double-shotted iron fire." It 
was " a sirocco of lead." Deep lanes 
wei-e cut in the Confederate ranks. The 
slaughter was terrible. Again and 
again the attempt was made to face 
the desolating storm of bullets ; but in 
vain. Blinded by the sulphurous smoke 
which, like a cloud-wall, rose up be- 
tween them and Rosecranz's line, and 
exposed to a fire which was increasing 
in rapidity and becoming more deadly 
in its aim, the troops of Bragg, so re- 
cently so triumphant, staggered, broke 
and fell back in confusion to the shelter 
of the woods. 

Compelled to abandon all further 



PERRYVILLE AND MITEF^ESBORO'. 



attempts on the new and powerful front 
of hia adversary, Bragg determined to 
make another attack on the left. With 
this end in view, he brought up the di- 
yision of Breckinridge, which, as we 
have seen already, was during the fore- 
ipoon on the east side of Stone River, 
and consequently not as yet in the fight. 
This force was seven thousand strong. 
The salient point of the National left 
was still held by the brave Hazen. His 
command, which had been so terribly 
cut up, was well supported now both 
on the right and left. About four 
o'clock in the afternoon the Confede- 
rates came down upon this point with 
tremendous energy. The attack, howev- 
er, was gallantly received and repelled. 
Rosecranz, when the fight was keenest, 
appeared on the scene, and hastened to 
animate the men by his voice and pres- 
ence. Dashing across the field of fire, 
a shell grazed his person and carried off 
the head of his chief of staff. Colonel 
Garasche, who was riding at his side. 
But it was no time for idle grief. 
Rushing to the front, he had words of 
advice and good cheer for the soldiers. 
" Men," said he, " do you wish to know 
how to be safe ? Shoot low. Give them 
ft blizzard at their shins ! Do you wish 
to know how to be safest of all ? Give 
them a blizzard, and then charge with 
cold steel ! Forward, now, and show 
(vhat you are made of ! " The encour- 
Mging words were, of course, obeyed 
with a will. The first attack being re- 
pePed, Breckinridge brought his second 
line Into action. The result was the 
same. It broke to the rear, at the first 
volley. This was the last «ncounter of 



the day. The sun had gone down; 
and the two rival hosts, sick of the 
bloodshed and weary of the toil, rested 
on their arms. It was the last day of 
the year 18G2. The night was unusu- 
ally beautiful. The stars shone bright 
in an almost cloudless sky. The silvery 
moon shed her pale beams over the 
cedar bi"ake, where were many sad 
relics of the day's struggle — thousands 
of brave men, stretched in the cold em- 
brace of death, thousands more wound- 
ed and helpless, piercing the night air: 
with their cries of agony. There were, 
no doubt, many thoughts of home — 
pleasant memories and bitter recollec- 
tions of days that were gone ; but 
among those wounded men and those 
thousands of warriors who, on both 
sides, were fighting for what they be- 
lieved to be the right, there were few 
of those joys which usually belong to a 
New Year's morning. 

The battle of the 31st of Decembei 
was, however, only a drawn battle. 
The National troops still held the orig- 
inal ground on their left ; and their new 
position was strong. From all the other 
points, however, they had been driven 
back. Neither general had been able 
to carry out his original jjlan. Nothing 
was decided. Everything must depend 
on a subsequent effort. On New 
Year's day, the two armies stood 
looking at each other, and biit little was 
done in the way of fighting. Both, Jan. 
however, were busy making pre- !• 
parations for a fresh test of strength 
Some slight fighting took place in the 
afternoon; but it led to no result. 
There is good reason for believing that 



BEAGG'S RETREAT. 



187 



Bragg thought the National army would 
retreat; but in this he was mistaken. 
Retreat was not as yet any part of Rose- 
iaH. cranz's plan. On the morning of 
2« the 2d, Friday, the Confederates 
opened four batteries on the National 
centre ; but these were soon silenced. 
A similar demonstration was made a 
little more to the National right, with 
.a like result. About three o'clock in 
the afternoon a spirited attack was 
made by Breckinridge. The position 
was held by VanCleve's division, which 
showed a want of steadiness, and yield- 
ed to the force of the enemy. Critten- 
den came to his rescue, and posted his 
batteries in an advantageous position 
on the west side of the river, while two 
brigades of Negley's division were or- 
dered up. " The firing was terrific, 
and the havoc fearful. The enemy re- 
treated more rapidly than he had ad- 
vanced. In forty minutes they had lost 
two thousand men." There was a re- 
treat and a pursuit. But it was now 
after dark, aiid rain was falling heavily. 
The pursuit, therefore, was discontin- 
ued. As it was, the Confederates had 
been foiled in all their efforts, and the 
Nationals had gained some points of 
Jan. advantage. On the morning of 
3. the 3d it was still raining heav- 
ily, ar(\ nothing was attempted on 
eithf T side. During the course of the 
day there was some skirmishing and 
' picket-firing all along the lines ; Ijut 
there was no serious effort, and but 
I little change made in the relative iiosi- 
I Jan. tioDS of the two armies. On the 
\ *• morning of the 4th, Sunday, it 
. was found that Biagg had retreated 



with his entire army during the pre- 
vious night. He had left behind him 
about two thousand of his sick and 
wounded, with attendant surgeons, in 
his hospitals. Nothing was done oa 
that day; but on Monday morn- jai^ 
iug Thomas entered Murfreesboro' *• 
and drove the Confederate cavalry some 
seven miles towards Manchester. On 
the same day Rosecranz established his 
headquarters in the village. Such was 
the end of the famous battle in the 
cedar brakes at Stone River — a battle 
in which were put hars de combat nearly 
thirty thousand men. The Confede- 
rates had lost over 14,000 and the Na- 
tionals over 15,000 men. More than 
one-third of the National artillery and 
a large portion of its train had been 
captured. Undecisive as had been the 
terrible struggle — one of the greatest 
in the war — it had at least determined' 
this — that the Confederates could not 
break through the line of investment 
between the Cumberland Mountains 
and the Free States. Two desperate 
attempts had been made ; but both had 
failed. 

The result of the battle of Murfrees- 
boro' filled the National heart with joy. 
It was natural that it should be so. 
On the first day Rosecranz was all but 
defeated, when he turned the tide of 
victory, saved his army, and compelled 
his antagonist to leave the field. If he 
had not completely accomplished his 
purpose — if the possession of Middle 
Tennessee would still have to be con- 
tested — the presumption now was that 
in the next struggle that important 
question would be settled in favor of 



188 



PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 



the North. This, however, was not all. 
The victory, partial as it was, was sin- 
gularly opportune. The summer cam- 
paign had been, all over, the reverse of 
favorable to the National arms. The 
Confederates, both in the east and west, 
had been daringly aggressive; and the 
successes which had attended and re- 
warded their efforts pained and dis- 
couraged the people of the North. 
Grant, after luka and Corinth, had sus- 
tained a series of checks in his onward 
movement towards Vicksburg; and the 
disastrous battle of Fredericksburg, 
which was fought on the 13th of De- 
cember, had produced a shock from 
which neither the government nor the 
people had wholly recovered. Light 
seemed to break in upon the darkness 
when the tidings of Murfreesboro' were 
flashed across the land. There was a 
general who knew how to handle his 
<!roops. There were men who knew 
how to follow and obey. By their 
joint efforts they had snatched victory 
out of defeat. It was the grateful and 
delighted sentiments of an entire people 
which President Lincoln telegraphed 
to Eosecranz, "God bless you and all 
of you ; please tender to all, and iiccept 
for yourself, the nation's gratitude for 
your and their skill, endurance, and 
dauntless courage." The words of the 
general-in-chief were equally expressive 
of the feeling of the Northern people. 
" The victory," he said in greeting Rose- 
cranz, " was well-earned, and one of the 
most brilliant of the war. You and 



your brave men have won the gratitude 
of the army and the admiration of the 
world." 

A new element of strength was now 
added to the army of the Cumberland in 
the person of Brigadier-General James 
A. Garfield, who was appointed to suc- 
ceed Colonel Garesch^ as chief of staff 
to General Rosecranz. General Garfield 
had seen hard service in other depart- 1 
nients, and to his natural abilities added ' 
the experience of a tried veteran. He 
proved of great service to General Rose- 
cranz, especially in softening the bitter- 
ness of the quarrel between his chief and 
the War Department, accomplishing 
more by his calm good sense than the 
fiery energy of the hero of Murfreesboro' 
could secure. 

During the time that the Confede- 
rates under Bragg were engaging the 
whole attention and all the available 
forces of Rosecranz, the superior cavalry 
of the South were scouring Tennessee 
and Kentucky, plundering the inhabit- 
ants and destroying the railroads. Of 
these marauding bands, the principal 
were under the lead of Forrest and Mor- 
gan. By and by they were compelled 
to desist ; and attention began to centre 
again on Chattanooga, near which, it 
was evident, another trial of arms must 
take place. Of this, however, we shall 
have occasion to treat in a subsequent 
chapter. Our attention, meanwhile, 
must be directed to certain important 
events which had already happened on 
the Atlantic border. 



WASHINGTON AND RICHMOND. 



189 



CHAPTER XIII. 



51xe Armies of the West. — What They Have Done. — The Eastern Campaign.— The Object of the Eastern Cam- 
paign. — Too Much Importance Attached to Kichmond. — General Scott. — The Army of the Potomac. — McClellan 
Commander-in-Chief. — His Delay. — The Nation Impatient. — President Lincoln Urgent. — A Council of Gen- 
erals. — McCleUans Secresy. — Had He a Plan ? — War Order No. 1. — Edwin M. Stanton. —McClellan's Plan. — 
New Army Arrangements. — Three Great Departments. — The West Under Halleck. — The Mountain Department 
Under Fremont. — The East Under McCleUan. — Manassas Evacuated. — McClellan's Promenade. —Quaker Guns. 
— The Office of Commander-in-Chief Abolished. — The Movement to the Peninsula Begim. — The Capital not 
SufBciently Defended. — McDowell's Command Detached and Detained. — McCleUan Complains. — Lincoln Re- 
monstrates. — Before Yorktown. — Magruder. — The Nationals Brought to a Halt. — The Folly of Manassas 
Bepeated. — McClellan Asks for More Troops. — Franklin's Division Sent to His Aid. — The Firing Com- 
menced. — Charge of the Vermont Brigade. — Compelled to Fall Back. — Another Charge. — The First Assault 
on the Confederate Position Fails. — The Twenty-Sixth. — Another Assault. — A Redoubt Carried and De- 
stroyed. — Another Pause. — The Third of May. — All Things are Heady. — Further Delay. — Confederate Retreat. 
— Magnider's Statement. — McClellan's Great Mistake. — The Goverrmient Disappointed. — National Indigna- 
tion. — McClellan's Excuses. — Lincoln's Letter. — The Story of Manassas Repeated. 



1861. 



For reasons already given, we have 
lingered a whole year with the 
armies of the West. We have 
followed Grant and his victorious le- 
gions from Cairo to Corinth, and seen 
them driving the Confederates before 
them, until Kentucky and Tennessee 
were secured to the Union, and un- 
til Vicksburg and Port Hudson alone 
barred the free navigation of the Missis- 
sippi. We have seen a National flotilla 
under Foote and Davis driving the en- 
emy from stronghold after stronghold 
on the great river until the National flag 
was again floating over the city of Mem- 
phis. We have followed Farragut and 
his fleet from the gulf to New Orleans, 
and seen that most important of south- 
em cities wrenched from the grasp of 
the rebellious Confederacy. We have 
followed Buell from Corinth to Chatta- 
nooga, and from Chattanooga to Louis- 
ville. We have returned 'with him on 
his backward march, and seen him suc- 



cessfully resist and even force the re- 
treat of the Confederates at Perryville. 
We have followed the same army under 
its new leader, Rosecranz, and witnessed 
the bloody and well-contested, though 
indecisive, battle of Murfreesboro' — a 
battle in which, although neither side 
could justly claim the victory, the Na- 
tionals not only held their ground, but 
again compelled their antagonists to re- 
tire before them. 

During that time, important opera- 
tions had been going on in the East. It 
becomes a necessity, therefore, for us 
now to leave the valley of the Missis- 
sippi and return to the Atlantic border. 
The object of the western campaign, 
which was the opening of the Missis- 
sippi River, was in a fair way of being 
accomplished. The object of the east- 
ern or peninsular campaign was the 
capture of Richmond. It will be our 
business, in the chapters which imme- 
diately follow, to ascertain how this 



•J17 



190 



YORKTOWN. 



campaign had been conducted, and with 
what success. 

There are certain vexed questions re- 
garding the management of the East- 
em forces — questions the discussion of 
which has led to a large amount of ill- 
feeling without producing any satisfac- 
tory result. Into these questions we 
will not enter further than is necessary 
for the elucidation of our subject. It is 
quite --possible that General McClellan 
attached too much importance to the 
capture of Richmond. There can be 
no doubt, we think, that the strength 
of the Confederacy lay rather in the 
strength of its armies than in the pos- 
session of any particular locality, city, 
or stronghold. The capture of Wash- 
ington by the Confederates in the early 
stages of the war might have proved 
fatal to the Union cause. But it would 
be absurd to say that Richmond was to 
the South all that Washington was to 
the North and to the National cause 
generally. The capture of Washington, 
the seat of the National government, 
and where were treasured all the Na- 
tional archives, would certainly have 
been followed by the recognition of the 
Confederacy by foreign governments, 
which might have been very disastrous 
to the National cause. It might have 
had another result equally bad, perhaps 
worse. The holders of the capital might 
have been regarded as the rightful 
rulei-s of the republic ; and been enabled 
to impose their own terms on the nation, 
and so not only resist, but throw back 
the revolution for an indefinite period. 
Even in a sectional point of view no 
such importance could attach to Rich- 



mond. It was tlie most influential toM'n 
in the Confederacy ; that was all. The 
Confedei'ate government could have 
been carried on in any other town ; and 
the strength of the Confederacy would 
still have consisted in tlie strength of 
the army. The correctness oi this prin- 
ciple was abundantly proved in the 
latej" stages of the war. Charleston fell 
by the march of Sherman ; Richmond i 
yielded to the persistent operations of ' 
Grant ; but neither the one geneial nor 
the other cared to enter the city which | 
he had conquered. In the estimation 
of each the extermination of the ai'my 
was moi'c important than the occupation 
of the city. 

It had, however, been decided, or 
T-ather it was taken for granted, that 
the capture of Richmond was a matter 
of primary importance. The question, 
therefore, was how it could be most 
easily and effectively accomplished. 
One thing, it Avas obvious from the out- 
set^ must not be overlooked in any plan 
which might be adopted. Washington 
must not, in any case, be left unpro- 
tected. This condition complied with 
and a plan agreed upon, it was abso- 
lutely necessary that action be taken at 
once. General McClellan, as we have 
seen, was appointed to the command of 
the army of the Potomac in July, 1861. 
On the 1st of November, on the ivov. 
resignation of General Scott, he '• 
was promoted to the chief command of 
the armies of the United States. No 
general, for the time being, so com- 
pletely commanded the confidence of 
the government and the people. He 
was by far the most popular and most 



McCLELLAN'S INACTION. 



191 



trusted man in the army. Although 
commander-in-chief, he still remained 
at tlie head of the amiy of the Potomac. 
At the date of his elevation, that army 
had an effective strength of one hun- 
dred and thirty-four thousand two hun- 
dred and eighty-five men, with some 
three hundred guns. On the 1st of 
February the aggregate strength of 
the army had risen to two hundred 
and twenty-two thousand one hundred 
and ninety-six, thei'e being present for 
duty over one hundred and ninety thou- 
sand men. The Confederate force in 
fj'ont of him at Manassas, where they 
had remained since the battle of Bull 
Run, did not exceed fifty-five thousand. 
In regard to drill and equipment, no finer 
army than that under McClellan was 
ever held in readiness for battle. Abso- 
r lutely trusted by the government, and 
permitted to mature his plans in secret, 
it was confidently expected that with 
such an army he would make such a 
dii,sh upon his antagonist as would force 
the war to a hurried conclusion. 

For reasons Ijest kntjwn to himself, 
McClellan was in no haste to put his 
army in motion. There was no end of 
parades — no end of magnificent manceu- 
vi'eiiig — which for a time delighted and 
astonished the people of Washington. 
Autumn was allowed to pass by, and 
the winter of 1861; and yet nothing 
was done. An excuse for delay wafl 
always at hand. It was too hot, or it 
was too cold. The foliage on the trees 
was as yet too thick, or the roads were 
too heavy for rapi<l and successful mili- 
tary operations. The people began to 
iiianifest impatience. News of the suc- 



cess of the army of the West began to 
arrive ; and the conduct of Halleck and 
Grant was contrasted with the persist- 
ent inaction of McClellan. The daily 
exhibitions of the army of the Potomac 
no longer pleased — they disgusted the 
populace. " On to Richmond," became 
the popular and imperious cry. Through 
the pniss, from the platform iind from 
the pulpit, the words rang out over the 
length and breadth of the North, finding 
a response in every loyal heart. There 
were many who did not hesitate to af- 
firm that McClellan was at heart in sym- 
pathy \vith the rebellion. The govern- 
ment caught the contagion, and all the 
more readily that the president had 
for some time been dissatisfied with 
McClellan. He saw that the heart of 
the nation was sinking. Expenses had 
been frightful, and there had been no 
result. The treasury was all but ex- 
hausted ; and there was the danger of 
the loss of public credit. He could 
obtain no satisfactory explanation from 
the commander-in-chief. There were 
signs of disaffection in the ranks; and 
the subordinate officers were impatient 
and sick of their life of inaction. They 
were there to protect theii' coimtry and 
to repel the foe ; but they had been 
compelled to spend precious months in 
daily repetition erf a meaningless show. 
In these circumstances the president 
summoned Generals McDowell and 
Franklin to a conference with himself 
and his cabinet. To them he frankly 
revealed his distress. " If something is 
not soon done," he said, "the bottom 
will be out of the whole affaii- ; and if 
General McClellan does not want to xtm 



i93 



YOKKTOWN. 



tte army, I would like to borrow it, pro- 
vided I can see how it could be made 
to do something." He had been to the 
house of the commander-in-chief; but 
he had not been admitted to his pre- 
sence. It was necessary that he should 
talk to somebody ; and therefore he 
had sent for them, to learn, if possi- 
ble, whether there was any probability 
of an early movement of the army. 
McDowell was in favor of immediate 
action. He would advance with a heavy 
force on the front and flanks of the Con- 
federates at Manassas. He believed 
that their numbers were greatly exag- 
gerated, and that it would not be diffi- 
cult to make an end of the disgraceful 
blockade, and drive the besieging army 
back upon Richmond. Franklin, who 
was somewhat in the confidence of Mc- 
Clellan, and knew at least part of his 
plan, was in favor of something being 
done at once ; but he approved of a 
movement upon Richmond by way of 
the lower Chesapeake and the Virginia 
peninsula. There were further confer- 
ences, McDowell and Franklin mean- 
while consulting with other prominent 
army officials. The result was that these 
two generals agreed as to the necessity 
of moving directly on Manassas; and 
they recommended such a movement. 
At this stage, however, the cabinet was 
somewhat divided; and it was agreed 
to hold another conference, and to ask 
(reneral McClellan to be present and 
give his own views on the question. 
The meeting was held accordingly ; 
Greneral McClellan appeared, but took 
no part in the discussion. He showed 
signs of being offended. To McDowell, 



who apologized for the position in 
which himself and Franklin were 
placed, he said haughtily that they 
could have any opinion they pleased. 
When asked by the president "what 
and when anything could be done," his 
answer was " that the case was so plain 
that a blind man could see it." To the 
question of the secretary of the treasury 
as to where and how he proposed to 
use the army, he gave for answer only 
that "the movements in Kentucky were 
to precede any from Washington." At 
the same time he expressed his willing- 
ness to develop his plans, if he was 
ordered to do so, although he said it 
was his conviction that always, in mili- 
tary matters, the fewer who knew the 
plans to be carried out the better. 

A few days aftei'wards his plan, 
which was to abandon his present base 
and proceed towards Richmond by way 
of the lower Chesapeake, was laid be- 
fore the president. The president liked 
it not. It implied further delay. It 
would, besides, be a tedious opei-ation ; 
and, so far as he could see, it promised 
little. Determined to be done with this 
do-nothing policy, the president, 
on the 27th of January, issued his 
famous War Order No. 1, in which he 
directed the 2 2d of February fol- jan. 
lowing "to be the day for a gen- 27, 
eral movement of the land and naval 
forces of the United States against the 
insurgent forces." Four days after- 
wards a special order was issued to 
McClellan, directing hiui to form all 
the disposable force of the army of the 
Potomac, after providing for the safety 
of Washington, into an expedition fuj 



MANASSAS EVACUATED. 



193 



the immediate object of seizing and oc- 
cupying a point on the railroad south- 
east of Manassas Junction, the details 
of the movement to be left to the dis- 
cretion of the commander-in-chief. This 
dispatch on the part of the president has 
generally been attributed to the energy 
and firmness of Edwin M. Stanton, who 
had, a few weeks before, succeeded 
Cameron as secretary of war. Against 
this order McClellan remonstrated. 
This led to a correspondence between 
him and the president, each advocating 
his own plan in preference to that of 
the other. The result was that the 
whole question was submitted to a 
council of twelve officers, McClellan's 
plan being approved of by eight out of 
the twelve. The president, of course, 
acquiesced ; and on the same day orders 
were issued from the War Department 
for the procuring of transports for the 
troops and the other necessaries of war. 
Mar. On the 8th of March the presi- 
8« dent issued a general order, direct- 
ing the army of the Potomac to be divid- 
ed into four corps, to be commanded re- 
spectively by Generals McDowell, Sum- 
ner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. A fifth 
corps, formed from his own and General 
Shields' division, was under the com- 
mand of General Banks. The command 
of the National troops in the valley of 
the Mississippi and westward of the 
longitude of Knoxville in Tennessee, 
was assigned to General Halleck ; and 
a Mountain Department, covering the 
region between McClellan and Halleck, 
was created and placed under the com- 
mand of General Fremont. The com- 
manders of departments were instructed 



to report directly to the secretary of 
war, and not, as fonnerly, through the 
commander-in-chief. This order gave 
great offense to McClellan. Later on 
the same day, another order directed 
that no change should be made in the 
base of operations without leaving a 
competent force for the protection of 
Washington ; that not more than fifty 
thousand troops should be moved to- 
ward the scene of intended operations 
until the navigation of the Potomac 
should be "freed from the enemy's bat- 
teries and other obstructions " ; that the 
new movement on Chesapeake Bay 
should begin as early as the 18th of 
March, and that the general-in-chief 
should "be responsible that it moves 
so early as that day " ; and that " the 
army and navy co-operate in an im- 
mediate effort to capture the enemy's 
batteries upon the Potomac, betweea 
Washington and the Chesapeake Bay." 
On learning that McClellan was about 
to move, Johnston (March 9th) jiar. 
evacuated Manassas, and hastened ^' 
towards Richmond, carrying eveiything 
with him. It was a timely and masterly 
retreat, and evinced that ability for 
which Johnston has obtained credit 
alike from friend and foe, and which 
stamped him as one of the greatest 
commanders developed on either side 
during the progress of the war. jiar. 
On the ensuing morning McClel- *®* 
Ian made a "promenade," as it has 
been called, to the deserted position, 
when his soldiers were mortified to 
witness the miserable earthworks and 
Quaker guns — logs of wood shaped like 
cannon — by which an army little more 



194 



YORKTOWN. 



than one-fourth their own, had kept 
them 80 long at bay. Undoubtedly this 
discovery irritated the president greatly, 
and went far to shake his faith in the 
ability or honesty of the general-in- 
chief. It is not wonderful, therefore, 
Mar. that on the day on which McClel- 

!•• Ian returned from the "prome- 
nade," he should have been relieved, 
V)y a special order from the president, 
of all the military departments except 
that of the Potomac. The reason as- 
signed for this change was that the 
campaign on which the army of the Po- 
tomac was about to enter would require 
all the resources and all the attention 
of its commander. It is impossible, how- 
ever, not to perceive in each of these 
successive orders a manifestation of dis- 
trust—an increasing want of confidence 
in the commander-in-chief. 

The movement which had been agreed 
upon was carried out with all prompti- 
tude. There was no unnecessary de- 
lay. There were chartered one hundred 
and thirteen steamers, one hundred 
and eighty-eight schooners, eighty-eight 
barges; and by means of these there 
were transported, in thirty-seven days, 
to Fortress Monroe, one hundred and 
twenty-one thousand troops, fourteen 
thousand five hundred and ninety-two 
cattle, eleven hundred and fifty wag- 
ons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four 
ambulances, as well as a vast quantity 
of equipage. McClellan left Washing- 
April ton on the 1st of April. On the 

!• same day he sent to the adjutant- 
general a detailed statement of the 
number and disposition of the forces 
which he had left behind. The number 



of men left for the avowed purpose of 
protecting the capital was about sev- 
enty-three thousand. These, however, 
were so disposed that not more than 
twenty thousand, and they but imper- 
fectly organized, were all that were left 
for the defense of Washington and Man- 
assas Junction. The president was indig- 
nant ; and General McDowell's corps 
was detached from McClellan's com- 
mand and detained at the capital. Mc- 
Clellan complained and delayed action. 
In a letter written by him at the time to 
McClellan, Lincoln explained and fully 
justified the course which he had been 
forced to adopt. In the same letter, 
Lincoln forcibly reminded him that in- 
action was no longer to be tolerated. 
" It is indispensable to 3/01/," he wrote, 
" that you strike a blow. / am power- 
less to help this." * * " The country 
will not fail to note," he added, "is now 
noting, that the present hesitation to 
move upon an intrenched camp is but 
the story of Manassas repeated." He 
wrote him, he assured him, in the ut- 
most kindness ; but his last words were 
" You must act." 

McClellan did not pay much atten- 
tion to the injunction. He seemed to 
feel that he was distrusted ; and his 
hesitation to strike a blow that might 
be ineffectual, almost implied distrust 
in himself. When McClellan's army 
fairly landed on the peninsula, there 
ought to have been no hesitation. A 
bold and vigorous blow promptly dealt 
could scarcely have failed to drive 
the enemy before him ; it would cer- 
tainly have redeemed his reputation for 
bravery. The Confederates under Gen- 



LEE'S MILLS. 



193 



eral Magruder did not exceed in number 
eleven thousand men. At the time 
of his landing, this was the only force 
opposed to him on the peninsula; and 
he was aware of the possibility of Ma- 
gi-uder being reinforced by Johnston. 
This force was so divided by the neces- 
sity of placing fixed gan'isons at York- 
town, on Grloucester Point, and on Mul- 
beiTy Island, on the James River, that 
the line in front of McClellan's great 
army, and stretching thirteen miles 
from Yorktown across the peninsula, 
did not consist of more than five or six 
thousand men. On this point authori- 
ties differ, but the largest estimate does 
not give Magruder for this line more 
than eight thousand. Magruder's own 
claim was that, exclusive of the garri- 
sons above named, he had only five 
thousand men. The National army 
April began to move forward from Fort- 
s' ress Monroe on the 3d of April. 
McClellan's avowed object was to drive 
or capture Magruder's anny before it 
could be reinforced by Johnston. The 
Nationals moved steadily but slowly in 
two columns, the one column by the 
old Yorktown road, the other along the 
Warwick road. These columns were 
commanded respectively by Generals 
Heintzelman and Keyes, Heintzelman 
being on the right and Keyes on the 
April Isft. On the afternoon of the 
5i 5th, the advance of each column 
was compelled to halt by Magruder's 
fortified lines — the right near Yorktown 
on the York River, and the left near 
Winn's Mill on the Warwick River. 
What did McClellan now do i Did he 
remember and seek to repair the blun- 



der he made at Manassas? Did he 
remember the kindly but withal sting- 
ing words of the president, " It is indis- 
pensable to you that you strike a blow." 
"You must act"? Not at all. The same 
demon of delay had taken hold of him. 
The folly of Manassas was repeated, if 
possible, in more aggravated form. In 
place of acting at once, he commenced 
the tedious operations of a regular siege, 
casting up intrenchments and otherwise 
acting like a field oflieer of the middle 
ages, rather than a skilled and practical 
general of modern times. Meantime he 
wrote complaining letters to Washing- 
ton, declaring it to be his conviction 
that he would have to fight all the 
available troops of the Confederates 
not far from his present position. " Do 
not force me to do so," he said, " with 
diminished numbers; but, whatever 
your decision may be, I will leave noth- 
ing undone to obtain success." At 
McClellan's urgent request, Franklin's 
division of McDowell's corps was sent 
to his aid. Towards the end of April 
the National forces in front of York- 
town amounted to close upon one hun- 
dred and forty thousand men; and of 
these, one hundred and twelve thousand 
were ready for duty. In addition to 
these, McClellan could count on the 
co-operation and aid of Wool's force, 
which was at Fortress Monroe. 

It was surely of all things the most 
natural that the government and people 
should expect that some prompt and 
effective work would be done with an 
army so large and so splendidly equij> 
ped. McClellan left Fortress Monroe, as 
we have seen, on the 3d of April. In- 



196 



YORKTOWN. 



stead of hastening forward and making 
a dash on the Confederate position, he 
occupied his time in throwing up earth- 
works and advantageously placing his 
April guns. It was the 16th before 
'*• any serious encounter took place. 
There had been cannonading on both 
sides, and some skirmishing ; but as yet 
BO regular encounter. On the day just 
mentioned, McClellan discovered that 
the Confederates were streng'thenin"' 
their works at Lee's Mills, on a stream- 
let of the Warwick River. On these 
he oi'dei-ed fire to be opened. Captain 
Mott, with the New York battery, took 
a position on the left of the enemy's 
works ; Captain Bartlett, with the 
Rhode Island Battery B, placed him- 
self on the right; the Third Vermont 
regiment, acting as skirmishers, were 
thi'own out in front, while a force of 
some strength was posted in the rear 
as a reserve. About eight o'clock in 
the morning the iirst section of Mott's 
battery, consisting of two ten-pounder 
Parrott guns, moved forward to within a 
thousand yards of the Confederate work, 
and took post under cover of a Avood on 
the Warwick road. Fire was immedi- 
ately opened. The Confederates made 
a brisk response ; and such was the ac- 
curacy of their aim that three of Mott's 
men were killed and four wounded. 
Mott brought vip the remainder of his 
guns; and the cannonading which en- 
siled was kept up on both sides for 
two hours, when the Confederates were 
driven back. At this stage General 
Smith, who had charge of the Vermont 
brigade, attempted to throw a force 
across the stream, with a view to take 



the defensel* hj assault. It was now 
about three in the afternoon. Colonel 
Hyde took charge of the storming par- 
ty, which consisted of four companies, 
D, E, F, and K, of the Third Vermont 
regiment. These companies Avere fresh, 
not having taken any part in the en- 
gagement of the morning ; and to cover 
them as they advanced, four batteries 
of light artillery, coimuanded respect- 
ively by Ayres, Mott, Kennedy, and 
Wheeler were placed on advantageous 
ground. As the batteries opened a con- 
certed fire on the fort, throwing shot, 
shell and spherical case into it, in rapid 
succession, the four companies dashed 
forward, plunged into the water, which 
in some places reached to their arm-pits, 
and made for the work. While the 
men were still in the water, a terrific 
fire was opened upon them by a body 
of Confederates who had hitherto lain 
low and concealed themselves. On 
pushed the brave little band ; and in 
spite of their soaked condition, and, 
what was still worse, their wet cart- 
ridge-boxes, they reached the fort and 
drove their antagonists out of the rifle- 
pit. Here they held their position for 
nearly half an hour. Strange to say, 
while thousands of men were close at 
hand, reinforcements failed to reach 
them in time. Observing the advance 
of two or three fresh Confederate regi- 
ments, the brave little battalion had no 
choice but fall back and reci'oss the 
river. In crossing and recrossing, they 
sustained very considerable loss. 

As soon as the remnant of these com- 
panies had returned within their own 
lines, the National batteries, which for 



THE BOMBARDMENT. 



19? 



a time had been silent, again opened 
fire. Orders were given to the Sixtli 
Vermont regiment to resume the at- 
tack, and storm the work by the left 
ilaiik. Colonel Lord, at the head of his 
bi-ave soldiers, dashed into the stream. 
Seven companies followed. The ad- 
vance had reached within three rods 
of the breastwork, when, being in three 
feet of water, they were fired upon by 
a long line of rifles which were popped 
above the parapets. A running fire 
from at least one thousand small ai'ms 
kept pouring upon the Nationals as 
they pressed on to the fort. "While the 
breastwork was lit up by a continuous 
sheet of flame, the National batteries 
kept up a steady fire, the shot and shell 
falling thick and fast inside the work. 
The Nationals were fighting at a great 
disadvantage ; but they kept their 
ground and used their rifles with great 
effect, taking off their men as they 
raised their heads from time to time 
above the parapet. For a time the 
battle raged with great fuiy ; and the 
scene was grand and imposing in the 
extreme. The Confederates continued 
to increase in strength at the point of 
attack ; and as it was impossible, in the 
cii'cumstances, to make any effective 
use of the bayonet. Lord ordered a 
retreat, carrying his wounded with him. 
In this struggle the National loss was 
.'55 killed, 1'20 wounded, and 9 miss- 
ing. Captain Mott, on whose battery 
the Confederates had concentrated their 
fire, had three men killed and seven 
wounded. Of his horses, seven were 
disabled. The Confederate loss was 
also considerable, Colonel McKinney, 



of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regi- 
ment, which bore the chief part in the 
fray, having been killed. 

After this ineffectual assault on the 
Confederate battery, ten days were al- 
lowed to elapse befoi-e any event of 
consequence occurred. General McClel- 
lan meanwhile busied himself in the 
perfecting of his siege arrangements. 
The Merrimac, of which we shall 
have something to say in our next 
chapter, gave him some uneasiness, 
and compelled him to be fearful for 
his gunboats. On the 26th of April 
April, the monotony of the siege 26t 
was varied by a spirited attack which 
was made on a Confederate redoubt. 
This work stood in front of a wood near 
the Yorktown road, and was somewhat 
in advance of the main defenses. Sur- 
rounded by a ditch six feet deep, with 
a strong parapet, it was manned by two 
companies of infantry, but with no ai* 
tillery. It was resolved to take this 
redoubt, and ascertain the nature of the 
works behind. Five Massachusetts com- 
panies were detailed for the purpose. 
Three of these companies were from 
the First regiment, and were under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wells. Two were 
from the Eleventh regiment, and were 
under Major Tripp. The attack was 
well planned. One company was sent 
out to skirmish on the left, in the corn- 
field, with instructions to prevent a 
flank movement of the enemy ; another 
company was held in reserve toward the 
right, near a ravine ; while a third com* 
pany, under Captain Carroll, made the 
assault. The assaulting party rushed 
across the cornfield at double-c^uick. 



198 



TORKTOWN. 



rfiaking straight for the Confederate i-e- 
douht. A Avarm reception awaited 
them. As soon as they came in view, 
the Confederate infantry opened fire, 
and used their rifles to some purpose. 
Nothing daunted, the Massachusetts 
men pushed forward. Not one of them 
fired a shot until they were within a 
few yards of the ditch. Then halting, 
they let fly a full volley into the faces 
of their antagonists. On again they 
rushed, clearing the ditch and mounting 
the parapet. The Confederates fled be- 
fore them, and the redoubt was cap- 
tured. A working party came up with 
spades and shovels, and the work was 
soon demolished. Thirteen Confede- 
rates were made prisoners. On the side 
of the Nationals there were three men 
killed and thirteen wounded. 

There was another pause. Nothing 
further was done in the way of direct 
April hostilities until the 30th. That 

^« day, General McClellan having ad- 
vanced his parallels, got one of his 
large batteries in position and opened 
fire on the Confederate works, at the 
distance of two miles. The first shot was 
fired from battery No. 1, at the mouth 
of Wormsley's Creek. It was aimed at 
the Confederate shipping, and it suc- 
ceeded in scattering the vessels. The 
guns were now directed against the 
works at Yorktown and Gloucester. 
The Confederates replied with their 
large pivot gun, a rifled sixty-eight 
pounder, which was mounted on the 
heights of Yorktown. For some hours, 
the firing on both sides was maintained 
with great spirit. No result, however, 

was visible. During the night the Con- 



federates-continued to fling shot and 
shell on McClellan's advanced parallels, I 
where the men were at work. Next 
morning they tried their columbiad, 
which was well posted on the heights, 
firing it with great rapidity ; but after 
the twenty- third discharge, " it went 
into a thousand pieces, tearing up the 
parapet, and making havoc with the 
crowd who wei'e collected &round it 
at the time." This was the only gun 
which seemed capable of competing 
with McClellan's heavy siege batteries. 
The National batteries maintained a 
continuous fire. Saturday ari'ived. May 
the 3d day of May. Before the *• 
close of that day everything was in 
readiness for opening the bombard- 
ment — the huge siege batteries being 
all in position. Still McClellan is in 
no haste. To-morrow (Sunday) is to 
be given to sacred rest ; and on Mon- 
day tlie guns are to be opened all along 
the line. The general is confident of 
success, and believes in a triumphant 
victory. On that same Saturday night, 
the Confederates evacuated Yorktown 
and Gloucester, carrying with them 
their sick, their hospital stores, their 
ammunition, and their camp equipage, 
and moved toward Williamsburg. So 
quietly and so skilfully was the I'etreat 
accomplished, that it was not until 
next morning the fact was known to 
the Nationals. McClellan on the Maj 
morning of the 4th telegraphed ^' 
to the Secretary of War that he was in 
possession of the abandoned fortress, and 
added, with an air of mightiness which 
ill became him in the circumstances. 
" No time shall be lost. I shall push 



LAME EXCUSES. 



19fi 



the enemy to the wall." Such was 
the end of the siege of Yorktown — an 
end almost as disgraceful, all things con- 
sidered, as would have been a defeat. 
When the National troops entered 
the abandoned fortifications, they found 
fifty-two guns spiked, and some stores ; 
but such surely was a poor trophy for 
so great an array, and especially after 
such magnificent and costly prepa- 
rations for a successful siege. It was 
McClellan over aiijain — all show and no 
work. The National army left Fortress 
Monroe, as M'e have seen, on the 3d of 
April. On the afternoon of the 5th, 
the advance of both columns halted in 
front of Magruder's fortifications. For 
nearly one month, therefore, McClellan 
with more than one hundred thousand 
men, and well supplied with all the ne- 
cessaries of war, lay before Yoi-ktown. 
Doing what? Preparing for a great 
siege — when there was to be no siege. 
Constructing extensive and costly lines 
of defense — which were never needed. 
General Mas-ruder's account of McClel- 
lan's conduct reads like a caricature; 
but we know nothing of those four 
weeks before Yorktown, which does 
not justify us in saying that Magruder's 
account is the simple truth. " To my 
utter surprise," says that general, "he 
(McClellan) pennitted day after day to 
elapse without an assault. In a few 
days the object of his delay became ap- 
parent. In every direction in front 
^f our lines, through the intervening 
woods and in the open fields, earth- 
works began to appear." Had McClel- 
lan moved on Yorktown and Gloucester 
%t once, in place of halting for a whole 



four weeks, these places most trndoubt^ 
edly would have yielded to the first 
attack, and the waste of time, of labor, 
of money, of human life even, in that 
inhospitable region, would have been 
avoided. "With five thousand men," 
adds Magnider, " inclusive of the garri- 
sons, we had stopped and held in check 
over one hundred thousand of the ene- 
my." Difference of opinion has existed 
as to the actual strength of the Confed- 
erates in and around Yoi'ktown. The 
presumption is that when McClellan 
arrived and felt Magruder's outer lines 
in front of Yorktown, the Confederate 
force did not exceed five thousand men, 
exclusive of the garrisons. It is now 
known that both Lee and Johnston 
were opposed to holding the peninsula, 
their reasons being that in the event of 
the York and James rivers falling into 
the possession of the Nationals, as 
seemed probable, the Confederate army, 
on both flanks, would be exposed to the 
National gunboats. They had no doubt 
that McClellan would capture York- 
town. Johnston visited and inspected 
the works at Yorktown soon after 
McClellan's amval; and what he saw 
confirmed him in this opinion. His de- 
sire was to concentrate all his forces 
near Richmond and offer there a deci- 
sive battle. These counsels, however, 
were overruled ; and it was decided to 
hold the peninsida, if possible, until 
the fortifications at Norfolk shoidd be 
dismantled and the naval establishment 
at that place destroyed. In these cir- 
cumstances, and when it was known 
that McClellan, instead of pressing for- 
ward, was intrenching himself reiar 



«00 



YORKTOWN. 



forcements were sent down fi'om Rich- 
mond; and, later, Johnston went to 
Yorktown and took command in per- 
son. Hence we find Magruder, in the 
same report from M'hich we have already 
quoted, saying : " Reinforcements be- 
gan to pour in, and each hour the army 
of the Peninsula grew stronger and 
stronger, until anxiety passed from my 
mind as to tlie result of an attack upon 
us." The conclusion, therefore, seems 
inevitable — that McClellan lost his 
golden opportunity when he failed to 
make an attack on Magruder immedi- 
ately on his arrival at Yorktown, and 
that in place of the barren victory which 
he reaped after a month's waiting, toil 
and teri'ible sacrifice, he might have 
won a fruitful victory by striking a 
blow at once with energy and determi- 
nation. 

A feeling began again to prevail all 
over the North, as soon as the details of 
the siege were made public, that nothing 
was to be expected from McClellan. 
Of course his friends still clung to him 
tenaciously ; but the eai-nest people of 
the North, who were bent on putting 
down the rebellion and jireserving the 
Union intact, began to feel that, if the 
great task was to be accomplished, it 
must be by other hands than those of 
the brilliant but hesitating chief of the 
army of the Potomac. McClellan was 
not ignorant that the siege of Yorktown 
was a blunder, and that it was generally 
BO regarded. He had, of course, some- 
thing to say in his own defence. It 
was impossible, he said, to ascertain 
the exact strength of the enemy; and 
there were many indications that they 



were behind the works in great force. 
It was his business to find out the facts, 
just as it was his misfoi'tune to be oat- 
generalled. Some of his excuses were 
very lame. Franklin's division had 
been promptly sent him when asked 
for. Yet in his report he said that the 
non-arrival of that division was the 
cause of his failure to attack Yorktowa, 
and that the same cause "made rap'd 
and brilliant operations impossible. '\ 
The simple truth is that when Frank -^ 
lin's division arrived, McClellan de- 
clared that he was not ready ; and, 
waiting for orders, these troops were 
detained on the river, in transports, for 
a whole fortnight. It was his intention, 
he said in his report, to turn Yorktown 
by an attack on Gloucester; and this 
attack was not made because Franklin's 
division was not forward. What Mc- 
Clellan's intention really was, it is diffi- 
cult to know. It does seem as if he was 
undecided, feeling afraid to attack in 
front and not daring to attack in flank. 
It certainly redounds to the credit of 
the Confederates that they were better 
posted regarding his movements than 
he was regarding theirs. The siege 
of Yorktown was no improvement on 
McClellan's past record. It was the 
first tardy step in a series of tardy 
movements which distinguished his pe- j 
uinsular campaign. Before the end of 
that disastrous campaign was reached, 
the storm of battle had done much to 
thin the ranks of his army ; but delay 
led to disease ; and disease proved more 
destructive than the bidlets of the ene- 
my. The view taken by President Lin- 
coln, in his letter to McClellan dated 



PKOrilETlC WORDS. 



'Ml 



April 9th, 1862, was sustained in every 
particular. In that letter the president 
says : " You will do me the justice to 
remember I always insisted that going 
down the bay in search of a field, in- 
stead of fighting at or near Manassas, 
was only shifting and not sunnounting 
a difiiculty — that we should find the 



same enemy and the same or equal in- 
trenchments at either place. The coun- 
try will not fail to note — is now noting 
— that the present hesitation to move 
upon an intrenched enemy is but the 
story of Manassas repeated." Read 
now, in the light of what took place, 
these words were really prophetic. 



CHAPTER XIV. 



The Importance of War Vessels on the Rivers and Gulfs. — The Merrimac. — Her original bnild. — ^Reconstructed.— 
A Powerful Lnstriuaent of Destruction. ^Confederate Cunning. — The Merrimac in her new Form said to be a 
Failure. — A Strange Sight. — The Merrimac at Hampton Roads. — The National Fleet Attacked. — The Cumber- 
land and Congress. — The Merrimac Shot-Proof. — The Cumberland Laid Open. — Terrific Filing. — The Cumber, 
land Goes Do«ti. — One Huudi-ed Sick and Wounded. — The Patrick Henry. — The Congress Attacked.— 
Heavy Loss of Life. — The Congress on Fire. — Newport News. — The Flag of the Congress Hauled Down. — Red 
Hot Shot. — Her Magazine Catches Fire. ^Two Hours' Work. — The Roanoke and the Minne.sota. — Hurrying to the 
Scene of Action. — The Minnesota Grounded. — The Merrimac unable to Approach. — The Guns of the Minnesota 
Skilfully Handled. — A Cheerless Prospect. — The Danger to New York. — Fortress Monroe. — What General 
Wool said. — Relief at Hand. — The Monitor. — Ericsson. — Description of the Monitor. — The great Purpose for 
which it was Built. — A Novelty. — The Success of the Experiment Doubted. — Prophets of EvO. — The Launch. — 
The Trial Trip. — A Fearful Storm. — Terrific Experience of the Crew. — Lieutenant John L. Wordeu in Com- 
mand. — What Spies had Done. — What Might Have Been. — Rejoicing at Norfolk. — The Nationals Downcast. — 
A Night to be Remembered. — The Congress Explodes. — Sunday Morning. — Wreck and Ruin all aronnd. — 
Reappearance of the Merrimac. — Worden Ready. — The Object of the Confederate Commander. — The 
Monitor alongside of the Merrimac. — A Contrast.— David and Goliath. — " Pebbles thrown by a Child." — A 
Battle of Mailed Giants. — The Merrimac Agroimd. —The Monitor Moving and Hitting like a Skilled Pugilist. — 
The Merrimac shows Signs of Punishment. — Turns off and Renews the Attack on the Minnesota. — A Warm Re- 
ception. — A Tremendoiis Shot. — The Monitor again Comes to the Relief. — The Merrimac a Second Time 
Grounded. — The Merrimac Retreats. — The Monitor Pursues. — A Fierce Encounter. — Canister Shot Compara- 
tively Harmless. — The Merrimac Badly Punished. — Sagging at the Stern. — The Last and Most Effective Shot 
of the Merrimac. — Worden Wounded and Felled to the Ground. — The Merrimac Sheers Off. — The Battle 
Ended. — Worden 's Life Despaired Of. — "Did We Save the Minnesota?" — Saved. — A Great Victory. — Re- 
joicings in the North. — The "Little Wonder." — Pilgi-image to Hampton Roads. — Profound Interest Abroad.-— 
Lessons Read to the Nations. — Superiority of Turrets. — Honors to the Brave. — Ericsson Cougratidated.-— 
The Importance of the Victory. — Reflections. 



In tracing the history of the great 
western campaign, we have seen 
how important was the part which 
was played by gunboats on the Tennes- 
see and Oliio rivers. It was natiu'ally 
to be expected that war vessels, suitably 
constructed, would J)lay an equally im- 



portant pai"t in the bays and rivers more 
to the east, and which connect them- 
selves with the waters of the Atlantic. 
One of the great events of the early 
part of 1802 was the appearance in 
Hampton Roads of the powerful iron- 
clad man-of-war Menimac. which had 



fcOSS 



THE MEKEIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 



l)een recon^itructecl by the Confederate 
g<)\ ernment and named Virginia. When 
the Norfolk N:ivy Yard was abandoned 
by the Nationals, this vessel was scut- 
tled and sunk. In her original form 
she was a powerful steam frigate of 
forty guns ; and she had cost the gov- 
ernment, for building and furnishing 
her, a sum not less than a million and 
a quarter dollars. The Confederates 
found little difficulty in raising her ; 
and the hull being in perfect condition, 
a substantial basis existed for the con- 
struction of a gigantic and dangerous 
vessel. A plan was furnished by Lieu- 
tenant John M. Brooke, formerly of the 
National navy ; and, reconstructed after 
the fashion of the shot-proof raft which 
had been used \a Charleston harbor, 
she became one of the strongest and 
most destructive engines of war which 
had ever been sc/en floating on any wa- 
ters. When properly cut down, she 
was covered with an iron roof project- 
ing into the water. At or below the 
water line the mail extended the oppo- 
site way, so that a shot striking above 
the water mark would glance upward, 
and below the water mark would glance 
downward. She was simply a broadside 
ironclad with sloj^ing armor. Her great 
bulk enabled her to carry a formidable 
batter};-. She was armed with a power- 
ful steel beak, and carried eleven guns, 
with a one hundred-pound rifled Arms- 
trong at each end. Such a monster might 
well be a terror as well as a surprise. 
It was known that the vessel was un- 
dergoing reconstruction, and that it was 
intended to make her a terrible engine 
of war; but strange rumors were circu- 



lated to her disadvantage by the Con- 
federate authorities; and it is probable 
that, until she was seen at Hampton 
Roads, she was somewhat despised by 
the oflicers of the National navy. The 
Southern newspapers artfully circulated 
that " the Merrimac was a failure " ; and, 
the wish being father to the thought, 
the statement was too readily believed. 
About noon, on Saturday, the 8 th of 
March, observers at Fortress Mon- jjjar. 
roe saw a strange object, " looking 8. 
like a submerged house, with the roof 
only above water," moving down 
the Elizabeth River toward Hampton 
Roads. It was the dreadful Mernmac; 
and she was under the command of 
Franklin Buchanan, an officer who had 
abandoned the National navy. Two 
smaller armed steamboats accompanied 
her. Almost immediately after their 
appearance, two other Confederate gun- 
boats came down from Richmond and 
took positions in the James River, a lit- 
tle above Newport News. Signal guns 
were at once fired from the Union bat- 
teries and by the ships Cumberland and 
Congress, lying off and blockading the 
James River, to give warning to the rest 
of the National fleet. Accompanied by 
the two smaller vessels the Merrimac 
moved steadily on' towards the Cumber- 
land and Congress. The Congress, a 
sailing frigate, was commanded by Lieu- 
tenant Joseph B. Smith. The sloop of 
war, Cumberland, 24 guns and 376 men, 
was commanded temporarily by Lieu- 
tenant George Mon-is. Pursuing the 
Congress, and giving and receiving a 
broadside, the Merrimac made straight 
for the Cumberland. This vessel had 



THE CUMBBBLAND SUNK. 



303 



been placed across the channel so as to 
bring her broadside to bear on her 
antagonist; and as the Merrimac ap- 
proaclied she opened upon the monster 
and jjoured forth a rapid fire. It was 
no use. The heavy shot from the nine 
and ten inch guns of the Cumberland 
glanced from her rival's shield of iron, 
"like so many peas." The Merrimac 
seemed stunned for an instant by the 
weight of the shot; but she quickly 
recovered; and having increased her 
speed, she rushed against the Cumber- 
land, striking her with her steel prow 
about amidships, and " literally laying 
her open." Before striking the Cumber- 
land, the Merrimac had received some 
seven or eight broadsides ; but they pro- 
duced no impression on. her invulner- 
able coat of mail. As she struck, she 
opened her ports and poured in on the 
unfortunate Cumberland, now rapidly 
filling with water, a most destructive 
fire. The Cumberland fought well; 
but the combat was unequal. Buchanan 
gradually drew off the Merrimac ; and 
again opening his ports, he rushed 
against his disabled antagonist, this 
time completely crushing in her side. 
It was now all over with the Cumber- 
land. Giving a parting fire to the 
monster which was retiring from the 
ruin it had wrought, with apparent in- 
difference, Morris ordered his men to 
jump overboard and save themselves. 
This was quickly done ; and in a few 
minutes afterwards, the vessel went 
down in fifty-four feet of water, carry- 
ing with her about one hundred of 
dead, sick and wounded, who could not 
be moved. The topmast of the Cum- 



berland remained partially above the 
water, with her flag flying from its peak. 
It was now nearly four o'clock in the 
afternoon. Having finished the Cum- 
berland, the Merrimac now turned her 
attention to the sailing frigate Congress. 
We have seen that just as the Merri- 
mac appeared by the way of the Eliza- 
beth River, two other vessels came down 
the James, as if by a preconcerted ar- 
rangement. These vessels were the 
Yorktown and the Jamestown, or, as the 
latter was now called, Patrick Henry. 
While the Merrimac was engaged with 
the Cumberland, the Yorktown and 
the Jamestown, which had successfully 
passed the National batteries at New- 
port News, had tackled the Congress. 
Until the Cumberland went down, the 
Congress made a gallant and success- 
ful resistance. With the help of the 
Zouave, she then managed to run 
agroimd under cover of the strong bat- 
teries just named. There she was be- 
yond reach of the Merrimac's prow, 
but she was not beyond the range of 
her guns. As soon, therefore, as that 
vessel came up, she opened fire upon 
the unfortunate Congress, which could 
not reply with her stern guns, one of 
which was soon dismounted by the 
Merrimac's shot, and the other had the 
muzzle knocked off. Lieutenant Smith, 
Acting-Master Mooi-e, and Pilot Wil- 
liam Rhodes, with nearly half the crew, 
were killed or wounded. The Merri- 
mac moved backward and forward slow- 
ly, firing at a range of less than a 
hundred yards. The Congress now 
took fire in several places. Further 
resistance would have been worse tha* 



204 



THE MERRIMaC and THE MONITOR. 



foolishness ; and so Lieutenant Prender- 
gast hauled down the flag. A tug 
came alongside to haul her off ; but the 
batteries on shore drove off the tug; 
and the Merrimac, despite the white 
flag which was flying over her in token 
of surrender, again opened fire upon 
the battered and helpless vessel. Later 
in the day, the Merrimac returned and 
set the Congress on fire by red-hot shot. 
About midnight the fire caught her 
magazine; and she exploded with a 
tremendous noise. Those of her crew 
which survived the first attack had 
meanwhile made good their escape. 
About one half of the whole, 218 out 
of 434, responded to the call of their 
names next morning at Newport News. 
In little more than two hours the Merri- 
mac had destroyed two of the best ships 
in the National service ; and Buchanan, 
her commander, had the satisfaction — 
if satisfaction it was — of killing or 
drowning more than three hundred of 
his old comrades. 

When the Merrimac first made her 
appearance in the early part of the day, 
the flag-ship of the National squadron, 
the Roanoke, Captain John Marston, 
and the steam frigate Minnesota, Cap- 
tain VanBrunt, were lying at Fortress 
Monroe, several miles distant. These 
were at once signalled to hurry forward 
to the assistance of the Cumberland, 
the Congress, and the other vessels now 
so sorely menaced. It was not possible 
for them to be forward in time to 
render any effective aid. Flag-oflicer 
Marston had responded to the signal as 
quickly as possible. His own ship was 
disabled in its machinery; but, with 



the help of two tugs, he set out for the 
scene of action. The Minnesota was 
ordered to hasten in the same direction. 
When passing Sewall's Point, the Min- 
nesota came within range of a Confede- 
rate battery there, and had her main- 
mast crippled. This, however, was not 
the only misfortune which she was des- 
tined to experience; she drew twenty- 
three feet of water; and although it 
was known that the water was danger- 
ously shallow, it was thought that, the 
bottom being soft, it would be possible 
to push her through. It was a mis- 
take. When within about a mile and 
a half of Nevrport News, the vessel 
grounded and stuck fast. While in 
this helpless condition, the Merrimac 
having destroyed the Cumberland, and 
having retired after her first attack 
on the Congress, came down upon her. 
Fortunately it was not possible for 
the Merrimac to get within a mile of 
her intended victim, her own heavy 
draught preventing a nearer approach. 
At this distance an ineffective fii'e was 
opened by both vessels. Some of the 
smaller anned steamboats ventured 
nearer, and with their rifled guns killed 
and wounded several men on board the 
Minnesota. Some of these, however, 
paid dearly for their rashness; foi', 
grounded as she was, her guns were 
ably handled,' and with great rapidity. 
It was now seven o'clock; and count- 
ing, no doubt, on an easy victory on 
the morrow, the Merrimac, with her 
companion ships, retired behind Sew- 
all's Point. The Minnesota still lay 
fast in the mud ; and although during 
the night several attempts were made 



EELIEF CAME. 



S0» 



to get her off, it was found impossible 
to move her. The Roanoke and the St. 
Lawrence, on their way to the scene of 
conflict, had both got aground ; but 
with the rising tide they were relieved, 
and moved down the Roads. It was 
Saturday night (March 8), and, when 
the sun went down, the prospect for the 
following morning was the reverse of 
cheering to the National commanders. 
There could be no doubt that the Mer- 
rimac would renew the battle in the 
m<^rning. In such a case, the result, 
unless some unexpected aid arrived, 
would be disastrous in the extreme. 
The Minnesota would be the first victim ; 
and, helpless as she was, her destruction 
was certain. If any of the other vessels 
were spared, they would surely endeavor 
ix) make their escape. The harbor of 
Hampton Roads would be lost. The 
Merrimac would be fi'ee to prosecute 
her work of destruction. Fortress Mon 
roe would be in danger ; and who could 
say that the harbor of New York was 
safe, while such a monster was afloat ? 
General Wool, commander of Fortress 
Monroe, telegraphed to Washington 
that the capture of the Minnesota was 
all but certain, and that " it was thought 
the Merrimac, Jamestown, and York- 
town would pass the fort to-night." It 
was the opinion of that officer that if 
the Merrimac, instead of passing on, at- 
tacked the foj'tress, it would not be 
possible to hold the place for more than 
a few daya 

Happily relief was at hand. At nine 
o'clock that night, the Monitor, Erics- 
son's new iron-clad turret ship, ai-rived 
•^t Fortress Monroe fi'om New York. 



This vessel, which was a dwarf beside 
the Merrimac, and which was of novel 
form and appearance, had been built 
at Green Point, Long Island, New York, 
under the direction of its inventor, 
Captain John Ericsson — a Swede by 
birth, but who had been a resi 
dent of the United States for twenty 
years. Ericsson had already won dis- 
tinction as a practical scientist in 
Sweden and in England ; and in 1842, 
having come to the United States, ho 
built for the government, the U. S. 
Steamer Princeton, the first screw-pro- 
peller in the world. The Monitor was 
one of three vessels — the other two 
were the Galena and the New Ironsides 
— which were constructed to meet the 
emergency, and by special requirement 
of the government. Ericsson's plan waa 
to secure the greatest possible power, 
both for attack and resistance, with the 
least possible exposure of surface. The 
hull of tlie Monitor admirably met all 
those requirements. It was buoyant, 
yet it was almost entirely under water. 
It presented to the enemy a target 
which was wonderfully small, but 
which because of the concentration of 
iron and timber was absolutely im- 
pregnable — proof against the heaviest 
artillery of the day. Concentration was 
Ericsson's object in the construction of 
the hull, so far as defence or resistance 
was concerned. He followed the same 
plan in regard to the offensive part o£ 
the ship. In the centre of his raft-like 
vessel, he fixed a revolving cylindei^ 
of wrought-iron, of sufficient diameter 
to allow of two heavy guns, and just 
high enough to give the gunners stand- 



319 



ao6 



THE MEERIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 



ing room. When finished, the total 
length of the Monitor was 172 feet. 
This covered the armor and what is 
called the " overhang." The length 
of the hull proper was 124 feet. Her 
total beam over armor and backing was 
41^ feet — the beam of the hull proper 
being .34 feet. Her depth was 11 feet; 
her draught 10 feet. The diameter of 
the turret inside was 20 feet; the 
height was 9 feet; the thickness, 8 
inches, there being 5 inches of wrought- 
iron and 3 feet of oak. The total 
weight, with everything on board, was 
nine hundred tons. As an engine of 
-^var, the Monitor was in the strictest 
sense of the word a novelty. Nothing 
of the kind had ever before existed. 
Not unnaturally, therefore, very differ- 
ent opinions prevailed as to the fitness 
of the vessel for the purposes contem- 
plated. Had the Monitor gone to 
the bottom as she slid from the 
stocks at Greenpoint, she would only 
have fulfilled the predictions and justi- 
fied the expectations of many prominent 
scientific men who were present when 
?he was launched. The strange-looking 
little ship, as we shall presently see, 
was to have a different and more glori- 
ous future. 

According to the terms of the con- 
tract the Monitor was not to be accepted 
by the government until her sea-going 
powers were tested and until she had 
made trial of her strength with the 
heaviest guns of the enemy. This, 
therefore, was her trial trip ; and never, 
perhaps, in the history of any ship of 
war was a trial trip more severely tested 
or more completely successful. Lieuten- 



ant John L. Worden was in command. 
On her way from New York the 
weather was extremely rough. For 
three days the Monitor battled with the 
storm ; but more than once victory was 
doubtful. The sea rolled over her decks, 
the turret alone being above the water. 
At one time the tiller-rope was thrown 
off the wheel, and the situation was 
really critical. The draft pipe was 
choked by the pouring down of the 
water; and but for the ventilation 
obtained through the turret, the men 
would have been suffocated. More 
than once during the voyage the fires 
were extinguished. After such a voy- 
age the crew, as was to be expected, 
were completely exhausted. We have 
seen that the Monitor reached Fortress 
Monroe at 9 o'clock, on the evening of 
Saturday, the 8th of March. But for 
this storm the Monitor might have been 
up in time to prevent the disaster of the 
previous day ; for it is now known that 
the Confederates, informed by spies of 
the forwardness of the Monitor, had 
made almost superhuman efforts to have 
the work on the Merrimac finished, so 
as to give her an opportunity of destroy- 
ing the National fleet at Hampton Roads 
before her great rival could appear on 
the scene. As it was, Lieutenant Worden 
lost no time after his arrival at Fortress 
Monroe. Within a few minutes he had 
reported to the flag ofiicer in the Roads, 
received orders and sailed to join the 
disabled fleet. Soon after mid- Mar. 
night, on the morning of the 9th, *• 
he anchored his little vessel alongside 
the Minnesota. 

Never did relief arrive more oppor- 



THE MINNESOTA. 



Vfi 



tunely. It was a night to be remem- 
bered—that of the 8th of March, 1862, 
at Hampton Roads. The Confederates 
were flushed with success. The Na- 
tionals were downcast, as well they 
might be, but by no means desperate. 
Norfolk was illuminated ; and the Con- 
federate officers and sailors were rejoic- 
ing and carousing with her grateful 
eitizens. On the one side, there was 
the certain conviction that to-mon'ow 
would bring with it an easy victory. 
Oi^ the other side there was a sullen 
determination to resist to the last, and 
a dim, ill-defined hope that some effec- 
tive aid was to be expected fi-om the 
strange little vessel which had just 
arrived. As the night wore on, the 
waters and the adjacent coast were brill- 
iantly lit up by the flames of the burn- 
ing Congress ; and ever and anon, at 
irregular intervals, a shotted gun would 
boom over the dull waters and startle 
the quiet air, as the spreading flames 
ignited its charge. The ship had been 
burning for ten hours, when, about one 
o'clock, the fire having reached the 
magazine, she blew up with a temfic 
aoise, filling the air and strewing the 
waters far and wide with masses of 
burnino; timber. 

Sunday morning broke beautiful and 
clear. The Congress had disappeai'ed ; 
but the masts and yards of the Cumber- 
land projected above the water, and her 
ensign was flying in its accustomed 
place. As sad evidences of the sudden- 
ness of her destruction, the dead bodies 
of her brave defenders floated in large 
numbers around the ship. Before the 
sun had fully revealed himself, and paled 



by his brighter light the lurid flames 
of the burning fragments of the Con- 
gress, the Merrimac was seen coming 
down from Sewall's Point. Evidently 
she was bent on completing the work 
of the previous day. The drums of 
the Merrimac beat to quarters. Word- 
en was ready. Taking his position 
at the peep-hole of the pilot-house of 
the Monitor, he gave orders for an im- 
mediate attack. The Merrimac made 
direct for the Minnesota ; and from the 
course she took it was apparently the 
intention of her commander to capture 
that vessel, if possible, and carry her 
back as a prize to Norfolk, where hun- 
dreds of people lined the shores, await- 
ing his triumphant return. As she 
approached, the stern guns of the Min- 
nesota opened upon her, but to little 
purpose ; for the stacks and sloping 
sides of the huge monster had beeu 
smeared with tallow, and the shot, 
heavy as it was, glanced harmlessly off. 
Meanwhile, the little Monitor, to the 
astonishment of all who were privileged 
to witness the sight, ran out from under 
the Minnesota's quarter and placed her- 
self alongside of the Merrimac, com- 
pletely covering the Minnesota ' ' as far 
as was possible with her diminutive 
dimensions*" The contrast was striking. 
It was more — i* was almost ridiculous. 
David and Goliath ! It seemed as if 
the Merrimac had but to move upon 
the insignificant, almost invisible thing, 
touch it with her iron prow, and make 
an end of it forever. But it was not 
so. This other giant had found more 
than a match in this other stripling. 
The Merrimac let fly a broadside ; and 



idfs 



THE MERRIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 



the tuiTet of the Monitor began to 
revolve. Both vessels, as we have 
shown already, were heavily armed. 
The Merrlmac had on each side two 72- 
inch rifles aud four 9-inch Dahlgrens. 
The Monitor had in her turret two 11- 
inch guns, each capable of flinging a 
shot of 168 pounds. The turret kept 
revolving ; but the ponderous shot of 
thfe iVTonitor rattled in vain against the 
mail-clad sides of the Merrimac. Broad- 
side followed broadside in rapid suc- 
cession ; but the heavy metal discharged 
by the guns of the Merrimac made no 
impression on the wrought-iron citadel 
of the Monitor. Unlike as were the two 
ships, it was really a battle of giants. 
"Gun after gun," says Captain Van 
Brunt of the Minnesota, " was tired by 
the Monitor, which was returned with 
whole broadsides from the rebels, with 
no more effect apparently than so many 
pebble-stones thrown by a child * * * 
clearly establishing the fact that wooden 
vessels cannot contend with iron-clad 
ones ; for never before was anything 
like it di'eamed of by the greatest en- 
thusiasts in maritime warfare." After 
the first vigorous onset there was some 
manoeuvring for positions, the Monitor 
seeking the port holes of the Merrimac, 
the latter all the while pouring her 
heavy shot on the invulnerable turret 
of her plucky little antagonist. One 
bolt from a rifle-gun struck the turret 
squarely, and penetrated the iron. "It 
then broke short off and left its head 
sticking in." Five times the Memmac 
attempted to run the Monitor down ; 
but, on each occasion, she received, at 
the distance of a few feet, the heavy 



shot of the 11-inch guns. In one of 
these encounters, the Meirimac got 
aground, and the Monitor, being light 
of draught, steamed easily around, mov- 
ing and hitting like a skilled pugilist, 
her lightning-like fire striking her an- 
tagonist at every vulnerable point. 
The Merrimac began to show signs of 
punishment. Her armor plate was 
bending and starting under the heavy 
blows. 

As if despairing of accomplishing any- 
thing definite or satisfactory with the 
Monitor, the Merrimac turned away 
from her agile and rather dangerous 
antagonist and renewed her attack on 
the Minnesota. Van Brunt, as he him- 
self tells us, was on his guard, and gave 
the monster a warm reception. He 
opened upon her all his broadside guns, 
with a ten-inch pivot gun besides. So 
terrific was the broadside that "it was 
enough," to quote Van Brunt's lan- 
guage, " to blow out of the water any 
timber built ship in the world." It 
produced, however, but very little ef- 
fect. The Merrimac gave a hearty re- 
sponse. From her rifled bow gun she 
flung one of her terrible shells, which 
went crashing through the side of the 
Minnesota, exploding on its way two 
charges of powder, and finally bursting 
in the boatswain's apartments, tearing 
four rooms into one and setting the 
ship on fire. Another shell burst the 
boiler of the tugboat Dragon, which 
lay alongside the Minnesota. During 
the encounter, which was brief, the 
guns of the Minnesota had hit the Mer- 
rimac at least fifty times, producing 
little or no impression. 



A DECIDED VICTORY. 



206 



A second time the Monitor comes to 
the aid of the Minnesota. The Merri- 
mac finds it necessary to change her po- 
sition, and in doing so, again gets 
grounded. The Minnesota asrain finds 
her opportunity; and her heavy guns 
are opened on her sti-anded foe. The 
broadsides are now telling on the thick 
armor-plates of the Merriniac. Catesby 
Jones, who was in command, Buchanan 
having been wounded the previous day, 
evidently regarded his situation as criti- 
cal ; and, accordingly, as soon as he got 
the Merrimac afloat, he turned her prow 
toward Norfolk. The Monitor gave 
chase. Irritated by the pertinacity of 
the little ship, the Merrimac turned 
round on her pursuer and rushed upon 
her at full speed, as if resolved to run 
her down. It was a vain attempt, al- 
though, judging from the appearance of 
things, it was by no means either un- 
natural or unwise. The huge beak of 
the Memmac grated on the deck of the 
Monitor and Avas wrenched. Such a 
blow had sent the Cumberland down 
on the Saturday. Such a blow, had 
it been possible to deal it, would 
doubtless have proved equally fatal to 
the Minnesota, or indeed to any Avooden 
ship afloat. It left the Monitor un- 
injured. The little vessel glided nim- 
bly out from under her antagonist ; and 
in doing so, the two ships being almost 
in actual contact, she opened iipon her 
with one of her heavy turret guns, strik- 
ing her with a force which seemed to 
crush in her armor. Quick as lightning 
the concentrated shot of the Memmac 
rattled against the turret and pilot- 
bouse of the Monitor. The encoun-ter 



was terrific; but the armor of both 
vessels was shot-proof, and for the first 
time in naval warfare, heavy and well- 
directed cannon were found to be com- 
paratively worthless. At this stage 
the Monitor hauled off for the purpose 
of hoisting more shot into her tun-et. 
Catesby Jones, imagining that he had 
silenced his small but formidable an- 
tagonist, made another move toward 
the Minnesota. Before he had time to 
open fire, the Monitor was steaming 
up towards him. He changed his course 
at once ; and it was now noticeable that 
the Merrimac was sagging at her stern. 
A well directed shot from the Monitor 
had hit the Merrimac at the junction 
of the casemate with the ship's side, 
and caused a leak. Another shot 
about the same moment had penetrated 
the boiler of one of the Merrimac's 
tenders, enveloping her in steam, and 
scalding a large number of her crew. 
Latterly the Monitor had been firing 
low, and every shot told with greater 
or less effect. The Monitor, however, 
was not to be allowed to escape unin- 
jured. The last shot fired by the Mer- 
rimac was the most effective. It struck 
the pilot-house of the Monitor opposite 
the peep-hole through which Worden 
at that moment was looking. It cut 
the iron plank in two, inflicted a severe 
wound on Worden, and knocked him 
senseless to the floor, Lieutenant Green, 
who commanded the guns, and Chief- 
Engineer Steiners, who worked the tur- 
ret, being at the same moment stunned 
and stupefied, but not severely injured. 
Green and Steiners recovered quickly 
enough to keep the gunners at work; 



no 



THE MEREIMAC AND THE MONITOH. 



but "Worden did not for some time re- 
cover consciousness. When he did so, 
his first question was, " Did we save 
the Minnesota ? " 

The battle was now ended. The 
Meri-imac steered at once for Norfolk. 
The Monitor soon afterwards steered for 
Fortress Monroe, the severe mishap 
which had befallen her commander pre- 
venting her fi'om following up her vic- 
tory, and forcing the battle to a 
surrender. Worden was really badly 
injured. His face was much disfigured, 
and he was completely blind. Removed 
to the city of Washington, his life for 
a time was despaired of ; but he revived ; 
and, as we shall see hereafter, he ren- 
dered his country further good service 
before the war was ended. As soon as 
the Merrimac retired, the Minnesota 
was got afloat by thi-owing some of her 
hea^^ guns overboard. She was saved. 
The battle which began as early as eight 
o'clock in the morning was waged with 
great ferocity until after midday. The 
little Monitor did noble work and won 
a most decided victory. 

During the two days the Minnesota 
had fii-ed 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and 
more than ten tons of powder. While 
struggling with the Merrimac, the Mon- 
itor fired 41 shots, and was struck 22 
times. The only serious injury done 
to the Monitor was the shattering of 
her pilot-house. The Merrimac suffered 
considerably. On board two men were 
killed and some nineteen wounded. 
She had lost her iron prow, her star- 
board anchor and all her boats. Her 
armor was badly damaged ; her steam- 
pipe and smoke-stack were riddled ; 



the muzzles of two of her gims were 
shot away ; the wood work at one of 
her ports was so exposed that it took 
fire at every discharge ; and the water 
was rushing in upon her through one of 
the openings made by the shot of the 
Monitor. 

No battle by land or sea, during the 
whole war, created more excitement or 
evoked more enthusiasm than the battle 
at Hampton Roads. At the close of the 
first day, victory was clearly on the side 
of the South. In proportion to the joy 
that prevailed throughout the Confed- 
erate States — and the joy was great — 
there was depression of feeling in the 
North. At the close of the second day 
the situation was reversed. There was 
depression of feeling in the South — all 
the greater because of the previous joy. 
The hearts of the Confederates, in truth, 
sank within them. But there were 
great rejoicings in the North. Cheers 
and congratulations rose up on all sides. 
The glad intelligence of the success of 
the Monitor was flashed from State to 
State and from city to city ; and from 
the Cabinet, from Congress, from State 
Legislatures, from Town Councils, from 
Chambers of Commerce, from Boards of 
Trade, from public bodies of all kinds, as 
well as from special meetings of the peo- 
ple, thanks and praise were pom-ed out up- 
on the Monitor, upon her inventor, upon 
her brave commander, and upon all the 
officers and men who took part in the 
heroic struggle and helped to bring 
about the glorious result. The rejoicing 
was universal ; and the praise was aa 
unstinted as the gratitude was genuine 
and profound. Hampton Roads became 



THE LESSON. 



211 



immortal ; and the little Monitor ac- 
quired a I'eputation such as was never 
befoi'e enjoyed by any ship of war. 
Pili:!;rimai>:es were organized and under- 
taken to visit the scene of the conflict 
and the victory; and all ranks and classes 
of the peoi^le, from the President down- 
ward, rushed to see the " little wonder " 
— the strange vessel which had done 
such effective work. The excitement 
was not confined to this country alone. 
The success of the Monitor created a 
profound interest throughout the civil- 
ized world, and nowhere more than in the 
Bntish Isles. It was felt and confessed 
not only that sea-girt nations must in 
future depend for protection on other 
than wooden walls, but that a new and 
terrible engine of war had been con- 
structed. The battle at Hampton Roads 
had read the world a lesson. It pro- 
claimed the superiority of such a vessel 
as the Merrimac with her sloping sides 
and inclined armor to the ordinary 
iron-clad. It also proclaimed the fact 
that inclined armor was inferior to a 
turret. The nations then busy with the 
reconstruction of their ships for war pur- 
poses, and spending millions upon mill- 
ions upon new models, felt it necessary 
to pause, to read the lesson Avhich came 
from Hampton Roads, and to reflect. 

It would not be easy to overestimate 
the importance of these two days' fight- 
ing on the general conduct of the war. 
The result was a heavy blow to the 
Confederates : it was a clear gain to the 
National cause. There was, no doubt, 
just cause for regret that the Merrimac 
was allowed to escape, and that she was 
not hotly pursued and compelled to 



surrender. There can be no doubt now 
that the Monitor was quite equal to 
such a task. It was developed in an 
investigation after the battle that the 
Monitor had on board wrought-iron 
shot, each weighing 184 pounds; but 
this shot was not used as the capacity 
and strength of the 11-inch Dahlgren 
guns were as yet imperfectly known. 
In answer to a question put by the War 
Committee, as to why the battle was 
not more promptly decided against the 
Merrimac, Mr. Newton, the Chief En- 
gineer of the Monitor, said : " It was 
due to the fact that the power and 
endurance of the 11-inch Dahlgren guns, 
with which the Monitor was armed, 
were not known at the time of the 
battle; hence the commander would 
scarcely have been justified in increas- 
ing the charge of powder above that 
authorized in the Ordnance Manual. 
Subsequent experience developed the 
important fact that these guns could be 
fired with thirty pounds of common 
powder, with solid shot. If this had 
been known at the time of the action, 
I am cleai-ly of opinion that from the 
close quarters at which Lieutenant 
Worden fought his vessel, the enemy 
would have been forced to surrendei"." 
According to the same witness, if a 15- 
inch gun could possiV)ly have been 
mounted in the turret, the action would 
have been short and decisive. Mr. 
Newton did not doubt that but for the 
injuiy received by Lieutenant Worden 
that officer would have pursued and 
" badgered " the Merrimac to surrender. 
These reasons, it must be admitted, aie 
sufficiently satisfactory. If they do not 



212 



THE MEREIMAC AND THE MOXITOR. 



remove all cause of regret that the Merri- 
mac made her escape, they at least com- 
pletely exonerate the National command- 
ers. Worden was irresponsible; and 
his subordinates, judging from the expe- 
rience they had had that Sunday fore- 
noon, thought it best to content them- 
selves with what they had actually ac- 
complished. If they missed a prize, 
posterity will not judge them harshly. 
As it was, the Nationals had won a 
great victory, and had just reason to 
be well pleased. Had the Meirimac 
been permitted to proceed unchecked 
in her work of destruction, the result 
could not but have been most disastrous 
to all tlie best interests of the North. 
It might have seriously affected the en- 
tire future of the war, and led to re- 
sults very different to what were de- 
sired and to what were ultimately 
achieved. But for the timely arrival 
of the Monitor, the Minnesota would 
have shared the fate of the Cumbei'land 
and the Congress ; the entire Union 
fleet would have been destroyed or cap- 
tured ; the splendid harbor of Hampton 
Roads would have been left in the un- 
disputed possession of the Confederates ; 
Fortress Moni'oe ^vould have been im- 
perilled, and its fall would have been 
only a question of days. Such a loss, 
in itself considered, would have been 
great. But it would have been greater 
still in the consequences which must 
necessarily have resulted. The pos- 
session of Hampton Roads, implying 
of course the possession of Fortress 
Monioe, Avould have given the Con- 
federates absolute control of the James 
and York rivers, and by consequeno*> 



would have upset all McClellan's plans, 
and brought his projected campaign 
against Richmond to premature and in- 
glorious defeat. This, however, would 
not have been all. The possession of 
these waters by the Confederates would 
have made secure, as it would have 
given them the command of, the Pen- 
insula, and made impossible any attack 
by way of the James River. Worse 
even than this was possible. What 
would have hindered the Menimac 
from running up Chesapeake Bay and 
steaming up the Potomac, to the terror 
of the National Capitol ? Or supposing 
she had put to sea, what was there to 
prevent her making her way to the 
harbor of New York, dealing de- 
struction among the shipping, and lay 
ing under contribution the chief com 
mercial city of the Union ? There were 
other possibilities equally if not even 
more alarming. One other we deem it 
proper to mention. The expulsion of the 
National fleet from Hampton Roads, 
coupled as it would have been with the 
fall of Fortress Monroe, would have 
encouraged foreign governments in what 
they would have been pleased to call 
the interests of peace, to grant recog- 
nition and even support to the Con- 
federacy. In the spring of 1862 the 
Confederates were not without bright, 
and, as they thought, cheering pros- 
pects ; if they were not absolutely 
commanding confidence abroad, they 
were at least inspiring hope ; and such 
success as that which we have indicated, 
would have been quite suflBcieut to 
make ill-concealed foreign sympathy 
.^siune an active form. 




MAI' SHOWING THE CITY OF MOBILE AND ITS DEFENCES. 



I 





MAT OF NORTHERN VIRC.INIA, SHOWING FREDERICKSBURG, CHANCELLOES- 
VILLE, SPOTTSYLVANIA, THE WILDERNESS, Etc., Etc. 



,ii 







^c-|^f^T ; 





dSOOO DWYNSVIlLB 
^^Z£SS-sou sc. y V^, — v.^^ \\ _y~\ 



MAP SHOWiNG THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES NEAR PETERSBURG, VA. 



> 




MAP SHOWING THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY, THE SCENE OF SEVEBAi 
IMPORTANT CAMPAIGNS. 




CAVALRY CHARGE 



r 





^N 




DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF 
MURFREESBORO- OB STONE RIVER. 




MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN MURFREESBORO" AND CHATTANOOGA, 

TENNESSEE. 




i:^ 



V'7^.;5!l|i1f!^ 11''/'/ 



■^ 



V 



■'!ii 



m' 111 i If. r 'J 



lUili 



•iiW 




SCALE or M/LCS 



MAP SHOWING THE ENTRANCES TO CAPE FEAR RIVER AND THE APPROACHES 
TO WILMINGTON, N. C. 



THE ADVANCE. 



213 



It wii» a matter of some importance 
to the Uuion that all these evils were 
averted. It was something of gi'eater 
importance still, that the Nationals had 
for the time being, at least, established 
their superiority in naval warfare, had 
effectually secured possession of one of 
the largest and most valuable land- 
locked bays on the Continent, with all 
the connected rivers of the Peninsula, 
and had rendered necessary the aban- 
donment of Norfolk. Now that the en- 
emy had been driven from all the neigh- 
boring waters, McClellan had a fair 
opportunity to carry out his projected 
plans on the Peninsula, with a view 
to the capture of Richmond. This 
happy state of things had been brought 



about mainly by the Monitor. It was 
not without good reason that Chief-En- 
gineer Steiner, on the day the battle had 
been fought, vsTote to Ericsson in the fol- 
lowing terms: " I congratulate you upon 
your great success. Thousands have this 
day blessed you. I have heard whole 
crowds cheer you. Every man feels 
that you have saved this place to the 
nation, by furnishing us with the means 
to whip an iron-clad frigate, that was, 
until our arrival, having it all her own 
way with our most powerful vosaels." 
The Merrimac was blowu up by 
the Confederates May 11th, ?tnd, to- 
wards the close of the year, 'jhe Mon- 
itor foundered in a storm off Cape 
Hatteras. 



CHAPTER XV. 

F-ollowing up the Foe. — The Confederate Works at WilUamsbnrg. — Fort Magruder. — Winn's Mill Road. — Hooker 
and Kearney. — Couch and Casey. —Sumner in Command. — General Stoneman. — The 4th of May. — A Fearful 
Night. — Hooker Engages the Foe. — The Confederates Well Prepared. — Severe Fighting. — Fort Magruder 
SUeuced. — Arrival of Longstreet. — A Cruel Piece of Deception. — Blaisdell's Men. — Private Doherty. — The 
Seventeenth New York. — Bravery of Hooker. — The Pluck and Endurance of His Men. — An Unequal Struggle. — 
Kearney Comes Up. — General Hancock. — General Birney. — A Gallant Charge. — Hancock's Advance. — Hancock 
Driven Back. — Falls Back in Good Order. — A Halt. — "Gentlemen, Charge!" — Retreat of tSae Confederates. — 
The Key of the Position. — The Heroes of Williamsburg. — An Unsatisfactory Fight. — The Great Bravery of the 
Troops. — Bad Generalship. — It Ought to Have Been Different. — Want of Unity. — McClellan's Mistake. — Sumner 
not the Right Man in the Right Place. — ^Why was McClellan Absent ? — Franklin's Expedition. — The Prince do 
Joinville. — McClellan on the Field. — His Appearance. — Enthusiasm of the Troops. — " That Little Matter. "— 
"Bivouac in Front of Williamsburg." — Other Battles to Fight. — More Delay. — What a Bold Stroke Might Have 
Accomplished. — Promises Fair but Fruitless. — Lincoln's Prophetic Words. — The Story of Manassas Repeate*/ 
—Would not Strike a Blow. 



/S62. 



After the evacuation of Yorktown, 
McClellan gave orders that the 
enemy should be followed up. 
The Confederates moved towards Will- 
iamsburg, where, some months before, 



they had constructed a line of strong 
works, some thii-teen in number, on the 
rolling but elevated ground on which 
that city stands. These works were 
two miles in front of Williamsburg, at 



»90 



214 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



the narrowest part of the Peninsula. The 
line stretched from a deep ravine, near 
the James River on the right, to Queen's 
Creek, near the York River on the left. 
The principal work was Fort Magi'uder, 
close to the junction of the Yorktown 
and "Winn's Mill Road. This was an 
earth-work, with bastioned front. Its 
crest measured nearly half a mile. It 
was heavily aiTQed and surrounded by a 
ditch. The others were redoubts not 
unlike those which were thrown up 
around Washington City. These works 
the Confederates placed under a strong 
guard for the purpose of holding the 
pui'suers in check, while the main body 
pressed on so as to place the Chicka- 
hominy between them and the Na- 
tionals. 

The pursuing army was headed by 
General Stonemau, with his cavaliy and 
horse artillery. Stoneman was followed 
along the Yorktown Road by the divi- 
sions of Generals Joseph Hooker and 
Philip Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, 
and along the Winn's Mill Road by the 
divisions of Generals W. F. Smith, 
Darius N. Couch and Silas Casey, of 
Keyes' corps. The commands of Rich- 
ardson, of Sedgwick, and of Fitz John 
Porter were left at Yorktown, with 
instructions to hold themselves in readi- 
ness to advance as a supporting force, if 
required, or, if deemed more important, 
to follow and co-operate with Franklin's 
division, which was to move up the York 
River to West Point, and take posses- 
sion of the terminus of the Richmond 
and York River Railroad. General 
Edwin V. Sumner, McClellan's second 
in command, was intrusted with the 



immediate direction of the pursuit. Mc 
Clellan himself remained at Yorktown 
for the purpose of completing the 
arrangements necessaiy for the depart- 
ure of Franklin up the York River. 

General Stoneman, who moved some 
miles ahead of the rest of the army, 
touched the Confederate lines in the 
neighborhood of Fort Magruder. Ex- 
posed to the guns of the fort, and fiercely 
attacked by the Confederate cavalry, h» 
was compelled to fall back. Meanwhile, 
Hooker and Smith's divisions, the latter 
ahead, were pressing forward with all 
haste on the Yorktown Road. On be- 
ing informed of Stoneman's repulse, 
Hooker, feeling the necessity of despatch, 
obtained leave from General Heintzel- 
man to thi-ow his division on the Hamp- 
ton or Warwick roads. Having Smith 
no longer in front, he was able to move 
with greater ease and rapidity. Sumner, 
having hurried forward with Smith's 
division, reached the place where Stone- 
man was halting about five o'clock in 
the afternoon. By midnight. Hooker, 
who had made the best possible use of 
his time, had his men in position on 
Smith's left. Here the troops rested 
on their arms until the morning. Maj 
The 4th of May, 1862, is one of *• 
the memorable Sundays of the war. It 
had i-ained all day, and the roads were 
almost impassable. At night the rain 
continued. " That was a fearful night," 
wrote one who was present with the 
army ; " and that was a strange, eventful 
bivouac. The i-oads being in a dread- 
fully muddy condition, the troops had 
had a difficult march ; and then, at night, 
without shelter from the rain, which wa» 



CEUEL DECEPTION. 



315 



falling fast, without food or nourish- 
ment, thej all, officers and soldiers, 
reposed that Sabbath night, as best they 
could, on the wet ground and among 
the forest trees." The position of the 
army, as, in these circumstances, it 
sought rest for the night, was as follows : 
General Hooker's division lay in front 
of the centre of the Confederate works ; 
Smith's division and Stoneman's cavalry 
and artillery lay to the right. The 
divisions of -Kearney and Couch had 
halted in the rear. 

At break of day on the 5th, Hooker 
May was up and in motion. Before the 
5« church clocks had struck six, he 
was in full view of the works which the 
Confederates had thrown up for defense ; 
and the towers and spires of Williams- 
burg were cleaT'ly revealed across the 
open level plains. For well nigh a mile 
in front, the gi'ound was obstructed by 
trees which had been felled for the pur- 
pose ; and wherever the ground was open 
it was dotted with rifle-pits. Hooker 
lost no time in moving upon the foe. He 
knew that there were thirty thousand 
men within supporting distance, and 
that the bulk of the army of the Poto- 
mac was within four hours' march. At 
half-past seven o'clock, he directed Gen- 
eral Grover, with his brigade, to make 
the attack. The First Massachusetts, the 
Second New Hampshire, the Eleventh 
Massachusetts and Twenty-Sixth Penn- 
sylvania regiments were deployed in 
front, to the left of the Hampton Road, 
as skirmishers, with orders to pick 
off the Confederate sharpshooters and 
artillerists, Avhile Captain Weber, with 
his battery, was pushed into the open 



field, until they were within seven 
hundred yards of Fort Magi-uder. The 
Confederates were not found unpre- 
pared. Before the disposition of the 
National troops was completed, the 
guns of the fort and of one of the ad- 
joining redoubts opened a heavy fire, 
killing two of Weber's officers and 
several of his men, and forcing the 
battery to fall back. The battery, 
however, was quickly re-manned by 
some volunteers from Osbom's ; and the 
guns were soon in position and respond- 
ing to the fire of the enemy. Bram- 
hall's New York battery came up 
opportunely and took a position to the 
right of Weber's. The two batteries 
were supported by the Fifth New Jersey 
regiment ; and while the batteries 
poured forth their shot and shell with 
terrible rapidity and with deadly aim, 
the rifle bullets of the infantry did 
scarcely less effective work. Within 
an hour and a half the Confederate 
troops which had appeared on the plain 
were dis])ersed, and the guns of their 
works apj)arently silenced. 

The battle, however, was as yet only 
beginning. The Confederates, at the 
veiy moment victory seemed secured by 
the Nationals, began to appear in great 
force. We have already seen that the 
main body of the Confederate army had 
left Williamsburg, and was on its way 
towards Richmond before Hooker came 
up. It was only, therefore, with the rear- 
guard of the retreating army, and with 
the troops which had been left behind 
to man the fort and the redoubts, that 
the Nationals had as yet been engaged. 
After Hooker had sent out his skirm- 



216 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



ishers, and the National batteries had 
opened fire, Johnston began to perceive 
that the pressure of the pursuers was 
much greater than he had been led to 
Buspect from the ordinarily dilatory 
movements of McClellan. Longstreet's 
division had already passed through 
Williamsbui'g. It was ordered back by 
Johnston to give its suppoi't to the rear- 
guard. It was this division which now 
appeared on the scene of conflict, and 
gave new life to the struggle. Long- 
street's men were fresh and full of 
vigor ; and when they fell in force upon 
Patterson's New Jersey brigade, which 
had been engaged all the morning, it 
was felt that the contest was unequal. 
Hooker, therefore, sent to Patterson's 
assistance Brigadier-General Grover, 
with the First Massachusetts and two 
regiments of the Excelsior brigade, the 
Twentieth and Seventy-Second New 
York. At the same time the Eleventh 
Pennsylvania and Twenty-Sixth Massa- 
chusetts came up to the Yorktown 
Road ; and Colonel Blaisdell, who com- 
manded them, was ordered to clear the 
road and form a connectioa with Heint- 
zelman's coi-ps. 

Blaisdell promptly put the order in 
fexecution. His men marched steadily 
forward until they were within fifty 
yards of the enemy ; and here occurred 
one of those cruel pieces of deception 
to which the Confederates on more than 
one occasion resorted. " Don't fire on 
your friends," shouted a Confederate 
ofticer, displaying a white flag. Blais- 
dell ordered his men to cease firing; 
and Private Doherty advanced to take 
the flag. "Now, give it them," ex- 



claimed the same treacherous voice ; and 
on Blaisdell's men, thus thrown off 
their guard, the Confederates opened a 
destructive fire. Several of them w<ere 
killed. Among them was poor Doherty, 
who, however, had managed, before he 
fell, to put a bullet through the head of 
the wretched traitor who had lured him 
to his death. Blaisdell's men did good 
and effective work, maintaining the 
struggle until their ammunition was 
exhausted. They were relieved by the 
Seventy-Second New York. This regi- 
ment, after an unsuccessful attack on a 
battery to the left, and having been 
exposed to a raking fire from the ene- 
my's guns, was compelled to give place 
to the Seventieth New York, Colonel 
Dwight. As this regiment came foi-- 
ward, it was supposed by the Confede- 
rates to be one of their own. The 
Confederate colonel displaying his own 
flag, asked for a similar display on the 
part of the Seventieth. Dwight un- 
furled the "stars and stripes." It was 
the signal for a Confederate volley, 
which, of course, was promptly re- 
sponded to, and with energy and effect. 
The Seventieth fought like heroes ; and 
although pressed by greatly superior 
numbers, they held their ground till 
their cartridge boxes were empty. 
After a severe and unequal struggle, in 
which twenty-two of the thirty-threa 
commissioned officers of the regiment 
were killed or wounded, Colonel 
Dwight, himself wounded, was made 
prisoner, with several of his men. The 
battle was now raging furiously all 
along the line ; the Confederates were 
continually being reinforced, Pickett 



HOOKER'S BRAVERY. 



217 



and Gholson, and Pryor and others, 
having hurried back from the direction 
of the Chickahominy ; and the increas- 
ing strength of Johnston's amiy was 
steadily concentrating on Hooker's left. 
The situation was becoming critical. 
The Confederates had three times 
charged the National centre ; they had 
made a bold dash from Fort Magruder, 
and captured five of Weber's guns ; 
they had worn out some of the best 
National regiments, and thinned sevei-al 
of the National brigades ; but Hooker, 
still unaided against the superior and 
rapidly increasing strength of his an- 
tagonist, tenaciously held his ground. 

As early as half-past eleven o'clock. 
Hooker sent a despatch to the assistant- 
adjutant-general of General Heintzel- 
man, to whose corps his division be- 
longed. In that despatch he said : " I 
have had a hard contest all the morning, 
but do not despair of success. My men 
are all at work, but a great deal exhaust- 
ed. It is reported to me that my com- 
munication with you by the Yorktown 
Road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, 
cavalry and infantry can take part by 
the side of mine and whip the enemy." 
Later in the day, and again and again, he 
addressed appeals for help to Sumner, 
but in vain. One o'clock, two o'clock, 
three o'clock struck, and still no help 
came, with the exception of Peck's bri- 
gade, of Couch's division, which arrived 
early in the afternoon, and was posted 
on his right, where it helped to repel 
several Confederate attacks. Later in 
the day two more of Couch's brigades 
came up; but as Hooker's men were 
eompletely exhausted, and their ammu- 



nition failing, it was too late to enable 
him to make any vigorous aggressive 
eifort. Between four and five in the 
afternoon. General Philip Kearney, with 
his division, appeared on the scene of 
action, and, with characteristic energy, 
pressed to the front. Hooker, with his 
thinned ranks and worn-out men, with- 
drew from the fight and rested as a 
reserve. He had lost in the battle one 
thousand seven hundred men. We do 
not much wonder that Hooker was in- 
dignant that his morning efforts were not 
more effectively backed by the strength 
of the other divisions of the army, and 
that he was allowed, after victory had 
become impossible to him and his brave 
soldiers, to fight so long unaided against 
such fearful odds. " History," he after- 
wards wrote, "will not be believed, 
when it is told that the noble ofiicers 
and men of my division were permitted 
to caiTy on this unequal struggle from 
morning until night, unaided, in the 
presence of more than 30,000 of their 
comrades, with arms in their hands ; 
nevertheless, it i^true." Of this, how- 
ever, more anon. 

Kearney, as we have just said, pressed 
to the front. General Beriy, whose 
brigade of Kearney's division, followed 
by Thomson's batteries, was the first to 
ari-ive on the ground, was immediately 
put into action. The brigade consisted 
of the Fifth Michigan, the Thirty- 
Seventh New York, and the Second 
Michigan. The Fifth Michigan was 
filed off into the woods to the left of 
the Hampton Road, and was supported 
by the Thirty-Seventh New York. A 
charge was ordered on the left ; and tht 



318 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



regiments just named "advanced in 
splendid style, driving the enemy be- 
fore them, away from the fallen timber, 
and out of the rifle-pits beyond." In 
this charge the Fifth Michigan suffered 
severely, Colonel Terry and nearly all 
his subordinate officers being wounded ; 
but they stoutly held the ground which 
they had so gallantly won. The Con- 
fedei'ates were now making vigorous 
and determined eiforts on the National 
centre. They had captured some of 
Bramhall's guns ; and they seemed re- 
solved to silence and capture the whole 
battery. To check these efforts, a bat- 
tery in charge of Captain Smith was 
planted, en echelon, on a rising knoll, to 
the right of the road. At the same 
time, two companies of the Second Mich- 
igan were ordered to charge on the 
enemy's skirmishers who were throng- 
ing about the coveted guns. The charge 
was gallantly made ; and what ^\^th the 
effective fire from Smith's battery, the 
Confederates were driven back. Gen- 
eral Birney, who, with two regiments 
of his brigade — the Thirty-Eiglith New 
York and the Fortieth New York — had 
been deployed on the right to relieve 
Hancock's weary men, now came for- 
ward. The Confederates had resumed 
firing from their forts ; and they were 
again pressing forward with their troops. 
Colonel Ward, with two companies of 
the Thirty-Eighth New York, made a 
brilliant dash down the road, taking 
the rifle-pits by the flank. The charge 
was completely successful; and the 
Confederates were driven from their po- 
sition. Encouraged by Colonel Wai'd's 
success, Kearney ordered a portion of 



the Fortieth New York to sustain him 
in another charge to the Confederate 
rear. This detachment was led by 
Captain Mindel, Birney's chief of staff. 
The charge was gallantly made, and was 
even more effective than the preceding. 
The Confederates fell back ; and there 
was no more firing either from the 
rifle-pits or by the artillery. The rear- 
brigade of Kearney's division, under 
General Jameson, now reached this por- 
tion of the field ; a second line was at 
once formed ; and arrangements were 
made for further vigorous efforts. But 
darkness fell upon the scene ; and the 
wearied soldiers, seeking repose, stretch- 
ed themselves on the rain-soaked and 
blood-stained battle field. 

While these events were taking place 
on the National left, events of equal 
importance were occurring on the ex- 
treme right. At an early hour in the 
day, fears were entertained that the 
Confederates might make a dangerous 
movement in that direction; and in 
obedience to orders from Sumner, the 
general in command. General Smith 
sent Hancock, with about twenty-five 
hundred men, to hold the enemy in 
check, and, if possible, to make a flank 
movement upon the works. Hancock's 
command consisted partly of his own 
and partly of Davidson's brigade. For 
the special duty assigned him, Hancock 
selected from his own brigade the Fifth 
Wisconsin, the Forty-Ninth Pennsylva- 
nia, and the Sixth Maine, and, from 
Davidson's brigade, the Seventh Maine 
and Thirty-Ninth New York volunteers. 
These were accompanied by the batteries 
of Crowen and Wheeler. One of the 



HANCOCK'S SPLENDID CHARGE. 



219 



redoubts which had been throwu up by 
Magruder, and which was near to the 
extreme Confederate left, was discov- 
ered to be unoccupied. Its existence, it 
appears, had been unknown to Johnston 
and his officers. The redoubt occupied 
a conspicuous and important position. 
It stood upon a high bank, looking 
down upon a ravine, and commanded a 
dam on what is called Cut Dam Creek, 
a. small tributary of Queen's Creek, and 
was about a mile and a half eastward of 
the Yorktown Road. Having crossed 
this creek, Hancock experienced no 
difficulty in taking possession of the re- 
doubt. Another redoubt, about twelve 
hundred yards in advance, was found to 
be unoccupied. This, also, was taken 
possession of. Between the redoubts 
now occupied by Hancock's men and 
Fort Magruder there were other two 
redoubts ; but these were manned by 
Confederate forces, more or less strong. 
A few shells were flung at these re- 
doubts, and a brisk fire was opened upon 
them at the same time by some sharp- 
shooters ; and they, too, were soon 
deserted. General Hancock had ac- 
complished^ without the least difficulty, 
more, perhaps, than he had expected to 
accomplish by severe and protracted 
fighting. But the evil genius of that 
ill-stari'ed day would not allow him to 
reap the full rewards of victory. He 
had not around him a sufficient number 
of men to warrant his occupation of the 
two desei'ted redoubts. There was no 
lack of men in the immediate neighbor- 
hood; but they were neither at hand 
nor in hand. It was Hooker's experience 
^ver again. He could make no further 



aggressive efforts without reinforce- 
ments. Meantime, Johnston discovered 
the blunder he had made in not making 
himself familiar with the ground. He 
ought to have known of the existence 
of these redoubts. They were all-im' 
portant ; for they were in the flank and 
rear of his line of defense. Unless 
speedily reclaimed, his line would be 
not only menaced in its integi'ity, but 
practically broken. By all means, the 
Nationals must be driven from this 
position. Such was the necessity which 
Johnston felt laid upon him. With 
this end in view, he gave instructions to 
General Hill to send a force of sufficient 
strength to expel Hancock from the 
redoubts and drive him back upon his 
own lines. The task was assigned to 
General Jubal Early, with a force of 
Virginia and North Carolina troops. 
Hancock, meanwhile, had been earnestly 
calling for reinforcements. It was all 
in vain. Sumner had been unable to 
send assistance to Hooker because of 
the number of men he had placed 
under Hancock ; and now he professes 
himself unable to succor and strengthen 
Hancock from a fear that he might 
thereby weaken his centre, and so place 
his whole army in peril. In place of re- 
ceiving reinforcements, Hancock was or. 
dered to abandon the redoubts and fal] 
back upon his original position. It was a 
painful order to execute ; but he had no 
choice. With the small number of men 
at his command, it was impossible for 
him to retain the position he had taken 
in face of the overwhelmingly superior 
numbers of the enemy. If, however, 
he must fall back, he will fall back in 



220 



WILLIAMSBTJRG. 



good order, contesting every inch of 
ground and saving his command. About 
five o'clock in the afternoon, he saw the 
two redoubts nearest Fort Magruder 
reoccupied by the Confederates. Their 
forward movement was fairly begun. 
In the most perfect order, and keeping 
his ranks in line, Hancock drew back 
his brigade. Retiring regiment by reg- 
iment, and carrying his artillery back 
piece by piece, maintaining, meanwhile, 
a vigorous fire upon the advancing foe, 
he reached the crest of a ridge not far 
from the dam above mentioned. There 
he halted, and forming his men in line 
of battle, he calmly ' awaited Early's 
approach. On came the Confederates 
in great force, firing as they advanced, 
shouting and yelling " Bull Run," 
" Ball's Bluff," and other offensive ex- 
pi'essions. They had reached vrithin 
thirty paces of his line, when Hancock, 
with as much politeness as bravery, ex- 
claimed, " Gentlemen, charge !" With 
enthusiastic cheers, his gallant soldiers 
dashed down the slope. The attack 
was irresistible. The Confederates 
broke and fled at the first touch of the 
bayonet. The Nationals, halting, fired 
some ten or a dozen volleys into the 
broken ranks. When the smoke cleared 
off, some five hundred of Early's men 
were found dead or wounded on the 
field. The remainder were in full re- 
treat towards the Confederate lines. 
The battle of Williamsburg was now 
practically ended. Hancock had won 
no great victory ; he had not dared to 
follow the retreating foe ; but he had 
secured the key of the position. Here 
be remained, waiting for reinforcements ; 



but when these were forwarded to him 
by special orders from McClellan him- 
self, who had now arrived on the field, 
they were no longer necessary. The 
battle had ceased all along the line. 

There were other struggles during 
the day, one particularly late in the 
afternoon, a little to the right of the 
Confederate works, on the Yorktown 
Road Here, in the open space. Peck's 
brigade encountered the Confederates 
in force ; and after severe fighting they 
were compelled to fall back, Generals 
Kleim and Devens, with their respect- 
ive brigades, of Casey's division, coming 
to their relief. The two great features 
of the day's contest were the heroic 
resistance of Hooker on the left and the 
splendid charge made by Hancock on 
the extreme right. Hooker and Han- 
cock, and after them Kearney — these 
were the men who won the laurels at 
Williamsburg.* 

•Joseph Hooker was born In 1819, in Hadley, Massa- 
chusetts. He was appointed a cadet at West Point in 
1833. He took part in the Mexican war, serving in the 
same regiment with "Stonewall" Jackson, and becom- 
ing aide-de-canjp to Brigadier-General Hamer. In 1848, 
having passed through the various grades, he was pro- 
moted to a full colonelcy, and entered the Adjutant- 
General's Department at Washington. In 1858 he 
resigned, went to California, and combined the duties of 
feirmer with those of railroad constructor. He super- 
intended the building of the National road. When the 
war broke out in 1861, he returned and was present as a 
spectator at the battle of Bull Run. Soon afterwards wo 
find him appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of a new regiment 
of regulars. Later he was made Brigadier-General of 
volunteers. His first active duties were in Maryland 
and Eastern Virginia. He made himself useful in help- 
ing to clear the Potomac of the Confederate blockading 
batteries. When McClellan moved to the Peninsula, 
Hooker's brigade was added to the command, and he 
himself placed at the head of a division. At Williams- 
burg, as we have seen, be estabUshed his reputation as 
one of the first soldiers of the republic. His name will 
frequently again appear in these annals. 



THE RETBEAT. 



831 



According to the official reports, the 
May National loss on Monday, May 
5« 5th, was 456 killed, 1411 wound- 
ed, and about 500 missing. The loss 
sustained by the Confederates was not 
quite so great ; but, including killed, 
wounded and missing, it could scarcely 
have been under one thousand men. 
Hooker's division suffered most severe- 
ly of all, the loss being in the propor- 
tion of one to six — a proportion of loss 
equal to that of the allied armies at 
Alma, one of the bloodiest battles of 
which history has preserved any record. 

On the night after the battle, the 



Winfield Scott Hancock, a direct descendant of John 
Hancock who signed the Declaration of Independence, 
was bom in Pennsylvania about 1824. He entered 
West Point in 1840, and graduated in 1844, receiving 
his commission of Second Lieutenant. One of his class- 
fellows at West Point was General Pleasonton. He 
served in the Mexican War, and was promoted for his 
gallantry. At the outbreak of the war he held the post 
•f Assistant-Quartermaster-General. In 1861 he was 
appointed a Brigadier-General of volunteers. In this 
capacity he was attached to the army of the Potomac. 
We have seen what services he rendered before York- 
town and at Williamsburg. His gallant charge at the 
close of that day will be remembered wilh pride so long 
as the history of the Civil War is read. Hancock's name 
■will appear in many subsequent struggles. 

" When General Kearney's troops were being brought 
into action, they met the lengthened files of General 
Hooker's wounded being carried to the rear. The 
shrieks of the lacerated and bleeding soldiers, who had 
been fighting so long and so well, pierced the air ; and 
this, joined to the mud and rain, and the exhaustion of 
those who had come several miles with so much speed, 
was not calculated to produce a favorable impression on 
them as they were going into action. General Heintzel- 
man, however, ordered several of the bands to strike up 
national and martial airs ; and when the strains of the 
familial tunes reached the ears of the wounded, as they 
were being carried from the field, three cheers mingled 
with those of the soldiers who were just rushing into 
battle. The effect, too, was great on the other side ; 
for some of the prisoners state that when they heard 
the bands strike up the Star-Spangled Banner, and 
heard our soldiers cheer, they knew that the victory 
irould be ours." — Gorrespondent N. T. Herald. 

mil 



soldiers of the National army rested on 
their arms on the ground where they 
fought during the day, some of them 
in front of the Confederate works, and 
not a few of them in close proximity 
to the bodies of their dead or wounded 
companions in arms. It was uncertain 
as yet what would be required of them 
on the following day. The Confede- 
rates still held their position ; and there 
was no good reason for believing that 
they would not renew the fight in the 
morning. Shortly after midnight it 
was rumored that the works were be- 
ing evacuated, and that according to 
appearances a retreat would be effect- 
ed during the night. When morning 
dawned, what was report was found to 
be a fact. The defenses were aban- 
doned ; and in their march to new 
ground beyond the Chickahominy, the 
Confederates were leaving behind them 
the town of Williamsburg. Fort Ma- 
gruder and the redoubts were speedily 
occupied by the Nationals ; and the 
Confederate i-ear-guard had not yet left 
the city on the one side when General 
Jameson entered it on the other. Will- 
iamsburg was found to be deserted. 

Of all the battles fought during the 
continuance of the war, none was more 
unsatisfactory, so far as the North was 
concerned, than the battle of Williams- 
burg. It was not that there was any 
lack of bravery on the part of the men. 
It was not that there was a want of 
pluck or skill on the part of those 
by whom they were immediately led. 
On the contrary, never was more 
heroism displayed than that exhibited 
by Hooker and the men of his divisiou 



232 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



as, during tlie weary hours of that day, ' 
they resisted, unaided, the vastly su- \ 
perior foi'ces of the Confederates ; and 
certainly there never was a more gal- 
lant charge than that made by Hancock 
and his little band down the ridge by 
the dam at Queen's Creek. Nor is it 
possible to speak in terms of too high 
commendation of the conduct of Kear- 
ney and his men when, after coming to 
the relief of Hooker, they charged the 
Confederates in front and flank and 
rear, driving them from their defenses, 
out of the redoubts, out of the rifle- 
pits, and out of the open ground, away 
into the woods beyond. From the 
actual work done by those commanders, 
and by the men who followed their 
lead, it is clear that the secret of the 
bungling inefficiency of that day on the 
outskirts of Williamsburg lay not with 
the army, properly so called, nor with 
the division leaders, but with those 
who were in supreme control. How 
Hooker could be left so long unaided, 
while whole divisions, not yet engaged 
or even menaced, were within easy 
distance, we confess we seek in vain 
for a satisfactory explanation. And 
why Hancock, after he had successfully 
captured the redoubts on the extreme 
right, should have been Ordered to fall 
back, is to us beset "wath the same 
difficulties. 

The success which attended Kearney 
in his repeated aggressive efforts, and 
the comparative ease with which Han- 
cock forced a retreat, show that the foe 
was much less redoubtable than was 
imagined ; and there can be no doubt 
that, if timely and sufficient aid had 



been sent to the one and the other, the 
battle would have been less endui'ing, 
and the victory more complete. The 
retreat of the Confederates from Will- 
iamsburg this second time ought to have 
been impossible. Their works, includ- 
ing Fort Magruder, ought to have been 
cleared, and the Confederate rear-guard 
captured or destroyed, before Long- 
street could have had time to return 
to the aid of his comrades. In that 
case, the battle of Williamsburg would 
have been unnecessary. A little more 
energy on the part of the Nationals, 
with greater unity of action and com- 
munity of purpose, and Johnston would 
have found it impossible to do what he 
actually accomplished even after the 
battle of Willianisbm-g — to place the 
Chickahominy and its fever-breedhig 
borders between himself and his op- 
ponents. A common purpose and 
unity of action were sadly and visibly 
wanting throughout the whole contest. 
How differently things were managed 
at Shiloh, and, later, at luka and Cor- 
inth ! How different at Perry ville and 
Mm'freesboro ! 

We have said that the secret of the 
mismanagement was to be sought not 
among the men, not among the sub- 
ordinate officers or generals of divi- 
sions, but in higher places. McClellan, 
it must be admitted, made a mistake in 
placing Sumner in chief command of 
the pursuing army. General Sumner 
was imdoubtedly a brave and capable 
commander, as he showed subsequently 
at Antietam and at Fredericksburg; 
but it has been known in all time that 
men capable of great effort and great 



^THAT LITTLE MATTER." 



223 



enterprise, when acting in a secondary 
capacity, are not necessarily possessed 
of those qualities which enable them 
to force success, when acting on their 
own responsibility. Many first-rate 
corps commanders and generals of 
divisions have proved but soriy com- 
manders-in-chief. Our own Civil War, 
on the one side and the other, revealed 
many such ; and it is no serious charge 
to make against General Sumner to 
say that, in the battle before Williams- 
burg, he did not prove himself to be 
possessed of those higher qualities — 
that eagle eye for the situation, that 
promptitude in sending assistance to the 
weak and menaced points, that power 
of holding the army in hand and 
utilizing all its strength towards the 
Jesired result — which are absolutely 
essential in a general-in-chief on the 
field of battle. It apjjears that Mc- 
Clellan had some hesitation about the 
appointment. His first intention, we 
understand, was to appoint Heintzel- 
man. Heintzelman might have been a 
better appointment ; but he might not ; 
and what we do know for certain is 
that Sumner was a failure. This, how- 
ever, brings us to the real source of 
trouble — the principal cause of com- 
plaint. 

Why was not McClellan present in 
person? Why was it necessary for 
him to delegate, on such an occasion, 
powers and responsibilities so import- 
ant ? He had wasted a month before 
Yorktown laboriously constructing ex- 
tensive and costly siege works. In 
spite of his vast preparations and cost^ 
ly care, the enemy had escaped from 



his grasp before his works were finish- 
ed, or, at least, before they were turned 
to any practical account. It would 
surely not have been unnatiu-al for 
him, yielding to feelings of mortifica- 
tion and disappointment, which most 
men would have felt in the circum- 
stances, to seize the opportunity so 
unexpectedly oifered to follow the 
retreating hosts of the enemy, and to 
smite them hip and thigh before they 
had time to cross the Chickahominy. 
But McClellan did not so feel — did not 
so judge — did not so act. What did 
he do? He sent five divisions of his 
army, under Sumner, to pursue the 
Confederates. Retaining three divi- 
sions with him, he remained at York- 
town, ostensibly for the purpose of 
superintending the arrangements neces- 
sary for the transport of Franklin's 
di\"ision up the York River. It would 
not do to belittle Franklin's expedition. 
It was, no doubt, all-important that 
West Point and the Richmond and 
York River Railway Terminus should 
be in the hands of the Nationals. 
That, however, is not the question. 
The question rather is, whether the 
general-in-chief was more needed at 
Yorktown or at the head of the army 
of pursuers. The mere statement of 
the actual facts of the case is the best 
answer which can be given to the 
question. While McClellan, with three 
divisions of his army, besides that of 
Franklin, was idling at Yorktown, 
Hooker was maintaining an unequal 
struggle, his men being cut to pieces 
in the very "presence of thirty thou- 
sand of their comrades," and Hancock, 



224 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



after having won a substantial victory, 
was compelled to relinquish his prize 
and fall back, for the want of support 
which existed on the very skirts of the 
battle field in the shape of whole di- 
visions. Such was the wretched man- 
agement of the forces sent in pursuit 
that, when the battle was ended, the 
divisions of Smith and Couch and Casey 
had scarcely been called upon to act. 

It was near the close of the battle 
before McClellan appeared on the field. 
It was too late for him to contribute 
iu any appreciable way to the result 
of the struggle. He gave orders to 
Smith, when made aware of Hancock's 
position, to forward reinforcements at 
once ; but Hancock had accomplished 
his task before the reinforcements 
arrived. The circumstances which 
brought McClellan to the field re- 
dound but little to his credit. General 
Sprague and the Prince de Joinville, 
during the confusion which prevailed 
in front in consequence of the absence 
of a skilful directing hand, rode in 
haste to Yorktown, and urged the 
general to hasten at once to the scene 
of action. The answer was as cold as 
it was curt. "I suppose those in front 
can attend to that little matter." Ulti- 
mately, however, he was induced to 
mount his horse and hasten forward. 
It was about two o'clock when he 
started from Yorktown. It was five 
o'clock when he approached the field of 
action ; Kearney on the left and Han- 
cock on the right were just about to 
deal those final blows which deter- 
mined the issue of the contest; and 
the sounds of battle, as well as the 



evidences of hard work which were 
visible as he drew near the front, 
convinced him that the day's struggle 
had been something far other than a 
" skirmish with the rebel rear-guard." 
His appearance on the field was the 
occasion of the wildest demonstration 
of applause. Regiment after regiment, 
as he was recognized, tendered him a 
welcome, than which none more hearty 
was ever given to the great Napo- 
leon himself. Mounted on a splendid 
charger, which he gracefully rode, and 
dressed in a plain blue coat and glaze- 
covered cap, himself and horse literally 
covered with mud, his whole appear- 
ance was admirably suited to the situ- 
ation. It was, no doubt, the opinion 
of many of those brave men, who were 
willing to be led against the enemy, 
that if the general had been present, 
the day's struggle would have had a 
different and more noble ending. The 
enthusiasm with which he was greeted 
ought to have been felt by him as a 
severe rebuke for his absence; for it 
testified to the existence on the part of 
his troops of a warm and deep-rooted 
affection, which he had but poorly 
rewarded. 

When the battle was ended, McClel- 
lan countermanded the order which he 
gave to Sedgwick and Richardson on 
leaving Yorktown ; and instead of ad- 
vancing, with their divisions, to the 
fi-ont, they were directed to accompany 
Franklin to "West Point. From " Biv- 
ouac, in front of Williamsburg," he 
telegraphed to the War Department 
that the Confederates were before him 
in great force, that they were probably 



PKOPHETIC WORDS. 



2*6 



in point of numbers stronger than him- 
self, and in all likelihood well-entrench- 
ed. In the same message, he said he 
would "run the risk of holding them 
in check there." On the following day 
he telegraphed to the secretary of war 
the particulars of the previous day's 
struggle. He estimated his loss at two 
thousand two hundred and twenty- 
eight, of whom four hundred and fifty- 
six were killed and fourteen hundred 
wounded. He indicated no desii'e for 
a rapid forward movement. The last 
words of the despatch were, "We have 
other battles to fight before reaching 
Richmond." It was not difficult to 
make such a prediction, especially as 
his dilatory movements were multi- 
plying the opportunities of the Con- 
federates, and enabling them so to 
concentrate their forces and so to en- 
trench themselves as to make their 
position almost invulnerable. It is 



only fifty miles from Williamsburg to 
Richmond. A bold and well-directed 
dash against the Confederate Capitol, 
and the fall of Richmond might have 
been antedated nearly three years. The 
battle was fought on May 5th. j^ay 
It was not until the 8th that the 8i 
march was resumed ; and when it was 
resumed, it was conducted in a manner 
so dilatory that it may justly be char- 
acterized as suicidal. Eleven days 
were consumed in accomplishing what 
might have been done in three. It ia 
not wonderful that the people became 
impatient because of the slow execu- 
tion of their desire and will, and 
weary of promises always fair but 
always fruitless. The words of Presi- 
dent Lincoln were now seen to be more 
and more prophetic. After Williams- 
burg, as before Yorktown, it was "the 
story of Manassas repeated." McClel- 
lan would not "strike a blow." 



226 



FAIE OAKS, 



CHAPTER XVI. 



Wedt Poinl. — ^York Eiver. — Franklin's Command. — The Gunboats. — West Point Occupied. — Norfolk. — Grenertt 
Wool. — Lincoln, Stanton and Chase at Fortress Monroe. — Se wall's Point. — Colonel T. J. Cram. — Ocean View. 
— Surrender of Norfolk. — General Huger. — The Gunboats on the James Eiver. — Ward's Bluff. — The James 
and York Rivers Both Open. — McClellan's Position Advantageous. — William and Mary College. — The Na- 
tional Advance after William.sburg. — Bad Eoads. — The Pamunkey River. — TuustaD's Station. — The Chicka- 
hominy. — Bottom Bridge. — The Railroad Bridge. — Gaines' Mills. — New Bridge. — Hanover Court House. — 
Mechanicsville. — Peake's Station. — Cool Arbor. — Ashland. — 'Vigorous Encounter Near Hanover Court House. 
— A National Victory.— The 80th of May.— The Williamsburg Road.— The Battle Ground.— Fair Oaks and 
Seven Pines. — McClellan's Headquarters. — New Bridge. — General Casey. — General Keyes. — White Oak 
Swamp: — The Position of the Two Armies. — The Army of the Potomac. — Time Lost. — A Critical Position. — 
A Heavy Eaia Storm. — Johnston's Opportunities. — The Confederates March to the Attack. — The Attack. 
The National Advance Driven In. — The Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines Begun. — Casey's Division Fights 
Bravely, but Hard Pressed. — Compelled to Fall Back. — A Furious Charge. — The Battle Raging. — The Rail 
Fence. — General Rains. — The Nationals Fall Back upon the Second Line. — General Couch. — Couch Not 
■Unprepared. — Heintzelman Comes 'Dp and Takes Command. — Berry and Jameson. — Birney. — Heintzelman 
Sorely Pressed. — Couch's Command Severed. — The Entire Left Wing of the National Army in Peril. 
— Couch Forms a Double Line of Battle. — Heintzelman 's Promptitude. — MoCleUan and Sumner Warned. 
— The Chickahominy Flooded. — The Grapevine Bridge. — Sumner Moves to the Assistance of the Right 
Wing. — A Critical Moment. — Sumner on the Scene. — A Timely Arrival. — A Tremendous Volley. — Morgan, 
of Sedgwick's Division. — Abercrombie in DiflBcnlty. — Johnston Woimded. — Still the Battle Rages. — An At- 
tempt to Outflank Sumner's Right. — Night and Rest. — The Second Day. — The Order of Battle. — The 
Battle Resumed. — Hooker.- — Richardson. — Stoneman. — French. — Howard. — Meagher. — Roger A. Pryor. — 
Mahone Comes to the Aid of Pryor. —Meagher Ordered Up. — Barriers of Bristling Steel. ^General Howard 
Wounded. — Th« Confederates Fall Back. — The Firing Ceases. — McClellan's Purpose. — Fatal Delay. — Hooker 
Looking into Richmond. — Hooker Rebuked and Recalled. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. —No Glory to 
McClellan. 



On the evening of the day ■wMcli 
vpitnessed the battle of Williams- 
burg, McClellan countermanded 
the orders -which he had given to 
Franklin, Sedgwick and Richardson. It 
was HO longer aecessaiy that they 
should advance towards the front. 
Franklin received instructions to pro- 
ceed to West Point, at the head of the 
York River; and Sedgwick, Richard- 
son and Fitz John Porter were to bear 
him company. During the night the 
transports reached their destination ; 
'^ay and early on th* morning of May 
*" 6th. NewtoD'b brigade landed 



and took position on an open plain, 
on the right bank of the Pamunkey, 
one of the principal affluents of the 
York River. Within twenty-four hours 
Franklin's whole division had encamp- 
ed, the gunboats had taken possession 
of West Point, and the National flag 
was floating over the little village. 
The other divisions were also promptly 
on hand. 

During the night of the 7th, the 
Confederate pickets ventured to May 
draw near the National encamp- ?. 
ment, and a guard belonging to the 
latter was shot. Franklin was thus 



'r 



SEWALL'S POIlSrT. 



227 



admonished that the enemy was not 
far off; and preparations were made 
for a possible engagement on the fol- 
lowing morning. At early dawn, 
'skinnishers were thrown out towards 
the edge of the woods; and the whole 
force was drawn up on the plains, 
ready to welcome the foe, should he 
make his appearance. As the Con- 
federates seemed in no haste to show 
themselves, the National troops were 
recalled to breakfast ; the Thirty- 
Second New York, and the Ninety- 
Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Pennsylvania 
regiments being left as an advanced 
guard near the skirts of the woods 
which, with the exception of the side to- 
wards the river, completely surrounded 
the plain. It was not long until the 
Confederates began to show themselves 
more openly and in greater strength. 
On the west side of the river, there 
appeared a considerable force; but a 
vigorous fire having been opened upon 
them by the gunboats, they were 
compelled to retire. No time was 
now lost in landing the troops from 
the transports ; and by nine o'clock in 
the morning General Dana had got 
his brigade ashore. The Confederate 
scouts were now becoming trouble- 
some ; and the Sixteenth, Thirty-First 
and Thirty-Second New York, and the 
Ninety-Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Penn- 
sylvania were ordered to enter and 
clear the woods. The scouts retired at 
their approach ; but the Nationals soon 
found themselves opposed by large 
bodies of the retreating army; and, 
as these were advantageously posted, 
and well supplied with artilleiy, it 



was feared that the above-named regi- 
ments might be ovei"whelmed. They 
were therefore withdrawn. Mean- 
while, the Second United States 
battery, under Captain Arnold, and 
the First Massachusetts battery were 
ordered into position, the former on 
the right and the latter on the left ; 
and so vigorous was the fire of shell, 
that the Confederates were driven from 
their shelter in the woods and forced, 



toward the river, where they came full 
under the fire of the gunboats. They 
had now no choice but to retire. In this 
encounter, the Nationals lost one hun- 
dred and ninety-four men — the Thirty- 
First and Thirty-Second New York 
having suffered most severely. The 
Confederate loss was not so great. The 
Nationals, however, had made them- 
selves masters of the position ; and 
secured the head of the York River as 
a base of supplies for the army of the 
Potomac. 

While Franklin was establishing 
himself at West Point, and while Mc- 
Clellan was slowly pressing forward 
with a view of establishing a com- 
munication between the main body of 
the army and the divisions at the head 
of the York River, events of the ut- 
most importance were taking place at 
Norfolk, far to the rear of the National 
army. From the time McClellan had 
decided to march to Richmond by way 
of the Peninsula, General Wool, who 
commanded at Fortress Monroe, saw 
the great advantages which would 
result from the possession of the 
James River. As a highway for the 
supplies of the army, it would be in- 



228 



FA IE OAKS. 



valuable. It would be all the more so 
if the York River was also wrenched 
from Confederate control. Influenced 
by these views, he had urged the gov- 
ernment to allow him to attempt the 
capture of Norfolk, and so break up 
the blockade of the James. It was not 
until the evacuation of Yorktown, and 
until he had renewed his request, that 
his suggestions were regarded with 
any degree of favor. The views of 
General Wool so impressed the gov- 
ernment, that a visit was made to 
Fortress Monroe by President Lincoln^ 
and Secretaries Chase and Stanton. 
The shore was carefully reconnoitred ; 
and Lincoln, though he saw some dif- 
ficulties in the way of effecting a 
landing, in consequence of the shal- 
lowness of the water, warmly encour- 
aged the plan — overcoming objections 
by vigorous and practical suggestions, 
which showed that on the battle-field, 
as in the council chamber, he was 
capable of winning distinction. The 
order was given on the 8th of May 
(Hay for an immediate attempt to be 
^' made on Sewall's Point and a 
march on Norfolk. An-angements were 
•uade with Commodore Goldsborough ; 
j.nd a large number of troops were 
embarked on transports then lying in 
Hampton Roads. Goldsborough moved 
towards Sewall's Point, and opened fire 
apon the batteries ; but the batteries 
on the Point replied with such spirit, 
ftnd the Meriimac having come to their 
ftid, the National vessels withdrew, and 
the troops were disembarked. 

On the following day, General Wool, 
with Colonel T. J. Cram and Secretaiy 



Chase, made a reconnoissance along th« 
shore, when it was decided to laud five 
thousand troops at a place called Ocean 
View. A successful landing made at 
this point would enable the Nationals 
to strike Sewall's Point in the rear, 
and would open up a direct road to 
Norfolk. The troops were again em- 
barked ; and while a bombardment 
was kept up on the Point from the Rip 
Raps, with the intention of convincing 
the Confederates that the purpose still 
was to move direct on Sewall's Point, 
a landing was successfully made at 
Ocean View. Before dawn on may 
the 10th, Captain Davis' com- 10* 
pany, of Richardson's light artillery, 
followed by the Twentieth New York 
regiment, was safe on shore. General 
Weber pushed on with the advance) 
but no opposition was oflFered, the Con- 
federates having already abandoned the 
position. About 8 o'clock in the morn- 
ing, General Wool, accompanied by 
the president and by the two secretaries 
above named, together with Generals 
Mansfield and Viele, arrived on the 
scene, and took command in person. 
The infantry were now pushed on to- 
wards Turner's Creek ; but the bridge 
had been set on fire by the Confede* 
rates ; and a circuitous route to reach 
Norfolk was rendered necessaiy. There 
was now a general advance ordered ; 
and at five o'clock in the afternoon, the 
lines of the Confederate intrenched 
camp were reached. Twenty-nine can- 
non were found in position, but there 
were no troops. On marched the Na- 
tionals; and just as they were about 
to enter the city, the mayor, preceded 



ASCENT OP THE JAMES RIVER. 



329 



by a flag of truce, and accompanied 
by several members of the Common 
Council, came out to meet them with 
a proposal of surrender. Huger, it 
iappears, who had charge of the city, 
had orders not to attempt to hold the 
city against any serious demonstration 
of National troops ; and when he was 
informed of the landing of General 
Wool at Ocean View, he turned over 
the city of Norfolk to Mayor Lamb, 
and fled, with his troops, towards 
Richmond. Having received the sur- 
render, General Wool issued an order 
from the City Hall, informing the in- 
habitants of what had taken place, 
appointing General Egbert Viele mili- 
tary governor, and directing that all 
peaceful citizens should be protected 
in the free use and exercise of their 
lawful rights and privileges. About 
midnight General Wool, who rode 
back to Ocean View, had crossed to 
Fortress Monroe with the pleasing 
intelligence that Norfolk had fallen. 
The president and Secretary Stanton 
were there to receive him. 

The Confederate commander, Huger, 
had evidently resolved to leave as 
little behind him as possible. The 
Navy Yard and works at Portsmouth 
' were found to be on fire ; and al- 
though every effort was made to save 
the place, the fire gained the mastery, 
and ships, gunboats, workshops and 
machinery of various kinds were all 
destroyed. On the morning of the 
May 11th, the Merrimac, which, on 
!*• <ihe retirement of the Confede- 
rates, \ad had a slow match applied 
to he magazine, exploded with a tre- 



mendous noise, the huge monster being 
blown into a thousand fragments. All 
the defenses in and about the city, and 
all the formidable works on the Eliza- 
beth River and on the borders of 
Chesapeake Bay, including Sewall's 
Point and Craney Island, were aban 
doned ; and about two hundred cannon, 
with a large quantity of ammunition, 
were left as spoil for the victors. The 
destruction of the Merrimac, judged 
from a Confederate standpoint, seems 
to have been a great blunder; and it 
was so judged at the time. It was 
natural and proper enough for them, 
in the cii'cumstances, to destroy the 
Navy Yard, and to put out of the 
way everything which should add to 
the strength of their enemy ; but the 
Merrimac was practically invulnerable ; 
and she might have been retained and 
used by the Confederates much to the 
inconvenience of the Nationals. As it 
was, the James River was free for the 
passage of the gunboats ; and without 
delay, and experiencing but little dif- 
ficulty, they were pushed forward, day 
by day, until they were brought to a 
halt at Ward's Bluff. At this point, 
the river was too narrow and the Con- 
federate works too strong for the gun- 
boats to pass. A bold and vigorous 
attempt was made on the 15th, May 
on which day they had worked '5. 
their way so far up the windings of the 
stream; but it was adjudged to be 
"impossible to reduce such works ex- 
cept with the aid of a land force," and 
the vessels were withdrawn. Up to 
this point the river was open ; and 
McClellan, in his advance up the 



»a» 



230 



FAIE OAKS. 



Peninsula and towards Richmond, had 
now the full advantage of both the 
James and the York. 

"We have followed Franklin, with his 
own division and those of Sedgwick, 
Richardson and Fitz John Porter, up 
from Yoi'ktown, along the York, to 
West Point. We have recounted the 
details of the encounter which they 
had with the Confederates shortly after 
their landing at what was called Brick 
House Point. We have also described 
the surrender of Norfolk, the explosion 
of the Merrimac, the abandonment of 
the forts on the Elizabeth and on the 
borders of the Chesapeake, and the 
other events which left the James 
River, like the York, in the possession 
of the Nationals. These two episodes 
form a natural, as they are a neces- 
sary, introduction to the battle of 
•'Fair Oaks," or "Seven Pines," as it 
is sometimes called. McClellan now 
found himself in a really advanta- 
geous position. Had events resulted 
in perfect conformity with his own 
desires and interests, they could hai'dly 
have been other than they were. Free 
from all danger of attack in the rear, 
and having complete command of both 
great waterways, he had only to think 
of the foe in his front. Let us now 
return to the main army, which we 
left under the personal command of 
McClellan. 

Having made provision for his sick 
and wounded in the halls of the ven- 
erable college of William and Mary, 
he began to move forward on the 8th of 
jHajr May, the third day after the bat- 
s' tie of Williamsburg. Stoneman 



was sent in advance to open a com- 
munication with Franklin and the 
other divisions which had accompanied 
or followed him up the York River. 
The roads were in a wretched con- 
dition ; and the march was conducted 
in circumstances of more than ordinary 
difficulty. It was one of the most 
beautiful and fertile portions of Vir- 
ginia; but the retreating army had 
spared no pains to injure the roads 
and to multiply obstructions. On the 
15th, McClellan had advanced jiay 
to the neighborhood of White '5. 
House, at the head of the navigation 
of the Pamunkey, and some eighteen 
miles from Richmond. On the May 
18th, he had reached Tunstall's 18' 
Station, on the Richmond and York 
River Railroad ; and on the 22d, May 
he establislied his headquarters 22. 
at Cool Arbor, not far from the Chick- 
ahominy, and between eight and nine 
miles from Richmond. His advanced 
light troops had already reached Bot- 
tom Bridge, on the Chickahominy, at 
the crossing of the New Kent Road. 
In their retreat, the Confederates had 
turned the bridge, but had left the 
point uncovered. Casey's division, of 
Keyes' corps, was soon across the river ; 
and the heights on the Richmond side 
were occupied. He was followed close 
by Heintzelman. Pressed by Stone- 
man, the Confederates had also re- 
treated across the I'ailroad bridge 
which passes over the Chickahominy, 
a little to the north of Bottom Bridge 
— destroying it as they crossed. Stone- 
man halted and took a position at 
Gaines' Mills, whence active and sue- 



HANOVEK COURT HOUSE. 



231 



oessful reconnoissances were made, a 
number of the Confederate scouts and 
advance troops, after some skirmishing, 
being driven from their posts at New 
Bridge. 

"While thus feeling his way, and get- 
ting his army into position, McClellan 
detached Fitz John Porter from the 
main body, which was still on the left 
of the Chickahominy, on an expedition 
to Hanover Court House. His object 
was to disperse the forces of the Con- 
federates concentrated at that point, 
and to cut off their railroad com- 
munications between Richmond and 
Fredericksburg. It was hoped, also, 
that he might facilitate the advance 
of McDowell's corps, whose approach 
McClellan anxiously awaited ; but 
operations in the Shenandoah A^alley, 
hereafter to be described, made Mc- 
Dowell's advance in this direction 
impossible. This detachment moved, 
by way of Mechanicsville, early on 
]nay the morning of the 27th. Gen- 
27» era! Emory led the advance, with 
the Fifth and Sixth Regular Cavalry 
and Benson's horse battery, supported 
by Morell's division, composed of the 
brigades of Martindale, Butterfield and 
McQuade, with Berdan's sharpshoot- 
ers and three batteries under Captain 
Griffin. Warren, with his provisional 
brigade, moved towards the same point 
by another road. The rain had fallen 
heavily during the early hours of the 
morning; and the roads, in conse- 
quence, were in a fearful condition. 
The troops, however, bore bravely up. 
When about six miles from Hanover 
Court House, the mounted pickets of 



the Confederates came into view, but 
they speedily disappeared. The Na- 
tionals kept moving on until they were 
within about two miles of the Court 
House, when they were brought to 
halt by a heavy fire of artillery and 
musketiT. The Twenty-Fifth New 
York suffered severely; two of their 
comj^anies were cut off and captured ; 
and they were compelled to fall back. 
Meanwhile, the batteries were hurried 
forward; and the main body of the 
Nationals rushed to the aid of the 
advance. After holding the ground 
obstinately for two hours, the Con- 
federates were foi-ced to retire, one 
of their guns being captured by the 
Seventeenth New York. They were 
vigorously pursued for some distance 
by the brigades of Butterfield and 
McQuade. Martindale's brigade was 
pushed forward to Peake's Station, on 
the Virginia Central Raili-oad, while 
Porter himself, Avith the rest- of his 
force, advanced towards Hanover Court 
House. On his way to the railroad, 
Martindale encountered a Confederate 
force, and drove it towards Ashland. 
In the encounter, one of his mounted 
men was shot by a concealed foe ; 1 )ut 
this was the only casualty. Having 
destroyed a portion of the i-ailroad, 
buraed the bridge, and cut the tele- 
graph wires, Martindale was on his 
way back to join the main body, when 
the Confederates, who had been rein- 
forced by fresh troops from Richmond, 
and had contrived secretly to regain 
the cover of the woods, fell upon him 
with tremendous fury. His men fought 
like true heroes, boldly maintaining 



>,32 



FAIR OAKS. 



^heir ground for nearly an hour, in 
/he face of superior numbers, when 
General Porter, who had reached the 
Court House, came back to their relief. 
Meanwhile, the brigades of Butterfield 
and McQuade, who had gone in pur- 
suit of the Confederates, arrived on the 
scene. So, also, did that of Warren, 
which had been delayed in repairing 
bridges. Porter was therefore able to 
meet his antagonist on equal terms. 
Planting his artillery to the right and 
left, and filling up the centre with his 
infantiy, he advanced and poured into 
the woods a diagonal fire of musketry 
and shell. This terrible work was 
kept up from five o'clock till dusk, 
when the Confederates retired — cling- 
ing, however, so close to the woods 
that they could not be pursued with 
any marked success. Bivouacking on 
the field he had won, Porter made 
prepai'ations for a I'enewal of the at- 
tack in the morning. When morning 
dawned, it was found that the Con- 
federates had disappeared. Porter, 
however, had reason to be satisfied. 
The object of his expedition had been 
Attained, so far as that was now possi- 
ble. He had occupied Hanover Court 

House; and he had destroyed the 
track and bridges of the Virginia 
Central Railroad. In these various 
encounters the Confederates suffered 
heavily. In killed and wounded and 
absent, their loss could not have been 
less than one thousand. The National 
loss was between three hundred and 
jUay fifty and four hundred. On the 

29« 29th, Porter returned to his 
original camp on the Chickahominy. 



The 30th of May arrived; and al 
though the two great armies lay within 
easy distance of each other, no very seri- 
ous effort had been attempted on either 
side. The position of the National 
anny was peculiar, and somewhat beset 
with peril. The ground occupied by 
the two rival armies has been compared 
not unaptly to the letter V. It might 
mth equal propriety be described aa 
bearing a general resemblance to an 
acute-angled triaugle, of which the 
point, or apex, was at Bottom Bridge, 
and the two larger sides were formed 
respectively by the Chickahominy and 
Williamsburg Road. The Chicka- 
hominy forms a line Avhich runs from 
Bottom Bridge towards the southwest. 
The Williamsburg Road forms a line 
Avhich, from the same point, runs al- 
most due west. A little to the north 
of Bottom Bridge, the York River 
Railroad crosses the Chickahominy and 
runs towards Richmond in a line very 
neai'ly parallel with the Williamsburg* 
Road. Inside of this angle, but 
towards Richmond, and with full com- 
mand of the country in the rear, lay 
the Confederate army. All the bridges 
in the neighborhood, it will be remem- 
bered, were destroyed by the Confede- 
rates before the Nationals came up. 
Outside of the angle, and along the 
left or northeast bank of the Chicka- 
hominy, was ranged the great bulk of 
the National army. Here, at Cool 
Arbor, near New Bridge, were the 
headquarters of General McClellan. 
Here, too, a little further down the 
stream, were Franklin, Fitz John 
Porter and others. And here, too^ 



THE CHICKAHOMINY. 



233 



was General Sumner, further on still, 
towards the point of the angle, at 
Bottom Bridge. Bottom Bridge hav- 
ing been repaired, Keyes' corps, as we 
jlay have seen, crossed the river on or 
24 about the morning of the 24th. 
He was followed by Heintzelman, who 
took up ground in his rear. Casey's 
division of the corps advanced as far 
as Fair Oaks Station, on the York 
River Railroad, where he took posi- 
tion, his line stretching from a point 
a little to the north of the railroad, 
southward as far as the Williamsburg 
Road. The ground was bounded on 
the left and front by dense woods. 
The edges of these woods were cut 
down to form abatis, in order to ob- 
struct the enemy. A line of earth- 
works was also thrown up, consisting 
of a redoubt and some rifle-pits. Be- 
hind these Casey posted his troops — 
his first biigade on the right, his second 
in the centre, his third on the left, his 
picket-guards oeing pushed forward 
into the woods in front. About half 
a mile to the rear of Casey, at a place 
called Seven Pines, Couch was simi- 
larly posted, his line lying across the 
Williamsburg turnpike, and stretching 
from a point slightly to the south of 
that road, northward towards the York 
River Railroad. His right was thus 
slightly in the rear of Fair Oaks 
Station. In fi-ont of him the Williams- 
burg Road is intersected by a circu- 
itous highway, called the " Nine Mile 
Road." Kearney's division, of Heint- 
zelman's corps, was further in the rear, 
on the York River Railroad, and in 
the neighborhood of Savage's Station. 



Hooker, with his division, also of 
Heintzelman's corps, was guarding 
the approaches to White Oak Swamp, 
which lay to the south of the Will- 
iamsburg Road, and stretched east- 
ward as far as the Chickahominy. 

Such was the position of the National 
army on the eve of the famous battle of 
Fair Oaks. We have already said that 
the position was one beset with con- 
siderable peril. One of the wings of 
that army, as we have shown, was on 
the right and the other was on the 
left side of the river. The right wing, 
which consisted of five divisions and 
the reserves, lay on the outside of the 
angle, on the side formed by the 
Chickahominy. The left wing, con- 
sisting of four divisions, lay, oi echelon, 
along the line of the York River Rail- 
road. From the extreme point of one 
wing to that of the other, by way of 
Bottom Bridge, which was the only 
available connection, was a distance of 
more than twelve miles, although by 
an air line the two wings were not 
at any point very far apai't. It is 
manifest at a glance that McClellan, 
by allowing himself to drift into the 
position, gave the Confederates an 
immense advantage. Until he should 
succeed in throwing up new bridges 
across the Chickahominy — and there 
was DO evidence that such work was 
going on — it naturally enough seemed 
to the Confederates a possibility to 
strike the National left, drive it into 
the river or swamp, or both, and per- 
haps annihilate it before any assistance 
could be rendered by the right. This 
was the plan of action decided upon 



834 



FAIR OAKS. 



by the Confederate leader; and the 
delay of McClellan gave Johnston his 
opportunity. On the 24th, at the head 
of the advance, Keyes had crossed 
Bottom Bridge. It veas now the 
30th. Six days of comparative in- 
action had thus been allowed to 
elapse; and the National general-in- 
chief seemed as yet in no haste to 
adopt the initiative. He had told his 
troops, when giving instructions in re- 
May gard to the crossing of the river on 
25i the 25th, to "go prepared for bat- 
tle at a moment's notice." He had, a 
day or two later, appealed to the pride 
of his soldiers, and reminded them 
" that the ai'my of the Potomac had 
never yet been checked." Still, he 
seemed unwilling to strike the first 
blow, and so force the fight. This 
delay was all the more reprehensible, 
that the waters of the Chickahominy 
were already somewhat swollen, and 
the marshy ground around considerably 
flooded. A heavy rain storm, which 
might fall at any moment, would so 
flood the ground as to increase the 
peril which would attend the retreat 
of the National left, and would so 
swell the river as to make communica- 
tion between the two wings impossible. 
On this occasion, at least, the Fates 
seemed to be on the side of the Con- 
May federates. On the night of the 
^®' 30th of May, there was a terrific 
rain storm in and arovmd Richmond. 
It is described as resembling a tropical 
deluge. All the lower lands were 
flooded ; and the Chickahominy over- 
flowed its banks and washed away 
many of the bridges by which it was 



spanned. Johnston's opportunity had 
come. He was not slow to see it. 
Everything was in readiness, and action 
was taken at once. Longstreet was 
ordered to go out by the Williamsburg 
Road, with his own and D. H. Hill's 
division — Hill, with his division, to 
attack the Nationals in front; General 
Huger was ordered to move down the 
Charles City Road, and strike them on 
the left; while General G. W. Smith 
was directed to follow the New Bridge 
Road towards the "Old Tavern," and 
then, by the Nine Mile Road, move 
towards their right at Fair Oaks. It 
was intended that all these troops 
should move simultaneously at dawn 
on the morning of the 31st; but May 
so heavy were the roads, in 31, 
consequence of the extraordinary rain- 
fall, that it was ten o'clock before 
Hill's division began to move. Gen- 
eral Casey was not ignorant of the 
responsible and perilous position whicL 
he occupied. He knew that an attack 
was meditated ; and he had every 
reason to believe that the first blow 
would fall upon his division. He had 
been busy all the morning making his 
ground secure. About eleven o'clock 
he was made aware that the Confede- 
rates were advancing in gi'eat force. 
He ordered his men to take to their 
arms. Almost as he gave orders, 
two shells came hissing along, too 
unmistakably announcing that the 
Confederates were close at hand. The 
spades and the axes with which the men 
had been working were speedily ex- 
changed for the weapons of war. It 
was not too soon. Shortly before ona 



REPULSE OF GENERAL CASEY. 



235 



o'clock, the strength of the enemy and 
the violence of the attack were soon 
revealed by the appearance of the 
panic-stricken pickets of the National 
advance, who had been driven in. The 
One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania 
was sent forward to aid in resisting the 
attack. It was of no avail. At the 
fii'st volley, two hundred men of this 
I'egimeut were struck down. The re- 
mainder turned back and fled in a 
panic, exclaiming that they had been 
" cut to pieces." Casey's entire divi- 
sion was now got into line. Colonel 
Bailey, Casey's chief of artillery, soon 
had his batteries in action. Spratt's 
battery was posted in a field to the 
right of the road, near the edge of a 
wood, through which the Confederates 
were advancing. Regan's battery was 
stationed to the left of Spratt's. The 
batteries were supported by a power- 
ful body of infantry, under General 
Naglee, consisting of the One Hun- 
dredth New York, the Eleventh Maine, 
the One Hundred and Fourth Penn- 
sylvania and the Ninety-Third New 
York. Bates' battery, under Lieu- 
tenjfut Hart, was in the unfinished 
redoubt. Wessel's brigade was in 
the rifle-pits Palmer's was held be- 
hir 1 as a reserve. The batteries 
op-?ned a vi^rous fiie and were well 
served. The infantry fought bravely, 
firing with great spirit, and contest- 
ing every inch of ground ; but they 
were compelled to fall back towards the 
riile-pits. The batteries, however, con- 
kinued their fire, and succeeded for a 
time in holding the enemy at bay. 
Casey now began to perceive that the 



Confederates were gaining on his flanks. 
His artillery was in peril. With a 
view to prevent so great a disaster, he 
ordered a bayonet charge. This was 
gallantly performed by the regiments 
above named, in immediate charge of 
General Naglee. With a tremendous 
yell, the National troops sprang for' 
ward, and drove the enemy back to 
the adjacent woods. Here, however, 
they were assailed by a most niurder^ 
ous musket fire; and the Confederates 
rushed upon them, from the cover of 
the woods, in overwhelming numbers. 
The battle ivas now raging furiously. 
Spratt's battery, which had long resist- 
ed the Confederate advance at a rail- 
fence, and had driven them back asain 
and again, was under the necessity of 
falling back for the want of amnmni- 
tion. Regan's battery held out for a 
little while longer. It was now about 
three o'clock; and the conflict had 
been fierce since before one. About 
this time, General Rains forced his 
way to the rear of the redoubt ; and 
multitudes of Confederates appeared 
at the rifle-pits. Casey, unable any 
longer to offer anything like effective 
resistance, ordered his troops to fall 
back upon the second line, in possession 
of Couch. The retreat Was well con- 
ducted. The Confederates halted not, 
but pressed vigorously forward. Two 
of Spratt's guns fell into their hands, 
but happily they had been spiked ; 
the cannon in the redoubt were seized 
by General Rhodes and turned upon 
the fugitives; yet, in spite of the odds 
which were arrayed against them, and 
the terrific fire to which, in their 



236 



PAIR OAKS. 



retreat, they were exposed, Casey's 
men carried off with them, and brought 
safe to the second line, thi'ee fourths of 
their guns. 

Couch was not unprepared for the 
stern duties which now devolved upon 
him. Several of hia regiments had 
been ordered forward to Casey's relief 
by his corps commander, General 
Keyes. Four of these regiments — the 
Fifty-Fifth New York, the Twenty- 
Third, Sixty-First and Ninety-Third 
Pennsylvania — had been in the thick 
of the fight, when it raged most vio- 
lently, and had been severely punished. 
These regiments, with the Seventh 
Massachusetts and Sixty-Second New 
York, which had been sent after them, 
were all pressed back again towards 
the right of the second line, which, it 
will be remembered, rested on the 
York River Railroad, not far in the 
rear of Fair Oaks Station. Couch's 
division, which, as we have already 
seen, lay across the Williamsburg 
Road, and reached northward to the 
York River Railroad, had its right 
considerably advanced, and presented 
to the approaching enemy an oblique 
front, nearly parallel to the Nine Mile 
Road. Rifle-pits were well arranged 
all along the line ; and the batteries of 
Flood jind Brady and Miller, with 
batteiy 0, of the First Pennsylvania 
artillery, were skilfully and advanta- 
geously posted. 

Heintzelman, whose corps lay con- 
siderably in the rear, had been notified 
by Keyes of the perilous position in 
which Casey's division was placed, and 
urged to send forward reinforcements, 



was huriying forward with all possible 
speed. Shortly after four o'clock, 
Heintzelman appeared on the field; 
and, as he outranked Keyes, he as- 
sumed the command. About the same 
time, Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, 
came up with two of his brigades — 
those of Berry and Jameson. Hia 
other brigade, that of Birney, was also 
on its way. There was a pause in the 
fight, after the Confederates occupied 
the ground from which they had 
driven Casey's division. It was brief, 
however; for before it was yet half- 
past four o'clock, they bore down with 
tremendous energy upon Couch's line ; 
and from its oblique character, having 
its right advanced, they came first in 
collision with the Twenty-Third Penn- 
sylvania. The attack was gallantly 
met by that regiment. Reserving their 
fire until the Confederates were close 
upon them, they opened with deadly 
effect ; and wliile their opponents 
reeled and staggered, thi^y charged 
them with tlie bayonet, and drove 
them back. The Twenty-Tliii'd paid 
, dearly for their temerity. Advancing 
too far, they exposed themselves to 
the fire of the enemy's artillery, and 
were driven back, in their turn, in dis- 
order, and with great loss. Colonel 
Niele, having retained his colors, rallied 
some one hundred of his men, fell 
back on the First Long Island, and 
re-formed. The struggle noAv became 
general on the right. Effort after 
effort was made to but little purpose. 
The First Long Island soon shared the 
fate of the Twenty-Third Pennsylvania. 
The Fifty-Seventh and Sixty-Thii'<I 



SUMNER TAKES COMMAND. 



237 



Pennsylvania were also compelled, in 
their turn, to yield to the pressure of 
the foe. The Tenth Massachusetts, 
after having been surrounded and 
broken, re-foimed and moved to the 
right ; but it was to little purpose. 
Heintzelmau was not pi-oving himself 
a match for Johnston, who was present 
with his army, and directing its every 
movement. All along the line on the 
right, in the centre and on the left, the 
Confederates were victorious. Couch's 
command Avas severed ; the general 
himself, with a portion of his forces, 
was compelled to cross the railroad to 
the north, while the body of his divi- 
sion was driven back in the direction of 
the Williamsburg Road ; and Kearney 
was pressed towards the borders of the 
flooded White Oak Swamp. The day 
was advancing ; and as night drew on, 
the prospect was the reverse of cheer- 
ing for Heintzelman and Keyes. De- 
struction seemed to rest on the entire 
left wing of the National army. 

In his extremity, and not knovdng 
which way retreat was possible, Couch 
formed two lines of battle — one toward 
the railroad, with a section of Brady's 
battery, supported by the Seventh 
Massachusetts ; another toward the 
wood to the west, with the other sec- 
tion of the batter}^, supported by the 
Anderson Zouaves, with the Thirty- 
First Pennsylvania and the First Chas- 
seurs. Tliis latter line was formed on 
the edge of the wood, under cover of 
a rail-fence. 

The situation had become perilous 
in the extreme. Happily, at this criti- 
cal moment, and when most needed, 
a»3 



relief came. Heintzelman, when made 
aware of Casey's perilous position, lost 
no time in conveying the information 
to Generals McClellan and Sumner. 
McClellan was at New Bridge, at the 
extreme point of the National right 
wing. Sumner was nearer the extrem- 
ity of the angle, in the neighborhood 
of the railroad bridge. Both were, as 
the reader has already been given to 
understand, on the further side of the 
now flooded Chickahorainy. Sumner, 
foi-tunately, had been seeing dangers 
ahead ; and without any special in- 
structions from his chief, he had, May 
as early as the 25th, commenced 25. 
to constmct a bridge across the stream, 
in front of his position. The Iwidge 
was completed on the evening of ji^y 
the 30th. It was known after- 3^« 
waids as the Grape Vine Bridge. It 
was slender ; but it saved the army of 
the Potomac. As soon as the newH 
reached McClellan of the danger which 
threatened his left wing, he ordered 
Sumner to be ready to move at a 
moment's warning. Sumner was ready, 
when, at two o'clock the order reached 
him to cross the stream at once. The 
passage was difficult ; but by caution 
and care it was successfully accom- 
plished. Sedgwick, with his division, 
crossed first, dragging with them a 
batteiy of twenty-four Napoleon guns. 
Richai-dson followed — Sumner last. At 
the moment when Couch and Heintzel- 
man were separated, Sumner appeared 
on the field and assumed the command 
No change was made in Sumner's dis- 
positions. Sedgwick formed in line of 
battle at the edge of the wood, neai 



238 



FAIR OAKS. 



Fail' Oaks, with the First Minnesota 
on his right flank. The Confederates 
began to press on as if they meant to 
rush victoriously to Bottom Bridge. 
The Napoleon guns opened fire ; and 
a stoiTU of canister mowed do-\vn theii' 
ranks and made them recoil. The 
Confederates made one more attempt 
to advance ; and as they came to the 
edge of the wood, they delivered a 
most effective volley at the Anderson 
Zouaves. Colonel Riker was killed, and 
the Zouaves broke and ran. Speedily 
rallied, they resumed their position. 
Just as the fatal volley was delivered 
by the Confederates, three regiments 
— the Thirty-First Pennsylvania, the 
First Chasseurs and the First Minne- 
sota — which were lying on their faces 
in front of the battery, sprang up, and 
poured their deadly fii-e into the very 
faces of the enemy. In front of that 
line the Confederates Jay in heaps. 
Brigadier-General A. Davis was among 
the killed; and Brigadier-General Pet- 
tigrew, who was wounded and had 
his horse killed under him, was taken 
prisoner. 

Morgan, of Sedgwick's division, had 
mean^vhile been sent to the relief of 
Abercrombie, who had been maintain- 
ing a protracted and unequal struggle 
on the extreme right. Morgan, in his 
turn, needed help; and the gallant 
(jeneral Burns, with the Sixty-Nintli 
and Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, was 
sent to his support, while Sedgwick 
himself advanced for the same purpose, 
taking with him two other Pennsylva- 
Dia regiments- — the Seventy-First and 
i'ae One Hundred and Sixth. At this 



time the fighting was severe. It re- 
quired all the nerve of Sedgwick and 
of Burns to keep the men at their 
work. The Confederates, resolved to 
win, seemed fearless of punishment. 
Again and again they attempted to 
advance, and as often were fearful 
lanes made in their compact ranks by 
the murderous fii'e of canister which 
was poured from the National battery. 
It was now sunset; and about this 
time General Johnston was wounded. 
The command devolved upon General 
Smith, who assumed its duties. The 
loss of their chief did not damp the 
purpose of the Confederates or lessen 
their energy. As darkness came on, 
a determined attempt was made to out- 
flank Sumner's light. Sumner ordered 
a bayonet charge by five regiments. 
The charge was gallantly made, and was 
completely successful. The Confede- 
rate line was broken and thrown int(3 
confusion. It was now eight o'clock ; 
darkness was falling upon the scene; 
and the weary combatants on both 
sides, resting on their arms, fell asleep 
on the ground where so many of their 
comrades lay in the cold embrace May 
of death. Such was the famous 3 It 
battle at Fair Oaks, May 31st, 1862. 

On the following morning (Sunday, 
June 1st), both armies wer^ ready Jnne 
to resume the contest. The Na; !• 
tional army had been largely reinforced 
dui'ing the night by troops from the 
other side of the Chickahominy. Mc- 
Clellan was himself on the field and 
made the disposition for the day; but 
with that habitual regaid which he 
had for the Sabbath, he seemed uu' 



-rHE BATTLE ENDED. 



23& 



willing to provoke battle. Sickles' 
New York brigade was posted on the 
left, and stretched across the Williams- 
burg turnpike, with Patterson and his 
New Jersey brigade on his right. 
Both were of Hooker's division and of 
Heintzelman's corps. To the light of 
Patterson, and slightly in advance, was 
Richardson's division, of Stoneman's 
corps. Sedgwick's division, also of 
Stoneman's corps, and also slightly in 
advance, was on Richardson's light. 
The two last were so placed along the 
line of railroad that they lay almost at 
right angles to the brigades of Sickles 
and Patterson. Couch held the posi- 
tion which he had reclaimed the day 
before, and was supported by Sedgwick. 
Birney was also on the railroad, but 
more to the rear. The National line, 
it will thus be seen, formed a sort of 
triangle. Inside of the tiiang;le were 
the Confederates, who occupied sub- 
stantially the ground which they had 
wrenched from the Nationals on the 
previous day. The main body of the 
Confederates faced the main body of 
the Nationals along the line of railroad. 
The Nationals were on tlie north of 
this line; the Confederates were on 
the south. 

McClellan, as we have said, was 
slow to provoke battle ; but his dispo- 
sitions were made, and he was ready 
for the attack which he had reason to 
expect the Confederates would make. 
He had not long to wait. With the 
first streak of early dawn, the Con- 
federates were in motion. It was evi- 
dent that they were nothing daunted 
by the experience of the previous day, 



and that they meant to complete what 
they doubtless regarded as their un- 
finished task. The Nationals were up 
and ready, when the Confederates fell 
upon Richardson's division with tre- 
mendous fury. It was a cavalry attack; 
and it was as warmly received aa it 
was vigorously given. The cavalry 
were driven back upon their lines by a 
well-directed fire of artillery. It was, 
however, only for a moment ; for they 
returned in greater force, M'ell sus- 
tained by companies of infantiy. The 
battle soon extended along the M'hole 
line. French's, Howard's and Meagher's 
biigades were the first to engage the 
foe who was so resolute on battle. 
To protect an open field on his right 
front, Richardson had advantageously 
posted a battery of 1 0-pound er rifle 
Parrott guns, under Captain Hazard; 
and directly in front of his line he 
had placed the brigade of General 
French and a regiment of the brigade 
of General O. O. Howard. The re- 
maining regiments of Howard's brigade 
formed a second line ; and the Irish 
brigade of Thomas F. Meagher, with 
eighteen pieces of artillery, formed the 
third. It was evidently the intention 
of the Confederates, in attacking Rich' 
aixlson, to cut the National line in two; 
and, by forcing their way between, to 
destroy the army in detail. If such 
was their pui"pose, they had sadly mis- 
calculated the strength and spirit of 
the National troops. General Rogei 
A. Pryor, whose acquaintance, the 
reader will remember, ^ve first made in 
Charleston Harbor, came up with a 
part of Huger's division, which had 



340 



PAIR OAKS. 



taken no part in Saturday's battle, and 
fell heavily upon French. Howard 
rushed forward to the support of 
Fi-ench. The fighting was severe ; and 
under the vigorous assaults and well- 
directed fire of the Confederates, the 
National troops more than once waver- 
ed, but were quickly rallied by their 
oiBcers. General Howard made him- 
self conspicuous at the head of his men, 
and did much to cheer and sustain 
them, both by word and deed. Ma- 
houe now came up to the aid of Pryor; 
and Meagher, who had been impatient 
to join the fray, was ordered to the 
front. He fell upon the enemy with 
great vigor. For three hours the 
battle raged with great fierceness. The 
Confederates began to yield to the 
bold and impetuous attacks of the 
Nationals on the right. They had no 
better fortune on the left ; for in that 
direction they became engaged with 
two brigades of Hooker's division — 
Patterson's New Jersey and Sickles' 
New York; and, after sustaining a 
severe fire from those brigades, they 
were driven back at the point of the 
bayonet. All along the line, wherever 
they attempted to penetrate, they found 
barriers of bristling steel and hearts of 
iron. It was in vain to make any 
further attempt to drive the Nation- 
als l>ack into the swollen waters of 
the Chickahominy and the adjoining 
swamps, or to force a way to Bottom 
Bridge. It was now nine o'clock ; 
and at this early hour, the Confede- 
rates, as if convinced of the fruitless- 
ness of further efforts, fell back, and 
the firing ceased. The battle was not 



renewed. "Towards the close of the 
struggle. General Howard received 
those wounds which cost him his right 
arm. He did not, however, leave the 
field. Binding his shattered limb in 
his handkerchief, he remained at his 
post till the battle was ended. 

Although they had failed in their 
second day's efforts, the Confederates 
did not abandon the ground which they 
had taken from Casey on Saturday. 
On this ground they remained during 
the whole of Monday, and some of 
them over Monday night. It was 
General McClellan's purpose to pursue 
them on the third day and regain what 
had been lost. With this end in view, 
he had made all necessary arrange- 
ments to ofi"er them battle. His line 
was drawn up, skirmishers were sent 
in advance, the artillery was posted, 
and the army began to move foi'ward. 
It was all unnecessary work. Delay 
had given the Confederates suflScient 
time to move back their camp equi- 
pages and munitions of war to their 
lines at Richmond. This being suc- 
cessfully accomplished, they themselves 
followed. When McClellan advanced 
there was no enemy to encounter. Fair 
Oaks and Seven Pines were reoccupied 
by the National troops; and the two 
armies resumed substantially their for- 
mer positions. Hooker, having been or- 
dered forward by Heintzelman, with a 
reconnoitering party towai'd Richmond, 
advanced within four miles of the Con- 
federate capital. On hearing of his 
temerity, McClellan ordered him back. 
These are the words McClellan used: 
" General Hooker will return from hi* 



THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 



241 



brilliant reconnoissance ; we cannot af- 
ford to lose his division." Hooker re- 
turned to Casey's camp, where, at the 
house of one George Turner, McClel- 
lan had established his headquarters. 
While McClellan busied himself again 
at his favorite work of throwing up 
entrenchments and constructing fortifi- 
cations, Hooker, yielding to the gentler 
impulses of a soldier's nature, occupied 
his hours of enforced inactivity in the 
establishment of an hospital near Fair 
Oaks Station. 

In the two days' fighting at Fair 
Oaks and Seven Pines, both armies 
sustained heavy losses. It has been 
estimated that the loss on either side 
must have amounted to near seven 
thousand men — a heavy loss, when it is 
considered that in neither the one army 



nor the other were there more than fif- 
teen thousand engaged. Attempts have 
been made to give the actual figures; 
but they cannot be regarded as reliable. 
The battle of Fair Oaks does not re- 
dound to the credit of General McClel- 
lan. It cannot be said that he wa3 
successful in his choice of battle 
ground or in the original disposition 
of his troops. He was neglectful iu 
the matter of bridges. His long delay 
before the battle gave the enemy an 
opportunity; he ought to have placed 
more men at Sumner's disposal, and 
most certainly he ought not to have 
been absent from the first day's fight. 
His delay, after the battle, in pressing 
on toward Richmond has been severely 
condemned by competent military au- 
thorities. 



CHAPTER XVII. 



rhe Old FoVioy ot Delay. — McClellan 's Army Still Inactive. — The Shenandoah Valley. — Jackson and Lander.— 
Blooming Gap. — Death of Lander. — General Banks at Harper's Ferry. — General Shields. — Battle of Kems- 
town. — Shields Wounded. — Conducting the Battle from his Bed. — Tyler's Splendid Charge. — The "Stone- 
wall Brigade." — Jackson's Defeat. — General Banks in Pursuit. — Shields the Hero of the Fight at Kernstown. 
— Sketch of Shields. — Jackson Joined by Ewell. — Shields Detached from Banks and Sent to Join McDowell. 
— Banks Greatly Weakened Thereby. — Jackson Strikes Fremont. — Banks' Retreat. — Jackson and EweU in 
Pursuit. — Attack on Front Eoyal. — Kenly Overpowered. — Banks Continues his Retreat from Strasburg. — 
Overtaken by Ewell at Winchester. — Battle of Winchester. — Banks Compelled to Fall Back. — He Reaches 
the Potomac Opposite WiUiamsport. — An Almost Unparalleled March. — Safe Across the River. — Jackson's 
Mistake. — Consternation at Washington. — McDowell's Recall. — Fremont and Shields. — Jackson's Retreat from 
Harper's Ferry. — Ewell's Demonstrations. — His Retreat. — The Race up the Shenandoah. — Jackson Eludes his 
Pursuers. — Bums the Bridges in his Rear.— Reaches Harrisonburg. — Followed Close by Fremont. — A Vigorous 
Encounter. — General Ashby Killed. — Capture of Colonel Wyndham. —Battle of Cross Keys. — EweU Holds his 
Ground. — Port Republic. — Jackson Across the Bridge. — Arrival of Shields' Advance. ^Ewell Joins Jackson. 
—The Nationals Driven Back. — The Burning of the Bridge. — Jackson's Success. — 'What He Had Done.— 
Sketch of Jackson. — Reflections. — The Mistake of the Government. 



The battle of Fair Oaks was fought 
on the last day of May and the 
fii'st day of June. For three 



IS62. 



weeks the army of the Potomac lay 
quietly along the line of the Chicka- 
hominy — McClellan, pursuing his old 



m 



JACKSOX'S CAMPATCtK. 



policy of delay, and occupying the 
thoughts of his men by throwing up 
fortifications and otherwise strengthen- 
ing his position. The three weeks' 
delay proved fatal, as we shall soon 
see, to the Peninsular campaign — a 
campaign begun in splendor and pro- 
mise, but, having signally failed of its- 
purpose, destined to end in gloom and 
disaster. 

In order, however, to an intelligent 
appreciation of what may be called the 
second period of the Peninsular cam- 
paign, it is necessary for the reader to 
carry with him a knowledge of the 
events which, at this date, were in 
progress in the Shenandoah V^alley and 
the adjacent regions on both sides of 
the Blue Ridge. While, therefore, 
McClellan waits for propitious weather, 
and for the advent of McDowell on 
the line of the Chickahominy and on 
the malarious borders of White Oak 
Swamp, let us follow the movements of 
the National armies a little further to 
the noi'th and west, and witness their 
vain endeavors to check the ti'iumphal 
progress of the Confederate general, 
" Stonewall " Jackson. In a previous 
chapter it has been shown that, when 
it was finally agreed that McClellan 
was to proceed to Richmond by way 
of the Peninsula, every precaution was 
taken for the protection of Washington. 
Early in January, General Lander, of 
■ General Banks' corps, was placed in 
; command of a force whose primary 
duty it was to protect the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad. Floyd and Wise 
and Lee had each of them been com- 
pelled to retire from that neighbor- 



hood ; and " Stonewall " Jackson, in 
whom Lander found a skilful and ener- 
getic opponent, was endeavoring to 
recover the ground which they had 
lost, and make himself master, if pos- 
sible, of the Shenandoah Valley. With 
a comparatively small force, not ex- 
ceeding fom' thousand men. Lander 
executed a series of brilliant move- 
ments in presence of the enemy ; and, 
on the night of February 14th, peb. 
he made a dash, at the head of !*• 
some four hundred horsemen, and, 
surprising Jackson at Blooming Gap, 
captured seventeen of his commissioned 
officers and about sixty of his rank 
and file, and compelled him to retire. 
Lander died soon after, from the effects 
of a wound which he had received in 
October of the previous year, a few 
days after the battle of Ball's Bluff, 
in a skirmish at Edwaid's Ferry. In 
Lander, the country lost a brave sol- 
dier, a capable general, and a truly 
loyal citizen. The troops commanded 
by Lander were placed under General 
Shields, another aide officer, who had 
already earned for himself a name by 
his services in Mexico. 

Early in February, General Banks, 
to whom had been assigned the duty 
of covering the line of the Potomac 
and Washington City, sent Colonel 
Geary forward with a force to occupy 
Harper's Ferry. This task was easily 
accomplished ; and towards the end of 
the month, General Banks arrived and 
took command in person, occupying, 
with his troops, all the higher ground 
near the ferry, as well as Charleston 
and Leesburg. Jackson, after his en- 



BATTLE OF KEKNSTOWN. 



245 



counter with Lander, had retired to 
Winchester, where he was lying, with 
liis division of some eight thousand 
men, when, early in March, Johnston 
evacuated Manassas. On the 11th of 
Mar. March, two days later, Jackson 
'*• also retired, moving further up 
the Shenandoah Valley, and keeping 
himself in easy communication with 
Johnston. He halted at Mount Jack- 
son, some forty miles above Winches- 
ter. Thither Shields pursued him; 
but finding Jackson well posted, and 
believing him to be too strong to 
warrant an attack, he fell back on 
Winchester for the double purpose of 
securing a place of safety, and of 
decoying Jackson from his position. 
After a march of thirty^ miles, which 
was accomplished in one day, Shields 
posted his division in a secluded place, 
about two miles from Winchester, on 
the Martinsburg Road, and about half 
a mile north of the village of Kerns- 
town. While the division under 
Shields was so occupied^ General 
Banks, following out the arrangements 
agreed upon at Fairfax Court House, 
]xit the rest of his corps in motion 
towards Centreville, from which the 
Confederates had retired on Mai'ch 
nth. In his backward march to- 
wards Winchester, Shields was fol- 
lowed closely by Ashby's cavalry. 
Mar. C)n the 22d, about five o'clock 
22. in the afternoon, Ashby's hors». 
men attacked and di-ove in Shields' 
pickets. Shields was well posted, and 
had under him a force of about 6000 
infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 guns. By 
order of General Banks, who was on 



the ground, Shields pushed forward 
one brigade and two batteries of artil- 
lery; but the movement was so con< 
ducted that the enemy could only see 
a small portion of that force. While 
directing one of the batteries to its 
position, Shields was hit by the frag- 
ment of a shell, which fractured his 
arm above the elbow, bruised his 
shoulder and injured his side. Badly 
injured as he was, he was yet able to 
attend to his duty, so far as to make 
dispositions for the ensuing days. 
Under cover of the night, he pushed 
forward Kimball's brigade, nearly 
three miles on the Strasbura; Road. 
To support this brigade, if attacked, 
Daum's artillery was placed in a strong 
position. In the rear of Kimball's, 
and vpithin supporting distance of it, 
covering all the approaches to the 
town, was placed Sullivan's brigade, 
which, with Broadhead's cavalry, was 
held in reserve. In that order the 
troops rested for the night. Early on 
the following morning a recon- ]^iap, 
noissance was made. There was 23. 
no evidence of the presence in front 
of any Confederate force, except Ash- 
by's cavalry. In the belief that such 
was the fact, and taking it for granted 
that Jackson would not be daring 
enough to attack Shields, Banks, in 
obedience to a summons from head- 
quarters, left at ten A. M. fgr Wash- 
ington, 

Shields was soon undeceived; and 
General Banks had only reached Har- 
per's Feriy, on his way to Washington, 
when he heard the sounds of battle, 
and promptly retraced his steps. At 



244 



JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN. 



the time the reconnoissance was made, 
and when the National scouts could 
see nothing but Ashby's cavalry, Jack- 
son's whole army was posted in battle 
order, with artillery on each flank, 
about half a mile south of Kernstown, 
and completely under cover of the 
woods. Shortly after eleven o'clock, 
the Confederate cannon opened fire upon 
Kimball. Sullivan's brigade was or- 
dered forward to his support ; and the 
fire of artillery on both sides became 
heavy, although as yet ineffective, 
because of the distance. Jackson 
seemed resolved to force the fighting. 
Pushing forward more guns to his 
right, and advancing to theu- support 
a considerable force of infantiy and 
cavalry, he made a vigorous effort, as 
If he wished to enfilade and turn the 
National left. At this moment, an 
active body of skirmishers, imder Col- 
onel Carrol, consisting of his own regi- 
ment — the Eighth Ohio — and three 
companies of the Sixty-Seventh Ohio, 
were thrown forward on both sides of 
the valley road, to check the enemy's 
advance. These skirmishers were ad- 
mirably supported by four pieces of 
artillery, under Captain Jenks, and 
also by Sullivan's gallant brigade. 
At every point the Confederates were 
repulsed; and Jackson, as if despair- 
ing of any success against the National 
left, massed his forces, and flung him- 
self wdth great energy on the right. 
The movement was skilfully made, 
and very narrowly missed success. So 
fierce was the onslaught that Daum's 
batteries, although worked with skill 
and energy, were powerless to offer 



any effective resistance. On rushed 
the Confederates, as if nothing coulc' 
check them ; and for a time it seemed 
as if they were about to snatch the 
prize of victory. Shields, who was 
unable to be present on the field, was 
actually conducting the battle from 
his bed. Having been informed by a 
messenger from Kimball of the state 
of affairs, he saw at once that his 
army was in danger, and that not a 
moment was to be lost. He gave 
orders that all the disposable infantry 
should be immediately thrown forward 
on the right, and that thus massed, they 
should fall with all their might on 
Jackson's batteries, capture them, then 
turn his left flank and hui'l it back 
on his centre. Kimball entrusted this 
movement to Colonel Tyler. It was 
admirably executed, the gallant Tyler 
and his splendid brigade marching 
f orwai'd with " alacrity and enthusiastic 
joy to the performance of the most 
perilous duty of the day." The Con- 
federate skirmishers yielded to the at- 
tack, and fell back to the main body, 
strongly posted on high ground, and 
behind a high and solid stone fence. 
Here the struggle became desperate, 
and, for a time, doubtful. Tyler's bri- 
gade was soon joined by the Fifth 
and Sixty-Second Ohio and Thirteenth 
Indiana, of Sullivan's brigade, and 
the Fourteenth Indiana, Eighty-Fourth 
Pennsylvania, and several companies of 
the Eighth and Sixty-Seventh Ohio, of 
Kimball's brigade. This united force, 
with cheers and yells, which rose high 
above the roar of battle, rushed upon 
the Confederates; and in spite of a 



THE PURSUIT. 



245 



most lieroic resistance, which was too 
well attested by the heaps of slain on 
the field, Jackson's men were driven 
Qack through the woods. Resting 
Tipon the reserve, an attempt was 
again made, chiefly by the famous 
"Stonewall laigade," to retrieve the 
fortunes of the day ; but it was of no 
avail. Nothing could resist the on- 
ward rush of the now triumphant 
Nationals, as they rent the air with 
their cheers, and poured forth theii' 
murderous volleys. This last attempt 
at resistance was but of brief dura- 
tion. The Confederates again broke ; 
and this time they fled in disordei- 
from the field, leaving, in addition to 
the multitude of killed and wounded, 
three hundred prisoners, two guns, 
four caissons, and a thousand stand of 
•small arms. "Night alone," said the 
gallant Shields, in his gi-aphic and 
lionest report, "saved them from total 
destruction." The Nationals rested 
on the battle field. 

On the following morning, in obedi- 
Mar. ^'1^6 to orders from General 
24« Shields, the pursuit was com- 
menced, the National artillery opening 
fire upon the rear-guard of the retreat- 
ing foe. General Banks, when he halt- 
"d at Harper's Ferry, ordered back 
Williams, with his whole division, 
rije general himself lost no time in 
returning to Winchester ; and having 
made a hasty visit to General Shields, 
lie assum-jd command of the forces in 
p;:rsuit of the enemy. The pursuit was 
ccatinued as far as Mount Jackson. 
It was there abandoned, in consequence 
of the utter exhaustion of the troops. 



This victory at Kernstown was due 
largely, no doubt, to the bravery of 
the rank and file of the National army 
and to the skill and intrepidity of 
its officers. It is doubtful, however, 
whether even such an army, in pres- 
ence of such a foe, could have nailed 
victory to its standard, without the 
clear head, the firm, decisive will and 
the prompt action of General Shields. 
No more skilful generalship than that 
displayed by General Shields on thi? 
occasion was exhibited during the eo 
tire progress of the war.* 

Although Jackson had been defeated, 
and held for a time in check, it was no 
part of the plan of the Confederates 
to abandon the Shenandoah Valley. 
They knew that so long as they were 
able to threaten Washington by main- 
taining a large force in the valley, 
they would embarrass the movements 
of McClellan in the Peninsula. It was 
not possible for Jackson to make any 
aggressive efforts, or even to maintain 
his position, if he was not considerably 

* General James Shields, the hero of Kernstown, was 
bom in 1810, in the county of Tyrone, Ireland. In 
1820, when at the age of sixteen, he emigrated to the 
United States. In 1832, he settled in Uliuois, where he 
devoted himself to the profession of law. After hav- 
ing filled several offices, he became a judge of the 
Supreme Court. In 184."), he was appointed by Presi- 
dent Polk, commissioner of the General Land Office, and 
removed to Washington. After serving in the Mexican 
War with distinction, he was elected United States Sen- 
ator from Illinois. He was living in Minnesota when 
that Territory was admitted a State of the Union, and 
was chosen United States Senator. When the war 
broke out, he had been for some years in California, 
living in comparative retirement. Congress made him 
a brigadier-general, with a commission bearing date 
August 19, 1801. General Shields has always been a 
pronounced Democrat ; but his politics have never 
tempted him to entertain views injurious to the tmity 
and integrity of the Natioaal government. 



3S4 



246 



JACKSON'fcs CAMPAIGN. 



reinforced. Accordingly, while he was 
lying at a point between the South 
Fork of the Shenandoah and Sv^aft 
Run Gap, after his retreat from Win- 
chester, he was joined by the divi- 
sion of General R. S. Ewell, and 
also two brigades under Edward J. 
Johnston. The entire force under 
Jackson was thus increased to about 
15,000 men. They were surely all 
needed ; for he was confronting three 
National armies — that of Fremont on 
his left ; that of Banks in front, and 
that of McDowell on his right. Fre- 
mont, it will be remembered, had 
charge of what was called the Moun- 
tain department ; Banks had charge of 
the Shenandoah department; and Mc- 
Dowell had charge of the newly- 
created department of the Rappahan- 
nock. Towards the end of April, 
when Jackson was about to commence 
offensive operations, Fremont, in obedi- 
ence to orders given by the presi- 
dent, had come down to Franklin, in 
Pendleton County, near the mountains 
west of HaiTisonburg, and had taken 
a position there with 15,000 men; 
General Banks was at Strasburg, in 
the valley, with about 16,000 men; 
and General McDowell was at Fred- 
ericksburg with 30,000 men. About 
the time Jackson began to move. 
Shields' division was detached from 
Banks' command and given to Mc- 
Dowell, who, as Washington was no 
longer menaced by Johnston, was on 
his march to McClellan, now at the 
head of some 41,000 men, with 100 
guns. Such was the disposition and 
such the strength of the National 



forces in Virginia in the first weeks 
of May. Banks, it will be observed, 
after Shields' division had been trans- 
ferred to McDowell, had not under 
him more than 6000 men. 

Jackson's great object was to pre- 
vent either McDowell or Fremont 
from forming a junction with Banks. 
Learning that Fremont was pressing 
on to join Banks at Harrisonburg, 
Jackson left Ewell to watch Banks, 
and advanced to meet Fremont. 
Coming up with his advance at Mc- 
Dowell, some thirty-six miles west of 
Staunton, a vigorous encounter took 
place. Both armies suffered severely, 
but the Nationals were compelled to 
retire. Jackson followed them up as 
far as Franklin, when, hearing from 
Ewell that Banks was evidently prepar- 
ing to make his escape from Harrison' 
burg, he hastened back to McDowell, 
recrossed the Shenandoah Mountains, 
rested for a little at Lebanon Sulphur 
Springs, and then pressed forward, 
with the view of falling upon Banks. 
Meanwhile, Banks had fled to Stras- 
burg, pursued by Ewell. Jackson 
posted on to New Market, where he 
joined Ewell. The united forces 
moved up the Luray Valley, between 
the Massanutten Mountains and the 
Blue Ridge, towards Front Royal, 
their object being to cut off Banks' 
I'etreat in that direction, and thus to 
prevent him joining McDowell by way 
of Manassas Gap. By this movement, 
Jackson accomplished a double object ; 
he created a panic in Washington and, 
indeed, throughout the whole North; 
and he fell with overwhelming force 



KETEEAT OF BANKS. 



247 



on Colonel Kenly and the little gam- 
eon at Front Royal. Kenly made a 
spirited resistance ; but he was com- 
pletely overpowered, and, after being 
wounded, he himself and 700 of his 
men, with a section of rifled 10- 
pounders and his entire supply train, 
fell into the hands of the victorious 
Confederates. This affair happened 
May on the 23d of May. Banks was 
23i still at Strasburg, when, on the 
evening of that day, he heard of the 
disaster at Front Royal. Alarm fol- 
lowed vexation when he learned that 
Jackson, at the head of 20,000 men, 
was moving rapidly toward Winches- 
ter. With his reduced force, it was 
vain to think of offering resistance to 
an army so greatly superior in num- 
bers. As he could not hope to win, 
his plain duty was to try to save his 
men and his war material. Early in 
May the morning of the 24th, Banks, 
2^» resolved to lose no time in put- 
ting distance between himself and his 
pursuers, hastened down the valley. 
By a forced march, he gained Winches- 
ter by midnight. The retreat was 
conducted in a masterly manner, and in 
circumstances of very great difiiculty. 
Banks, however, had little time to rest 
his weary troops. Ewell was ali'eady 
at his heels ; and Jackson was pressing 
forward in overwhelming strength, not 
far in the rear of Ewell. The Con- 
federate advance bivouacked within 
a mile and a half of Winchester. It 
was evidently their expectation that 
the next day would witness the cap- 
ture or destruction of their opponents. 
Banks, as we have seen, had only . 



about 6000 men, with ten Parrott guns 
and a battery of six-pounder smooth 
bore cannon, with which to resist the 
pursuer and protect the valley. The 
Confederate force had been consider- 
ably strengthened, and must have 
numbered, all told, over 20,000 men. 
It was not possible to continue the 
retreat without showing front to the 
pursuers. 

By daylight on the 25th both 
armies were in battle order; May 
and the fight opened furiously 25. 
in front of Winchester. Banks' left 
was commanded by Colonel Donnelly, 
and his right by Colonel Gordon, 
while the troops in the centre were 
well protected by stone fences. Ewell 
made a bold endeavor to turn the Na- 
tional right, and to shut Banks off 
from Harper's Ferry. The National 
soldiers, realizing their danger, fought 
with great bravery, and for some tive 
hours held the Confederates in check. 
Jackson's whole force was now seen 
to be moving forward. Banks, wise- 
ly concluding that further resistance 
might prove his ruin, issued orders 
for a retreat. He had abeady, in an- 
ticipation of such an emergency, sent 
his trains on to the Potomac. Under 
a most destructive fire, the troops 
formed into three parallel columns, and 
moved in the direction of Martins- 
burg, each column being protected by 
an efficient rear-guard. In passing 
through Winchester, they were sub- 
jected to insults and violence, the 
women pouring upon them hot water 
from the windows and flinging other 
missiles. In the course of the after- 



348 



JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN. 



loon Banks reached Martipgburg, hav- 
ing accomplished a march of twenty- 
two miles. There he rested his foot- 
sore and battle-worn troops for two 
and a half hours. At the end of that 
time the march was resumed ; the 
other twelve miles of the journey were 
accomplished ; and by sundown of the 
same day Banks, with his worn-out 
but not yet disorganized men, stood 
on the banks of the Potomac, directly 
opposite W^lliamsport. Forty-eight 
hours had just elapsed since the news 
had reached them of the disaster of 
Front Royal. It was a march of fifty- 
three miles, thirty-five of which were 
perfox-med in one day. "The scene at 
the river," says General Banks, in his 
graphic repoi't of that retreat, " when 
the rear-guard arrived, was of the most 
animating and exciting description. A 
thousand camp fires were burning on 
the hill-side, a thousand carriages of 
every desciiption were crowded upon 
the banks, and the broad river rolled 
between the exhausted troops and 
their coveted rest." 

Some difficulty was experienced in 
getting across the river. The ferry 
was occxipied by the ammunition trains 
— the ford by the wagons. The cav- 
alry was secure in its own power of 
crossing. But the infantry had to 
content themselves with some boats 
which belonged to the pontoon train, 
and which had been brought along 
from Strasburg. With an ingenuous- 
ness which does no discredit to his 
well-tried soldierly qualities. General 
Banks tells us that "there never were 
more grateful hearts in the same num- 



ber of raeti than when, at mid- May 
day on the 26th, we stood on 26t 
the opposite shore." In killed and 
wounded. Banks' loss was about 200. 
Two guns, more than 9000 small arms, 
and some 3000 prisoners constituted 
Jackson's prize. 

It would be unfair to refuse to Gen- 
eral Banks the highest praise for the 
orderly and successful manner in which 
he conducted this retreat from Stras- 
burg to the Potomac. At the same 
time it is undeniable that, if Jackson 
had pursued with the same vigor with 
which Banks conducted his retreat, 
the result might have been very dit 
ferent. Jackson halted his infantry 
not far from Winchester; and George 
H. Stewart, who was sent after the 
fugitives, discontinued the pursuit at 
Martinsburg. In the latter part of his 
retreat, therefore. Banks' danger was 
more in seeming than in reality; for 
Jackson, by giving up the pursuit, had 
flung away his opportunity. Superior 
numbers gave Jackson the victory ; 
but fortune smiled upon Banks, and 
enabled him to save his army. The 
National government had reason to 
honor Banks for saving his men and 
his ammunition trains. The Confede- 
rate government had reason to blame 
Jackson for not completing his victory 
by the annihilation of his antagonist. 

The I'eappearance of Jackson in the 
valley of the Shenandoah, followed as 
that was by the attack on Front Royal 
and the retreat and pursuit from Stras 
bui'g, naturally enough produced not 
a little consternation in Washington. 
We have seen that Genei'al Shields 



THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 



349 



formerly of Banks' corps, had been 
ordered to join the army of McDowell, 
takmg with him his 11,000 men. We 
have also seen that thus reinforced, 
and with an army 41,000 strong, Mc- 
Dowell was under instructions to move 
toward Richmond on the 2(5th, for the 
purpose of co-operating with McClel- 
lan. Before McDowell began to move 
toward Richmond, tidings of what had 
happened in the Shenandoah Valley 
had, of course, reached Washington. 
The government was alarmed ; the 
National capital was considered to be 
in peril ; and McDowell, in place of 
being allowed to carry out the orders 
received eai'lier on the same day, and 
proceed to aid McClellan before Rich- 
mond, was instructed to push 20,000 
men into the valley by way of Ma- 
nassas Gap, the object being to intercept 
Jackson, if he should attempt to re- 
treat. At the same time instructions 
were sent to Fremont by telegi-aph, 
commanding him to hasten, with his 
army, over the Shenandoah Mountain 
to Harrisonburg, the object being the 
same. It was hoped that both armies 
might efFect a junction at Strasburg, 
and that they might do so in sufficient 
time to head off Jackson. Fremont 
lost no time in complying with the 
instructions which he had received; 
but, having taken a more northerly 
road across the mountain to Sti-asburg, 
June ^6 ^^^ ^'^^ reach that place 
*• till the evening of the 1st of 
June. Jackson had passed through the 
town a few hours before. McDowell 
was equally prompt, although, in let- 
ters addressed both to the president 



and to the secretary of war, he ex- 
pressed his regret, in a dignified and 
soldierly manner, that it should have 
been necessary to countermand his 
orders and compel him to fall back. 
Shields' division was pushed forward 
in advance. On the morning of June 
the 2d of June, Shields' cavalry, 2. 
under General Bayard, reached Stras- 
burg — too late also to accomplish their 
intended purpose^ 

In the meantime, the excitement 
and anxiety of the government were 
finding other channels of expressioa 
Alarming despatches were sent to the 
governors of the different States. They 
were informed that the enemy in great 
force was marching on Washington' 
and they were exhorted to organize, 
and forward immediately, all the militi* 
and volunteer force in their respective 
States. On the same day on which 
these despatches were forwarded, the 
president took militaiy possession of 
all the railroads in the United States, 
ordering their ofiicers and servants to 
hold themselves in readiness for the 
transportation of troops and n:unitiona 
of wai' to the exclusion of all other 
business. It was evident that the 
government was really alanned; but 
it was plain also that it knew its duty, 
and that it meant to perform it. 

Jackson had advanced, after the re- 
tirement of Banks, as far as Harper's 
FeiTy. There he became aware of the 
orders which had been given to Mc- 
Dowell and Fremont. He felt that 
he was in danger. If these generals 
should succeed in forming a junction 
at Strasburg before he reaches ths-t 



260 



JACKSON'S CAMPAIGlSr. 



place, it will be necessary for him to 
offer battle to their combined forces ; 
and the result, as he fears, will not 
he favorable. He deemed it wise to 
beat a hasty retreat. Leaving Ewell 
as a reai'-guard, he moved back fi'om 
Harper's Ferry on the night of the 
29th of May. On the following night, 
May and with a view to create a 
3®' false impression, Ewell kept up 
a heavy cannonading, and otherwise 
acted as if a severe contest was going 
on. The night was favorable for his 
purpose. It was "intensely dark; the 
hills around were alive with signal 
lights ; the rain descended in torrents ; 
vivid flashes of lightning illuminated, 
at intervals, the green and magnificent 
scenery, while the crash of the thunder, 
echoing among the mountains, threw 
into comparative insignificance the roar 
of the artilleiy." When the sun rose 
May on the morning of the 31st, there 
31. were no traces of any Confede- 
rates in the neighborhood of Harper's 
Ferry. Ewell was already far ad- 
vanced on his way to rejoin Jackson. 
It was a race, as if for sweet life, 
both with Jackson and with Ewell. 
In order to overtake Jackson, whom 
he rejoined at Middletown, Ewell 
marched in one day thirty-four miles. 
The race up the Shenandoah Valley 
was now fairly begun ; and the retreat 
of Jackson in the one direction was 
(|uite as hasty as that of Banks had 
been in the other. Jackson, in fact, 
had exhibited even more celerity 
in retreat than he had done in pur- 
suit. 

We have ah-eady mentioned that 



when FreSnont reached Strasburg on 
the 1st of June, Jackson had passed 
through the town some hours before, 
and that the van-guard of Shields' di- 
vision, which had been detached by 
McDowell, did not arrive at Strasburg 
until a day later. A vigorous effort 
was now made by both of those offi- 
cers to intercept Jackson further to 
the south. Shields moved vigorously 
along the South Fork of the Shenan- 
doah, between the Massanutten and 
Blue Ridge Mountains, while Fremont, 
somewhat in his rear, and leaning on 
the North Fork, marched along the 
great turnpike to Harrisonburg. The 
mountain streams which flow into the 
Shenandoah were all swollen with the 
heavy rains — so swollen as to make 
it perilous in most places to attempt 
to ford them. Jackson, who was 
also on the South Fork, took the 
precaution of desti'oying the biidges 
as he passed, and, by means of his 
cavaliy, of breaking down or burn- 
ing all those in the opening-s of the 
Massanutten range. By so doing, he 
greatly retarded the advance of his 
pursuers. On the 5th of June, jnne 
and after making the most vigor- 5. 
ous efforts all along his line of march, 
he reached Harrisonburg. Jackson 
now saw that his one hope of safety 
was to cross the swollen Shenandoah 
at Port Republic, where there was a 
strong bridge. He would thus put the 
liver between himself and Fremont. 
He would do more. It was all-im- 
portant that Shields, who was near at 
hand, on the east side of the river, 
should not be allowed to cross and 



BATTLE AT CROSS KEYS. 



251 



form a juuction with the other National 
army. He would make this junction 
impossible. With these ends in view, 
and after allowing his wearied soldiers 
a bi'ief period of repose, Jackson be- 
gan to move from Harrisonburg — his 
line of march being towards the river, 
in a southeasterly direction, by way of 
Staunton. Fremont's advance entered 
Harrisonburg shortly after Jackson left 
it. They were not allowed to halt. 
Pushing on after the retreating army, 
a body of cavalry, imder Colonel Percy 
Wyndham, came upon its rear-guard 
about two miles from Harrisonburg. 
The Confederate rear was covered l)y 
General Turner Ashby's cavalry. With 
the speed of lightning, Ashby turned 
upon the Nationals and smote them 
with great severity. Wyndham was 
captured, together with some sixty- 
three of his men. At this critical 
moment, Bayard and Cluseret humed 
forward cavalry and infantry. Among 
those engaged were Kane's Bucktail 
Rifles. Ashby, feeling himself hard 
pressed, called for an infantry support. 
General Stewart rushed to his aid. 
Severe fighting ensued. Kane's rifle- 
men, after performing deeds of great 
valor, were driven back with a loss 
of fifty-five men. Kane himself was 
wounded and made prisoner. During 
the brief encounter, in which both 
sides sustained heavy losses, General 
Ashby was killed. His horse had 
been shot under him ; and he was dis- 
mounted when the fatal bullet entered 
his body. General Ashby was one of 
the most brilliant generals developed 
on either side during the war. His 



death at this crisis was a great loss to 
the Confederate cause.* 

Jackson continued his march toward 
the Shenandoah with the view of at- 
tempting a passage at Port Republic. 
In the meantime he had left Ewell,( 
with the three brigades of Elzy, 
Trimble and Stewart, well posted at a 
place called Cross Keys, near Union 
Church, about seven miles from Harri- 
sonburg, and about five miles from the 
river. Ewell's force was about 5000 
strong, and occupied a ridge which 
crossed the road near the church. 
There were on either side dense woods 
which protected his flanks. Trimble 
was a little in advance, in the centre ; 
Stewart was on the right ; and Elzy 
on the left. On Sunday morn- jnm 
ing, the 8th of June, as early as 8. 
six o'clock, Fremont marched out of 
Harrisonburg ; and by nine o'clock 
he had his army arranged in order of 
battle. Schenck was on the right; 
Milroy in the centre ; and Stahl on the 
left. Between Milroy and Schenck was 
Cluseret's brigade, composed of the 
Sixtieth Ohio and the Eighth Virginia, 
supported by the Garibaldi guard, of 
Blenker's division. Bohlen's brigade 
supported Stahl ; and the remainder of 
Blenker's division was held as a re- 

* Brigadier-General Turner Ashby was a middle-sized 
man, handsomely built, and very active. He was a dark- 
complexioned man — had dark eyes and tine features, 
and was distinguished by rather a benevolent counte- 
nance. He was a man of much piety. Although not a 
soldier by profession, he soon gave proof that he was 
possessed of all those qualities which secure distinction 
and success on the field of battle. He was a splendid 
horseman ; and he had done good service to the cause 
which he had represented in many a hard-fought battle. 
He had been promoted to the rank of brigadier-geno' 
ral only three weeks before his death. 



353 



JACKSOITS CAMPAIGJJ. 



serve. The Nationals moved to the 
attack up the rising ground under a 
tremendous fii'e. By eleven o'clock 
the battle had become general. The 
fighting was particularly severe in the 
centre, vphere, in spite of the terrific 
fire of the Confederates, Milroy and 
Schenck were gaining ground. For 
hours the battle raged with great fury, 
Milroy and Stahl suffering most severe- 
ly. The Eighth New York alone had 
sixty -five killed. On the Confederate 
side, Trimble, who was the most ex- 
posed, had suffered the heaviest loss. 
For a time vict(n'y seemed doubtful. 
After having been driven back, the 
Nationals again pressed forward ; and 
Milroy had already penetrated Ewell's 
centre, and forced his way up almost 
to his guns. It was now four o'clock ; 
and Stahl's troops, at the supreme 
moment when Fremont seemed on the 
point of grasping victory, giving way, 
the order was given to fall back along 
the whole line. 

Thus ended the battle of Cross Keys 
—one of the best-contested, and, con- 
sidering the numbers engaged, severest 
struggles since the war commenced. 
It was fought wath great bravery on 
both sides ; and if victory remained 
with the Confederates, it was because 
of the excellency of the position which 
they occupied, rather than because of 
the greater endurance of their troops, 
or the superior skill of their command- 
ers. On both sides the loss was heavy, 
"t was particularly severe among the 
National ofiaoers. General Stahl had 
five killed and seventeen wounded. 
The Pennsylvania Bucktails lost all 



their oflieers — commissioned and non- 
commissioned. 

Both armies slept on the ground 
M'iiich they occupied in the morning 
before the battle commenced. Ewell 
was pi-epared to resume the con- jnn^ 
fiict on the morning of the 9th ; ®' 
but being called to aid Jackson at 
Port Republic, he began to move, as 
soon as day broke, towards the Shen- 
andoah — Fremont following in battle 
order. Shields' advance, under Colonel 
Carroll, reached Port Republic on the 
8th of June. There he found some of 
Jackson's cavalry guard; and falling 
upon them with great force, he drove 
them out of the town and took posses- 
sion of the bridge. His true policy at 
that moment would have been to burn 
the bridge; for by that means he 
might have ruined Jackson, by making 
it impossible for Ewell to come to his 
aid. This, however, he neglected to 
do, believing, perhaps, that he could 
liold it, and that it might still be use- 
ful in enabling the two National armies 
to form a junction. While waiting 
for the arrival of his infantry, he was 
joined by General E. B. Tyler, who 
took command. After assuming com- 
mand, Tyler was unwilling to act 
until he had received instructions from 
Shields. Ewell, meanwhile, had man- 
aged to escape from Fremont, had 
brought his troops across the liver, and 
had so strengthened Jackson that the 
Confederate had no reason any longer 
to fear his enemy. Discovering that an 
attempt was being made by the Con- 
federates in great strength to outflank 
his left, Tyler made a vigorous show 







.j^ 




W.''^' 






GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS 



PORT REPUBLIC. 



ssat 



of resistance. Counteracting the flank- 
ing movement by employing liis whole 
force, Tyler drove back into the woods 
about 8000 Confederates. The battle 
raged for some time with great sever- 
ity. It was impossible, however, for 
Tyler to maintain the struggle against 
the fearful odds which were now ar- 
rayed against him. Fremont, when 
he heard the sounds of battle and saw 
the clouds of smoke, had hastened 
towards Port Republic. When he 
reached the bridge he found it in 
flames, the water too deep to be 
forded, and the enemy safe beyond his 
reach. Tyler had no choice but to order 
a retreat, which, covered by Carroll and 
his cavalry, was conducted in good order. 
The Confederates pursued the retreat- 
ing forces some five miles, the " boys 
preserving their places in the I'anks, 
and fighting every inch of the way." 

Port Republic added another laurel 
to the victorious wreath which en- 
circled the brow of General Jackson. 
His campaign in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley had been conducted with wonder- 
ful skill and with great success. He 
had not won, it is true, any great vic- 
tory, but he certainly enjoyed its fruits. 
He had, by the pursuit of Banks, al- 
most threatened the National capital. 
By his rapidity and dexterity of move- 
ment he had baffled all the skill of 
three major-generals. At the last mo- 
ment, when he seemed to be shut in 
between two forces, he paralyzed Fre- 
mont with one blow and Shields with 
another, and finally, by the destruction 
of the bridge, made their junction im- 
possible. This, however, was not all. 



He had diverted large- reinforcements 
from McClellan, and, while he had 
given that general a cause for indulg- 
ing in his "masterly inactivity," he 
had otherwise neutralized the influence 
of 60,000 men. He had taught the 
National government that it would 
never again be saf/ /hile the war 
lasted, to leave Washington unpro- 
tected. That lesson, taught at that 
time, was equal to the adding of many 
thousands of men to the Confederate 
armies. 

This chapter would be incomplete 
without a brief sketch of the man who 
is really its hero.* 

The National government was un- 
doubtedly primarily to blame for the 

* Thomas Jefferson Jackson was born in Western 
Virginia, in January, 1824. His family was respect- 
able ; but in his boyhood he received only a limited edu- 
cation. At the age of nineteen, he entered, as student, 
the military academy of West Point, where, in spite ol 
his homely dress and uncouth manners, he distanced 
many of his competitors, taking a prominent place in 
several of his classes. He served in the Mexican War 
as an artillery officer under Magruder, and acquired the 
reputation of being a good gunner. Toward the close 
of that war he was bre vetted a major. He afterwards 
held for ten years the chair of chemistry at the military 
academy of Virginia, at Lexington. On the death of 
his first wife he visited Europe ; and during his stay in 
England, he took great delight in visiting the cathe- 
drals, York Minster being his special favorite. When 
the Civil War broke out, he had married a lady of a 
Northern family ; and it is said he was for some short 
time in doubt as to what course he should follow. He 
had, in 18.52, resigned his rank in the army. Ultimate- 
ly he offered his sword to his native State, and received 
a commission. It was he who turned the tide of affairs 
at Bull Run, and secured the victory for the Confede- 
rates. His exploits in the Shenandoah Valley speak for 
themselves. Jackson's life was destined to be brief; 
but, as we shall see while this history progresses, he 
filled it with noble deeds, and left behind him a name 
which the world wiU not willingly let die. "Stonewall" 
Jackson will ever be the symbol of a chivalry equal to 
that of a Bayard, and of a piety equal to that of a saint. 
In his life, he commanded the love and confidence ol 
his men. In his death, he was mourned by the world. 



xas 



SB4 



JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN. 



humiliation brought upon the Northern 
armies by Jackson's raid. The action 
at Winchester showed what could be 
done, even against such a man, with a 
force of reasonable strength. It was 
the weakening of Shields, by the re- 
moval of so many troops to Centre- 
ville, which provoked the battle of 
Winchester. In the presence of so 
watchful an antagonist as Jackson, the 
lesson ought not to have been lost. 
When, therefore, the government de- 
tached Shields from Banks, and sent 
him, with his division, to swell the 
army of McDowell, leaving Banks with 
only some 6000 men, a grave blunder 
was committed. It was not possible 
for Jackson to resist the temptation 
which was thus offered. But for that 
temptation, Jackson certainly would 
•not at that time have ventured to at- 
tack Banks ; and probably the famous 
race thi'ough the Shenandoah Valley 
would never have taken place. This, 
however, was not all. The blunder 
committed by the government had an- 
other result. It hindered the very 
purpose for which Shields had been 
detached from Banks — it prevented 
McDowell from joining McClellan be- 
fore Richmond. It is not wonderful 
that McDowell, when commanded to 
fall back and take part with Banks 
and Fremont in the interception of 
Jackson, should have done so reluctant- 
ly, exclaiming, with a heavy heart, as 



he repeated the order : " It is a crush- 
ing blow to us all." It was unfortu- 
nate that Shields and Fremont did not 
meet at Strasburg ; and the latter gen- 
eral, though assuming a responsibility 
which success would have justified, un- 
doubtedly made a mistake in not tak 
ing the route across the mountains 
which he was ordered to take. If 
he had taken the appointed route, he 
might have intercepted Jackson ; but 
he might not, for the mountain roads 
were in a wretched condition, in con- 
sequence of the heavy rains, which 
had soaked the soil and swollen the 
streams. As it was, Jackson had 
passed through Strasburg only a few 
hours before he arrived. Supposing 
Fremont had been up in time to meet 
the retreating army, it is by no means 
certain that he could have hindered 
Jackson's onward march. Shields did 
not arrive at Strasburg till the follow- 
ing day; and it is by no means im- 
probable, judging from what actually 
did happen, that Jackson, in the 
interval, could have found time to 
punish Fremont and proceed on his 
journey. Fremont and Shields no 
doubt did their best; and if they 
were outrun, and finally defeated, they 
had the satisfaction of knowing that 
the task had been accomplis^ied by a 
general who was without a superior, 
either in the armies of the South o* 
in the armies of the North. 



ON THE CHICKAHOMINY. 



253 



CHAPTEK XVIII. 



Th* Army of the Potomac. — A Critical Period. — McClellan Still on the Chickahominy. — Masterly Inactiyity. 
— Quiet Siege of Richmond. — Stuart's Raid. — A Confederate Council of War. — McCleUan's Difficulty. — 
Fight or Retreat. — He Might Have Fought and Won. — Retreat to the Jame-s River Resolved Upon. — The 
Confederates Move on Mechanicsville. — The Nationals Well Posted at Beaver Dam Creek. — The Confede- 
rate Attack at Mechanicsville. — Night Closes the Straggle. — The Result a National Victory. — McCIeUan 
Hastens his Retreat — The Second Day. — The Nationals Still Well Posted. — The Brave Confederates. — • 
"Thundering Hurrahs." — Repeated, but Vain Attempts. — Porter Calls for Help. — Slocum Sent to his Aid. 
—Porter Again Calls for Help. — Butterfield Sorely Pressed. — St. George Cooke. — A Pause. — The Nationals 
Falling Back to the River. — Arrival of Meagher and French. — The Day Saved. — White Oak Swamp. — The 
Confederates Deceived. — White House Evacuated. — The Pursuit. — McCleUan's Despatch. — Savage's Station. 
.^Fair Oaks Abandoned. — Battle of Savage's Station. — McClellan at Malvern HiUs. — The Battle at 'White 
Oak Swamp Bridge. — The Confederates in High Hopes. — Grand Massing of Troops. — Jackson at White 
Oak Swamp Bridge. — Frazier's Farm. — Willis's Road. — Battle of Glendale. — Determined Fighting on Both 
Sides. — Arrival of Hooker and Kearney. — A DrawTi Battle. — Meade Wounded and McCall Captured. — Inci- 
dents of the Two Battles. — White Oak Swamp and Glendale. — The Retreat Continued. — Malvern Hills. — A 
Strong Position. — The Hills Covered with Artillery and Infantry. — Lee's Plan. — Hill's Opinion. — A Bold 
Attack and a Fearful Cannonade. — The Confederates Repulsed. — A Lull in the Fight. — The Attack Re- 
newed. — The Quivering Hills. — Terrible Slaughter. — Hand-to-Hand Fighting. — The Nationals Hold Their 
Position. — A Fearful Night. — The Retreat Continued. — Vexation of the National Officers. — Fitz John Porter. 
— Philip Kearney. — The Circumstances Depressing. — McCleUan's Address t« his Soldiers. — Address of Jeffer- 
son Davis to the Army of Virginia. — Committee of Congress. — Heavy Loss of Men. — Poor Results. — 
McCleUan and Lincoln. — McCleUan and Halleck. — Correspondence. — Reluctance of MeCleUan to Leave 
Harrison's Landing. — His Demand for More Troops. — End of the Peninsular Expedition. — Reflections. 



1862. 



We have now arrived at the most 
critical, if not the most perilous, 
period in the entire histoiy o£ 
the war. Since the disastrous battle of 
Bull Run, the National armies had ex- 
perienced no very serious reverse. On 
the contraiy, in many a hard-contested 
fight, and on many a blood-stained 
battle field, victory had rewarded the 
bravery and crowned the efforts of the 
Union troops. In the West they had 
marched in triumph fi-oin Cairo to the 
iK-ighborhood of Vicksburg; and such 
names as Heniy and Donelson, and 
Bhiloh and Corinth, and Perryville 
and Murfreesboro had become separate 
sources of National pride. Along the 



coast and on the inland waters, they 
had been even more successful than 
they had been on land; and it 'was 
with feelings of equal pride they 
could reflect that the entire seaboard, 
both of the Atlantic and of the Gu)f, 
had been restored to Federal authority. 
It was only in the Peninsula and 
over the army of the Potomac that 
the cloud of darkness hovered. Here 
alone fortune seemed to be chary of 
her favors. 

The siege of Yorktown, the battle of 
Williamsburg and the battle of Fair 
Oaks had shed but little lustre on the 
Federal arms. The anny of the Poto- 
mac — so imposing in its strength, so 



256 



McOLELLAN'S RETKEAT. 



splendid in its equipment, so perfect 
in its training, the pride of its chief, 
the hope of the nation — had not yet 
given any earnest of the fulfillment 
of its high promise. We have fol- 
lowed it from Manassas to Yorktown, 
from Yorktown to Williamsburg, from 
Williamsburg to the swamps of the 
Chickahomiuy ; and, although we have 
no reason to blame either officers or 
men for lack of bravery, we have seen 
precious time wasted, blunder after 
blunder committed, and opportunity 
after opportunity flung to the winds 
of heaven, A month had elapsed 
since the battle of Fair Oaks, and Mc- 
Clellan was still lying inactive along 
the line of the Chickahomiuy. While 
he waited for reinforcements, and oc- 
cupied himself and his men in the 
construction of bridges and battei'ies, 
the enemy was multiplying his own 
forces, and mightily increasing the dif- 
ficulties of the National commander. 
Had McClellan moved on Richmond 
immediately after the battle of Fair 
Oaks, the presumption is that he 
would have won an easy victory. As 
it was, he gave General Jackson 
abundant time, after his brilliant cam- 
paign in the valley, to come up and, 
with his army of 35,000 men, to 
join General Lee, who had succeeded 
General Joseph E. Johnston in the 
supreme command. This, howevei', 
was not all. Time was given the gov- 
ei'nment at Richmond to reap the full 
benefit of the new Conscription Act, 
and to huriy forward, at the same 
time, detachments from the West. Mc- 
Clellan's army had no doubt suffered 



since it first landed on the Peninsula. 
The ranks of the regiments had been 
thinned. Some had died in battle; 
and not a few had perished from the 
malarioiis fevers of the swamps. De- 
tachments, too, had been left respective 
ly at Yorktown and at Williamsburg. 
But he had been joined by five regi' 
ments from Baltimore ; General Wool's 
disposable force at Fortress Monroe 
was at his call; McCall's division, of 
McDowell's corps, had already arrived 
from Fredericksburg ; and if McDowell 
himself, with the remainder of his 
army, had been prevented from coming 
to his Aid, McClellan had the less rea- 
son to complain that his own dilatory 
conduct had given Stonewall Jackson 
the opportunity of teaching the Fede- 
ral authorities the propriety of securely 
guarding the National capital. A vail 
of mysteiy hangs over some of the 
doings of this period ; and it may l)e 
that there are some things which will 
yet find a fuller explanation ; but in the 
meantime, with all the light we now 
enjoy, the evidence seems conclusive 
that McClellan sacrificed his chances 
by his habitual caution, or rather bj' 
his incorrigible habit of delay. 

The National army was stronglj- 
fortified on the Chickahomiuy. The 
left wing was on the south of that 
stream, between White Oak Swamp 
and New Bridge. The roads tow!ird>i 
Richmond were commanded by heaw 
guns. The right wing was north of 
the Chickahomiuy, and extended be- 
yond Mechanicsville. Several solid 
bridges had been thrown over thf 
stream, thereby bi'inging the two' 



HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 



257 



wings into easier communication. The 
one fault of McClellan's arrangement 
was that his line was too long, and, 
consequently, greatly attenuated. The 
Confedei'ates were not slow to dis- 
cover this weakness of their adversary. 
June On the 13th of June, General J. 

*3« E. B. Stuart, with some 1500 cav- 
alry and four pieces of horse artillery, 
made a bold dash on the National 
right, and, after some severe fight- 
ing at Hanover Court House, swept 
around the entire army, working terri- 
ble destniction, and capturing 165 
prisoners and 260 mules and horses. 
After resting three hours at Talleys- 
ville, he returned next morning to 
Richmond, unopposed. This audacious 
movement of Stuart actually created 
great commotion in the army of the 
Potomac. For some days more all 
was quiet on the Chickahominy. On 
June the 25th of June the army, then 

25i numbering 115,000 men present 
for duty, heard with delight that they 
were to be led out of the pestilential 
swamps. On that day a forward 
movement was made by Heintzelman's 
corps, Math a part of Keyes' and 
Sumner's, on the Williamsburg Road. 
At a place called Oak Grove the 
enemy was encountered in considerable 
strength, when a severe fight ensued, 
the Nationals losing some 516 men in 
killed and wounded. The coveted 
point was gained, but it was not to be 
turned to nuich account. On that very 
night the uuwelcome tidings arrived 
that Stonewall Jackson was at Han- 
Jnne over Coui't House. On the fol- 

2ft« lowing uiuiuing the advance was 



recalled ; and for the army of the Po- 
tomac there was something else to do 
than to march in triumph to the Con- 
federate capital. 

On the same day on which the above, 
mentioned encounter took place, jnne 
a Confederate council of war was 25. 
held, and it was resolved that, as the 
Confederate lines around the city were 
now completed, the greater portion of 
the army might now be spared for a 
forward movement on the National line. 
Jackson was to cross to the north of 
the Chickahominy, and move on the 
right flank of the National army ; and 
in the event of McDowell remaining 
inactive at Fredericksburg, a general 
and simultaneous attack was to be 
made along McClellan's whole line. 
The National army was now in a peril- 
ous position. It was evident that the 
object was to cut McClellan ofp from 
his communications with the York 
River. He must either retreat or give 
battle out of his intrench ments. Mc- 
Clellan had now to resolve what he 
would do. There was no time for de- 
lay. His decision was quickly taken. 
The bridge which he had thrown across 
the Chickahominy gave him the oppor- 
tunity of throwing over either wing to 
the assistance of the other. He might 
concentrate on the north side or the 
south side, as he thought fit. But if 
he concentrated on the north bank, it 
implied an abandonment of the idea of 
capturing Richmond, and exposed him 
to the risk of an unsupported retreat 
to Yorktown. If he concentrated on 
the south bank, he lost his communica- 
tions with White House, and he would' 



258 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



have to execute the perilous operation 
of changing his base by a flank move- 
ment. It was seventeen miles from 
Fair Oaks to James River, and there 
was only one road — a road which was 
exposed to many others radiating from 
Richmou'd. The southern movement 
had this one advantage: that since the 
destruction of the Memmac, the James 
River Avas open, and some transports 
had already found their way to City 
Point. The movement to James River 
ivas determined upon ; and arrange- 
ments for a letreat were made at once. 
Happily, the only bridges in possession 
of the Confederates were about ten 
miles above, at Mechanicsville As 
the Confederates must needs go round 
by that way, time would be gained by 
the Nationals to make good their re- 
treat to Harrison's Landing, where 
they would come under the shelter of 
the gunboats. Military writers have 
expressed the opinion that a more 
daring general might, by a judicious 
concentration of his troops on the 
south side of the Chickahominy, have 
marched in triumph to Richmond. It 
is true that the Confederate capital 
was left comparatively unprotected ; 
and it is undeniable that the bravery 
of the troops and the skill of the 
officers, from the commander-in-chief 
downward, as displayed in the retreat, 
encourage the belief that if the at- 
tempt had been made, it might have 
resulted in complete success. Such a 
course, however, necessarily implied 
a great risk. Defeat was not impossi- 
ble ; and defeat in such circumstances 
would have been ruinous to the Na- 



tional army. True to his instincts, 
faithful to the character which he had 
already established, McClellan chose, 
as might have been predicted, the less 
hazardous course. 

On the afternoon of the 26th began 
that series of engagements which jud« 
culminated in retreat — a retreat 26. 
which, whether regard be had to the 
protracted character of the struggle, 
the severity of the fighting, or the skill 
with which it was conducted, must 
be considered one of the most memo- 
rable in history. Shortly after two 
o'clock on that day, the Confederate 
general, A. P. Hill, crossed to the 
north side of the Chickahominy and 
moved on Mechanicsville. The right 
wing of McClellan's army which, as 
we have seen, stretched beyond Me' 
chanicsville, was under the command 
of General Fitz John Porter, and con- 
sisted of the divisions of Morell, Sykes 
and McCall. McClellan had long be- 
fore seen and recognized the strategic 
importance of Beaver Dam Creek, near 
Mechanicsville. The place was natu- 
rally strong ; and its strength had been 
increased by some rifle-pits and abatis. 
Here were posted McCall's Pennsylva- 
nia reserves, 8500 strong, with five 
batteries. The batteries were so dis- 
posed as to command the stream and 
the open fields beyond, through which 
the Confederates must approach. In 
the face of a heavy fire from the bat- 
teries and from the infantr}^, Hill's 
brigades, followed by those of Long- 
street, advanced to the attack. They 
fell with tremendous force upon Mc- 
Call's division. Marking but little im 



MECHANICSVILLE. 



259 



pression at first, they massed and fell 
successively on his right and on his 
left, doing terrible damage ; but it was 
all of no avail. The Nationals stood 
firm. McCall, receiving some effective 
aid from Martindale and Grifiin, of the 
division of Morell, and his orders be- 
ing admirably carried out by Generals 
Reynolds and Seymour, repelled the 
enemy at every point. From their 
superior position, the National gims did 
terrible execution. The battle lasted 
until nine o'clock, when the Confede- 
rates were driven back with a loss of 
1500 men. The National loss was 
trifling ; and, at the close of the fight, 
McClellan's men were in full posses- 
sion of eveiy point of the battle field. 
The fight of the 26th is known as the 
battle of Mechanicsville. 

McClellan had won the battle of Me- 
chanicsville ; but he felt, even more 
than before, the necessity of making 
a hurried retreat to the James River. 
Jackson had at last come up. He had 
already crossed Beaver Dam Creek ; 
and he was moving down towards the 
National right. McClellan could no 
longer doubt that it was Lee's inten- 
tion to cut him off from his communi- 
cations at the White House. Retreat, 
in his judgment, must be commenced 
at once ; and, in his own words, " to 
that end, from the evening of the 26th, 
every energy of the army was bent." 
Quarter-master Ingalls was ordered to 
forwai'd the stores and munitions of war 
to Savage's Station, to burn what he 
could not remove, and to do his utmost 
to have supplies sent up the James. 
Having sent his wounded also to Sa- 



vage's Station, he prepared to cross 
the Chickahominy with his right wing. 
for the flight. Diu'ing the night most 
of the heavy guns and wagons wer« 
thrown across the rivei, and shortlj 
before dawn the troops were skilfullv 
withdrawn to a strong position near 
Gaines' Mills, between Cool Ai-bor and 
the Chickahominy. There, in the form 
of an arc of a circle, the left resting 
on the Chickahominy, the right to 
wards Cool Arbor, and covering the 
two bridges — Woodbury's and Alex- 
ander's — the Fifth corps on the jnne 
morning of the 27th awaited the 27. 
attack. Some of the siege guns were 
yet in position there ; and those which 
had been taken over the stream were 
planted so as to cover the approaches 
to the bridges. Morell's division was 
on the left; and Sykes' division of 
Regulars and Duryea's Zouaves were 
on the right, extending towards Cool 
Arbor. The extreme point of the 
right wing, which rested on a swamp 
on the Cool Arbor Road, was held 
by Batteiy I, Fifth United States ar- 
tillery. Captain J. H. Weed. Mean- 
while, Stoneman had been sent to the 
White House with a column of cavalry, 
to evacuate the depot and to destroy 
there what could not be used. 

About noon the Confederates were 
discovered approaching in force, under 
A. P. Hill; and soon the artillery 
opened a heavy fire. Sykes was the 
first to feel the severity of the ene- 
my's attack ; but he rose upon them 
in his might and hurled them back in 
confusion, and with heavy loss. Long- 
street now came forward to the relief 



260 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



of Hill. His first intention was to 
make a feint on Porter's left ; but the 
situation was too serious ; and he was 
compelled to make a real attack, or do 
nothing at all. He resolved, therefore, 
to carry the heights on which the 
Nationals were posted; and while he 
was preparing to do so, Jackson and 
D. H. Hill arrived and took positions. 
The order was now given for the whole 
Confederate line to advance, except 
the right wing under Magruder, which 
was confronting McClellan on the right 
bank of the Chickahominy. The brave 
masses rushed, with "thundering hur- 
rahs," upon the musketry of Porter's 
troops ; and whole ranks went down 
under the terrible fire. After a tre- 
mendous struggle, in which the Con- 
federates vainly attempted to get pos- 
session of the rising ground on which 
the Nationals were posted, the former 
began to give way. They were al- 
ready falling back in disorder. At 
this critical juncture, General Cobb 
appeared on the field with his legion, 
together with the Fourteenth Virginia 
and the Nineteenth North Carolina, and 
vainly attempted to renew the fight. 
His legion was sent rolling back in 
liroken fragments from the charge ; 
and the Nineteenth North Carolina 
lost eight standard bearers, with most 
of their ofiicers killed or wounded. 

At two o'clock, Porter, feeling the 
pressure which was brought to bear 
upon him, sent to McClellan for rein- 
forcements. McClellan, dreading the 
army under Magruder in his immediate 
front, could only spare Slocum's divi- 
sion, of Franklin's corps. He did not 



know that Magruder had not more 
than 25,000 to oppose to his (JOjOOC 
all of whom were well entrenche( 
Slocum arrived about half-past thret. 
Avhen the battle was raging most fierce 
ly. Porter's force now amounted to 
35,000 men. For hours afterwards the 
fighting was desperate, and the issue 
doubtful. The Confederates continued 
to hurl brigade after brigade against 
the National line ; but they came up, 
one after another, only to be broken 
like the angry waves on the rock- 
bound shore. Later in the day Porter 
again sent for i-einforcements ; and the 
brigades of French and Meaghei', of 
Richardson's division, were sent to his 
aid. They arrived just in time. Jack- 
son, with tlie divisions of Longstreet 
and Whiting, had fallen with terrific 
energy on the National left. With 
fierce yells they crossed the interven- 
ing swamp, and rushed up to the very 
muzzles of Porter's guns. Cut dowB 
like grass before the scythe, the surviv- 
oi's nevertheless still pressed forward 
ovei- the dead bodies of their comrades. 
It seemed as if nothing could check their 
advance. Butterfi eld's gallant brigade, 
which had been repelling the heaviest 
attacks of the Confederates for moie 
than an hour without any assistance, 
was no longer able to resist those furi- 
ous onsets. Sorely pressed, it yielded, 
and fell back to the woods. By this 
movement, the batteries of Allen, 
Weedon, Hart and Edwards were left 
exposed. In spite of a most heroic re- 
sistance, they, too, were forced to fall 
back, with the loss of several guns. 
At five o'clock. Porter reported hia 



UAINES' MILL. 



2C.I 



position as critical. His opponents 
had now double his strength. At this 
supreme moment an untoward circum- 
stance aggravated the difficulties of his 
position. Poiter was calling up all his 
reserved artilleiy — about eighty guns 
in all — and was effectually covering 
the retreat of his infantry, when Gen- 
eral St. George Cooke, acting Avithout 
orders, attacked the Confederates on 
their flank with his cavalry, repulsing 
them in great disorder. His horses, 
terrified by the roar of two hundred 
guns and the shrill, sharp sounds of 
thousands of muskets, rushed back 
through the Union batteries, giving 
the impression that it was an attack 
of Confederate cavalry, and producing 
all the effects of a panic. But for this 
unhappy circumstance, Porter might 
have been able to hold the field and 
get all his guns across the river. As 
it was, his entii'e force was pressing 
towards the bridges, the Confederates, 
in great force, close upon their heels. 
It had almost become a rout. At this 
extreme moment, when all seemed lost, 
the brigades of French and Meagher, 
Avho had crossed from the other side, 
came rushing up from the bridges and 
dashed to the front. Wild hurrahs 
i-ent the air as they appeared on the 
field. The retreating Nationals halted 
and re-formed. The Confederates, see- 
ing fresh troops, and ignorant of their 
number, paused, and rested on the 
field they had won. It was now after 
sunset; and darkness soon fell upon 
the scene of carnage. Such was the 
battle of Gaines' Mill. Prodigies of 
valor were performed by both armies. 



Weed's battery, above referred to, was 
under fire for eight and a half hours ; 
and it was only when some of the 
guns were disabled, and when pressed 
by the overwhelming masses of the 
enemy, that the position was abaU" 
doned. On both sides the losses were 
heavy. The Confederate loss must 
have been great; for in Jackson's corps 
alone there were 589 killed and 2671 
wounded. McClellan's loss was 9000 
men and twenty-two guns. 

Although he had suffered severely, 
and been driven from his position. 
Porter had yet won a substantial vic- 
tory. He had accomj^lished the great 
purpose for which he fought:. He was 
still master of the position in front 
of the bridges. During the night, he 
carried his thinned and exhausted recfi- 
ments across the Chickahominy, and 
destroyed the bridges in his rear. It 
was found impossible to care for the 
dead and the seriously wounded ; and 
a few guns and some pnsoners were 
left behind. McClellan applied his 
whole energies more and more towards 
the successful accomplishment of his 
retreat. Flight, not fight, was now 
his fixed purpose. General Keyes was 
ordered forward to take possession of 
the road across the White Oak Swamp, 
and of all communicatory approaches. 
By noon of the 28th Keyes was jnm 
in the position prescribed. Dur- 28. 
ing the day Porter and McCall, with 
their shattered bands, took positions 
on the roads leading from Richmond to 
White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. 
Sumner and Heintzelman, with Smith's 
division, of Franklin's corps, formed 



S63 



McCLELLAN'S RETKEAT. 



an interior line, guarding the Rieli- 
mond roads. Slocum's division was 
left as a reserve at Savage's Station. 
"While the troops were in this posi- 
tion, 5000 wagons, a siege train, a 
herd of 2500 oxen and vast quantities 
of material were successfully moved 
across the swamp, on the way towards 
the James River. 

It was not until the afternoon of the 
28th that the Confederates fully under- 
stood the situation. They had sup- 
posed, from the manner in which the 
ground had been vacated, that McClel- 
lan had been cut off from his line of 
retreat ; and the capture or destruction 
of the entire National army was re- 
garded as certain. The Confederates 
were wild with delight. The day was 
spent in burying the dead and caring 
for the wounded. A demonstration 
was made towards White House, where 
it was expected immense stores of all 
kinds would be found. But Stoneman 
and Emory had already done their 
work, and proceeded by way of York- 
town to rejoin the army on the James 
River. In place, therefore, of finding 
rich and abundant supplies at White 
House, the Confederates found nothing 
but blackened ruins. What the Na- 
tionals had not been able to carry off, 
they had committed to the flames. 
When the state of things at White 
House was reported to General Lee, he 
at once comprehended the situation. 
McClellan, he knew, was on his way 
to the James River, to form a junction 
with the fleet. Singularly enough, it 
does not appear that the plan of re- 
treat conceived and carried out by 



McClellan had, up to that moment, 
entered the minds of the Confederate 
leaders. When it became known to 
them, they did not dream of the pos- 
sibility of its success. It was their 
decided conviction that, as he had been 
driven from all his strongholds on the 
north side of the Chickahominy, and 
been cut off from all communications 
with White House, his base of sup- 
plies, the Chickahominy in his rear 
and the divisions of Magruder, Long- 
street and Huger in his front, it would 
be impossible for the National com- 
mander to save his army. AiTange- 
ments were made at once for a vigorous 
pursuit. 

McClellan, not unnaturally, was 
greatly elated by the success which 
had so far attended the retreat. His 
despatch to the secretary of war, bear- 
ing date June 28th, was boastful and 
extravagant. He truly declared that 
no one need blush for the aimy of the 
Potomac. It was a little absurd, how- 
ever, for him to say, considering the 
many opportunities he had flung away, 
that with 10,000 additional men he 
could take Richmond to-morrow ; and 
surely his better sense had deserted 
him when he allowed himself to write 
to the secretary of war: "If I save this 
ai'my now, I tell you plainly that I 
owe no thanks to you or to any other 
person in Washington. You have done 
your best to sacrifice this army." 

McClellan had spent the whole of 
the 28th at Savage's Station, superin- 
tending the retreat, and so disposing 
his troops as effectually to block the 
way of his pursuers. Early on the 



SAVAGE'S STATION. 



263 



June morning of tlie 29tli, he caused 
29< to be destroyed all that could 
not be carried away from the camps. 
A complete railroad train, locomotive, 
tender and cars, which had been left 
on the track, the cars filled with sup- 
plies and shells, was turned loose, and 
went rolling headlong over the broken 
bridge into the Chickahominy. The 
train had been set on fire at starting ; 
and, as car after car went crashing 
over the broken bridge, the shells 
bursting in rapid succession, added 
grandeur to the work of destruction. 
This done, the general-in-chief moved 
across the White Oak Swamp towards 
the front of his retreating columns. 
About the same hour that McClellan 
left Savage's Station, Lee commenced 
his pursuit. In the race, McClellan 
had the advantage of twenty-four hours. 
Magruder and Huger, who, as we have 
seen, were posted south of the Chick- 
ahominy and in front of the works at 
Fair Oaks, were ordered to push along 
the Williamsburg and Charles City 
Roads; Longstreet and Hill were to 
cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge; 
and Jackson was to cross at the Grape 
Vine Bridge, and sweep down the 
right bank of the river. Provision was 
thus made to intercept the retreating 
army if possible ; and, in any case, to 
fall with great force on both flanks, 
and on the rear. Magruder, as he 
moved along the Williamsburg Turn- 
pike, found that the works at Fair Oaks 
had been abandoned. Sumner and 
Heintzelman, with Smith's division, of 
Franklin's corps, had fallen back to- 
ward Savage's Station. Made aware 



of the approach of Magnider, Sumner 
prepared to offer resistance. The di' 
visions of Richardson and Sedgwick 
were formed on the right of the rail- 
road — Sedgwick's right touching Heint- 
zelman's left. Magruder fell with 
great fury on Sedgwick as early as 
nine o'clock, but he was compelled to 
fall back. Unfortunately at this stage 
Heintzelman, giving way to some mis- 
apprehension of the orders given him, 
moved towards White Oak Swamp, 
and crossed the bridge, thus leaving a 
gap of some three-quarters of a mile 
between Sumner an-d Smith. Magru- 
der saw his opportunity; and, aftei 
some manoeuvreing, rushed upon the 
Nationals with tremendous violence. 
The brigades of Generals Burns, Brooke 
and Hancock were soon engaged. The 
New York Sixty-Ninth came to their 
aid; while splendid sei-vice was ren- 
dered by the batteries of Pettit, Osborn 
and Bramhall, who promptly took 
part in the action. Magruder was thus 
kept at bay, the National troops hold- 
ing their gi'ound until darkness fell 
upon the scene and made an end of the 
battle. Magruder had counted wdth 
confidence on being joined by Jackson, 
but that officer had been too long de^ 
layed in rebuilding Grape Vine Bridge, 
During the night Sumner, leaving be- 
hind him in the hospitals some 2500 
sick and wounded, moved towards 
White Oak Swamp ; and before sun- 
rise on the following morning, the Na- 
tional troops had passed over White 
Oak Bridge, and the bridge had been 
destroyed. Over this one bridge had 
passed almost the entire army of the 



364 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



Potomac, with all its trains and herds 
of cattle. By its destruction, a fresh 
obstacle was placed in the way of the 
pursuing army. The fight of the 29th 
is known as the battle of Savage's 
Station. The one sad feature of the 
day was the leaving behind so many 
sick and wounded. It was one of those 
terrible necessities which bring out into 
striking relief the horrors of war. 

On Monday morning, the 30th of 
June June, McClellan had reached 
SO* Malvern Hills. This is " an ele- 
vated plateau, cleared of timber, about 
a mile and a half long by three-fourths 
of a mile wide, with several converg- 
ing roads running over it. In front 
$.Ye numerous defensible ravines, the 
ground sloping gradually toward the 
north and east to the woodland, giv- 
ing clear ranges for the artillery in 
those directions. Towards the north- 
west, the plateau falls off more abrupt- 
ly to a ravine which extends to James 
River. From the position of the ene- 
my, his most obvious lines of attack 
were from the direction of Richmond 
and White Oak Swamp, and would 
almost of necessity strike the Na- 
tional army on its left wing." This 
place McClellan regarded as the key to 
his contemplated new position. Here, 
therefore, in the mansion house of the 
estate, he established his headquarters ; 
and here he resolved to mass his troops 
(ind collect his artillery. He lost no 
time in establishing communication 
between the army and the gunboats, 
which were in charge of Commodore 
Rodgers. Meanwhile a large part of 
the army, having emerged from White 



Oak Swamp, were beginning to appear 
on tlie high, open ground of Malvern 
Hills, the van reaching as far forward 
as Turkey Bend. It was not, however, 
without a severe struggle that this 
position had been gained. The morn- 
ing of the iJOth was exceedingly hot; 
but there was to be no rest for the 
weai-y and foot-sore men on either 
side. The retreating army must con- 
tinue its retreat : the pursuing army 
must continue its pursuit. Generals 
Sumner and Franklin were left to act 
as a rear-guard, and to hold the pas< 
sage of White Oak Swamp Bridge. 
General Heintzelman, with the divi- 
sions of Hooker, Kearney, Sedgwick 
and McCall, took a position at the point 
of intersection of the roads which lead 
from Richmond, called Charles City 
Cross Roads. The Confederates re- 
sumed the advance the following morn- 
ing. Generals D. H. Hill, Whitney 
and Ewell, with their divisions, un- 
der command of Jackson, had crossed 
the Chickahominy by the Grape Vine 
Bridge, and followed the retreating 
Nationals by the Williamsburg Road 
and Savage's Station. Generals Long- 
street and A. P. Hill had crossed at 
New Bridge, and, having moved around 
the head of the swamp, made a rapid 
march down the Central Road, in the 
hope of being able to strike McCleL 
lan's flank. Meanwhile, Magruder and 
Huger had been marching on a pai-allel 
line with Longstreet along the New 
Market Road. The Confederates wei'e 
in high hopes that they would be able 
to penetrate McClellan's line ; and to 
make matters absolutely certain, a bri- 



WHITE OAK SWAMP AND GLENDALE. 



265 



gade had been ordered to come across 
the James River from Fort Daj'ling. 
It was expected that at least 80,000 
Confederates would be brought into 
action ; and Jefferson Davis had come 
on from Richmond to witness the cap- 
ture or destruction of the army of the 
Potomac. About noon Jackson came 
up to White Oak Swamp and found 
the bridge destroyed. Sumner and 
Franklin weie there in force. A fierce 
artillery fight commenced at once. It 
lasted during the entire day, the Con- 
federates massing their forces and put- 
ting forth almost superhuman efforts 
to force a passage. * It was found to 
be impossible, however, to make any 
headway against the batteries of Ayres 
and Hazard. During the struggle 
Hazard was mortally wounded, and 
his force was so cut up that his bat- 
tery had to be withdrawn. Ayres 
continued the fire without intermission 
until night closed upon the scene. The 
Confederates failed in their purpose 
to force a passage across the swamp. 
During the night the Nationals retired, 
leaving on the ground some 350 sick 
and wounded, and several disabl^wi 
guns. 

While the contest was raging at the 
broken bridge, and the Confederates 
were prevented from crossing or making 
any attempt at reconstruction, another 
and even more fearful battle was raging 
in another direction, although at no great 
distance. Later on the same day, about 
four o'clock in the afternoon, Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill, who had been waiting 
for Magruder and Huger, fell upon 
Heintzelman and his forces at the point 



where the Long Bridge Road intersects 
the Quaker or Willis Road, not far 
from Willis Church. There were two 
farms in the immediate neighborhood, 
one called Frazier's and the other called 
Nelson's, both of which have given 
names to the battle. The Nationals 
were strongly posted, their heavy guns 
particularly being in good position. 
Longstreet having been called away, 
the Confederate command devolved 
upon A. P. Hill. It seemed to be 
Hill's intention to drive the Nationals 
before him by the first onslaught. 
Massing his forces, therefore, on he 
came, as if with the speed of the 
whirlwind and the force of the ava- 
lanche. He had not properly reckoned 
regarding his foe. A terrific shower 
of ai'tillery and musketry decimated 
his ranks and threw his troops into 
disorder. The crushing blow dealt by 
the Confederates fell most heavily 
upon McCall. His division — the Peun 
sylvania Reserves — originally 10,000 
strong, had been reduced since he 
reached the Pamunkey to 6000. But 
the men were in excellent trim, and 
full of spirit. Colonel Simmons, with 
the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth 
Reserves, rushed upon the Confederates, 
when reeling and broken under the,, 
terrific fire, driving them back to the 
woods and making 200 of them pris- 
onei's. Lee hurried forward reinforce- 
ments; and the victorious Nationals 
were driven back to their original 
ground with terriWe slaughter, Sim- 
mons himself being mortally wounded. 
For two hours more the battle raged, 
victoiy yielding now to the one side 



266 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



1 



and now to the other. It seemed to 
be the determined purpose of the Con- 
federates to break the National line 
and to capture its batteries. At one 
time Cooper's battery in the centre 
was captured. By a dashing effort it 
was retaken, together with the stand- 
ard of an Ahibama regiment. At a 
critical moment Meagher rushed for- 
ward with his Irish brigade ; and such 
was the fuiy of the onset that the 
Confederates were driven back again 
to the woods. One of the most brill- 
iant charges of the day was made by 
the Fifty-Fifth and Sixtieth Yii-ginia. 
They captured Randall's battery, and 
drove back in confusion the supporting 
regiments. Determined to reca2:)ture 
it, McCall and Meade rallied their in- 
fantry. A terrific and protracted hand- 
to-hand fight ensued ; and, although 
the reserves were repulsed, they car- 
ried back with them the recaptured 
guus. The darkness was setting in. 
Dui'ing the fierce struggle, the officers 
had recklessly exposed themselves. 
Meade was severely wounded, and a 
Jittle later McCall was captured. Sey- 
mour assumed command, and the bat- 
tle continued. The sounds of battle 
had attracted the attention of Hooker 
and Kearney ; and as night was clos- 
ing upon the scene, their divisions 
arrived upon the field. They were 
soon joined by the First New Jersey 
brigade. Some of the lost ground was 
immediately reclaimed. Joyful shouts 
arose from the National ranks. The 
Confederates, worn out and perplexed 
}iy this fresh accession of strength on 
the part of the Nationals, retired to the 



shelter of the woods. It was not an- 
other victory to either side; but it 
was another great battle ; and to the 
Nationals it was equal to a victory, 
for it was a successful resistance. On 
this day, as the reader now knows, 
there were two separate fights. The 
one is best known as the battle of 
White Oak Swamp ; the other as the 
battle of Glendale. The latter is 
known also as the battle of Frazier's 
Farm. 

In no previous battle of the war, 
perhaps, was the martial spirit so keen- 
ly and so bitterly developed as on this 
day, and particularly at the battle of 
Glendale. The wounding of Meade 
and the capture of McCall give evi- 
dence of the feeling on the National 
side. On the 30th of June, the real 
sentiment of the rank and file of the 
Nationals was several times revealed 
by the loud and universal cry, " On to 
Richmond." On the Confederate side 
there was equal determination and more 
bitterness. It was no uncommon thing 
on that day for cavalry officers to leap 
from their saddles and lead to the 
charge infantry regiments who had lost 
their commanders. At one time Gen- 
eral Hill, when the Confederates were 
in full retreat, seized the standard of 
the Fourth North Carolina, a regiment 
which he had formerly commanded, 
and shouted to the retreating soldiers : 
" If you will not follow, I will perish 
alone." "Lead on. Hill: head your 
old North Carolina boys !" rang over 
the field, while fifty officers dashed to 
his side. The result was that the Con- 
federates halted and turned, and the 



MALVERN HILLS. 



267 



pursuit was checked. Major Peyton 
had a son who had both his legs shat- 
tered. He called to his father for help. 
" When we have beaten the enemy, 
then I will help you. 1 have other 
sons to lead to glory. Forward." 
Such was the answer. In a few sec- 
onds more the father was dead. Such 
incidents might easily be multiplied on 
both sides ; but these are sufficient to 
show the intensity of feeling which 
influenced both armies at this particu- 
lar juncture. Of McCall's division, 
nearly one-fourth had been killed or 
wounded ; and General Pryor tells us 
that he crossed the Chickahominy with 
1400 men, and that in the fights that 
followed he suffered a loss of 859 
killed and wounded, and eleven miss- 
ing. 

It was the confident expectation of 
the Confederates that the battle would 
be resumed next day. In this, however, 
they were doomed to disappointment. 
During the darkness the retreat was 
July continued ; and on the morning 
!• of the 1st of July, the army of 
the Potomac was again a unit, and 
strongly posted— infantry, cavalry and 
artillery — on the high gi'ounds of Mal- 
vern Hills, the James River in view, 
and its communication with that river 
secured. The character of that ground 
has been already described. The posi- 
tion was naturally strong, and Mc- 
Clellan had arrayed his forces with 
admirable skill. Both flanks of the 
army rested on James River, under 
protection of the gunboats. The ar- 
rangement of the troops from left to 
right was thus: Porter, Heintaelman, 



Sumner, Franklin, Keyes. The ap- 
proaches to the position were com- 
manded by about seventy guns, several 
of them heavy siege cannon. " There 
were crouching cannon waiting for 
the enemy, and ready to defend all 
the approaches. Sheltered by fences, 
ditches, ravines, were swarms of in- 
fantry. There were horsemen pictur- 
esquely careering over the noon-tide 
and sun-scarred field. Tier after tier of 
batteries were grimly visible upon the 
slope which rose in the form of an am- 
phitheatre. With a fan-shaped sheet 
of fire, they could sweep the incline — a 
sort of natural glacis — up which the 
assailants must advance. A crown of 
cannon was on the brow of the hill. 
The first line of batteries could only 
be reached by traversing an open space 
of from three to four hundred yards, 
exposed to grape and canister from 
the artillery, and musketry from the 
infantry. If that were earned, another 
and still another more difficult re- 
mained in the rear." Such was the 
position, and such were the forces 
against which Lee was now to direct 
all his strength. It was not without 
reason that, when the attack was about 
to be made, Hill expressed to Lee 
his strong disapproval. Lee, however, 
had made up his mind to take the 
position by storm; and he gave his 
orders accordingly. 

The Confederate chief had massed 
his troops on the right; and he so 
posted his artillery as to be able to 
bring upon the National batteries a 
concentrated fire. It was his belief 
that by this means he would silence 



268 



McCLELLAN'S EETREAT. 



the guns of McClellan; and he had 
given orders that, whenever the expect- 
ed result was produced, Armistead's 
brigade, of Huger's division, should 
advance with a shout and capture the 
battery immediately before it. This 
shout was to be the signal for a gen- 
eral advance with fixed bayonets to 
" drive the invaders into the James." 
Lee found more difficulty in carrying 
out his plan than he had anticipated. 
The day was far advanced before the 
first gun was fired. Between three and 
four o'clock a heavy artillery fire was 
opened upon Couch, of Keyes' division, 
and Kearney, of Heintzelman's. A 
little later D. H. Hill, believing that 
he heard the preconcerted signal for a 
general advance, made a vigorous rush 
towards Couch's front. Instead of being 
supported by one hundred guns, as he 
had expected, only a single battery was 
ordered up — that of Moorman ; and it 
was knocked to pieces in a few min- 
utes. One or two others shared the 
same fate — that of being beat in detail. 
Hill was di'iven back in confusion to 
the woods near the Quaker Road. On 
his retreating, the National right ad- 
vanced several hundred yards and took 
a stronger position. Magruder, mean- 
while, had made a fuiious attack on 
Porter, who commanded on the Na- 
tional left. Two brigades of McLaws' 
division, charging through a dense 
wood, rushed up to the very muzzles 
of Porter's guns. Attacks equally 
furious were made a little further to 
the right, and also on the centre. It 
was to no purpose. The attacking col- 
umns, one and all, shared the same 



fate. They were driven back in con- 
fusion, and with heavy loss. Nothing 
could withstand the terrific fire of the 
National batteries. Malvern Hills lit- 
erally blazed, as if one sheet of solid 
flame; and the guns, which crowned 
every rising knoll, from their many 
mouths belched forth shot and shell 
which fell in showers on the bewil- 
dered masses who from time to time 
pressed forward, only to be torn to 
pieces, or to be driven back in wildest 
confusion. There was a lull in the 
battle. The fighting ceased for a time, 
the Confederates having all fallen back 
and taken shelter in the pine forest. 
Lee, however, was not to be driven 
from his purpose. He had made up 
his mind that Malvern Hills must be 
taken by storm ; and no matter what 
the cost, no matter how great the sacri- 
fice, the attempt must be repeated. 
He spent the interval in re-forming his 
battalions ; and at about six o'clock he 
opened a general artillery fire on the 
right and left of the National j.osition, 
his infantry rushing from their cover- 
ing at the double-quick, sweeping over 
the undulating fields and boldly up the 
hill in the direction of the "oatteries. 
As they advanced, their raiiks were 
torn and ploughed by musketry as 
well as by the heavy guns. Brigade 
after brigade was cut up and driven 
back; but their places were speedily 
filled, with a like result. As the even- 
ing advanced, the fighting became at 
once more general and more severe. 
The batteries on the hill redoubled their 
fire, the Confederates replying with 
equal boldness. The gunboats on the 




. ' AL dTONEWALL" JACKSON 

THE FAMOUS CONFEDERATE COMMANDER 



AN OPPORTUNITY LOST. 



269 



river now began to fling shot and shell, 
which fell with deadly effect on the 
Confederate masses. For two hours 
the hills absolutely shook under the 
fierce cannonade. It was not until 
nine o'clock that the attempt to cap- 
ture the National position was aban- 
doned, and that the firing ceased. In 
his report of the engagement at Mal- 
vern Hills, General McClellan gives a 
gi-aphic picture of the struggle when it 
was most fierce. " Brigade after bri- 
gade," he says, " formed under cover 
of the woods, started at a run to cross 
the open space and charge our bat- 
teries, but the heavy fire of our guns, 
■with the cool and steady volleys of our 
Infantry, in every case sent them reel- 
ing back to shelter, and covered the 
ground with their dead and wounded. 
In several instances our infantry with- 
held their fire until the attacking col- 
umns — which rushed through the storm 
of canister and shell from our artillery — 
had reached within a few yards of our 
lines. They then poured in a single 
volley, and dashed forward with the 
bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, 
and driving the routed columns in con- 
fusion from the field." Such was the 
battle of Malvern Hills. It was, al- 
though not in any sense decisive, one 
of the bloodiest and most fiercely con- 
tested battles of the war. 

The night that followed was dark 
ind stormy. The rain fell in absolute 
orrents. During such a night the 
Bufferings of the wounded must have 
been fearful. The wearied Confede- 
rates sought a brief repose on the rain- 
soaked and blood-stained soil, some of 



them lying within one hundred yards 
of the National batteries. 

When the morning of the 2d of July 
dawned, and the half-slept Con- Jniy 
federates began to open their 2. 
eyes, they discovered with some amaze- 
ment that the Nationals were gone, 
and that Malvern Hills, the scene the 
evening before of so much tempestuous 
life — their heights crowned with frown- 
ing cannon, brilliant with gay uniforms, 
and refulgent with thousands of bay- 
onets, which caught on their glittering 
points the rays of the setting sun — were 
deserted and silent as the grave. In 
the Confederate camp all was dire con- 
fusion. The following picture is by 
one of their own generals : " The next 
morning, by dawn," he says, "I went 
oif to ask for orders, when I found the 
whole army in the utmost disorder. 
Thousands of straggling men were ask- 
ing every passer-by for their regiments; 
ambulances, wagons and artillery ob- 
structing every road, and all together 
in a drenching rain presenting a scene 
of the most woful and heart-rending: 
confusion." It is not wonderful, when 
these things are known to us, that 
many competent critics have ques- 
tioned the propriety of McClellan's 
conduct in continuing the retreat. The 
words, "On to Richmond," if uttered 
by him, would have been gladly obeyed 
by most of his oflScers, and by thou- 
sands of his men. This perpetual 
fighting, with no result but further 
retreat, was breaking the spirits of his' 
soldiers. Such an order on the morn- 
ing of the 2d would have filled them 
with newness of life ; and even at the 



SX7 



370 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



last, worn and weary as they were, 
they might have marched in triumph 
to the Confederate capital. McClellan 
thought otherwise ; and he otherwise 
ordered. 

It is hardly possible to conceive of 
bircumstances more depressing, than 
those in which McClellan's army 
was placed on the night of the 1st 
of July, 1862. For six days they 
had been struggling with a powerful 
foe, each successive fight being fol- 
lowed by a fresh retreat. During 
thi'ee days it had been continuous 
fighting and marching. The men had 
had no rest. . Foot-sore and battle- 
worn, they were not to be allowed even 
on this night even an hour's repose. 
The roar of the conflict had not ceased 
more than two hours, when orders 
were given to resume the retreat. The 
night, as we have said, was dark, and 
the storm I'aged fiercely. We cannot 
wonder that the order gave general 
dissatisfaction. Some of them openly 
and loudly protested. Fitz John Porter 
was indignant ; and his faith in his 
chief was at least temporarily shaken. 
Phil. Kearney was more plain-spoken 
than most of his brother-oflScers. " I, 
Philip Kearney," he said, "an old sol- 
dier, enter my solemn protest against 
this order for a retreat. We ought, 
instead of retreating, to follow up the 
enemy, and take Richmond ; and in 
full view of all the responsibilities of 
such a declaration, I say to you all, 
such an order can only be prompted 
by cowardice or treason." The order, 
July however, was obeyed ; and by 

!• midnight the utterly exhausted 



soldiers were groping their way along 
a road which is described as desperate. 
There was only a narrow pass along 
which the army could retreat. The mud 
was ankle deep all over the ground. 
It was only seven miles to Harrison's 
Landing ; and yet such was the nature of 
the road and the condition of the ground, 
that it was not till the middle jniy 
of the next day that the landing 2. 
was reached. It was the evening of the 
3d before the wagons were all for- jniy 
ward and in their places. The Con- ^« 
federates, after a fourth attempt at pur- 
suit, turned their backs on the National 
army and on they moved to Richmond. 
On the 4th of July General Mc- jniy 
Clellan issued the following ad- *• 
dress to his army : 

" Soldiers of the army of thb 
Potomac — Your achievements of the 
past ten days have illustrated the valor 
and endurance of the American soldier. 
Attacked by superior forces, and with- 
out hopes of reinforcements, you have 
succeeded in changing your base of 
operations by a flank movement, always 
regarded as the most hazardous of mil- 
itary operations. You have saved all 
your guns, except a few lost in battle. 
Upon your march you have been as- 
sailed, day after day, with desperate 
fury, by men of the same race and 
nation, skilfully massed and led. Un- 
der every disadvantage of number, and 
necessarily of position also, you have 
in every conflict beaten back your foes 
with enormous slaughter. Your con- 
duct ranks you among the celebrated 
armies of history. None wiU now ques- 
tion what each of you may always, with 



NATIONAL DISAPPOINTMENT. 



271 



pride, say : ' I belonged to the army of 
the Potomac' You have reached this 
new base complete in organization and 
unimpaired in spirit. The enemy may at 
any time attack you— we are prepared 
to meet them. I have personally es- 
tablished your lines. Let them come, 
and we will convert their repulse into 
a final defeat. 

" Your government is strengthening 
you with the resources of a great people. 
On this, our nation's birthday, we de- 
clare to our foes, who are rebels against 
the best interests of mankind, that this 
army shall enter the capital of the so- 
called Confederacy; that our National 
constitution shall prevail, and that the 
Union, which can alone insure internal 
peace and external security to each 
State, must and shall be preserved, cost 
Vhat it may in time, treasure and blood. 
" Geo. B. McClellan, 
"Major-General Commanding." 

On the 5th, President Davis issued 
July the following address to the 
5» army in Eastern Virginia : 

" Soldiers — I congratulate you on 
the series of brilliant victories which, 
under the favor of Divine Providence, 
you have lately won, and, as the presi- 
dent of the Confederate States, do 
heartily tender to you the thanks of 
the country, whose just cause you have 
so skilfully and heroically served. Ten 
days ago an invading army, vastly 
superior to you in numbers and the 
material of war, closely beleaguered 
your capital and vauntingly proclaimed 
its speedy conquest; you marched to 
attack the enemy in his intrenchments ; 
with well-dii*ected movements and 



death-defying valor, you charged upon 
him in his strong positions, drove him 
from field to field over a distance of 
more than thirty-five miles, and, despite 
his reinforcements, compelled him to 
seek sjifety under the cover of his gun- 
boats, where he now lies cowering 
before the army so lately derided and 
threatened with entire subjugation. 
The fortitude with which you have 
borne toil and privation, the gallantry 
with which you have entered into each 
successive battle, must have been wit- 
nessed to be fully appreciated ; but a 
grateful people will not fail to recog- 
nize you, and to bear you in loved re- 
membrance. Well may it be said of 
you that you have 'done enough for 
glory ' ; but duty to a suffering country 
and to the cause of constitutional lib- 
erty, claims from you yet further effort. 
Let it be your pride to relax in nothing 
which can promote your futui-e effi- 
ciency; your one great object being to 
drive the invader from your soil, and, 
carrying your standards beyond the 
outer boundaries of the Confederacy, 
to wring from an unscrupulous foe the 
recognition of your birthright, com' 
rounity and independence. 

"Jefferson Davis." 
Cheeiy and hopeful as were General 
McClellan's words, the complete failure 
of the Peninsular expedition filled the 
nation with sorrow. There was gen- 
eral gloom ; and but for the successes 
which had attended the armies in the 
"West, the situation would have been 
desperate enough. The Confederates, 
of course, were jubilant; and there 
were many who thought that they had 



272 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



good reason for their joy. In his re- 
port, General Lee said: "The siege of 
Richmond was raised, and the object 
of a campaign which had been prose- 
cuted after months of preparations, at 
an enormous expenditure of men and 
money, completely finistrated. More 
than ten thousand prisoners, including 
officers of rank, fifty-two pieces of 
artilleiy and upwards of thirty-five 
thousand stand of small arms, were 
captured. The stores and supplies, of 
every description, which fell into our 
hands were great in amount and value, 
but small in comparison with those 
destroyed by the enemy. His losses 
in battle exceeded our own, as attested 
by the thousands of dead and woimded 
left on every field, which his subse- 
quent inaction shows in what condition 
the survivors reached the protection to 
which they fl^ed." Boastful and offen- 
sive as this report was felt to be at the 
time, it was nevertheless admitted to 
be a not distant approximation to the 
truth. The committee of Congress on 
the conduct of the war gave in a re- 
port which was not altogether favor- 
able to McClellan. "The retreat of 
the army from Malvern to Harrison's 
Bar," it declared, "was very precipi- 
tate. The troops, upon their arrival 
there, were huddled together in great 
confiision, the entire army being col- 
lected within a space of about three 
miles along the river. No orders were 
•iven the first day for occupying the 
.ieights which commanded the position, 
nor were the troops so placed as to be 
able to resist an attack in force by the 
enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain, 



thereby preventing the enemy from 
bringing up their artillery, saved the 
army from destruction." There had 
been sent to the Peninsula from first 
to last about 160,000 men. On the 3d 
of July, when this army had reached 
Harrison's Landing and was under the 
protection of the gunboats, McClellan 
telegraphed to the president that he 
had not "over 50,000 left vdth their 
colors." The actual number, however, 
was about 86,000, as was found on close 
inspection, when President Lincoln, on 
July the 7th, made a visit to McClellan's 
headquarters. These figures speak vol- 
umes. So large a sacrifice of human 
life ought to have produced greater 
and more beneficial results. 

This chapter would be incomplett 
without a reference to the correspond- 
ence which took place between General 
McClellan and the government, in re- 
gard to his future movements and the 
use to be made of his army. On the 
morning of the day on which was 
fought the battle of Malvern jnne 
Hills, McClellan telegraphed to 30. 
"Washington for fresh troops, adding 
that it might be necessary for him to 
fall back to the river. The president 
promptly replied that he had no men 
to send, but that if he had a million 
at his disposal, it would be impossible 
to forward them in time to meet the 
emergency, urging him at the same 
time to save his army, even if he should 
be compelled to fall back to Fort- 
ress Monroe. The president added : 
" We still have strength enough in the 
country, and will bring it out." jnij 
On the following day McClellan *• 



DEMAND FOR MORE TROOPS. 



213 



«l«^ for 50,000 troops, when he had 
for i*vply that the demand could not be 
complied with, as 15,000 more men 
were needed to defend the National 
oapital. If he was not strong enough 
to take Richmond, the president did 
not ask him to attempt an impossi- 
bility. Strange to say, in spite of all 
jnly this, McClellan made a demand 

3. on the 3d for 100,000 men— 
a demand which he repeated on the 
Jnly 4th, that he might, as he said, 

*• '' take Richmond and the re- 
bellion." It was at this time, too, 
that he wrote that foolish letter which 
is destined to be remembeied against 
him, offering the president political 
advice, particularly in the matter of 
slavery. 

McClellan could not bear the idea of 
being overruled in his plans — if Rich- 
mond was to be captured, he must 
have the gloiy ; nor could he for one 
moment find a place for the thought 
that he should cease to be the chief of 
July the army of the Potomac. On 

23. the 23d of July, General Halleck, 
having resigned his command of the 
army of the West, assumed the duties 
of general-in-chief of the entire army 
of the United States. The first thing 
to which his attention was called, was 
the condition of the army of the Po- 
tomac Halleck, without delay, visited 
Harrison's Landing. Lincoln had been 
there on the 7th. McClellan was thus 
receiving sufficient attention. Halleck 
found McClellan bent on moving to 
Richmond, but impenous in his de- 
mands for more troops. To accomplish 
his purpose, he would lequire at least 



50,000 additional troops. So large 
a number, Halleck assured him, was 
altogether out of tlie question. He 
was not authorized to promise more 
than 20,000, and to let him have 
even that number implied the '.veak- 
ening of other places. McClellan took 
the night to consider the matter. In 
the morning he had come to the 
conclusion that he would make an at- 
tempt on Richmond Math the ad- 
ditional 20,000. With this under- 
standing Halleck left for "Washington. 
Almost immediately after his arrival 
there, he received from McClellan a 
telegram, stating that he could not 
imdertake a movement upon Richmond 
with any hope of success, unless he 
was reinforced to the extent of 35,000 
men. So large a body of men was not 
at the moment disposable. It was re- 
solved, therefore, to withdraw the 
army of the Potomac to some position 
where it could imite ^vith that of Gen- 
eral Pope, and cover Washington at 
the same time that it operated against 
the enemy. On the 30th of July, juiy 
McClellan received instructions 30. 
to send away his sick as quickly as 
possible, and to prepare for a movement 
of his troops. On the 3d of Au- \ng, 
gust he was oi'dered by telegraph 3. 
to withdi-aw his entire army to Acquia 
Creek. This he most reluctantly 
proceeded to do. On the 4th \ug, 
he wrote to Halleck, protesting *• 
against the withdi'awal of his army. 
The telegram of the coramander-in-chiol 
had given him great pain. The with- 
drawal of the aiTny to Acquia CreeK 
could not but prove disastrous. It waij 



«T4 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 



removing the army further from Rich- 
mond, and from a base of operations 
which had all the advantage of the co- 
operation of the gunboats on the river. 
It would prove demoralizing to the 
army — both men and officers ; it would 
have a depressing effect upon the peo- 
ple; and it would have a powerful 
influence in inducing foreign govern- 
ments to recognize the independent 
sovereignty of the Southern Confede- 
racy. By implication he denied that 
the government was unable to send 
him reinforcements. " I point you," 
he said, "to General Burnside's force, 
to that of General Pope — not necessary 
to maintain a strict defense in front of 
Washington and Harper's Ferry; to 
those portions of the amiy of theWest — 
not required for a strict defense there. 
Here, directly in front of the army, is 
the heart of the rebellion. It is here 
that all our resources should be col- 
lected to strike the blow which will 
determine the fate of this nation. All 
points of secondary importance else- 
where should be abandoned, and every 
available man brought here. A decided 
victory here, and the military strength 
of the rebellion is cnished. It matters 
not what reverses we may meet with 
elsewhere — here is the true defense of 
Washington ; it is here, on the bank of 
the James River, that the fate of the 
Union should be decided." There 
were both truth and eloquence in Mc- 
Clellan's words ; but coming from him 
at this particular juncture, they were 
powerless and without effect. They 
failed to convince Halleck. They 
equally failed to make any change in 



the purpose of the government. Hal- 
leck's reply was vigorous. It left un- 
heeded none of the points which Mc- 
Clellan had raised. He differed from 
McClellan entirely as to the value of 
his position, at least in the circum- 
stances in which the National anny, as , 
a whole, found itself. He made a y 
strong point of the fact that he found, 
on his arrival at Washington, the orig- li 
inal army of the Potomac split into ' 
two parts, with the entire force of the 
enemy directly between them. It was 
desirable — it was necessary- — that they 
be again united; and, as this union 
could not be effected on the banks of 
the James, it must be attempted in the 
neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The 
question of demoralization was easily 
disposed of. "Your change of front," 
said Halleck, "from your extreme light 
at Hanover Com't House to your pres- 
ent position was over thirty miles, but 
I have not heard that it demoralized 
your troops, notwithstanding the severe 
losses they sustained in effecting it." 
He referred with effect to McClellan's 
fickleness of purpose, now demanding 
50,000 men, now 20,000, and then dis- 
covering that nothing could be done 
without an addition of at least 35,000. 
He I'eminded him also of the dangerous 
character of the climate on the James 
River — a climate fatal to whites in the 
months of August and September. He 
finally assured him that no change 
could be made in the orders issued, 
and that the wishes of the govern- 
ment must be carried out. Hal- ^uj, 
leek's letter was written on the ^* 
6th of August. It was not until the 



DTEXOTTSABLE DELAYS. 



STCi 



Lag. 14th that the evacuation of Har- 
'^» rison's Landing commenced. Mc- 
Clellan left himself on the 23d, and 
Aug. arrived at Acquia Creek on the, 
23. day following. 

Thus ended the ill-starred Peninsular 
'expedition. From first to last it had 
been unfortunate. Whatever the cause, 
that magnificent army which had been 
organized with so much pomp and 
pageantry at Washington, and from 
which so great things were expected, 
had virtually exhausted itself and cc- 
complished nothing. No finer soldiers 
ever went to give battle to an enemy. 
But they were allowed to sicken in the 
trenches at Yorktown, and to perish 
by thousands in the woods and swamps 
of the blood-stained Chickahominy. 
Once only during the campaign was 
the government, in our judgment, to 
blame. It might have given an entire- 
ly new feature to the campaign if, on 
the eve of the battle of Mechanicsville, 
McDowell had been ordered to make 
a demonstration along the Richmond 
Road. Such a demonstration, as we 
have already had occasion to observe, 
was dreaded by Lee,* as it would have 
rendered entirely impracticable the 
flank movement of General Jackson. 
In the circumstances, however, and 
after the experience it had had, the 

* (leueral Robert Edmund Lee, to whom belongs 
the chief glory of this campaign, and who had already 
proved himself one of the greatest commanders devel- 
oped by the war on either side, was son of General Henry 
Lee, and was bom in Washington, in 1808. Graduating 
at West Point, he entered the array in 1829 ; rising to 
the rank of captain in 1838 ; major in 1846 ; and lieu- 
tenant-colonel in 1847. He was promoted to the post 
of anperintendent of the West Point Military Academy 
in 1852. In 1854, he accompanied General George B. 
MoGlellan on the commission sent hf the United States 



government was not without abundant 
reason for the justification of its con- 
duct. It trembled for the safety of 
Washington, and it called McDowell 
to its protection. McClellan, however, 
was to blame throughout. We have 
no desire to repeat what we said when 
treating of Yorktown and of Williams- 
burg and of Fair Oaks, and what we 
said over again at the conunencement 
of this chapter. The ai-my of the Po- 
tomac, as one has well put it, was 
without a presiding genius — a control- 
ling mind. The delays, which proved 
ruinous, were absolutely inexcusable. 
It would be ungenerous to say that Mc- 
Clellan was wanting in bravery, or that 
he lacked the higher qualities essentia] 
in a great commander. But it is noto- 
rious that he lingered at Yorktown 
when he had no enemy to oppose hia 
advance, that he was not present till 
tlie battle of Williamsburg was fought 
and won, that he was not present at 
all at the battle of Fair Oaks, that 
when the great battle was fought at 
Gaines' Mill he was on the south side 
of the Chickahominy, that he was not 
present at White Oak Swamp or ax 
Glendale, and that Avhen Malvern Hills 
were shaking as if to their foundations 
with the thunder of cannon, he was safe 
on board the gunboats on James River. 

Government to the seat of war in the Crimea. On the 
25th of April, 1861, he re.signed his commission in the 
United States army, and offered his sword to his native 
State of Virginia. During that summer, he conducted 
the military operations in the mountain regions of Vir- 
ginia. Returning to Richmond, he was occupied till 
June, 1862, with the general disposition and equipment 
of the Confederate forces. When Johnston was wound- 
ed at Fair Oaks, Lee assumed command of the army, 
and pressed McClellan from point to point, until he took 
his final ^tand at Malvern Hills and Harrison's Lauding 



2U 



POPE AND LEE IN VIBGDJiA. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

fhe Aimy of Virginia. — Pope in Oomnjand.— Fremont Eesigns. — Bumside Ordered to Alexandria. — Pope's In- 
stmotions.— Pope Opposed to MoClellan's Retreat. — Pope's Address to his Soldiers.— He Asks to be Re- 
lieved of his Command.— McClellan at Acquia Creek.— The Plans of the Confederates.— Pope s Orders.— 
Measures of Retaliation by the Confederates.— A Call for Militia.— The Unpopular Orders Modified.— Th« 
Confederates at the Rappahannock. — Pope's Army Begins to Move. — Position of the Nationals. —Pope at 
Culpepper Court House.— Banks at Cedar Mountain. —The Confederates Approaching.— Battle of Cedar 
Mountain.— Banks Begins the Attack.— Pope on the Ground.— A Severe Encounter.— Banks Driven Back- 
American Obsttuacy. — The Losses on Both Sides.— The Confederates Fall Back.— Intercepted Letters.— 
Lee's Plan.— Pope Reinforced.— A Retreat Ordered.— The Retreat Successfully Conducted. —No Rest foi 
the Wearied Army. — The Confederates at the Heels of the Nationals. —Across the Rappahannock.— Fight- 
ing at the Bridges and the Fords.— Stuart's Raid.— The Nationals Humiliated. — Character of the Retreat— 
The Object of the Confederates.— Pope's Danger.- McClellan's Delay.— Wairenton Evacuated.— Pope's Dis- 
position of his Troops. — Jackson Across the Rappahannock.— Jackson Through Thoroughfare Gap. — At 
Bristow Station. — Captureof Manassas Junction. — Pope's Communication Intercepted. — Activity of Jackson. — 
Both Armies in Critical Circumstances. — Pope Prepares to Strike Jackson Before the Arrival of Long- 
street. Movement Toward Gainesville. —An Encounter at Bristow Station. — Hooker Successful. — Retreat 

of Ewell. — Jackson Evacuates Manassas. — Delays Again. — Porter at Bristow Station. — His Troops Need 

jieat. Merritt at Warrenton Junction. —McClellan's Officers Lukewarm. — Pope at Manassas. — Jackson's 

iatreat by Way of CentrevUle. — The Pursuit. —Kearney at Centre vUle. — Bull Run. — The Old Battle- 
Ground.— Jackson Pressing Toward Thoroughfare Gap.— King's Division.— Gallantry of Gibbons and 
Doubleday.— A Severe Encounter. —Ewell Loses a Leg.— King Holds his Ground.— Ricketts' Division at 
Thoroughfare Gap.— Arrival of Longstreet. — Ricketts' Division Driven Back.— King Falls Back. — The Sitn>^ 
ition Changed.— A New Disposition of the Nationals. — Battle of Groveton or Gainesville. — The Confede- 
ates Well Posted. — Arrival of Pope. — Severe Fighting in the Morning. —Pause in the Battle. — Pope Waits 
for Reinforcements. — Battle Resumed. — Terrific Fighting. — The Confederate Left Doubled Back on th« 
Centre. — The Nationals Hold the Ground. — Remarks on the Battle. —Porter Blamed. — The National Army 
Exhausted. — Ammunition Scarce. — Pope Calls for Supplies. — McClellan's Reply. — Pope Resumes the At- 
tack. Porter Arrives. — A Tempest of Shot and Shell. — Porter Driven Back.— A Severe Attack on the Na- 
tional Left. — The Nationals Forced Back.— Pope Retu-es Across Bull Run. — Destruction of the Stone 
Bridge. — The Nationals at CentreviUe. — Reports of Lee and Pope. — Preparations for Another Engage- 
ment. — Excitement in Washington. — Lee's Purpose. — The First of September. — Battle of Chantilly.— A 
Severe Thunder Storm. — Bravery of Stevens and Kearney. — Death of Stevens. — Death of Kearney. — Tha 
Gallant Seventy-Ninth. — The Brave Bimey. — Kearney's Body Sent to Pope's Headquarters.— The Losses 
During the Campaign. — Difficult Creek. — The National Army Ordered Inside the Fortifications at Washing- 
ton. — Resignation of Pope. — Disappearance of the Army of Virginia. — Restoration of the Army of the By 
tomac. — Reappointment of McClellan. — Vindication of Pope. 



1862. 



At the time McClellan was continu- 
ing his disastrous reti'eat towards 
Harrison's Landing, important 
events were taking place in the nearer 
neighborhood of the National capital; 
and public interest and expectation 
were both excited by the active and 
"rigorous measures of General Pope, 



who had been called from the West 
and placed in command of the army of 
Virginia. As early as the 27th jqik 
of June, 1862, the following or- 27. 
der had been issued by the president 
" I. The forces under Major-Generals 
Fremont, Banks and McDowell, includ 
ing the troops no^v under Brigadier 



GENERAL JOHN POPE. 



277 



G-eneral Sturgis, at Washington, shall 
be consolidated and form one army, to 
be called the army of Virginia. 

"II. The command of the army of 
Virginia is specially assigned to Major- 
Greneral John Pope, as commanding 
general. 

" The troops of the Mountain Depart- 
ment, heretofore under command of 
General Fremont, shall constitute the 
First army corps, under the command 
of General Fremont. 

"The troops of the Shenandoah De- 
partment, now under General Banks, 
shall constitute the Second army corps, 
and be commanded by him. 

"The troops under the command of 
General McDowell, except those within 
the fortifications and the city of Wash- 
ington, shall form the Third army corps, 
and be under his command." 

Major-General Pope, who now comes 
prominently to the front, had, as the 
reader already knows, won some dis- 
tinction in the West. He was a native 
of Illinois, having been born at Kas- 
kaskia, in that State, in March, 1823. 
His father was Judge Pope, of Illinois. 
Having received a liberal education, 
the younger Pope entered West Point 
in 1838. He graduated with Rose- 
cranz in 1842, and in August, 1846, 
joined the army, under General Taylor, 
in Mexico. From the close of the 
Mexican War up until 1861, he was 
engaged chiefly in surveying expedi- 
tions. When the Civil War broke out, 
he held only the rank of captain. He 
was soon, however, appointed briga- 
dier-general of volunteers. In De- 
cember of 1861, he was despatched by 



General Halleck into central and west- 
ern Missouri, then being harassed by 
Confederate raiders. In this mission 
Pope was completely successful. Sub- 
sequently, in March, 1862, he was 
appointed major-general of volunteers, 
and soon afterwards captured New 
Madrid and Island No. 10. He took 
part, also, in the siege of Corinth, and 
followed up the retreating Confede- 
rates. 

The consolidation of these various 
forces into one command was favorably 
regarded by the public. It was be- 
lieved that the combination would con- 
duce alike to strength and usefulness. 
The new aiTangemeut did not prove 
agreeable to General Fremont, as Pope 
had been his junior in Missouri. It 
was Fremont's opinion that the effect 
of the appointment of Pope to the su- 
preme command, while he himself re- 
mained in a subordinate jjosition, would 
be greatly to reduce his rank and con- 
sideration in the service ; and conse- 
quently he asked to be relieved from 
command. He was relieved according- 
ly; and his corps was given first to 
General King, and then to General 
Sigel. In addition to these three corps, 
a small and unorganized force, under 
Brigadier-General Sturgis, was posted 
in the neighborhood of Alexandria; 
and thither, also, Burnside, who had 
arrived at Newport News from Roan- 
oke, was ordered to proceed with his 
troops. The disposable movable forces 
consisted of the three corps first namedj 
— that of Sigel ; that of Banks ; and. 
that of McDowell ;— about 40,000 in all. 
The cavalry numbered about 5000; 



99a 



278 



POPE AND LEB IN VIRGINIA. 



but the horses were in wretched con- 
dition, and the men were poorly pro- 
vided with amis. These forces were 
scattered over a wide surface, and along 
a line which extended fi'om Fredericks- 
burg to Winchester and Harper's Ferry, 
in the Shenandoah Valley ; and General 
Pope was charged with the three-fold 
duty of covering the National capital, 
of guarding the valley entrance to Mary- 
land, in the rear of Washington, and of 
menacing Richmond from the North, 
as a diversion in favor of McClellan. 

Pope assumed command on the 28th 
June of June, Colonel George D. Rug- 
28« gles being his chief of staff. 
Having disposed of his troops as he 
best could, for the purpose of carrying 
out the wishes of the government, he 
was prepared to move toward Rich- 
mond with the view of aiding McClel- 
lan when began that series of battles 
which preceded and attended the re- 
treat of the army of the Potomac from 
the Chickahominy to Harrison's Land- 
ing. It was Pope's intention to ad- 
vance by way of Charlottesville upon 
the James River, above Richmond, 
compelling Lee to detach a part of his 
army from the front of Richmond, and 
thus enabling McClellan to complete 
his movement successfully. McClel- 
lan's retreat changed the entire plan of 
the campaign. A cabinet council was 
called; and Pope was summoned be- 
fore it. Pope was seriously opposed to 
McClellan's retreat; and strongly urged 
its impolicy upon the president and the 
secretary of war. He offered to march 
from Fredericksburg upon Richmond 
direct with his whole force, insisting 



only on one condition — that peremptory 
orders should be sent to McClellan, and 
such measures taken in advance, that it 
would not be possible for him to evade, 
on any pretext, making a vigorous at- 
tack upon the enemy with his whole 
army the moment he heard that Pope 
was engaged. This proposal of Pope, 
was the more honorable that it implied 
a very considerable risk : it would have 
placed Lee between the two National 
annies, and given him the opportunity 
of striking each in turn, with the pos- 
sibility of destroying both. After Mc- 
Clellan arrived at Harrison's Landing, 
Pope clung to his conviction that it 
would be impolitic for him to abandon 
the Peninsula, and wrote to him a per- 
sonal note, offering every assistance in 
his power, and inviting a free exchange 
of opinions. To this letter McClellan 
returned a chilling reply. On jniy 
the 14th of July, when about •*• 
to commence active operations. Pope 
issued to his soldiers an address which 
revealed something like vanity, with 
not a little irritation of feeling — an ad- 
dress which could not have been other- 
wise conceived and expressed if the 
object had been to embitter sentiment 
already known to exist, and to di- 
vide the discordant sympathies of the 
army of the Potomac and the army of 
Virginia. " By special assignment of 
the president," said Pope, " I have as- 
sumed command of this army. I have 
spent two weeks in learning your 
whereabouts, your condition and your 
wants, in preparing you for active oper- 
ation's, and in placing you in positions 
from which you can act promptly and 



POPE'S ADDRESS. 



279 



to the purpose. These labors are near- 
ly completed, and I am about to join 
you in the field. Let us understand 
each other. I have come to you from 
the West, where we have always seen 
the backs of our enemies — from an army 
whose business it has been to seek the 
adversary, and beat him when found ; 
whose policy has been attack, and not 
defense. In but one instance has the 
enemy been able to place oiu* "Western 
armies in a defensive attitude. I pre- 
sume I have been called here to pursue 
the same system, and to lead you 
against the enemy. It is my purpose 
to do so, and that speedily. I am sure 
you long for an opportunity to win the 
distinction you are capable of achiev- 
ing ; that opportunity I shall endeavor 
to give you. In the meantime I desire 
you to dismiss certain phrases I am 
sorry to find much in vogue amongst 
you. I hear constantly of taking strong 
positions, and holding them — of Knes of 
retreat and bases of supplies. Let us 
discard such ideas. The strongest po- 
sition a soldier should desire to occupy 
is one from which he can most easily 
advance against the enemy. Let us 
study the probable line of retreat of 
our opponents, and leave our own 
to take care of itself. Let us look 
before us, and not behind. Success 
and glory are in the advance — disaster 
and shame lurk in the rear. Let us 
act on this understanding, and it is safe 
to predict that your bannera shall be 
inscribed with many a glorious deed, 
and that your names will be dear to 
your countrymen forever." Such lan- 
guage was certainly not fitted to en- 



courage good feeling and unity of 
purpose. It is painful to have to al- 
lude to these personal differences ; but 
it is useless to make any attempt to 
conceal the fact that these same differ- 
ences had much to do with the disas- 
ters which had befallen, and which 
were soon again to befall, the National 
arms — disasters which foi' a time threat- 
ened the ruin of the Union cause. 
These difficulties showed the govern- 
ment the necessity for a commander-in- 
chief of all the forces of the Union ; 
and on the 23d of July General jnjy 
Halleck, having resigned his com- 23. 
mand of the army of the West, as- 
simied, in obedience to an order from 
the president, the duties of this high and 
responsible position. Pope, foreseeing 
the inconveniencies, not to say injuries 
to the Union cause, which must inevita- 
bly result from the inharmonious action 
already manifest on the part of the dif- 
ferent generals, asked to be relieved from 
his command in Virginia and returned 
to the Western country. His request, 
however, was not complied with. In 
such circumstances began Pope's cam- 
paign in northeastern Virginia — grovmd 
made memorable by the first battle of 
Bull Run, and, more recently, by the 
successful raid of General Jackson 
and by the comparatively unsuccessful 
efforts of Banks, Fremont and Shields. 
We have seen in a previous chaptei 
that the withdrawal of McClellan's 
army was definitely decided upon at 
Wii-sliington. It had become a neces- 
sity. On the 14th of August, Aas;. 
therefore, that army began to **• 
move towards Acquia Creek, with a 



mo 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



view to reinforce General Pope, and 
to act under his command. It was 
Pope's object, therefore, so to act that, 
while he would cover Washington and 
assure the safety of the Shenandoah 
Valley, he would also facilitate the 
4ng, movements of McClellan. On 
23. the 23d McClellan himself left 
ftie landing ; and on the following day 
iie reached Acquia Creek. 

It is not much to be wondered at 
that the Confederate government had 
found great encouragement from the 
failure of the Peninsular campaign, and 
had, in consequence, resolved to aban- 
don the merely defensive attitude 
with which hitherto they had for the 
most part contented themselves, and 
to push forward upon the foe, striking 
him boldly in his own territory. The 
conscription had proved singularly suc- 
cessful; their armies had been largely 
increased ; and victory had wonderfully 
improved the spirits of their men. 
Conscious of strength and full of high 
hopes, the Richmond authorities made 
up their minds that the time had come 
for the adoption of vigorous, aggressive, 
measures. It was resolved that Bragg 
should push his way through Kentucky, 
and capture Louis\nlle and Cincinnati, 
while Lee should make a rush through 
ihe Shenandoah Valley, cross Maryland, 
and make himself master of Philadel- 
phia in the hope that, by two simultane- 
ous movements, both of them proving 
eminently successful, they would be 
ftble to compel the government at 
Washington to come to terms. In a 
previous chapter, when treating of some 
vf the important operations in the 



West, we have shown what success at 
tended the sortie of General Bragg. 
We have now to consider the success 
which attended that of General Lee. 
As soon as it became known at Rich- 
mond that an attempt was about to be 
made to unite the forces of McClellan 
to the command of Pope, it was de- 
termined to act at once, and to make a 
bold attempt to force a way to Wash- 
ington before the junction of the two 
armies could be effected. The exploit 
of Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley 
was to be repeated on a grander scale. 
There was much high-sounding talk at 
the time. All that was predicted was 
not destined to be fulfilled ; but for a 
time matters looked black enough for the 
Nationals ; and the Confederates were 
not wholly without reason for the hopes 
which they indulged and for the lan- 
guage which they used. There were at 
least 150,000 fighting men centred at 
and around Richmond. With the ex- 
ception of a strong corps of observation, 
all these were at once to be precipitated 
upon Maryland. 

At this stage of our narrative, and 
while the armies of Lee and the armies 
of Pope are preparing to rush into 
deadly collision — the fii'st resolute for 
attack, the second resolute for resist- 
ance — it is necessary to pause and di- 
rect the attention of the reader to 
certain measui'es which had been adopt- 
ed for the more successful prosecution of 
the war — measures which at this very 
moment were largely occupying the 
public mind. We refer to the orders of 
General Pope, dated July 18th, 1862, 
and the orders of the War Department, 



SEVERE MEASURES. 



iSl 



bearing date August 4th, August 8th 
and August 11th. On the 18th of 
July Pope issued the following orders : 

'■ Headquarters of the Army of Virginia, ) 
Washinqton, July 18, 1862. ) 

" General Orders, No. 5. 

" Hereafter, as far as practicable, the 
troops of this command will subsist 
upon the country in which their oper- 
ations ai'e carried on. In all cases, sup- 
plies for this purpose will be taken by 
the officers to whose department they 
properly belong, under the orders of 
the commanding officer of the troops 
for whose use they are intended. Vouch- 
ers will be given to the o^vners, 
stating on their face that they will be 
payable at the conclusion of the war 
upon sufficient testimony being fur- 
nished that such owners have been 
loyal citizens of the United States since 
the date of the vouchers. 

" Whenever it is known that supplies 
can be furnished in any district of the 
country where the troops are to operate, 
the use of trains for carrying subsist- 
ence will be dispensed with as far as 
possible, 

"By command of 

" Majoe-Gejoiral Pope. 
"Geo. D. Ruggles, 

" Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff." 

" Headquarters of thb Armt of Virginia, j 
Washington, July 18, 1862. j 

"General Orders, No. 6. 

" Hereafter, in any operations of the 
cavalry forces in this command no sup- 
ply or baggage trains of any descrip- 
tion will be used, unless so stated 
especially in the order for the move- 
ment. Two days' cooked rations will 



be carried on the persons of the men ; 
and all villages and neighborhoods 
through which they pass will be laid 
under contribution in the manner speci- 
fied by General Orders, No. 5, cmTent 
series, fi-om these headquarters, for the 
subsistence of men and horses. 

" Movements of cavalry must always 
be made with celerity, and no delay in 
such movements will be excused here- 
after on any pretext. 

" Whenever the order for the moye> 
ment of any portion of the army ema- 
nates from these headquarters, the time 
of marching, and that to be consumed 
in the execution of the duty, will be 
specifically designated, and no de- 
parture therefrom will be pemiitted to 
pass unnoticed without the gravest and 
most conclusive reasons. 

" Commanding officers will be held re- 
sponsible for strict and prompt compli- 
ance with every provision of this order. 
" By command of 

" Major-Genebal Pope. 
" Geo. D. Ruggles, 

" Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff." 

On the same day was issued another 
order, declaring that the inhabitants 
along the lines of railroads and tele- 
graphs and the routes of travel would 
be held responsible for any injury done 
to track, line or road, or for any at. 
tacks on trains or stragglers by bauds 
of guerrillas in their neighborhood. In 
cases of damage to I'oads, the citizens 
within five miles would be turned out 
in mass to repair the damage. If a 
soldier or legitimate follower of the 
army was fired upon from any house, 
the same should be razed to the ground 



282 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



By another order, all disloyal citizens 
within the lines of the army or within 
the reach of its I'espective officers, were 
to be an-ested at once. Those taking 
the oath of allegiance, and giving suffi- 
cient security for its observance, were 
to be allowed to remain ; all others 
were to be conducted to the South, be- 
yond the extreme pickets, and if again 
found anywhere within the lines, were 
to be treated as spies, and subjected to 
the extreme rigor of military law. These 
orders of General Pope were followed 
by the pillaging of private property, 
and by insults to females, to a degree 
unknown heretofore during the war. 

The Confederate government, by 
way of retaliation, issued an order de- 
claring that General Pope and the 
commissioned officers serving under 
him were "not entitled to be con- 
sidered as soldiers, and therefore not 
entitled to the benefit of cartel for the 
parole of future prisoners of war. Or- 
dered, further, that in the event of 
the capture of Major-General Pope, or 
any commissioned officers serving under 
him, the captive so taken shall be held 
in close confinement so long as the 
orders aforesaid shall continue in force 
and unrepealed by the competent mili- 
tary authority of the United States, 
and that in the event of the murder of 
an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this 
Confederacy, by virtue or under pre- 
tense of the order hereinbefore recited, 
it shall be the duty of the commanding 
general of the forces of this Confede- 
racy to cause immediately to be hung, 
out of commissioned officers, prisoners 
as aforesaid, a number equal to that of 



our own citizens thus murdered by the 
enemy." It was manifest from the 
orders of General Pope that he meant 
to conduct the war on very different 
principles from those which had guided 
General McClellan. The action taken 
by the Confederate government showed, 
on the other hand, that through them 
Pope had added bitterness to the con- 
test. Pope's orders were afterwards 
considerably modified. 

After the failure of the Peninsular 
campaign became fully apparent, and 
McClellan had commenced his retreat, 
the government at Washington natural- 
ly enough felt the danger to which the 
countiy was in consequence exposed, 
and proceeded to do their utmost to 
provide against the emergency. A call 
had just been made for 300,000 volun- 
teers. It was now deemed necessary to 
call upon the several States to furnish 
an equal number of militia, to serve for 
nine months. It was found extremely 
difficult to raise by voluntary enlist- 
ment as many as 600,000 men. Great 
efforts were therefore made to arouse 
the enthusiasm of the people. Burning 
words went forth from pulpit and plat- 
form ; and the press lent the weight of 
its mighty influence to the advancement 
of the common cause. Liberal bounties 
were offered by the government; and 
large sums of money were contributed 
from private sources for the purpose of 
promoting enlistment. All these efforts, 
however, were found to be insufficient ; 
and the president at last found Agg, 
himself under the necessity of *• 
having recourse to a draft. The fol- 
lowing orders were, therefore, issued: 



GENERAL ORDERS. 



283 



" War Department, i 

Washington, August 4, 1862. f 

"Oedeked, First— That a draft of 
300,000 militia be imi^iediately called 
into the service of the United States, 
to serve for nine months, unless sooner 
discharged. The secretary of war will 
assign the quotas to the States, and 
establish regulations for the draft. 

^'Second — That if any State shall not, 
by the 15th of August, furnish the 
quota of the additional 300,000 volun- 
teers authorized by law, the deficiency 
of volunteers in that State will also be 
made up by a special draft from the 
militia. The secretary of war will 
establish regulations for this purpose. 

" Third — Regulations will be pre- 
pared by the War Department, and 
presented to the president, with the 
object of securing the promotion of 
officers of the army and volunteers for 
meritorious and distinguished services, 
and of preventing the nomination and 
appointment in the military service of 
incompetent or unworthy officers. The 
regulations will also provide for ridding 
the service of such incompetent persons 
as now hold commissions. 

"By order of the president. 
" Edwin M. Stanton, 

"Secretary of War." 

These orders were submitted to with 
a reasonably good grace, considering 
the natural repugnance of the Ameri- 
can citizen to compulsory military ser- 
vice. Subsequent orders, however, 
\iijnr, dated the 8th of August, and 
^' seriously interfering with the 
principles involved in the writ of 
holjcas corpus — orders, for example, 



authorizing the arrest and imprison- 
ment of any person or persons who 
should by act, speech or writing dis- 
courage volunteer enlistments, or who 
should aid and comfort the enemy, or 
who should be discovered in any other 
disloyal practice ; authorizing, also, the 
arrest and imprisonment of any person 
or persons who should attempt to leave 
the United States, and thus seek to 
avoid military duty — these raised a 
pei'fect tempest of excitement. They 
placed the foreigner resident on these 
shores under great inconveniences ; and 
they forbade the American citizen, \vho 
was liable to be drafted, to go out of 
the country or even to absent himself 
from his State or county. It was found 
to be impossible to cany out these 
orders according to the strict letter; 
and, consequently, another order from 
the War Department, dated the Aug, 
11th of August — some daj^s after J*- 
the fighting between Pope and Lee had 
fairly commenced — took the edge off 
their offensiveness, by advising the ex- 
ercise of great caution and sound judg- 
ment in carrying them into execution. 
The difficulty was thus got over; and 
the manifestations of patriotism on the 
part of the people were such as to teach 
the government that such measures 
were as unnecessary as they were un- 
wise 

The reader is now in a position in 
which he can comprehend the state of 
things North and South at this critical 
moment in the history of the war. 
With a knowledge of these details, he 
will be able the more easily to enter 
into the feelings of the rival armies 



S84 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



which now confronted each other and 
were ready to rush into deadly strife, 
as well as to appreciate the special ad- 
vantages which belonged to each. It 
is important, also, for the reader to re- 
member that, at this particular junc- 
ture, McClellan had not yet left Harri- 
son's Landing. 

Early in the month of August the 
divisions of Ewell, Hill and Jackson 
were hurried forward to the Rapi- 
dan River, which is the south fork 
of the Rappahannock. General Pope 
made immediate preparations to meet 
the enemy, and to hinder his ad- 
vance. Hitherto he had been giv- 
ing his instructions from Washington, 
the capital of Rappahannock County. 
General Rufus King had been ordered 
to send forward detachments of cavalry, 
and break up, if possible, the Virginia 
Central Railroad. In this mission King 
had been successful ; and the road was 
broken up in several places. General 
Banks had been instructed to move 
forward and take post where the turn- 
pike from Sperryville to Culpepper 
crosses Hazel River. Previous to this, 
Banks had been instructed to send 
General Hatch, with some 2000 of his 
best mounted men, to proceed from 
Madison Court House around the west 
side of the Blue Ridge, and make a 
descent upon Gordonsville and destroy 
the railroad leading to Richmond, and 
then to push forward to Charlottesville 
and break up the railroad between 
that place and Lynchburg. Hatch 
was despatched accordingly. But both 
movements failed. Hatch was dis- 
graced; and the cavalry of General 



Banks was placed in charge of Genera] 
J«»hn Buford. McDowell had been 
ordered fi'om Waterloo Bridge to Cul- 
pepper Court House ; and General 
Sigel was already encamped at Sperry- 
ville, some twenty miles from Cul- 
pepper. On the 7th of August, \^g. 
Pope himself tells us, all the in- '• 
fantry and artillery forces of the orig- 
inal army of Virginia were assembled 
along the turnpike from Sperry\aUe 
to Culpepper, and numbered about 
28,000 men. The cavalry were well 
arranged, both for observation and de- 
fense. Buford, with five regiments, 
was posted at Madison Court House, 
with his pickets stretching along the 
line of the Rapidan from Barnett's 
Ford to the Blue Ridge. Sigel, ac- 
cording to instructions, had posted a 
biigade of infantry and a battery of 
artillery at the point where the road 
from Madison Court House to Sperry- 
ville crosses the Robertson River. 
These were intended as a support for 
Buford. Bayanl, with four regiments 
of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan 
Station, at the point where the Orange 
and Alexandria Road crosses the Rapi- 
dan, his pickets extending as far east 
as Racoon Ford, and connecting with 
Buford at Barnett's Ford. There was 
a signal station on the siunmit of 
Thoroughfare Mountain, commanding a 
view of the entire country as far south 
as Orange Court House. Having com- 
mand of this station, Pope could count 
with confidence on being informed of 
the first appearance of the enemy, as 
well as of the direction of his move- 
ments. Burnside and his troops, of 



CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 



389 



Irhich no account is here taken, were 
ieft in charge of Fredericksburg. The 
two main points of Pope's line of de- 
fense were thus Fredericksburg and 
Culpepper Court House. Culpepper 
is about seventy miles from Washing- 
ton. The route crosses the Long Bridge 
at Washington, thence through Alex- 
andria, Fairfax, Manassas and Warren- 
ton. It is equally distant from Rich- 
mond. Fredericksburg is connected 
with Washington by steamboat naviga- 
tion on the Potomac to Acquia Creek, 
thence, by railroad, fifteen miles to 
Fredericksburg, which is sixty miles by 
railroad from Richmond. 

On the morning of the 8th of Au- 
iog. g'lst, after having inspected the 

8t different corps, and seen and 
given orders to the different generals, 
Pope arrived in person at Culpepper. 
Here he found that his orders had 
been attended to, and that all things 
were in a satisfactory condition. Craw- 
ford's brigade, of General Banks' corps, 
had already arrived. So, too, had 
Ricketts' division, of General McDow- 
ell's corps. At an early hour he had 
learned from General Bayard, who was 
slowly falling back towards Culpepper, 
that the enemy was approaching. The 
same information came from General 
Buford, who was stationed more to the 
west. It was impossible during the 
whole of the 8th to decide whether 
the intended movement of the enemy 
was in the direction of Culpepper or 
Madison Court House. As he had 
been specially instructed to preserve 
his communication with the Rappahan- 
nock at Fredericksburg, he regulated 
ftt* 



his movements with that end in view. 
Early in the day he pushed forward 
Crawford's brigade in the direction of 
Cedai" or Slaughter Mountain, to the 
support of Bayard, who was falling 
back in that dii-ection. Meanwhile he 
concentrated his forces, bringing them 
closer together in the neighborhood of 
Culpepper. Banks was summoned to 
that place from Hazel River. Sigel 
was ordered to hurry forward from 
Sperryville. Banks arrived in good 
time; but Sigel, from some cause, 
blundered as to the road he should 
take, and was by that means prevented 
from coming up until late in the after- 
noon of the following day. On the 
morning of the 9th ^ Pope ordered \ag. 
General Banks, with the remain- ^' 
der of his corps, to advance towards 
Cedar Mountain — a sugar-loaf eminence 
about seven miles south of Culpepper, 
and about two miles west of the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad. Banks was 
to join Crawford, who was stationed in 
the rear of Bayard, and to take com- 
mand of all the forces present. He had. 
special instructions to check the ad- 
vance of the enemy and to ascertain his 
strength, as well as, if possible, to dis- 
cover his immediate purpose. 

The Confederates had, meanwhile, 
been pressing forward in very consider- 
able strength ; and before Banks ai- 
rived, Jackson had taken possession ol 
Cedar Mountain, and, from that com 
manding eminence, had taken in the 
entire view and made himself acquaint- 
ed with the position and strength of 
the National army. Ewell was thrown 
forward with his division ; and care 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



was taken to conceal the troops as 
much as possible under the cover of the 
woods. Early's brigade, of EwelFs 
division, was posted on the road lead- 
ing from Culpepper. The other divi- 
sions took position on the western slope 
of the moimtain, and planted batteries 
on every available spot. Some of the 
batteries were as high as a hundred feet 
above the common level of the ground. 
Foul- guns were advanced to the front ; 
and these, with some of the more ele- 
vated batteries, opened fire upon Craw- 
ford's batteries. Simultaneously with 
the opening of this fire on Crawford, 
General Winder, with a portion of 
Jackson's corps, moved out towards 
the left, carefully keeping under cover. 
A little later in the day. Hill came up 
with his division ; and when about five 
o'clock they began to throw out skirm- 
ishers, the Confederates, strongly post- 
ed, numbered about 20,000 veterans. 

It was about five o'clock in the after- 
noon when General Banks advanced to 
the attack. Up to that hour he did 
not believe that the enemy were in 
sufficient force to make any vigorous 
demonstration ; and he so reported to 
General Pope. The battle at once be- 
came general ; it began to rage more 
fiercely after six o'clock ; and from 
that time till darkness came on the 
fighting was furious and incessant. 
About seven o'clock Pope himself 
came on the field, bringing with him 
Ricketts' division. On his arrival on 
the ground, Pope saw at once that 
Banks' right wing was too much ex- 
tended. Directing Banks to draw in 
his right wing and mass it upon his 



centre, he pushed forward Ricketts' 
division to occupy the ground thus 
vacated. As Banks retired his men 
with great caution, the Confederates 
pi'essed close upon them and began to 
emerge from the woods. The battenes i 
of Ricketts' division opened upon them 
a tremendous fire, and compelled them 
to fall back under cover. Night now 
fell upon the scene ; and the close, and, 
in some cases, hand-to-liaud fighting 
ceased ; but the artillery firing was 
kept up until near midnight. General 
Sigel did not arrive in time to take any 
active part in the fight ; but his ap- 
pearance helped to give courage against 
the possibilities of the coming day. 
General Banks held the ground he 
took early in the morning. His mis- 
take, if he made any, was that he ad- 
vanced against a foe whose strength he 
had no means of knowing. He had 
been driven back one mile from the 
spot where the fighting commenced. 
Such was the battle of Cedar Mountain, 
or, as it is named by the Confederates, 
Cedar Run. Not on so large a scale, 
or so protracted as some of the battles 
which we have described, it was yet 
one of the bloodiest and most keenly 
contested. "I have witnessed," writes 
one who was present, " many battles 
during the war; but I have seen none 
where the tenacious obstinacy of the 
American character was so fully dis- 
played." It was a fight of one against 
two. The Nationals were in the mi- 
nority ; but it can hardly be said that 
they were robbed of the honors of the 
day. The loss on both sides was very 
heavy. General Banks corps was so 



THE BETREAT. 



287 



cut up as to be reduced at least one- 
half. Brigadier-Generals Geary, Augur 
and Carroll were badly wounded, and 
Brigadier-General Prince was captured. 
Pope estimated Lis entire loss at 1800 
men. The confederate loss was heavy, 
and included some of the best officers. 

The 10th was Sunday. At day- 
Aug. break the Confederates fell back 
•Oi about two miles. The National 
pickets advanced and occupied the 
ground. During the remainder of the 
jlng, day the army rested. The day 
11* following was spent in burying 
the dead ; and on the same night the 
enemy disappeared, leaving his dead 
unburied, and his wounded to the 
mercy of the Nationals. 

On the 16th a party of Confederate 
Aug. cavali-y were surprised and cap- 
iat tured at Louisa Court House. 
On their persons were found some im- 
portant letters, one of them being an 
autograph letter from Lee, intimating 
that he was moving the main body of 
his army, by forced marches, to attack 
General Pope before a junction could 
be formed between him and the army 
of the Potomac. This information hav- 
ing been sent to Washington, Pope 
received instructions from the com- 
mander-in-chief not to cross the Rapi- 
dan, but to fall back and take post 
Ijehind the north fork of the Rappa- 
hannock, where reinforcements could 
be more easily sent him. This move- 
jVng, ment was commenced on the 
'8« 18th. On the following day Lee, 
with a large force, crossed the Rapidan. 
Meanwhile Pope had been consider- 
ably reinforced. He had been joined 



by 8000 of Burnside's soldiers, under 
General Reno ; by ten regiments, under 
General Stevens, which had just re- 
turned from Port Royal ; and by Gen- 
eral King, with some regiments from 
McDowell's corps. He was also author- 
ized to call the main portion of General 
Cox's forces from Western Virginia. 
With the greater portion of these forces 
already on hand — about forty regi- 
ments in all — the retreat began. Gen- 
eral Sigel led the advance ; General 
Reno had charge of the left ; and Gen- 
eral McDowell, suppoi'ted by General 
Banks, occupied the centre. In this 
order the retreat was commenced on 
the night of the 18th of August. The 
night was dark and cold for the season 
of the year. The usual camp fires 
were extinguished, and all unnecessary 
noise was avoided. Considering the 
immense train of wagons in advance of 
the troops, the progress made during 
the night was marvellous. On the 
morning of Tuesday the 19th a j^ng. 
large portion of the army had '9' 
passed through Culpepper. The sight 
presented by the moving masses of in- 
fantry, cavalry and artillery, together 
with the multitudes of white-covered 
wagons winding slowly up the distant 
hills, was imposing in the extreme, and 
one which it rarely falls to the lot of 
even military men to witness. It was 
unfortunate for the countiy, however, 
that two such spectacles should have 
been witnessed by the same men within 
80 limited a period. By noon on the 
19th the advance had reached the one 
bridge — the railroad bridge at the Rap- 
pahannock Station — ovei- wliich f' t; 



288 



POPE AND LEE IN VTKGINIA. 



entire army must pass. All day long, 
and all night through, this great army, 
with all its encumbrances, continued to 
pass over the bridge ; and by one 
Aug. o'clock on the 20th, the mighty 
20t moving mass was, if not absolute- 
ly safe, at least on the other side of the 
North Fork. They were not a moment 
too soon across; for the Confederates 
were already in great force at their 
heels. Bayard, who had charge of the 
rear, had been skiiTaishing with their 
advance since he had passed Cedar 
Mountain. At the last moment the 
Confederate cavalry made a vigorous 
charge on the National rear; a few 
men were killed ; but the complete 
success of the retreat was not hindered. 
It was with good i-eason that Pope was 
proud of the manner in which the re- 
treat had been conducted. 

After an effort so exhaustive, it might 
be expected that the army would need 
rest. But there was to be no rest : 
the toil must be severe and continuous 
for days and weeks to come. Pope 
posted his army along the line of the 
Rappahannock, so as to guard the rail- 
road bridge and all the fords. On the 
j\Hg. morning of the 21st, the Confede- 
21t rates were forward in full iorce ; 
and a series of attempts at different 
places were made to cross the river. 
There were, in consequence, a number 
of fierce artillery duels. But the 
bridge and all the fords were well 
guarded ; and every attempt at forcing 
a passage completely failed. These 
attempts were repeated, and heavy 
artillery firing was maintained at the 
different fords on the 23d and 24th, 



but with no special results. Ou j^ng, 
the 23d Ricketts destroyed by fii-e 23. 
the bridge at the Rappahannock. Lee 
now resolved on a flank movement ; and, 
with this end in view, he advanced 
about twelve miles further up the river, 
and made a bold attempt to cross at 
Waterloo Bridge. This attempt was i 
also resisted ; but it was only par- » 
tially defeated. Meanwhile, General 
Stuart, at the head of a body of Con- 
federate cavalry, had succeeded in 
crossing the river, and, having made a 
bold dash on Catlett's Station, on the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, some 
thirty-five miles from Washington and 
some thirteen miles in the rear of the 
Rappahannock Station, where he ran- 
sacked Pope's army trains, seized his 
baggage, with the property of his staff 
ofiicers, captured more than two hun- 
dred horses, and destroyed much that 
he could not carry away, then found 
his way back again to the Confederate 
lines with all his booty, encountering 
during the entire raid almost no oppo- 
sition. This raid of Stuart was ex- 
tremely discouraging to the people of 
the North, and to the government at 
Washington. It was not less dis- 
couraging to the National army, and to 
Pope himself. It revealed to the world 
what Pope and many of his officers 
well knew — that but little was accom- 
plished when, after his retreat from 
Cedar Mountain, he had put the Rap- 
pahannock between his own army and 
that of General Lee. It showed that 
Washington, unless some manifestation 
of strength was quickly made, was 
again at the mercy of the Confederacy, 



REINFORCEMENTS. 



289 



and that General Lee was not ignorant 
of the way by which he might pass 
through Maryland and dictate terms of 
peace in the city of Brotherly Love. 

The retreat across the Rappahannock 
waS) in fact, partly a temporary expedi- 
ent and partly a military necessity. It 
was a military necessity because Pope, 
with the forces at his command, could 
not continue the struggle so far from 
his base of supplies, and against such 
fearful odds. It was a temporary ex- 
pedient because it was believed that, 
by putting the Rappahannock Vjetween 
the two opposing armies, Lee would be 
so hindered in his operations that he 
would be unable to stiike with his su- 
perior numbers before the proposed 
junction had been eifected between the 
army of the Potomac and the army of 
Virginia. Pope was not ignorant of 
the danger to which he was exposed 
from an attack on his right flank, un- 
less he were speedily reinforced — a 
danger greatly aggravated oy the fact 
that he was bound by strict orders to 
preserve intact his communication with 
Fredericksbui'g. 

Pope had now become fully alive to 
the danger of his position. Convinced 
that the main body of Lee's army was 
being moved further up the river, where 
there was little difficulty in crossing, 
and that the object was to turn his 
right, get in his rear, and cut oif his 
supplies from Washington, he tele- 
graphed again and again that, if not 
reinforced, he would be compelled to 
retreat; that, with the enemy moving 
in force to his right, it was impossible 
for him to offer effective resistance 



without abandoning Fredericksburg. 
He was assured that if he could only 
hold on two days longer, he would be 
so reinforced that he would be able te 
resume the offensive. Day after day 
from the 21st of August were these as- 
surances repeated. On the 25th, ^qg, 
of the 30,000 or 40,000 men 25. 
promised him, only 7000 had yet got 
forward so far as Warrenton Junction. 
It was out of the question to think 
of waiting any longer. The situation 
was pregnant with peril. Delay one 
day more might be attended with 
the most disastrous consequences. Ar- 
rangements were, in consequence, made 
for immediate retreat. Breaking up 
his camp at Warrenton and Warrenton 
Junction, Pope began to march rapidly 
back in three columns. General Heint- 
zelman, from McClellan's army, had 
arrived; but he was without wagons, 
without artillery, without even horses 
for the general and field officers, with- 
out provisions, and with only forty 
I'ounds of ammunition to the man. 
Porter, too, had an-ived at Bealston 
with a portion of his division. His 
men were fresh, but poorly provided 
either with provisions or with ammuni- 
tion. Sturgis and Cox were hourly 
expected at Wairenton Junction — the 
former with 10,000, the latter with 
7000 men. Franklin, too, was on his 
way with 10,000 more. Before the 
arrival of Heintzelman, Pope estimated 
his entire force at about 40,000. The 
Confederate force amounted to at least 
80,000. On evacuating WaxTenton, 
Pope resolved to offer the enemy battle 
in the neighborhood of Gainesville, th« 



290 



POPE AND LEE IN VIKGINIA. 



first station to the west of Manassas 
Junction, on what is called the Gap 
Eailroad. With this end in view, he 
disposed his forces, sending McDowell, 
with his own coi-ps and that of Sigel, 
by the turnpike toward Gainesville, 
Reno toward Sudley Springs, and 
Heintzelman toward Greenwich, assign- 
ing at the same time suitable positions 
to the expected reinforcements as they 
should come up. Porter was to push 
forward and join Reno ; Franklin was 
to push forward with all possible speed 
to Gainesville ; and Haupt, who com- 
manded at Manassas Junction, was 
authorized to retain one of the strong- 
est divisions that should arrive, for the 
protection of the works, and to push 
forward its cavaliy to Thoroughfare 
Gap. General Sturgis, also, received 
instructions to post strong guards along 
the railroad from Manassas Junction to 
Catlett's Station, and to superintend 
them in person. Pope's command, in- 
cluding all these expected reinforce- 
ments, now amounted to 60,000 men. 

While Pope's forces are moving 
steadily to the positions assigned them, 
the Confederates are not idle. Jack- 
son has crossed the Rappahannock at 
Hmon's Mill, four miles above Water- 
/)o Bridge, has rested his men for the 
night at Salem ; and before to-morrow 
at noon he will have crossed the Bull 
Run Ridge, at Thoroughfare Gap, and 
forced his way to Gainesville. In 
point of fact he reached Gainesville 
when the day was yet young, and was 
joined by Stuart, with two cavalry bri- 
gades ; and before midnight, while he 
was destroying Bristow Station, where 



he had arrived a little after sundown, 
Stuart, in obedience to his instructions, 
had surprised the post at Manassaa 
Junction, captured 300 men, eight guns, 
stores in large quantity, and nuich pub- 
lic property. Intelligence of what had 
happened at the Junction reached Col- 
onel Scammon, at Union Mills, on Bull 
Run, who was stationed there with the, 
Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio, of General 
Cox's division. Scammon hasted to the 
Junction ; a severe skirmish en- jug, 
sued at dawn on the 27th ; but 27. 
he was driven back and compelled to 
retreat toward Alexandria. Brigadier- 
General Taylor, with the Second, Third 
and Fom-th New Jersey Infantry, hur- 
ried from Alexandria by railroad to the 
assistance of Scammon ; but these, too, 
were soon routed ; and in the brief 
conflict Taylor lost a leg. It is quite 
manifest that Pope had not counted on 
the appearance of the enemy on the 
eastern side of Thoroughfare Gap so 
early, and in so great numbers. Jack- 
son had, in reality, effected a surprise. 
It is true that Pope's report says: " The 
movement of General Jackson in the 
direction of Thoroughfare Gap, while 
the main body of the enemy confronted 
me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo 
Bridge, was well known to me, but I 
had relied confidently on the forces 
which I had been assured would be 
sent from Alexandria, and one strong 
division of which I had ordered to take 
post on the works at Manassas Jimc» 
tion. I was entirely under the belief 
that these would be there, and it waa 
not until I found my communication 
intercepted that I was undeceived. I 



BRISTOW STATION. 



991 



knew that this movement was no raid, 
and that it was made by not less than 
25,000 men." It is also true, however, 
that when Jackson was reposing at 
Salem, between Thoroughfare and Ma- 
nassas Gaps, Pope sent word to Mc- 
Dowell at WaiTenton that he believed 
"the whole force of the enemy had 
marched for the Shenandoah Valley by 
way of Luray and Front Royal." Banks, 
it would seem, was of the same opinion, 
^o thoroughly ignorant were the Na- 
tionals of the whereabouts of Jackson 
that, when he was already at Bristow 
Station, a train of cars came up and, of 
course, was captured — a train on which 
a short time before Hooker and his 
division had passed for Warrenton. 

On the 27th of August, the army of 
Pope and the army of Lee were both 
in critical circumstances. Pope was cut 
off from his supplies and reinforcements. 
This was serious enough in the presence 
of such a general as Jackson, and in 
view of the speedy arrival of Longstreet 
and Lee. On the other hand, however. 
Pope had a splendid opportunity — an 
opportunity which, if it could be seized 
and acted upon in time, might prove 
the ruin not only of Jackson, but of 
the whole Confederate army. If he 
could block Thoroughfare Gap, and 
thus prevent the passage of Longstreet, 
he might fall with overwhelming force 
upon Jackson. Pope saw his opportu- 
nity, and began to turn it to account. 
The instructions already given in re- 
gard to Gainesville were repeated and 
emphasized. He ordered McDowell, 
with Sigel and Reynolds, to hasten to 
Gainesville that night, and there inter- 



cept Longstreet at the head of Lee's 
main column. Reno was to hurry for- 
ward to Greenwich with his corps and 
with Kearney's division, of Heintzei- 
man, to report to and assist McDowell, 
if necessary. Porter was to remain at 
Warrenton Station until the arrival of 
Banks, who was marching to that place 
from Fayetteville. So soon as he was 
relieved, he was to push forward to 
Gainesville. Pope himself, with Hook- 
er's division, of Heintzelman's corps — 
a division which had now become 
famous, and which could always be 
relied upon — proceeded along the rail- 
road to Manassas Junction. McDowell 
reached his destination without the 
necessity of fighting. Hooker had 
been less fortunate. On approaching 
Bristow Station, somewhat late in the 
afternoon, he came into contact with 
Ewell. It was the advance of the same 
force, a portion of which had attacked 
Scammon and Taylor in the forenoon. 
A vigorous action ensued, with a loss 
to each of about 300 men. Ewell was 
driven from the field with the loss of 
all his camp equipage ; but he succeed- 
ed in destroying the bridge and railroad 
track, and thus hindered pursuit. He 
hastened to join Jackson at Manassas. 
When this action commenced, Hooker 
had only forty rounds of ammunition 
to each man. When it ended, the forty 
had been reduced to four. Pope was 
put in high spirits by the success of 
Hooker. He believed that, by a vigor- 
ous effort on the morning of the 28th, 
he might "bag the whole crowd" at 
Manassaa Junction. Jackson was al- 
ready, after the defeat of Ewell, in « 



POPE a:nd lee in vieginia. 



tight place. There were but two 
routes by which he could retreat — 
the one through Gainesville and the 
other through Centreville. Retreat by 
Gainesville was impossible; for Mc- 
Dowell was there with a force equal, 
if not superior, to his own. He must, 
therefore, retreat through Centreville, 
or mass his forces and attack Pope, 
with the view of turning the National 
right at Bristow Station. Jackson chose 
the former course, and proceeded to 
retire through Centreville. Meanwhile, 
in consequence of the exhausted con- 
dition of Hooker's troops, and knowing 
that they were without ammunition, 
Pope had sent special orders to Porter 
on the evening of the 27th, instructing 
him to move forward at one o'clock in 
the morning, and to report at Bristow 
by daylight. In the event of Banks 
not having yet arrived, he was to leave 
him some instructions in detail. This 
order was not obeyed. If Jackson had 
not retired — if, on the contrary, he 
had massed his men and offered fight — 
the consequences might have been dis- 
Aug. astrous. At three o'clock on the 
28. morning of the 28th Jackson, 
believing himself to be in danger, 
evacuated Manassas, and sought to 
effect a junction with Lee by way of 
Centreville. As it was. Pope i-esolved 
to pursue the retreating foe with all 
the foi'ces at his command. 

McDowell had been ordered on the 
evening of the 27th to push forward, 
at the very earliest dawn, from Gaines- 
ville toward Manassas Junction. He 
was to rest his right on Manassas Gap 
Railroad, and throw his left to the 



west. Reno had orders to march at 
the same hour from Greenwich, also 
upon Manassas; and Kearney was to 
march upon Bristow Kearney was 
promptly on hand, and, with Hooker 
following, was pushed forward to Ma- 
nassas in pursuit of Ewell. Sigel, with 
McDowell's advance, was not forward 
until three hours after the time ap- 
pointed. Porter did not arrive at 
Bristow Station until after ten o'clock, 
when, instead of being willing and 
anxious to push forward, he asked 
pel-mission to halt and rest his men. 
Sykes' division, of Porter's corps, had 
spent the whole day of the 27th, from 
ten o'clock in the morning until day- 
light of the 28th, in camp at Wairen- 
ton Junction. Merritt's division, of 
the same corps, arrived at Warrenton 
Junction later on the day of the 27th, 
and also remained there during the 
whole of the night. It was Pope's 
opinion that Porter's troops were the 
freshest in the whole army. It is, it 
must be confessed, exceedingly difficult 
for the impartial mind to take in all the 
facts, even at this early stage of the 
campaign, and yet resist the conviction 
that, in the service of Pope, some of 
McClellan's officers were not only want- 
ing in enthusiasm, but haK- hearted, 
lukewarm, indifferent. Either that, or 
the demon of delay, which held their 
former master in bondage, had extend- 
ed its baleful influence to them. Pope 
an-ived at Manassas Junction about 
noon of the 28th, shortly after Jackson 
in person had left. He immediately 
pushed forward Hooker, Kearney and 
Reno upon Centreville McDowell, 



WARRENTON TURNPIKE. 



298 



also, was ordered to recall that portion 
of his foi'ce which had moved in the 
direction of Manassas Junction, and to 
march with his whole strength towards 
Centreville. McDowell had, unfortu- 
nately, sent Ricketts' division toward 
Thoroughfare Gap. For this new move- 
ment it was not, therefore, available. 
Instructions were sent to Porter to take 
post at Manassas Junction. 

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, 
Kearney came up with the rear-guard 
of Jackson's retreating columns, and 
drove them out of Centreville, one por- 
tion of the Confederates falling back 
by the Suilley Springs Road, the other 
portion by the Wari-enton Turnpike, 
toward Gainesville. Kearney remained 
in occupation of Centreville. The Con- 
federates destroyed the bridges over 
the streams as they passed. The 
ground which the pursued and the 
pursuei's were now treading was that 
made famous by the first great battle 
of the war. They were passing over 
Bull Run. In spite of the eager anx- 
iety of the moment and the all-absorb- 
ing interest of the situation, stimng 
memories must have been awakened in 
the minds of the rank and file, as well 
as of the officers, of both armies. After 
more than a year's incessant fighting, 
the two great representative armies of 
the divided nation were again in bloody 
conflict on the same battle field, about 
to attempt to settle the question whether 
freedom should or should not be the 
inalienable birthright of all the child- 
ren of the Republic. The Confede- 
rates had their faces turned toward 
Thoroughfare Gap, where they knew 

»30 



Longstreet was coming to their aid. 
Suddenly Jackson's advance came into 
contact, on the Warrenton Turnpike, 
with King's division, of McDowell's 
coi'ps, which was pressing vigorously 
forward to intercept the retreat. It 
was about six o'clock in the evening. 
The struggle which ensued was severe 
and sanguinary, and was terminated 
only by the darkness. In this action 
noble work was done by the brigades 
of Gibbon and Doubleday, both of 
the gallant commanders covering them- 
selves with glory. The Confederate 
general, Taliaferro, was badly wound- 
ed ; and Ewell, who was in the thick 
of the fight, lost a leg. 

Made aware of this engagement 
that evening about ten o'clock. Pope 
concluded that he had caught Jackson 
in a trap, and that if King, McDowell 
with his other divisions sustaining him, 
could hold out till the morning, he 
would be able so to concentrate his 
forces as to crush and destroy the Con- 
federate army before Longstreet could 
arrive with the expected relief. Mc- 
Dowell and King were accordingly 
urged to hold on, at all hazards, and 
by no means to allow Jackson to pass 
to the west through Thoroughfare Gap, 
Pope assuring them that by daylight 
the entire National forces would be 
forward both from Centreville and Ma- 
nassas, and that the enemy must be 
crushed between them. Kearney was 
ordered to move cautiously, after mid- 
night, from Centreville along the War- 
renton Turnpike, to keep close to the 
enemy's lines, resting his left on the 
Warrenton Turnpike, and throwing his 



294 



POPE AND LEE IN VIKGINIA. 



right well to the north, and, at daylight, 
to assault him vigorously with his right 
advance. Reno and Hooker, he was 
told, would join him shortly after dawn. 
Pope's instructions to Kearney were 
even more than usually particular, be- 
cause he dreaded lest Jackson should 
make an attempt to retreat to the north 
in the direction of Leesburg. Porter, 
who was supposed to be at Manassas 
Junction, was ordered to move upon 
Centreville at the earliest dawn. On 
the night of the 28th, therefore, Mc- 
Dowell, Sigel and Reynolds, whose 
united strength was 25,000 men, were 
immediately west of Jackson, and be- 
tween him and Thoroughfare Gap. On 
the following morning, as soon as it 
was light. Porter's corps and Heintzel- 
man, with Kearney, Hooker and Reno, 
were simultaneously to fall upon him 
from the east. Such was the dispo- 
sition Pope had made of his forces ; 
and it M^as his conviction that Long- 
street was, as yet, so far off that he 
would be able to defeat Jackson before 
the former could come to his aid. 

Longstreet, however, was fully aware 
of the perilous situation of his compan- 
ion in arms; and, by forced marches, 
made with almost incredible activity, 
he had, on the evening of the 28th, 
reached Thoroughfare Gap. There he 
encountered Ricketts' division, of Mc- 
Dowell's corps ; and, after some sharp 
fighting, drove it back in the direction 
of Manassas Junction. The gap was, 
therefore, left undefended, and Long- 
street was able to pass through without 
further hindrance. Prior to this, on dis- 
covering that Thoroughfare Gap was 



well guarded, he had sent a portion of 
his troops up to Hopeville Gap, a little 
further to the north, about three miles 
above White Plains. Through both 
these gaps, therefore, Lee's men were 
nishing to the assistance of JacksonV 
This, however, was not the only calam. 
ity which, at this critical moment, oc- 
cun-ed to thwart Pope's designs. Angt 
Early on the morning of the 29th, 29. 
before daybreak, the National com- 
mander, greatly to his mortification, 
learned that King, unable to resist the 
pressure brought to bear upon him bj 
Jackson, had fallen back in the same 
du-ection with Ricketts. A new dispo- 
sition of his forces was, therefore, neces- 
sary. Pope lost no time in endeav 
oring to meet the emergency. Sigel, 
supported by Reynolds, was ordered 
to advance from Groveton and at- 
tack Jackson in the wooded heights 
close by, while the remainder of the 
forces were being got well in hand. 
Quickly thereafter Heintzelman, with 
the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, 
was pushed forward from Centreville 
toward Gainesville. Reno was to fol- 
low. Their instructions were to strike 
promptly, and with all their weight. 
Porter, with his own corps and the di« 
vision of King, was ordered to move 
from Manassas toward the same place. 
Porter's instructions were to strike 
Jackson's flank at the point where the 
Warrenton Turnpike is intersected by 
the road from Manassas Junction to 
Gainesville, to turn it, and then fall 
heavily upon his rear. 

Pope's instructions, with one excep- 
tion, were well carried out. Sigel, with 



GAINESVILLE. 



295 



the division of Carl Schm-z ou his 
right, that of Scheuck on his left, and 
the division of Milroy in the centre, 
about five o'clock on the morning of 
the 29th, fell heavily on the Confede- 
rates, a mile or two east of Groveton. 
They were soon joined by Hooker an J 

, Kearney. The battle became fiirioiu 
all at once. Jackson, feeling the 
weight of the onset, fell back some dis- 
tance ; but he was so closely pressed, 
that he was compelled to halt and 
make the best defense possible. Ac- 
cordingly he took up a position \vith 
his left on Sudley Spiiugs, his right a 
little to the south of the Warrenton 
Turnpike, his line being covered by an 
old lailioad grade which leads from 
Gainesville in the direction of Lees- 
burg. His batteries were numerous ; 
and some of them were of hea^^ cali- 
bre. They were for the most part 
behind lidges in the open ground on 
both sides of the turnpike. His troops, 
too, wei'e well sheltered in dense woods 
behind the railroad ernVjankment. It 
was about noon when Pope appeared 
on the field. He had hurried forward 
from Centreville with all possible de- 
spatch. He ft)und both amiies much 
cut up ])}' the sharp action in which 
they had been engaged since daj'light. 
Heintzelman Avas on the right of the 
line, in front of Sudley Springs Road. 
Sigel Avas on Heintzelman's left, with 
his line extended a short distance south 

[ of the WaiTenton Turnpike, Schenck's 
division occupying the high ground to 
the left of that road. Rej-nolds was on 
the extreme left. Reno's corps had 
reached the field, and some of his regi- 



ments had already been pushed into 
action. Four regiments of this c>-Tps, 
however, were held in reserve in the 
real- of the centre. Heintzelman in- 
formed Pope that his line was weak, 
and that two of his divisions — those of 
Schurz and Stelnwehr — were so cut irp 
that they ought to be drawn back from 
the front. To this Pope could not con- 
sent, but he cheei'ed him with the in- 
formation that McDowell and Port< r 
were both on the road to Gainesville, 
and would soon be in position to fall 
upon Jackson's riglit flank, and prob- 
ably also ou his I'eai'. Riding along 
the whole front of his line, he cheered 
the different commanders liy the same 
comlV>rting assurance. From twelve 
until four o'clock, the skirmishing was 
frequent and severe, but the fighting 
was neither genei'al nor continuous. 
About two o'clock, fii-ing was heard 
in the du-ection of Jackson's right; 
and Pope naturally sup})osed that Mc- 
Dowell and Port-er had reached their 
position. The filing, however, was not 
long continued. Soon afterwards, he 
learned that McDowell Avas advancing 
by the Sudley Springs Road, and that 
he would piobably be up in two hours. 
As }et thei'e was no information regard- 
ing Porter. At half-past foui' o'clock 
Pope, utterly imjiatient, sent him per- '■ 
emptory orders to push forward at once 
into action on the enemy's right, and, 
if possil)le, turn his rear. He at the 
same time stated to him genei'ally the 
condition of things on the field. After 
allowinij Avhat he thouoht a sufficient 
time for the execution of these oi-dera 
by Porter, and knowing that McDowell 



396 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



was close cat hand, the order was given 
to Hemtzelman and Reno to make 
the attack in front. It was half-past 
five o'clock. The order was promptly 
obeyed, and with a will. Never was 
onslaught more vigorous or more gal- 
lantly made. They fell upon the ene- 
my with the swiftness of lightning and 
with the force of an avalanche. Jack- 
son's men could not resist the fury of 
the onset. Fighting bravely, and con- 
testing every inch of ground, they were 
yet steadily pressed back into the 
woods. On both sides the fighting 
was desperate and gallant. Regiment 
vied with regiment, and soldier with 
soldier. Nor did the officers spare 
themselves. Everywhere they were 
seen in the front, in the thickest of 
the fight, urging the contest by voice 
and gesture. Hooker and Kearney, of 
Heintzelman's corps, justified the con- 
fidence reposed in them, and established 
on a fii'mer basis their well-won fame. 
One of the most brilliant efforts of tlie 
day was made by Grover's brigade, of 
Hooker's division. In the fury of the 
first onset this brigade penetrated, by a 
bayonet charge, first one, then another 
of Jackson's lines, and was well up 
to the third line before it could be 
checked. After a severe hand-to-hand 
struggle, it got possession of the rail- 
way embankment on the Confederate 
left, Init not until it had sacrificed 
thirty per cent, of its strength. Hook- 
er's other brigades gallantly joined in 
the sti-uggle. Meanwhile, Kearney had 
ttruck Jackson's left at the point occu- 
pied by A. r Hill ; and, by the joint 
■efforts of the two divisions, Jackson's 



left was doubled back upou his centre, 
and the railway entrenchment was se. 
cured. While Heintzelman was thus 
pressing back the enemy's extreme left, 
Reno was firmly holding his positioa 
more to the centre ; and after an hour 
and a half from the first onset, this 
portion of the Confederate army was 
driven off the original battle ground — 
the dead and wounded being left in 
the hands of the Nationals. 

It was now sunset. McDowell had 
arrived on the field. His corps was 
pushed to the front along the Warrentou 
Turnpike, his instructions being to fall 
upon the enemy who was retreating to- 
wards the turnpike from Sudley Springs. 
With this end in view, King's division, 
of McDowell's corps, advanced beyond 
the general line of the Nationals. The 
advance of the main body of the enemy, 
under Longstreet, had begun to reach 
the field. With these King came into 
contact about three quaiters of a mile 
in front of the line of battle. Some 
severe fighting ensued, but neither 
gained upon the other. With this 
advance of Longstreet, Kearney, who 
had pressed back the Confederate left 
toward the Warrenton Turnpike, also 
came into collision. Kearney was com- 
pelled to fall back with the loss of a 
gun, four flags, and 100 men made 
prisoners. Porter now came up, and 
made a disposition for attack; but it 
was too late. Darkness fell upon the 
scene ; and the battle of Groveton, or, 
as it is more generally called, the battle 
of Gainesville, was ended. On the 
whole, it was a victory for Pope ; for 
he had driven the enemy back fi-om his 



POKTEK BLAMED. 



297 



original position; and almost the en- 
tire battle field was occupied by the 
National troops. The loss on either 
side was about 7000 men. Both armies 
slept that night on their arms, near the 
old battle ground of Bull Run. 

Judged from a National standpoint, 
the battle of the 29th of August, at 
Gainesville, must be jjronounced in the 
last degree unsatisfactory. There was 
no lack of bravery on the part of the 
men. In the conflict, both bravery and 
ability were displayed by the oflicers, 
higher and lower. But somehow there 
was a want of harmony on the part of 
the higher oflicials. Either there was 
a defect in the orders, or time was 
badly kept. The result certainly might 
have been different if McDowell and 
Porter had come up at an earlier hour. 
Those precious hours — from noon to 
half -past five — during which Pope 
waited to hear from those two gen- 
erals, saved Jackson's army, and ruined 
the National prospect. They allowed 
Longstreet to come up and unite with 
Jackson, thus making the Confederate 
army greatly superior to that of Pope. 
The battle, it is true, was not lost ; but 
it was indecisive. It settled nothing. 
It was abeady manifest that Pope 
must retreat, and that Lee would be 
able to cany out his purpose of driving 
the Nationals inside of the fortifica- 
tions at Washington, of passing across 
through Maryland, and of entering 
Pennsylvania. In his report, Pope 
greatly blamed Porter. " I do not 
hesitate to say," he says, " that if he 
had dischai-ged his duty, as became a 
soldier under the circumstances, and 



had made a vigorous attack on the ene- 
my, as he was expected and directed 
to do, at any time up to eight o'clock 
that night, we should have utterly 
crushed and captured the larger por- 
tion of Jackson's force before he could 
have been by any possibility suflficient- 
ly reinforced to have made an effective 
resistance." Porter says he did not 
receive the order until it was dusk, and 
that he had not time to come up. The 
evidence is, no doubt, conflicting. In 
our judgment, the balance of the evi- 
dence is against Porter ; and we do not 
see how, when subsequently he was 
tried on the charges preferred against 
him by Pope, found guilty, and dis- 
missed the service, the verdict or the 
punishment could have been other than 
they were. His dilatory conduct, as 
we have seen, had become painfully 
conspicuous, even before the battle of 
Gainesville. His particular defense — 
that it was dusk on the evening of the 
29th, when he received the order— is 
weak in view of all the facts of the 
case. On the afternoon of the 28th, he 
was ordered to move from Manassas to 
Centreville at the earliest dawn, Pope 
assuring him that a battle would un- 
doubtedly be fought on the following 
morning. Early on the morning of the 
29th, on hearing of the withdrawal 
of Ricketts and King, and the con 
sequent opening of Thoroughfare Gap, 
and before Porter had time to leave 
Manassas Junction, he was ordered to 
move forward from that place by the 
direct road to Gainesville. The order 
was repeated in the most urgent man- 
ner at half-past four o'clock, on tho 



298 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



afternoon of the 29th. His explana- 
tion, ev^en if it covers the last order, 
does not certainly touch the other two. 
His apologists have endeavored to vin- 
dicate him, by saying that nearly the 
whole of Longstreet's corps had been 
directly in front of him for several 
hours when Pope's last order reached 
him. This, we think, creates diffi- 
culties, rather than removes them. It 
is not claimed that Porter was engaged 
with any portion of Longstreet's corps — 
only that this coi'ps was lying in front 
of him. If Longstreet was so early on 
the ground, it is natural to conclude 
that he would have heard the sounds 
of battle in the forenoon, and, instead 
of moving so far to the south, would 
have moved in the direction whence 
these sounds came. It is notorious, 
too, that although after twelve o'clock 
there was a lengthened pause in the 
fight, there were between that hour and 
four in the afternoon frequent skirni- 
ishes — skirmishes no doubt noisy and 
demonstrative enough to indicate to 
Longstreet where he was most needed. 
And is it conceivable that Longstreet 
could have been for several hours so 
far on the eastern side of Thoroughfare 
Gap, and Jackson not have known it ? 
How, in fact, on the supposition that 
Longstreet was already in force on the 
field, are we to account for the prac- 
tical suspension of hostilities which 
existed from twelve noon until half- 
past five o'clock, when Heintzelman 
and Reno resumed the attack ? 

After the battle of the 29th, Pope's 
army was in no fit condition to resume 
the straggle Math fresh and vastly 



superior forces. For the last fortnight 
his men had been continually marching 
or fighting. There had been positively 
no rest. The cavalry and artillery had 
been ten days in harness ; and the 
entire army had been two days with- 
out food. On the 28th, Pope had tele- 
graphed to the commander-in-chief to 
have rations and forage sent forward 
from Alexandria with all despatch. 
Halleck communicated with McClellan, 
who was then at Alexandria, ordering s- 
him to send the needed supplies at 
once. On the morning of the \ng, 
30th, the day after the first bat- 30. 
tie, about daylight. Pope received from 
McClellan a letter, dated at eight 
o'clock, P. M., on the 29th, stating that 
" I'ations and forage would be loaded 
into the available wagons " as soon as 
he would send a cavalry escort to bring 
out the triiins. It is not wonderful 
that Pope should thus express himself 
in his report: "I do not see," he says, 
" what service cavaliy could have ren- 
dered in guarding railroad trains. It 
was not imtil I received this letter that 
I began to feel discouraged and nearly 
hopeless of any successful issue to the op- 
erations with which I was charged." On 
the 30th, Pope jnade a request for more 
anmiunition — a reque.st which, strange 
to say, had to go the same round ; and the 
answer which was given by McClellan 
was, " I know nothing of the calibres 
of Pope's artillery." There is one other 
story, which strikingly illustrates the 
want of harmony among some of the 
leading National commanders at this 
critical juncture. On the afternoon 
of the 29th, at the time Pope was 



MANASSAS. 



299 



heroically engaged with Jackson, and 
dreading the arrival of Longstreet, Mc- 
Clellan, in a communication to the 
government, suggested that one of the 
best things to do in the circumstances 
would be "to leave Pope to get out of 
his scrape, and at once use all our 
means to make the capital perfectly 
safe," An}i;hing more heartless than 
this suggestion could hardly be con- 
ceived. It is said that when President 
Lincoln bad read the despatch which 
contained it, he fell back horror- 
stricken in his chair. It is not won- 
derful that Pope's campaign pioved a 
failure. The wonder rather is that the 
National cause, whose representatives 
on the field were so divided in sympa- 
thy, did not utterly perish. 

In these circumstances, on the morn- 
ing of the 30th, Pope found himself in 
presence of the enemy. Lee's forces 
had been coming up in great numbers 
during the night and early morning 
from the direction of Thoroughfare 
Grap. By noon the Confederates great- 
ly outnumbered the Nationals. To 
confront the mighty and rapidly in- 
creasing forces of Lee, Pope had not 
more than 40,000 men ; and many of 
them were comparatively useless from 
fatigue and want of food. It seemed 
to him, however, that he had no choice 
but fight. He could hardly hope to 
win ; but he " detennined to give bat- 
tle to the enemy, and at least to lay on 
•uch blows as would cripple him as 
much as possible, and delay as long as 
practicable any further advance toward 
the capital." Pope felt the necessity 
of immediate and vigorous action ; for 



every moment of delay was increasing 
the odds against him. It was his in- 
tention to attack the Confederate left ; 
and he had made his disposition ac- 
cordingly. It soon became apparent, 
however, that the Confederate general 
was massing his troops on his right, as 
fast as they arrived on the field, and 
that his purpose was to fall back, and, 
if possible, turn the National left. It 
would appear as if, for a moment, Pope 
had been deceived hj the movement of 
the Confederates towards their own 
right. In the moment of exultation, 
he telegraphed to Washington that the 
Confederate's were " retreating to the 
mountains." He quickly, however, 
discovered his mistake, and arranged 
his troops as he best could to meet the 
requirements of the situation. Mc- 
Dowell was ordered forward with three 
corps, Porter's in advance, along the 
Warrenton Turnpike; and Ricketts' 
division, which had been sent to the 
right, was brought back and posted on 
the left of the National line. As Porter 
moved forward, his advance was re- 
ceived by a perfect tempest of shot, 
shell and bullet, which came fi'om the 
wooded eminence near Groveton, where 
the Confederates were swarming in 
thousands. Porter's men, unable to 
face this terrific storm, reeled, stag 
gered, and fell back. At the same 
moment almost, the Confederates fell 
with tiemendous force on the National 
left. Recognizing the fact that the 
main attack was to be made in this 
direction, McDowell ordered Reynolds 
from Porter's left to the assistance of 
Schenck and Milroy, on whose divisions 



300 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



the blow was about to fall. This 
movement was attended with consider- 
able peril, as it exposed Porter's key- 
point; but, with singular presence of 
gaind, and with great promptitude of 
action, Colonel G. K. Warren, seeing 
the danger, pushed forward his little 
brigade of a thousand men and occu- 
pied the vacant place. Had he waited 
for orders, the National line might 
have been cut in two. The battle was 
already raging furiously on the Na- 
tional left, Schenck, Milroy and Reyn- 
olds, in spite of superior numbers, 
offering a gallant and stubborn resist- 
ance. Porter's men were rallied and 
brought to a halt as they were retiring 
to the rear ; and as soon as order was 
restored among them, they were pushed 
forward to the suppoi't of the left, 
where they rendered splendid service, 
Warren's little band of Volunteers 
and Buchanan's brigade of Regulars 
particularly distinguishing themselves. 
Ricketts' division had also gone to 
the assistance of Schenck, Milroy and 
Reynolds, and had greatly strengthened 
them, both on their left and in their 
rear. Towers, of Ricketts' division, 
who went to the support of Reynolds, 
and led his brigade in person, made 
himself conspicuous alike by his skill 
and by his daring. Such was the con- 
duct of this brigade that it drew forth 
enthusiastic and repeated cheers. " Its 
example," says Pope, "was of great 
service, and infused new spirit into all 
the troops who witnessed their intrepid 
conduct." For a time it seemed as if 
the Nationals might carry the day. In 
Bpite of all his strength and the pertina- 



city of his attack, Jackson's advanced 
line was being steadily pushed back. 
It was not until five o'clock that the 
tide began to turn. About that hour 
the battle commenced to rage more 
furiously than before. LongstreeX had 
found a commanding position on Jack- 
son's riglit; and with four batteries 
he poured a most destructive fire 
upon the National troops. Line after 
line was cut down by the raking 
fii'e, like grass by the scythe of thj 
mower. The slaughter on both bides 
was terrific. Late in the afternoon, 
Reno's corps was withdrawn from its 
position on the right centre and thrown 
into the action on the left. This corps, 
coming up as the tide of battle began 
to turn, behaved with great gallantry. 
For hours this mutual slaughter con- 
tinued, the Confederates showing their 
superior strength by falling heavily on 
the National right as well as upon the 
left, the latter presenting a bold and 
determined fi'ont, gallantly contesting 
every inch of ground, but gradually 
vieldinc: to the fiei'ce onsets and tre- 
mendous pressure of thu foe. The 
contest ended only when darkness fell 
upon the scene. The losses on both 
sides had been very severe. The Na- 
j tional left had been pushed back well 
nigh three quarters of a mile ; but its 
]-anks were unbroken, and it still held 
I the Warrenton Turnpike. The Na- 
1 tional right, on which the pressure had 
been less heavy, still held its ground. 
Pope had now no choice but fall back 
upon Washington. Happily he had 
been able to hold command of the 
turnpike in his rear. At about six 



THE KETREAT. 



301 



I'clock in the evening, he had acci- 
dentally learned that Franklin was 
approaching Centre ville, about four 
miles to the east of that place, and 
that Sumner was about four miles in 
the rear of Fi'ankliu. To Centreville 
he resolved to fall back. At eight 
o'clock, he accordingly issued an order 
to the effect that the whole anny 
should withdraw during the night 
across Bull Run, and take position on 
the heights of Centreville. The retreat 
was conducted for the most part by 
way of the Stone Bridge. When the 
passage was completed, the bridge was 
destroyed. The night was excessively 
dark ; and Lee did not pursue. When 
4ng, daylight broke on the morning of 
3'» the 31st, Bull Run once more di- 
vided the two great armies. The engage- 
ment of the 30th is sometimes spoken 
of as the second battle of Bull Run.* 

On the morning of the 31st, the en- 
tire Union army, under General Pope, 
was at or near Centreville, with the 
exception of two brigades, about 4000 
strong, which had been sent on to Fair- 
fax Station to guard the train and the 

• In his report of the second day's fighting in the 
neighborhood of Gainesville and Groveton, General 
Lee says : " The enemy, being reinforced, renewed the 
attack on the afternoon of the 30th, when a general 
advance of both wings of the army was ordered, and 
after a fierce combat, which raged until after nine 
o'clock, he was completely defeated, and driven beyond 
Bull Kun. The darkness of the night, his destruction 
of the Stone Bridge after crossing, and the uncertainty 
of the fords, stopped the pursuit. " 

The following is Pope's account of the doings of the 
30th: "The enemy's heavy reinforcements," he says, 
" having reached him on Friday afternoon and night, 
he began to mass on hLs right for the purpose of crush- 
ing our left, and occupying the road to Centreville in 
our reeir. His heaviest assault was made about five 
''dock in the forenoon, when, after oveTwheluiing Fitz 



depot. Generals Franklin and Sumner 
had arrived ; and General Banks, after 
destroying a large amount of property 
which he could not bring with him, 
was pressing forward from Bristow 
Station. On tlie following day Burn- 
side evacuated Fredericksburg ; and 
Falmouth Station, with all the bridges, 
was destroyed by fire. Acquia Creek 
was soon also deserted. The Nationals 
from all points were pressed back to- 
wards Washington. The strength of 
the aiTny, as reported by the different 
corps commanders, was as follows : Mc- 
Dowell's corps, 10,000 ; Sigel's corps, 
about 7000 ; Heintzelman's, 6000 ; Re- 
no's, 6000; Banks', 5000; Sumner's, 
11,000; Franklin's, 8000. Large num- 
bers had straggled from the ranks; 
and many had been left on the battle 
field. The retreat of Pope behind 
Bull Run created the wildest excite- 
ment throughout the North. It was 
matter of universal regret and hmnili- 
ation that so many of the wounded 
brave should be left on the battle 
field to the tender mercy of the Con- 
federates, and so near the National 

John Porter, and driving his forces back in the centre 
and left, mass after mass of his forces was pushed 
against our left. A terrible contest, with great slaugh- 
ter, was canied on for several hours, our men behaving 
with firmness and gallantry, under the immediate com- 
mand of General McDowell. When night closed, our 
left had been forced back about half a mUe, but still 
remained firm and unshaken, while our right held its 
ground. General Franklin, with his corps, arrived aftei 
dark at Centreville, six mUes in our rear, while Sumner 
was four miles behind Franklin. I could have brought 
up three corps in the morning in time to renew the 
action, but starvation stared both men and horses in 
the face ; and, broken and exhausted as they were, 
they were in no condition to bear hunger also. I 
accordingly retired to Centreville that night in per- 
fect order." 



302 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



capital. An invitation was issued by 
the War Department, calling on citizens 
to go out to the battle field and assist 
in taking care of the wounded. On 
the afternoon of the 30th, the streets 
of Washington were crowded with 
people and conveyances loaded with 
blankets and baskets and rolls of lint, 
all pressing forward to the scene of 
distress. In some respects the move- 
ment was ill-advised ; for very few of 
those who went out were allowed to 
get near the wounded, and some were 
made prisoners by the Confederates. 
On the following morning the invita- 
tion was recalled. At the same time, 
the movement thus begun at Washing- 
ton, although not immediately of any 
practical value, produced good and 
wholesome fruit. The example set by 
the capital was imitated by Boston, by 
Philadelphia, by New York, and by 
all the cities of the North ; and from 
that day until the close of the war, 
the wounded soldier became more and 
more the object of the nation's care. 
It is only just to remark that, while 
General Lee would not consent to a 
truce or a suspension of military opera- 
tions, he interposed no obstacles to the 
removal of the wounded. 

The 31st was Sunday. On that day 
the Confederate army began to move 
forward. It was evident to Pope, from 
the direction in which the enemy was 
moving, that it was Lee's intention to 
fall with force on his right flank. At 
an early hour in the morning Jackson, 
taking with him his own and Ewell's 
divisions, crossed Bull Run at Sudley 
Springs, and pushed towards the Little 



River Turnpike. His object clearly 
was to cut the rear of Pope in the 
direction of Fairfax Court House. 
Pope, not unprepared for some such 
movement, disposed his forces so as to 
meet the requirements of the situation. 
Changing his entire front, and flinging 
his right wing back to the heights of 
Germautown, he occupied, on the sept, 
morning of the 1st of September, '• 
when the Confederates came up, an 
entirely new position. Pope had no 
intention to strike the enemy until the 
morning of the 2d ; but Lee's purpose 
became so developed by the afternoon 
of the Ist, that he resolved to hazard a 
battle between the Little River Turn- 
pike and the road from Centreville to 
Fairfax Court House. Hooker was 
ordered forward to the latter place, to 
assemble the troops there and to move 
towards Germantown. McDowell was 
directed to take a position on the War- 
renton Turnpike, about two miles west 
of Fairfax. He was to connect with 
Hooker by his right. Reno was pushed 
forward to the north of the turnpike, 
in the direction of Chantilly, about 
two and a half miles east of Centre- 
ville. Heintzelman was posted in the 
rear of Reno; Franklin was on Mc- 
Dowell's left and rear ; Sumner was on 
the left of Heintzelman ; while Sigel 
and Porter had orders to unite with 
Sumner's right. Banks, who had 
charge of the wagon trains, was to 
come by the old Braddock Road into 
the Alexandria Turnpike, in rear of 
Fairfax Court House. Just before 
sunset, Hooker and Reno came simul- 
taneously in contact with the enemy'? 



CHANTILLY. 



SOB 



advance — the one on the Little River 
Turnpike, close by Germantown, the 
other a little more to the west, near 
Chantilly. The day was in the last 
degree unfavorable for wailike oper- 
ations. The wind was cold, and a 
drenching rain was falling. But neither 
wind nor rain could now deter the com- 
batants. The battle became furious 
all at once. After it had raged for 
nearly an hour, the Confederates con- 
centrated on Reno's left, and fell 
heavily on his second division, which 
was commanded by General Isaac I. 
Btevens, of Port Royal Ferry fame. 
Hooker, McDowell and Kearney, of 
Heintzelman's, rushed to Reno's assist- 
ance. At this point the battle was 
raging with ti'emendous fury, when 
General Stevens, who had ordered a 
charge, and was leading it in person, 
was shot dead. When their general 
fell, this division fell back in disorder. 
The remainder of Reno's force were 
showing signs of confusion, when Kear- 
ney, descrying the danger, advanced 
with his division, and, sending Birney's 
biigade to the front, boldly renewed 
the action. A thunderstorm, which 
had for some time been raging, had 
now reached its height. It was dan- 
gerous to expose the ammunition ; but 
Kearney, personally regardless of con- 
sequences, brought forward a battery 
and put it in position himself. It was 
the last heroic act of a l)rave life. Dark- 
ness was now setting in. As if anxious 
to know the character of the ground, 
he pushed forward to reconnoitre ; and 
having inadvertently passed beyond 
th6 line of his own pickets, and ap- 



proached too close to those of the 
enemy, a Confederate bullet laid him 
low. As soon as he was miased, the 
gallant Birney assumed command oi 
the division ; and by means of a bay- 
onet charge of his own brigade, com. 
posed of the First, Thirty-Eighth and 
Fortieth New York, and led by Col- 
onel Egan, he drove the Confederates 
back for a consideiable distance, and 
held the field for the night. The dark 
hours were spent in burying the dead. 
Such was the battle of Chantilly — the 
last battle of Pope's unfortunate cam- 
paign. It was a battle by no means 
inglorious to the National arms; but, 
like all the other battles of the cam- 
paign, it was fruitless of good. It was 
the last of a series of disasters. 

In the battle of Chantilly many 
precious lives were lost. Kearney and 
Stevens left behind them vacant places 
which could not be easily filled. In 
the charge in which he fell, shot 
through the head, Stevens led the attack 
in person at the head of the brave Sev- 
enty-Ninth (Highlanders) New York, 
bearing with him the colors of that 
regiment, which had fallen from the 
hands of a wounded sergeant. The 
army had no braver ofiicer. Kearney 
had already won great distinction and 
become a popular favorite. He was one 
of the few men on whom the hopes of 
the North were centred. He had 
often been tried : he had never been 
found wanting. '' Words," said Pope, 
"cannot express my sense of the zeal, 
the gallantry, and the sympathy of that 
most earnest and accomplished soldier, 
Major-General Kearney. He died as 



J04 



POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 



he would have wished to die, and as 
became his heioic character." Kearney 
was well known to General Lee ; and 
next morning the Confederate com- 
mander sent the body of the unfortu- 
nate general, with a flag of truce, to the 
headquarters of Pope. Kearney's body 
was conveyed to New York, where it 
was deposited in the family vault in 
the quiet church-yard of old Trinity. 
The same terrific encounter in which 
Kearney and Stevens lost their lives, 
proved fatal, also, to Major Tilden, of 
the Thirty-Eighth New York — a brave 
soldier and a gallant and skilful officer. 
Pope's losses, since the commence- 
ment of the campaign, were about 
30,000 men, 30 guns, 20,000 small 
arms, and vast quantities of supplies 
and war material. Lee must have lost 
at least 15,000 men. On the morning 
Septt <^f the 2d of September, Pope's 
army was massed behind Difficult 
Germantown, Flint 
Hill and Fairfax. It was a strong 
position ; but, exhausted with continu- 
ous marching and fighting for three 
weary weeks, broken and demoral- 
ized, it would have been cruel, as well 
as impolitic, to prolong the contest. 
About noon of that day, therefore, 
orders were given by General-in-Chief 
Halleck for the army of Virginia to 
fall back vnthin the defenses of Wash- 
ington. McClellan had the proud sat- 
isfaction of seeing the fortifications on 
which he had spent so much time, labor 
and care — works of which he was per- 
sonally so proud, but which had been 
made the subject of so much ridicule — 
•A last protecting the National capital, 



2. 



Creek, between 



and shielding a National army. At his 
own request. Pope was relieved from 
the command, and allowed to return to 
the West. The army of Virginia dis- 
appeared as a separate and distinct 
oi'ganization, and was merged in the 
army of the Potomac; and, in compli-" 
ance with the wisLes of a large body 
of the people, as well as Math the 
wishes of his surviving officers and 
men, by whom he was greatly beloved, 
General McClellan was placed in com- 
mand of all the troops entrusted with 
the defense of Washington. 

It would not be difficult for the mill 
tary critic to point out professional mis- 
takes in Pope's campaign. It is possible 
that he might have done better with 
the forces at his command. It is ungen- 
erous, however, to judge him harshly, 
in view of the disappointments he was 
from first to last called upon to endure. 
He was certainly most unfortunate; 
but his misfortunes M'ere not always of 
his own creating. It was natural, 
after the high expectations which had 
been formed, fii'st of the army of the 
Potomac, and then of the army of Vir- 
ginia, and after the disastrous failure 
of both, that popular indignation should 
have been aroused, and that Pope 
should come in for a share of that abuse 
at the beginning of September, which 
was heaped upon McClellan at the be- 
ginning of August. To this day Poj^f 
has not received justice. We have al- 
ready called the reader's attention to 
the feelings of jealousy and dislike 
which McClellan entertained towards 
Pope, to the want of sympathy between 
McClellan's officers and the commander 



POLE'S COMPLAINT. 



«« 



ill the field, to McClellan's "Leave 
Pope to get out of his scrape," and his 
" I know nothing of the calibres of 
Pope's artillery," to the failure of the 
army of the Potomac to join Pope in 
time, to the dilatory conduct of most 
of McClellan's officers, and to the posi- 
tive refusal of some of them to obey 
orders ; and having done so once, it is 
unnecessary again to enter into details. 
The charges made by Pope have not 
yet been refuted. Where they have 
been brought to the test, they have 
been sustained, rather than disproved. 
"The small fraction of 20,500 men," 
Bays Pope, "was all of the 91,000 
veteran troops from Harrison's Land- 
ing who ever drew trigger under my 
command, or in any way took part in 
this campaign. Some of the corps," he 
goes on to say, "moved with becom- 
ing activity, but the delays of others 

The battle of Chantilly will be remembered in con- 
nection with the loss of Generals Kearney and Stevens. 

Philip Keaknet was bom in New York. June 2d, 
1815. In 1837 he was commissioned second lieutenant 
in the First Dragooas. Shortly afterwards he was sent 
to Europe by the government to study and report upon 
French military tactics. For a time he pursued his studies 
in the military school at Saumur. He went thence to 
Algeria, joined the Finst Chasseurs d'Afrique, and, for his 
services, received the Cross of the Legion of Honor. He 
returned to his home in 1840. During the Mexican War 
he was brevetted major for gallant conduct at Contreras 
and Churubusco ; and, in a charge at the San Antonio 
Gate, he lost his left arm. In 1841, having resigned his 
position in the army, he went again to Europe, with 
the view of resuming his military studies. When the 
Italian War broke out, in 1859, Kearney took a position 
<ju the staff of General Maurier, and was present at the 
liattles of Magenta and Solferino, receiving for his 
Mrvicea, a second time, the Cross of the Legion of 
Honor. On the outbreak of the Civil War, he hurried 
home, and offered his sword to his country. His sub- 
sequent career was rendered famous by his actions in 
the engagements at Williamsburg, at Fair Oaks, at 
Frazier's Farm, and at ChantiUy, where he met his un- 
timely death. 



were neither creditable nor excusable." 
Most of the troops actually engaged in 
these battles fought with great bravery, 
but some of them could not be brought 
into action at all. Many thousands 
straggled away from their commands ; 
and it is said that not a few voluntarily 
surrendered to the enemy, so as to be 
paroled prisoners of war. These are 
serious charges ; and until they are dis- 
proved the presumption must remain 
that the judgment of history will coin- 
cide with that which Pope himself has 
pronounced — that " the complete over- 
throw of Lee's army, or, at least, the 
entire frustration of his movement 
towards the Potomac, was defeated 
by the failure of the army of the 
Potomac to effect a junction in time 
with the army of Virginia on the line 
of the Rappahannock, or even so far 
back as the line of Bull Run." 

Isaac Ihoalls Stevens was bom in Andover, Mass., 
m 1817, and graduated at West Point in 1839. As an 
engineer, he had few equals in the service. When the 
Mexican War broke out, he was employed in the 
fortifications of the New England Coast. During the 
Mexican War he served on the staff of General Scott 
who pronounced him "the most promising officer of 
hia age." In the organization of Washington Territory 
he took an active part, first in the capacity of gover- 
nor, and later as delegate to Congress. A sincere 
friend of President Buchanan, he was yet opposed to 
the policy he pursued towards the South; and, when 
the war broke out, he hurried from the Territory, and 
offered his sword to his country. Appointed colonel 
of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders after the 
death of Cameron, he was soon afterwards com- 
missioned brigadier-general of volunteers. He accom- 
panied Gen. Thos. W. Sherman to Port Koyal in th( 
fall of 18C1. Having been transferred to North Caro- 
Una, we soon find him in Virginia, in the corps of 
General Reno ; and, as major-general, he figured 
prominently iu Pope's famous but unfortunate cam- 
paign. At Centreville, where he was shot through 
the head by a Minie ball, he was leading a charge, 
and bearing aloft the colors of hia favorite Seventy 
ninth. 



106 



ANTIETAM. 



CHAPTER XX. 



SMte of Feeling in the North. — The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia. — Lee's Opportnnity.-i 
His Plan. — Invasion of Maryland. — His Address to the People of Maryland. — Disappointment. — Excitement 
in Pennsylvania and in Maryland. — High Hopes of the South. — MoCleUan's Army in Motion. — Lee's 
Order. — Lnportant Discovery. — Lee's Blunder. — McClellan Hurries Forward. — Catootin Range. — The Catoe- 
tin Valley. — Turner's Gap. — Crampton Gap. — Harper's Ferry. — McClellan's Advice Regarding it. — D. S. 
Miles. — Thomas H. Ford. — Jackson at Harper's Ferry. — McLaws and Walker. —Ford Falls Back. — Maryland 
Heights Captured.— Miles' Difficulty.— McClellan's Advice.- The White Flag.— Death of Miles.- The Capit- 
Illation. — A Disgraceful Affair. — The Committee of Investigation. — The Two Armies Come Into Collision. — 
D. H. Hill Retires up the Mountain. — Turner's Gap. — The Battle of South Mountain Begim. — Hooker on 
the Right— Reno on the Left. — Longstreat Arrives and Takes Command of the Confederates. — National 
■Victory. — Death of Reno. — Franklin at Crampton's Gap. — Howell Cobb. — A Three Hours' Fight. — The Na- 
tionals Victorious. — Lee's Purpose Accomplished. — A Great Risk. — Lee Falls Back. — Antietam Creek. — 
Sharpsburg. — The Heights. — The Battle Ground. — The Potomac. — The Shepherdstown Ford. — Lee's Po- 
sition. — His Reasons for Offering Battle. — McClellan Advances. — His Line of Battle. — Time Lost. — Lee 
Reinforced. — Arrival of "Stonewall" Jackson. — The Confederate Line. — The Three Stone Bridges. — 
McClellan's Plan of Attack.— Lee Strongly Posted.— The Dunker Church.— The Woods.— The Open 
Ground. — The Battle Area. — Hooker Advances by Bridge No. 1. — The Battle of Antietam Begun. — The 
Darkness. — The Battle Resumed. — The Confederates Driven Back. — A Fearful Struggle. — Hartsuff Wound- 
ed. — Terrible Slaughter. — Mansfield Comes Up. — A Pandemonium. — Mansfield Killed. — Hooker Sorely 
Pressed, but Hopeful. — The Key of the Position. — Hooker's Reckless Daring. — The Air Alive with Bul- 
lets. — Hooker Shot in the Foot. — Sumner Arrives and Takes Command. — General Sedgwick Advances.-- 
French and Richardson. — Sedgwick Wounded. — Struggle at the Dunker Church. — The Nationals Again 
Driven Back. —Arrival of Franklin. — Irwin's Brigade, of Smith's Division. — Gallant Efforts. — The Maine 
and Vermont Regiments. — Havoc. — A Ghastly Spectacle. — Sumner's Bravery. — Fighting on Sumner's 
Left. — Gallant Movement of Meagher. — Colonel Cross. — The "Fighting" Fifth New Hampshire. — The 
Confederates Driven Back. — Death of Richardson. — Meagher Wounded — The National Right at Last Vic- 
torious. — Porter and Burnside. — Bumside Ordered to Attack. — His Delay. — The Attack Successfully Made.— 
Burnside's Blunder. — Arrival of A. P. Hill. — Burnside Driven Back to the Bridge. — Darkness. — The Battle 
Ended. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. — A National Victory. — Lee's Plan had Failed.— The Battle Ought to 
Have Been More Decisive. — The Comte de Paris. — McClellan's Mistakes. — The Morale of Lis Men. — Bum. 
side to Blame. — McClellan Vindicated. — Reinforcements. — The 18th of September. — The Battle Field. — A 
Sad Picture.— The 19th. — Preparations for an Advance. — Lee's Retreat. — Porter in Pursuit. — The Pursuit 
Feeble and Ineffective. Lincoln Visits the Army. — McClellan's Inactivity . —The Government Impatient.— 
Stuart's Raid. — The People Indignant. — The 1st of October. — The Army iu Motion. — McClellan Removed 
from Command. — The Proclamation of Emancipation. — The President's Purpose. —Secretary Seward. 



1862. 



In the first week of September, 1862, 
the state of affairs at Washington 
■was not encouraging. A shadow 
of gloom seemed to rest on the National 
cause. There were many men loyal and 
true to the Union — men who, for its 
preservation, had given their best, their 
means, their strength, the fruit of their 
bodies, everything which they held most 



dear — who had come to the conduction 
that the war which had now extended 
over the better part of two years, and, 
to outward appearance, accomplished 
nothing, should be abandoned. If the 
South could not be subdued, it was 
us'eless, they thought, to prolong the 
contest. If they could not live together 
in the same household, surely there wa» 



« MY MARYLAND." 



30Y 



no reason why North and South should 
not get along as neighbors. 

These sentiments prevailed exten- 
(flvely throughout the North ; and it is 
not wonderful that they should have 
prevailed. Within a few weeks the 
hopes of the people had twice been 
raised to the highest point, only to be 
iiewarded with the bitterest disappoint- 
ment. The army of the Potomac, in 
many respects one of the finest armies 
the world had ever vntnessed, had not 
only failed of its purpose, but had prac- 
tically ceased to exist as a separate 
organization. The army of Virginia had 
similarly inspired hope, and similarly 
failed. After well-nigh two years of 
costly and bloody warfare, the enemy 
was literally knocking at the gates of 
the capital. Two months before, the 
army of the Potomac was lying in 
strength before Richmond ; one month 
before, the army of Virginia promised 
to do what the army of the Potomac 
had failed to accomplish ; but now, 
after having been driven, inch by inch, 
from the soil of Virginia, all that re- 
mained of those two magnificent armies 
•was sheltered behind the fortifications 
at Washington. 

Widely as these sentiments prevailed, 
they were not by any means universal ; 
nor did they represent the pith and 
backbone of the North. There were 
still men who were willing to fight; 
there were still sources of revenue 
which had been left untouched; and 
while money could be had, and men 
could be found, the Union cause was 
not to be regarded as desperate. 

The withdrawal of the army of Pope 



left the field clear for the Confederates 
Lee had a choice of two courses. H« 
might assault the fortifications of Wash- 
ington, or cross the Potomac and enter 
into Maryland. The fii'st course was 
not to be thought of. It would con- 
sume too much time, and, besides, there 
was but small hope of success. The 
invasion of Maryland promised richer 
results. It was known that in that State 
there were many who, at heart, were 
deeply in sympathy with the Southern 
cause. It was believed by many in the 
South that Maryland was held in the 
Union by sheer force, and that the 
appearance of Confederate troops on 
her soil would be the signal for a gen- 
eral uprising of the people. "Mary- 
land ! my Maiyland ! " was the burden 
of one of the most beautiful lyrics of 
the time ; it was supposed to express 
the sentiments of the entire South — ■ 
Maryland included ; and nowhere was 
that song more rapturously sung than 
at the firesides of Virginia. Lee con- 
fidently expected that he would be 
warmly received by the people of Mary- 
land, and that once firmly established 
in that State, he would be able to at- 
tack Washington in the rear, and pos- 
sibly invade Pennsylvania. In any 
case, such a movement could not fail to 
be productive of good fruit. It would 
demonstrate to the governments of 
Europe the inherent strength of the 
Confederacy ; and, if it did not compel 
recognition, it would, at least, command 
sympathy and encouragement. 

On the 2d of September, D. H. Hill 
came up with his fresh divisions sept, 
from Richmond. He was imme- 2. 



308 



ANTIETAM. 



diately sent forward as a vanguard to 
Leesburg. Between the 4th and the 
Sept. 5th, the entire Confederate anny 
5' had crossed the Potomac by the 
fords, in the neighborhood of what is 
called Point of Rocks, and encamped 
near the city of Frederick, on the Mono- 
cacy River. The Confederate general 
lost no time in bringing to a test the 
sentiments of the Marylanders. On 
the 8th of September he issued the 
following address : 

" Headquarters Armt of Northern Virginia, | 
Near Frederick, September 8, 1862. ) 

" To THE People of Maeyland : 

" It is right that you should know 
the purpose that has brought the army 
under my command within the limits 
of your State, so far as that purpose 
concerns yourselves. 

" The people of the Confederate 
States have long watched with the 
deepest sympathy the wrongs and out- 
ragss that have been inflicted upon the 
citizens of a Commonwealth allied to 
the States of the South by the strong- 
est social, political and commercial ties, 
and reduced to the condition of a con- 
quered province. 

" Under the pretense of supporting 
the Constitution, but in violation of its 
most valuable provisions, your citizens 
have been arrested and imprisoned, 
upon no chai'ge, and contrary to all the 
forms of law. 

"A faithful and manly protest against 
this outrage, made by a venerable and 
illustrious Marylander, to whom, in his 
better days, no citizen appealed for 
right in vain, was treated with scorn 
and contempt. 



" The government of your chief city 
has been usurped by armed strangers ; 
your legislature has been dissolved by 
the unlawful arrest of its members; 
freedom of the press and of speech has 
been suppressed ; words have been de- 
clared offenses by an ai-bitrary decree 
of the Federal executive ; and citizens 
ordered to be tried by military com- 
missions for what they may dare to 
speak. 

" Believing that the people of Mary^ 
land possess a spirit too lofty to submit 
to such a government, the people of the 
South have long wished to aid you in 
throwing off this foreign yoke, to en- 
able you again to enjoy the inalienable 
rights of freemen, and restore the in- 
dependence and sovereignty of your 
State. 

" In obedience to this wish, our army 
has come among you, and is prepared 
to assist you with the power of its arms 
in regaining the rights of which you 
have been so unjustly despoiled. 

"This, citizens of Maryland, ia our 
mission, so far as you are concerned. 
No restraint upon your free-will is 
intended, no intimidation will be 
allowed, within the limits of this aiTny 
at least. Marylanders shall once more 
enjoy their ancient freedom of thought 
and speech. We know no enemies 
among you, and will protect all of you 
in every opinion. 

" It is for you to decide your destinyj 
freely and without restraint. This armj 
will respect your choice, whatever i' 
may be ; and, while the Southern pea 
pie will rejoice to welcome you to your 
natural position among them, they wiU 



EXCITEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA. 



309 



only welcome you when you come of 
your own free will. 

"R. E. Lee, 
" General Commanding." 
Lee had counted too confidently on 
Maryland sympathy. His expectations 
were not realized. His address, which 
was well conceived and carefully ex- 
pressed, fell flat on the people. A few 
Southern sympathizers joined his ranks ; 
but he soon discovered that his recruits 
were few in comparison with the num- 
bers who took advantage of the circum- 
stances in which they found themselves, 
to reclaim that liberty of which, by the 
conscription, they had been deprived. 
Maryland, in fact, was lukewarm ; and 
Lee WIS too sharp not to see that the 
invasion of Pennsylvania would not be 
free from peiil, with a doubtful or 
hostile State in his rear. His appear- 
ance in Maryland, however, naturally 
enough created the wildest excitement 
in Pennsylvania. In York and Adams 
counties, and in the valleys of the Sus- 
quehanna and the Cumberland, the peo- 
ple were seized with a panic; but it 
was not the panic which comes of fear 
or cowardice. The fai-mers and vil- 
lagers T'jalized their difficulty, and pre- 
pared to meet it. Sending away their 
wives and children, and removing their 
cattle to regions where they would be 
'ess at the mercy of the enemy, they 
themselves hastened to take up arms. 
In many of the townships of the State 
the stores were closed, bells were nmg, 
guns were fired, public meetings were 
held, and citizens assembled in large 
masses to drill. Governor Curtin issued 
wa order, calling upon all the able-bodied 



men of Pennsylvania to organize im- 
mediately for the defense of the State, 
and to be ready for marching orders 
upon an hour's notice. On the Sept. 
nth, he issued a call for 50,000 iJ' 
of the freemen of the State to enter 
immediate service, in order to repel the 
imminent danger of invasion. On the 
same day he ti-ansmitted the following 
despatch to the mayor of Philadelphia : 
" We have," he said, " reliable informa- 
tion this evening that the rebel gen- 
erals have moved their entire army 
from Frederick to Cumberland Valley, 
and theu' destination is now Harrisburg 
and Philadelphia. We need every 
available man immediately. Stir up 
your population to-night. Form them 
into companies, and send us 20,000 to- 
morrow. No time can be lost in mass- 
ing a force on the Susquehanna to de- 
fend the State and your city. Arouse 
every man possible, and send him here." 
The governor of Maryland followed a 
similar course. To these appeals the 
people made hearty response. Penn- 
sylvania acted nobly. The excitement 
produced by the governor's words knew 
no bounds. Seventy-five thousand men 
were soon converging from all parts of 
the State to Harrisburg. Volunteers 
came pouring in from the adjacent States; 
and in a brief space both Harrisburg 
and Washington were overflowing with 
troops. The Confederates M^ere still in 
high spirits ; and some of them openly 
expressed their belief that in a few days 
they would be able to dictate terms of 
peace in the city of Philadelphia. The 
same old hall which had witnessed the 
signing of the Declaration of Inde- 



»3« 



310 



AWTIBTAM. 



pendence of the United States was to 
witness the signing of a treaty ac- 
knowledging the independence of the 
South. General Lee had already ar- 
rived at a different conclusion ; but 
these sentiments were largely shared 
by the rank and file of the Confederate 
army. 

We have already seen McClellan 
placed at the head of the reconstructed 
army of the Potomac, or rather, as it 
was now called, the army of Northern 
Virginia. McClellan had always been 
a great favorite with the men, from 
the officers down to the common sol- 
dier. His reappearance among them 
was hailed with enthusiasm. The army 
was in a wretched condition. It was 
not slow, however, to assume something 
like order. The absentees, in great 
numbers, rallied to theu- standards ; 
discipline recovered its sway ; and the 
shapeless, disorganized mass became 
once again the army of the Potomac. 
As soon as it became known that Gen- 
eral Lee had crossed into Maryland, 
McClellan was ordered to follow him 
with all the troops not needed for the 
Sept. defense of Washington. On the 

3. following day, he set his troops 
in motion; and on the 7th, leaving 
Sept. General Banks in command at 

'• the National capital, he hastened 
to the field, and made his headquarters 
that night with the Sixth corps at 
Rockville. His army, comprising his 
own old forces and those of Pope and 
Burnside, numbered over 87,000 effect- 
ive men. On the morning of the 10th 
Sept. McClellan was at Damascus ; and 

12. on the 12th, his army having 



marched by five parallel roads, he hac 
reached Fi-ederick. The first move- 
ments of McClellan were conducted! 
with a view to command all the lower 
fords of the Potomac, thus giving 
Lee the choice of meeting him in bat 
tie, or of retiring before him and 
crossing the river further up, with the 
view of retreating through the Shen- 
andoah Valley. Great caution was 
necessary, as the real intentions of Lee 
were not known. Happily, however, 
a copy of his order of march, issued 
on the 9th, was found at Fred- sepl. 
erick on the 13th. The follow- 13* 
ing is the order : 

" Headquabteks Arht of Northbrn { 
ViRoiNiA, Sept. 9, 1862. J 

'' Special Order, No. 119. 

" in. The army will resume its march 
to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown Road. 
General Jackson's command will forrs 
the advance, and, after passing Middle 
ton with such portion as he may select, 
take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross 
the Potomac at the most convenient 
point, and, by Friday morning, take pos- 
session of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road, capture such of the enemy as may 
be at Martinsburg, and intercept such 
as may attempt to escape from Harper's 
Ferry. 

"IV. General Longstreet's command 
will pursue the main road as far as 
Boonsboro', where it will halt with re- 
serve, supply and baggage trains of the 
army. 

"V. General McLaws, with his own 
division and that of General R. H. An- 
derson, will follow General Longstreet ; 
on reaching Middleton, will take the 



taiE'S PLAN DISOOVEEED. 



8» 



route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday 
morning, possess himself of the Marj'- 
land Heights, and endeavor to capture 
the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vi- 
cinity. 

"VI. General Walker, with his divi- 
sion, after accomplishing the object in 
which he is now engaged, will cross the 
Potomac at Check's Ford, ascend its 
right bank to Lovettsville, take posses- 
sion of Loudon Heights, if practicable, 
by Friday morning, keep the ford on 
his left, and the road between the end 
of the mountain and the Potomac on his 
right. He will, as far as practicable, 
co-operate with General McLaws and 
General Jackson in intercepting the re- 
treat of the enemy. 

"VII. General D. H. Hill's division 
will form the rear-guard of the army, 
pursuing the road taken by the main 
body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, 
and supply trains will precede General 
Hill. 

"VIII. General Stuart will detach a 
squadron of cavaliy to accompany the 
conunands of Generals Longstreet, Jack- 
son and McLaws, and, with the main 
body of the cavalry, will cover the 
route of the army, and bring up all 
stragglers that may have been left be- 
hind. 

"IX. The commands of Generals 
Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after 
accomplishing the objects for which 
they have been detached, will join the 
main body of the army at Boonsboro' 
or Hagerstown. 

"X. Each regiment on the march, 
will habitually carry its axes in the 
regimental ordnance wagons for use of 



the men at their encampments to pro 
cure wood, &c. 

" By command of 

" General R. E. Lee. 

" R. H. Chilton, A.-A.-General, 
" For Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, Comd'g, Division." 

The secret which this document r»^ 
vealed was of priceless value to Mo 
Clellan. It was evident that Lee had 
no intention to leave Maryland until 
necessity compelled him. His object, 
as he himself afterwards put it, was 
"to move the army into Western Mary- 
land, establish our communications with 
Richmond through the valley of the 
Shenandoah, and, by threatening Penn- 
sylvania, induce the enemy to follow, 
and di-aw him back from his base. 
Now, it had been supposed that the 
advance upon Frederick would lead to 
the evacuation of Martinsburg and 
Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line 
of communication through the valley. 
But this not ha^^ng occiirred, it became 
necessary to dislodge the enemy from 
these positions, before concentrating the 
army west of the mountains. To ac- 
complish this with the least delay, Gen- 
eral Jackson was directed to proceed 
with his command to Martinsburg, and, 
after driving the enemy from that place, 
to move down the south side of the 
Potomac upon Harper's Ferry. Gen- 
eral McLaws, with his own and R. H. 
Anderson's divisions, was ordered to 
besiege Maryland Heights, on the north 
side of the Potomac, opposite Harper'^ 
Ferry, and Brigadier-General Walker 
to take possession of Loudon Heights, 
on the east side of the Shenandoah, 
where it unites with the Potomac. 



m 



ANTIETAM. 



These several commands were directed, 
after reducing Harper's Ferry and clear- 
ing the valley of the enemy, to jom 
the rest of the army at Boonsboro' or 
Hagerstown." 

Lee's plan was undoubtedly bold, 
[t cannot, however, be called mse. He 
was far away from his supplies; and 
}et he was cutting his army into two 
parts, and placing between those pai-ts 
a river which was liable to be made 
impassable in a few hours by a heavy 
rain. In addition to all this, he was 
closely pursued by an enemy M^ho was 
considerably superior in numbers. It 
is difficult to acquit Lee of the charge 
of having, at this particular ciisis, com- 
mitted a grave blunder. He has him- 
self tried to explain what seemed a 
gross violation of the fundamental prin- 
ciples of military tactics. "The advance 
of the Federal army," he says, "was so 
slow, at the time we left Frederick, as 
to justify the belief that the reduction 
of Harper's Ferry would be accom- 
plished, and our troops concentrated 
before they would be called to meet it. 
In that event, it was not intended to 
oppose its passage through the South 
Mountain, as it was desired to engage 
it as far from its base as possible." Lee 
was evidently judging McClellan by his 
experience in the Peninsula. On this 
occasion, however, the National com- 
mander had made good use of his time. 
The discovery of Lee's purpose had led 
Sept. to both vigor and promptitude of 
**• action; and on the 14th, the 
Confederates were startled to perceive 
the Nationals, in great force, coming 
streaming down the western sides of 



the Catoctin Hills. Such an apparition 
was all the more alarming that the 
operations at Harper's Feriy had not 
yet been crowned with success; and 
that, if the National forces should pene- 
trate the South Mountain, they would 
find themselves in Pleasant Valley, di- 
rectly in the rear of McLaws, who, from 
the side of the Maryland Heights, was 
co-operating with Jackson in the reduc- 
tion of Harper's Ferry. This was not 
a state of things which Lee could have 
any special desire to see brought about. 
It could hardly fail to prove destructive 
of his whole plan of campaign. 

The Catoctin range is a continuation 
of the Blue Ridge. On the south, it 
terminates in Maryland at the Point of 
Rocks. On the north, it unites at the 
Pennsylvania State line with the South 
Mountain range which, trending to the 
southwest, slopes down to the Potomac 
at Knoxville, about four miles to the 
east of Harper's Fe.'Ty. Between these 
two ranges nestles the most beautiful 
valley in Maryland — the valley of Ca- 
toctin. In the centre of the valley, 
and about ten miles from Frederick, is 
the village of Middletown. Few vil- 
lages in the whole world are more high-" 
ly favored for situation than the village 
of Middletown. At this season of the 
year Nature, clad in her rich, autumnal 
robes, presents in this region unusual 
attractions. To prevent any possibility 
of disaster resulting fi'om the unfortu- 
nate division of his army, Lee made 
such disposition of his forces as would 
cover the siege of Harper's Ferry. He 
had fallen back upon South Mountain, 
which runniim north, as it does fron? 



HARPER'S FERRY. 



313 



the ferrj', forms a sort of natural cur- 
tain and furnishes an excellent line of 
defense. This line can only be pene- 
trated by Turner's Gap, in front of 
Middletown, and by Crampton's Gap, 
some five miles further to the south. 
Master of these natural passes, Lee 
could hold back the Union anny with 
one hand, while with the other he was 
securing the rich prize of Harper's 
Ferry. Here, therefore, he posted his 
troops. Meanwhile, the Nationals, 
whom we have just seen streaming 
down the western slopes of the Catoc- 
tins, were moving in two columns across 
the valley — the right and centre — to- 
wards Tui-ner's Gap, Burnside leading 
the way ; and the left, composed of 
Franklin's corps, towards Crampton's 
Gap, more to the south. 

While the forces of North and South 
are thus nearing each other at South 
Mountain, and while a great battle is 
hourly becoming more imminent, let us 
see what is taking place in the immediate 
neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. This 
place is highly favored by nature, the 
entire hollow being commanded by the 
three mountains, named, respectively, 
Bolivar, Maryland and Loudon Heights. 
A large amount of artillery and stores 
had been collected at Harper's Ferry 
by the Federal government. In the 
event of its being found necessary to 
evacuate the ferry, it would be neces- 
sary to destroy all the stores and other 
property, or leave them to the enemy. 
It was McClellan's opinion, when he 
started to follow Lee into Maryland, 
that Harper's Ferry could not be held. 
He therefoie advised its evacuation. 



and the employment of its garrison in 
co-operation with his army. Foiu* days 
later he repeated the same advice to 
Halleck. But Halleck was unwilling 
to make so great a sacrifice. He re- 
solved, therefore, to hold the position 
until McClellan should be able to re- 
lieve it, or until communication would 
be open, so that it could be evacuated 
in safety. The place had been, since 
the 15th of August, in charge of T). S. 
Miles, who had been sent thither by 
General Wool, with special instructions 
to fortify Maryland Heights — the key 
of the position. Miles had been singu- 
larly remiss in the discharge of his duty. 
He had done nothing to strengthen the 
position. On tlie 5th of September, 
Colonel Thomas H. Ford was placed 
by Miles in command of the heights. 
Ford saw the danger to which the Na< 
tionals were exposed from the unpro 
tected nature of the position. Ho 
therefore called for reinforcements, and 
for intrenching tools. The reinforce- 
ments came, but not the tools. With a 
few borrowed axes and other imple- 
ments, Ford went to work, and was 
successful in constnicting a slight breast- 
work of trees near the crest of the hill. 
This was finished the very day that 
Jackson appeared with his advance. 
Miles had fortified Bolivar Heights 
behind the town ; but these are com- 
manded by both Loudon and Maryland 
Heights. The garrison at Harper's 
Ferry had been increased to about 
13,000 men by the arrival of General 
Julius White with the garrison from 
Martinsburg. At noon of the 13th, 
Jackson was in full force in the rear of 



014 



ANTEETAM. 



Harper's Ferry, and at once put him- 
self in communication with Walker and 
McLaws. Walker was already in pos- 
session of Loudon Heights; and Mc- 
Laws was exerting himself to the 
utmost to get hold of the Maryland 
Heights on the other side of the Po- 
tomac. The summits of these diflFerent 
mountains are wathin cannon shot of 
each other. Ford had been attacked 
on the 12th, but had managed to hold 
his gi'ound. On the 1 3th again, early 
in the day, he had repelled a fierce as- 
sault ; but later on the same day, the 
attack was resumed by Kershaw, and 
the Nationals were driven back in some 
confusion. At two o'clock next morn- 
ing Ford, hopeless of aid from Miles, 
spiked his guns, and, under cover of the 
darkness, retired to Harper's Ferry. 
All now depended upon Miles. Could 
he hold out till McClellan should be 
able to send him aid ? It was a difficult 
and dangerous task. But with the 
forces at his command, and considering 
the advantages of the position, it was 
not by any means impossible of ac- 
complishment. Early on the 14th, Har- 
per's Ferry was completely invested, 
the Confederates being in command of 
both Loudon and Maryland Heights. 
At the foot of the latter. General Wright 
was well posted vvdth artillery; and 
McLaws, who had pushed forward to 
the Potomac, at Sandy Hook, was bar- 
ring all way of escape down the river. 
In the afternoon an artillery fire was 
opened. On the same day a message 
came from McClellan to Miles, saying, 
" Hold on to the last extremity, and, if 
possible, reoccupy Maryland Heights 



with your whole force. The Catoctin 
Valley is in our possession, and you 
can safely cross the river at Berlin." 
This Miles could not or would not do. 
At nine o'clock that night he allowed 
his cavaby, 2000 strong, under Col 
onel Davis, to depart. When morning 
dawned, it was found that Bolivar 
Heights were also in the hands of the 
Confederates. With the early light, 
no fewer than nine batteries opened 
fire upon the now comparatively help 
less garrison. Miles could not prolong 
the resistance. He soon hoisted a 
white flag ; but as it was not perceived 
by the Confederates, the firing con- 
tinued for some thirty or forty minutes 
afterwards. During this time Miles 
was mortally wounded by the fragment 
of a shell. The duty of sun-endering 
devolved upon General White. Eleven 
thousand five hundred and eighty-three 
men were made prisoners of war ; and 
73 guns, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, 
and large quantities of supplies fell 
into the hands of the Confederates. 
The officers were allowed to go on 
parole with their side arms and private 
property. The private soldiers were 
peiTiiitted to take everything with them 
except their equipments and guns. The 
surrender of Harper's Ferry was felt 
to be a disgrace to the National arms. 
Later in the year it was made the sub- 
ject of examination by a Court of In- 
quiry at Washington. The evidence 
produced was of the most damning 
kind. Ford and other officers were dis- 
missed from the ai-my of the United 
States ; and a lasting stigma was affixed 
to the name and memory of Miles, who 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 



8U 



was declared to have exhibited "an 
incapacity amounting almost to imbe- 
cility." 

Let us now see what was taking 
place a little further to the northeast. 
We left the National army under Mc- 
Clellan marching across the beautiful 
valley through which, as seen from the 
neighboring heights, runs, like a silver 
thread, the little river Catoctin. They 
were moving towards the two passes 
which lead through the South Moun- 
tain — Turner's Gap and Crampton's 
Gap — both of which the Confederates 
had carefully guarded, and each of 
which they were resolved to defend to 
the very uttermost. McClellan knew 
that the garrison at Harper's Ferry was 
reduced to great straits ; and being eager 
to afford relief, he pressed foi'ward 
with unwonted speed. On the morn- 
ing of Sunday, the 14th of September, 
the two rival armies came into collision 
at a bridge which traverses the Catoc- 
tin about half a mile west of Middle- 
town, and where the Confederates had 
posted some artillery. Finding it im- 
possible to resist the heavy and resolute 
pressure of the Nationals, D. H. Hill, 
who was in command, fell back, retiring 
further up the mountain, and posting 
his men on the three roads which lead 
through Turner's Gap. In addition to 
the main road, there are two country 
roads — one to the right and one to the 
left. All these approaches were well 
guarded by artillery. Cox's Kanawha 
division, of Reno's corps of Burnside's 
column, moved along the road to the 
left or south of the gap. They soon 
discovered that the Confederates occu- 



pied the crest in their front in great 
force. Reno immediately ordered an 
advance, promising the support of his 
whole corps. Cox was promptly sup- 
ported by Wilcox, Rodman and Stur- 
gis. At this point, the battle now 
began to rage with great fierceness, the 
Nationals not only holding their own, 
but gradually pressing the enemy back- 
ward, and gaining a foothold on the 
crest. Between two and three o'clock. 
Hooker's corps, of Burnside's column, 
moved along the road to the right, his 
object being to crush the Confederate 
left at the higher crest. Meade pressed 
toward the eminence on the one side of 
this road ; and Patrick, supported by 
Doubleday and Phelps, was pressing 
toward the eminence on the other side. 
Duryee advanced to the assistance of 
Meade with his fine brigade, of Rick- 
etts' division, arriving just in time to 
witness the close of the contest. About 
four o'clock, when the battle had 
reached a climax, Longstreet came up 
from Hagerstown with reinforcements ; 
and, as he outranked Hill, he assumed 
the command. While victory was 
crowning the efforts of Reno on the 
left, and those of Hooker on the right, 
Burnside, somewhat late in the after- 
noon, pushed Gibbon's brigade forward 
on the main road which leads along 
through the gap. This brigade, com- 
ing into contact with the Confederate 
centre, encountered a stubborn resist- 
ance ; but they pressed on, fighting 
bravely, and steadily gaining ground. 
At nine o'clock, when they had all but 
reached the summit of the pass, their 
ammunition failed them ; but the vie- 



816 



ANTIETAM. 



tory was secure ; and they were soon 
afterwards relieved. When the contest 
closed, the Nationals had carried the 
mountain sides on the right and left 
of the gap ; and the main road or 
turnpike was also in their hands. Such 
was the battle of South Mountain. It 
was a decided victory for the National 
rnns. It was not won, however, with- 
out very considerable loss — a loss in 
liiDed and wounded amounting to 2325 
men. Among the kilied was General 
iieno — one of the bravest of the brave — 
a soldier who had done much during 
the dark hours of advereity to sustain 
the sinking spiiit of the North. 

Simultaneously with this struggle at 
Turner's Gap, the Nationals, under 
Franklin, were making a bold effort to 
Secure possession of Crampton's Gap, 
some six miles further to the south. 
The position was held by Howell Cobb, 
who, the reader will remember, was 
secretary of the treasury under Bu- 
chanan. Cobb had under him three of 
McLaws' brigades. Franklin, follow- 
ing out McClellan's instructions, ap- 
peared at Barkittsville, in front of the 
pass, at noon on the 14th, with a fine 
body of men from New York, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania. He found 
the Confederates well posted behind 
stone-wall defenses. Forming his line 
of battle with Slocum's division on the 
right of the road running through the 
gap, and with Smith's on the left, he 
advanced upon Cobb, steadily driving 
him back from his defenses up the 
slope ; and after an action which lasted 
some three hours, he gained the crest 
of the hilL The Confederates fled 



down the western side of the mountain, 
leaving 400 prisoners, three regimental 
colors, two pieces of artillery and 3000 
stand of amis. Franklin was now only 
six miles from Harper's Ferry. He 
was in a position to go to the assistance 
of Miles. But, as the reader has al- 
ready learned, it was too late. In this 
engagement, Franklin lost 115 killed 
and 418 wounded and missing. In the 
two engagements, the Nationals had 
actually come off victorious ; but Lee 
had accomplished his purpose-~he had 
secm'ed time for Jackson to complete 
the enterprise at Harper's Ferry. 

Maryland Heights and Harper's 
Ferry, with its stores, were m the 
hands of the Confederates. In one 
sense it was a great prize which Lee 
had won. It was a prize, however, 
more in seeming than reality. To gain 
it he had divided his army into two 
parts, in presence of united and power- 
ful forces, and had thereby exposed 
himself to the terrible risk of being cut 
up in detail. This danger was im- 
minent on the 14th, when Harper's 
Ferry was still engaging Jackson's at- 
tention, and employing all his strength. 
It was still imminent on the morn- Sepj, 
ing of the 15th, when Franklin, *5. 
having forced his way through Cramp- 
ton's Gap, appeared, like a spectre, in 
Pleasant Vallej Jackson had hurried 
off that morning from Harper's Ferry, 
leaving A. P. Hill to carry out the ar- 
rangements rendered necessary by the 
surrender ; but some time must elapse 
before Lee could count on Jackson's 
presence with any number of his troopa, 
The Confederate commander lost no 




GEN P. H SHERIDAN 




GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER 

FAMOUS CAVALRY COMMANDER, ASSOCIATED WITH GENERAL SHERIDAN IN THE PURSUIT AND 

CAPTURE OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY ; AFTERWARD CELESRiTED INDIAN 

FIGHTER; KILLED BY THE INDIANS, JUNE 25, 1876 



THE BATTLE GROUND. 



317 



time in making the necessary disposi- 
tion of his forces. Withdrawing from 
South Mountain, he crossed Pleasant 
Valley, and took position on the slop- 
ing ground to the west of Antietam 
Creek, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. 
Sept. On the 16th, the larger portion of 
*6' the Confederate forces left Har- 
per's Ferry in great haste, crossed the 
pontoon bridge into Maryland, and, by 
forced marches, succeeded in joining 
Lee at Antietam in time for the great 
battle of the 17th. Jackson, who, as 
has been mentioned, left on the 15th, 
rejoined Lee on the 16th. McLaws 
had abandoned the Maryland Heights 
when he became aware of the near 
presence of Franklin. Walker at the 
same time abandoned Loudon Heights. 
These last reached Lee by way of Shep- 
herdstown, about nine o'clock on the 
morning of the 17th. On the night of 
the 16th, the Confederates were well 
posted on the heights near Sharpsburg. 
A few words here, descriptive of the 
ground on which two great armies were 
about to come into deadly collision, 
will enable the reader to understand 
more clearly the battle picture which 
follows. As the traveler, after reach- 
ing the summit of South Mountain, be- 
gins to descend the western slope, there 
bursts upon his view one of the love- 
liest landscapes in the United States — 
a scene quite as attractive as the valley 
of the Catoctin which he has just left 
behind. In the distance, some eight or 
twelve miles in front of him, rolls 
lazily along on its tortuous bed the 
dark current of the Potomac. On this 
side of the Potomac, and from six to 



eight miles from the mountain passea 
runs the drowsy stream called Antietam 
Creek. This creek, which, flowing al- 
most due south and falling into the 
Potomac some eight miles above Har- 
per's Ferry, forms with that river a 
sort of irregular acute angle. Between 
these two streams there is an enclosed 
space which, of course, widens consider- 
ably towards the north, but which, at 
this point now particularly claiming 
attention is from two to three miles 
broad, and about seven or eight miles 
long. From the western margin of the 
Antietam the ground rises until it be- 
comes a bold crest, the entire slope 
being covered by woods and cultivated 
fields ; it then falls back to the Po- 
tomac in rugged and broken outlines of 
rock. Almost in the centre of this 
space, and just behind the ridge to the 
west, nestles the town of Sharpsburg; 
and behind Sharpsburg, a little to the 
south, is the Shepherdstown Ford across 
the Potomac. 

Such was the position which the 
Confederate general had chosen, and on 
which he proposed to await the attack 
of McClellan. The creek was in his 
front; the Potomac was in his rear; 
and behind and near the middle of his 
line was the little town of Sharpsburg, 
about a mile from the creek. The 
position unquestionably offered several 
advantages ; but it is always dangerous 
to hazaid — what in the circumstances 
this could not but be — a great and pos- 
sibly decisive battle, with a river in the 
rear. The truth is, Lee's original plan 
had failed. He was no longer offensive, 
but defensive. His great object, from 



».?3 



318 



ANTIETAM. 



the failure at South Mountain, had 
been to gain time for the concentration 
of his troops. This, however, he could 
have accomplished with equal ease on 
the other side of the Potomac. Why, 
then, did he remain on the Maryland 
side ? The answer is simple. He could 
not have recrossed the Potomac without 
covering himself with odium — without 
making his expedition to a certain ex- 
tent ridiculous. He had marched North 
with a great flourish of trumpets; his 
plans and purposes had become known ; 
it was absolutely necessary, in short, 
that in a fair fight he should test the 
skill and strength of his antagonist; 
and judging from the past, he was not 
without reason to hope that victory 
might crown his effort. If defeated, 
he might still be able to make good his 
retreat across the Potomac. If success- 
ful, he might yet march in triumph to 
Baltimore and Washington. 

On the morning of the 15th, the Na- 
tional army had defiled from the South 
Mountain, and moved in long, shining 
columns athwart the valley. By the 
evening of that day, the advance had 
arrived at Antietam Creek ; and the 
enemy was discovered well posted be- 
hind the crest of the opposite slope. 
There was some slight skirmishing 
with cavahy ; but neither of the com- 
manders was quite willing to open the 
fight. Lee, while actually waiting for 
the arrival of reinforcements from Har- 
per's Ferry, made such a show of 
Btrength as imposed upon McClellan. 
The National forces were not well for- 
ward, when darkness set in. There 
had been on the part of some of the 



commands unnecessary delay — a delay 
but for which McClellan might have 
been able to attack Lee vpith success 
on the afternoon of the 15th. During 
the morning of the 16th, the whole 
of the National army arrived, with the< 
exception of Franklin's command, which 
was still in Pleasant Valley. By that 
time, however, Lee was equally pre- 
pared for battle; for Jackson had al- 
ready arrived, and with him almost the 
entire Confederate strength from Har- 
per's Ferry. 

On the morning of the 16th, there 
was some artillery filing; but it did 
not seem to indicate that either side 
was yet fully ready for the fight. Both 
armies, however, were busy making 
preparations for the attack which could 
not now be long delayed. The Con- 
federates were so arranged that Long- 
street was on the right, with his right 
flank resting on a curve of the Antie- 
tam, D. H. Hill being on his left, and 
one of Longstreet's divisions, com- 
manded by Hood, being on the left 
of Hill. In a general manner their 
line stood north and south ; but Hood's 
division made an angle with the rest, 
and, facing northward, stood across the 
Hagerstown Road. The object of this 
arrangement was to oppose any flank 
movement which might be made in 
that direction. Close to that point, and 
in the rear of Hood, Jackson's exhaust- 
ed troops, which had just arrived from 
Harper's Ferry, were posted in reserve, 
his line stretching from the Hagerstown 
Road toward the Potomac, and pro^ 
tected by Stuart, with cavalry and 
artillery. Walker was posted on Long- 



THE DUNKEE CHURCH. 



319 



wreet'a right with two brigades, near 
what was called Sbaveley's Farm. Lee 
had his headquarters iu a tent on the 
hill where the National cemetery now is. 
McClellan's forces, on the morning of 
'that day, were posted along the eastern 
bank of the Antietam. Hooker's^ corps 
was placed on the extreme right. Next 
to him was Sumner, with his corps. 
Porter was placed in the centre, and 
Burnside on the left. Mansfield was 
stationed in the rear of Hooker. Frank- 
lin had not yet come up from Pleasant 
Valley. General McClellan's head- 
quarters were at the fine brick mansion 
of Philip Pry, on the east side of the 
Antietam, and about two miles north- 
east of Sharpsburg. From this point 
he had a commanding view of the en- 
tire line of battle. In front of the Na- 
tional line were three stone bridges. 
These bridges have been described as 
No9. 1, 2 and 3. No. 1 was in front of 
the National right, near which were 
stationed Hooker, Sumner and Mans- 
field. No. 2 was in front of Porter, 
who commanded the National centre. 
No. 3 was opposite Burnside, who had 
charge of the National left. Near 
biidge 1 was a ford, which was turned 
to good account during the progress of 
th'i fight. McClellan's plan was to at- 
tack the enemy's left with the corps of 
Hooker and Mansfield, supported by 
S^imner's, and, if necessary, by Frank- 
lin's; and, as soon as matters looked 
favorable in that direction, to move the 
loi-ps of Burnside against the enemy's 
extreme right, upon the ridge running 
to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, 
and, having carried that position, to 



press along the crest toward his left. 
Whenever either of these flank move- 
ments should be successful, he proposed 
to advance the centre with all the 
forces then disposable. 

We have already referred to the 
careful disposition which Lee had made 
of his troops on his own left, on and 
around the Hagerstown Road. On the 
west side of that road, about a mile 
from Sharpsburg, and about half a mile 
from the rear of the Confederate left, 
there was a small meeting-house, known 
as the Dunker Church. This church was 
enveloped in woods. In the immediate 
neighborhood of the church there was 
an open, cultivated area, extending from 
the noi'th, for the most part skii-ted 
vnth woods, but part of which was 
travei'sed by the Hagerstown Road. 
In the woods near the church were 
numerous ledges of limestone, which 
afford-ed an excellent cover for troops. 
It was here, among these limestone 
ledges, where Jackson had posted his 
men. The middle part of this open 
ground was a cornfield. A portion of 
it toward the east had been recently 
ploughed. It was in the woods, near 
the chui'ch, and in that open ground, 
that the battle of Antietam most fierce- 
ly raged and was principally fought. 
This was the focus of the fight. 

On the afternoon of the 16th, about 
two P. M., General McClellan began to 
put his plans into operation. General 
Hooker, ever ready and always equal 
to the situation, with his corps, consist- 
ing of Ricketts', Meade's and Double- 
day's divisions, in prompt obedience to 
orders, crossed the Antietam at bridge 



^20 



ANTIETAM, 



No. 1, and by the adjoining ford. Gen- 
eral Mansfield was to follow Hooker 
during the night, and to be in a posi- 
tion to render him assistance by day- 
break. Sumner was to follow in the 
same direction in the morning. Hooker, 
encoimtering no opposition in crossing 
the river, advanced in a southward di- 
rection, and came to the eastern edge 
of what we have desci'ibed as the battle 
ai'ea. As he approached the house of 
a Mr. D. Miller, his advance — Meade's 
Pennsylvania Reserves — came into con- 
tact with a portion of the enemy's left. 
The contest thus begun was sharp and 
severe, and lasted until dark, when the 
Confederates fell back. Hooker's men 
rested that night on their arms on the 
ground they had won. Mansfield's 
corps, consisting of the divisions of 
Williams and Green, were also success- 
ful in crossing the Antietam ; and upon 
the farm of Poifenberger, about a mile 
in Hooker's rear, they bivouacked till 
dawn. 

Hooker, impatient to resume the 
8epl. attack, was ready and in action 
*7. by the first streak of early day. 
The Pennsylvania Reserves were again 
the first to be engaged. Soon, how- 
ever, the whole of his corps were in 
deadly conflict with the enemy, Jackson 
being in conunand. Hooker advanced, 
with Doubleday on his right, Meade on 
his left, and Ricketta in the centre. 
Such was the vigor of the onslaught, 
and so effective was the assistance ren- 
dered by the batteries on the east side of 
the Antietam, that Jackson's brigades, 
terribly cut up, were driven across the 
cornfield, in the open ground, over the 



Hagerstown Road, and into the woods 
beyond the Dunker Church, where were 
their reserves. Eager to accomplish his 
purpose, and to obtain possession of 
the woods beyond, Hooker now pushed 
forward his left and centre. At this 
point, where the ground rises to some- 
what of an elevation, they were met 
by a murderous fire. The broken bat- 
talions were re-formed ; and Jackson 
brought forth his reserves. A fearful 
struggle ensued. At short range, and 
in the open ground, and with the ardor 
of desperation, they plied their deadly 
work. It was a fight in which there 
was no desire for quai'ter — no wish to 
save or be saved. Two great com- 
manders were pitted against each other; 
and the men were animated by the 
spirit of their chiefs. In his extremity. 
Hooker called on Doubleday for aid', 
and a brigade under Hartsuff was for- 
warded at the double-quick. This bri- 
gade was tenibly punished in pushing 
its way across the cornfield. It offei'ed 
a gallant resistance; but it could not 
turn the tide of battle. In the brief 
struggle of half an hour Hartsuff fell, 
severely wounded. The opposing forces 
were literally torn to shreds. In his 
official report of this fierce encounter. 
General Jackson says: "The carnage 
on both sides was terrific. At an 
early hour. General Starke, command- 
ing the Stonewall division, was killed ; 
Colonel Douglas, commanding Law- 
ton's brigade, was also killed. Gen- 
eral Lawton, commanding division, and 
Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, 
were severely wounded. More than 
half the brigades of Lawton and Hays 



THE AlB ALIVE WITH BULLETS. 



321 



were either killed or wounded, and 
more than a third of Trimble's. All 
the regimental commanders in those 
brigades, except two, were either killed 
or wounded. Thinned in their ranks, 
and their ammunition exhausted," it 
was necessary to withdraw the shattered 
regiments to the rear, when "Hood's di- 
vision, of Longstreet's command, took 
their place." Hooker's corps had simi- 
larly suffered. Indeed, General Sum- 
ner, who arrived on the field a little 
later, testified that when he came up 
he " saw nothing of Hooker's corps 
at all." 

It was now half-past seven o'clock. 
Mansfield had just come up to the sup- 
port of Hooker. He had pushed his 
way to the Hageratown Road. At that 
moment the battle din was fearful. 
What with the yells of the Confede- 
rates, the ringing cheers of the Na- 
tionals, the sharp, penetrating fire of 
musketry, the loud booming of can- 
non, and the ghastly procession of the 
wounded as they came out fi'om the 
thick of the fight, it seemed a very pan- 
demonium. But it was no time for idle 
moralizing. While attempting to de- 
ploy his corps — the divisions of Will- 
iams and Green — Mansfield was fiercely 
set upon by the division of D. H. Hill, 
which had just come out of the woods 
at the Danker Chuich. In the struggle 
which ensued, and in which his corps 
were di-iven back to the woods, brave 
old Mansfield was killed. His com- 
mand devolved on General Williams, 
who left his division to the care of 
General Crawford, one of his brigade 
commanders. Hooker, nothing daunted 



by his terrible losses, was still hopeful 
of success. Ricketts was unable to ad- 
vance ; but he assured the general that 
he could hold his ground. Doubleday 
had succeeded in silencing a battery 
which for half an hour had been pour- 
ing enfilading fire on Hooker's central 
line. Near the Dunker Church was 
a wood-'crowned elevation, which was 
really the key of the position. This 
Hooker determined to take. With this 
end in view, he ordered forward two of 
the Mansfield brigades — Crawford and 
Gordon — Hooker himself advancing to 
the front, and recklessly exposing him- 
self to the enemy's bullets, which fell 
in showers around him. For a time he 
moved about on foot, examining the 
gi'ound in his front, and seeking a 
favorable site for a battery. As he 
remounted on a piece of rising ground, 
the air was literally alive with bullets. 
He was scarcely in the saddle when 
three men were shot by his side, and 
when he himself was shot in the foot. 
Suffering dreadfully from the wound, 
and sitting unsteadily in his saddle, he 
turned and fixed his eyes on the coveted 
position. " There is a regiment to the 
right," said he; "order it forward. 
Crawford and Gordon are coming up; 
tell them to carry these works, and hold 
them, and it is our fight." On exam- 
ination, it was found that the bullet 
had completely passed through his foot. 
Soon afterwards he was carried off the 
field to McClellan's headiiuarters at 
Pry's, but not until he felt satisfied 
that he had won the field, so fai- as it 
was the duty or in the power of the 
National right to win it. In carrying 



332 



ANTIETAM. 



out the orders given them, Crawford 
and Gordon were fairly successful. 
They had reached the woods, and were 
holding them against heavy odds. 

It was onl)^ nine o'clock. It seemed 
as if the battle had been raging for the 
gi'eater part of a day. Just as Hooker 
was leaving the field, Sumner arrived 
and assuD^ed commandw Discovering at 
once the dangerous position held by 
the two Mansfield brigades, Sumner 
ordered Sedgwick, whose division was 
in advance, to move forward to their 
support. It was a hazardous operation. 
It was necessary to cross the cornfield ; 
and if the enemy's line was complete, 
he was in immediate danger of being 
flanked. Simultaneously, with the ad- 
vance of Sedgwick, French and Rich- 
ardson, who had also arrived on the 
fifld, moved down upon the foe a little 
more to the left, Sedgwick suffered 
terribly ; but the Nationals, having 
again pressed across the open and now 
blood-stained area, were holding the 
ground around the Dunker Church. It 
seemed for a moment as if victory had 
pronounced in their favor. But no. 
The backward and forward struggle 
must be repeated. The blood-stained 
field must be crossed and recrossed. 
McLaws and Walker, who had arrived 
with their troops from Harper's Ferry, 
were moved at once to Jackson's sup- 
port, with Early on their left. Posted 
behind the rocky bulwarks, they await- 
ed the approach of the Nationals ; and, 
as they drew near, they leaped from 
their hiding-places and fell upon them 
with tremendous fury, forcing them 
from the Dunker Woods, and driving 



them across the cornfield, and into the 
woods beyond. At this moment, affairs 
looked sufficiently gloomy for the Na- 
tional right. Sumner's headquarters 
were now in the narrow field where 
Hooker in the morning had begun the 
fight. Sedgwick, who had been thre6 
times wounded, was at last obliged 
to leave the field. Dana, Crawford 
and other officers had been wounded. 
What remained of Hooker's troops 
were terribly exhausted; and theii' 
general was off the field. Mansfield 
was gone; and what remained of his 
troops were in little better condition 
than those of Hooker. It was Sum- 
ner's conviction that further aggressive 
effort without reinforcements was im- 
possible. He might hold his own ; but 
he could do no more. The Confede- 
rates at this stage did not seem to be 
in any better plight than their antago* 
nists. They had suffered terribly from 
the National artillery; and as the] 
were exposed in their advanced position 
to the batteries of Doubleday, who 
held his place on the right with in- 
flexible tenacity, they fell back to 
their original ground near the Dunker 
Church. Some of them, however, 
were still engaged ; nor was there 
any evidence that they were unwill- 
ing to continue the fight. 

It was now shortly after midday. 
Franklin, who had left Crampton's Pass 
in the morning about six o'clock, had 
just amved on the field. It was Mc- 
Clellan's intention to retain that corps 
on the east side of the Antietam, to be 
ready to operate on either flank or on 
the centre, as circumstaacea might re- 



ARRIVAL OF FRANKLIN. 



333 



quire. The terrible condition of the 
National right, however, left the gen- 
eral-in-chief no choice. McClellan had 
been an anxious spectator of the fight 
all the morning and forenoon. He 
knew how critical was the situation in 
which Sumner found himself. Franklin 
was, therefore, ordered at once to his 
assistance. He made no delay. Hast- 
ening forward, he reached the point of 
danger not a moment too soon. An 
attack was being made on battery 
A, Fourth United States Artillery, 
commanded by Lieutenant Thomas. 
Smith's division led the column, fol- 
lowed by Slocum's. Smith received 
general instructions to retake the ground 
on which the battle had all day long 
raged so fiercely. Slocum was ordered 
to move more to the centre. The or- 
ders were promptly executed. Smith's 
men were soon in the thick of the fight. 
Batteiy A was immediately relieved by 
Hancock's brigade ; and, as he observed 
that the enemy was still disposed to 
advance. Smith ordered up his third 
brigade, commanded by Colonel Irwin. 
Passing through Thomas's battery, this 
brigade rushed upon the foe with in- 
trepid energy, and with a violence 
which was irresistible ; and by a series 
of gallant charges, made in the face of 
a most destructive fire, which ploughed 
through their ranks, the men cheering 
as they advanced on the run, they 
drove the Confederates across the open 
field, and beyond the Hagerstown 
Road, compelling them to seek shelter 
in the woods to the west of the Dunker 
Church. On this day of brilliant effort 
and heroic self-sacrifice, nothing was 



more brilliant, more heroic or more full 
of self-sacrifice than this last and crown- 
ing effort of Smith's division, of Frank- 
lin's corps. The grandest work was 
done by the Maine and Vermont regi- 
ments. They literally covered them- 
selves with glory. It was only fifteen 
minutes from the time the order was 
given, when the field was reclaimed, 
and the work was done. "The field 
and its ghastly harvest," says an eye- 
witness, "which the reaper had gath- 
ered in those fatal hours, remained 
finally with the Nationals. Four times 
it had been lost and won. The dead 
are strewn so thickly that, as you ride 
over it, you cannot guide your horse's 
steps too carefully. Pale and bloody 
faces are everywhere upturned. They 
are sad and terrible ; but there is noth- 
ing which makes one's heart beat so 
quickly as the imploring looks of some 
sorely- wounded men, who beckon weari- 
ly for help which you cannot stay to 
give." 

The arrival of Franklin on the field 
was singularly opportune. A few 
minutes later, the Confederates might 
have penetrated the National line be- 
tween the division of Sedgwick and 
that of French. Such a result would 
have been disastrous in the extreme. 
His efforts had been attended with so 
much success, that he felt emboldened 
to assaiilt the woods near the Dunker 
Church, where the Confederate left had 
again sought shelter — a position wbicli 
had been vainly assaulted by botli 
Hooker and Sumner. Franklin had 
given the order; but Sumner having 
come up, it was c<^untermanded. 1( 



su 



ANTIETAM. 



was Slocum's brigade that was to make 
the intended assault. Franklin, confi- 
dent of success, was anxious that it 
should be made; but Sumner, "the 
old bull of the woods," as they called 
him at Fair Oaks, who was as stubborn 
as he was brave, and as cautious as he 
was daring, could not be persuaded to 
give his consent. Franklin's was the 
only remaining coi-ps available for at- 
tack. In the meditated assault on the 
enemy, strongly posted on ground 
which hitherto had proved impregna- 
ble, a repulse was at least possible ; 
and a repulse, in Sumner's judgment, 
would peril the safety of the whole 
army. Sumner's caution at this crisis 
of the fight was the more entitled to 
respect that that day he proved himself 
to be the bravest of the brave. He 
was ever at the post of danger, and 
where the battle raged most fiercely. 
Mounted on his spirited chai'ger, and 
careering through the woods, his head 
bare, his white hair streaming in the 
wind, the fire of battle in his eye, he 
seemed the very impersonation of the 
god of war. Few that saw him that 
day in the thick of the fight believed he 
could leave the field alive. But the 
bullets fell mercifully around the brave 
old warrior. 

While these events were taking place 
on Sumner's right, severe fighting was 
going on also on his left. French and 
Richardson had not been idle. The for- 
mer, with the brigades of Weber, Kim- 
ball and Morris, pushed on where the 
Confederate general, D. H. Hill, was 
posted in considerable strength. Weber 
led the advance, while hotly engaged 



with the enemy. French received orders 
to press on with the utmost vigor, and 
make a diversion in favor of the I'ight. 
The Confederates were pressed back 
towards a hollow or sunken road in 
much disorder. At this point, Rich- 
ardson came up, with the brigades of 
Meagher, Caldwell and Brooks, and 
took position on the left of French. 
Meagher fought his way to the crest of 
a hill which overlooked the Confede- 
rate position. The battle now raged 
furiously. A vigorous effort was made 
by the Confederates, who at this 
time were reinforced by about 4000 
men under R. H. Anderson, to obtain 
possession of a piece of rising ground 
on the left of the National right Aviug, 
with the view of turning that flank. 
The ground, however, after what might 
be called a fighting race, was seized and 
held by Colonel Cross and his famous 
"fighting" Fifth New Hampshire. 
Cross was speedily joined by the 
Eighty-First Pennsylvania; and the 
Confederates were driven back, leaving 
behind them the colors of the Fourth 
North Carolina. An effort was made 
at the same time to push towards and 
flank the National right. It was made 
with great energy and stubbornness 
Resisted, however, by French and by 
Richardson, the Confederates were 
brought to a standstill, and finally 
driven back to Dr. Piper's house, near 
the Shaipsburg Road. There they came 
to a halt, and made an obstinate attack. 
Richardson now brought up his artil- 
lery. It was at this moment, and 
while directing one of the batteries, that 
this brave oflScer was felled to the 



"TATTERED FRAGMENTS." 



325 



earth by a cannon ball. General Han- 
cock immediately took command ; and, 
by a desperate charge, he drove the 
Confederates from Dr. Piper's house, 
and pressed them so closely that it was 
only by the merest chance that Lee s 
line was not completely severed. A 
vigorous and more general effort at 
this moment might have given a new 
aspect to the entii-e struggle, and even 
crowned the day with a decisive vic- 
tory. As it was, the Nationals held 
the ground on the right and toward the 
centre when darkness fell. In this 
closing struggle, General Meagher, who 
performed deeds of valor, was wounded 
and carried from the field. 

Thus far our attention has been di- 
rected exclusively to the operations on 
the National right. This has been un- 
avoidable. It was by his right wing 
McClellan intended to fight the battle 
of Antietara ; and it was by that wing 
the battle was really fought. It was 
not the general's intention, however, 
that either the centre or the left, or 
both, should be mere armed spectators 
of the scene. The reader will remem- 
ber that General Fitz John Porter, who 
had command of the National centre, 
occupied a position on the east of Antie- 
tam, commanding bridge No. 2. The 
left wing, it will also be remembered, 
was under General Burnside, and held 
a position also on the east side of 
the creek, commanding bridge No. 3. 
While this murderous work was going 
on to the right of the National line, 
what was being done by the centre and 
left ? Let us see. 

McClellan deemed the position held 



by Porter of the utmost importance; 
and, consequently, it was not until the 
afternoon was somewhat advanced that 
he could be induced to take any steps 
which should have the effect of weak- 
ening his centre. Hooker had been' 
taken from the field wounded; his 
corps had been cut to pieces. Mansfield 
had fallen in battle; and there remained 
but tattered fragments of his once 
splendid regiments. Sumner was still 
giving directions in the field ; but his 
own corps had shared the fate of 
those of Hooker and Mansfield. It was 
"towards the middle of the afternoon," 
McClellan tells us, that, discovering 
the desperate state of things on his 
right, he detached two of Porter's bri- 
gades, and sent them to Sumner's assist- 
ance. About the same time he caused 
six battalions, of Sykes' regulars, to be 
thrown across bridge No. 2, in order to 
attack and drive away the Confederate 
sharpshooters, who were giving great 
annoyance to Pleasonton's horse bat- 
teries, which were stationed a little in 
advance of the bridge. At the same 
time, also, he detached Warren's bri- 
gade from the same corps, and sent 
them to hold a position on the right 
and rear of Burnside. In consequence 
of these repeated withdrawals of troops 
Porter's corps was, at one time during 
the day, reduced to fewer than 4000 
men. 

And what was taking place on the 
left ? It was McClellan's design, as has 
been indicated, to support his right by 
making an attack on the enemy with 
his left. With this end in view, Burn- 
side's corps, on the evening of the IGth, 



!i34 



826 



ANTIETAM. 



was moved into position near the bridge. 
On tliat day McClellan visited Buraside, 
and, after pointing out the proper dis- 
position to be made of his troops, in- 
formed him that he would probably 
be required to make an attack on the 
enemy's right on the following morning. 
He was instructed, also, to make care- 
ful reconnoissances. Burnside's corps 
consisted of the divisions of Generals 
Cox, Wilcox, Rodman and Sturgis. Col- 
onel Brooks' brigade, of Cox's divi- 
sion, was on the right; Sturgis' divi- 
sion was immediately in the rear; while 
Rodman's division, with Scammon's 
brigade, of Cox's division, in support, 
was stationed on the left. The division 
of Wilcox was held in reserve. On the 
night of the 16th the corps bivouarcked 
in position. At eight o'clock on the 
morning of the 17th, McClellan sent 
instructions to Burnside to force the 
lower stone bridge, to gain possession 
of the heights beyond, and to advance 
along their crest upon Sharpsburg and 
its rear. The position was held by 
Toombs' brigade, supported by sharp- 
shooters and batteries, under the com- 
mand of D. R. Jones. Burnside was 
singularly tardy in carrying out the 
instructions given him. It is to be ad- 
mitted that the task imposed upon him 
was one of more than ordinary diffi- 
culty. The approaches to the bridge 
partook of the character of a defile, 
which was completely commanded by 
the Confederate batteries. Burnside 
made repeated attempts ; but they were 
feeble, and without effect. He was 
evidently impressed with the idea that, 
however important it might be to cap- 



ture the bridge and the heights beyond, 
the risk to be run was too great. Again 
and again imperative orders were sent 
to him to push forward his troops with- 
out delay, and, if necessary, to carry 
the bridge at the point of the bayonet. 
It was not until about one o'clock, 
when Colonel Sackett had been sent to 
Burnside with instructions to remain 
and see the order executed, that a 
really vigorous effort was made. The 
Fifty-First New York and the Fifty- 
First Pennsylvania charged with tre- 
mendous energy, driving the Confede- 
rates from the bridge, and back to the 
heights in their rear. Other troops fol- 
lowed, and the position was secured. 
Unhappily, however, Burnside did not 
pursue the advantage thus gained. In 
getting his troops and batteries across 
the bridge, and putting them in order, 
he wasted two precious hours — the 
most precious hours of the day ; for, as 
we now know, Longstreet had so ex- 
hausted his strength by sending rein- 
forcements to the Confederate left, that 
he had only some two thousand men 
with whom to oppose Burnside's ad- 
vance. It is impossiljle not to admire 
the skill with which, on this and other 
occasions, the Confederate generals con- 
trived to make an imposing and de- 
ceptive show of their forces, when they 
were I'eally weak and in distress. At 
three o'clock, Burnside was in the same 
position. McClellan, becoming impa- 
tient, sent Colonel Key to him, with 
the most urgent entreaties to push on 
without a moment's delay. The move- 
ment, he assured him, was vital to suc- 
cess. It was no time to halt or hesitate 



THE BATTLE ENDED. 



321 



because of the value of life. "With a 
consideratecess which seems strange to 
those accustomed to the stern military 
orders of older nations, McClellan again 
sends Key to Burnside, telling him 
that if, on experiment, he finds that he 
Ciinnot flank or stoi-m the battery, and 
carry the heights, he is to inform him, 
so that he may be able to recall the 
troops. The advance is now resumed ; 
the attack is gallantly made ; the guns 
are abandoned by the fleeing Confede- 
rates ; the heights are carried ; and the 
victorious Nationals, in considerable 
force, are already at the outskii'ts of 
Sharpsbufg. At this supreme moment, 
when victory seems at last about to 
crown the labors and sacrifices of the 
day, the Nationals are brought to a 
standstill. A new army appears to 
have arisen out of the gi'ound. It is 
A. P. Hill, who, with his division, has 
just come up from Harper's Ferry. 
Getting his men into order on the brow 
of a ridge to the left, he falls heavily 
on Burnside's troops, as they press 
eagerly forward, apparently with vic- 
toiy in their grasp. The blow is all 
the more stunning that it is unexpected. 
Under cover of a tremendous fii'e of 
artillery, the Confederates charge upon 
Burnside's left flank. The National 
troops offer a stubborn resistance. But 
they cannot hold their ground. Step 
hy step they are forced back to the 
bridge over the Antietam, where they 
are protected by the batteries on the 
other side of the creek. Here Burnside 
had instractions to make a determined 
stand. It was unnecessary, as the Con- 
federates did not venture to pursre. In 



this last struggle there was a heavy 
loss of life. The Confederate general, 
Branch, was killed ; and General Rod- 
man was mortally wounded. The last 
shot was fired as night spread her 
mantle of gloom over that field of blood 
and agony. The battle of Antietam 
was ended. It was not the most de- 
cisive, but it was the bloodiest battle 
since the commencement of the Civil 
Wai. On that narrow piece of ground 
lay dead, or bleeding to death, twenty 
thousand men, their comrades so com- 
pletely outworn by continuous march- 
ing and fighting, without sleep and 
without food, that they could not give 
burial to the one or succor to the other 
The National loss in this battle wa.1 
2010 killed, 941G wounded, and 104? 
missing; a total of 12, 4G9. Lee's lossefi 
were correspondingly heavy. About 
2700 were buried by McClellan. His 
wounded numbered about 7000, not in 
eluding those which had fallen Into the 
hands of the Nationals. In that single 
day his army must have been reduced 
by at least 10,000 men. Lee himself 
acknowledged that, in the different en- 
gagements at Crampton's Gap, Tur- 
ner's Gaj^, Harper's Ferry and Antietam, 
he sustained a loss of 1567 killed, and 
8724 wounded. Most undoubtedly 
Lee, from some cause or other, under- 
estimated his loss. It does not appear 
possible to get at the exact figures; 
but it is not an overestimate to say that 
Lee's loss, during his brief campaign in 
Maryland, was from 25,000 to 30,000 
men. Although Antietam could not 
1)6 called a National victory, it was un- 
questionably a gain to the Nationn] 



126 



ANTIETAM. 



cause ; and McClellan was hardly to be 
blamed if he felt some self-satisfaction 
in being able to say that "thirteen 
guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
15,000 stand of small arms, and more 
than 6000 piisoners are the trophies 
which attest the success of our arms 
in the battles of South Mountain, 
Crampton's Gap and Antietam," and 
fhat " not a single gun or color was lost 
by iur army during these battles." 
Lep '^.ould, no doubt, boast that he had 
not been defeated, although he had 
fought with inferior numbers, and that 
McClellan did not AJ^enture to resume 
the battle on the following day; but 
he had lost ground along the whole 
line, and his army was so broken down 
that a retreat to Virginia was now an 
absolute necessity. His whole plan of 
campaign had failed. It is fair, here, 
to ask the reader to bear in mind that 
Lee, although repeatedly reinforced, 
was not able to bring into the field on 
that day more than 40,000 or 45,000 
men ; whereas, McClellan's effective 
strength was over 87,000. 

It would not be difiicult to show that 
gi'eater results ought to have been 
achieved by the noble army of the Po- 
tomac. The discipline was defective. 
The generalship was not good. The 
commanding mind which gives unity of 
purpose and unity of movement to a 
|;reat army was wanting. McClellan 
repeated his characteristic blunder. In 
place of combining his forces, and at- 
tacking with an overwhelming mass, 
he used them too much in driblets, and 
worked too much in detail. In his 
history of the Civil War, the Comte de 



I'aris very clearly puts the merits and 
demerits of the fight. "The error,'" 
he says, "which Lee expiated by this 
great defeat is evident. This error 
was in dividing his army for the pur 
pose of capturing Harper's Ferry in the 
presence of McClellan, and in counting 
too much upon the tardiness of his ad- 
versary. If he had not made sue! a 
division of his forces, he would have, 
had the choice either to fight a decisive 
battle under much more favorable cir- 
cumstances, upon the steep acclivities 
of South Mountain, or of continuing 
the campaign on the upper Potomac 
with all his troops. The mistakes of 
his enemies repaired to some extent 
those committed by himself. Through 
the disgraceful capitulation of Miles, 
the slow movements of Franklin on the 
14th and 15th, and the delays which 
prevented McClellan from attackmg 
him on the 16th, he was enabled on the 
17th to mass all his troops on the field 
of battle. The issue of the contest, 
however, would probably have been 
different if A. P. Hill, instead of arriv- 
ing at three o'clock in the afternoon, 
had been able to take part in the strug- 
gle early in the morning, and add his 
efforts to those which kept the Federal 
right so long in check. There were, 
however, many other causes which pre- 
vented McClellan from achieving a 
more complete victory, and taking ad- 
vantage of the opportunity to strike an 
irreparable blow at Lee. The first is to 
be found in the moral condition of his 
troops. The army which had been en- 
trusted to him was partly composed of 
the van(j_uished soldiers of Man;issa-, 



A WISE DISCKETION. 



329 



and the remainder consisted of soldiers 
who had been only one or two weeks 
in the serxace, who had never marched, 
never been under fire, and knew neither 
their commanders nor their comrades. 
They fought with great bravery; but 
ihey could not be expected to perform 
what Lee easily obtained from his men. 
Their ranks had not that cohesion 
which enables a commander to follow 
up a first success without inten-uption. 
The Union generals may be censured 
for having divided their efforts on the 
right in successive attacks, and thereby 
impaired their effectiveness. The corps 
of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner — in 
all from 40,000 to 44,000 men— instead 
of being brought into action one after 
the other for the space of four hours, 
might have been united so as together 
to strike the Confederate left, which 
they would, no doubt, have crushed. 
McClellan and several of his lieuten- 
ants, as w^e have said, had also overrated 
the number of their adversaries — an 
error which had the effect of keeping 
back Franklin and Porter, whose co- 
operation at the close of the battle 
would have been decisive. Finally 
Burnside, by his long inaction, upset 
all McClellan's plans, enabled Lee to 
mass all his forces on his left, and thus 
deprived the Federals of the pi-incipal 
advantages which a more energetic 
action on his part would certainly have 
secured." These are sensible words; 
and they justify the tone which per- 
vades this naiTative. 

McClellan himself tells us that the 
night of the 17th brought with it grave 
responsibilities. The question was seri- 



ously revolved in his own mind, and 
discussed with his generals, "whether 
to renew the attack on the 18th or to 
defer it, even Math the risk of the ene- 
my's retirement." Some of the gen- 
erals, Fj'anklin among the rest, urged 
immediate action. Others again, Sum- 
ner included, opposed such a course. 
McClellan concluded to wait a day, to 
give his army rest, and to prepare for 
the renewal of the battle on the 19th. 
For this McClellan has been greatly 
blamed by many. We cannot join ^vith 
them. Discretion is, sometimes at least, 
the better part of valor. McClellan, 
we think, showed a wdse discretion. It 
may be true that, if he had resumed the 
attack on the morning of the 18th, he 
could easily have captured or ruined 
Lee's army. It ought not to be forgot-, 
ten, however, that we judge the situa- 
tion now with a fuller knowledge than 
McClellan then possessed. There were 
certainly grave reaaona why he should 
act with cautioh. As he himself has 
said : " At that moment — V irginia lost, 
Washington menaced, Maiyland invad- 
ed — the National cause could afford no 
risks of defeat. One battle lost, and 
all would have been lost." During the 
course of the 18th, he was joined by 
14,000 fresh troops, under Couch and 
Humphrey. Thus strengthened, he felt 
that he could strike the enemy on the 
following morning with assured hope 
of victory. Meanwhile, the 18th was 
spent in collecting the dispersed, giving 
rest to the fatigued, removing the 
wounded, burying the dead, and the 
necessary preparations for a renewal of 
the battle. 



«30 



ANTIETAM. 



The ISth of September, 1862, will 
Sept. iict soon be forgotten by any who 
18. spent that day on the battle field 
of Antietam. Sad duties had to be 
periormed ; and sad sights had to be 
witnessed. In battle histories, it is too 
much the habit to confine the reader's 
attention to. the stirring scenes of actual 
conflict — too little the habit to linger 
with him in the battle's rear, and wit- 
Sess the scenes of woe. _ Yet it is on 
the blood-soaked field, when the din of 
battle has ceased, among the dead and 
the wounded, that the true lesson is to 
b8 learned. Happil}', a picture cf the 
field of Antietam after the battle has 
been preserved to us by a competent 
eye-witness. " My route," says Captain 
Noyes, " carried me over the late battle 
field, and I spent much of the afternoon, 
in company with a friend, in visiting 
some of the most severely-contested 
points, to be awe-struck, sickened, al- 
most benumbed with its sights of hoiTor. 
Within this space of little more than a 
mile square — this spot once beautiful 
with handsome residences and well- 
cultivated farms, isolated, hedged in 
with verdure, sacred to quiet, calm con- 
tent — the hottest fiiiy of man's hottest 
wrath had expended itself, burning 
residences and well-filled barns, plough- 
ing fields of ripened grain with artillery, 
scattering everywhere through corn- 
field, wood and valley the most awful 
illustrations of war. Not a building 
ftbout us which was not deserted by its 
occupants, and rent and torn by shot 
and shell ; not a field which had not 
witnessed the fierce and bloody en- 
counter of armed and desperate men. 



Passing through the cornfield, -with the 
dead lying all through its aisles, out 
into an uncultivated field, I saw bodies, 
attired mainly in gray, lying in ranks so 
regular that Death, the Reaper, must 
have mowed them down in swaths. 
Our burying parties were already busi- 
ly engaged, and had put away to rest 
many of our own men ; still here, as 
everywhere, I saw them scattered over 
the field. The ground was strewn with 
muskets, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes and 
articles of clothing; the carcasses of 
horses, and thousands of shot and shell. 
And so it was on the other side of the 
turnpike — nay, in the turnpike itself. 
Ride where we may, through cornfield 
wood or ravine, and our ride will be 
among the dead, until the heart grows 
sick and faint with hoiTor. Just in 
front of these hay-stacks, where our 
general and his staff paused for a while 
during the heat of the battle, was the 
only pleasing picture on this battle 
field — a fine horse struck with death. 
At the instant when cut down by his 
wound, he was attempting to I'ise from 
the ground. His head was half lifted ; 
his neck proudly arched ; every muscle 
seemed replete with animal life. The 
wound which killed him was wholly- 
concealed from view, so that I had tu 
ride close up before 1 could believe 
him dead. He was the admired of 
every passer-by. Two weeks after- 
ward, I found myself pausing to gaze 
upon him, and always with the -wish 
that some sculptor would immortalize 
in stone this magnificent animal, in the 
exact pose of his death-hour. One 
would like to see something from a 



LEE'S iJETKBAT. 



331 



battle field not wholly terrible. One 
more scene in thia battle picture, and 
our ride may end. It is a narrow 
country lane, hollowed out somewhat 
between the fields, partially shaded, 
and now literally crowded with the 
Confederate dead. Here they stood in 
line of battle, and here, in the length 
of five hundred feet, I counted more 
than two hundred of their dead in 
every attitude conceivable — some piled 
in groups of four or six ; some gi-asping 
their muskets, as if in the act of dis- 
charging them ; some, evidently oifi- 
cers, killed while encouraging their 
men ; some lying in the position of 
calm repose, all black and swollen, and 
ghastly with wounds. This battalion 
of the dead filled the lane with horror. 
As we rode beside it — we could not 
ride in it — I saw the field all about me 
black with corpses ; and I was told 
that the cornfield beyond was equally 
crowded. It was a place to see once, 
to glance at, and then to ride hurriedly 
away; for strong-hearted as was then 
my mood, I had gazed upon as much 
horror as I was able to bear." Such is 
war, when stripped of the pomp and the 
splendor and the show, and seen in its 
naked reality. 

On the morning of the 19th, accord- 
Sept, log to instructions given the day 
•^. before, preparations were made 
for an advance. The cavalry were sent 
forward to reconnoitre the ground. 
What has happened ? Mounted mes- 
sengers return at full speed to McClel- 
lan's headquarters. There is no longer 
any enemy in front. Taking advantage 
of the darkness of the night, Lee had 



taken his entire army across the Po- 
tomac by the Shepherdstown Ford, and 
escaped, unmolested, into Virginia. He 
had left eight batteries, under Pendle- 
ton, on the river bluffs, for the purpose 
of checking the pursuit. This, then, 
was the end of all that blood and sac- 
rifice. Justified, as McClellan was, in 
resting on the 18th, it must be regard- 
ed, from a National point of view, as 
a great misfortune that Lee should 
have been able, without let or hin- 
drance, to cross the Potomac, carrying 
- with him his entire army, with all the 
supplies, material and impedimenta of 
war generally. It is no matter of won- 
der if many a soldier's heart sank 
within him, when he learned that the 
enemy had escaped. Good generalship 
was again on the side of the Confede- 
rates. An attempt at pursuit was made 
by a portion of Porter's corps; but it 
was a feeble attempt, and tended to 
reveal the indecision and \vant of pur- 
pose on the part of the National com- 
mander. Porter's men, under General 
Griflin, captured fom- of the enemy's 
guns ; but on the morning of the gept. 
20th, when making a reconnois- 20. 
sance in force, and when about a mile 
from the ford, they were surprised by 
A. P. Hill, who lay in ambush, and 
driven back into and across the i-iver 
in great disorder, with the loss of 200 
men made prisoners. The Confederates 
held the river for the remainder of that 
day. On the 21st, Lee moved Sept. 
leisurely toward Martinsburg, de- 21. 
stroying, as he moved along, the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad. Stuart lin- 
gered behind to make a show of numbers 



S3;J 



ANTIETAM. 



and strength ; and on the same day that 
Lee marched to Martinsburg, he was 
daring enough to recross the river at 
Williamsport. He was met by Couch, 
who compelled him to make a precipi- 
tate retreat Two days later, Mary- 
land Heights were retaken by the Na- 
tionals ; Harper's Ferry was reoccupied, 
and in charge of General Sumner ; and 
pontoon bridges were thrown across 
both the Potomac and the Shenandoah 
Rivers. The Maryland campaign was 
ended. The great battle of Antietam 
had been fought; blood and treasure 
had been liberally spent on both sides ; 
yet both armies had substantially re- 
sumed the positions which they occupied 
some three Aveeks before.* 

McClellan's besetting sin again be- 
came a source of disquietude to the coun- 
try and the government. There was 
an earnest and general desire that he 

* The battle of Antietam, it is but jnst to notice, had 
a most important effect in determining the promulga- 
tion of the war policy which the National government 
had at this time under consideration. President Lin- 
coln himself tells the story. "It had got to be," said 
he, "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from 
bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end 
of our rope on the plan of operations we were pursu- 
ing : that we had about played our last card, and most 
ehange our tactics, or lose the game. I now deter- 
mined upon the emancipation policy ; and without 
consulting with, or the knowledge of, the cabinet, I 
prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, 
after much anxious thought, called a cabinet meeting 
on the subject. This was the last of July or the first 
part of the month of August, 1862. This cabinet 
meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. • • * 
Nothing was offered that I had not already fully antici- 
pated and settled in my mind, until Secretary Seward 
^poke. He said in substance: 'Mr. President, I ap- 
prove of the proclamation, but I question the expedi- 
ency of its issue at this jimcture. The depression of 
the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, 
is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. 
It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted 
GjOTemjneut— aery for help; the government atretohing i 



should pui'sue Lee, and force matters 
to a crisis before the winter should 
set in. Lincoln visited the army oet. 
on the 1st of October, and re- '• 
mained with it several days. His en- 
treaties were urgent that McClellan 
should advance. The general was full 
of promises; but his wants were many. 
He needed reinforcements, horses, cloth- 
ing, shoes, supplies of all kinds. Lee had 
moved to Winchester. His army was 
in a wretched condition. McClellan's 
army had increased to 150,000 strong. 
Yet day follows day, and nothing is 
done. On the 6th of October, Hal- 
leek telegraphed to the general: "The 
president directs that you cross the 
Potomac, and give battle to the ene- 
my, or drive him South. Your army 
must move now, while the roads are, 
good." On the 10th, General J. E. B. 
Stuart made a raid into Pennsylvania. 

forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretch- 
ing forth her hands to the government.' His idea," 
said the president, ' ' was that it would be considered 
our last shriek on the retreat. ' Now, ' continued Mr- 
Seward, ' while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, 
that you postpone its issue, uutil you can give it to the 
country supported by military success, instead of issu- 
ing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest dis- 
asters of the war.'" Mr. Lincoln continued: "The 
wisdom of the view of the secretary of state struck me 
with great force. The result was that I put the draft 
of the proclamation aside, waiting for a victory. Well, 
the next news we had was of Pope's disaster at Bull 
Kun. Things looked darker than ever. Finally came 
the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to 
wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednes- 
day, that the advantage was on our side. I was then/ 
staying at the Soldiers' Home. Here I finished writing! 
the second draft of the proclamation ; came up on, 
Saturday; called the cabinet together to hear it,- 
and it was published the following Monday. I made 

A SOLEMN vow BEFOBE GoD THAT, IP GeNEBAL LeE 
WAS DBITEN BAOX PBOM MaBYIiAIJD, I WOITLD OBOWN 
THE BEBUIiT BZ THE DEOLABATION OF FBEEOOU TO 

THE SLAVES." — Oarpenttr't Six Month* in the WhiU 
Motu*. 



STUAKT'S RAID. 



338 



Capturing Chambersburg in that State, 
he destroyed a large quantity of sup- 
plies, burning machine shops, trains of 
cars, and other property; and then, 
having made a complete circuit around 
McClellan's army, he re-entered Vir- 
ginia by crossing the Potomac below 
him. This raid of Stuart roused public 
indignation to its highest pitch. It 
was regarded as an open insult to 
the National army; and it was felt 
that the Confederates had made good 
their boast, by carrying war into the 
free States. Still McClellan remained 
inactive. There was no forward move- 
ment. Again, on the 21st, Halleck 
telegraphed : "The president does not 



expect impossibilities, but he is very 
anxious that all this good weather 
should not be wasted in inactivity." 
McClellan could not move before the 
1st of November. Then he did move ; 
but it was too lata On the 7th of that 
•month there was a heavy snow-storm. 
It was a sure sign that winter was at 
hand- Lincoln's patience was at last 
exhausted — his forbearance had given 
way; he had already taken action; 
and on the night of that day, while at 
Rectortown, on his southward march 
towards Gordonsville, McClellan re- 
ceived instructions to turn over the 
command of the army to General Bum 
side. 



gst 



334 



FREDEEICKSBUEG. 



CHAPTER XXI. 

j^n^yinMti and the National Government. — Bad Blood. — Blame on Both Sides. — MoClellan's Love for the Annj 
of the Potomac. — The Army Again on the March. — McClellan'g Plan. — A Storm. — McClellan's K^nioval. — 
Bumsiato iu Command. — Reconstruction of the Army. — Bumside's Order. — His Pl»u. — MoCleUan's Plan 
Abandons J. — On to Fredericksburg. — Halleck and Meigs. — The Pontoon Difficulty. — Who Were to Blame ?— 
Fahnontn. — Fredericksburg. — Stafford Heights. — Marye's Heights. — Description of the Country. — Topogra- 
phy of the. Position. — Acquia Creek. — Sumner at Falmouth. — The River Impassable. — No Pontoons. — 
An Unfortnijtite Delay. — Lee's Activity. — Position of the Confederate Army. — Marye's Heights Impreg- 
nable. — Arrival of the Pontoons. — Precious Time liost.^Five Bridges. — The Morning of the 11th.— The 
Confederate Bhurpshooters and the Pontouiers. — Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Construct the Bridges. — 
A Cannonade. — I'he Sharpshooters Dislodged. — The Bridges Completed. — The National Army Across the 
Rappahannock.— Preparations for Battle. — Both Armies in Line. — A Glance at Lee's Position. — The Dis- 
position of his f'»oops. — Bumside's Position. — His Plan of Attack. — The Night of the 12th. — Bumside 
Changes his Mind. — His Delay in Giving Orders. — His Order to Franklin. — Franklin Perplexed, but Obe- 
dient. — The Attack on the Left. — The Gallantry of Meade and his Pennsylvaniaus. — Gibbon and Double- 
day. — An Artillery Duoi.^Meade Penetrates the First Confederate Line. — His Difficulty. — A Terrific Strug- 
gle. — Fearful Slaughter — Meade Driven Back. — Arrival of Birney. — The Confederate Lin« Closed. — Miracles 
of Valor. — Bad Management. — The Attack on the Right. — General Sumner Advances. — French and Han- 
cock. — Slarye's Hill. — rhe Plank Road. — The Stone Wall. — Bravery of the National Troops. — Terrifio 
Slaughter. — The Jaws of L^iath. — French's and Hancock's Divisions Cut to Pieces. — The Confederate Po- 
Bition Impregnable. — Bumsia* Orders Hooker to Advance. — Hooker Remonstrates. — Bumside Obstinate. — 
"That Crest Must be Taken To-Night." — Useless Slaughter. — Hooker's Own Account. — The Darkness.^ 
The Battle of Fredericksburg Ended. — A Confederate Victory. — Bumside's Blunders. — He Alone Responsi- 
ble. — Retreats Across the River Preparations for Another Attack. — Disaffection and Distrust. — The Pro- 
posed Attack Countermanded. — Jtrumside Offers to Resign. — The Resignation Not Accepted. — Change of 
Plan.— Another Attack About to be 'Jiade.— A Fearful Storm.— The Elements.— The "Mud March."— The 
Enterprise Abandoned. — The Army tJaek in the Old Camps. — Public Indignation. — Burnside Dissatisfied 
with his Subordinates. — Relieved of Command. — Franklin Removed. — Sumner Relieved. — Hooker in Com- 
mand. 



i8(S2. 



The battle Df Aatietam was fought 
on the 1 7th of September. It 
^as zi<^ until the beautiful month 
of October was all but passed that any 
active, forward movement was made by 
the army of the Potomac. It is not 
necessary to dwell at aay length on 
the causes of this extraordinary and, 
as the result proved, unfortunate de- 
lay. It is prcbaljle that the exact 
truth concerning this matter will never 
be known. It is certain that much 
precious tirti? -vas wasted in useless cor- 



respondence between the National com 
mander and the authorities at Washing- 
ton. Bad blood most unquestionably 
existed ; and the ill-concealed jealousies 
and enmities of individuals contributed 
not a little to increase that burden of 
sorrow and suffering under which the 
people were already groaning. We 
are not disposed to entirely acquit Mc- 
Clellan. But we are as little disposed 
to acquit the National government. 
The foi'mer was, no doubt, too exacting 
in his demands for supplies and rein 



McCLELLAN'S LOVE FOR HIS ARMY. 



336 



foicements. Poorly equipped as his 
army was at this period, it was not for 
a moment to be put in comparison in 
this respect with the army of Lee, 
whose men were shoeless and half-naked. 
Nor was there any good reason for in- 
sisting that the reinforcements and sup- 
plies should be forwarded at once, and 
before the onward movement com- 
menced ; for surely they could be sent 
after him. On the other hand there 
was, on the part of the Washington 
officials, a too manifest disposition to 
dictate, to disregard the demands and 
to ignore the wishes of the commander 
in the field. There was, in fact, a 
mutual distrust, which had grown into 
dislike. There was blame on both 
sides. McClellan was self-willed ; and 
the authorities were officious. It might 
have been better for McClellan's fame 
to-day if, when at this stage, he found 
that he could not get on amicably with 
the War Department, he had resigned 
his position. It was known that he 
was deeply attached to the ai'my of the 
Potomac, and that he was proud to be 
its chief. It had grown up under his 
own eye ; it had reached maturity and 
attained perfection under his own watch- 
ful care. His Gallic legions were not 
more dear to Caesar; the grand army 
of the empire was not more dear to 
Napoleon, than was the army of the 
Potomac to McClellan. His resigna- 
tion would have fallen like a thunder- 
clap on the ai-my and on the people. 
It would have disarmed suspicion 
wherever suspicion existed ; and it 
would have proclaimed to all the world 
that his motives were pure and noble, 



and his actions disinterested. As it 
was, patriotism or ambition impelled him 
in a diflPerent course. 

On the 6th of October, instructions 
were received from Washington to ocl« 
the effect that McClellan should *• 
move at once. He was to cross the 
Potomac and give battle to the enemy, 
or di-ive him South. " Your army must 
now move, while the roads are good.' 
It was the 26th, when the first od- 
movement was made in obedience 26. 
to this order; and it was not until the 
2d of November that McClellan was 
able to announce that his whole army 
was once more in Virginia, prepared to 
move southward on the east side of the 
Blue Ridge, instead of pursuing Lee up 
the Shenandoah Valley, on the western 
side of those mountains. By the 4th 
the National army, reinforced by the 
divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles 
from Washington, were in possession 
of the entire region east of the Blue 
Ridge, with several of the passes 
through the mountains, from Hai-per's 
Ferry to Paris. On the 6th, Mc- pjov. 
Clellan's headquarters were at <•• 
Rectortown, near Front Royal. The 
Confederates, meanwhile, were steadily 
falling back. The spectacle, at this 
time presented, was that of two great 
armies moving in parallel lines, the 
mountain chain of the Blue Ridge be- 
tween them, the objective point in both 
cases being the same. It was a race 
for Richmond. Everything depended 
on despatch. The race was eagerly 
watched. Would not McClellan, with 
his superior force and ample supplies, 
outrun his opponent, and, by gaining 



336 



FREDERICKSBURG. 



his front, strike him there and also on 
the flank, through the gaps in the hills ? 
Such was the question put by many. 
As usual, Lee was too quick for his 
opponent. Anticipating some such 
movement, he had hurried Longstreet 
forward ; and on the very day that Mc- 
Clellan's army crossed the Potomac, 
that general, having pushed his way 
over the Blue Ridge, was at Culpepper 
Court House, and ready to resist the 
advance of the Nationals on the Con- 
federate capital. There was still an 
opportunity for McClellan. By a rapid 
and vigorous movement, he might cut 
Lee's army in two, and destroy it in 
detail. But there was distrust of Mc- 
Clellan at Washington ; and at this 
critical moment it was determined to 
displace him. On the 5th of Novem- 
ber, an order was issued from the Wai- 
Department, relieving him of the com- 
mand of the army of the Potomac, and 
appointing General Bui'nside in his 
place — McClellan being required to re- 
port himself at Trenton, New Jersey. 
This order vpas placed in the hands of 
General Buckingham. On the night 
of the 7th, during a heavy snow-storm, 
when General Burnside happened to 
be in McClellan's tent at Rectortown, 
Buckingham arrived, and placed the 
despatch in McClellan's hands. After 
reading it, and without betraying any 
emotion, he handed it to Burnside, 
simply remarking, "Burnside, you com- 
mand the army." The news was as 
unwelcome to Burnside as it was to Mc- 
Clellan. The position had been offered 
him twice before; but Burnside, hav- 
ing, as we have seen in a previous 



chapter, a high opinion of McClellan's 
ability, being a warm, personal friend, 
and being, besides, distrustful of him- 
self, had, in both instances, modestly 
declined the proffered honor. He had 
not changed his mind. It was not 
until the 10th, after having received 
peremptory orders from Washington, 
and being warmly encouraged by his 
friends, that he consented to assume 
the responsibilities of general-in-chief 
of the army of the Potomac. "I'll 
try," he said, evidently intimating that 
he had a secret distrust of his own 
fitness for so responsible a position. In 
view of the actual situation, and with- 
out having any regard to the disasters 
which so speedily followed, the removal 
of General McClellan, at this particulai" 
juncture, must be pronounced unfort^i- 
nate and ill-timed. He ought to have 
been removed at an earlier date, or not 
until he had had another opportunity 
of measuring his strength with his an- 
tagonist. 

McClellan made immediate prepara- 
tions for departure. He took leave of 
his troops in the following words : 

" Headquarters op the Army of the Potomac, I 
Camp near Rectortown, Va., Nov. 1, 1862. j 

" Officers and Soujiersof the Arht of the Potomac : 

"An order of the president devolves 
upon Major-General Burnside the com- 
mand of this army. In parting from 
you, I cannot express the love and grati 
tude I bear to you. As an army, you 
have grown up in my care. In you I 
have never found doubt or coldness. 
The battles you have fought under my 
command will probably live in our na- 
tion's history. The glory you hava 



BURNSIDE IN COMMAND. 



337 



»chieved over mutual perils and fa- 
tigues ; the graves of our comrades 
fallen in battle and by disease; the 
\)roken forms of those whom wounds 
md sickness have disabled — the strong- 
sst associations which can exist among 
men unite us by an indissoluble tie. 
We shall ever be comrades in support- 
ing the Constitution of our country and 
the nationality of its people. 
"Geo. B. McClellan, 

"Major-General U. S. A." 
On Monday, the 9 th, General McClel- 
j^ov. ^^^ visited the different camps, 
9i reviewed the troops, and took a 
final leave of officers and men. The 
leave-taking showed that, whatever his 
defects of character, or whatever were 
the blunders he committed, he had not 
lost the respect and confidence of his 
men. As the general, " mounted upon 
a fill" horse, attended by a retinue of 
fine-looking military men, riding rapid- 
ly through the ranks, gracefully recog- 
nized and bade a farewell to the army, 
the cries and demonstrations of the 
men were beyond bounds — wild, impas- 
sioned, and unrestrained. Disregai'ding 
all military forms, they rushed from 
their ranks and thronged around him, 
with the bitterest complaints against 
those who had removed from command 
their beloved leader." On the next 
day he withdrew, taking the cars to 
WaiTenton. On reaching the junction, 
a salute was fired. The troops assem- 
bled at that point actually broke their 
ranks, through their eagerness to see 
him and to obtain a few parting words. 
While on the platform, he said, "I 
wish you to stand by General Burnside, 



as you have stood by me, and all will 
be well. Good-bye." At Bristow Sta- 
tion and at Manassas Junction, the same 
scenes were repeated ; and the cheering 
was loud and enthusiastic. 

On assuming the duties of general- 
in-chief, Burnside issued the following 
order : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
iVoc. 10, 1862. j 

"In accordance with General Orders 
No. 182, issued by the president of the* 
United States, I hereby assume com- 
mand of the army of the Potomac. 
Patriotism, and the exercise of my every 
energy in the direction of this army, 
aided by the full and hearty co-opera- 
tion of its officers and men, will, I hope, 
under the blessing of God, insure its 
success. 

" Having been a sharer of the priva> 
tions, and a witness of the bravery oj 
the old army of the Potomac in th« 
Maryland campaign, and fully identi 
fied with them in their feelings of re 
spect and esteem for General McClel 
Ian, entertained through a long a^i 
most fi-iendly association with him, I 
feel that it is not as a stranger I assniiie 
command. 

"To the ninth army corps, solon.^ and 
intimately associated with me, I need 
say nothing. Our histories are identi- 
cal. With diffidence for myadf, but 
with a proud confidence in the 'unswerv- 
ing loyalty and deterniiriatJon of the 
gallant army now entrusted to my care, 
I accept its control, with tha steadfast as- 
surance that the just cause must prevail. 
"A. E. Burnside, 
"Major-General Commanding." 



/ 



d38 



FREDBKICKSBURG. 



Biirnside did not make any attempt 
to carry out McClellan's plan of attack, 
which was, oy a rapid march upon Gor- 
donsville, to interpose between Lee's 
divided forces and beat them in detail. 
The truth is, the opportunity for doing 
this was already lost. With consent of 
Halleck, who made a visit to the army, 
he adopted a new plan of operations. 
The capture of Richmond, I'ather than 
the destruction of Lee's army, was now 
to be his objective. Some precious 
time was wasted in reorganizing the 
army. It was now 120,000 strong. 
In place of the old airangement of 
corps with subordinate divisions. Burn- 
side divided his entire force into three 
grand divisions, each consisting of two 
coi-ps. The right was placed under the 
command of General Sumner, the left 
under General Franklin, and the centre 
under General Hooker, while a large 
body of reserve was commanded by 
General Sigel. Burnside had his head- 
•juarters at Warrenton. The National 
plan of attack, as stated by Burnside 
himself, was to concentrate the army 
in the neighborhood of Warrenton, to 
make a movement across the Rappahan- 
nock as a feint, with a view to divert 
the attention of the enemy, and leading 
him to believe that an attack was 
about to be made in the direction of 
Gordons\'ille, and then to move the 
whole army rapidly to Fredericksburg, 
on the southern side of the Rappahan- 
nock. 

Such being the general plan, the 
mouth of Acquia Creek, where it emp- 
ties into the Potomac, was established 
as the basis of supplies. Piers and 



roads were constructed ; and immense 
quantities of stoi'es were sent thither 
to meet the wants of so large a body 
of men. The bridges across the Rap- 
pahannock, in the neighborhood of 
Fredericksbui'g, had all been destroyed; 
and, in canying out the proposed plan, 
it would be necessary to throw pontoon 
bridges across at various points. In 
connection with this matter, there was 
some sad bungling — bungling which, if 
it did not lead to the defeat of the Na- 
tional army, at least gave the Confede- 
rates time to discover Burnside's plan, 
and to prepare to meet him on his own 
chosen ground. This whole affair is so 
mixed up that it is difficult, if not im- 
possible, to get at the exact truth. It 
does appear that when Commander-in- 
Chief Halleck and Quartermaster-Gen 
era! Meigs were at Warrenton, Burn- 
side expressed to them the necessity foi 
having the pontoon material sent on 
from Washington without delay. It 
was understood that Halleck and Meigs 
sent the necessary instructions to Wash- 
ington regarding the pontoons. It is 
certain that General Burnside felt satis- 
fied that this matter had been attended 
to, and that the instructions would be 
faithfully and promptly carried out. It 
is stated on reliable authority that Gen- 
eral Woodbury, who commanded the 
engineer brigade which had charge of 
the pontoon equipage, received no in- 
structions as to the time it was required 
to be at Acquia Creek, or the part 
it was to play in the campaign ; that he 
called upon General Halleck on the 
14th, telling him that, if the date of 
the arrival of the pontoons was to coin- 



FATAL DELAY. 



339 



cide with the arrival of the army at 
Fredericksburg, the departure of the 
latter from Warreaton should be de- 
layed for at least five days ; and that 
Halleck, while not yet giving any posi- 
tive instractions regarding the trans- 
port of the pontoon equipage, not only 
refused to grant the delay, but even 
neglected to communicate Woodbury's 
remarks to Burnside. It was a badly 
managed business, and led to lament- 
able results, as the reader will soon 
perceive ; and, while Burnside cannot 
be held wholly guiltless, the evidence 
lays the burden of blame on Halleck 
and Meigs. 

On the 14th of November, orders 
"Nov. were given for the march from 
J 4' Warrenton to Falmouth. Sum- 
ner, who was the fli*st to start, set out 
on the morning of the 15th, and arrived 
at Falmouth on the 17th. This village 
is situated on the left or northern bank 
of the Rappahannock. At this point, 
the river meets a line of steep hills, and 
describing an angle, changes its course 
from east to southeast. The hills on 
the right bank, known by the name of 
Marye's Heights, recede from the river 
a little above the angle, and then de- 
scend gradually towards a small plain, 
on which, and close to the river's edge, 
stands the town of Fredericksburg, a 
little below Falmouth. The hills on the 
Falmouth side command the south bank 
and much of the distance — a mile and a 
half — toward the frowning hills beyond. 
But these heights equally command the 
intermediate plain, and are beyond the 
reach of guns planted on the north side 
of the river. When Sumner arrived at 



Falmouth, he discovered that on the op- 
posite bank of the river there were only 
one battery and a few detachments of 
infantry and cavalry. He had but little 
difficulty in silencing the battery. Fred 
ericksburg, in fact, was at his mercy 
and he might with ease have taken pes 
session of Marye's Heights — the kej 
of the position. The pontoons had noj 
yet arrived ; but the water in the Rap- 
pahannock was low, and the fords^ al- 
though not free from difficulty and dan- 
ger, were not impassable. Sunmer was 
willing and even anxious to make the 
attempt ; but he was positively forbid- 
den to cross the river until the arrival 
of the other troops. "I think," said 
Sumner in his testimony, " that I could 
have taken that city, and heights on 
the other side of it, at any time within 
three days after my arrival here [Fal- 
mouth], if the pontoons had been here; 
foi I do not think there was much force 
of the enemy here up to that time." 
Sumner was thus compelled to remain 
inactive. Burnside, with Franklin's 
grand division, reached Falmouth jfov. 
on the 19th. Hooker, on the **• 
same day, arrived at the village of Har- 
wood ; and, yielding to the same im- 
pulses which controlled Sumner, he 
expressed a desire to his chief to cioss 
the river above Fredericksburg, and 
occupy Marye's Heights. But the same 
reasons which hindered Sumner's action, 
hindered that of Hooker. There were 
no pontoons; and by this time heavy 
rains had swollen the river, making the 
fords impassable. 

While the National army was thus 
compelled to remain comparatively in- 



uo 



FREDERICKSBURG. 



active on the northern side, what was 
taking place at Fredeiicksburg and the 
iieights beyond ? The movement of 
Sumner on the 15th had been quickly- 
reported to Lee. He had also been in- 
formed of the arrival of several trans- 
ports at Acquia Creek. He was not 
slow to divine the meaning of the move- 
ments of his antagonist. The feeble 
demonstrations made at Culpepper 
could not deceive him. Fi'edericks- 
burg, he saw at a glance, was the objec- 
tive point. Towards Fredericksburg, 
therefore, he directed his attention. 
Longstreet's corps had been at Culpep- 
per since the 3d. Lee ordered them to 
strike their camp, and started with 
them for Fredericksburg. On his ar- 
rival, he found McLaws in quiet posses- 
sion of the heights commanding the 
town ; and while the Nationals were 
5till baiTed by the impassable river, he 
proceeded with all haste to take full 
advantage of his splendid position. On 
Not; ^^^ 22d, Buraside and his divi- 
22. sion commanders had the mortifi- 
cation to see the opposite heights — the 
object of their ambition, the vantage 
ground on which they had set their 
hearts — crowned with the enemy's bat- 
teries, and bristling with the enemy's 
steel. It was a humiliating sight. Jack- 
son was summoned from Orange Court 
House on the 26th. It was not until 
the 28th or 29th that he rejoined Lee. 
Up until that date Bumside's opportu- 
nity lasted. If he could have crossed 
the river, he might have whipped Lee, 
and taken possession of Marye's Heights 
before the arinval of Jackson. But the 
opportunity could not be taken advan- 



tage of. The pontoon equipages were 
not forward until the 25th ; and it was 
the 10th of December before all things 
were ready for throwing the bridges 
across the nver. The hills behind 
Fredericksburg had by this time been 
rendered impregnable. It was a fatal 
delay — the most fatal since the com- 
mencement of the war. 

Burnside had not, however, been 
wholly idle. The Confederates, as has 
been stated, had destroyed the railroad 
between Fredericksburg and Acquia 
Creek. The bridges were all broken 
down or burned; and the- track in 
many places was torn up. The Na- 
tional engineers had succeeded in re- 
storing the bridges — one of these, built 
under the superintendence of Colonel 
Haupt over the Potomac Creek, being 
four hundred feet in length and one 
hundred feet above the water, com- 
manding especial attention ; and the 
line was put in good working order. 
Arrangements had been made to cross 
the river at Skinker's Neck, twelve 
miles below Falmouth, with the view 
of turning the Confederate right; but 
the ever-vigilant Lee discovered the 
movement in time to show himself 
fully prepared. Burnside was check- 
mated, and the enterprise was aban- 
doned. As early as the 21st of Novem- 
ber, Sumner had made a call on the 
mayor of Fredericksburg to surrender ^ 
that town ; but the reply was promptly 
made that, while it would not be used 
for offensive purposes against the Na- 
tional army, any attempt to occupy it 
would be stubbornly resisted. The re- 
sult of this correspondence was that the 



THE PONTOONS. 



341 



^habitants, dreading a bombardment, 
for the most part left the city, Barks- 
dale's sharpshooters distiibuting them- 
selves behind the deserted buildings 
^ear the river. Meanwhile, Lee's army, 
some 80,000 strong, had been vpell 
brought forward; and at the end of 
November, it l^y in a semicircle around 
Fredericksburg, each wing resting on 
the river- -its right at Port Royal, be- 
low the city, and its left a short dis- 
tanc<? above it. His engineers had 
co"3structed in the rear of the city two 
'ines of fortifications, one mile apart; 
And the range of hills to his left were 
also well fortified. 

In the meantime the pontoons had 
Dec. arrived ; and Bui'nside, on the 
'®' evening of the 10th, made the 
necessary arrangements to have the 
bridges thrown across early on the fol- 
lowing morning. About four o'clock on 
the cold, raw morning of the 11th of De- 
cember, and amid a dense fog, the work 
was commenced. Five bridges were to 
be constructed — three immediately in 
front of Fredericksburg, and the other 
two a couple of miles below. The two 
lower bridges were to be used by 
Franklin ; those in front of the town 
by Sunmer and Hooker. The topogra- 
phy of the river shores, as we have 
already indicated, offered facilities for 
carrying out the enterprise. Stafford 
Heights, on the Falmouth side, and on 
which the Nationals were encamped, 
were close to the margin of the river, 
which at this point is about three 
hundred yards wide. These heights 
were crowned with twenty-nine power- 
fill batteries, numbering 147 guns. 
236 



Lee's batteries, on the othei hand, 
were from three fourths of a mile to a 
mile and a half from the banks. But 
for the sharpshooters, who had found 
secure lodgment behind the stone waUa 
of the river street of the town, there 
would have been but little difficulty ex- 
perienced in throwing across the pon- 
toons. The National anny was posted 
along the north bank of the Rappahan- 
nock — Hooker and Sumner in front of 
Fredericksburg, Sumner more to the 
right ; Franklin about two miles below. 
Burnside had his headquarters at the 
house of a Mi- Phillips, on the high 
ground, about a mile from the river; 
and from that commanding position, he 
had a full view of the whole field of 
operations. On the; morning of Dec, 
the 11th, as we have seen, before !*• 
day-break, the work was commenced. 
For a time it went quietly on, the 
workmen being covered by the Fifty- 
Seventh and Sixty-Sixth New York, 
of Zook's biigade, of Hancock's divi- 
sion. The bridges below Fredericks- 
burg were constructed without much 
hindi-ance; but those in front of the 
town were now exposed to the Con- 
federate sharpshooters. One of these 
latter bridges was well-nigh completedj 
when the Confederates discovered what 
was going on. Two signal guns were 
fii-ed ; and from behind the walls along 
the banks of the river, and from the 
windows of the houses, a galling fire 
of musketry was opened upon the pon- 
toniers, who were compelled to desist 
and fall back to the shelter of the hills. 
The woi'k was resumed about six 
o'clock. The Confederate fire became 



S43 



FREDERICKSBURG. 



more seveie, the bullets falling like 
hail among the brave poutoniers. It 
was impossible to continue the work. 
Again it was necessary to fall back 
to the shelter of the hills which ran 
parallel with the river. Burnside now 
became impatient. The sharpshooters 
must be silenced and driven from their 
hiding-places. Orders were given that 
the batteries on Stafford Heights should 
open fire on the town, and batter it 
down, if necessary. The response was 
prompt and tenific. More than a hun- 
dred guns opened their angry mouths 
at once. Fifty rounds were fired be- 
fore the cannonade ceased. The shot 
told on the buildings, battering many 
of them down, and setting some of 
them on fire. Another .attempt was 
now made, under cover of this fire, 
to finish the bridges ; but the sharp- 
shooters, strange to say, were still 
on the river's bank, and concealed be- 
hind the stone walls. A third time 
were the pontoniers compelled to fall 
back. The sharpshooters must be dis- 
lodged. Volunteers were called for; 
when the Seventh Michigan, and Nine- 
teenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, 
of Howard's division, offered theii" ser- 
vices. They were quickly conveyed 
across the stream; and in a brief space 
of time the Mississippian sharpshooters 
were driven from their shelter, and 
nearly 100 of them made prisoners. 
The bridges were soon completed. 

As soon as the bridges were in a fit 
state to be used, Sumner's gi-and divi- 
sion, and a portion of Hooker's, were 
over before dark at the upper bridges ; 
Franklin's grand division crossed at the 



lower. The movement was re- Dee, 
sumed on the morning of the '2. 
12th ; and on the evening of that day, 
the greater portion of the National 
army was on the south side of the Rap- 
pahannock, and in full possession of 
Fredericksbui'g. During the afternoon, 
fii'e was opened on the town by the Con- 
federate batteries on the heights near- 
est the town. The Nationals made a 
bnsk response, and the firing was dis- 
continued. It was Lee's purpose to 
tempt the Nationals to attack him on 
the heights, where he knew he was all 
but impregnable. Had he given them 
more annoyance in the city, as he could 
easily have done, this purpose might 
have failed. A full revelation of his 
strength might have led to the recross- 
ins: of the river. Lee succeeded in his 
plan. Burnside made immediate ar- 
rangements for an assault on the Con- 
federate position. 

We have already endeavored to give 
the reader a general idea of the ground 
on which the struggle was about to 
take place. We have seen that the 
town of Fredericksburg lay on a stretch 
of level ground on the south bank of 
the Rapjjahannock, and that, at the dis- 
tance of half a mile or a little more in 
rear of the town, the ground begins to 
rise in sharp slopes, until it forms a 
sort of table land, with two ridges, the 
more remote ridge being the higher of 
the two. These heights were generally 
known by the name of Marye's Heights, 
although special names were given to. 
particular prominences. The heights, 
which are from three quarters of a mile 
to a mile and a half in the rear ( f 



READY T'OR THE ATTAOK. 



345 



Fi-edericksburg, and which completely 
command the town, had been rendered 
impregnable. A little to the south of 
Marye's Heights there is another, but 
more in'egular, range of hills, running 
for some distance due south, then 
trending to the southeast, in the direc- 
tion of the Massaponax, when they fol- 
low the line of that stream to the Rap- 
pahanock. On these hills there were 
some strong natural positions, particu- 
lai-ly what was afterwards called Lee's 
Hill, at tlie northern extremity; Pros- 
pect Hill, at the extreme south ; and 
Bernard's Cabin, not far from the centre. 
The ground in the rear of this in'egu- 
lar range was well wooded, thus afford- 
ing good shelter for the troops which 



might be in possession. 



Along 



the 



front of this ridge ran the Fredericks- 
burg and Potomac Railroad. In conse- 
quence of the recession of the hills 
towards the middle of the ransre, the 
plain, which extends from Fredericks- 
bm-g to the Massaponax, and from the 
base of the hills to the Rappahannock, 
acquires considerable dimensions. In 
addition to the railroad just mentioned, 
there runs through the entire length 
of this plain the old Richmond Road. 
Every available spot on this range of 
hills, as on Marye's Heights, although 
the batteries were not so crowded, was 
covered with cannon. Distributed along 
this line, and guarding every approach, 
was Lee's army of 80,000 men, with 
,300 pieces of artilleiy. Jackson was 
on the right; Longstreet on the left; 
Stuart, Avith cavalry and artillery, on 
the plain on the extreme right. In his 
rear Lee had cut a new road, by means 



of which he was able, without making 
a long detour throiigh a bad country, 
to connect both wings of his army. 
The National army was lying on the 
southwest side of the Rappahannock, 
in the same position in which the divi- 
sions had crossed — Sumner and Hooker 
at the town of Fredericksburg, and 
Franklin about two miles below. Such 
were the relative positions of the two 
armies on the night of the 12th and the 
morning of the 13th. Burnside's army, 
which was over 120,000 strong, out- 
numbered that of Lee ; but Lee had 
the advantage of position. His army, 
which was stretched out in a sort of 
semicircle, not only commanded the 
open space in front — it flanked it. 

Everything was now ready for the 
attack. The Confederates, however, 
were not less prepared than the Na- 
tionals. Jackson had arrived on the 
field ; and Longstreet had been enabled 
to close his lines on tne left. On the 
afternoon of the 12th, A. P. Hill had 
relieved Hood, and taken position along 
the margin of the woods, on the Con- 
federate right, from Hamilton's Crossing 
to Bernard's Cabin. Hood lay on the 
heights, between Deep Run and Hazel 
Run. Pickett was stationed at the foot 
of the hills, near the centre, between 
Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road. 
McLaws was on the heights, to the left 
of Pickett; and Anderson's division, 
which was fiu^her to the left, rested 
on the I'iver. The important point was 
Marye's Hill, the southernmost promi-* 
nence of Marye's Heights, which com- 
manded the Plank Road. This posi- 
tion, which was strongly fortified and 



Hi 



FREDERICKSBURG. 



well mounted with guns, was placed 
under the immediate care of General 
Ransom. At the foot of the hill, on a 
road which was protected on the town 
side by a gray stone wall, were sta- 
tioned Cobb's brigade and the Twenty- 
Fourth North Carolina, The redoubts 
on the crest of Marye's Hill were held 
by the Washington (New Orleans) ar- 
tillery, under Colonel Walton. On the 
evening of the 12th, Burnside convened 
his officers, and submitted to thera his 
plan of attack for the next morning. 
His purpose was to push forward his 
entire force which had crossed the 
river, and, by sudden and simultaneous 
attacks made along the whole line, to 
penetrate the Confederate ranks, and 
seize the fortified heights. The work 
was to be done by Franklin on the left 
and Sumner on the right. Hooker's 
grand division was to be held in re- 
serve, so as to be ready for any emerg- 
ency. After consultation, it was agreed 
that the main attack should be made 
'ipon the enemy's right ; and to enable 
Franklin to do his part of the work 
.vith effect, his command was strength- 
ened by the addition of two of Hooker's 
best divisions, making his whole force 
about 55,000 men. It was understood 
that Franklin would make the attack 
at daM^n ; but he was to receive positive 
instructions from the commanding-gen- 
eraV before midnight, Sumner's attack, 
which was to be made more to the 
right of the Confederate position, in the 
neighborhood of Marye'^? Hill, was to 
be conditioned somewhat on the success 
which might attend Franklin's, but it 
was to be made almost immediately 



after. Such was the general understand- 
ing on the night of the 12th. Franklin 
waited anxiously for his orders. Mid- 
night came and went ; but there was 
no message from Burnside. 

It was not until near six o'clock next 
morning that Burnside issued his Oee. 
orders to his three gi-and divi- l^' 
sion commanders; and it was nearly 
eight o'clock before Franklin knew 
what was expected of him. As Frank- 
lin was greatly, but very unjustly, 
blamed for his conduct at Fredericks- 
burg, it is well that the reader should 
be put in a position to judge for him- 
self. Bumside's order to Franklin read 
as follows : " General Hardie will carry 
this despatch to you, and remain with 
you during the day. The general com- 
manding directs that you keep your tvhok 
command in position for a rapid move 
ment down the old Richmond Road, and 
you will send out at once a division, at 
least, to pass below Sraithfleld, to seize, 
if possible, the heights near Captain 
Hamilton's, on this side of the Massa- 
ponax, taking care to keep it well sup- 
ported, and its line of retreat open. 
He has ordered another column of a 
division, or more, to be moved fi'om 
General Sumner's command up the 
Plank Road to its intersection of the 
Telegraph Road, where they will di- 
vide with a view to seizing the heights 
on both these roads. Holding these 
heights, with the heights near Captain 
Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the 
enemy to evacuate the whole ridge be 
tween these points. He makes these 
moves by columns distant from each 
other, with a view of avoiding the poa- 



THE ATTACK ON THE LEFT. 



345 



Bibility of a collision of our own forces, 
which might occur in a general move- 
ment during the fog. Two of General 
Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at 
the bridges, and will remain as sup- 
ports. Copies of instructions to Gen- 
erals Sumner and Hooker will be sent 
to you by an orderly very soon. You 
will keep your whole command in readi- 
ness to move at once, as soon as the fog 
lifts. The watchword which, if pos- 
sible, should be given to every com- 
pany, will be 'Scott.'" The order was 
signed by J. G. Parke, Chief of Staff. 

Such were the instructions brought 
to Franklin on the morning of the 13th. 
They were not the instructions expect- 
ed, and for which preparations had 
already been made. The new plan 
differed entirely from that agreed upon 
the night before. Puzzled and per- 
plexed as Franklin was by this change 
of mind on the part of his chief, he had 
no choice but obey. It deserves to be 
borne in mind that Hardie, who brought 
the instructions, remained with Frank- 
lin, and was in constant communication 
with Burnside during the day The 
general-commanding was, therefore, kept 
well informed of all that was going on, 
on his left. For the orders given to 
Sumner to attack at a time when Frank- 
lin was not yet seriously engaged, for 
all the subsequent orders of that day, 
and for the general plan of the battle, 
Burnside was wholly responsible. It 
is evident from this order that Burnside 
had concluded, at the last moment, not 
to make a vigorous assault with his 
entire strength both on the left and 
right of the enemy's position, but, in | 



the first instance at least, to make, 
simultaneously, two partial and tenta- 
tive efforts — one on the right and one 
on the left. Franklin made immediate 
preparations to carry out the order. 
Believing that he was to hold his com- 
mand in readiness for a I'apid move- 
ment on the old Richmond Road, and 
that he was to send out only an armed 
reconnoissance, vnth a single di\nsion, 
he ordered Reynolds to take Meade's 
division, and attack the point indicat- 
ed. Meade's division was accordingly 
thrown forward. The other two divi- 
sions of the same corps — those of Gib- 
bon and of Doubleday — were ordered to 
support Meade, the one on his right, the 
other on his left, but somewhat in the 
rear. Meade had under him about 
5000 men; Doubleday had about th«. 
same number ; and Gibbon had nearly 
6000. Reynolds' disposable force was 
therefore, about 16,000 men. A heavj 
fog lay over the valley. So dense was 
it that neither army could be seen hy 
the other. The Confederates, however, 
could distinctly hear the words of com 
mand given by the National officers 
As the ground was exceedingly broke*, 
and irregular, the advance wafe conduct 
ed under great difficulty, .ft was nov( 
nearly ten o'clock. The fog began tc 
clear off; and the columns of Meade 
which were well advanced beyond tht 
road, came full into view of the Con 
federates. At this moment, Meade was 
assailed by a ten-ible stonn of bullets 
at near range. He had come close 
upon Stuart's hoi-se artilleiy, which 
were posted along the road, on ths 
open ground, to the Coufederut* right 



846 



FBEDEK1CK.SBUKG. 



Meade was now compelled to halt. For 
half an hour the battle raged fiercely. 
At the end of that time Doubleday 
came up to his relief. Doubleday de- 
ployed his men in front of Stuart ; and 
Meade continued his advance. At this 
moment Doubleday was facing towards 
the left, while Meade was pressing to- 
wards the railroad which, at this point, 
skirts the edge of the wooded heights. 
Meade's progress was uninterrupted. 
All was quiet on the heights and in 
the woods beyond. Not a sign of the 
foe was visible. The National ai'tillery 
poured shell into the woods occupied 
by the division of A. P. Hill ; but 
there was no response. Jackson was 
evidently reserving his fire until his 
antagonist came fully under his guns. 
Eveiything now depended upon dash 
and daring. Meade urged forward his 
men. On rushed the brave Pennsyl- 
vanians — troops which had covered 
themselves with glory at Beaver Dam 
and on the blood-stained field of Glen- 
dale. They rapidly approached the 
position occupied by Walker's artillery 
at Prospect Hill. Suddenly these guns 
open fire ; the twelve guns at the Con- 
federate left centre open fire at the 
same moment; and Meade finds himself 
alone, in the open space, exposed to the 
fire of two concentric batteries, the pro- 
jectiles actually crossing each other in 
his ranks. The situation is perilous. 
There is a halt ; and an attempt is made 
to silence the enemy's guns. Gibbon 
deploys to the right of Meade. Birney, 
with his division, of Stoneman's corps, 
is hurried forward to the relief of both. 
After a fearful artillery duel, the Con- 



federate fire from the batteries on 
Prospect Hill, and those more to their 
left centre in front of the raib'oad, is 
considerably slackened. A decided ad- 
vantage has been gained by the Na- 
tionals. 

Reynolds now gives Meade the signal 
for attack. Though the ground is co^er- 
ed with dead and wounded, there is no 
time to halt and consider. On rush the 
Pennsylvanians — on in the face of the 
most destructive fire of shell and canis- 
ter. The Confederate general, Brock- 
enborough, is compelled to fall back. 
A powerful battery is silenced, and 
hurried to the rear. Rushing bravely 
on, Meade soon finds himself across the 
railroad, over the crest of the hill, with 
his advance, under Sinclair, as far as 
the new military road, which Lee had 
constructed for the purpose of uniting 
the ^vings of his array. The first line 
of the Confederates had been pierced. 
On the military road, the victorious 
Nationals come into contact with Gregg 
and his South Carolina veterans. Un- 
prepared for so vigorous an attack, and 
mistaking Meade's men for Confederate 
soldiers, Gregg forbids his own men 
to fire. In a moment he is undeceived. 
There is a terrific discharge of mus- 
ketry. Orr's rifles, the most exposed 
regiment of the Confederate line, is al- 
most annihilated ; and Gregg himself 
has fallen, mortally wounded. 

It is a critical moment. If Meade is 
well sustained, he may succeed in pene- 
trating the second line of the enemy — 
thus cutting the Confederate army in 
two. In such a case, Burnside's first 
object will have been accomplished; 



MEADE REPULSED. 



84'} 



and victory, it is not improbable, may 
crown his efforts. Bat Meade has 
been brave almost overmuch ; he is far 
in advance of his supports; and his 
brave Pennsylvanlans are utterly ex- 
hausted. No help is within reach. 
Doubleday is on the Richmond Road ; 
Gibbon has allowed himself to be 
stopped at the left of HilFs line, near 
the railroad ; and Birney still lingers in 
the rear. Franklin's headquarters are 
far distant ivom the scene of action : 
and being desirous to cany out the in- 
structions he has received, he is fearful 
to engage the greater portion of his 
forces. Left thus to himself, Meade is 
imable to make good the advantage he 
has gained. The Confederates, having 
re-formed, fall upon his wearied troops 
in front with great weight, and with 
tremendous fury. It was already a 
most unequal combat. While thus at- 
tacked in front, and while his men were 
reeling and staggering under the vigor- 
ous onslaughts of the rapidly multiply- 
ing Confederates, Early came dashing 
up, with Ewell's division, and struck 
Meade's flank as if with a thunderbolt. 
Resistance was no longer possible. The 
Nationals were driven back over the 
railroad in confusion, and with great 
loss, the Confederates pursuing, with 
loud yells, and flinging themselves on 
the guns which covered the retreat. 
Birney came forward in time to save 
Meade from destruction. The Confede- 
rates were forced back into the woods, 
with the loss of 500 men in killed and 
wounded. Birney, however, could not 
reopen the breach in the Confederate 
line. Meade could render no assist- 



ance ; Gibbon's men had suffered terri- 
bly, and he himself had been wounded; 
while Smith, Avho had been advanced 
more to the right, was too far removed 
to render any efiicient aid. At two 
o'clock Reynolds held the railroad ; but 
he was not strong enough to make any 
attempt upon the woods. All that 
Meade had won was lost — hopelessly 
lost ; and yet Franklin had under him 
some 30,000 men who had never been 
engaged. Never, during the world's 
history, was there displayed more gal- 
lantry; but never was gallantry dis 
played to so little piirpose. Meade 
performed miracles of valor; and the 
future hero of Gettysburg was already 
revealed. Franklin, overfaithful, and 
too rigidly obedient to rule, lost his op- 
portunity — an opportunity which rare- 
ly falls to the lot of a division com- 
mander, and which was never to be 
his again. In strictly adliering to his 
orders, he did that which was right; 
but a little more willingness to incur 
risk, and to share responsibility, might 
have made him the hero of Fredericks- 
burg, and the future captain of the 
Northern hosts. 

Let us now see what was taking place 
on the right. While the thick fog was 
still resting heavily on the valley, Sum- 
ner's forces were already moving to- 
wards the artillery-crowned heights in 
the rear of the city. Marye's Heights 
we have already described. There were 
three prominences, all of which were 
well mounted with cannon — Marye's 
Hill to the south, and commanding the 
Plank Road; Cemetery Hill towards 
the centre; and Stansbury Hill further 



848 



FREDERICKSBURG. 



to the north. Burnside's plan, it will 
be remembered, was to throw upon the 
Plank Road and Telegraph Road a col- 
umn of equal strength with that which 
was to make the attack on the left, his 
expectation being that he would thus 
make himself master of the entire I'ange 
of hills, those on his right as well as 
those on his left. Of Sumner's grand 
division, Couch's corps (the Second) 
occupied the town of Fredericksburg; 
and Wilcox's (the Ninth) occupied the 
interval between Couch and Franklin. 
Couch was to have the honor of making 
the first attack. It was now nearing 
the noontide. The mist had just cleared 
off the valley. Burnside, who was still 
at the Phillips House, on the northern 
side of the river, and who had reserved 
to himself the direction of the battle 
on his right, gave the signal for attack; 
and Fi*ench's division, of Couch's corps, 
composed of the brigades of Kimball, 
Anderson and Palmer, was seen to 
emerge fi-om Fredericksburg into the 
open plain. The Confederate batteries 
on Marye's Hill had already opened 
fire upon the town. As French's col- 
umns advanced, the Confederate guns 
on the heights were lowered ; and the 
shot and shell fell thick and fast into 
his serried ranks. French's division 
was followed at some little distance by 
that ol Hancock; and Howard's divi- 
sion was held in reserve. An attempt 
was made by the National artillery on 
Stafford Heights to silence the batteries 
on Marye's Hill ; but the distance was 
so great that the shot fell short, and 
threatened to do more damage to friend 
than foe. The firing on the part of the 



National artillery on the northern side 
of the river was, therefore, discontin- 
ued. So terrific was the fire from 
Marye's Hill that Couch's field-piecej 
could not be advanced. On, however^ 
rushed the brave Nationals — French iu 
front, Hancock following close behind. 
It was a rush into the jaws of death. 
Longstreet has told us that the gaps 
made by the artillery could be seen 
half a mile away. French's soldiers 
had approached within fifty paces of 
the stone wall at the base of Marye's 
Hill. As they rushed forwai'd, they 
were received with a murderous volley. 
The first line was reduced to a handful 
of men. The two brigades which fol- 
lowed were brought to a standstill; 
and, after a single discharge, they re- 
tii'ed, leaving nearly one half of their 
comrades on the ground. Hancock was 
now in the front; and, being joined by 
such portions of French's command as 
had not been broken and disorganized, 
he rushed towards the stone wall. It 
was a terrific struggle Bullet, ball 
and shell, like a tempest of iron, mowed 
down his ranks, while the triumphant 
Confederates, safe behind their strong 
bulwark, shouted and yelled in fierce 
delight. Again and again did Meagher 
dash his gallant Irishmen against the 
stone wall. As often, torn and bleed- 
ing and reduced in numbers, were 
they driven back. Fifteen minutes had 
elapsed since Hancock advanced to the 
front. His division, like that of Fi'encL 
had been cut to pieces. Of 5600 vet- 
erans whom he led into action, he had 
lost over 2000, of whom 156 were offi- 
cers. The slaughter was terrible. 



HOOKER'S ATTACK. 



34» 



Hancock in turn was compelled to 
fall back ; but the battle was not dis- 
continued. Howard hurried forward 
to lend what aid he could on Hancock's 
right. Sturgis and Getty crossed Hazel 
Run, with two brigades, and endeav- 
ored to divert the attention of the ene- 
my by an attack on the right of his 
position. It was all in vain. These 
attempts only increased the number of 
victims. They did not in any material 
way affect the enemy. It was now 
about half-past one. On the left, 
Meade had just been driven out of the 
Hamilton Wood, and back over the 
railroad. Burnside's plan had failed. 
The two independent attacks had been 
made ; they had been sustained with 
great vigor, and with indomitable pluck; 
but they had only revealed the strength 
of the enemy's position. It was time 
to desist. To prolong the struggle was 
useless. It was worse than useless — it 
was mtirder. 

Such, however, was not the opinion 
of Burnside. Orders were sent to 
Franklin to renew the assault, and this 
time with all his forces, the avowed 
object being so to engage the enemy's 
attention as to facilitate a new attack 
on the right. Hooker, at the same 
time, was ordered forward to repeat 
the attack where French and Hancock 
had vainly sacrificed their splendid di- 
visions. The experience of that morn- 
ing had irritated, not enlightened, the 
general in command. Burnside, in fact, 
was ignorant of the situation. He was 
still at the Phillips House. He saw the 
battle only from afar ; and he had but 
a dim notion of the strength of the 



enemy's position, and of the temble 
sacrifices which he himself had uselessly 
made. His eye was fixed on Marye'a 
Hill — alternately girt with flame, and 
wreathed with smoke. He knew the 
importance of the position ; but he 
forgot, for the time, the deadly havoc 
which that incessant and well-directed 
fire was producing among his troops. 
Striding up and down the terrace, proof 
against all advice, and as if lost to all 
reason, he kept repeating, mechanically, 
"That crest must be carried to-night." 
No one has ever had the hardihood 
to accuse Hooker of cowardice. Dur- 
ing the peninsular campaign at Will- 
iamsburg, and in all the subsequent bat- 
tles before Richmond, in almost every 
one of which he performed a brilliant 
part, he had acquired the name of 
" Fighting Joe." Hooker did not hesi- 
tate to obey the orders he had received 
from his chief. Taking with him the 
divisions of Sykes and Humphreys, of 
Butterfield's corps, he advanced to the 
attack. As soon, however, as he saw 
the positions he was ordered to take, 
and heard from their own lips the ex- 
perience of French and Hancock, he 
became convinced that the attempt 
was vain, and sent an aide-de-camp to 
the general-in-chief for a counter-or- 
der. Burnside, however, was inflexible. 
"That crest must be carried to-night." 
Hooker, unwilling to fling away the 
lives of his brave men, hurried across 
the river, and saw his chief in person. 
It was all in vain. Burnside would listen 
to no advice. The only answer which 
Hooker could get from him was, "That 
height must be carried this evening." 



850 



FREDERICKSBURG. 



An hour and a half had thus been 
lost. On the National left, the fighting 
had not been resumed with any degree 
of vigor. Franklin's forces were scat- 
tered over an extended line. It would 
be dangerous to leave any one point 
undefended. Even if it were safe to 
concentrate, it would be night before it 
could be accomplished ; and to make 
any fresh attack with a portion of his 
forces would only be useless slaughter. 
About three o'clock, the Confederates 
made a vigorous attack on the left of 
Howe's division, which was posted 
along the railroad. The attack was 
speedily repulsed, one of the Con- 
federate regiments — the Fifty-Seventh 
North Carolina— being almost annihi- 
lated. With this exception, the fight- 
ing was virtually ended on the National 
left, when Birney came to the relief 
of Meade, and reclaimed the railroad. 
Musketry firing was kept up along the 
whole line ; but there was no engage- 
ment. 

It was now four o'clock. The brief 
December daylight would soon be suc- 
ceeded by the dense December dark- 
ness. Hooker had returned to the field. 
Burnside's orders were positive. The 
attack must be made at once. How the 
attack was made, and with what suc- 
cess. Hooker has told us himself. " I 
proceeded," he says, " against the bar- 
rier as I would against a fortification, 
and endeavored to breach a hole sufii- 
ciently large for a ' forlorn hope ' to 
enter. Before that, the attack along 
the line, it seemed to me, had been too 
general — not sufficiently concentrated. 
I had two batteries posted on the left of 



the road, within four hundred yards of 
the position upon which the attack was 
to be made, and I had other parts of 
batteries posted on the right of the 
road, at the distance of five hundred or 
six hundred yards. 1 had all these 
batteries playing with great vigor until 
sunset upon that point, but with no 
apparent effect upon the rebels or upon 
their works. During the last part of 
the cannonading, I had given dii'ections 
to General Humphrey's division to form 
under the shelter, which a small hill 
afforded, in column for assault. When 
the fire of the artillery ceased, I gave 
directions for the enemy's works to be 
assaulted. General Humphrey's men 
took off their knapsacks, overcoats and 
haversacks. They were ordered to 
make the assault with empty muskets, 
for there was no time then to load and 
fire. When the word was given, the 
men moved forward with great impetu- 
osity. They I'an and hurrahed, and I 
was encoui'aged by the great good feel- 
ing that pervaded them. The head of 
General Humphrey's column advanced 
to perhaps within fifteen or twenty yards 
of the stone wall, which was the ad- 
vanced position held by the rebels, and 
then they were thrown back as quickly 
as tliey had advanced. Probably the 
whole of the advance, and the retiring, 
did not occupy fifteen minutes. They 
left behind, as was reported to me, 
1760 of their number, out of 4000." It 
was now twilight. Hooker, to use his 
own words, having lost "about as many 
men as he was ordered to sacrifice," 
gave the signal for retreat. Darkness 
came and prevented a further useless 



DEFEAT. 



351 



Bacrifice of life. A few hours more of 
daylight, and Jackson might have fallen 
upon Franklin with tremendous energy. 
It is hardly possible that he could have 
won ; but the attack must have resulted 
m a heavy loss of life. The battle of 
Fredericksburg was ended. To the 
National cause, it was one of the most 
disastrous battles of the war. To the 
Confederate cause, it was a great tri- 
umph ; but the triumph was more in 
<?eemiug than in reality, for Lee, either 
from inability or from fear, failed to 
turn it to account. 

According to the reports of the divi- 
sion commanders, the National loss was 
over 13,000. Franklin had lost 4(379. 
Sumner had lost 5494, and Hooker's 
loss was 3548. The killed numbered 
1152; the wounded 9101; and there 
were 3234 missing. The Confederate 
loss did not exceed one half of these 
enormous figures. 

The battle of Fredericksburg must 
ever be regarded as one huge blunder, so 
far as Burnside is concerned. For the 
battle gi'ound chosen he, and he alone, 
was responsible. The plan he followed 
was not McClellan's plan ; it was not 
the plan approved and recommended 
by the authorities at Washington ; it 
was his own. He might have done 
better by pursuing Lee towards the 
Rapidan, than by occupying the heights 
of Falmouth. He gave the enemy his 
opportunity ; and circumstances enabled 
the enemy to seize it. The pontoon 
mismanagement was the second grand 
blunder. It was the opinion of Burn- 
side himself, and all his subordinates, 
that if the pontoons had arrived in time 



to allow him to transfer his army to 
the south side of the Rappahannock, 
before Lee had time to concentrate his 
forces and fortify the heights, the battle 
of Fredericksburg might never have 
been fought, or, if fought, the result 
would have been entirely different. 
For the pontoon mismanagement Burn- 
side was not M'holly responsible ; but it 
was his lousiness more than that of any 
other. On the prompt arrival of the 
pontoons everything depended ; yet he 
treated this as a secondary matter, and 
left it entirely for some days in the 
hands of Halleck and Meigs, who 
regarded themselves as iri'espousible. 
The non-arrival of the pontoons in time 
gave the Confederates the full advan- 
tage of a splendid position, and brought 
about the necessity that if a battle were 
to be fought at all on the chosen 
ground, it must be fought by tlie Na- 
tionals at a terrible disadvantaue. It 
would have been better far, however 
humiliating for the moment it might 
have seemed, if Burnside, after he knew 
that the heights on the opposite side 
of the river were all but, if not abso- 
lutely, impregnable, had entirely aban- 
doned his plan, and sought to meet the 
foe by a different course. Having de- 
cided to make the attack, he ought to 
have done it differently. His plan on 
the evening of the 12 th was better than 
that on the morning of the I3th. He 
had changed his mind in the interval ; 
but he had changed it for the worse. A 
general attack was hazardous. A partial 
attack was folly. The temporaiy suc- 
cess of Meade sliowed what might have 
been done if he bad massed his troops 



852 



FBEDEBICKSBUEG. 



on his left, and encouraged Franklin to 
put forth his entire strength in one 
bold, dashing effort. He blundered 
again when he ordered Sumner to ad- 
vance before he knew what success 
bad attended Franklin on the left. He 
dnned against reason and common-sense 
when he forced Hooker to make the 
final attack. History will say that the 
aiTny of the Potomac — one of the finest 
armies the world has ever known — was 
literally slaughtered through the in- 
competency of its chief. 

The 1 4th was Sunday. It had been 
Deci Bui'nside's intention to renew the 

*4. attack in the morning. He found 
it impossible, however, to overcome the 
opposition of his chief officer^j who re- 
garded the enemy's lines as impreg- 
nable; and the order which had already 
been given was countermanded. Dur- 
ing that day, and the next, the Na- 
tional army lay on the Fredericksburg 
side of the RappatiannocK ; but on 
neither side was any evidence given of 
a disposition to attack. 

During the night of the 15th, Burnside 
Dec. quietly withdrew his entire army, 

*5i with his guns, to the Falmouth side 
of the river ; the pontoon bridges were 
also taken up ; and Lee was permitted 
to enter and occupy Fredericksburg. 
It was not to be wondered at that Lee 
took advantage of the circumstance, to 
boast of a great victoiy. On the 16th, 
Dec. Burnside M'rote to Halleck, the 

ifi* commander-in-chief, that the army 
was withdrawn to the Falmouth side of 
the river, because he felt that the posi- 
tion in front could not be carried, and 
}>ecau8e it was a military necessity 



either to attack or retire. A repulse, 
he said, would have been disastrous. 
The army was withdi-awn at night 
without the knowledge of the enemy, 
and without loss either of property or 
men. 

Burnside was still hopeful that he 
might be able to redeem the disaster 
which had befallen the National army. 
He had another plan ready. He pro- 
posed to make an immediate advance 
on Richmond. His plan was ta make 
a feint above Fredericksburg, And to 
cross with the main body of the army 
about six miles below. Twenty-five 
thousand cavalry, with four guns, were 
to cross at Kelley's Ford, push towards 
the Rapidan, destroy the railroad tracks 
and bridges in the rear of Lee's army, 
destroy, also, the locks on the James 
River Canal, traverse Virginia, raiding 
as they advanced, and finally join the 
National garrison, then under Peck at 
Suffolk. Such was Burnside's plan. 
Unhappily for him and his plan, how- 
ever, there was dissatisfaction among 
his subordinate oflScers. The bad man- 
agement at Fredericksburg had pro- 
duced a feeling of general distrust ; and 
this distrust found free and full expres. 
sion at Washington. Representations 
had been made to the president by 
Franklin and Smith, showing the utter 
folly and uselessness of any further 
attempts to cross the Rappahannock. 
They could only, they said, result in 
disaster. At the same time, two other 
generals — Newton and Cochrane — who 
happened to be in Washington, fully 
convinced the president of the bad tem- 
per which prevailed in the army of the 



THE ''MUD MAIiUH." 



858 



Potomac — a temper which did not jus- 
tify any further movement for the pres- 
ent. 

A fortnight had now elapsed since 
the battle of Fredericksburg. On the 
[)ec 30th of December, Bumside ^fA 
^' completed his preparations for the 
onward movement ; his cavalry were al- 
ready at Kelley's Ford, and his infantry 
were ready to start The whole move- 
ment was suddenly stopped by an order 
from the president. Burnside hastened 
to Washington to demand an explana- 
tion. From the commander-in-chief uud 
the secretary of war he could learn 
nothing. Ignorant of the cause them- 
selves, they could not explain. The 
president, however, did not conceal his 
reasons for acting as he had done. 
Complaints against the general had 
been made by several prominent officers 
La the wmy. The complaints of these 
men were such that the president could 
ttot afford to ignore them. It was no- 
torious that bad feeling existed among 
the officers and men; and while such 
was the state of things, he did not feel 
justified in sanctioning a forward move- 
ment. Bui'nside tendered his resigna- 
tion; but this the president, having 
perfect faith in his loyalty and patriot- 
ism, refused to accept. The president 
desu'ed him to remain in command of 
the army, but he was not to renew the 
campaign without his knowledge and 
consent All these things led to delay. 
Much precious time was wasted; and 
what was even more to be lamented, 
the secret of Bumside's plans had leaked 
out, and Lee was no longer ignorant 
of the iateutions of bis antagonist 



Burnside changed his plan. He now 
proposed to cross the Rappahan- 
nock above Fredericksburg, at 
Banks' and United States Fords, hop- 
ing to flank the enemy, and to force a 
battle. Permission was given him by 
the president to renew the campaign. 
It was now the 20th of January, jan, 
1863. Franklin and Hooker were 20. 
at Banks' Ford, At that point the river 
is not passable in winter time. The 
pontoons, however, had been brought 
up ; and preparations were being made 
for throwing bridges across the swollen 
waters. 1; seemed, for the moment, as 
if fortune were smiling on Bumside. 
Some demonstrations made at a point a 
little further down had been attended 
with complete success. The weather, 
too, was good; and the roads were 
in excellent condition. On the night 
of the 20th, all these hopes were di» 
sipated- A fearful storm of wind, 
snow, sleet and rain came on, such as is 
seldom seen in that region; it contin- 
ued all night; and when morning 
dawned, the entire country was con- 
verted into a huge quagmire. The 
troops were for some hours hopelessly 
mired. They could neither retreat nor 
advance. Lee had already become 
aware of Bumside's intention to cross 
the river, and was at the point of dan- 
ger, ready to meet him. Burnside waa 
not unwilling even yet to cross the 
river, and offer the enemy battla II 
was found impossible, however, to con- 
struct the bridges. The greater the 
effort made by men and horses to push 
forward the vehicles containing the 
boats, the more hopelessly did they 



3S4 



FEEDERICKGjJUEG. 



sink in the soft, paste-like mud, with 
which the roads were covered. The 
rain continued during the whole of the 
21st. It was still raining on the morn- 
ing of the 22d. The three days' ra- 
tions, with which the men had been 

f Aim- 

'supplied, were all but exhausted. The 
game was already lost; and the Con- 
federates could again make the boast 
that the elements fought in their favor. 
Jan, On the 23d, the army of the 
23» Potomac was in its former en- 
campments, and in winter quai-tera 
What was known at the time as the 
"Mud March" was ended. 

At this crisis, the public mind was 
filled with indignation and sorrow. 
Not a little blame was attached to the 
president and his cabinet. The com- 
mander-in-chief was not held guiltless. 
The revelations made through the court 
of inquuy in the case of General Mc- 
Dowell, and the court martial on Gen- 
eral Porter, had convinced the public 
that the government had intermeddled 
too much with the plans of the militaiy 
leaders. Burnside had done much to 
Bave the president and his cabinet by 
publishing a letter, in which he assumed 
the entire responsibility of the plan, 
and the conduct of the attack on Fred- 
ericksbm-g. Some of the old feeling, 
however, still remained. At this time, 
Burnside became ill-satisfied with his 
generals ; and, irritated and discouraged 
by this latest failure, and by the ad- 
verse criticisms which were freely made 
both by men and officers, he resolved 
to rid the army of the f omenters of dis- 



cord. Among the officers aimed at 
were Generals Hooker, Brooks, New- 
ton and Cochrane, whom he wished to 
be dismissed from the service of the 
United States ; and Generals Franklin, 
Smith, Sturgis and Ferrers, with Col 
onel Taylor, whom he wished to be 
deprived of their respective commands. 
Hurrying to Washington, he asked the 
president to sign the order which he 
had already prepared. Of course the 
president refused. To have signed such 
an order would have ruined the army. 
It would have depiived it of some of 
its trusted and most competent leaders. 
Burnside then tendered his resignation 
of the command of the army of the Po- 
tomac, and also of his rank of major- 
general. He was relieved of command 
at his own request, but he retained hij 
rank in the army. The same ordei 
which relieved Burnside, also relieveii 
Franklin and Sumner. Franklin, some- 
what unjustly, we think, had come 
under suspicion; and Sumner, who waa 
broken down by age and infirmity, was 
relieved at his own request. Hooker 
was now the senior general of the army 
of the Potomac. He had shared its for- 
tunes from the first. By his courage, 
skill and promptitude, he had won not 
a little renown. To him, therefore, was 
now assigned the dangerous honor ol 
being its chief. The appointment waa 
generally ajiproved; and Hooker waa 
well received by both ofticers and men. 
How the army fared under his com* 
mand will form the subject of auothei 
chapter. 



BATESVILLE. 



S05 



CHAPTER XXII. 

Ouefrilla Mo-veiaenta in the West. — General Curtis at BatesvUle. — Moving Eastward. — At Jaoksonport — N» 
tioual Gunboats. — White River.— St. Charles. ^Clarendon. — Encounter with General Rust. — Condition of 
the National Army. — Sad Disappointment. — What was to be Done? — The March to Helena. — At Helena. — 
Arkansas and Missouri Unprotected. — General J. M. Schofleld in Command in Missouri. —Attacks of the 
GuerriDas. — Political Feuds in Missouri. — Lincoln Complains. — Guerrilla Leaders. — Porter, Poindexter and 
Cobb. — General McNeil. — McNeil Attacked by Porter and Cobb. — Colonel Merrill. — Newark Captured. — 
Battle of Kirksville. — Poindexter Caught in a Trap. — Defeat of Cobb. — National Supremacy Restored North 
of the Missouri. — Capture of the Garrison at Independence. — Battle of Cross Roads. — Defeat of Foster. — 
Coffee's Retreat. — The Guerrillas in Arkansas. — Rains, Parsons, Cooper and McBride. — Hindman in Com- 
mand of the Guerrillas. — The Ozark Mountains. — Schofleld Takes the Field in Person. — The "Army of 
the Frontier." — Sarcoxie. — Blunt and Totten. — Fort Wayne. — The Confederates Attacked. — Fayetteville. — 
Boston Mountains. — Hindman Preparing to Attack the Nationals. — Cane Hill. — Illness of Schofleld. — Blunt 
in Command. — Blunt About to be Attacked. — Herron Sent For. — Prairie Grove. — Battle of Prairie Grove. — 
Terrible Fighting. — Herron in Peril. — Arrival of Blunt. — The Confeaerates Defeated. — Hindman 's Mistakes. — 
Blunts Ride to Van Buren. — The Guerrillas in Texas. — The Loyalty of the Texans. — The Texan Martyrs. — 
Among the Indians. — Tale-Quah. — Forts Davis and Gibson. — The Indian Encampments. — Colonel Phillipps. — 
Phillipps Attacked by Taylor. — Bayou Barnard. — Taylor Killed. — Attack by the Indians on New Ulm and 
the Agencies. — Horrible Butchery. — Swift Punishment. — Peace Established on the Frontier of Minnesota. 



1862. 



Towards the close of 1862, there 
were some engagements, in the 
western country, beyond the Mis- 
sissippi, and east of the Rocky Moun- 
tains — engagements which, although not 
of first-class importance, or directly con- 
nected with any of the great, leading 
military movements, cannot, in a work 
of this kind, be passed over in silence. 
After the battle of Pea Ridge, described 
in a previous chapter, the Confederate 
general. Van Dorn, who, as we have 
seen, made a skilful and successful re- 
treat, moved with the greater portion 
of his army down the Arkansas River 
as far as Little Rock, marched in an 
eastward direction, crossed the Missis- 
sippi at Helena, and joined the army of 
Beauregard almost in time to take part 
in the battle of Shiloh. General Curtis 
made no haste to pursue. On the field 



of victory he rested his men ; and then, 
finding no foe in that part of Arkansas, 
he descended from the highlands into 
the vast plains below, and, moving in a 
southeasterly direction, reached, on the 
8th of May, Batesville, a large vOlage 
on the White River. Here he expected 
to find gunboats and supplies in charge 
of Colonel Fitch. But the siege of 
Corinth had not yet ended; and, in 
consequence, the White River and its 
tributaries were not yet open to the 
Federal flotilla. Curtis, not a little 
disappointed, remained at Batesville 
until the 24th of June, depending foi 
his supplies by wagon trains from Rolla, 
far up in Missouri, and thus very much 
at the mercy of the guerrilla bands 
which infested the country. After the 
evacuation of Corinth, and the capture 
of Memphis, the Arkansas waters werp 



sse 



THE GUERKILLAS. 



open to navigation ; and several Federal 
gunboats proceeded up the White River. 
Juiie Oq the 25th of June, Curtis, 

25» learning that the gunboats were 
coming up the river, started for Jack- 
sonport. Here he was joined by Gen- 
eral C. C. Washburne, with the Third 
Wisconsin cavalry, which had come 
down from Springfield, Missouri, with- 
out encountering any opposition. The 
gunboats, however, had not yet made 
their appearance. They had been de- 
tained further down the river, by an 
encounter with some Confederate bat- 
teries near St. Charles; and, although 
these works had been carried, the gun- 
boats had been so damaged that they 
were unable to proceed further up. To 
add to their difficulties, the water in 
the river had become very low. Still 
hopeful that, if he could reach the gun- 
boats, he might be able to tui-n them 
to some account in a joint movement 
against Little Rock, Curtis, with his 
whole army, pressed on towards Claren- 
don. He was the more anxious to 
reach the gunboats, that he knew they 
were accompanied by a brigade of in- 
fantry from Indiana. It was a wretch- 
ed country through which they had to 
pass — a low, swampy region, intersected 
by canals or bayous, covered with cane- 
brakes, and inhabited by a white popu- 
lation, who were entirely in sympathy 
July with the Southern cause. On the 

J'' 7th of July, while still in this 
inhospitable region, the advance (Thir- 
ty-Third Illinois) under Colonel A. P. 
Hovey, was attacked by some 1500 
Texan cavalry, under General Albert 
Rust. Hovey was soon joined by Wood, 



who came up with the First Indiana 
cavalry and two howitzers, when a vig- 
orous charge was made, and Rust was 
compelled to beat a hasty retreat, leav- 
ing 1 10 of his men dead ou the field. 
The National loss was 8 killed and 45 
wounded. The march was continued 
to Clarendon; but, on reaching that 
place, it was found that the gunboats 
had departed some twenty-four hours 
before. 

It was a sad disappointment. Cm-tis' 
condition was a thousand times worse 
than it had been before. It would 
have been better far for him to have 
remained at Pea Ridge or at Batesville. 
He had not only made a long and fa- 
tiguing march : he had lost all the ad- 
vantages of these positions, without ob- 
taining any compensation. What ^vaa 
now to be done ? Retrace his steps ? 
That was not to be thought of. Remain 
where he was? That would be suici- 
dal ; for the region was unhealthful, 
and he was without food, witliout 
ammunition, without supplies of any 
kind, and without the means of com- 
municating with any base of operations. 
There was but one course open to 
him, and that was to reach the waters 
of the Mississippi as quickly as possi- 
ble. It was an ungrateful task, con- 
sidering the exhausted condition of his 
men. But there was no choice. No 
delay was permitted. It was sixty-five 
miles to Helena, the nearest point of 
any importance. WashBurne, with all 
the cavalry, numbering some 2500 
horses, and with five howitzers, set out 
at once. Although he had to make the 
roads as he advanced, bridging the bay- 



DIVISION OF SENTIMENT. 



3157 



ous, and cutting his way through the 
tangled and almost impenetrable copse, 
Helena was reached in twenty-four 
hours. Curtis followed, with the in- 
fantry, taking Avith him a few Arkansas 
volunteers and a large number of ne- 
groes, and, proceeding by long marches, 
July arrived at the same place on the 
13. 12th and 13th of July. At He- 
lena, Curtis found his much-needed sup- 
plies; but for the remainder of the 
summer he was fastened to the Missis- 
sippi, having no other duty to perform 
than that of guarding its western banks, 
and thus covering the right of the Na- 
tional army, which was operating on 
the other side. 

The retirement of Curtis to the Mis- 
sissippi left Arkansas very much un- 
cared for. The result was that large 
guerrilla bands were organized in that 
State and the neighboring State of Mis- 
souri. They gradually united and as- 
sumed the proportions of a formidable 
^army. In April, 1862, Missouri was 
in charge of General J. M. Schofield, 
an officer of decided ability, who had 
served on the staff of the lamented 
Lyon. All the militia of the State, 
numbering some 14,000 men, and large- 
ly composed of cavalry, were assigned 
to his command. To this was attached 
a volunteer force of considerable 
strength, and drawn from almost all 
sections of the State. In June, at the 
request of Curtis, Missouri was created 
into a separate military district; and 
Schofield was placed in command. 
About this time the guerrilla bands 
began to be a terrible source of annoy- 
ance. Every device was resorted to 



by the Confederates to organize armed 
opposition in the State. Whole Mis^ 
souri regiments, including officers and 
men, were furloughed; they returned 
to their homes in citizens' clothes, carry- 
ing with them secret instructions to 
recruit and organize bands in all direc 
tions, and then, at a given signal, to 
meet in the heart of the State, and de- 
stroy the militia enrolled under the 
Federal flag. Schofield, however, was 
vigilant, active and energetic, and 
spared no efforts to overcome these 
cunning devices of the foe. Fresh ap- 
peals were made to the militia and to 
the volunteers ; and, on the 22d of June, 
he issued an order holding all rebels 
and rebel sympathizers responsible in 
their property, and, if need be, in their 
persons, for damages thereafter com- 
mitted by guerrillas or marauding par- 
ties. His appeals to the militia and 
the volunteers were only partially suc- 
cessful ; and his order did not produce 
the effect which he probably expected. 
At the close of July he had on his roll 
50,000 men, of whom 20,000 were 
ready for effective service; but the 
failure of the campaign against Rich 
mond greatly encouraged the rebel 
spirit, and rendered his position one of 
extreme difficulty. The people of Mis- 
souri were greatly divided in sentiment 
as to the political issues before the 
country. Emancipation found favor 
with one party : it was bitterly op< 
posed by another. Such were the 
wranglings and contentions that Lin- 
coln, on one occasion, -wrote to tliem 
in bitter complaint. " It is painful to 
me," he said, "that you in Missouri 



858 



THE GUERRILLAS. 



cannot or will not settle your factional 
quarrels among yourselves. I have 
been tormented ^vith them beyond en- 
durance for months, by both sides. 
Neither side pays the least respect to 
my appeals to your reason." 

Schofield's amiy of militia and volun- 
teers was distributed over the State in 
six divisions, under competent officers. 
Towards the end of July, the guerrillas 
began to reveal their strength and their 
purpose. The northeastern division of 
the State, above the Missouri River, 
and bordering on the Mississippi, was 
under the command of Colonel McNeil. 
This was the principal theatre of oper- 
ations. Here the guerrilla bands Avere 
strong, and under the leadership of such 
men as Porter, Poindexter and Cobb. 
July On the 28th of July, Porter and 

28. Cobb came into contact with a 
portion of McNeil's command, under 
Colonel Menill. In this encounter, 
Merrill revealed those rare qualities 
which mark a first-class cavalry officer. 
Porter and Cobb were compelled to re- 
treat. Three days afterwards, Porter 
captured Newark and two companies 
of National troops. Merrill renewed 
the pursuit, which lasted for twelve 
days, ultimately coming up with the 
lug. Confederates on the 6th of Au- 

®' gust, at Kirksville, in Adair 
County. Hei-e a desperate fight en- 
sued. McNeil's entire force at this 
point did not exceed 1000 men, all 
mounted, with six guns. Porter had 
under him at least 2500 men of all 
aims. Porter, however, was defeated, 
with a loss of 180 killed, about 500 
■wounded, and several wagon loads of 



arms. McNeil's loss was 28 killed and 
60 wounded. Porter's power was com 
pletely broken. Poindexter's gang, 
meanwhile, had increased to at least 
1200 men. Early in August, Colonel 
Guitar, with 600 men, and two pieces* 
of artillery, went in pursuit of the guer- 
rilla captain, and fell upon him while 
crossing the Chariton River, on the ^ng, 
nightof the 10th. Poindexter was '^' 
caught in a trap. A large number of his 
men fell a prey to the bullets and sabres 
of the Nationals ; not a few were driven 
into the river and drowned. A consid- 
erable quantity of his supplies was cap 
tured. With what remained of his 
band, Poindexter hastened north to 
effect a junction with Porter ; but, com- 
ing into contact with Ben Loan, he was 
forced back again upon Guitar. He 
was thus caught between two fires. His 
men fled for their lives, and he himself 
was made prisoner. Cobb soon after- 
wards shared the fate of his brother 
bandits ; and to the north of the Mis- 
souri River, the National supremacy' 
was restored. In his report., Schofield 
tells us that, from the 1st of April to 
the 20th of September, there were more 
than one hundred engagements. The 
National loss was 3000. The loss on 
the other side was not less than 10,000 
men. Some terrible stories are told, 
illustrative of the vengeful spirit vidth 
which, on both sides, this guerrilla war- 
fare was conducted. It is quite possi- 
ble that the stories are exaggerated 
reports of the facts in the case; but 
there can be no doubt that the cold- 
blooded murder of Colonel McCullough. 
the day after Kirksville, and what 



I 



COFFEE AND HUGHES. 



353 



were called the Palmyra massacres, 
threw a dark cloud over the name of 
McNeil, and damaged the reputation of 
a loyal and patriotic soldier. 

The guerrilla bands to the south of 
the Missouri River were scarcely less 
aggressive than their brethren further 
north. These bands, having been or- 
ganized under a chief of the name of 
Hughes, when they heard of the out- 
break in the north, resolved to take the 
initiative, and, if possible, open com- 
munication with their friends across the 
Aug. river. On the 11th of August 
J*' Hughes, with about 1000 com- 
batants, surprised the garrison at Inde- 
pendence. He encovintered some severe 
opposition from them inside the garri- 
son ; but he had no great difficulty in 
making himself master of the place. 
About the same time the Confederate 
general. Coffee, who had moved from 
the interior of Arkansas with 1500 
horse, was pushing on rapidly for the 
purpose of forming a junction with 
Hughes. A combinatijon of National 
troops was formed to prevent this junc- 
tion. Coffee, as he moved north, was 
being pressed by 1200 cavalry sent by 
Brown. General Blunt, commanding 
on the west of Kansas, detached some 
troops for the same purpose. General 
Totten was ordered by Schofield to 
attack Hughes at once, before he could 
be joined by Coffee. Unhappily, Tot- 
ten's forces were divided ; 800 horse 
and two guns, commanded by Major 
Foster, being at Lexington, on the Mis- 
souri, east of Independence, and 1500 
men, under Colonel Warren, being at 
Clinton, more to the southeast. Both 



had started for Independence. Foster, 
who had the shorter journey io make, 
encountered the enemy at the Cross 
Roads, called Lone Jack, on the Auw, 
15th of August. Coffee and 15, 
Hughes had formed a junction; and 
their united forces amounted to 4000 
or 5000 men. Foster's band was de- 
feated, and driven back to Lexington. 
In the struggle, Foster himself was 
wounded. At this moment Coffee, 
who was free in his movements, would 
not have shown bad generalship, if he 
had crossed the river and joined his 
fi'iends, who were waiting for him on 
the other side; :3ut he was so pressed 
in his rear, that he deemed it best tc 
make a detour and find his way, a£ 
quickly as possible, back into Arkan 
sas. Blunt was already upon his heels ; 
but Cofl'ee, who knew the country 
thoroughly, and whose men were well 
trained in that kind of warfare, con- 
trived to make his escape. 

Robbed of their sti-ength, if not com- 
pletely driven out of Missouri, the 
guerrillas were still powerful in Ar- 
kansas ; nor was it any part of their 
plan that their adversaries should re- 
main masters in Missouri. At the be- 
ginning of September, the united Con- 
federate forces in Arkansas amounted 
to nearly 50,000 men. They were 
under the command of General T. C. 
Hindman, who was assisted l)y Gen- 
erals Rains, Parsons, Cooper, Mc-Bride 
and others. Hindman had been a mem- 
ber of Congress ; but he had warmly 
espoused the Confederate cause, and 
gone into the war with all the bitterness 
of a partisan. Under tlie plea of .tix13 



360 



THE GUERRILLAS. 



tary necessity, he had arrogated to him- 
self excessive powers in the State, exer- 
cising au arbitrary authority, and allow- 
ing his soldiers a license in the last 
degree offensive to all peaceful citizens. 
Living on the country wherever he hap- 
pened to be, and rigidly enforcing the 
conscription law, he was enabled to 
gather together and to maintain a large 
body of men. Hiudman was complete- 
ly master of Arkansas. Indeed, there 
were no Federal soldiers in that State 
to dispute his authority. Nestling in 
the recesses of the Ozark Mountains, 
among which the battle of Pea R'dge 
had been fought, he could sweep the 
rast and fertile plains which lay around 
him on every side, and carry off what- 
ever he thought his army needed. In 
one thing only was that army found 
wanting. It was well provisioned, but 
poorly supplied with ai-ms. This was 
the less an inconvenience that there was 
Qo foe against which the arms could be 
used. So much was this the case that 
General J. Johnston, who had just been 
placed in command of the armies of the 
West, added his solicitations to those 
of General Randolph, that the forces 
under Hindman should be turned to 
some account, by being sent across the 
Mississippi to strengthen the forces 
under Pemberton. Davis, however, 
would not give his consent. Randolph, 
in consequence, retired from the Con- 
federate cabinet, and Hindman de- 
termined to make a fresh invasion of 
file State of Missouri. His forces were 
di Tided as follows: Rains, with 6000 
infantry, occupied the heights in the 
ueighborcood of Pea Ridge; Cooper, 



with 7000 horse and some artillery, had 
advanced into the valley of Neosho, as 
far as Newtonia, thus menacing the 
National troops, who were stationed 
at Springfield ; while another body 
of 4000 men, massed on the White 
River, seemed to be making ready for 
a march on Rolla, the most important 
of the National depots in the Western 
country. 

Schofield now resolved to take the 
field in person, and, if possible, strike 
the enemy before he was in a fit condi- 
tion to take the offensive. He had 
shortly before, on the 26th of Septem- 
ber, been appointed to the command of 
what was called the " army of the fron- 
tier," General Curtis having superseded 
him by taking command of the depart- 
ment. Steele was put in command of 
the forces which remained stationary at 
Helena. The army under Schofield has 
been variously estimated at from 12,000 
to 15,000 men, of whom about 8000 
were available for active operations. 
There were about 5000 cavalry and 
some sixteen pieces of artillery, with a 
complement of men and horses. The 
largest portion of this aimy was at 
Springfield ; two brigades, all mounted, 
were at Sarcoxie; and General Blunt 
was known to be coming up from Kan- 
sas. Schofield took up his line of 
march for Sarcoxie with 6000 men, leav 
ing some 5000 to guard Springfield and 
his long line of communication with St. 
Louis. On the 30th, a reconnois- gepJ. 
sauce was made in the direction 30. 
of Newtonia by some of the troops 
which were already at Sarcoxie. Com- 
ing into contact with Cooper's cavalry, 



COOPEK AND RAINS DEFEATED. 



361 



they were, after a lively engagement, 
driven back to their encampments. On 
the 1st or 2d of October, the troops, 
which had left Springfield, arrived in 
the neighborhood of Sarcoxie, and, form- 
ing a division under General Totten, 
were joined by those commanded by 
Blunt. On the following day, the en- 
tii'e National army set out for Newtonia. 
Blunt and Totten approached at differ- 
ent points. The Confederates evident- 
ly were taken by surprise ; and Rains 
and Cooper, who had not been able to 
form a junction, both took to flight, the 
one towards Huntsville, the other to- 
wards Maysville. Schofield marched 
Oct. steadily onward ; and, on the 
"• 17th of October, he was on the 
old battle ground of Pea Ridge. The 
Confederates, as we have seen, were 
divided. Cooper evidently intended to 
take possession of Maysville, and cut 
off communication with Fort Scott. 
Rains, with the main body of the troops, 
covered by about 3000 cavalry, was 
still moving in the direction of Hunts- 
ville. Blunt, with two brigades, went 
off in pursuit of Cooper; while Scho- 
field, with the main array, pushed over 
the White River Mountains, in the 
track of Rains. 

Blunt, who did not allow his m€ n to 
halt by the way, reached the outskirts 
Oct. of Maysville before daylight on 
22. the morning of the 22d of Octo- 
ber. He felt satisfied that the enemy 
could not be far off. Disguising him- 
self, and entering into conversation 
with some of the villagers, he soon dis- 
covered that Coo])er was encamped on 
yrairie ground in the \ncinity of an old 



military post, called Fort Wayne. As 
soon as day broke. Blunt, although his 
men were not all forward, resolved to 
make the attack. It was important to 
sti'ike a blow before his presence was 
discovered by the enemy. His van- 
guard, therefore, dismounted and com- 
menced firing. The Confederates were 
quite unprepared for the attack; and, 
before they thorougnly understood 
their position, the main body of Blunt's 
troops came up at a gallop from Mays- 
ville, and deployed on the pi'aii'ie. A 
few shells were flung into the encamp- 
ment, and then the whole line advanced. 
The Confederates, making but little re- 
sistance, fled precipitately towards Fort 
Gibson in the Indian Territory, leaving 
their four guns behind them. There 
was but little loss of life on the part of 
the Confederates; and the Nationals 
had only three men disabled. 

Schofield had been not less successful 
in his pursuit of Rains. The enemy had 
escaped from Huntsville, and sought 
shelter once more in the neighborhood 
of the Ozark Mountains. It was evi- 
dently Hiadman's intention to avoid 
battle until his troops were collected 
in greater force. Returning to a posi- 
tion not far from Pea Ridge, Schofield 
learned that some 3000 or 4000 cavalry 
were encamped on White River, about 
eight miles from Fayetteville. Totten 
was ordered to advance and attacl< 
them in front, while Francis J. Herron 
was instructed to proceed imniediatel} 
with about 1000 cavalry, and strike 
them in the rear. Heri'on was the first 
to reach the enemy. On the morn- oct, 
ing of the 28th of October, after 2«« 



362 



THE GUERRILLAS. 



a rapid night march, he found him- 
self close upon the encampment. With- 
out waiting for the arrival of the in- 
fantry, he fell upon the foe with the 
rapidity of lightning. The surprise 
was complete ; and such was the vigor 
of the onslaught that the Confederates 
fled to the mountains, leaving every- 
thing behind them. 

Comparative quiet reigned in those 
regions for neaily a month. On the 
26th of November, however, it became 
known to Schofield that Hindman had 
made up his mind to resume the offen- 
sive. The Confederate general, Mar- 
maduke, had arrived at Cane Hill with 
7000 or 8000 men ; and it was natural 
to conclude that Hindman was about to 
follow. Schofield, who had for some 
time previous to this been in poor 
health, deemed it necessary to resign 
bis command. General Blunt imme- 
diately accepted the responsibilities of 
the situation. He set out at once in 
quest of the enemy. So rapid were 
his movements that, on the morning of 
Nov. the 28th, he found himself in 
28. presence of his antagonist. Blunt 
had advanced with .5000 men and 
thirty pieces of artillery. He had 
taken with him provisions for four 
days. In one day he had marched 
twenty-seven miles. Only some 200 
men were forward when he encoun- 
tered resistance. The main body, how- 
ever, soon came up, when Marmaduke 
fell back upon his reserves on the Bos- 
ton Mountains, and took a good position 
on the heights. Blunt now assailed 
him with his entire strength ; and a 
vigorous charge having been made by 



the Second Kansas Cavalry, the Third 
Cherokee Indians, and the Eleventh 
Kansas Infantry, the Confederates were 
driven back, but not in disorder, in the 
direction of Van Buren. Blunt re- 
turned and took up a position at Cane 
Hill. In this engagement, which is 
known as the battle of Boston Moun- 
tains, the Nationals had four killed, and 
36 wounded. The Confederate loss 
was 75 killed. The number of wound- 
ed was not reported. 

Hindman was not disposed to give 
the Nationals any rest. He seemed re- 
solved to recover his State. In order 
to do this, it was necessary to give a 
crushing blow to Blunt. Hindman, no 
doubt, was encouraged in this determin- 
ation by the knowledge that Schofield, 
who had been his great terror, was no 
longer in command. He might also 
have been emboldened in his j)uri3ose 
by the fact that the National army was 
divided into two parts, at that time far 
from each other. Blunt, with the fii'st 
division, composed of three brigades, 
numbering about 6000 or 7000 men, 
was at Cane Hill and the village 
called Rhea's Mills, on the Fayetteville 
Road. Herron, with the remainder of 
the army, comprising 6000 infantiy, 
8000 horse, and 20 guns, was at Wil- 
son's Creek, many miles away. On the 
1st of December, Hindman, who pee, 
had been hastening to Marma- •• 
duke's relief, crossed the Arkansas River 
at Van Buren with 9000 infantry and 
3000 cavalry; and the two forces were 
united at a point some fifteen miles 
further up. Made aware of this fact. 
Blunt sent to Herron, requesting him 



PRAIRIE GROVE. 



363 



to hurry to his assistance. That excel- 
lent officer lost no time in coming to the 
relief of his chief. His cavalry he hur- 
ried forward under Colonel Wicker- 
sham, while he himself advanced with 
the main army. Fayetteville was reached 
0ec. '^'1 tli6 morning of the 7th. He 
'• had marched all night. Resting 
his men for an hour, he pushed on in 
the direction of Cane Hill. He had 
advanced to within ten or eleven miles 
of that place, when he met a portion of 
his own cavalry, despatched by him in 
advance, fleeing from the enemy. They 
had been attacked and broken by Mar- 
maduke's horsemen, flerron was in a 
position of very considerable danger. 
The Confederate general had been ap- 
prised of the approach of Herron ; and 
his purpose was, if possible, to inter- 
pose between him and Blunt. He had 
left a few troops, with a field battery, 
in a strong position on the Cane Hill 
Road, at the culminating point of the 
pass of the Boston Mountains, his ob- 
ject being to mask his movement and 
detain Blunt. With the rest of his 
army, he had moved along the Fayette- 
ville Road. This was the condition of 
things when, about eight o'clock, Her- 
ron's advance, consisting of two regi- 
ments of cavalry, was met and driven 
back by Marmaduke. The retreating 
cavalry were brought to a halt by the 
second division, which was under Gen- 
eral Totten, the Confederate attack 
being not only resisted but repelled. 
Herron, at this moment, had a good po- 
sition ; and he might have been able, if 
he had known the actual state of things, 
to make a bold, defensive stand. But he 



was ignorant of his real danger, and in- 
tent only on the relief of Blunt. He, 
therefore, pressed forward, driving the 
Confederates back over Illinois Creek, 
on the heights beyond which the Con- 
federate army was posted. 

The ground on which Herron now 
found himself was known by the name 
of Prairie Grove. It was an extensive, 
natui'al clearing in the midst of woods 
and thickets, with which the surround- 
ing hills were covered. The ground 
was irregular; thei'e were also some 
clumps of trees; and, here and there, 
cultivated patches had taken the place 
of the tall grasses, with which the 
prairie generally was covered. On its 
eastern extremity, this open ground was 
watered by the creek above mentioned. 
It was traversed, also, by two roads- 
one leading from Fayetteville to Cane 
Hill, and passing at Rhea's Mills ; an- 
other leading from Van Buren, and 
crossing a ford at Illinois Creek, near 
the church of Prairie Grove. Beyond 
this stream, and about three-quarters of 
a mile to the east, the Van Buren Road 
ascends a hill which is well covered 
with woods. On these heights, so soon 
as he became aware of the approach of 
Herron, Hindraan had taken position 
with all his array. 

Hindman's troops were well concealed 
in the woods. Herron did not know, 
and he had no means of discovering, 
the actual strength of the enemy in his 
front. On these heights, hidden by the 
trees, but admirably posted for defense, 
was an army of some 20,000 men, well 
supplied with cavalry and artillery. 
Herron had found it necessary to leave 



364 



THE GUERRILLAS. 



certain detachments behind him. His 
entire available force, therefore, did 
not exceed 5000 men ; and these were 
not yet all on the ground. It was, so 
far as numbers were concerned, destined 
to be a most unequal contest. Had 
Herron been aware of the facts, he 
might well have hesitated, before ven- 
turing upon an attack. In this case, 
however, as not unfrequently happens, 
pluck and daring, guided by a clear 
head and steady nerve, fully compen- 
sated for lack of numbers. Herron had 
not heard from Blunt since the 2d, 
when he received instructions to come 
to his aid. Blunt was aware of the 
difficulties w^hich lay in Herron's way ; 
but such was the activity of Marraa- 
duke's skirmishers, that he found it 
impossible to open communications with 
his lieutenant, or send to him any words 
of warning. Blunt, in fact, had for 
some days been misled by the tactics of 
his antagonist. He was under the im- 
pression that he had been skirmishing 
with the advance of Hindman's main 
army, when, in truth, Hindman, having 
turned his left, was making for his 
trains, and actually interposing between 
him and Herron. It was not until the 
arrival of Wickersham, with his four 
cavalry regiments, that Blunt became 
fully alive to the true character of the 
situation. 

As soon as his third division came 
up, Herron resolved to assume the of- 
fensive. It was yet early morning. An 
attempt was made to force the passage 
of the ford near the church, a light bat- 
tery having been sent forward to feel 
the foe. The attempt was unsuccess- 



ful, the battery being driven baclv, 
Another attempt was made about a 
mile and a half farther down the creek. 
Murphy's battery was successfully trans- 
ported to the other side of the creek; 
and, as soon as it was got into position, 
it opened fire upon the flank of the 
enemy. The attack from tliis quarter 
had all the effect of a surprise. It not 
only engaged the attention of the Con- 
federate officers — it created the impres- 
sion that the National troops were more 
numerous than they actually were. 
Herron did not lose his opportunity. 
Three batteries, accompanied by three 
full regiments, were pushed across the 
ford in his front ; and about ten o'clock 
the whole of the National artillery 
were pouring grape-shot and canister on 
the Confederate positions. The result 
was soon visible. Within sixty miu' 
utes most of the Confederate guns 
were silenced. The Nationals contin- 
ued to advance, the artillery belching 
forth destruction until they were with- 
in a hundred yards of the ridge. It 
was now evident that Hindman, whose 
force had already suffered severelj-, 
was massing his men on the right with 
a view to crush the National left. 
This movement was supported by a 
powerful battery in front. This battery 
must be captured. The perilous task 
was assigned to the Nineteenth Iowa, 
and the Twentieth Wisconsin. The 
task was speedily accomplished. It 
was the work of only a few minutes. 
The summit of the hill was reached; 
the enemy was driven back ; and the 
guns were seized. It was impossible, 
however, for those gallant regiments to 



PRAIRIE GROVE. 



365 



hold the position which they had so 
nobly won. The Confederates rallied 
and returned to the charge. Largely 
outnumbered, the two National regi- 
ments were compelled to fall back, and 
the battery was again in possession of 
the enemy. The Confederates contrived 
to press forward ; and, gathering cour- 
age as they advanced, they made a bold 
dash towards the National guns. It 
was a vain effort. Their ranks were 
ploughed by grape-shot ; they were 
torn in pieces by canister. It was a 
rush to destruction. They soon fell 
back, leaving the ground covered with 
the dead and wounded. At this criti- 
cal moment, and seeing the determina- 
tion with which Hindman was menacing 
his left, Herron summoned up two 
fresh regiments — the Twenty-Sixth In- 
diana and the Thirty-Seventh Illinois — 
and hurled them against the enemy's 
risrht. This fresh attack was, in the 
first instance, completely successful. 
Colonel Houston, who was in charge, 
led his men forward right gallantlj^ 
The Confederate battery was again cap- 
tured ; but, as in the fomier case, so in 
this, the National regiments were out- 
numbered, and compelled to fall back. 
It was now half-past two. The bat- 
tle had raged fiercely since eleven. 
Herron's men had all been put under 
fire. Further aggressive effort, on his 
part, was out of the question. It was 
doubtful whether he could much longer 
hold the ground he occupied ; for the 
Confederates had evidently begiui to 
feel their strength, and to realize the 
value of superior numbers. Fortu- 
nately, just at this time, the noise of 

■^39 



heavy guns was heard on the extremo 
right ; and some stray shot fell in the 
midst of the National skirmishers. It 
was Blunt. He had arrived on the 
field just in time. The news quickly 
spread along the lines, reviving the 
sinking spii'its of the Union soldiers. 
Hindman was in the act of massing his 
forces, for the purpose of flanking Her- 
ron's right wing. While thus engaged, 
he came into contact with the heads of 
Blunt's advancing columns. The bat- 
tle was thus renewed with tremendous 
energy. Blunt pushed forward three 
batteries, which soon drove the Con- 
federates back into the woods. While 
the cavalry was crossing his right, he 
pushed forward Colonel Weir, with a 
heavy force, to the woods, where the 
Confederates were forming for the atr 
tack. Weir accomplished his task with 
skill and energy. The Confederates 
were driven from their shelter, and 
their onward movement was completely 
arrested. During the struggle, an at- 
tempt was made by the Confederates 
to capture the batteries of Robb and 
Hopkins. The assailants, however, were 
severely punished for their temerity. 
Another attack, in which the Confed- 
erate general. Stein, of Missouri, fell, 
was successfully repelled by Lieutenant 
Tenney and liis six ten-pounder Par- 
rotts. After the arrival of Blunt, his 
own lines and those of Herron were 
speedily joined ; and a daring attempt 
made V)y the Confederates, to penetrate 
between Herron's second and third di- 
vision, was completely frustrated by 
the stubborn resistance of Dye's bri- 
gade. Musketry-fire and cannonading 



J66 



THE GUEKEILLAS. 



continued until dark; but the Confed- 
erates did not renew the attack, nor 
did the Nationals retire from the posi- 
tion they had won. Night ended the 
conflict. The National troops slept on 
iheir arms, in the expectation that the 
battle would be resumed in the morn- 
ing. When morning dawned, the Con- 
federates were in full flight along the 
Van Buren Road. The Nationals, how- 
ever, were in no condition to pursue. 
Such was the famous and bloody battle 
of Praiiie Grove. The estimated Na- 
tional loss in this day's fighting was 
1148 men, of whom 167 were killed, 
798 wounded, and 183 made prisoners 
— but of the total, 953 belonged to 
Herron's foi'ce. 

If Hindman had been more daring, 
the battle at Prairie Grove might have 
resulted very differently. He had two 
good opportunities, both of which he 
recklessly flung away. He might have 
crushed Blunt on the 4th or 5th, on 
both of which days he had him alone 
in his fi'ont ; and a more dashing effort 
might have led to the discomfiture of 
Herron, when he met him alone on the 
borders of Illinois Creek. 

After the battle of Prairie Grove, 
the "army of the frontier" remained 
quiet in the Ozark Mountains. As 
late as the 28th of December Blunt, 
having been informed that Hindman 
was collecting troops and preparing 
for another attack, made a rapid march 
with some light cavalry and artillery, 
as far as the borders of the Arkansas, 
taking possession of Van Buren with- 
out any opposition, burning several 
steamers, destroying the Confederate 



depots, and then returning to the main 
army, which had gone into winter 
quarters. At the close of 1862, quiet 
reigned both in Missouri and Arkansas, 
Missouri had been completely relieved, 
and at least one half of Arkansas had 
been occupied. 

These guerrilla bands were not con- 
fined to Missouri and Arkansas alone, 
nor indeed to Kentucky and Tennessee, 
where we have already found them. 
They were scattered in large numbers 
over Texas — the extreme southwestern 
State of the Republic. In the western 
part of that State there were but few 
slaveholders. There was, therefore, 
but little sympathy with the Southern 
cause. The people, who were truly 
loyal and devoted to the Union, were 
at once feared and hated by the guer 
rilla bands which infested the country, 
and whose acts were characterized by 
great wastefulness and horrible bru- 
tality. As they were far removed from 
the National armies, and but little lia- 
ble to be called to account, they seemed 
to deem it their privilege to indulge in 
all kinds of excess, and to riot in the 
destruction of life and property. Early 
in the summer of 1862, after the Con- 
federates had been defeated and driven 
out of Tennessee, I'exas was placed 
by the Richmond government under 
martial law, and a rigid and merciless 
conscription was enforced. The State 
was overrun by guerrilla bands, whose 
lawlessness knew no bounds. They 
robbed and murdered at will ; and 
other crimes of th" most heinous and 
shocking character have been laid to 
their charge. Some of the loyalists at- 



THE TEXAN MARTYRS. 



361 



tempted to escape into Mexico. Of 
these, many were captured and mur- 
dered ; and the boast was proudly made 
by the San Antonio Herald, that their 
bones were bleaching on the soil of 
every county, from Red River to the 
Rio Grande ; and in the counties of 
Wise and Denton, their bodies were 
suspended by scores from the "black 
jacks." On the night of the 9th of 
A'lgust, 1862, a company of young 
Germans, about sixty in all, and be- 
longing to the best families in Western 
Texas, who were on their way to New 
Orleans, by way of Mexico, in order to 
join the Union army, had reached the 
Nueces River, about forty miles from 
the Rio Grande. They '.ay encamped 
on the edge of a cedar brake ; their 
movements had been conducted with 
great seci-ecy; and they were hopeful 
that they might escape the vigilance of 
the guen'illas. By treachery or othei-- 
wise, their character and their where- 
abouts became known to the freeboot- 
ers; and Duff, the guerrilla chief in 
those parts, sent one hundred men to 
■surprise and destroy them. Early on 
the morning of the 8th, one of the 
party, who happened to be up and 
about, was captured. As he refused 
>/) lead the gang to the exact spot 
where his companions were still sleep- 
ing, he was immediately hanged. The 
guerrillas found out the encampment, 
and at night fell upon the young men 
in their sleep. A terrible hand-to-hand 
fight ensued. Not less than two-thirds 
of the brave young Unionists perished, 
some of them having been cruelly put 
to death after they were wounded and 



helpless. Only a few of them escaped 
to tell the horrid tale. One of the 
butchers afterwards boasted that he 
killed several of the wounded with his 
own hands. In the performance of this 
brutal work he emptied two revolvers. 
Such was his own confession. His 
name will be infamous forever. It was 
Lieutenant Lily. Three years after- 
wards, a monument was erected ovei 
all that could be collected of the re 
mains of the Texan martyrs. 6 

The Western territory, during the 
year 1862, experienced not a little dis- 
turbance fi'om the peculiar combina- 
tions and conflicts of the Indian tribes. 
The withdrawal of the volunteers 
raised in Northern Missouri, and in the 
young States of Iowa and Minnesota, 
had left some portions of the country 
on the western slope of the Rocky 
Mountains very much at the mercy of 
the indigenous race. The Indians had 
wrongs to right, revenges to gratify, 
both as regarded their white conquerors 
and the rival native tribes; and, in the 
absence of the ti-oops of the regular 
army, they believed they had found 
their opportunity. In the circumstances, 
it was natural that they should make 
some efforts to multiply the scalps with 
which they delighted to adorn their 
wigwams. Some of those tribes, more- 
over, had been induced to take sides in 
the great struggle. On both sides, con- 
siderable armies had been raised. They 
were generally commanded by whites, 
and were, for the most part, employed 
in guarding the frontier. The frontier 
was designated by several posts which, 
before the war, had served as provision 



/ 



368 



THE GUERRILLAS. 



depots. All those to the south of Kan- 
sas had beeu abandoned by the Na- 
tionals. These posts, separated from 
each other by vast intervals, and placed 
en echdon through the vast region then 
known as Indian Territory, were di- 
vided among several tribes, the most 
powerful of which were the Creeks and 
the Cherokees. The latter tribe had 
experienced somewhat of the benefits 
of civilization. Scattered over the rich 
prairie, which extends from Pea Ridge 
to the borders of the Neosho, vpere to 
be seen not a few Cherokee villages, 
surrounded and adorned by patches of 
cultivated land. The principal chief of 
this tribe was John Ross, who resided 
in a beautiful villa at Park Hill, on the 
Fayetteville Road. The chief town or 
capital of this tribe was called Tah-le- 
Quali, a place which though not yet old, 
was giving some evidence of premature 
decay. The Cherokees were no great 
favorites w^ith their more war-like neigh- 
bors, who were located a little more to 
the south and west. As a rule, the 
semi-civilized Indian is despised by his 
rougher and ruder brethern, who ad- 
here to their primitive modes of life. 
Such was the feeling entertained to- 
wards the Cherokees by the other 
Indian tribes all along the borders of 
the Arkansas. The war-like ardor of 
these latter was stimulated by Southern 
emissaries ; and in the neighborhood of 
Foi't Davis — a new fort built by the 
Confederates — and also at Fort Gibson 
' — an old fort near the village of the same 
name — quite a little army of redskins 
had assembled. Oflicered by white men, 
they undertook to conquer the whole 



Indian Temtory, and even threatened 
the invasion of Arkansas and Missouri. 
In the absence of the regular army, 
this whole region depended for protec- 
tion on three regiments of Indians, all 
mounted, and officered by white men of 
the National army. It was not long 
before these National officers became 
aware of the hostile intentions of the 
rival tribes enlisted in the interest of 
the South. It was resolved to make 
an immediate attack — to surprise and 
disperse them, before they could have 
time to carry out their meditated pur- 
pose. With this end in view. Colonel 
Phillipps, with 1200 mounted men and 
two field pieces, was detached, and sent 
forward in the direction of the enemy. 
We have already seen that the hostile 
Indians were congregated in strength 
in and about the village of Gibson. 
They, too, consisted of three mounted 
regiments, and were under the com- 
mand of Colonel Taylor. Phillipps di- 
vided his forces into two columns of 
equal strength. The one column, under 
Major Forman, was to cross the Neosho, 
and descend the right bank of the 
river: the other column, under Phillipps 
himself, was to march towards Gibson, 
through Park Hill and Tah-le-Quah. 
It was Phillipps' intention to advance 
and surprise the enemy on the morning 
of July, the 24th. Taylor, however, 
was not to be so easily caught. He 
had been apprised of the intended 
movement, and had made preparations 
accordingly. Sending forward some 
300 men to meet and delay the ad- 
vance of Forman, he advanced himself 
with about 800 men to meet Phillipps. 



THE INDIANS. 



369 



July On the 28th, about two o'clock 
28. iu the afternoon, Taylor came 
into contact with the National advance, 
between Gibson and Tah-le-Quah ; and 
falling upon them with tremendous 
fury, he drove them back in confu- 
sion. Their retreat, however, was soon 
arrested by the main body, which had 
found time to deploy, dismount, and 
occupy a strong position along the 
edge of a wood. As Taylor's Indians 
were rushing forward in the full tri- 
umph of victory, they were received by 
a murderous fire, the Nationals, with 
fierce yells, rushing out upon them, and 
driving them back in disorder. On a 
ridge which commanded the little val- 
ley of Bayou Barnard, they rallied and 
renewed the attack. It was, however, 
only for an instant. After the first 
fire, they fell back again and dispersed. 
In this last encounter, Colonel Taylor 
was killed. His body and the body of 
two Choctaw captains were found on 
the field. Phillipps crossed the Neosho 
and joined Forman ; but the detach- 
ment of Indians which Taylor had sent 
against the latter, contrived to escape, 
and succeeded in making its way to 
the south of the Arkansas. 

On the 19th of August, a savage at- 
\nfr, tack was made by the Sioux on 
J9» two Indian agencies and on the 
village of New Ulm, not far from 
Fort Ridgely, on the Minnesota River. 
At the agencies, all the employes were 
massacred ; and at the village, over 100 
women and children were ruthlessly 
put to death. After their bloody work, 
the Indians retired to their camp, near 
Yellow Medicine Creek. It was abso- 



lutely necessary, for the safety of the set- 
tiers, that so hori'ible an outrage should 
be promptly and adequately avenged. 
Colonel Sibley was entrusted with 
this duty. On the 19th of Sep- Sep. 
tember, taking with him about I** 
1000 men in all, composed of detach- 
ments from the Third, Sixth and Sev- 
enth regiments of Minnesota, with some 
militia, Sibley proceeded from Fort 
Ridgely towards the Indian encamp- 
ment. As soon as it became known 
that he was approaching, Little Crow, 
the chief of the tribe, called a council 
of war, and advised that an attack 
should be made on the National camps 
at night. His counsel was not ap- 
proved of by the Sioux warriors; and 
it was agreed that, to give proof of 
their courage, they should fight the 
white men openly in the broad light of 
day. On the 23d of September, ggp, 
they approached the National en- 23. 
campment from two different points; 
and rushing forward in their usual man- 
ner, uttering savage yells, they made a 
vigorous attack. The Nationals prompt- 
ly put themselves in line to receive them. 
For two hours the battle raged, the In- 
dians trying to break their ranks in 
front, to turn their right, and to strike 
them in the rear. It was all in vain. 
The Nationals were more numerous, and 
their artillery enabled them to keep the 
Indians at a distance. Peace was thus 
established on the frontier of Minnesota, 
Before the close of 1862, all those guer- 
rilla bands, both whites and redskins, 
were broken and dispersed ; and between 
the Mississippi and the Rocky Moun 
tains, the National power was supreme. 



3?6 



CHICKASAW. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 



9f*«i Oorinth — Grant's Army. — The Great Western Plan. — The Mississippi. — Grant's Inaction. — The Eeason.-^ 
Vicksbarg. — Farrae;ut at Vicksburg. — Williams and the Canal. — Reinforcements for Grant. — Grant's Army in 
Motion. — The Confederate Position. — John C. Pemberton. — The YaUabusha and Tallahatchie. — The Yazoo.^ 
Grant at La Grange. — Feeling his Way. — McPherson at Lamar, — VVashburne and Hovey. — Grant at Holly 
Springs and Oxford. — Sherman at College HUl. — Grant's New Plan. — The Expedition to the Yazoo. — Sher- 
man and Porter. — Grant to Move Against Pemberton. — McClemand's Intrigue. — Holly Springs. — Van Doru's 
£aid. — Holly Springs Captured. — Murphy's Cowardice. — Forrest's Raid. — Grant's Supplies Cut Off. — His Re- 
treat. — Failure of his Plan. — Murphy Dismissed the Army. — Grant at La Grange and Grand Junction. — Sherman 
and Porter on their Way Down the Mississippi. — Friar's Point. — Lincoln's Weakness. — McClemand's Appoint- 
ment. — Sherman and Porter at the Mouth of the Yazoo. — Disposition of the Troops. — The Plan of Attack. — 
The Disembarkation. — The Ground. — Vicksburg. — Walnut Hills. — Haines' Bluff. — Chickasaw Bayou. — The 
Slough. — Dangerous Battle Ground. — The Preparations of the Confederates. — The Nationals Prepared for the 
Attack. — Barfield's Plantation. — Movements of General • Steele. — General Frank P. Blair. — The Morning of 
the 29th of November. — The Attack. — The Reception. — Blair and Thayer. — Their Bravery. — Morgan's Failure.— 
Inactivity of Stuart and A. J. Smith. — Morgan L. Smith Wounded. — A Critical Moment. — Blair, Thayer 
and De Comcy Compelled to Fall Back. — The Sixth Missouri. — "Shoot Higher." — "Shoot Lower." — A 
Complete Failure. — Morgan to Blame. — Sherman Mortified. — A Flag of Truce. — Burying the Dead. — A Sad 
Sight. — Another Attack Resolved Upon. — The Fog. — The New Enterprise Abandoned. — End of the Second 
Campaign Against Vicksburg. — Disappointment in the North. — Rejoicing in the South. — Reflections. — 
Sherman's Mistake. — Blair the Hero of Chickasaw Bayou. — Back at the Month of the Yazoo. — Arrival of 
McClemand. — Sherman Superseded. — His NobUity of Conduct. — Army Corps. — McClemand's General Order 
No. 1. — Sherman's Order. — Arkansas Post. — The New Expedition. — Up the Mississippi. — At the Mouth of 
the White River — The " Cut-Off." — The Arkansas River. — Notrib's Farm. — Fort Hindman. — The Ground.^ 
Strength of the Fortress. — The Garrison. — Landing of the Troops. — A Detour. — Porter and his Gunboats.^ 
The Morning of the 11th of December — The Signal for Attack. — A Terrific Cannonade. — Sherman on the 
Right.— Morgan on the Left.— A Hard Struggle. —The Edge of the Woods.— The Guns of the Fort 
Silenced. — Steele's Men Performing Prodigies of Valor. — Morgan's Advance Interrupted by the Ravine. — 
Bravery of Burbridge. — The Surrender. — The Prize of Victory. — Sherman Dissatisfied, but Patiently 
Submissive. — McClemand's Report. — Petty Jealousy. — Sherman's Memoirs. — Porter's Report. — Grant's In- 
fluence. — The Day After the Battle. — Burial of the Dead. — The Transportation of Prisoners. — Little Rock. — 
Another Joint Expedition. — Des Arc and Duval's Bluff Captured. — Fort Hindman Dismantled and Blown 
Up. — On the Way Down the Arkansas. — The Army and the Flotilla at Napoleon. — Instructions from Grant. ^ 
Back at Milliken's Bend. — Estimate of the Whole Expedition. 



Attee the battle of Coriutli, which 
was fought oa the 4th of Octo- 
ber, the army, under General 
Grant, fell back to the position which 
it formerly occupied, and remained in 
comparative inacti'vity until the begin- 
nius: of November. It was stationed 
from Memphis to Bridgeport, Tennes- 
see, along the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad. Its strong points were Mem- 
phis, Grand Junction and Corinth. The 



army was arranged in four divisions. 
General Sherman, with the first divi- 
sion, was at Memphis; General Hurl- 
but, with the second, was at Jackson; 
General C. S. Hamilton, with the third, 
was at Corinth ; and General T. A. 
Davies, with the foiu'th, was at Colum- 
bus. Grant's headquarters were at 
Jackson, Tennessee, a point in the West 
where the Central Mississippi Railroad 
unites with the Mobile and Ohio. That 



FAERAGUT AND WILLIAMS. 



371 



general had not abandoned the plan 
which was inaugurated at Henry and 
Donelson. His whole soul was bent on 
the capture of Vicksburg. A variety 
of circumstances, however, had necessi- 
tated delay. The removal of Halleck 
to Washington had devolved upon him 
the entire care of the Department of 
the Tennessee — a department which 
included, in addition to Cairo, Forts 
Henry and Donelson, the whole of 
Northern Mississippi, and those por- 
tions of Tennessee and Kentucky west 
of the Tennessee River. This, how- 
ever, was not the only or even the 
most important reason. The army 
which had fought and won at Shiloh, 
at Corinth and at luka, had been great- 
ly weakened, a large proportion of its 
strength having been sent to Kentucky 
to resist the invasion of Bragg. It was 
necessary, therefore, for Grant, while 
perfecting his plans and rearranging 
his troops, to wait for reinforcements. 
As soon as the reinforcements arrived, 
he was ready to move. 

The reader has already been made 
familiar with the general plan to be 
pursued in the opening of the Missis- 
sippi ; and he has learned that a con- 
siderable portion of that plan had been 
successfully carried out. The National 
gunboats had swept the Mississippi, 
from Cairo to Memphis ; and, between 
those two points, every Confederate 
stronghold had been deserted or de- 
stroyed. Farragut, with a portion of his 
fleet, had pushed his way up to Vicks- 
burg, after the capture of New Orleans. 
He was accompanied by General F. 
Williams, with an infantry force of 



four regiments. While Farragut bom- 
barded the city, Williams was cutting 
a canal, with the view of divertino- the 
waters of the Mississippi from their 
proper channel, thus leaving Vicksburg 
high and dry on all sides. The siege 
lasted some seventy days. It was all 
to no purpose. Farragut, who failed 
to make any serious impression on the 
Confederate works, began to fear for 
his own safety. The canal, also, proved 
a complete failure. The fleet and the 
land force both found it necessary t<7 
retire ; and Vicksburg remained to ob- 
struct the navigation of the great river. 

On the 4th of November, Grant 
began to move. He transferred j^qv, 
his headquarters from Jackson to 4. 
La Grange, some few miles to the west 
of Grand Junction. He soon discovered 
that the Confederates, under General 
John C. Pemberton, a Pennsylvanian, 
who had superseded Van Dorn, were 
in considerable strength immediately in 
his front. Pemberton, in fact, had taken 
a strong position behind two lines of 
defenses, the outer being the Yalla- 
busha, and the inner being the Talla- 
hatchie — two streams which, after their 
junction, form the Fazoo River. Both 
of these streams cross the Mississippi 
Central Railroad, between Grand Junc- 
tion and Grenada. The banks of the 
Tallahatchie were strongly fortified. 
Grant's first intention was to offer 
Pemberton battle, defeat him, and force 
his way to Vicksburg. 

On the 8th, he sent out McPhersow 
with 10,000 infantry and 1500 ^'ot. 
cavalry, with instructions to drive 8. 
from Lamar a body of Confederate* 



Bf2 



<:!HICKASAW. 



who were holding the railroad. Mc- 
Pherson accomplished his task in the 
most effectual manner, the Confederates 
having been driven back as far as Holly 
Springs. 

About the 17th of November, Grant 
eummoned Sherman to meet him at 
Columbus ; and at the interview which 
there took place, the views of the two 
generals were freely exchanged, Grant 
explaining to Sherman his plan, and 
giving him his orders. It was at Sher- 
man's suggestion that a portion of 
Curtis' army, which, as we have seen 
in a previous chapter, was stationed at 
Helena, should be brought over to 
Delta, with a view to co-operate with 
Grant in his general movement towards 
Vicksburg. These troops which, in 
the absence of General Curtis, who was 
at St. Paul, being under the temporary 
command of General Frederick Steele, 
were promptly at the place appointed, 
on the eastern banks of the Mississippi. 
They numbered some 7000 men, and 
were under the joint command of Gen- 
erals A. P. Hovey and C. C. Wash- 
burne. Oi'dered to scour the country 
to the south and east, in the rear of the 
Confederate army, to destroy the rail- 
roads and bridges, so as to cut off sup- 
plies, and generally to prepare the way 
for Grant's advance, they accomplished 
their task in the most effectual manner, 
and then returned to the Mississippi. 
Pemberton, on discovering that the rail- 
roads were badly damaged, and that 
the rolling-stock was destroyed, Grant 
meanwhile pressing on his front, deemed 
it prudent to fall back on Grenada, 

On the 1st of December, Grant was 



at Holly Springs. On the 5th, he was 
at Oxford, where he established his 
headquarters. It now became a serious 
question with General Grant, how far 
he was wise in allowing himself to be 
tempted to advance into the enemy's 
country. The State of Mississippi was 
but sparsely peopled; and he had no 
means of knowing whether its resources 
were equal to the wants of a large 
army, possibly cut off from its base of 
supplies. Had he known what he 
knew afterwards, the caution would 
have been unnecessary ; and he would 
doubtless have continued hia onward 
march. 

On the 5th of December^ Sherman 
on his way to join Grant, and 0ec. 
bringing with him from Memphis 5- 
some 16,000 men, arrived at College 
Hill, about ten miles from Oxford, 
whence he reported to his chief. On 
the 8th, he received from Grant a let- 
ter, requesting his immediate presence 
at Oxford, and enclosing a message 
from Halleck to Grant, authorizing the 
latter to prosecute the new plan he had 
just submitted to him, to move his 
troops as he thought best, to retain till 
further orders all Curtis' troops now in 
his department, to telegraph to General 
Allen, in St. Louis, for all the steam- 
boats he might need, and to ask Porter 
to co-operate with his gunboats. On 
his arrival at Oxford, Sherman found 
Grant surrounded by his staff. The 
new plan was discussed and approved. 
It will be seen that Grant had made up 
his mind that, for the safety of his men 
as well as for the final success of the 
expedition, it was necessary to take 




o 
a 

•s. 




TORTBAITS fSY SOME OF THE GENERALS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 




PORTKAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. 




PORTRAITS OF SHERMAN AND SOME OF HIS COMMANDERS. 




PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS. 




PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. 




■\VS8SKX3s-S5SW3RS. 



PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. 




PORTRAITS OF THF PPiwr-ir., t ^ 

iHE PRINCIPAL NAVAL COMMANDER^' 



DURING THE WA9 




PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS- 




PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS. 




POETRAITS OF PKOMINENT UNION GENERALS. 




POETEAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERAIS. 







PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERALS. 




POKTEAITS OF SOME OF THE LEADERS OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 



DISASTER AT HOLLY SPRINGS. 



373 



full advantage ot the river communica- 
tion with Vicksburg. It was agreed 
that a large force on transports should 
proceed down the Mississippi, under 
convoy of Porter's gunboats, that on 
reaching the mouth of the Yazoo, they 
should open up that water line, and, by 
a joint attack of the land and naval 
forces, attempt to capture Vicksburg in 
the rear. Grant, meanwhile, was to 
press forward towards Jackson, which 
is only some forty-six miles to the 
west of Vicksburg, offering Pemberton 
battle, and following him up close in 
the event of his retreat, in the hope of 
finding Sherman on the Yazoo with 
supplies, or in possession of Vicksburg. 
Happily, Grant had been left com- 
plete control of the whole movement, 
Halleck having offered no special ad- 
vice, and imposed no conditions. He 
could move at will, and he could place 
in prominent command the men of his 
own choice. Sherman, who commanded 
the right wing of Gi'ant's army, was 
appointed to the command of the river 
expedition, and received his instruc- 
tions. Grant had the greater pleasure 
m appointing Sherman to this com- 
mand that McClernand, who had great 
influence with the president, was known 
to be intriguing for an independent 
command on the Mississippi. Sherman 
was, therefore, ordered to take com- 
mand of the forces at Memphis, and 
those also at Helena and Delta, under 
General Steele, to descend the river 
by transports, with the gunljoat fleet 
as a convoy, commanded by Admiral 
Porter, and to attack Vicksburg by the 
-'9th of November, McClernand was 

»40 



to take the forces at Cairo, and to pro- 
ceed to Vicksburg, so as to be in 
time to lend Sherman effective aid as 
soon as he made the attack. Grant 
himself, as we have said, was to move 
rapidly on the Confederates to the 
north and east of Vicksburg, to follow 
them if they should retreat towards the 
city, and to take part with Sherman, if 
necessary, in the reduction of the place. 
It was a well-conceived plan. Its suc- 
cess, however, depended on the prompt 
and faithful execution of all its parts. 
Grant knew that it was unsafe to trust 
for supplies solely to the enemy's coun- 
try. He had therefore, repaired the 
Central Mississippi Railroad as far aa 
Oxford, where, for the present, he had 
established his headquarters ; and Holly 
Springs, which was entrusted to the 
care of Colonel R. C. Murphy, was re- 
tained as a grand depot and hospital. 

Let us see how this plan was carried 
out. Grant had taken great care that 
no misfortune should befall him in his 
rear. He had left small but adequate 
garrisons at Columbus, at Humboldt, 
Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, 
Holly Springs, Coldwater, Davis' Mills 
and Middlebury. He had taken par- 
ticular care of Holly Springs ; for 
he knew that the treasures at that 
place presented a powerful temptation 
to Van Dorn. On the night of the 
I9th, he warned Murphy of his danger, 
and informed him that he had sent 4000 
men to enable him to rej^el any attack 
which might be made upon him. Mur- 
phy, it would seem, paid little heed to 
the instructions given him. He made 
no extra preparations to resist the enemj. 



iU 



CHICKASAW. 



On the morning of the 20th, at day- 
Dec break, Van Dorn, executing a 
20» briUlant cavalry operation, rushed 
upon the place with tremendous fury. 
Murphy offered no resistance. The 
Second Illinois, however, refused to 
Biirrender, and gallantly fought their 
way out, with a loss of only seven men. 
Murphy, with the rest of his men, ac- 
cepted a paiole. Van Dorn seized all 
the property, valued at over $1,500,000, 
taking with him what he could cany, 
and destroying the remainder. He set 
fire to the buildings, not even sparing 
the hospital, which was filled with sick 
and wounded soldiers. This was the 
second time that Murphy had been 
guilty of such conduct. He did the 
same thing at luka. General Grant 
was wild with rage. It was his opinion 
that with " all the cotton, public stores 
and substantial buildings about the 
depot," Murphy ought to have been 
able to keep the assailants at bay until 
relief arrived. It was only four hours 
after the catastrophe, when the 4000 
men sent to his aid arrived on the spot. 
Grant was particularly incensed at Mur- 
phy for accepting a parole for himself 
and his men. A cartel had been agreed 
to by the rival commanders ; and it had 
been stipulated that each party should 
take care of his own prisoners. If 
Murphy had refused parole for himself 
and men, Van Dorn would have been 
"compelled to release them uncon- 
ditionally, or to have abandoned all 
further aggressive movements for the 
time being." In a severe oi'der, on the 
9th of January, General Grant dis- 
'"lissed Murphy from the army, the 



order to take effect "from December 
20th, the date of his cowardly and dis- 
graceful conduct." 

The disaster at Holly Springs was 
ruinous to Grant's plan. It robbed him 
of supplies, which, it was intended, 
should sustain the army for several 
weeks. To replace them, it would be 
necessary to put in operation all the 
capacity and force of the Columbus 
Railroad ; but this railroad had been 
destroyed, and weeks would be ex- 
hausted before it could be put in work- 
ing order. Ignorant of the resources 
of the country, and not knowing 
whether, in the event of his pressing 
forward, he should find Sherman in the 
vicinity of Vicksburg, he deemed it his 
duty to fall back. He immediately re- 
crossed the Tallahatchie. Having no 
other means of subsisting his army, he 
made requisitions on the inhabitants as 
he moved along. On the 23d of De- 
cember, he was at Holly Springs, now 
a scene of wreck and ruin ; and a few 
days later, he re-entered La Grange 
and Grand Junction, where he was once 
more in communication with Corinth 
and Memphis. Pemberton made no at- 
tempt to pursue. On the contrary, 
taking advantage of the retreat of his 
antagonist, he withdrew the greater 
portion of his forces from Grenada, and 
concentrated towards Vicksburg. 

On the same day that Van Dorn 
made his raid on Holly Springs, an at- 
tack was made by a Confederate forct 
on Davis' Mills, a little further to the 
north. In the neighborhood of Jack- 
son, Tennessee, a vital point in Grant's 
line of communications, an attack w^e 



THE J-OINT EXPEDITION. 



67S 



made by a body of cavalry under For- 
rest, on the 19th. The telegraph wii-es 
were cut, and the railroad was destroyed. 
On the following day Forrest presented 
himself before Humboldt and Trenton. 
These and other stations along the rail- 
road, such as Dyer's, Rutherford and 
Kenton, fell an easy prey to the enemy. 
It seemed to be the purpose of the 
Confederates to destroy every railroad 
bridge from Columbus to Corinth, and 
thus to cut Grant off from all his com- 
munications and supplies. So far, they 
had carried out their purpose with 
determination, and with not a little 
success. Never was campaign opened 
under apparently happier auspices. 
The rich bud of promise, however, was 
cruelly blasted. 

Grant's plan of the campaign had 
failed. Meanwhile, what of Sherman ? 
On the 20th, the very day on which 
Van Dorn and Forrest struck the blow 
which compelled Grant to fall back 
and abandon his part of the joint un- 
dertaking, Sherman took his departure 
fi'om Memphis. Taking with him over 
20,000 troops in transports, he left, as 
a guard to the city, a strong force of 
infantry and cavalry, and the siege 
guns in position, with a complement of 
gunners. On the following day, at 
Friar's Point, he was joined by Admi- 
ral Porter, in his flag-ship Black Hawk, 
with the Marmora, Captain Getty, and 
the Conestoga, Captain Selfridge, which 
were to act as a convoy. The remain- 
der of Porter's fleet were at the mouth 
of the Yazoo. On the same evening, 
the 21st, the troops at Helena embark- 
ed in transports, and came to Friar's 



Point. Sherman's force was now at 
least 30,000 strong. All the an-ange- 
ments were completed; and the joint 
expedition was moving down the river 
the following morning. 

Sherman got away just in time to se- 
cure for himself the glory or dishonor 
of the expedition. Had he lingered a 
day longer, he woiJd have been super, 
seded in his command by General 
McClernand. It is a strange story, 
and one which, for tiie sake of all the 
parties concerned, it would be well if 
the world could forget. We will not 
enter into details. It has already been 
stated that General McClernai?d was a 
warm personal friend of President Lin 
coin, and that he was ambitious of ai. 
independent command on the Missis 
sippi. It is not necessary to say thai 
Sherman was a man according to Grant's 
own heart. Since that great day at 
Shiloh, theii- fates had been linked to- 
gether, and they had been to each other 
like David and Jonathan. Sherman 
was also a great favorite with Halleck, 
the commander-in-chief at Washing- 
ton. But for the personal wishes of 
Grant and Halleck, both of whom 
knew well that Sherman was the man 
for the position, McClernand would 
have been appointed by Lincoln in the 
first instance to 'the command of the 
I'iver expedition. 

McClernand, however, was not to be 
put off ; and Lincoln, who was always 
unwilling to disoblige a friend, was 
weak enough to yield to his entreaties. 
On the 18th of December, an order fioni 
the president reached Grant, directing 
him to divide all his forces into four 



576 



CHICKASAW. 



army corps, to assign one corps to 
McClernand, and to place him at the 
head of the troops destined for the 
attack upon Vicksburg. Grant could 
hardlj' fail to see in this order a blow 
aimed at himself. It was a most awk- 
ward circumstance, and reflected little 
credit on the wisdom and good sense of 
the president. Good and great as he 
was, Lincoln was not without his weak- 
nesses. He was vain enough to imagine 
that he knew quite as much as his gen- 
erals in the field ; and he was disposed 
to deal with military officers, as he was 
in the habit of dealing with politicians. 
It is not much to be wondered at if 
Grant was staggered by this order, and 
if he was slow to put it in execution. 
It was not difficult for him to find an ex- 
cuse. He was in the midst of his pre- 
parations for an onward march. The 
reconstruction of his army, according 
to the instructions received, occupied 
him the whole of the 19th. The disaster 
at Holly Springs, compelling a back- 
ward movement, occurred on the 20th ; 
and the raids of Forrest on the same 
day deprived him of the use of the 
telegraph. As it was, Sherman had 
proceeded down the river before any 
counter-instructions reached Memphis. 
If Sherman had any reason to fear a 
counter-order, his haste to get ready 
and his prompt departure but revealed 
the soldierly spirit and true character 
of the man. As the result proved, it 
was well for Sherman, well for General 
Grant, and well for the nation at large, 
that Lincoln's order did not take effect 
before the 20th of December. 

On Christmas Day, the expedition 



Deci 
25. 



under Sherman and Porter had 
reached Milliken's Bend, when 
Sherman detached Burbridge's brigade, 
of A. J. Smith's di^■^sion, to break up 
the i-ailroad leading ft-om Vicksburg to 
Shreveport, Louisiana. Leaving A. J. 
Smith's division to await the arrival, 
the remaining divisions proceeded, on 
the 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo, 
and up that river to Johnson's planta- 
tion, some thirteen miles, and there dis- 
embarked. The disembarkation was 
conducted without any opposition, 
Steele's division landed furthest up the 
river, above what is called Chickasaw 
Bayou ; Morgan's division a little lower 
down, at the house of Johnson, which 
had been burned by the gunboats on a 



former occasion ; M 



oi-gan 



L. Smith's 



division below that of Morgan ; and 
A. J. Smith's, which arrived next night, 
below that of M. L. Smith. The 
groimd on which Sherman now found 
himself presented obstacles of which 
formerly he had but a very imperfect 
conception. 

Vicksburg is built on a range of 
bluffs, known as the Walnut Hills. 
These hills, which take their rise a lit- 
tle below the city, extend for the most 
part in a northeasterly direction, ter- 
minating in Haines' Bluff, a distance 
of some thirteen or fourteen miles. The 
configuration of these hills has been 
compared to the ridge at Inkerman, to 
which, it is said, they bear, in some par- 
ticulars, a striking resemblance. Their 
average height is about two hundred 
feet. Where the Mississippi touches 
their base at Vicksburg, and for some 
miles both above and below, they are 



THE YAZOO. 



377 



precipitous. Along their entire length, 
indeed, from Vicksbui-g to Haines' Bluff, 
their face is very abrupt, and cut up by 
numerous valleys and ravines. The 
only approach to the city by land, from 
up the river, is by climbing their al- 
most perpendicular front. The ground 
beyond is high, broken, and somewhat 
rolling, gradually descending to the 
Big Black River. The Yazoo, which 
skirts the ridge at Haines' Bluff, about 
nine miles above Vicksburg by the 
road, along the foot of the bluffs, flows 
in a southwestern direction, and before 
discharging its waters into the Missis- 
sippi, crosses an old arm of the river, 
which now forms a semicii'cular lake. 

The Yazoo evidently, in times gone 
by, clung to the foot of the hills ; and 
traces of its former whereabouts are to 
be seen in the numerous bayous and 
channels by which the intervening 
ground is cut up. One of these bayous 
puts off from the Yazoo, about one 
third of the distance below Haines' 
Bluff, running at right angles with the 
river until it approaches the bluffs, 
when it turns and follows their base 
until it empties itself into the Missis- 
sippi. It is called Chickasaw Bayou. 
Between the bayou and the hills there 
was an irregular strip of land, on which 
the trees had been filled to form an 
abatis. It was dotted also with rifle- 
pits. Rifle-trenches abounded, too, 
along the front of the bluffs ; and the 
heights above were crowned with bat- 
teries. About a mile to the northeast 
of the bayou, and parallel with it, there 
is a deep slough, which makes a sharp 
turn as it approaches the bluffs, and 



enters Chickasaw Bayou at the point 
where the latter is checked in its course, 
and turns to flow along the base of the 
hills. There was thus a fortified Hne 
some twelve or thirteen miles in la^igth 
formed of abatis and rifle-pits, with an 
impassable ditch in front, and terminat- 
ing in the powerful fixed batteries a< 
Haines' Bluff, on the one hand, and it 
the heavy batteries and field works 
above Vicksburg, on the other. The 
land lying between the Yazoo and the 
Chickasaw was not only low and 
swampy : it was, except in one or two 
places, where there were plantations, 
densely wooded. The distance from 
Johnson's Landing to the Chickasaw 
was about six miles. Such was the 
ground over which Sherman proposed 
to march his men. Such were the ob- 
stacles to be overcome before he could 
enter Vicksburg. To the National com- 
mander, however, and to his ofiicers, 
these obstacles were, as yet, but imper- 
fectly known. 

General Shennan's army was organ- 
ized in four divisions. The first divi 
sion, comprising three brigades, wast 
under Brigadier-General George "W. 
Morgan; second division, three brl 
gades, under Brigadier-General Morgan 
L. Smith ; third division, three brigades, 
under Brigadier-General A. J. Smith; 
fourth division, four brigades, undei 
Brigadier-General Frederick Steele. 
The brigade commanders of the fourtlj 
division were Generals Frank P. Blair^ 
John M. Thayer, 0. E. Hovey, an(j 
Colonel Hassendurbel. According to 
Sherman's plan of attack, General 
Steele was to hold the extreme left, 



S78 



CHICKASAW. 



General Morgan the left centre, Gen- 
eral M. L. Smith the right centre, and 
General A. J. Smith the extreme right. 
As the latter general had not yet ar- 
rived from Milliken's Bend, where we 
left him waiting for Burbridge, Gen- 
eral Frank P. Blair, with his brigade, 
was detached from Steele's division, and 
placed on Morgan's right. The object 
of this arrangement was to distract the 
enemy's attention, leading him to ex- 
pect an attack at a number of different 
points. Instructions, however, had been 
given to each of the commanders to 
converge toward the point of attack, at 
or near Barfield's plantation. There it 
had been discovered the bayou could 
be crossed at two points — at a sand 
bar, and at a narrow levee. 

On the 27th, the army began to 
Pec. move. General Steele, who had 
27' been ordered to take position on 
the further side of the slough above 
this bayou, experienced great difficulty 
in landing his troops. So soft and 
slushy was the ground, and so dense 
was the brushwood, that he found it 
necessary to construct roads for moving 
his wagons and artillery. When night 
came he had only advanced some two 
miles from the shore. During the 
^eater portion of next day he pushed 
forward his command; but he was com- 
pelled to report to Sherman that he 
found it physically impossible to reach 
the bluifs from his position, and that 
to persist in the attempt, would inevit- 
ably lead to the ruin of his troops, and 
the loss of his field equipage. He was, 
therefore, ordered to leave some of his 
troops behind him as a show of force, 



to hasten to the west side of the Chick- 
asaw Bayou, and take a position on 
Morgan's left. On the 27th, Blair 
moved slowly towards the bluffs, his 
desire being to give Steele time to 
come into position on the left. He 
succeeded in silencing one of the ene- 
my's batteries at the point where he 
expected Steele would be able to join 
him, and held his ground. 

On the 28th, the various divisions 
pressed forward; and the Na- Dec. 
tional troops were in full posses- 28. 
sion on the Yazoo side of the bayou, 
with one bridge thrown across, and 
with two bridges partially constructed. 
Duj'ing the course of the day, while re- 
counoitering. General M. L. Smith was 
severely wounded in the hip, and com- 
pelled to retire to his steamboat. His 
command devolved on General Stuart ; 
bat Sherman, feeling convinced that 
A. J. Smith could accomplish nothing 
on the extreme right, because of the 
heavy fire of the forts immediately in 
his front, ordered him to leave Bur- 
bridge in position at tliat point, and to 
come up with a portion of his forces 
to the point selected for crossing the 
bayou, and entinisted liim with the 
execution of the task. Such was the 
state of things on the night of the 
28th. General Morgan was in position 
on the west or rather southwest side of 
the Chickasaw; General Blair was a 
little to his right, near the angle of the 
bayou ; General M. L. Smith's division, 
under General Stuart, was on the right 
centre; General A. J. Smith's, which 
was further to the right, had taken posi- 
tion near the place where the bayou 



THE ATTACK. 



879 



was to be crossed; and General Steele 
was moving up on the left, to act as a 
reserve to Morgan. 

On the morning of the 29th, all 
Dec, things were in readiness for the 
29» attack. It was Shennan's object, 
as he himself has told us, to make a 
lodgment on the foot-hills and bluffs 
abreast of his position, while diver- 
sions were being made by the navy at 
Haines' Bluff, and by the first division, 
directly towards Vicksburg. We have 
already mentioned that there were two 
crossings — one in front of Morgan, and 
another a little furthei* to the south- 
west, in front of M. L. Smith. An 
attempt was made by A. J. Smith to 
thi'ow a light-flyiug bridge over the 
bayou, more to the right. On the ex- 
treme left, a little above the angle of 
the Chickasaw, near the house of Mrs. 
Lake, Blair's men had succeeded in 
constructing a bridge, but not without 
great difficulty, and with very consider- 
able loss. Sherman expected great 
things from General Morgan, who, as 
we have seen, commanded the first di- 
vision, and was to lead the attack in 
person. Sherman pointed out to him 
the place where he could pass the 
bayou, and received for answer : " Gen- 
eral, in ten minutes after you give the 
signal, I'll be on those hills." His po- 
sition was one of considerable difficulty. 
The crossing was narrow ; and immedi- 
ately opposite, at the base of the hills, 
there was a Confederate battery, sup- 
(ported by infantry, posted on the spurs 
of the hills in the rear. This was the 
real point of attack; but to distract the 
attention of the enemy, Shei'mau's in- 



structions were that the initial move- 
ments should be made at the flanks. 

It was about noon before the signal 
was given for a general forward move- 
ment across the bayou and towards the 
enemy's position. A heavy artillery 
fii'e was opened all along the National 
line. It recalled the memory of luka 
and Corinth. The Confederate batteries 
made a prompt reply, and were soon 
followed by the infantry, which opened 
a perfect tempest of lead on the ad- 
vance ranks of Morgan and A. J. Smith. 
In the midst of this fierce storm of can- 
non-shot and musketiy, De Courcy's 
brigade, of Morgan's division, succeeded 
in crossing the bayou; but so terrific 
was the fire that they took to cover be- 
hind the bank, and could not be moved 
forward. General Blair, meanwhile, 
had crossed the bayou by the bridge 
above the angle, and had reached the 
slough, the bottom of which was quick- 
sand, and the banks of which were cov- 
ered with felled trees. With great 
difficulty, and not until his ranks were 
thrown into some disorder, was the 
crossing of the slough accomplished. 
This done, it was necessary, before 
reaching the enemy's works, to traverse 
a sloping plateau, raked by a direct 
and enfilading fire from heavy artillery, 
and swept by a storm of bullets from 
the rifle-pits. Nothing daunted, Blair 
and his brave brigade — his own and 
his officers' horses having been left be- 
hind, some of them floundering in the 
mire and vainly seeking a foothold in 
the quicksand — went bounding acrocs 
the plateau. Rushing upon the rifle- 
pits, they captured the first line and 



880 



CHICKASAW. 



then the second, and made a desperate 
effort to gain the crest of the hill on 
which the batteries were planted. 

Colonel Thayer, of Steele's division, 
had followed Blair, with his brigade, 
over the same bridge. Entering the 
4xhdtis at the same point, he turned 
iomewhat to the right, and emerged 
upon the plateau almost simultaneously 
with Blair, and about two hundred 
yards to his right. Unfortunately, 
however, Thayer found that he was fol- 
lowed by only one regiment ; his second 
regiment, after his movement had com- 
menced, having been ordered to the 
support of Morgan, and the other two 
regiments having followed this one by 
mistake. It was a sad blunder, and 
one which contributed not a little to 
the disaster of the day. Thayer dis- 
covered the mistake before he had faii'- 
ly brought his troops into action ; but 
he was too brave a man to halt or 
hesitate in the circumstances On he 
pushed to the right of Blair, and I'en- 
dered effective aid in the capture of the 
second line of rifle-pits. Leaving his 
regiment to hold the position it had 
won, he hurried, back, with Blair's con- 
sent, to obtain reinforcements. It was 
a trying interval. The moments seemed 
hours. " It was a struggle," as has 
been well said, "between three thou- 
sand in the open ground below and ten 
thousand behind entrenchments above." 
The hill sides bristled with bayonets 
and blazed with the fire of musketry, 
while, from the angry mouths of huge 
cannon^ destruction was poured foiih 
upon the shattered and rapidly thinning 
ranks of the assailants. Blair, impa- 



tient for the return of Thayer, rushed 
back himself to persuade the advance 
of more troops. It was all in vain. 
Both Thayer and himself failed in 
obtaining reinforcements. No help 
reached them; no diversion was made' 
in their favor. They had no choice but 
to order a retreat. Blair and Thayer 
fell back, with, a loss of at least one 
third of their men; and De Courcy, 
who had been attacked on the flank by 
the Seventeenth and Twenty-Sixth Lou- 
isiana, lost four flags, 332 men made 
prisoners, and about 500 small arms. 

The attack was a complete failure. 
Somehow, the signal for attack was im- 
perfectly understood. Either that, or 
it was not heard at all on the right. 
Two divisions had remained immovable, 
while a handful of men were being 
crushed in a desperate attempt on the 
left. A. J. Smith had done nothing. 
Stuart had managed to push across one 
regiment — the Sixth Missouri— which 
had orders to undermine the bluff. The 
position of those men was one which 
severely tried then- faith and patience. 
They were exposed to the vertical fire 
of the Confederate sharpshooters who 
occupied the ridge ; and a battalion of 
the Thirteenth Regulars, who were 
stationed opposite, and who attempted 
to protect them from the Confederate 
fire, proved eq^ually dangerous with the 
enemy above. " Shoot higher !" shouted 
the Nationals below the bluff. "Shoot 
lower!" cried the Confederates. After 
dai'k, this regiment was brouo;ht back 
over the bayou. The remainder of 
Steele's division did not get up in time 
to be of any assistance to Blair. Mor- 



SAD SCENES. 



3&1 



gau failed to make good his promise. 
He did not even obey his orders. Gen- 
eral Sherman was particularly severe on 
Morgan. To him, and to his conduct, 
he attributed the failare of the attack. 
" This attack failed," he has since told 
us in his memoirs, " and I have always 
felt that it was due to the failure of Gen- 
eral G. W. Morgan to obey his orders, 
or to fulfil his promises made in person. 
Had he used with skill and boldness 
one of his brigades, in addition to that 
of Blair, he could have made a lodg- 
ment on the bluff, which would have 
opened the door for our whole force to 
follow." 

Sherman was naturally mortified at 
the " lame and impotent conclusion " 
of a movement which, he had fondly 
and confidently believed, would result 
in a great and decisive victory. Baffled, 
and even humiliated, he was not dis- 
mayed. He resolved to make another 
attack; and arrangements were made 
to push forward General Hovey to the 
position from which Blair had been 
driven ; Morgan's division, with the 
brigades of Blair and Thayer, to follow 
and support. For some reason it was 
not done ; and next morning it was 
found to be impossible, because of the 
increased strength of the Confederates 
at the menaced point. Firing was con- 
tinued on both sides during Tuesday ; 
Dec. and on Wednesday, the 31st, a 
31« flag of truce was sent in ; and the 
dead were buried, and the wounded 
cared for. An eye-witness has given 
us a sad picture of the battle field on 
that day of burial. "All across the 
plain, scattered among the abatis, and 



hid away in little entanglements of 
bogs, or tufts of bushes, they lay, Con- 
federates and Federals side by side, 
showing how the battle had rolled and 
surged with the alternate charges of 
either party. But the saddest sight of 
all was that of the unfortunate wound- 
ed who had lain through all these weary 
hours, since the battle, uncared for, 
many of them, because the nature of 
their wounds prevented them from 
moving; others were held fast by a 
little knot of corpses which chance had 
thrown upon them; and still others, 
perhaps not wounded at all at first, 
but being caught beneath the horses 
they rode, as they fell, were pinned to 
the earth. The frantic appeals for 
water, for food, or other succor, of such 
of these miserable victims of war as 
could speak at all, were most heart- 
rending." 

Sherman was still dissatisfied, and 
resolved to make another attack. After 
consulting with Admiral Porter, it was 
agreed that a combined naval and land 
assault should be made on Haines' 
Bluff, the key of the Confederate posi- 
tion. Porter was to proceed up the 
Yazoo with his gunboats, and open fire 
on the blufPs, while General Steele was 
to land his division out of range of the 
enemy's guns, then to push forward 
and take the position by storm. The 
attack was to be made during the dark 
hours. By two o'clock on the morn- 
ing of Thursday, the 1st of Jan- 
uaiy, the necessary arrangements 
were completed. A heavy fog, how- 
ever, had enveloped the entire district; 
and so dense was it that Porter found it 



1863. 



X41 



382 



CHICKASAW. 



impossible to steer the boats. It was 
utterly out of the question to make 
any further efforts. On the night of 
the 29th December, there had been a 
tremendous rain-storm ; all the low 
ground was flooded ; and the men who 
had been bivouacking for five successive 
days in those wretched swamps, with- 
out fire, were suffering cruelly fi'om 
Jan, damp and cold. On the 2d of 
2« January, Sherman placed his 
troops on board the transports ; and 
the fleet sailed dowm to the mouth of 
the Yazoo. Thus ended, somewhat in- 
gloriously, the second campaign against 
Vicksburg. Shennan had accomplished 
nothing. He had, however, made great 
sacrifices ; his loss in killed and wound- 
ed and prisoners amounting to nearly 
2000 men. Such was the battle of 
Chickasaw Bayou, or, as it is sometimes 
but less correctly named, the battle of 
Haines' Bluff. 

It was a sad disappointment to the 
people of the North; and Sherman, 
from whom great things were expected, 
came in for a large share of abuse. 
Several of the correspondents on the 
spot, ignorant of some of the causes of 
the failure, and not knowing as yet 
the fate which had befallen Grant, were 
unnecessarily severe in their condemna- 
tion of Sherman. That he meant well, 
that he was resolved to win, and that 
his plan was well-conceived, there can 
be no doubt. But somehow the execu- 
tion was not equal to the conception. 
There was some mistake in giving 
the signal; and the real assault was 
made by only 3000 men. If Blair had 
been sustained in his attack, as he 



ought to have been sustained, the Na- 
tional army would most undoubtedly 
have effected a lodgment on the 
heights; and, although hard fighting 
must have followed with doubtful suc- 
cess, it is not at all impossible that 
Sherman might have reaped all the 
glory due to the capture of Vicksburg. 
Blair will be remembered as the hero 
of Chickasaw Bayou. He fought like 
a warrior of old, face to face and hand 
to hand with the foe. After Blair, 
praise is due to Thayer, who gallantly 
sustained his companion in arms. The 
battle ground, no doubt, had much to 
do with the defeat. To any one of 
less daring than Sherman, familiar 
with the district, and well-informed as 
to the strength of the enemy's position, 
the undertaking might have seemed 
impracticable from the outset ; and it is 
questionable whether even he, had he 
possessed a fuller knowledge of the 
difiiculties which beset him, would 
have imperilled his fame and risked 
the lives of his soldiers in a task so 
apparently hopeless. It was doubtless 
a mistake not to have more thoroughly 
and oflicially reeonnoitered the ground 
before choosing it as the field of action. 
After all, however, it was an experi- 
ment which might have been successful ; 
and it was not the only unsuccessful 
experiment which was made before 
Vicksburg was captured. As it was, 
everything might have been well, if 
Grant had been able to carry out his 
part of the plan. The retreat of the 
latter from Oxford, leaving, as it did, 
Pemberton free to concentrate hi? 
troops for the defense of Vicksbm-g, 



McCLERNAND IN COMMAND. 



3S3 



iargely diminished Sherman's chances 
>f success. 

The Confederates were jubilant after 
this first victory. It was undoubtedly 
ft great triumph. General Pemberton, 
not without reason, felt proud that he 
had baffled Grant in person, compelling 
him to retreat, and that he had tem- 
porarily, at least, saved Vicksburg by 
the defeat of the greatest of Grant's 
lieutenants. These z'ejoicings in the 
South were not unmixed with sorrow. 
The more thoughtful of the Confed- 
erates knew that defeat only intensi- 
fied the purpose of the North. Vicks- 
burg had not yet fallen ; but Vicksburg, 
they felt, was doomed. 

We left the transports and the fleet 
on their way down the Yazoo. At the 
mouth of that river, General McCler- 
nand was waiting ^vith orders fi-om the 
War Department to take command of 
the entire expedition. That general, 
it will be remembered, was appointed 
to this command by the direct influence 
of President Lincoln. It was a severe 
blow to Sherman, who felt it keenly. 
It was some consolation, however, to 
him to know that the appointment — 
which had been made weeks ahead, 
and which had no connection with the 
recent disaster — was not intended as a 
disgrace. With a modesty which be- 
came a man of his high spirit, he ac- 
cepted the situation, and explained to 
McClernand what had been done, ac- 
cepting the entire responsibility of the 
failure. Referring to the trains of cars 
which could be heard coming in to 
Vicksburg almost every hour, and the 
fresh troops seen on the bluffs, he gave 



it as his opinion that Pemberton's army 
must have been pressed back, and that 
Grant must be at hand. He then 
learned, for the first time, what had 
befallen Grant ; McClernand stating 
that Grant was not coming at all, that 
the depot at Holly Springs had been 
captured by Van Dorn, that Grant had 
fallen back from Coffeeville and Ox- 
ford to Holly Springs and La Grange, 
and that when he passed down, Quim- 
by's division, of Grant's army, was ac- 
tually at Memphis for stores. By 
common consent, all further attempts 
against Vicksburg, for the present, 
were abandoned ; and the entire force 
left the Yazoo, and retired to Milli- 
ken's Bend on the Mississippi. 

On the 4th of January, McClernand 
issued his General Order No. 1, assum- 
ing command of what was to be called 
the army of the Mississippi, and, fol- 
lowing the plan which had been agreed 
upon at Washington, and which had 
been adopted in the armies of the East, 
dividing his forces into two corps. 
The first was to be commanded by 
General Morgan, and was to be com- 
posed of his own and A. J. Smith's 
divisions ; and the second, to consist of 
Steele's and Stuart's divisions, was to 
be commanded by General Sherman. 
The rest of the army of the Tennessee 
was similarly divided, General Hurl- 
but being placed in command of one 
corps, and General McPherson in com- 
mand of the other. The supreme com- 
mand of these four corps was retained 
by General Grant, On the same day, 
General Sherman issued the following 
order : 



384 



UUICKASAW. 



*' Headquarters Right Wing Abmt of Tennessee 
Steamer Forest Queen, Milliken's Bend, 
January 4, 1863. 

" Pursuant to the terms of Greneral 
Order No. 1, made this day by General 
McClernand, the title of our army ceases 
to exist, and constitutes in the future 
the army of the Mississippi, composed 
of two 'army corps'; one to be com- 
manded by General G. W. Morgan, and 
the other by myself. In relinquishing 
the command of the army of the Ten- 
nessee, and restricting my authority to 
my own corps, I desire to express to all 
commandei's, to soldiers and officers re- 
cently operating before Vicksbui'g, aiy 
hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and 
courage manifested by them on all oc- 
casions. We failed in accomplishing 
one great purpose of our movement — 
the capture of Vicksburg ; but we were 
part of a whole. Ours was but part of 
a combined movement in which others 
were to assist. We were on time; un- 
foreseen contingencies must have de- 
layed the others. We have destroyed 
the Shreveport Road, we have attacked 
the defenses of Vicksburg, and pushed 
the attack as far as prudence would jus- 
tify ; and, having found it too strong for 
our single column, we have drawn off in 
good order and good spirits, ready for 
any new move. A new commander is 
now here to lead you. He is chosen by 
the president of the United States, who 
is charged by the Constitution to main- 
tain and defend it, and he has the un- 
doubted right to select his own agents. 
I know that all good officers and sol- 
diers will give him the same hearty 
support and cheerful obedience they 



have hitherto given me. There are 
honors enough in reserve for all, and 
woi'k enough, too. Let each do his ap- 
propriate part, and our nation must, in 
the end, emerge from the dire conflict 
purified and ennobled by the fires which 
now test its strength and purity. All 
officers of the general staff not attached 
to my person will hereafter repoi"t in 
person and by letter to Major-General 
McClernand, commanding the army of 
the Mississippi, on board the steamer 
Tigress at our rendezvous at Haines' 
Landing and at Montgomery Point. 

"By order of 
"Major-General W. T. Sherman. 
"J. H. Hammond, 
"Assistant-Adjutant General." 

Before the arrival of McClernand, 
Sherman and Porter had agreed upon a 
plan for the reduction of Fort Hind- 
man, or, as it was called, Arkansas Post. 
About forty or forty-five miles from the 
mouth of the Arkansas, there is a piece 
of elevated ground, the first high land 
on the banks of the river, after leaving 
the Mississippi. At this point, the 
river makes a sharp bend. Here the 
French had a trading post and a settle- 
ment as far back as 1685. The Con- 
federates had taken advantage of the 
place to erect some fortifications, the 
principal work being named Fort Hind- 
man, after the famous guerrilla chief. 
Behind these works, they kept several 
steamboats, which were wont to sweep 
down the river and intercept supplies. 
Sherman had experienced some incon- 
venience from the existence of this 
stronghold. He had left Memphis in 
such haste that he had not been able tu 



WHITE RIVEE. 



38A 



take with him a sufficient supply of 
ammunition for his guns. The Blue 
Wing, a small steamer carrying a mail, 
towing some coal barges, and having 
with her the necessary supplies, had 
been sent after him. This boat had 
been poimced upon at the mouth of the 
Arkansas, captured, and, with all her 
supplies, taken up to Fort Hindman. It 
was Sherman's conviction, from the 
moment he learned of the fate of the 
Blue Wing, that before any operation 
could be successfully conducted against 
Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi, 
it would be necessary to reduce Fort 
Hindman, and make an end of the Ar- 
kansas pirates. Sherman communicated 
his purpose to McClernand, and asked 
permission to go up the Arkansas, and 
clear out the post. McClernand, who 
had not as yet, so far as appearances 
indicated, formed any plan of his own, 
went with Sherman on board the Black 
Hawk to consult with Porter. Porter, 
who had the highest esteem for Sher- 
man, not only approved of the enter- 
prise, but expressed a desire to go up 
the river himself, in place of trusting 
the expedition to any of his subordi- 
nates. It was Sherman's expectation 
that he would be sent, with his own 
coi-ps, alone on this business ; but Mc- 
Clernand concluded to go himself, and 
to take with him his whole force. 

The troops, which had not yet dis- 
embarked from the transports, were 
ordered to remain on board. Sher- 
man's corps was in two divisions. The 
first, which consisted of three brigades, 
commanded respectively by Blair, 
Hovey and Thayer, was uudrr Bi'iga- 



dier-General Frederick Steele. The 
second, which consisted of two bri- 
gades, commanded by Colonels G. A. 
Smith and T. Kilby Smith, was under 
Brigadier-General Stuart. The trans- 
ports with the troops on board, con- 
voyed by the gun boats, of which 
three were iron-clads, proceeded up the 
Mississippi. The force under McCler- 
nand amounted to some 26,000 or 
27,000 men, comprising 40 regiments 
of infantry, 10 batteries with several 
guns of heavy calibre, and about 
1500 horse. On the 8th of January, 
the expedition was at the mouth of the 
White River. This river, which is one 
of the principal streams in Arkansas, 
rises a few miles east of Fayetteville, 
flows northeast into Missouri, then re- 
turns into Arkansas, and, pursuing a 
southeasterly course, enters the Missis- 
sippi about fifteen miles above the 
mouth of the Arkansas River. It is 
navigable by steamboats for about 
three hundred and fifty miles. About 
fifteen miles from its mouth, there is a 
channel or " cut-oif," through which it 
discharges a portion of its waters into 
the Arkansas. If, as sometimes hap- 
pens, the Arkansas should be higher 
than the White River, the state of 
things is reversed, and the waters of 
the Arkansas * seek the Mississippi 
through the channel of the White 
River. The "cut-off" at this season 
of the year is always well filled and 
easily navigable. On the morning of 
the 9th, the expedition having jan, 
ascended the White River, had *. 
reached the mouth of the "cnt-off." 
There was no delay in making the 



386 



CHICKASAW. 



passage through to the Arkansas, a dis- 
tance of about eight miles. Steaming 
up the Arkansas, the boats reached 
Notrib's Farm, about four miles below 
Fort Hindman, shortly after four o'clock 
in the afternoon. Here they halted ; 
and during the night the artillery and 
wagons were got on shore, the troops 
disembarking in the morning. Arkan- 
sas Post is on the north side or left 
bank of the Arkansas, at a point where 
the river makes a sharp elbow, by 
flowing north, then east, then again ab- 
ruptly to the south. The principal 
work, as we have said, was Fort Hind- 
man. Its guns commanded the river, 
as it stretched to the east, and, after it 
bent toward the south. This fort was 
a regular square bastioned work, one 
hundred yards each exterior side, with 
a deep ditch about fifteen feet wide, 
and a parapet eighteen feet high. It was 
armed with twelve guns, two of which 
were eight-inch, and one nine-inch. 
The garrison, which numbered only 
.5000 men, was under the command of 
General T. J. Chiirchill, who was under 
the direction of General T. H. Holmes, 
then commanding at Little Rock. 
Churchill had received instructions to 
"hold on until help should arrive or 
all were dead." 

The disparity of forces was great. 
It was 2G,000 or 27,000 against 5000. 
The strong position held by the Con- 
federates, however, did much to com- 
pensate for inferiority of numbers. 
The fort itself was strong ; and its ap- 
proaches were of the most diiBcult de- 
scription. Fronting on the river, it 
was protected on the west by a bayou, 



on the east by a swamp which did not 
quite reach the edge of the water. 
Between the fort and the swamp, there 
was a ravine which stretched down to 
the river; and the front of this ravine 
was well fortified. The position had 
thus to be approached through the ele- 
vated ground which lay between the 
bayou and the swamp. The encamp- 
ments of the Confederates were estab- 
lished in front of the fort, in the centre 
of the plateau dotted with clumps of 
trees. There was an outer line of en- 
trenchments which stretched across the 
entire ground. 

On the 10th, the army was kept 
busy endeavoring to get a posi- jan, 
tion in rear of the fort, Sher- Io- 
nian on the right and Morgan on the 
left. Some mistakes were made, in con- 
sequence of a want of knowledge of 
the ground. In the afternoon, and 
while the land forces were still seeking 
position. Porter was making good use 
of his flotilla. As he moved up the 
river, he shelled the rifle-pits along the 
levee, and drove the Confederates in- 
side the fort. When about four hun- 
dred yards from Fort Hindman, he 
brought into action his three iron-cl ids — 
the Baron de Kalb, the Louisville and 
the Cincinnati; and for half an hour 
the firing was kept up, the guns of the 
fort replying vigorously. 

On the morning of the 11th McCler- 
nand, who had his quarters still Jan. 
on board the Tigress, had come ''• 
up and taken a position in the woods 
to the rear. Early in the forenoon, he 
sent a message to Shenuan, asking him 
wh)' the attack was not begun. It had 



FORT HINDMAN CAPTURED. 



387 



been understood beforehand that the 
opening of fire by the gunboats on the 
fort should be the signal for a general 
attack. Sherman, therefore, replied 
that all was ready ; that he was within 
five or six hundred yards of the enemy's 
works; that the next movement must 
be a direct assault along the whole line ; 
and that he was waiting to hear from 
the gunboats. Half an hour or there- 
about afterwards was heard the clear, 
ringing sound of the navy guns, the 
firing becoming louder and more rapid 
as they neared the fort. The National 
field pieces opened fire along the whole 
line. The thunder was terrific. The 
Confederates, most of whom were Texan 
volunteers, made a gallant resistance. 
A regiment of cavalry, abandoning their 
horses, fought on foot, and rendered, 
for a time, effective service in resisting 
the advance of the Nationals. It was 
impossible for them to resist the fierce 
onset made by overwhelming numbers. 
Sherman pressed forward on the nght, 
Morgan on the left, each driving the 
Confederates back, and gradually ob- 
taining possession of the wooded ground 
in front of the newly-erected parapet, 
but not without considerable loss. The 
Confederate firing was heavy ; but the 
National soldiers took advantage of the 
clumps of trees, and felled logs to shield 
themselves from the storm of bullets. 
Gradually the edge of the woods was 
reached; the ground was clear; and 
there was nothing to protect them from 
the decimating fire of the enemy. 

Meanwhile, the gunboats were pour- 
ing a mui'derous fire upon the fort, and 
sweeping the adjoining gi-ound above 



and below with grape and shrapnelL 
Porter had brought into action not only 
the iron-clads, but the ram Monarch, 
Commander EUet, and even the fi-ailer 
vessels, as he tells us, that amid the 
clouds of smoke they might "do the 
best they could." It was not long until 
the effects of this terrific firing began 
to be visible. All the adjoining ground 
was cleared of the foe; neai'ly all the 
artilleiy horses in the fort were killed ; 
and one by one the guns were being 
silenced. Shortly after three o'clock, 
the firing from the fort altogethei 
ceased. The cannonading, however, 
was kept up by the gunboats. Porter, 
who had taken a regiment on board, 
was proceeding vsdth the Black Hawk 
to attempt a landing, and to take pos 
session, when a white flag was raised i» 
token of surrender. He immediately 
ordered the firing to cease. 

We left the troops in the clearing at 
the edge of the woods, fully exposed to 
the enemy's fire from the parapet out- 
side the fort. This line had three sec- 
tions of field guns; and they were 
handled, according to the testimony of 
Shennan himself, with great skill and 
energy. Hovey was wounded ; Thayer 
had his horse shot under him ; and so 
thick and fast was the round-shot fall- 
ing about Sherman and his staff, that 
they felt it necessary to scatter, Sher- 
man himself dismounting. Morgan, at 
this crisis, unfortunately found himself 
in front of the ravine, beyond which it 
was impossible to pass. Sherman was 
now well engaged on the right; and 
Morgan, finding himself thus hindered, 
sent a few regiments to his aid. The 



388 



CHICKASAW. 



burden of the fight, as at Chickasaw, 
had fallen on the brigades which now 
composed the division of General Steele. 
Blair and Thayer and Hovey performed 
prodigies of valor. 

On the right, the Confederate bat- 
teries had been all but silenced. Mor- 
gan's men, on the left, had done splen- 
did work before they were brought to 
a standstill at the ravine. A. J. Smith's 
brigades had pressed the Confederates 
back, step by step, until they were 
within two hundred yards of the fort. 
Burbridge expressly distinguished him- 
self. But for the ravine, an attempt 
would have been made by the One 
Hundred and Twentieth Ohio to scale, 
and carry by assault, the eastern side of 
the fort. Almost at this moment, how- 
ever, Sherman, as his attention was 
arrested by the flags of the gunboats 
visible above the parapet of Fort Hind- 
man, saw a man jiimp on the nearer 
parapet at the point where entered the 
road which divided the peninsula. 
"Cease firing!" he ordered; and the 
words were passed along the line with 
amazing rapidity. The firing soon 
ceased. In a few seconds the fort was 
invaded on every side by the National 
troops. Colonel Dayton was ordered 
forward to the place where was hung 
out the large white flag; and as soon 
as his horse was seen on the parapet, 
Sherman advanced with his staff. It 
appeared afterwards that the white flag 
was hung out without even the knowl- 
gdge of Churchill. It made little dif- 
ference. The battle had really been 
won on the land as well as on the river 
side of the fort. The surrender was 



subsequently made in due form — Col- 
onel Dunniugton, the commander of the 
fort, sui-rendering to Admiral Porter, 
and Colonel Churchill surrendering to 
the military authorities. The National 
loss in killed, wounded and missing 
amounted to 977 men. On the Con- 
federate side there were only 60 killed 
and 80 wounded. Five thousand sol- 
diers, with their officers, made prison- 
ers, and all the property of the place, 
including some seventeen guns, consti- 
tuted the prize of victory. General 
Burbridge was singled out for the 
honor of planting the National stand- 
ard on Fort Hindman. Such was the 
battle of Arkansas Post. 

General Sherman was dissatisfied 
with the arrangements made by Gen- 
eral McClernand immediately after the 
surrender. The post of honor — the oc- 
cupation of Fort Hindman — was given 
to A. J. Smith, of Morgan's division, 
Sherman being ordered to hold the 
lines outside, and go on securing the 
prisoners and stores. McClernand's 
reason for so doing was that he did not 
wish to interfere with the actual state 
of facts — the status quo at the time of 
surrender. It is undeniable that it was 
Sherman's plan throughout; that his 
corps bore the burden of the fight ; that, 
after the surrender, his troops were in 
possession of two of the three brigades 
which constituted the opposing force; 
and that he was in possession of all the 
gi'ound outside the "fort proper." Mc- 
Clernand was proud of his success, and 
manifested not a little vanity. His 
star, he said, was ever in the ascendant. 
In his memoirs, Sherman tells us that 



JEALOtJSY. 



380 



McClernand was extremely jealous of 
the navy, and that, in his report, he ig- 
nored altogether the action of Porter's 
fleet. This was the less to be regretted 
that Porter told his own story in a very 
handsome and eifective way. It is only 
simple truth to say that the battle was 
fought and won by the fleet before the 
land troops had any certainty of success. 
There was, in f»ct, a feeling of jealousy 
among the commanders — a feeling which 
was not wholly to disappear until the 
arrival of Grant, in whose presence, and 
under the influence of whose more com- 
manding genius, jealousy and selfish- 
ness gave place to a spirit of honorable 
rivalry and dutiful obedience. 

The day after the battle was devoted 
to burying the dead. The prisoners 
were all collected and sent to St. Louis. 
The victory at Arkansas Post opened 
the way for a successful expedition to 
Little Rock, the capital of the State of 
Arkansas. Shennan expressed a desire 
to be sent on this expedition. McCler- 
nand, however, did not deem it advis- 
able. A combined expedition, was, 
therefore, sent up the White River, as 



far as St. Charles, Des Arc and Duval's 
Bluff, under General Gorman and 
Lieutenant-Commanding J. G. Walker. 
The expedition was completely success- 
ful. Meanwhile, the works at Fort 
Hindman were dismantled and blown 
up ; and, on the 13th, the troops were 
re-embarked, and proceeded down the 
Arkansas to Napoleon. There, instruc- 
tions were received from General Grant, 
who ordered McClernand to take the 
entire expedition down the river to 
Milliken's Bend, and await his arrival. 
This place was reached on the 21st of 
January. 

lu itself, the movement against Ar- 
kansas Post was a small affair; it was 
so regarded by General Grant ; it ought 
to have been successfully accomplished 
by one corps, and by a portion of the 
fleet — instead of the combined strength 
of both — and that was Sherman's idea ; 
but resulting, as it did, in victory, 
it served the double purpose of em- 
ploying troops which would otherwise 
have been idle, and of cheering the 
hearts of a peopl*i who were som© 
what despondent 



a4a 



390 



VICKSBFRG. 



CHAPTEK XXIV. 



The Proclamation of Emancipation. — Divided Sentiments. — A Turning Point in History. — The Cry of the 
Slave. — Prayers Heard and Answered. — Colored Troops. — "Vicksburg Must Be Taken." — Grant at Young's 
Point. — The Walnut Hills. —The Yazoo. — Haines' Bluff. — An Apparently Impregnable City. — How to Get to 
the East of the Mississippi. — Five Different Schemes. — The Williams Canal Experiment. — Almost a Suc- 
cess. — A Failure.— A Bold and Daring Experiment. — The Flood. — Roundabout Bayou. — Another Failure. — ■ 
— Lake Providence. — Moon Lake. — The Y'allabusha. — The Tallahatchie. — Greenwood. — Fort Pemberton. — 
Another Failure. — Steele's Bayou. — Admiral Porter. — Failure Again. — A Five-Fold Failure. — Grant Disap- 
pointed, but Not Discouraged — Sherman's Opinion. — Grant's Resolve. — The New Movement Commenced. — 
New Carthage. — A Tedious and Difficult March. — The Fleet. — Passing the Batteries. — A Midnight Scene. — 
Grierson's Raid. — The Importance of Cavalry. — A Brilliant Exploit. — Grand Gulf. — The Gunboats Open Fire. — 
The Place too Strong. — Rodney. — Bruuisburg. — A Landing Effected. — A Useful Diversion. — Sherman at 
Haines' Bluff. — Safe on the East Side. — Grant's Self -Reliance. — Port Gibson. — The Battle. — The Confederates 
Fall Back. — Hankinaon's Ferry. — "The City of an Hundred HiUs. " — Bayou Pierre. — Big Black. — The Natural 
Barriers. — Reconnoitering Parties. — Raymond. — A Tremendous Rush for the Guns. — A National Victory. — 
Johnston at Jackson. — His Instructions to Pemberton. — Jackson Evacuated. — An Easy Victory. — Torrents of 
Rain. — The Three Generals, Grant, McPherson and Sherman. — Grant Now Marches Against Pemberton. — 
Edward's Station the Point of Rendezvous. — Champion Hills. — A Strong Position. — Pemberton Prepares for 
Battle. — Arrival of the National Advance. — The Battle of Champion Hills Begun. — Hovey Sorely Pressed. — 
Reinforced. —Logan's Success. — The Battle Won After a Terrible Struggle. — McClemand too Late. — McCler- 
nand and Osterhaus Ordered in Pursuit. — The Big Black River. — The Railway Bridge. — A Successful Re- 
treat. — Preparations for Assault. —Lawler's Discovery. —The Assault Made. — A Terrible Struggle. — Heavy 
Loss of Life. — The Burning of the Bridges. — The Bridges Reconstructed. — On to Vicksburg. — Porter on 
the Yazoo. — Sherman at Haines' Bluff. — The Fall of Vicksburg Secured. — Preparing to Make the Assault. — 
Pemberton's Situation. — The Assault of the ]9th of May. — A Failure. — The Assault of the 22d. — Grant's 
Reasons for Avoiding Further Delay. — Terrible Fighting. — The "Works too Strong, Naturally and Arti 
ficially, to be Taken by Assault." — McClemand's Mistake. — Sergeant Griffiths. — X Useless Slaughter. — The 
Troops Recalled. — The Troops Complimented. — The Bravery of the Defenders. — A Confederate Picture. — 
McClernand's Congratulatory Order. — His Removal from the Command of the Thirteenth Corps. — The 
Appointment of Ord. — Grant Resolves to Take the Place by a Regular Siege. — Reinforcements. — The In- 
vestment Completed. — Siege Operations Commenced. — Pemberton's Situation Becoming Desperate. — Hia 
Complaints. — The Want of Cavalry. — What Johnston Proposed. — Johnston Preparing to Attack the Na- 
tional Rear. — Pemberton's Vacillation. — Distress of the Garrison. — The Mining Operations Well Advanced. — 
The25thof June.— The First Mine Fired. —The Storming Columns.— The Assault on Fort HiU.— A Terrific 
Cannonade. — A Repulse. — The 1st of July. — The Destruction of the Redan. — An Intercepted Letter. — 
Promised Aid to Pemberton. — Grant's Instructions to Sherman. — The 3d of July. — The White Flag. — General 
Bowen and Colonel Montgomery. — A Letter from Pemberton. — He Asks for an Armistice and the Appoint- 
ment of Commissiocfirs. — Grant Refuses. — "Unconditional Surrender." — The Interview Between Grant and 
Pemberton. — An Imposing Scene. — Under the Old Oak, in View of Both Armies. — A Striking Contrast. — Can't 
Agree. — Consideration on the Part of Grant. — Terms in Writing.— The Agreement. — The Surrender. — The 
Fourth of July. — Light at Last. — A Great Day for the National Cause. — A National Triumph.— A Great Triumph 
lor Grant. — The First Soldier of the Republic. — The Results of the Campaign. — Pursuit of Johnston.-"- 
Evacuation of Jackson. — Johnston, the "Hero of Retreats." — The End of a Great and Glorious Campaign. 



1863. 



The opening of the year 1863 -was 
made memorable by the Procla- 
mation of Emancipation. It 'was 



by slo'w degrees that Abraham Lincoln 
rose to the full dignity of his mission^ 
and arrived at the conclusion that the 



THE OEY OF THE OPPRESSED. 



391 



will of God, as well as the rights of 
man and the preservation of the Union, 
called for the immediate and unquali- 
fied abolition of slavery. What to do 
with the slaves of the South had, in- 
deed, been a vexed question since the 
commencement of the war. It was a 
fruitful source of controversy in the 
cabinet ; and it puzzled alike the legis- 
lators in Congress and the generals in 
the field. Among the last named, par- 
ticularly from whom direct action was 
frequently demanded, the greatest di- 
versity of sentiment prevailed. Butler 
/ooked upon the slaves as contraband. 
In his own department, Fremont gave 
them liberty. McClellan would put 
them down "with an iron hand." Pat- 
terson would repress all servile insur- 
rections. Mansfield would allow them 
no harbor in his camps. Halleck would 
drive them out of his lines. Burnside 
would not interfere with slavery. Cam- 
eron would not sui'render any that 
might chance to come within the army 
lines. Dix was unwilling to interfere 
between the slave and his master. 
Wool was willing to give them employ- 
ment, and to regulate their pay and al- 
lowances. Hooker and Buell actually 
went so far as to authorize slave-owners 
to search tbe National camps for fugi- 
tives, and to carry them off. Lincoln 
complained of the conduct of Fremont ; 
and he issued a counter-order when 
Hunter, at Hilton Head, proclaimed 
the slaves in his department free. 

It is not necessary to trace the suc- 
cessive steps by which, ultimately, eraan- 
cipation was reached. Reference has 
already V)een made, in these pages^ to 



the history of the proclamation itself. 
It was the work of Lincoln's own hand; 
and, in its every sentence, it bears the 
impress of his genius. Evidently it 
took shape during the unfortunate cam- 
paign of General Pope in Virginia — a 
campaign, the disastrous results of 
which were all the more severely felt 
that it followed so close upon McClel- 
lan's retreat from the peninsula. But 
for the advice of Secretary Seward, the 
proclamation would have been pub- 
lished while the nation was yet smart- 
ing under defeat, while Pope and his 
shattered legions were sheltered behind 
the fortifications at Washington, and 
while Lee had marched in triumph into 
Maryland. It was wisely concluded to 
wait until the first returning sunshine 
of victory should rest on the National 
cause. The opportunity arrived after 
the battle of Antietam, and when Lee, 
on the night of the 19th of September, 
1862, retired into Virginia. Thiee 
days after that date, on the 2 2d of Sep- 
tember, Lincoln — remembering the vow 
he had made before God, that, if Gen 
eral Lee were driven back from Mary 
land, he would crown the result by a 
declaration of freedom to the slaves — is- 
sued that famous proclamation which 
marked a turning-point, not only in the 
history of the United States, but ip 
the history of the world. 

In one of the finest passages of his 
excellent history of the Civil War, Dr. 
Draper, when describing the condition 
of the negroes, and the hopes which the 
proclamation inspired in their" breasts, 
says : " From the rivers of Virginia to 
the Mexican confines of the Republic 



S92 



VICKSBURG. 



arose a mournful wail : ' How long, O 
Lord, how long!' It came from the 
weary laborer, leaning on his hoe in the 
cotton field under the noontide sun ; it 
came through the moaning midnight 
forests, solemn and clear above their 
multitudinous inarticulate sounds; it 
came from children torn from their 
parents, from wives and husbands part- 
ed at the auction block, from mothers 
in despair, from strong men fainting 
under the lash, from the aged, whose 
heads were fi'osted by time. In their 
quaint prayers, the Africans talk to 
God as a man talks face to face with 
his friend. Slavery had made Him 
their friend. By the flickering fires of 
their cabins, they stealthily spelt out 
the Bible, to see what He had promised 
to them. It was their dreadful lot that 
had caused JefFei'son, himself a slave- 
owner, to expostulate solemnly with his 
countrymen, and to deprecate the wrath 
of God. For who shall escape when, 
from the hand of Eternal Justice, her 
scales have dropped as useless; when 
from her brow the bandage has been 
raised, that her imcovered and angry 
eyes may gaze upon unutterable wrong; 
when her uplifted arm, quivering with 
indignation, is ready to strike a blow 
that shall make a whole continent 
tremble !" 

On the evening of the last day of the 
year 1862, these poor, down-trodden 
ones, wherever they could gather to- 
gether—in their humble meeting-houses, 
in their lowlier cabins, or in the lone 
woods — ^met in solemn assembly, and 
lifted their eyes and their hearts to 
heaven, calling upon Almighty God to 



strengthen the hands of Abraham Lin- 
coln on the coming day. When that 
day arrived, the purpose which had 
been declared in Septenlber, was made 
good; and the stain of slavery was 
wiped out from the escutcheon of the 
Republic. 

The emancipation proclamation did 
not give satisfaction to all. It greatly 
enraged, as a matter of course, the 
Southern leaders ; and there were many 
in the North who, although they had 
no sympathy with the Southern Con- 
federacy, regarded the abolition of 
slavery as an interference with the 
rights of property, and a violation of 
one of the fundamental principles of 
the constitution. Immediate and un- 
qualified abolition may not have been 
an unmixed good; but it was a neces- 
sity — a necessity growing out of the 
war. It was a weapon which the North 
had a perfect right to use in putting 
down the rebellion ; and not to have 
used it would have implied both weak- 
ness and foUy. Slavery, besides, lay 
at the very root of the evil out of 
which, cancer-like, the war arose ; and, 
if it was "the paramount object" of the 
North " to save the Union, and not to 
save or to destroy slavery," it was to 
preserve the institution of slavery that 
the war was undertaken and continued 
by the South. It was not a rash act, 
done in hot haste, the offspring of re- 
venge or despair. It was the i-esult of 
much anxious and prayerful thought, 
the ripe fruit of calm, patient and pro- 
tracted study. It was the noblest act 
of Lincoln's brief and chequered but 
withal noble life. 



EMANCIPATION. 



393 



One of the immediate results of this 
proclamation of emancipation was the 
organization of colored troops. Towards 
the close of 1863, there were some fifty 
thousand colored men in actual ser- 
vice ; and this number was tripled be- 
fore the close of 1864. It was not, 
however, for some time to come that 
their influence on the field began to be 
felt. During the year 1863, although 
colored troops, as we shall see, took 
part at the siege of Port Hudson, and 
in other engagements, their effect was 
comparatively unimportant. The intro- 
duction of colored men into the army 
was regarded by many in the light of 
a fi'esh revolution. It gave birth in 
some quarters to a perfect howl of dis- 
satisfaction ; several of the newspapers 
went beyond all bounds in their fierce 
denunciation of the government; and 
the swords of some prominent generals 
relaxed in their grasp. General Grant, 
not troubling himself with politics, but 
regarding himself simply as the servant 
of the Republic, heartily approved of 
the emancipation policy, and enforced 
the measures of the government. " It 
is expected," he said, " that all com- 
manders will especially exert them- 
selves in cai'rying out the policy of the 
administration, not only in organizing 
colored troops, and rendering them efii- 
cient, but also in removing prejudices 
against them." 

The situation was now ripe for the 
vigorous prosecution of the siege of 
Vicksburg. Sherman's non-success at 
Chickasaw had not dismayed Grant, 
while the comparatively unimportant 
victory at Arkansas Post had greatly 



cheered the people. The popular cry 
was "On to Vicksburg!" and Grant's 
emphatic dictum was " Vicksburg must 
be taken." The army under General 
Grant had been greatly reinforced ; and 
the general feeling was that if the 
"Queen City of the Bluff" was to be 
reduced, it was to be done by the hero 
of Donelson and Shiloh, of luka and 
Corinth. 

As we stated at the close of the last 
chapter. Grant was to meet McClernand 
and Porter, with the fleet and trans- 
ports, at Milliken's Bend. On the 18th 
of January, that meeting took jan, 
place. There was a general con- I8« 
sultation ; and the views of the general- 
in-chief, and of all the leading officers, 
were freely exchanged. After con- 
sultation, Grant made arrangements for 
future movements, and gave some spe- 
cial instructions. McClernand and Sher- 
man made immediate preparations to 
go down the Mississippi to Youmg's 
Point; and Grant, without delay, re- 
turned to Memphis, in order to hasten 
the transportation of his trooj)s to the 
neighborhood of Vicksburg. McCler- 
nand, it will be remembered, assumed 
command of what was named the 
army of the Mississippi, after the bat- 
tle of the Chickasaw, by virtue of 3 
confidential order from the War De- 
partment. In this capacity, however, 
he was subject to orders from General 
Grant, who was at the head of the de- 
partment of the Tennessee. At the 
time of which we write, all things were 
changed. By an order (No. 210) of De- 
cember 18th, 1862, from the War De^ 
partment, the Western armies had be«'^ 



S94 



VICKSBURG. 



grouped into five corps, viz. : the Thir- 
teenth, Major-General McClernand ; the 
Fourteenth, Major-General George H. 
Thomas, in Middle Tennessee ; the Fif- 
teenth, Major-General "W. T. Sherman ; 
the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, 
at Memphis; and the Seventeenth, 
Major-General McPherson, back of 
Memphis. This entire force was placed 
"\nder the control of General Grant. 
jfeb. On the 2d of February, the 
^» greater number of the troops in- 
tended to be used in the operations 
Against Vicksburg having already 
reached their destination. Grant arrived 
at Young's Point, and took command. 

Now that General Grant was on the 
spot, the question which he had to set- 
tle was — How could Vicksburg be 
most easily and effectually approached ? 
The National army was lying on the 
west side of the Mississippi. Vicks- 
burg stood on the Walnut Hills, high 
and impregnable gi'ound on the oppo- 
site shore. The city must be ap- 
proached by way of the river. To 
give any effect to the siege, troops 
must be landed either above or below 
the city. To land troops above the 
city, implied steaming up the Yazoo and 
passing the formidable batteries at 
Haines' Bluff, which completely com- 
manded that river. This, as the latest 
attempt had proved, was in the last de- 
gree dangerous, if not absolutely im- 
possible. It could only succeed by a 
sacrifice of life which would be but im- 
perfectly lewarded by the result. To 
land troops below the city, implied 
steaming down the Mississippi and pass- 
ing the Vicksburg defenses throughout 



their entire length. This seemed even 
a more perilous undertaking than the 
other. How were these obstacles to be 
overcome? That was the question 
which General Grant had now to an- 
swer. Five different solutions were 
suggested. There were, first, the Will- 
iams' Canal ; second, the route from 
Milliken's Bend ; third, the Lake Provi- 
dence route; fourth, the Yazoo Pass; 
and fifth, the route by Steele's Bayou. 
Let us consider these in the order in 
which we have named them. 

A glance at the map will show the 
reader what was meant by the canal, 
and how practicable at first it seemed. 
In front of Vicksburg the Mississippi 
makes a sharp bend, forming the penin- 
sula on which stands the town of De 
Soto. A canal cut across this tongue 
of land, giving a more direct passage 
to the current of the river, would leave 
Vicksburg without any water de- 
fenses — the place would, for all mili- 
tary pui'poses, be neutralized. It will 
be remembered that, in the summer of 
1862, General Williams, who came up 
the river with Farragut, undertook to 
cut such a canal, and, for that purpose, 
gathered some twelve hundred negroes 
from the plantations in the immediate 
neighborhood. It has already been 
nan-ated how, from an error committed 
in the location of its mouth, the canal 
proved a failure. The waters stub- 
bornly refused to leave thei^ ancient 
channel. This canal or " cut-off," which 
was one mile in length, was located 
across the peninsula, at right angles, 
about six miles below Vicksburg. 
Grant perc*>Wed that if it could effect* 



EXPERIMENTS. 



890 



ively be turned to account, it would 
not only isolate Vicksburg, but make a 
channel for the transportation of troops 
and supplies to the south of the city. 
To the completion of this work, he 
gave much of his personal attention, as 
Boon as he returned from Memphis. 

Meantime, the work had been prose- 
cated with great vigor by McClemand 
and Sherman. The men continued to 
work day and night; and, to secure 
their protection, good use was made of 
Porter's fleet, strengthened now by the 
addition of several armed vessels, such 
as the Chillicothe, Indianola, Lafayette, 
Eastport and others. It was a bold 
and daring experiment to attempt to 
divert the course of a great river like 
the Mississippi — all the more so that 
the former attempt, undertaken in more 
favorable circumstances, had proved a 
complete failure. But it was not an 
impossible task ; and, in the circum- 
stances, nothing but the absolutely im- 
possible was to be left untried. The 
work progressed favorably. The camps 
were on the west side of the canal ; and 
the earth was thrown up on that side 
as a sort of levee. During February, 
the river continued to rise. By the 
end of the month, it had risen to a 
great height ; and the work was carried 
on with very great difficulty, McCler- 
nand's corps being removed to higher 
ground at Milliken's Bend. Sherman 
remained at Young's Point, and con- 
tinued to direct operations at the canal. 
For days the waters, rolling past in 
their fury, and ever rising higher and 
higher, had been thi'eatening instant 
and sweeping destruction to the entire 



scheme. It was now the 8th of March. 
The barrier at the mouth of the ''cut" 
could no longer resist the pressure of 
the great river. Suddenly, this barrier 
gave way; and the waters rushing 
through, swept all before them, filling 
the cut, submerging thousands of im- 
plements, and di'iving the soldiers to 
the levee. The canal experiment was 
a second time a failure. It was not to 
be tried again. General Grant was no 
doubt disappointed; but he was not 
discouraged. 

There were a series of bayous con 
necting Milliken's Bend with the Ten- 
sas River, which again connects with 
the Mississippi, at New Carthage, some 
distance below Vicksburg. The prin- 
cipal of these bayous was that of 
Roundabout or Roundaway, which at 
one of its extremities unites with the 
Tensas. In this case, canal-cutting 
was less necessary than dredging. It- 
so happened that some dredge boats 
were on hand; and with these boats, 
Captain F. E. Prime and Colonel Gr. G. 
Pride, went earnestly to work. In a 
short time, a clear passage was eflPected ; 
and some vessels of light tonnage were 
able to pass through. The Mississippi, 
however, began to fall in April; and 
as the roads between Milliken's Bend 
and New Carthage became more ser- 
viceable, this water-way was of com- 
paratively little value. It was, in fact, 
another useless experiment. 

General Grant's attention was not 
devoted exclusively to any one of those 
possible avenues by which Vicksburg 
might be approached. His object was 
to discover a route which should be at 



STUART'S RAID. 



33« 



Capturing Chambersburg in tbat State, 
he destroyed a large quantity of sup- 
plies, burning machine shops, trains of 
cars, and other property; and then, 
having made a complete circuit around 
McClellan's army, he re-entered Vir- 
ginia by crossing the Potomac below 
him. This raid of Stuart roused public 
indignation to its highest pitch. It 
was regarded as an open insult to 
the National army; and it was felt 
that the Confederates had made good 
their boast, by carrying war into the 
free Statea. Still McClellan remained 
inactive. There was no forward move- 
ment. Again, on the 2l8t, Halleck 
telegraphed ; "The president does not 



erpect impossibilities, but he is very 
anxious that all this good weather 
should not be wasted in inactivity." 
McClellan could not move before the 
1st of November. Then he did move ; 
but it was too lata On the 7th of that 
•month there was a heavy snow-storm. 
It was a sure sign that winter was at 
hand. Lincoln's patience was at last 
exhausted — his forbearance had given 
way ; he had already taken action ; 
and on the night of that day, while at 
Rectortown, on his southward march 
towards Gordonsville, McClellan re- 
ceived instructions to turn over the 
command of the army to General Bum 
side. 



»8S 



398 



VICKSBUBG. 



waa hopeless with the force at his con?- 
mand, retired by the way he came. On 
his way, he was met by General Quim- 
by, of McPherson's corps, with some 
'troops, when another attack was medi- 
Mar. tated; but on the 23d of March, 
23. the whole expedition was ordered 
to return to the Mississippi, General 
Grant having made up his mind to con- 
centrate his ai'my at Milliken's Bend. 

This does not exhaust the experi- 
ments which were made in order to 
obtain a suitable route by which the 
National army could be moved so as to 
attack Vicksburg on the land side. 
While those other experiments were 
being made Admiral Porter had been 
unv/eariedly active. Before it was 
known what success might attend the 
expedition by way of Yazoo Pass and 
the Tallahatchie, Porter had reconnoi- 
tered another route, by which he hoped 
the Yazoo might be reached, and a de- 
scent made above the batteries on 
Haines' Bluff. Seven miles above the 
mouth of the Yazoo, what has been 
called Steele's Bayou empties into that 
river. Having discovered that about 
thirty miles up Steele's Bayou there 
was a passage through Black Bayou to 
Deer Creek, about six miles distant, 
and learning from some negroes that 
Deer Creek could be navigated to Roll- 
ing Fork, and thence down the Big 
Sunflower into the Yazoo, Porter noti- 
fied Grant of the possibilities of this 
water-way. Grant saw at once that if 
such a route could be turned to practi- 
cal account, it would place Greenwood 
between two bodies of his forces, and 
compel the abandonment of Fort Pem- 



berton. This was not all. Some thirty 
of the enemy's steamboats, which had 
sought refuge in those inland waters, 
would fall into his hands. 

The expedition was promptly ap- 
proved of; and five gunboats, several 
transports, and one of Sherman's divi- 
sions, were ordered to attempt the new 
passage. This was the most intricate 
and difficult of all the routes yet at- 
tempted. Grant had accompanied Por- 
ter part of the way, and experienced 
some of the difficulties, before Sherman 
was ordered to take with him his pioneer 
corps or a regiment of first-class men, 
and, with the steamers Diligence and 
Silver Wave, proceed up the bayou to 
the assistance of Porter. In Black 
Bayou, and in Deer Creek, the most 
formidable obstacles Avere encountered. 
The passages were blocked by over- 
hanging trees, which had to be cut down 
before the boats could pass. The dark- 
ness of the moonless night was rendered 
all the more intense by the deep gloom 
of the surrounding forests. Rain fell 
incessantly. In some cases heavy trees, 
which had been felled, lay across the 
streams. At last, before Porter had ac- 
complished the passage of Deer Creek, 
the Confederates, who had evidently 
anticipated the movement, were encoun- 
tered in great force ; and it became peril- 
ous for the men to show themselves on 
the gunboats or on the transports. It 
was found impossible to advance. 

This expedition, like all the others, 
had to be abandoned ; and it was dis- 
covered to be no easy matter to effect a 
retreat. "The expedition," says Gen- 
eral Grant, " failed, probably, more from 



DISAPPOINTMENTS. 



39S 



Want of knowledge as to what would 
be required to open this route, than 
from any impracticability in the naviga- 
tion of the streams and bayous through 
which it was proposed to pass. The 
want of this knowledge led the expedi- 
tion on, and difficailties were encoun- 
tered, and then it would become neces- 
sary to send back to Young's Point for 
the means of removing them. This 
gave the enemy time to move forces to 
eifectually checkmate further progress ; 
and the expedition was withdrawn 
when within a few hundred yards of 
free and open navigation to the Yazoo." 
It seemed as if Vicksburg were des- 
tined to sit secure on her throne of 
hills, in proud defiance of all the skill, 
ingenuity and force of the National 
government. Farragut and Williams 
had done their best, but had failed. 
Sherman and Porter had put forth their 
noblest efforts, but to no purpose. And 
now a five-fold failure had been experi- 
enced by Grant himself. Disappointed 
he must have been ; but he was not 
discouraged. Disappointment but gave 
force to his determination ; his repeated 
failures but gave him a firmer grasp of 
the difficulties which he had to over- 
come ; and out of the darkness, in which 
he saw but dimly, he was gradually 
working his way to a clearer light, and 
to a fuller comprehension of the situa- 
tion. "At that veiy stage," as Swinton 
well puts it, "when an intellect of less 
determined fibre would have been re- 
signing itself to a seemingly implacable 
fortune. Grant, overleaping fate and 
failure, rose to the height of that au- 
dacious conception, on which, at length. 



he vaulted into Vicksburg." A Na- 
poleon might not have wasted time in 
so many fruitless experiments ; but Na- 
poleon himself could not more resolute- 
ly have resisted fate — could not more 
imperiously have resumed operations 
which were destined to chain victory to 
his standard. 

It was now evident that all hope of 
diverting the Mississippi from its chan- 
nel must be abandoned, and that prac- 
tical access to the east bank of the 
Yazoo, in the rear of Vicksburg, was 
not to be obtained by any of the passes. 
What was now to be done ? General 
Grant alone could answer that question. 
It was the opinion of some. General 
Sherman included, that the movement 
so auspiciously begun, but so premature- 
ly brought to grief, at the close of the 
previous year, should be resumed. Ac- 
cording to this plan, it would have been 
necessaiy for the main army to return 
up the Mississippi, and, after landing, 
to make an inland march towards Vicks- 
burg, on the eastern side of that river ; 
while the gunboats and a minor land 
force would have remained behind to 
threaten Vicksburg on its river front. 

The position of Grant at this stage, 
so far as appearances went, was not 
better than it was when he commenced 
his retreat from Oxford, after the dis- 
aster at Holly Springs ; and there can 
be no doubt that he already regretted 
that retreat. We know that he has 
since confessed that if the army had 
had, in December, 1862, the experience 
which it afterwards acquired, he would 
have marched on from Oxford, as at 
first contemplated, and trusted to the 



400 



VICKSBUEQ. 



country along his line of march and 
around Vicksburg for support. A back- 
ward march, however, at this time, if 
any other movement promising equal 
success were possible, would have been 
in the last degree injudicious. It would 
have given temporary encouragement, 
at least, to the Confederates It would 
have lent emphasis to the howl of dis- 
content, already loud all over the North. 
It would — it could not but — have been 
humiliating to General Grant. Happi- 
ly, another movement was possible, al- 
though it was beset at the outset with 
gi-ave and serious difficulties. 

Grant, whose headquarters were at 
Milliken's Bend, and whose army was 
well gathered around him, resolved to 
attack Vicksburg from the south ; and, 
in order to give effect to this resolution, 
he proceeded to make all the necessary 
arrangements. It was a bold experi- 
ment — bolder than any yet attempted. 
It implied gi-eat risks. It implied the 
mo\ang of the whole army across the 
Mississippi. But this could not be 
done at any point within range of the 
guns of the enemy's works, or without 
the aid of the gunboats and transports 
which were lying above the city. The 
troops would, therefore, have to march 
at least thirty or forty miles, probably 
a greater distance, over the worst pos- 
sible country, at the worst possible sea- 
son of the year; and the gunboats and 
transports would have to run the gaunt- 
let of the long line of batteries which 
completely commanded the river at 
Vicksburg. These difficulties overcome, 
it implied the transportation of the 
troops across the river, in the face of 



all the opposition of a powerful and 
vigilant enemy. Nor was this all. It 
implied the complete abandonment of 
his former base of communications, with- 
out having secured another in advance. 
Such was the movement which General 
Grant determined to make. Let u^ 
now see how it was put in execution. 

On the 29th of March the movemeni 
was commenced. On that day, jjai., 
General McClernand, with the 29. 
Thirteenth army corps, moved from Mil- 
liken's Bend across the peninsula which 
the river heie makes towards New Car- 
thage. McPherson was to follow with 
the Seventeenth army corps as soon as 
supplies of food, ammunition and other 
stores could be forwarded. Shermaa 
with the Fifteenth army corps, was to 
bring up the rear. The roads were exe- 
crable. The march was, in consequence, 
made with the utmost difficulty, and 
much time was consumed. Roads had to 
be made and repaired; boats and bridges 
had to be extemporized ; and, as there 
was danger that the rising flood might 
burst its barriers and sweep all before 
it, some twenty miles of levee had to 
be carefully guarded both day and 
night. At last, McClernand 's advance 
reached Smith's Plantation, about two 
miles from New Carthage, when it was 
found that the levee of the Bayou Vidal 
had given way in several places, and 
that the town and immediate neighbor- 
hood were suiTOunded by water. New 
Carthage, in fact, had become an island. 
Attempts were made to reach the town 
by boats. This, however, proved to be 
too tedious a process ; and, a circuitous 
road being discovered, the march was 



PASSING THE BATTERIES. 



401 



resumed around Bayou Vidal to a point 
some twelve miles further to the south. 
The distance travelled from Milliken's 
Bend was about thirty-five miles. It 
was a most laborious and tedious 
march. 

In the meantime, preparations were 
being pushed forward for running the 
transports and gunboats past the heavy 
batteries at Vicksburg. These batteries 
extended eight miles along the river. 
April On the night of the 16th of April, 
•6' the attempt was made by seven 
irou-clads, one unarmed gunboat, and 
three transports, the vulnerable parts 
of which, above the water, were all 
well protected with hay and cotton. 
It was arranged that the gunboats 
should pass down in single file, with 
intervals between of a few hundred 
yards, and that when th,ey opened their 
broadsides upon the batteries, the 
transports, under cover of the smoke, 
should endeavor to pass unseen. It 
was a starlit night ; but there was a 
haze on the river which dimmed the 
lights on the Vicksburg heights. The | 
Benton led the way. It seemed as if 
the city was wrapped in sleep, and as 
if the fleet would pass undetected. 
But no. " At just a quarter before 
eleven o'clock," an eye-witness tells us, 
" two bright, sharp lines of flame flashed 
through the darkness, at the extreme j 
right of the Vicksburg batteries; and 
in an instant the whole length of the 
line of the bluffs was ablaze with fire." 
The gunboats, which had just rounded 
the point and lay squarely before the 
city, opened their broadsides at once. 
The firing was terrific. In an hour and 



a half the Vicksburg batteries were 
passed. 

The batteries of Warrenton, a little 
further down the river, had still to be 
encountered. As these were approached, 
the fleet took the initiative, and so 
continuous and effective was the fire, 
that the enemy made but a feeble re- 
sponse. The work was now done, and 
done effectively. The gunboats were 
comparatively uninjured. Of the three 
transports, the Forest Queen, which 
was in the advance, received one shot 
in her hull and another in her steam- 
drum, and was instantly disabled. 
Taken in tow by a gunboat, she was 
earned down the river without further 
damage. The Henry Clay, which was 
next, having been hit by a shell, waife 
soon a blazing mass, and beyond all 
hope of being saved. The Silver Wave 
had passed through the fiery ordeal un- 
scathed. On board the gunboats, one 
man was killed and two men wounded. 
Not a man was injured on board the 
transports. The affair had been suo 
ceesful beyond all expectation. Em- 
boldened by what had happened. Grant 
had other six transports prepared and 
sent down the river on the night of tho 
22d of April. One of them, the Louis- 
iana, which was sti'uck below water- 
maik, was sunk. The other five were 
all more or less injured, but they were 
soon repaired, and ready for use again. 

Simultaneously with these move- 
ments, a magnificent cavalry exploit 
was being performed by Colonel Ben- 
jamin H. Grierson. Grant was anxious 
to ascertain the strength of the Con- 
federacy, and to find out by a practical 



103 



VIOKSBTTEG. 



test what resistance it could make to 
an invading force well organized and 
well equipped. He wished to do 
more: he wished to cut off the Con- 
federate forces who were protecting 
Vicksburg fi-om their base of supplies 
and their lines of communication. Col- 
onel Grierson was a dashing but able 
and skilful cavalry officer ; and to him 
was entrusted this somewhat hazardous 
April task. On the morning of the 
*'• 17th of April, while the National 
troops were still busy seeking a route by 
which to attack Vicksburg from above, 
Grrierson, taking with him his own regi- 
ment, the Sixth Illinois, the Seventh Ill- 
inois, and the Second Iowa, some 1700 
horsemen in all, and a battery of artille- 
fy, started from La Grange, Tennessee, 
and proceeded on his southward march, 
in the rear of the Confederate forces. 
These mounted men, now breaking up 
into detached parties, and diverging in 
different directions, and now reuniting, 
swept the country like a tornado, break- 
ing up railroad tracks, cutting the tele- 
graph wires, and burning bridges, 
depots, cars, manufactories, magazines 
and stores of every kind. The work 
was not pei-formed without some hard 
erperience. On the fith day after their 
departure from La Grange, Grierson's 
men rode eight miles through a swamp 
in which the water was from three to 
fom- feet deep, losing twenty of their 
horses. Much of the country through 
which they passed was utterly desti- 
tute of forage and provisions; and it 
was rarely that they could obtain more 
than one meal a day. In less than six- 
teen days they had travelled over six 



hundred miles. During the last thirty 
hours they had accomplished at least 
eighty miles, fought the enemy four 
times, swum the Comite River and de- 
stroyed a Confederate camp. 

At noon, on the 2d day of May, 
they entered Baton Rouge, amid May 
the plaudits of Banks' men, horses 2. 
and men half-famished, and some three 
fourths of the latter more than half- 
asleep in their saddles. During the 
expedition, they had killed and wound- 
ed one hundred of the enemy, captured 
and paroled five hundred prisoners, 
many of them officers, destroyed be- 
tween fifty and sixty miles of railroad 
and telegraph, captured and destroyed 
over three thousand stand of aims, and 
seized and carried with them over a 
thousand horses and mules. It was 
not without reason that General Grant 
pronounced this one of the most brill- 
iant exploits of the war, and one 
which would be handed down in his- 
toiy as an example to be imitated. 
Grierson had demonstrated the rotten- 
ness of the Confederacy. It was a 
"shell," and nothing more. 

We left General Grant, with the two 
army corps — McClemand's in advance, 
McPherson's following close behind— at 
a point some few miles below New 
Carthage. Under Grant's own superin- 
tendence, the necessary preparations 
were being hurried forward for the 
transportation of his troops from the 
west to the east side of the Mississippi. 
It was his intention to cross the river 
from this point, and to attempt a land- 
ing at Grand Gulf. It was found, 
however, that his means of transports^ 



BRUINSBURG. 



403 



tion were insufficient; and he deemed 
it necessary to extend his line of move- 
ment as far south as Hard Times, mak- 
ing tbi' ciKiie distance from Milliken's 
Bend some seventy or seventy-five 
miles. On the 29th March, all things 
were in readiness. McClernand's troops 
were all forward; and MePherson's 
were well on their waj'. Sherman, as 
we have seen, was left behind to bring 
up the rear. As many of the Thirteenth 
corps (McClernand's) as could be put 
on board the transports and barges, 
were embarked, and moved to the front 
of Grand Gulf. This was a strong for- 
tified position on the east bank of the 
Mississippi, below the mouth of the 
Big Black River — the last of the forti- 
fications which guarded the approach to 
Vicksburg from the south. Grant's 
plan was to silence the batteries by the 
gunboats, and, under cover of the fire, 
to land the troops, and carry the place 
by storm. At eight o'clock in the 
morning. Porter moved his fleet towards 
the enemy's works, and opened a tre- 
mendous fire. The response was quick 
and hearty. For five hours and a half 
the firing on both sides continued. At 
the end of that time the lower batteries 
were silenced ; but the upper ones could 
not be reached. 

From a tugboat on the river. General 
Grant contemplated the scene. " Many 
times," he tells us, "it seemed to me 
that the gunboats were within pistol 
shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon 
became evident that the guns of the 
enemy were too elevated and their for- 
tifications too strong to be taken from 
the water side. The whole range of 



hills on that side were known to be 
lined with rifle-pits. Besides, the field' 
artillery could be moved to any position 
where it might be useful, in case of 
an attempt at landing." He wisely 
concluded, therefore, to discontinue the 
firing, and to abandon the attempt to 
effect a landing at Grand Gulf. Porter 
was ordered to run past the batteries, 
with the gunboats and transports, as he 
had done at Vicksburg and Warrenton, 
and move down to a point opposite 
Rodney, where the river might be 
crossed with less difficulty. At six 
o'clock that evening, accordingly. Porter 
renewed the attack ; and, under cover 
of the fire, the transports passed with- 
out injury. In the doiible effort thus 
made, three of the gunboats sustained 
some damage ; but they were soon re- 
paired. Porter had 24 men killed and 
56 wounded. 

During the course of the night, infor- 
mation was obtained from a negro who 
had been selling home-made beer at 
Grand Gulf, that there was a good road 
from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, on the 
Bayou Pierre, in the rear of Grand 
Gulf. Bruinsbiu'g lies between Grand 
Gulf and Rodney. At Bruinsbui'g, ac- 
cordingly. General Grant resolved to 
effect a landing. At daylight, on j^^f, 
the morning of the 30th, the gun- 30. 
boats and transports were again in mo- 
tion. The landing was effected with- 
out any great inconvenience. McCler- 
nand's corps (the Thirteenth) was fer 
ried across first. MePherson's (the 
Fourteenth), which had arrived from 
Lake Providence, followed. Without 
delay, both corps, having been supplied 



404 



VICKSBURG. 



with rations for three days, were on 
T;heir way to Port Gibson. 

The east side of the Mississippi, be- 
low y icksburg, had at last been reached 
with comparative ease. The crossing 
might have been attended with greater 
difficulty, but for the use which was 
made of Sherman and his corps. While 
waiting for orders to follow the other 
two corps, Sherman received from 
Grant a letter, couched in very friendly 
terms, requesting him, while McCler- 
nand and McPherson were attempting 
to cross the river below, "to make a 
demonstration on Haines' Bluff, and to 
make all the show possible." He did 
not like, he said, to order him to do it, 
because it might be reported at the 
North as another failure. Sherman an- 
swered that he would do as required, 
without any regard to public clamor at 
a distance ; and he did it most eflfec- 
tually. On the 29th, at an early hour 
in the morning, he embarked ten regi- 
ments, of Blair's division, on ten steam- 
ers, and, preceded by several irou-clads 
and gunboats, he ascended the Yazoo, 
and lay for the night at the mouth of 
Chickasaw Bayou. Towards evening, 
he caused the troops to disembark in 
full view of the enemy, although, as he 
has himself told us, he "knew full well 
that there was no road across the sub- 
merged field that lay between the river 
and the bluff." 

This movement had the desired ef- 
fect. Pemberton had just sent off a 
large force to assist General Bowen to 
resist the threatened attack on the 
river below. Seeing this movement in 
his front, and di-eading an immediate 



assault in great force, he recalled his 
men, and ordered them to take position 
at Haines' Bluff. The feint resulted 
advantageously in a double sense. It 
withdrew opposition from the point at 
which the troops were to be pushed 
across the river ; and the marching and 
counter-marching so fatigued Pember- 
ton's troops, that they were unfit for 
serious work when the real encounter 
took place. For two days, Sherman 
preserved this threatening attitude. As 
the other two corps had crossed the 
river seventy-five miles below, and 
gained a firm footing on the " high pla- 
teau in rear of Vicksburg," further de- 
monstration in the direction of Haines' 
Bluff was unnecessary. Sherman was 
accordingly ordered to hasten forward 
and join the main army. 

It had been General Grant's inten- 
tion, up to the time of his crossing the 
Mississippi, to collect all his forces at 
Grand Gulf, to get on hand a good 
supply of provisions and ordnance 
stores, and, in the meantime, to detach 
an army corps to co-operate with Gen- 
eral Banks against Port Hudson, in the 
hope that thereby he might be able to 
effect a junction of the two armies. A 
letter from General Banks informed 
him that it would be impossible for 
him to return to Baton Rouge before 
the 10th of May, but that by the re- 
duction of Port Hudson, he would be 
able to join him with 12,000 men. 
About the same time, information 
reached him that troops were expected 
at Jackson from the Southern cities, 
with General Beauregard in command. 
Grant wisely concluded that delay un 



PORT GIBSON. 



40b 



der the ciicumstances was dangerous- 
all the more so that on the 10th of May, 
with the addition of 12,000 men, his 
strength relatively would not be so 
great as it now was. He resolved, 
therefore, to act at once. This decisive 
step was taken on his own responsi- 
bility. He did not consult the authori- 
ties at Washington ; for he knew that 
he would encounter opposition alike 
from Lincoln and from Halleck, both 
of whom were in favor of his effecting 
a union v^nth Banks. 

As soon as the troops had been 
landed on the other side of the river, 
the onward movement was commenced. 
May On the morning of the 1st of 
l- May, about two o'clock, when 
some eight miles from Bruinsburg, the 
advance, under McClernand, came into 
contact with the enemy. The Confede- 
rates retired ; and no attempt at pursuit 
was made imtil daylight. Early in the 
morning, General Grant rode forw£J'd, 
with his staff, and found McClernand 
engaged with a strong force of the 
enemy, about four miles from Port 
Gibson. At this point the road forked 
off in two opposite du-ections, both 
branches, however, leading to Port 
Gibson. These roads which, for the 
most pait, ran ali>'jg narrow ridges, 
were flanked on either side by deep 
and impenetrable ravines. The Con- 
federates had taken position on both 
roads. It was a position which offered 
peculiar advantages to the resisting 
party, as in falling back, they necessa- 
rily divided the pursuing forces. It was 
held by General Bowen, with not more 
than 6000 men. McClei-nand's troops 



were divided so as to suit the require- 
ments of the ground. The divisions of 
Hovey, Carr and Smith were on the 
right; the division of Osterhaus was 
on the left. McClernand advanced 
with the three divisions. The Confed- 
erates offered a stubborn resistance, 
contesting point after point with great 
bravery. The National forces on the 
right made steady advances on the 
enemy, driving him from position to 
position ; but Osterhaus on the left was 
making no impression on his stubborn 
antagonist. On the anival of Logan's 
division, of McPherson's corps. Grant 
sent one brigade to the assistance of 
McClernand and another to the assist- 
ance of Osterhaus. Effective resistance 
was no longer possible. At both points 
the Confederates gave way, but fell back 
in good order towards Port Gibson. 
Night closing in, the Nationals halted, 
and rested on their arms in the expecta- 
tion of renewing the conflict in the morn- 
ing. When morning came, it was found 
that the Confederates had abandoned 
Port Gibson, had crossed both forks of 
the Bayou PieiTe, and burned the bridges 
in their rear. In this engagement, the 
Confederates sustained a heavy loss. 
The Nationals captured three guns, 
four flags and 580 prisoners. Their 
loss was 130 killed and 780 woimded. 
This encounter is generally spoken of 
as the battle of Port Gibson. 

No time was lost in the reconstruo 
tion of the bridges; and on the jfay 
3d of May, the Confederates were S» 
pui-sued as far as Hankinson's Ferry. 
On the same day, Grant ha\ang discov- 
ered that Grand Gulf had been evao 



li44 



400 



VICKSBUEG. 



uated, resolved to transfer his base of 
supplies from Bruinsburg to that place. 
At Hankinson's Ferry, he halted his 
forces, and waited for wagons and sup- 
plies, as well as for the arrival of Sher- 
May man. On the 7th of May, that 
''• general succeeded in carrying 
across the river nis entire command, 
with the exception of Blair's division, 
which Avas left at Milliken's Bend to 
protect the depots there, until relieved 
by troops from Memphis. On the same 
day, General Grant gave orders for a 
general forward movement of the whole 
army. 

In a previous chapter, we endeavored 
to present a clear and intelligible view 
of Vicksburg, as looked at from the 
river side. Built on one side of a sharp 
bend in the river, on a high line of 
blufFs, which extend some fifteen miles 
from Haines' Bluff, touching the Yazoo 
on the north to a point below Warren- 
ton on the south, the heights being for- 
tified throughout their entu-e length, 
and the ground on the triangle in front 
of the Northern defenses being all but 
impassable, it is no abuse of language 
to say that on the rivei- front Vicks- 
burg was impregnable. We have al- 
ready seen how all the attempts on that 
side had failed. We have now to look 
at Vicksburg from a different stand- 
point. Another and formidable effort 
was about to be made to reduce the "city 
of an hundred hills "; but this time the 
attack was to be made on the land side — 
not from the river. It is but truth to 
say that, at the time of Grant's ap- 
proach, the obstacles to be encountered 
and overcome on the land side were, in 



many respects, as great as those on the 
side of the river. There was first the 
Bayou Pierre, vsdth its steep banks, 
forming an outer line. Then came the 
Big Black, with its tributaries, Big 
Sandy, Five Mile, Fourteen Mile and 
Baker's Creeks. This, however, was 
not all. The roads were narrow, and 
not unfrequently, as we have just seen, 
flanked on both sides by deep ravines. 
The whole country was broken and ir- 
regular, presenting serious obstacles to 
an invading army. Nearer the city, 
the surrounding heights were crowned 
with fortifications — bastioned forts, re- 
doubts, redans, detached batteries with- 
out number, and countless lines of con- 
necting rifle-pits. It was not without 
reason that the South was proud of 
Vicksburg. After Richmond, it wa3 
the strongest place within the limits of 
the Confederate States. Such was the 
place which Grant had resolved to cap- 
ture. Such were the obstacles which 
lay in the way of the accomplishment 
of his purpose. 

It was General Graat's design to se- 
cure his rear by a rapid march on Jack- 
son, the capital of the State of Missis- 
sippi, to destroy the public property 
there, to break up the railroad which 
connects that capital with Vicksburg, 
and then to concentrate his fot-ces. 
around the doomed city. In order the 
more effectually to accomplish his pur- 
pose, he deemed it prudent to distract 
the attention of the enemy, and to con- 
ceal, as far as possible, his real inten- 
tion. Reconnoitering parties to the 
west side of the Big Black felt their 
way, unmolested, to within six miles of 



RAYMOND. 



40T 



Warrenton. The main body of the army 
advanced by two parallel roads on the 
southeast bank of the same river — Mc- 
Pherson on the road to the left; Mc- 
Clernand on the ridge road, a little 
more to the right; Sherman, vehose 
corps was divided, following on both 
roads. On the 11th, and while these 
movements were being cairied out. 
Grant telegraphed to General Halleck 
that he would communicate no more 
with Grand Gulf, and that several 
weeks might elapse before he would 
ao;ain hear from him. That night Mc- 
demand's corps was on and near the 
Baldwin's Ferry Road ; Sherman's corps 
was at and beyond Auburn ; and Mc- 
Pherson, with his corps, was eight 
miles to the right, a little in advanc«» of 
Utica, in the direction of Raymond. 

On the morning of the 12th, Sherman 
Blay and McClernand crossed Fourteen 
•2. Mile Creek, the former at Dillon's 
Plantation, the latter a little further to 
the west. At both crossings the enemy 
was encountered, and there was severe 
skirmishing. Grant had been with 
Sherman from the time the latter ar- 
rived at Auburn. McPherson, who, as 
we have seen, was moving northward 
some seven or eight miles to the west, 
when ^vithin two or three miles of Ray- 
mond, encountered the Confederates in 
much greater force. Two brigades of 
the enemy, some six thousand strong, 
under Generals Gregg and Walker, the 
former being in command, were well 
posted near Farnden's Creek. The 
troops were for the most part concealed 
in the thickly-wooded and irregular 
ground which bordered the streajn 



Two powerful batteries, planted on an 
eminence, commanded the two roads by 
which the Nationals were approaching. 
Logan, who was in the advance, was 
the first to feel the weight of the ene- 
my's arm. His second brigade, which 
advanced to the edge of the woods, 
called forth a vigorous and well-direct- 
ed volley. De Golyer's artillery was 
ordered forward, when for the first 
time the Confederates opened their bat- 
teries. The firing was kept up with 
great vigor on both sides. Finding it 
impossible to silence the National ar- 
tillery, the Confederates made a tre- 
mendous rush for the guns. The Na- 
tional gunners stuck to their posts. 
They were not to be intimidated. 
Waiting till the Confederates were 
fairly within range, they opened upon 
them a well-directed fire of shot and 
shell. The Confederates, their ranks 
torn in pieces by exploding shells, halt- 
ed, broke, and retired in confusion be- 
yond the creek. There, however, they 
rallied, and re-formed. McPherson fol- 
lowed them lip, and ordered a fresh at- 
tack on their new position. This time 
the movement was led by the bi-igade 
of General Dennis. The struggle at 
this point was protracted and severe, 
the Twentieth Ohio, the Twentieth 
Illinois and the Twenty-Third Indiana 
being badly cut up. Offering a most 
stubborn resistance, the Confederates, 
although compelled to yield some of 
their ground, still maintained an un- 
broken front. Roused to the highest 
pitch of excitement, the Eighth Illinois, 
Colonel Sturgis, at the supreme moment 
of the fight, rushed with tremendous 



«og 



VICKSBURG. 



fury, and with fixed bayonets, on this 
unbroken and apparently in\4ncible 
phalanx. The attack was irresistible. 
The Confederate line broke in frag- 
ments, and, in disordered masses, fled 
from the creek. Such was the battle of 
Raymond. It lasted three hours. The 
Confederate loss in this engagement 
was 103 killed and 720 wounded. 
The National loss was 69 killed, 341 
wounded and 32 missing. The battle 
of Raymond added to the already 
great reputation of McPherson, and to 
Logan's growing fame. 

McClemand and Sherman had been 
ordered to move towards the Vicks- 
burg and Jackson Railroad by parallel 
roads, the former in the direction of 
Edwai'd's Station, the latter to a point 
between Edward's Station and Bolton. 
This order was countermanded, and 
both were ordered to march towards 
Raymond. This change had been ren- 
dered necessary by the battle which 
had just been fought, the defeated 
Confederates having retreated in the 
direction of Jackson, where it was 
known General Joe Johnston was 
hourly expected, with large reinforce- 
ments. General Grant resolved to 
make sure of Raymond, so ais to have 
no enemy in his rear. Determined to 
anticipate Johnston, and to prevent by 
all possible means a junction between 
him and Pemberton, Grant hurried for- 
May ward his troops. On the 13th, 
•3' McPherson pushed on towards 
Clinton, entering the town unopposed 
about two o'clock in the afternoon, and 
immediately destroyed a section of the 
railroad, thus cutting off supplies from 



Vicksburg. This was a victory in it- 
self. Losing no time, McPherson has- 
tened towards Jackson. Sherman was 
marching to the same point by the di- 
rect road from Raymond. McCler- 
nand, meanwhile, was taking a position 
near Raymond. 

Johnston had arrived at Jackson on 
the 13th. There he found the brigades 
of Gregg and Walker which, on the 
preceding day had fallen back before 
McPherson from Raymond. He knew 
that Grant was approaching; and re- 
cognizing the militaiy genius mani- 
fested in the conception of the cam- 
paign, as well as impressed by the 
terrible energy with which it was being 
executed, he felt convinced that he had 
to deal with a formidable antagonist. 
He, therefore, ordered Pemberton to 
move up to Clinton, in rear of the Na- 
tional force, which he imagined to be 
only a detachment. He was to move 
that night. " To beat such a detach- 
ment," he said, " would be of immense 
value. The troops could here co-ope- 
rate. All the strength you can quickly 
assemble should be brought. Time is 
all-important." It was sound advice. 
It indicated a course which Pemberton 
ought to have followed at an earlier 
date. There was a bare probability, 
however, that if Johnston's advice had 
been taken, the movements of General 
Grant might have been seriously em- 
barrassed. Pemberton, who held posi- 
tion at Edward's Station, might at 
least have been able to effect a junction 
with Johnston. What did he do ? He 
called a council of war. It was the 
opinion of the majority of the officers 



JACKSON. 



409 



that Joanston's order should be obeyed. 
It was the opinion of not a few of them 
that, in place of following out Johnston's 
instructions, a movement should be made 
to cut off Grant's supplies from the 
Mississippi — a very unnecessary move- 
ment, as Grant had, five days before 
this time, notified the government that 
he "would communicate no more with 
Grand Gulf." "My own views," says 
Pemberton, "were expressed as un- 
favoi'able to any movement which 
would remove me from my base, which 
was and is Vicksburg. I did not, how- 
ever, see fit to place my own judgment 
and opinions so far in opposition as to 
prevent the movement altogether ; but 
believing the only possibility of success 
to be in the plan proposed, of cutting 
off the enemy's supplies, I directed all 
my disposable force — say seventeen 
thousand five hundred — toward Ray- 
mond." On the morning of the 14th, 
therefore, when Johnston was momen- 
tarily expecting the arrival of the Na- 
tionals, his expected reinforcements not 
having come up, he was depending en- 
tirely on the two brigades of Walker 
and Gregj;. McPherson moved on Jack- 
son by the Clinton Road. Sheraian 
advanced by the road which leads from 
Raymond. Both encountered some 
slight opposition ; and both entered the 
place at the same time. It was an easy 
victory. The Confederates made good 
their retreat, moving northward, in the 
direction of Canton. It was found that 
the State and city officials had fled, 
carrying with them the State papers 
and funds. Seventeen guns had been 
Hptured; but the commissary and 



quartermaster's stores were in flames. 
Grant entered the city with Sherman';? 
head of column. His soldiers patrolled 
the streets, and brought the prisoner? 
to the State House. In the hotel, in 
front of the State House, the three 
generals met, when arrangements were 
made for the immediate future of the 
campaign. During the night of the 
1 3th and the morning of the 14th, up 
until noon, the rain fell in torrents; 
but the rank and file of the army oi 
the West were inured to the hardships 
of a soldier's life; and, while excellent 
work was done and the most perfecl 
order preserved, there was neither mup 
mur nor complaint. 

On the morning of the 14th, General 
Grant learned that Johnston had jjiaj 
ordered Pemberton to move im- ^^' 
mediately out of Vicksburg, cross the 
Big Black, and fall upon the National 
rear. Grant saw at once what was 
meant, and he gave his corps command- 
ers to understand that " time was all- 
important." All his and their energies 
must now be bent to prevent the junc- 
tion of the Confederate forces. Action 
was taken at once. Pemberton must 
receive the lesson which had just been 
given to Johnston. Orders were given 
for a concentration of the entire Na- 
tional army in the direction of Edward's 
Station. McClernand was ordered to 
gather together his scattered divisions, 
and move towards Bolton. Blair, with 
his division, was detached from Sher- 
man's corps, and ordered to move in 
the same direction. Similar instruc- 
tions were given to McPherson. Sher- 
man, with the bulk of his troops, was 



4iO 



VICKSBUEG. 



ordered to remain for the present at 
Jackson, the special duty assigned him 
being the destruction of the railroads, 
bridges, factories, woi'kshops, arsenals, 
and everything which might be of any 
value or service to the enemy. This 
duty was faithfully performed, and 
with a rapidity and completeness 
which characterized all the doings of 
that great soldier. Bolton was favor- 
ably situated for the conveyance of the 
troops. It was a convenient point from 
which to move on Edward's Station. 
jjay On the morning of the loth the 
*5i movement began. Grant had 
been particularly careful that there 
should be no mistake ; and, as McCler- 
nand was at some distance from his 
headquarters, he sent Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Wilson, of his staff, to explain to 
him the situation, and to urge imme- 
diate action. Grant himself hastened 
to the front. 

Meanwhile, what was Pemberton do- 
ing ? He had received a despatch from 
Johnston on the 14th, "suggesting, not 
ordering," as he afterwards said, a com- 
bined attack on McPherson at Clinton. 
It was not until the next morning that 
he began to move towards Raymond. 
He did not know that his chief had fled 
from Jackson, and that Grant, with the 
bulk of his army, was making forced 
marches westward. He had been de- 
layed for some hours in passing a 
branch of Bakei's Creek, which was 
greatly swollen by the heavy rains. 
He had, therefore, only reached Cham- 
pion Hills, a strong place, some four or 
five miles from Baker's Creek, when he 
rec^ved a note from Johnston, directing 



him to move northward, so that they 
might be able to unite their forces. 
Pemberton halted, sent back his wagon 
trains to the Big Black, and was pre- 
paring to follow, when he learned that 
Grant was close at hand. It was too 
late to return. It was perilous to ad- 
vance. He, therefore, took position, 
and remained to fight. The ground 
was well adapted for offering resistance. 
To the left of the road, as it approaches 
Vicksburg, there was a high, undulat- 
ing hill, covered by a dense forest and 
undergrowth. To the right, the timber 
extended a little way down the hill, 
and then opened into cultivated fields, 
and a valley which stretched out for a 
considerable distance. On the right, 
the slope was gentle. Pemberton had 
posted his army right across the road, 
his left wing resting on a height where 
the road made a sharp turn to the left. 
General W. W. Loring commanded his 
]'ight ; General John Bowen his centre ; 
and General Carter L. Stevenson his 
left. 

It was the morning of the 16th of 
May. Grant was already at the may 
front. There he found Hovey, of 16» 
McClernaud's corps, getting into line, 
and nearly ready for battle- Hovey, 
who had moved iip the road, occupied 
the centre ; McPherson, with two of his 
divisions, was stationed on the right ; 
and Smith and Blair were to take pasi- 
tion on the left. The enemy was not 
only well posted : he was strong in 
numbei's. Grant, unwilling to run any 
unnecessaiy risks, forbade an attack un- 
til the arrival of McClernand, who was 
coming up with four divisions. Mes- 



CHAMPION HILLS. 



411 



sages were sent to McClemand, urging 
him forward with all possible haste. 
In vain did Grant listen for the sound 
of McClemand's guns. Every minute 
made it more difficult to postpone the 
conflict. The troops were already in 
close contact. Hovey's advance was 
developing the enemy's skiriuishing 
line. The firing became more and more 
rapid ; and by eleven o'clock the battle 
had fairly begun. Hovey's division 
was soon fully engaged. This division, 
indeed, which was composed of Ohio, 
Indiana and Wisconsin troops, bore 
the brunt of the battle. General Mc- 
Ginnis gallantly led the attack. A 
vigorous charge w^as made upon two 
Confederate batteries, which were post- 
ed upon a ridge; and one of them was 
captured. The battle raged with gi'eat 
fury for an hour and a half. Pember- 
ton, however, continued to mass his men 
in the centre and towards the National 
right; and Hovey's troops, pressed by 
superior numbers, unable to hold their 
pcjsition or to retain possession of the 
captured guns, reluctantly fell back 
nearly half a mile. Hovey called for 
help. Help could not be given without 
weakening McPherson on the right; but 
help could not be refused, except at the 
risk of losing the fight. 

Knowingthat McClernand would soon 
be up, and having no fear of the result, 
Grant sent first one and then another 
brigade, of Croker's division, of McPher- 
son's corps, to the aid of Hovey, who 
gallantly renewed the conflict. Mean- 
while, Logan's division was operating 
with great effect on the enemy's left 
and rear. When Hovey called for 



more troops, Logan rode up to General 
Grant, and told him that if Hovey 
could make another dash at the ene- 
my, he could come up where he then 
was, and capture the greater part of 
the opposing army. Grant rode for 
ward, and cheered the troops who had 
been so gallantly engaged, urging them 
again to the attack, and explaining the 
position of Logan's division. Logan 
continued to press heavily on Pember- 
ton's left. General C. L. Stevenson, 
Hovey holding his ground in the cen- 
tre. About five o'clock in the after- 
noon, Stevenson's line, which for some 
time had been yielding under Logan's 
pressure, broke, and fell back in dis- 
order. The battle was lost. Loring, 
who commanded on the Confederate 
right, had already left the field, leaving 
his cannon behind him. When his left 
gave out, Pemberton's heart sank within 
him ; and he ordered a retreat of his 
whole army. McClernand, with Carr's 
division, followed by that of Osterhaus, 
arrived on the field only in time to 
pursue the retreating foe. The battle 
of Champion Hills was fought and won 
by Hovey's division, of McClernand's 
corps, and by Logan's and Quimby's, 
commanded by Croker, of McPher- 
son's corps. It was a bloody and 
most unequal strife, the Nationals from 
the outset being greatly outnumbered. 
The National loss amounted to nearly 
2500, of whom some 430 were killed. 
The loss sustained by the Confederates 
must have been even more severe ; for 
in addition to killed and wounded, 
2000 were made prisoners 

After the battle was ended, it was 



412 



VICKSBURG. 



discovered that the Vicksburg Road, 
after following the ridge in a southerly 
direction for about a mile, turns almost 
to the west, across the valley in which 
Logan was operating. One of Logan's 
brigades had nearly reached this road. 
Consciously or unconsciously to himself, 
Logan's manoeuvre was thus threatening 
the Confederate rear and the capture of 
the gi'eater portion of Pemberton's army. 
There is no evidence that the existence 
of this road was known to Grant, or any 
of his commanders, at the commence- 
ment of or during the contest. Its ex- 
istence was, of course, known to the 
Confederates. This circumstance goes 
far to explain the panic which seized 
Loring on the right, and Stevenson on 
the left, and which at last demoralized 
the centre, making flight a necessity. 
The non-arrival of McClernand in time 
was unfortunate, and threatened to be 
dangerous; and, most undoubtedly, if 
the result had been different, he would 
have been called to account. General 
Grant evidently felt the delicacy of Mc- 
Clernand's position, and the necessity 
for some explanation of his conduct; 
and it redounds to his credit that, in his 
I'eport, he takes some pains and goes 
somewhat out of his way to throw over 
his lieutenant the mantle of his protec- 
tion. "The delay," he says, "in the 
advance of the troops immediately with 
McClernand was caused, no doubt, by 
the enemy presenting a front of artillery 
and infantry where it was impossible, 
from the nature of the ground and the 
density of the forest, to discover his 
numbers." 

If any blame was attachable to Mc- 



Clernand for his delay in coming up on 
the 1 6th, he nobly atoned for it by his 
conduct of the pursuit on the day fol- 
lowing. The pursuit, as we have seen, 
was commenced on the afternoon of the 
16th. It was continued until after 
dai-k, with great loss to the Confede- 
rates. A train of cars, loaded with a 
large quantity of commissary and ord- 
nance stores, fell into the hands of the 
pursuers; and the 'Confederates them- 
selves destroyed much valuable proper- 
ty, which they found it impossible to 
carry with them. McClernand biv- 
ouacked for the night on the hill which 
overlooks Edward's Station. It was 
Saturday night. On Sunday morning 
the pursuit was resumed ; but it was not 
long continued. The Nationals were 
soon brought to a standstill by the strong 
works which the Confederates had con- 
structed on both sides of the Big Black, 
in the neighborhood of the Railroad 
Bridge. On the west side, the bluffs 
extend to the water's edge. On the 
eastern side, there is an open, cultivated 
plain, nearly a mile in width, surround- 
ed by a bayou of stagnant water, from 
two to three feet in depth, and from 
ten to twenty in width, reaching from 
the river above the railroad to the river 
below. Following the line of this 
bayou, which served as a ditch in front, 
was a well-constructed line of rifle-pita. 
Behind the defenses on the eastern side 
of the river were the brigades of Green, 
Villepigue and Cockrell. A little above 
the Railroad Bridge, was a passage-way 
for troops, constructed of steamboat 
hulks. On the western side which, as we 
have said, was steep, the bluffs running 



THE BIG BLACK. 



ilH 



down to the water's edge, there were 
strong fortifications, mounted with 
heavy guns. Such was the new posi- 
tion which obstructed the triumphant 
Nationals in their onward march to 
Vicksburg. Of the pursuing party, 
Carr's division occupied the extreme 
advance. Of this division, Lawler com- 
manded the ri2;ht bris-ade. After seve- 
I'al hours ineffectual skirmishing, Lawler 
discovered that, by mo\nng under cover 
of the river bank, he could gain a point 
from which a successful assault might 
be made. It was a hazardous opera- 
tion, because of the level ground over 
which a portion of the troops would 
have to pass without cover, and because 
of the ditch in front of the works. 
Lawler gave the order ; the charge was 
gallantly made ; and in spite of the 
obstacles which lay in their way, and 
the tempest of 'bullets which decimated 
their ranks, the brave fellows, whose 
comrades were falling at every step by 
their side, nobly and successfully ac- 
complished their task. Not a shot did 
they fire until they had crossed the 
ditch ; then they poured forth one 
simultaneous and terrific volley, and, 
rushing forward without reloading, they 
carried the works at the point of the 
bayonet. Almost the entire garrison, 
and seventeen pieces of artillery, several 
thousand stand of arms, and a large 
quantity of commissary stores, were the 
trophies of this daring and brilliant 
exploit. Only a few of the ganison, 
some 1500 strong, had found their way 
across the river, when the Confederates 
on the western bank set fire to both 
bridges — th" railroad bridge and the 



bridge of boats — thus shutting off their 
comrades from all means of escape, and 
checking the progress of the National 
troops. It was a cruel measure, and 
as the result proved, a useless piece of 
incendiarism ; but such things are not 
unlawful in war. Such was the battle 
of the Bio; Black. It briofhtened the 
fame of McClernand ; but Lawler, and 
his brave brigade, carried off the honors 
of the day. In the engagement, Oster- 
haus was wounded. 

With as little delay as possible, float- 
ing bridges were thrown across the river. 
On the afternoon of the 17th, McCler- 
nand came up ; and all the neces- May 
sary preparations were completed "'• 
for continuing the pursuit. On the 
folloAving morning his corps, and that 
of McPherson, which had also arrived, 
crossed to the western side of the Big 
Black. After the battle of Champion 
Hills, Sherman had been ordered to 
advance to Bridgeport, some miles to 
the north of the railroad bridge. By 
crossing the river at that point, it was 
expected he would be able effectually 
to fall on the enemy's flank, in the 
event of his making a stand at the 
bridge on the western shore. On the 
17th, Sherman had reached his destina- 
tion, and been joined by Grant. Sher- 
man had with him a pontoon train, the 
only one with the army. On the even- 
ing oi that day, the bridge having 
been thrown across, the troops began 
the passage. After dark, the scene 
was lit up with fires of pitch-pine. 
Grant and Sherman having crossed, 
seated themselves on a log, and, by the 
light of the blazing pine fires, wi*- 



M« 



114 



VICKSBURG. 



nessed the passage of the Fifteenth 
corps, Sherman's own. Having made 
known his purpose, and explained his 
plans for the morrow, Grant returned 
through the forest to his headquarters 
in the cane-brake. Next day Shei'- 
man, in his onward march to Vicks- 
burg, and when about three and a half 
miles from the city, turned to the 
right, in the direction of the Yazoo and 
the northern extremity of the Walnut 
Hills. That night, Haines' Bluff was' 
in his possession ; and he had opened 
communication with Admiral Porter 
on the Yazoo. Porter, who left his 
iron-clads below Vicksburg, had entered 
the Yazoo on the 16th, to be ready 
to co-operate with the army. On the 
18th he heard, in the rear of Vicks- 
burg, the sound of cannon ; and soon 
afterwards, by the use of his glass, he 
discovered Sherman's division on the 
left of Snyder's Bluff, and knew that 
the Confederates at that place had 
been cut off from joining the forces in 
the city. With the view of opening 
communication with the army, he des- 
patched, up the Yazoo, the De Kalb, 
the Choctaw, the Romeo and the For- 
est Rose, under Lieutenant-Commander 
Breeze. The task was easily accom- 
plished. Menaced by the land forces 
on the adjoining heights, the Confed- 
erates made a precipitate retreat, leav- 
ing everything behind them — stores of 
all kinds, guns, gun-carriages, ammu- 
nition, tents, and an admirably con- 
structed camp. The Yazoo was now 
open. A base of supplies had thus 
been secured for the National army; 
Mid if Vicksburg could not be taken 



by assault. Grant could afford to wait, 
and force submission by the slower 
process of a siege. 

It was a proud satisfaction to both 
Porter and Sherman, to find themselves 
masters of this important position at 
last. The woiks at Haines' Bluff had 
been abandoned on the 17th. They 
were found to have been very strong, 
" Such a network of forts," says Porter, 
"I never saw." Writing to M. L. 
Smith, some time afterwards, Sherman 
says, " As soon as we had fixed things 
in Jackson, I made good time in reach- 
ing the very point above Vicksburg 
that we had worked so hard and thank- 
lessly for last Januaiy. It has fulfilled 
all my expectations, and we now have 
high and commanding ground, and haul 
all our stores from our old landing, at 
Chickasaw Bayou. The very roads 
made by the enemy, which enabled him 
to mass his troops so promptly before 
us, are now ours, and answer an ad- 
mirable purpose. I ride often to the 
very hill from which all our movements 
were telegi'aphed, and enjoy an inter- 
nal satisfaction that, after five months' 
patient labor and fighting, I can now 
reciprocate the compliment. We are 
close upon the enemy; our artillery 
reaches every part of the city, which, I 
am told, has become like a prairie-dog 
callage, all burrowed in the earth." 
At this stage. Grant must have felt 
well-satisfied. He had now marched 
two hundred miles since he crossed 
the river at Bruinsburg, had fought 
four battles, had taken ninety guns, 
had captured six thousand prisoners 
had cut off Pembertar's retreat; and 



THE FIRST ASSAULT. 



415 



he knew that Vicksburg was already 
May ill his grasp. On the 19th, the in- 
**• vestment of Vicksl)ui'g was com- 
pleted. Porter commanded the city 
from the river, cutting off all communi- 
cations on that side. McPherson took 
position at the front, when Sherman 
turned off to the right. McClernand 
came up the Jackson Road to Mount 
Alban's, and then turned to the left to 
get to the Baldwin Road. Sherman 
was thus on the right ; McPherson in 
the centre ; and McClernand on the left. 
The situation now looked gloomy 
enough for Pemberton. He had locked 
himself in a cage with his own hands. 
He had done it delibei'ately, and against 
the advice of his chief. Vicksburcr had 
ceased to be of any value as a strategic 
point from the moment that the National 
troops crossed the river below the city. 
After the battle at Port Gibson, it was 
patent to all reflecting minds that the 
capture of Vicksburg was merely a 
question of time. The city was doomed. 
Pemberton refused to open his eyes to 
facts ; and, in place of saving his army 
and making it his chief business to 
effect a junction with Johnston, he 
cluug to Vicksburg with what seemed 
the tenacity of despair, rather than the 
tenacity of hope. He had received a 
letter from Johnston, written on the 
17th. "If Haines' Bluff," said John- 
ston in that despatch, " be untenable, 
Vicksburg is of no value ; it cannot be 
held. If you are invested in it, you 
must ultimately surrender. Instead of 
losing both troops and place, you must, 
if possible, save the troops. If not too 
late, evacuate Vicksbui-g and its de- 



pendencies forthwith, and march north- 
east." It was too late. Pemberton 
had been blind to his duty in a higher 
sense than he understood it ; he had 
lost his opportimity, whether he knew 
it or not; and he must now reap the 
fruit of his folly. As escape was now 
impossible, and as he was not yet in a 
mood to surrender, he must needs do 
as he best can with his shattered and 
dispirited forces. His position, as we 
have shown already, was one of great 
strength. His line of works was ex- 
tensive, but it was protected by one 
hundred and two guns; and, as there 
were Avithin the lines from twenty-five 
to thirty thousand men, the forts were 
well manned. In the arrangerDtnt of 
his troops, he placed Brigadier-Genera; 
Stevenson in command on the right, 
Major-General Forney in the centre, 
and Major-General Martin L. Smith on 
the extreme left. 

On the 19th, Grant, believing that 
the Confederate troops were demoral- 
ized by the repeated defeats sustained 
outside of Vicksburg, ordered a gen- 
eral assault to be made at two o'clock 
in the afternoon. This attack was 
made mainly by Sherman's corps on 
the right, Blair's division taking the 
lead, followed by Tuttle's as a support. 
There were two forts which guarded 
the entrance to the city by tlie old 
; Jackson Road — Fort Hill to the right 
and Fort Beauregard to the left. The 
attack was directed a2;ainst the former 
of those works. It was gallantly made, 
the Thirteenth regulars, tlie Eighty- 
Third Indiana, and the One Hundred 
and Twenty-Seventh Illinois, winning 



416 



VICKSBUEG. 



special distinction. It was a perilous 
operation, rendered all the more so by 
the rugged character of the ground, 
intersected by deep chasms and covered 
by felled trees, -which, with the remain- 
ing stumps, made a powerful abatis. 
The ground was really almost impassa- 
ble. Sherman's men reached the para- 
pet, but they could not cross over. At 
dark they were recalled. But little 
fighting was done by the other two 
army corps. The result of the attempt 
on the 19th was that the Nationals along 
the whole line drew nearer the Con- 
federate works, and secured more ad- 
vantageous positions. A Confederate 
writer gives the folio-wing account of 
that day's fighting : 

" On Tuesday, the enemy made their 
first assault on the line of Avorks held 
by Brigadier-General Shoup's brigade 
of Louisianians. They marched up in 
one solid column, our men withholding 
theii" fire until the enemy had ap- 
proached within thii-t}' yards of the 
lines, when they opened a terrific vol- 
ley of musketry. The enemy wavered 
a moment, and then marched forward. 
They were again met by another vol- 
ley, when they broke and fled under 
cover of the hills. This was the onlj' 
attempt made on that day to force our 
lines, and the attempt was evidently 
made more with the intention of ' feel- 
ing' our lines than with any serious 
idea of storming them." 

Two days were allowed to pass with- 
out any further attempt being made 
against the enemy's works. Grant, 
however, was not idle; nor was any 
idleness permitted in the National lines. 



Supplies were hurried forward from 
the Yazoo ; rations were served to the 
men ; roads were constructed ; and can- 
non were planted on every available 
spot which offered any advantage. On 
the 21st, Grant was ready to make 
another assault. He has himself given us 
the reasons which induced him to make 
this second attempt without further 
delay. It was his belief that an assault 
made from the position which he had 
now gained would be attended with 
success. He knew that Johnston was 
at Canton, -with the forces taken from 
Jackson, that he was continually re- 
ceiving reinforcements, and that it was 
his intention to make an attack on his 
rear, A\'ith the view of relieving Pem- 
berton. His own forces, not exceeding 
at the time 30,000 men, did not justify 
him in courting any such attack from a 
general of Johnston's skill and expe- 
rience. Possessed of Vicksburg, he 
would be able to tiu-n upon Johnston, 
drive him from the State, and make 
himself master of the entire territory 
west of the Tombigbee, before the 
season for campaigning was over. Nor 
was this all. A successful assault, by 
enabling him to secure all this country, 
would render it unnecessaiy for the gov- 
ernment to send him reinforcements 
which were needed elsewhere. In ad- 
dition to all this, the troops were impa- 
tient to be led to the attack, and 
detested trench-work, because they be- 
lieved it to be unnecessary. Such were 
his reasons; and even in view of the 
failure of the attack and the terrible 
loss of life which it entailed, they mu?t 
be admitted to be satisfactory. 



THE SECOND ASSAULT. 



ill 



On the 21st, Grant's arrangements 
Vere completed ; and ordei's were given 
for an assault along his whole line, at 
ten o'clock on the following morning. 
That there might be no blundering or 
irregularity in the movement, he or- i 
dered all his corps commanders to set 
their watches by his. On the morning 
May of the 22d, promptly at the hour 
22. designated, the three army corps 
simultaneously advanced to the assault. 
Grant had taken a commanding posi- 
tion near the centre, from which he 
could see all McPherson's corps, a 
part of Sherman's and a portion also of 
McClernaud's Meanwhile, Admiral 
Porter, according to instructions re- 
ceived from General Grant, had opened 
a heavy fire from his mortars and gun- 
boats, on the water and hill batteries. 
On both the one side and the other, 
the enemy's works were found to be 
invulnerable. "The works," said Por- 
ter, " are stronger than any of us 
dreamed of." Sherman, whose advance, 
as on the 19th, was led by Blair's divi- 
sion, encountered a vigorous resistance 
from the brigades of Baldwin and 
Shoup, of the division of General 
Smith ; Hurlbut's brigade, of Forney's 
division, met the attack ir^ the centre; 
while on the National left, McClernand, 
putting forth his whole strength, made 
but little impression on the stubborn 
brigades of Moore and Lee, of the di- 
vision of General Stevenson, who, as 
we have mentioned, commanded on the 
Confederate right. The assault was 
gallantly made by each of the three 
corps. It was not all at once that the 
Confederates revealed themselves. Con- 



cealed behind the parapets, they waited 
until their assailants were close to the 
works ; and then springing, as if from 
the bosom of the earth, they poured 
their destructive fire on the advancing 
columns, literally mowing down the 
first line. In spite of this withering 
fire, a portion of the commands of each 
succeeded in planting the National flag 
on the outer slopes of the enemy's bas- 
tions. For two hours the battle raged 
with great fierceness. No real advan- 
tage, however, was being gained by 
the assailants at any point. Under 
cover of their guns, the Nationals made 
repeated attempts to carry the works in 
their front. It was all in vain. No 
permanent lodgment could be secured. 
The experience of the three different 
corps, and along the entire line, was 
veiy much the same. In one instance, 
only, was an entrance effected into any 
of the Confederate works ; but it was 
only a brief triumph, and proved to be 
barren of good results. In the first 
fierce onset made by the brigades of 
Lawler and Landrum, of McClernand's 
corps, upon the fortifications to the 
southeast of the city, Sergeant Grifiiths, 
a youth of eighteen years, with eleven 
privates of the Twenty-First Iowa Vol- 
unteers, rushed across the ditch, up the 
slope, over the bastion, and leaped 
into one of the redoubts. The privates 
were all prostrated inside the work 
GriflSths, however, contrived to escape, he 
being the only one of the number lefk 
alive. McClernand's men succeeded in 
planting their colors on the bastion of 
this redoubt, and on the bastion of 
another stroii"; earth-work in their 



418 



VICKSBURG. 



front ; but Griffiths' was tte only case 
of actual occupation. 

It was now about twelve o'clock. 
Grant, but little satisfied with the suc- 
cess of the undertaking, and, having 
left his horse in a place of safety in the 
real*, came up on foot to Sherman's 
headquarters. Sherman pointed out to 
him the Confederate works, and admit- 
ted that his assault had failed. Grant, 
whose position had given him a full 
view of the National centre and also of 
the right of the National left, admitted 
that it was about the same with both 
McPherson and McClernand. At this 
moment, a messenger arrived from Mc- 
Clernand, bearing a despatch to Grant, 
"stating positively and unequivocally 
that he was in possession of, and still 
held, two of the enemy's forts, and that 
the American flag was waving over 
them," requesting, at the same time, 
that Sherman and McPherson should 
be ordered to make a diversion in his 
favor. This was the second despatch 
which General Grant had received from 
McClernand to the same effect. He 
doubted its accuracy. He did not be- 
lieve it to be a faithful presentation of 
the facts of the case. He had just left 
a commanding position where he had a 
full view of tlie works referred to, and 
he had witnessed no signs of successful 
attack or occupation. His first impulse 
was to disregard the message altogether. 
But he was reminded by Sherman that 
the note was official. With great re- 
luctance, Grant consented to give orders 
for a renewal of the attack. He or- 
dered Quimby's division, of McPher- 
son's corps, to the aid of McClernand, 



and authorized that general to call ti. 
his assistance also the division of Mc 
x^irthur, of the same corps. At three 
o'clock, the general-in'-chief having re- 
sumed his position, with McPherson in 
the centre, the attack was renewed with 
great vigor. This other assault was 
but a repetition of the former — deter- 
mined, bloody, but unsuccessful. It 
resulted in the useless slaughter of 
3000 men, including many veteran sol- 
diers, who could ill be spared, and not 
a few first-class officers. Genei'al Grant 
bitterly regretted yielding to McCler- 
nand's importunate calls for assistance. 
It was, in fact, a great blunder. Mc- 
Clernand was either greatly deceived 
as to the value of the position occupied 
by his troops, or his better reason was 
overpowered by an extreme desire to 
connect his name in some prominent 
way with the capture of "Vicksburg. 
It was no doubt unfortunate that Mc- 
Arthur Avas so far distant when he re- 
ceived Grant's orders, and that Quimby, 
who had been hurried to McCleruand's 
relief, did not arrive until twilight. It 
is doubtful, however, whether any as- 
sistance which might have been sent Mc- 
Clernand could have altered the situa- 
tion. It does not appear that he had 
gained any real advantage. Subsequent 
revelations justified the doubts which 
General Grant expressed as to the cor- 
rectness of McClernand's statement ; and 
General Sherman has told us that " in- 
stead of having taken any single point of 
the rebel main parapet, McClernand had 
only taken one or two small outlying 
lunettes, open to the rear, where hia 
men were at the mercy of the enemy, 



ANOTHEK FAILURE. 



419 



behind the main parapet," most of his 
men, in fact, being thus actually cap- 
tured. As it was, the fighting con- 
tinued until dark. During the whole 
day, Porter's mortars kept up an in- 
cessant fire on the city, greatly adding 
to the horrors of the imprisoned inhab- 
itants. It was, however, a useless 
stniggle. The diversion requested by 
McClernand had been promptly and 
vigorously mude ; but wiiile it had in- 
creased the mortality list of the Na- 
tional troop^i full fifty per cent., it had 
brought a1x)ut no compensating advan- 
tages. A])out eight o'clock in the even- 
ing, therefore, the troops were recalled 
from the more advanced positions, 
pickets being left to hold the ground 
which had been won. 

In his report. General Grant paid a 
n^eU-merited compliment to his men. 
"The assault of this day," he said, 
"proved the quality of the soldiers of 
this army. Without entire success, and 
with a heavy loss, there was no mur- 
muring or complaining, no falling back, 
or other evidence of demoralization." 
It is but just to say that the gallantry 
exhibited by the assailants was equalled 
by the bravery of the troops defending 
the works, and by the heroic self-en- 
durance of the unfoi'tuuate people who 
were shut up inside the city. Every 
part of Vicksburg was within range 
of the Federal guns — of Porter's mor- 
tars as of the attacking batteries. The 
scene presented is described by those 
who were inside the fortifications as 
having been sublime and terrific in the 
extreme, and requiring the " pen of the 
poet " to do it justice. The following 



report is from a Confederate source. 
While doing substantial justice to the 
National troops, it gives us an inside 
view of the day's fighting : 

"On the morning of the 22d, the 
enemy opened a terrific fire with their 
Parrott guns, and continued it till 
about eleven o'clock, when the bom- 
bardment ceased, and heavy columns of 
the enemy could be seen forming in line 
of battle. Our forces were all ready 
for them, and eager for their advance. 
At about a quarter to twelve, the col- 
umn of the Federal army advanced all 
along the lines in splendid order, and, 
with a loud cheer, dashed up to the 
works. They were gallantly responded 
to by our brave boys, and the first 
charge repulsed. On the extreme right 
of our lines, the nature of the ground 
prevented the enemy from making any 
heavy attack ; but on the right of the 
centre, the centre and the left of the 
centre, the assault was desperately made 
and gallantly met. But once did 'our 
lines break, and that was in Lee's bri- 
gade The enemy gained a temporary 
footing on the rifle-pits, but Lee quickly 
rallied his men, and, after a desperate 
hand-to-hand fight, drove them out and 
reoccupied the lines. The engagement 
at this point, and at the right of the 
line, held by Brigadier-General L. Her- 
bert, was of a terrible nature, the Fed- 
erals having thrown their best troopa 
on these works. Five times did they 
charge, and each time were repulsed. 
The last charge on the right of Brig- 
adier-General Herbert's lines was made 
by an Irish regiment (the Seventeenth 
Wisconsin), carrying the green flag of 



430 



VICKSBURG. 



Erin. They came at a double quick up 
the hill, each man in the fiont rank fur- 
nished with ladders to reach the works. 
Three times they essayed to plant their 
ladders, but were prevented by the 
obstinate resistance offered by the con- 
solidated Twenty-First and Twenty- 
Third Louisiana regiments. At the 
third charge, they came within ten yards 
of the line ; but two volleys of buckshot 
from the shot-guns of our forces com- 
pelled them to make a precipitate re- 
treat from the front of our works. At 
about two o'clock they made their 
last charge, and were again repulsed, 
when they retired, and did not at- 
tempt any further demonstration that 
day." 

The Confederates not imnaturally ex- 
aggerated the National loss, by putting 
it down at from 8000 to 10,000 men. 
They admitted a loss of 1000 in killed 
and wounded. 

The difficulty between McClernand 
Mid the general-in-chief was not to be 
easily removed. Grant naturally felt 
pore because of the useless waste of life 
which McClernand had brought about. 
This, however, might have been got 
over, had not McClernand, in a congrat- 
nlatory order addressed to his troops, 
>!jnd first published in St. Louis, re- 
ilected on General Grant and the dis- 
position which he made of his troops, 
»nd attributed his own failure to a 
Want of support which, he asserted, 
could have been given him. On the 
15th of June, Grant deemed it pru- 
dent, for the sake of preserving disci- 
pline in his army, to remove Mc- 
Clernand from the command of the 



Thirteenth corps. The command was 
given to Major-General Old. 

After the failure of the 22d of May, 
Grant, already convinced that the po- 
sition of the enemy was too strong, 
" both naturally and artificially " to be 
taken by direct assault, determined 
upon a regular siege. The troops now 
at his command were not sufficient, ab- 
solutely to complete the investment — ■ 
such was the extent of the enemy's 
works. He sent, therefore, to West 
Tennessee for all the troops which 
could be spared. Reinforcements were 
ordered also from West Vu-ginia, Ken- 
tucky and Missouri. Lanman's division, 
and four regiments from Memphis, with 
the divisions of Generals Smith and 
Kimball, of the Sixteenth corps, soon 
anived, and were placed under the 
command of General C. C. Washburn. 
On the 11th of June, General Herron 
arrived, with his division, from the de- 
partment of the Missouri ; and on the 
14th came General Parke, with two 
divisions of the Ninth army coips. The 
National force was thus increased to 
some 70,000 men, in sixteen divisions. 
The investment was now made abso- 
lute. Parke's corps and the divisions 
of Smith and Kimball were sent to 
Haines' Bluff. In front of the works 
which protected the city, Sherman was 
posted to the light ; McPherson's corps 
came next, and extended so as to guard 
the railroad ; Ord's corps lay to the left 
of McPherson's ; the investment in that 
direction being completed by the divi- 
sions of Herron and Lanman which, 
stretching across Stout's Bayou, touched 
the bluffs on the river. The ground 



THE Bo.MJAR1)j1ENT. 



431 



was, in a high degree, favorable to a 
besieging army. Springs of excellent 
water abounded in the ravines ; and the 
sheltering woods protected the troops 
from the rays of the hot summer sun. 
On the river side, Porter had made 
ample preparations; and throughout 
the siege, as he had already done in 
the different assaults, he continued to 
render very effective assistance. In 
addition to gunboats, which were sta- 
tioned both above and below fhe city, 
he had six 13-inch mortars, and two 
200-pound Parrott guns mounted on 
rafts. 

Siege operations were commenced at 
once, and were conducted with great 
vigor. Along the entire front, forts, 
batteries and rifle-pits were rapidly con- 
structed ; and the irregularities of the 
ground admitted of the construction of 
covered roads, by which the men could 
move from point to point without 
being exposed to the fire of the sharp- 
shooters behind the Confederate works. 
Up until the 25th of May, the firing on 
the city was made only during the day. 
After that date, it was continued both 
day and night. Porter opened fire on 
^laj the 26th, and on his part there 
26» was no interruption until the 
surrender. It was estimated that 
as many as 6000 mortar-shells were 
dung into the city eveiy twenty-four 
hours, and that, in the same space 
nf time, not fewer than 4000 shells 
'vere flung from the land batteries in 
the rear. 

It was not long until Pemberton 
was in a sufficiently sorrowful plight. 
His relations with Johnston were the 



reverse of agreeable ; and he had been 
wonied by delusive hopes held out by 
the authorities at Richmond. To the 
one and the other, however, he was 
bound to look for succor. There was 
no other source of relief. He com- 
plained bitterly of the want of cavalry. 
With a sufiicient force of mounted men, 
he might have been able to protect his 
communications — he would certainly 
have been able to watch, if not to 
thwart, the movements of Grierson, 
who gave him so much annoyance. He 
might even have prevented Grant from 
reaching Jackson. As it was, he had 
to submit to great inconvenience, and 
not a little mortification. One of his 
greatest sorrows was that he had found 
it impossible — such was the rapidity 
of Grant's advance — to withdraw his 
heavy guns from Grand Gulf. This, 
however, was not all. He had, for 
some reasons, lost the confidence of his 
troops ; and he was no longer a favor- 
ite with the people of Vicksburg. 
There were, in addition, troubles of a 
more pressing and immediate character. 
His ammunition which, since the com- 
mencement of the siege, he had been 
using with the utmost economy, was 
well-nigh exhausted. Provisions, also, 
were scarce. For the first five days of 
the siege, full rations were allowed to 
the troops; but, afterwards, the daily 
allowance was gradually reduced to 
four ounces of flour, four ounces of 
bacon, one and a half ounce of rice, 
two ounces of peas, and three ounces 
of sugar — fourteen and a half ounces 
of food in all. Add to all this the 
small number of men, and the conse- 



M« 



422 



VICKSBUEG. 



ijuent heavy duties which, day and 
night, devolved upon them, and an 
idea may be formed of Pemberton's 
position. 

Pemberton's hope of relief was now 
centred in Johnston. The latter was 
not without reason for being angry 
with his lieutenant; but it was his 
duty to do all that lay within the 
reach of his ability to extricate the be- 
leaguered garrison. It was no longer 
possible to save the city ; but something 
might be attempted to save Pember- 
ton's soldiers. Pemberton had written 
to Johnston in despair. On the 14th, 
Johnston sent word to Pemberton that 
he would make an attempt to come to 
his relief, suggested that while he made 
an attack on Grant's line at a given 
point, an attack should be made simul- 
taneously on the same point from within 
the lines, and requested that Pember- 
ton should designate the point of attack 
somewhere north of the railroad. The 
desires of Pemberton and the purposes 
of Johnston were no secret to the Na- 
tional commander. Haines' Bluff was 
carefully guarded ; so, also, was the 
entire peninsula on the river side of the 
city ; Porter's boats were keeping watch 
above and below ; and vigilant recon- 
noissances were being made in the 
neighborhood of Milliken's Bend. It 
was from the land side, however, that 
an attack was most to be dreaded. It 
was well known that Johnston was col- 
lecting troops on the line of the Big 
Black, that his army was rapidly in- 
creasing in numbers, that his deficien- 
cies in artillery, in ammunition for all 
arms, and in means of transport, were 



gradually being supplied, and that his 
object was to attack the National army 
in the rear, with a view to the relief of 
Pemberton. Happily Grant, had now 
a sufficient number of troops to enable 
him to hold Pemberton with the one 
hand, and to strike, if necessary, John- 
ston with the other. Parke's corps, 
which was stationed at Haines' Bluff 
with one division of each of three corps 
cfarmee investing Vicksburg, was placed 
under the command of General Sher- 
man, who was ordered to watch John- 
ston, and counteract any movement he 
might make in the direction of Vicks- 
burg. It was General Grant's inten- 
tion, as he wrote to General Parke on 
the 27th of June, "to whip Johnston 
fifteen miles off." Sherman faced 
about, his line extending from Haines' 
Bluff eastward to the railroad crossing 
of the Big Black, where Osterhaus 
held a strong position. It was Sher- 
man's conviction that if Johnston 
should cross the Big Black, it would 
not be difficult, from the nature 
of the country, to hold him in check, 
until a concentration could be effect- 
ed. Johnston did not venture to 
make any attempt to pen:^trate Sher- 
man's line, nor did he cross the Big 
Black. 

It was now towards the end of June 
Pemberton's situation was well-nigh 
desperate. In his agony, his mind va- 
cillated from one resolution to another. 
The one day he writes to Johnston, 
suggesting that if he could divert the 
attention of the assailants by attacking 
them to the north of the city, he might 
succeed in making his escape by break- 



THE FIRST MINE EXPLODED. 



43o 



ing the investing lines to the south, 
and by forcing his way across the Big 
Black, at Hankinson's Ferry. The next 
day, as if despairing of the success of 
his plan, he thinks it might be better 
to abandon Vicksburg, and to propose 
to Grant that he allow all the troops 
to j^ass out " with their arms and equi- 
page." Success would have been as 
little likely to result from the one 
course as from the other. Meanwhile, 
famine was doing its terrible work. 
After the thirty-fifth day of the siege, 
mule meat had become the common 
fare of all alike ; and even dog's meat 
was in request for the table. Bean- 
meal was made into bread, and corn- 
meal into coifee. "In these straits," 
says a Confederate officei", " the garri- 
son dragged on the weary length of 
one day after another, under a scorch- 
ing sun, the stench from the unburied 
corpses all around alone causing the 
strongest -minded, firmest -nerved to 
grow impatient for the day of deliver- 
ance." 

In the last week of June, the mining 
operations which were being carried on 
in front of McPherson's line, and under 
his immediate direction, were well ad- 
Jsne vanced. On the 25th, between 
25« four and five o'clock in the after- 
noon, the first mine was fired. The 
explosion was fearful. The air was 
filled to the height of one hundred feet 
with earth, broken timber, and the 
shattered fragments of gabions, stock- 
ades and gun-carriages A great breach 
was made, a part of the face of Fort 
Hill having been thrown down. Two 
columns of stonning parties, consisting 



each of 100 picked men, taken respec- 
tively fi"om the Forty-Fifth Illinois and 
from the Twenty-Third Indiana, were 
held in readiness to make the assault. 
As soon as the breach was made, in 
rushed the brave fellows, in their shirt- 
sleeves, and carrying nothing with them 
save their muskets and their cartridge- 
boxes. A fearful struggle ensued, the 
Confederates offering a most stubborn 
resistance. Supports were pressed for- 
ward ; and ultimately, amid wild cheers, 
heard amid the roaring din of battle, 
the flag of the Forty-Fifth was planted 
on the summit of Fort Hill. As soon 
as the storming columns entered the 
breach, the batteries opened fire along 
the whole line. Porter following the 
example with his gunboats and mortars 
on the river fi'ont. It was one of the 
most terrific cannonades heard during 
the whole war. While shot and shell 
were falling thick and fast upon the 
Confederate works and upon the doomed 
city, " the classic thunders of the Roman 
poet were being realized across the 
whole heavens, and from pole to pole." 
Nobly as was this assault on Fort Hill, 
and proud as was the tempoi'ary tri- 
umph, it ended in a repulse. On the 
28th, there was another mine explo- 
sion, which did farther damage to Fort 
Hill. On the 1st of July, a mine 
was sprung to the right of the Jack- 
son Road. The result was the com- 
plete demolition of the redan situated 
at that point, the living burial ol 
nine men who were counter-mining, 
and the killing and wounding of a 
large number who were manning the 
works 



^S4 



VICKSBUfiG. 



On the 1st of July, Johnston had 
jHly taken position between Browns- 
*• ville and the Big Black, having 
with him from 30,000 to 40,000 men, 
with all the necessary munition of war. 
With as little delay as possible, he sent 
A note to Pemberton, informing him that 
a diversion would be made on or about 
the 7th, to enable him to cut his way 
out. This message, which was inter- 
cepted by General Ewing, fell into the 
hands of General Grant. The latter 
had already made up his mind as to 
what he should do. He had deter- 
mined to make aii assault on Vicksburg 
on the morning of the 6th, and, if the 
assault should prove successful, to move 
Sherman with all possible haste, and 
with all the forces that could be spared, 
against Johnston. All needful prepa- 
rations for the final assault were com- 
pleted. Further delay might prove as 
dangerous as it was unnecessary. Sher- 
man was notified of his intention, and 
ordered to hold himself in readiness. 
Grant was confirmed in his purpose by 
intercepted documents, which informed 
him of the wretched condition to which 
the city and garrison had been reduced. 
The assault, however, was not to be 
necessary. In addition to all the other 
misfortunes of the situation, 6000 sick 
and wounded crowded the hospitals of 
Vicksburg; and the number was daily 
increasing. Convinced that Grant was 
about to make a final and fatal assault, 
despairing of any aid from Johnston, 
and knowing how helpless be was to 
offei' either a vigorous or protracted re- 
sistance, Pemberton's heart sunk within 
iim, and he determined to surrender. 



On the 3d of July, about eight 
o'clock in the morning, a white jniy 
flag was seen displayed on the '• 
parapet in front of the division of Gen- 
eral A. J. Smith, of Ord's (late Mc- 
Clernand's) corps. An officer having 
been sent forward to learn its meaning, 
it was found that General Bowen, com- 
mander of one of the Confederate di- 
visions, and Colonel Montgomery, of 
Pemberton's staff, were the bearers of 
a message to General Grant. Having 
been blind-folded, these officei's were 
led to the headquarters of General 
Smith, to await the reply of the Na- 
tional commander. It must have been 
a proud moment in the life of General 
Grant, when the sealed message was 
put into his hands. After more than 
seven months of planning, hard fight-, 
ing and weary waiting, his great task 
was on the point of accomplishment. 
But the bystander looked on those firm 
features in vain for any sign of unusual 
emotion. At that moment, when weaker 
men would have given way, the con- 
queror gave proof that, if he knew how 
to subdue great armies, he knew also 
how to restrain himself. The message 
proved to be a proposal from the Con- 
federate commander for an armistice. 
during a time not specified, and for the 
appointment, on each side, of three com- 
missioners, whose duty it should be to 
arrange terms for the capitulation of 
Vicksburg. " I make this proposition," 
said Pemberton, "to save the further 
effusion of blood, which must otherwise 
be shed to a frightful extent, feeling my- 
self fully able to maintain my position 
a yet indefinite period." Grant's reply 



THE SURRENDEK. 



425 



was characteristic. "The effusion of 
blood, which you propose stopping by 
this course, can be ended at any time 
you may choose, by an unconditional 
surrender of the city and garrison. 
Men who have shown so much endu- 
rance and courage, as those now in 
Vicksburg, will always challenge the 
respect of an adversary, and, I can 
assure you, will be treated with all 
the respect due to them as prisoners of 
wai". I do not favor the proposition 
of appointing commissioners to arrange 
tenns of capitulation, because I have 
no other terms than those indicated 
above." Declining to see General 
Bowen, General Grant expressed a 
willingness, if it were so desired, to 
meet General Pemberton, any time that 
'vfternoon, between the lines, in Mc- 
pherson's front. Three o'clock was 
appointed. At that hour the meeting 
was held. Grant was accompanied by 
Generals McPherson, Ord, Logan and 
A.. J. Smith. Pemberton was attended 
by General Bowen and Colonel Mont- 
gomeiy. After shaking hands, and in- 
troducing the officers, the two chiefs 
retired, and sat down on the grass be- 
neath the shade of an old oak tree. 
The position was on the soiithern slope 
of Fort Hill, and in full view of thou- 
sands of the opposing armies. The oak 
tree has disappeared ; but a handsome 
monument now commemorates the event. 
Pemberton renewed his proposition for 
the appointment of commissioners. This 
was the course followed at Vera Cruz, 
at the surrender of which, he said, he 
was present. Grant was not to be 
moved fi-om his pm-pose. He had no 



terms to offer but "unconditional surren- 
der," and he would consent to no other. 
Pemberton thought the terms unrea- 
sonable. He would never submit to 
them — never, while he had a man left — 
he would fight, rather. Unable to re* 
strain himself, he was showing signs 
of great irritation. " Then, sir," said 
Grant, coolly puffing his cigar, "you 
can continue the defense. My army 
has never been in a better condition 
for the prosecution of the siege." Pem- 
berton had much to say in regard to 
details. Finding it impossible to come 
to an agreement, Grant, with an evident 
desire not to wound unnecessarily the 
feelings of his baffled and defeated oppo- 
nent, brought the interview to a close 
by promising to send his ultimatum in 
wiiting. It was finally agreed that the en- 
tire garrison — officers and men — should 
be paroled not to take up arms against 
the United States until exchanged by 
proper authority; that the officers should 
be allowed their side-arms and private 
baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry 
officers one horse each; that the rank 
and file be allowed all their clothing, 
but no other property ; that they should 
take rations from their own stores suffi- 
cient to last them until beyond the Na- 
tional lines; that they should be allowed 
to take with them the necessary cooking 
utensils for preparing their food; and 
that they should have thirty wagons 
for the transport of such articles as 
could not well be carried. The same 
conditions were to be granted to all 
sick and wounded officers and privates 
as soon aa they should be able to 
travel. 



t26 



VXC^KSBUKQ 



The next day was the Fourth of : 
July July — a day sacred to American 
*• liberty. On the morning of that 
day, white flags weve displayed along 
the whole length of the Confederate 
works, in token of surrender. In the 
afternoon, General Grant, accompanied 
by General McPherson, with their 
staffs, entered the city in triumph. 
Pemberton was greatly blamed for sur- 
rendering the city on the 4th. It was I 
a lame excuse to say that, knowing the 
vanity of his enemies, he hoped to 
obtain better terms by giving theiu an 
opportunity to triumph on that day. 
The Fourth of July, 1863, was indeed 
a proud day for the friends of the 
Union. On that same day, victoiy, 
which smiled so propitiously at Vicks- 
burg, crowned the National arms at 
Gettysburg. The star of the Union 
was again in the ascendant; and the 
hearts of a dispiiited people were once 
more filled with joy. The fall of Vicks- 
burg was a great triumph to the nation. 
It settled the question of the free navi- 
gation of the Mississippi, and it deter- 
mined the fate of the rebellion. It was 
a gi'eat triumph for General Grant, be- 
cause it stamped him as the first soldier 
of the Republic. His praises were in 
eveiy mouth ; and the country rang mth 
applause. Congratulatory letters came 
to him from all quarters; but those 
most prized were from Commander-in- 
Chief Halleck and from President Liu- 
eoln, both of whom, it was known, had 
had at one time doubts as to the wis- 
dom shown in his movements. Halleck 
was lavish of praise ; and Lincoln con- 
eluded his noble letter by saying, "I 



now wish to make the personal acknow- 
ledgment that you were right and I was 
wrong." * 

The I'esult of the campaign, as summed 
up by Grant himself, was " the de- 
feat of the enemy in five battles out- 
side of Vicksburg; the occupation of 
Jackson, Mississippi, and the capture 
of Vicksburg, its garrison and muni- 
tions of war; a loss to the enemy of 
37,000 prisoners, among whom were 
fifteen general officers ; at least 10,000 
killed and wounded, and among the 
killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and 
Green; and hundreds, perhaps thou- 
sands, of stragglers who can never be 
collected and recognized. Arms and 
munitions of war for an army of 60,000 
men have fallen into our hands, be- 
sides a large amount of other public 
property, consisting of railroads, loco- 

* General Grant, like all other men who have risen to 
fame and fortune, has had his detractors. His own 
grand career which, from first to last, needs no com- 
mentary, is his best advocate. In this connection, 
however, we cannot refrain from reproducing one 
paragraph from the elegantly written and thoughtful 
Memoirs of General Sherman. In his chapter on 
Vicksburg, General Sherman says : "The campaign of 
Vicksburg, in its conception and execution, belonged 
exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great 
whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain 
many of his letters and notes, all in his own hand- 
writing, prescribing the routes of march for divisions 
and detachments, specifying even the amount of food 
and tools to be carried along. Many persons gave his 
adjutant-general, Rawlins, the credit for these things, 
but they were in error ; for no commanding general ol 
an army ever gave more of his personal attention to 
details, or wrote so many of his own orders, reports and 
letters, as General Grant. His success at Vicksburg 
justly gave him great fame at home and abroad. The 
president conferred on him the rank of major-general 
in the regular army, the highest grade then existing by 
law : and General McPherson and I shared in his suc- 
cess by receiving similar commissions as brigadier- 
generals in the regular army." — Sherman't Memoirt, 
vol. 1, page 334. 



RETREAT OE JOHNSTON. 



427 



motives, cars, steamboats, cotton, <fcc. ; 
and much was destroyed to prevent our 
capturing it." His own losses he ad- 
mitted to be 8573, of whom 943 were 
killed." He owed much to Generals 
Shennan, McPherson, Logan and Ad- 
miral Porter, all of whose services were 
handsomely acknowledged. 

One of the immediate results of the 
occupation of Vicksburg was the fall of 
Port Hudson ; but of this we shall have 
to speak more in detail in the next 
chapter. Grant's immediate attention, 
after placing McPherson in charge of 
Vicksburg, ^vas given to Johnston. As 
soon as that general heard of the sur- 
render, he fell back to Jackson. Sher- 
man was already in pursuit, with an 
army of 50,000 men; and Grant was 
resolved that Johnston should not 
escape. On the 8th, the National 
army, under Sherman, had reached the 
neighborhood of Clinton. The weather 
was extremely hot, and the water 
scarce. All the ponds were filled with 
dead animals, which Johnston on his 
march had driven in and shot. On the 
10th, Sherman was before Jackson ; 
and the Confederates had been driven 
in behind the intrenchments. On the 
11th, pressing close in, the Nationals 
shelled the town from every direction. 
It unfortunately happened that Lan- 
man's brigade, on this occasion, got too 
close, and was roughly handled, some 
250 men being killed and wounded, 
and as many captured. Lanman, who 
had the reputation of being a brave 
and capable officer, was greatly blamed 
{or his rashness or his folly, and at the 



request of Ord, his corps commander, 
was relieved of his command. In spite 
of the excessive heat, Sherman was 
pressing the siege day and night, and 
preparing for a vigorous and final as- 
sault, when, on the morning of the 
17th, the place was found to l^e July 
evacuated — Johnston thus once •'• 
more vindicating his reputation as a 
" hero of retreats." * Steele's division 
pursued as far as Brandon, a distance 
of fourteen miles ; but as Johnston was 
found to be safely off, with his whole 
army, the pursuit was not continued. 
On the 27th of July, Sherman was 
back in his old position between Haines' 
Bluff and the Big Black, indulging the 
hope that botk himself and his troops 
would enjoy rest for the remainder 
of the sunmier. Thus ended one of 
the greatest, and, in many respects,; 
most important campaigns of the Civil 
War. 

* The town of Jackson suffered terribly from these 
repeated occupations and evacuations. Situated on the 
right bank of the Pearl River, and adorned with many 
magnificent public buildings, such as the capitol, the 
penitentiary, the governor's house, the asylum for the 
deaf, dumb and insane, as well as with many handsome 
residences — the entire place being tastefully laid out 
and beautified by trim gardens— Jackson was one of 
the most elegant towns of the South. It had suffered 
much from the first occupation by the National troops. 
The Confederate soldiers, under Johnston, showed little 
respect either to the beauty of the situation or to the 
value of the property. The Nationals, in this last occu- 
pation, showed even less. The soldiers, for a time, 
were allowed to give themselves up to license. Some 
of the finest buildings and most useful public works 
were burned to the ground. Houses were ransacked ■ 
pianos and other articles of furniture were demolished 
libraries were torn to pieces and trampled in the dust ; 
pictures were pierced with bayonets; and daring all 
hours of the night the place wa8 illumined by burning 
buildings. Such conduct, too common in war, wat hap- 
pily exceptional in the great American conflict. 



^i8 



PORT HUDfeON. 



CHAPTER XXV. 



E^ect of the Surrender of Vicksburg. — The Mississippi. — "Unvexed to the Sea." — The Department of the 
Gulf. — General Butler. — Minor Engagements. — The Confederate Earn, Arkansa.s.— Farragut and Williams. — 
The Yazoo. — Bombardment of Donaldsonville. — Baton Kouge. — Van Dom and Breckenridge. — Battle of 
Baton Rouge. — WiUiams Killed. — The Confederates Fall Back and Retreat. — The Arkansas Again. — 
Porter in Search of Her. — The Arkansas Exploded. — La Fourehe. — Expedition under Weitzel. — The 
Confederates under McPheeters Defeated. — La Fourehe Reclaimed. — General Banks at New Orleans. — 
His Expedition. — How he was Received by Butler. — The Nineteenth Army Corps. — The General Instruc- 
tions Given to Banks. — The Departure of Butler. — Galveston. — Commodore Renshaw. — The Forty- 
Second Massachusetts. — Colonel Burrill. — General Magnider. ^Virginia Point. — Magruder's Fleet. — De- 
scription of Galveston. — The Confederate Attack. — Sibley's Brigade. — Fighting on Land and Water. — The 
Massachusetts Men Make a Bold Resistance. — The Bayou City and Neptune Fall Upon the Harriet Lane. — 
A Rush Together. — The Neptune Sunk. — The Bayou City iu Danger. — She Rushes for the Harriet Lane. — 
The Two Vessels Become Entangled. — Commander Wainright Refuses to Surrender. — Wainright Killed 
while Defending Himself. — The Harriet Lane Captured. — The Westfield Aground. — Demand for Surrender. — 
Refusal. — She is Prematurely Blown Up. — Terrible Destruction of Life. — Renshaw Involved iu the Common 
Ruin. — Several Other Vessels Captured. — The Troops Surrender. — The Sabine River. — The Morning Light 
and Velocity. — Capture of Sabine Pass. — The National Vessels Driven to Sea and Captured. — The Sugar 
Districts of Louisiana. — -The Red River Country. —The Bayou Teche. — The J. A. Cotton. — Brashear City . ^ 
Weitzel and McKean Buchanan on the Teche. — Carney's Bridge. — Torpedoes and Batteries. — Buchanan 
Killed. — A National Victory. — The Return to Brashear City. — A Joint Expedition to Port Hudson. — An At- 
tempt to Run the Batteries. — An Awful Scene. — Another Louisiana Expedition. — Fort Bisland. — The Con- 
federates Again Retreat.- — General Dick Taylor. — A Successful Expedition. —Success of General Augur. — 
Farragut. — The Hartford and the Albatross. — At Grand Gulf — .\t Warrenton. — \t the Williams Canal. — 
In Communication with Grant and Porter. — Reinforcements and Supplies. — Destruction of the Lancas- 
ter. — Going Down the River Again. — Farragut on the Red River. — Xt Gjrlou's Landing. — A Severe En- 
gagement. — The Mary T. and the Grand Duke. — Heavy Firing. — The Albalrcss Injured. — The Confede- 
rate Vessels Badly Punished. — Banks Again on the Mississippi. — At Bayou Sara. — Concentration of his 
Forces. ^Preparations for Investing Port Hudson. — Joined by Sherman and Augur. — Port Hudson Plains. — 
Description of Port Hudson. — The Strength of the Place. — The First Assault. — A Tremendous Fire. — The 
Great Bravery of the Troops. — Temporary and Partial Success. — The Troops Withdrawn. — Negro Soldiers. — 
Complimented and Praised by General Banks. — Disappointed, but not Disheartened. — Preparing ft)r a 
Regular Siege. — Digging Trenches. — The Hot June Sun. — General Gardner in a Sad Plight. — The nth of 
June. — The Second Assault. — Another Failure.— The 14th of June. — Gardner Called Upon to Surrender. — 
He Refuses. — Another Assault. — Tremendous Fighting, both on the Right and Left. — Another Failure. — A 
Regular Siege the Only Hope. — Mining and Counter-mining. — The Heroic Garrison. — The Confederates 
Again in Louisiana. — Capture of Brashear City. —Banks' Misfortune. — The 7th of July. — News of the Fall 
of Vicksburg. — Rejoicing in the National Ranks. — G-ardner in Despair. — A Council of War. — Pro- 
posals for Surrender. — Honorable Terms. — The Surrender. — The Spoils of Victory. — The Hero of Port 
Hudson. 



Thbee days after the surrender and 
occupation of Vicksburg, a cor- 
respondence ■was opened between 
Major-General Gardner audMajor-Gen- 
eral Banks, v^^ith a view to the surren- 
render of Port Hudson. On learning 



that Vicksburg had fallen, Gardner 
feeling convinced that further resist 
ance was useless?, and that he had de- 
fended the city as long as duty required 
him, expressed a willingness to surren- 
der the stronghold in his charge. Cod*- 



THE ARKANSAS. 



429 



missioners having been appointed on 
both sides, and the terms of capitula- 
tion having been drawn up, the surren- 
jnly der was formally made on the 8th 

8' of July, General Banks and the 
National troops entering and occupying 
the place on the following day. Port 
Hudson fell because Vieksbui'g fell ; and 
the fall of the one, as of the other, vp-as 
due to the persistent, patient, persever- 
ing genius of General Grant. On one 
occasion General Sherman said, " The 
possession of the Mississippi River is 
the possession of America." It was his 
opinion that if the Confederates had 
been able to hold, with a grip sufficient- 
ly strong, the lower portion of that great 
river, the Union could not have been 
restored. This opinion was shared by 
General Grant and by the best minds 
in the North. It was this opinion— 
this deejj-rooted conviction — that gave 
importance to the capture of Vicks- 
burg; for so long as the Confederates 
held that stronghold, they were, to all 
intents and purposes, masters of the 
waters of the lower Mississippi, and 
that river was comparatively useless. 
With Vicksburg fell Port Hudson ; the 
great object aimed at by the Western 
armies was accomplished ; the back- 
bone of the Confederacy was broken ; 
and the Mississippi, as President Lin- 
coln expressed it, rolled " unvexed to 
the sea." 

The fall of Port Huds<jn, however, 
formed the climax of a lengthened se- 

les of detailed operations, not necessa- 
rily connected with Vicksburg. Some 
of these operations were of greater, 
some of them of lesser, importance ; but 

»47 



they had all of them a common bearing, 
and were conducted, for the most part, 
under the direction of one controlling: 
mind. In the present chapter, there- 
fore, we shall endeavor to group these 
operations together, describe them in 
detail, and, as far as possible, present 
them as a connected whole. 

In a previous chapter we have de- 
scribed at length the operations 
which resulted in the capture of 
New Orleans. In that chapter, it was 
incidentally stated that Baton Rouge 
and Natchez speedily shared the fate 
of the Queen City of the South. Pre- 
vious to the recall of General Butler 
from the command of the Department 
of the Gulf, there occurred a few 
engagements of a minor character, 
each of which is entitled to a passing 
notice— all the more so that the reader 
will thus be enabled the more easily 
and tlie more clearly to understand 
what follows. No account of the bat- 
tles of the Civil War could be rea-arded 
as complete, if it omitted all reference 
to the Confederate " ram " Arkansas. 
After the first unsuccessful attempt, 
made upon Vicksburg by Farragut and 
Williams, and when the National ves- 
sels, with comparatively little harm, 
had been run up past the city, Farragut 
was made aware that a Confederate 
steam-ram, of immense dimensions and 
of enonnous power, was lying in the 
Yazoo. This vessel, it appeared, had 
been commenced at Memphis ; but two 
days before the evacuation of Fort Pil- 
low, she had been towed down the 
river to a place of safety, in order to be 
finished. She was now completed, and 



430 



PORT HUDSON. 



ready for action, her engines, which 
were low pressure, possessing an aggre- 
gate strength of 900 horse-power. This 
was the Arkansas. Farragiit lost no 
time in offerins: the monster battle. 
July On the 15th July, 1862, the gun- 
15. boats Caroudelet and Tyler, and 
Ellet's ram. Queen of the "West, were 
sent to reconnoitre her position. They 
had sailed about six miles up the Yazoo, 
when they found themselves in the 
presence of their powerful antagonist. 
The fire was opened at once, on both 
sides. After a sharp encounter, the 
National boats were compelled to re- 
tire, the Arkansas making her way 
down the Yazoo into the Mississippi, 
and taking shelter under the batteries 
at "Vicksburg. In this encounter the 
Carondelet was badly injured, having 
lost 14 men in killed and wounded. On 
board the Arkansas there were 20 killed 
and wounded. The idea of further de- 
monstration being made against Vicks- 
burg for the present having been 
abandoned, Farragut ran past the bat- 
teries again. Another attack was made 
July on the Arkansas on the 22d, this 
22. time by the Essex, Captain W. 
D. Porter, and Ellet's Queen of the 
West. It was unsuccessful ; and, as 
the river was now falling rapidly, the 
fleet was ordei'ed to return to New 
Orleans. 

The progress down the river was aiver- 
sified by some lively incidents. When 
passing Donaldsonville, fire was opened 
upon the fleet by a band of gueiTillas. 
Having: warned the inhabitants of his 
intention, Farragut bombarded the vil- 
lage, setting it on fire. The place was 



afterwards occupied by National troops, 
and named Fort Butler. Amved at 
Baton Rouge, General Williams and 
the land force disembarked, with the 
view of permanently occupying the 
place. Reinforcements were sent to 
Williams; and Fan-agut held himself 
in readiness to give what assistance 
might be necessary. Van Dorn, not 
ignorant of the intentions of the Na- 
tional commanders, and aware that 
the troops were suffering much from 
sickness, was prepared to offer them 
battle. General J. C. Breckenridge was 
sent towards the city with 500 men; 
and the Arkansas was ordered down 
the river to take part in the fight. A 
severe battle ensued on the 5 th of ^ng, 
August, and lasted for the better 5- 
part of two hours. Williams' ti'oops, 
although attacked by greatly superior 
forces, offered a stubborn resistance. 
During the struggle, the Twenty-First 
Indiana won great distinction. Discov- 
ering that it had lost all its field-officers, 
General Williams placed himself at its 
head, exclaiming, "Boys! your field- 
officers are all gone. I will lead you." 
Loud cheers greeted his words. Scarce- 
ly, however, had he spoken, when he fell 
to the ground dead, pierced by a bullet- 
wound in the breast. He had just 
ordered the line to fall back. Colonel 
T. W. Cahill, of the Ninth Connecticut, 
taking the command, the movement was 
conducted in good order. The battle, 
however, was now ended ; for the Con- 
federates also fell back, and then re- 
treated. The National loss was 90 
killed and 250 wounded. The Confed- 
erate loss was considerably greater, the 



ARRIVAL OF BANKS. 



431 



Nation''»ls cTaimiug that they them- 
selves buried 300 of the enemy's 
dead. The Arkansas did not arrive 
in time to take part in the conflict. In 
coming down the river, her machinery 
got disabled, and she became unman- 
ageable. 

On the following moi'ning, the 6th 
of August, Porter, who had done some 
good service at Baton Rouge, in repell- 
ing the enemy, was waiting in readi- 
ness for the appearance of the "rebel 
ram." Impatient of her delay, he set 
out in search of her with his gunboat, 
the Essex, accompanied by the Cayuga 
and Sumter. The huge monster was 
discovered on the river, about four 
miles above She was really helpless. 
When within half a mile of her, and 
about 10 A. M., Porter opened fire. 
After an action of about twenty min- 
utes, she was discovered to be ablaze. 
She was then headed to the river bank; 
and, about noon, she exploded with a 
tremendous noise, being literally shat- 
tered into fragments. Such was the 
end of the famous iron-clad which was 
to " drive the Yankees from New Or- 
leans," and which was as much a terror 
to the inhabitants on the banks of the 
lower Mississippi, as it was the hope of 
the Confederate government* 

In the early part of October, detach- 
ments of the fleet were emploj-ed t(^ 
advantage against the defenses of th( 
harbor and city of Galveston and on 

• Difference of opinion exists as to the origin of the firo 
which destroyed the Arkansas. It was claimed by Porler 
that he set her on fire by an incendiary shell of his own 
invention. It was claimed by the officers and crew, all 
of whom escaped, that they set her on fire when she 
became nnmanitgeable. 



the Sabine River; and both Galveston 
and Sabine Pass were occupied. 

Later in the month of October, an 
effort was made to " re-possess " the 
rich district of La Fourche, on the west 
side of the Mississippi. On the 27th, at 
Labadieville, a sharp encounter oct. 
took place between the Nationals^ 27. 
under General Weitzel, and the Confed- 
erates, under McPheeteis. The Confed- 
erates were driven back, and pursued 
about four miles. Weitzel captured 268 1 
prisoners and one j^iece of artillery. His 
loss was 18 killed and 74 wounded. 
The result of this engagement was the 
recovery of two congi-essional districts, 
each of which, in December, sent repre- 
sentatives to Washington. 

General Banks had been appointed 
to the command of the Department of 
the Gulf late in the autumn. He did 
not ariive in New Oi'leans until the 
14th of December. Banks sailed from 
the North at the head of an expedition 
consisting of 26 steam vessels and 25 
sailing vessels, and carrying with him a 
military force of about 10,000 men. 
The destination of the expedition was, 
for obvious reasons, kept a secret. The 
secret was well kept, although, by the 
time the fleet set sail, it began to 
l)e whispered about that its destination 
was the coast of Texas. Ou his arrival 
at New Orleans, Banks was received 
by Butler in the most courteous man- 
ner. Banks immediately took command 
of the department; and what, with the 
17,000 well-trained troops — some of 
them colored — handed over to him by 
Butler, and the 10,000 which he had 
brought with him from the North, hu 



«32 



PORT HUDSON. 



found himself at the head of an anned 
force of 30,000 men. This force was 
designated the Nineteenth army corps. 
It was expected thai;, with these troops, 
Banks would co-operate with Grant 
generally in the opening of the Missis- 
sippi — that he would attempt the de- 
struction or capture of Port Hudson, 
take possession of the Red River region, 
expel the Confederates from Louisiana, 
and restore the National authority in 
Tex<as. 

On his arrival in New Orleans, Banks 
discovered that matters were not in so 
hopeful a condition as they seemed at 
ft distance. Grant had met with re- 
verses on his way to Vicksburg, and 
had deemed it prudent to fall back. 
Sherman was meeting with but little 
Buccess at Chickasaw Bayou. He re- 
occupied Baton Rouge with a force of 
10,000 men, under General Cuvier; 
but such was the strength of the enemy 
in and around Poit Hudson, that the 
advance on that place was for the pres- 
ent delayed. We have seen already 
that the Nationals had resumed posses- 
sion of Galveston, and also of the Sa- 
bine Pass — both of them positions of 
first-class importance. In the posses- 
sion of these, however, they were not 
to be allowed long to remain. At the 
close of December, and at the request 
of Commodore Renshaw, who was in 
charge of Galveston, Banks sent to that 
place, from New Orleans, three com- 
panies of the Forty-Second Massachu- 
setts Volunteers, under Colonel Burrill. 
Pec, When they landed and encamped 
28. on the 28th, the gunboats West- 
neld, Clifton, Harriet Lane, Owasco, 



Corypheus and Sachem, were lying in 
front of the town. At this time Gen- 
eral Magruder, who had distinguished 
himself in the Peninsula by his skilful 
resistance of McClellan, was in com- 
mand in that department, Magruder 
seems to have had a high opinion of the 
courtesy and good-nature of Renshaw. 
At Virginia Point, opposite Galveston, 
he spent a whole night, with some 80 
men, inspecting the defenses. Renshaw 
was made aware of the fact — was 
Avarned even — that an attack was con- 
templated ; but he made no prepara- 
tions. Meantime, Magruder, who had 
collected from the adjoining rivers all 
the available troops in the neighbor- 
hood, with four steamboats, on which 
he had put guns, and which he had for- 
tified with cotton bales, proceeded to- 
wards Galveston, with the view of mak- 
ing an attack on Renshaw at dawn on 
the morning of the 1st of January, 1863. 
The island on which Galveston is 
built is a sand bank, some thirty 
miles long and two wide. It is 
connected Avith the main-land by a 
wooden bridge, two miles long, over 
which runs the Galveston and Houston 
Railroad. It was bi-ight moon- jau. 
light, shortly after midnight, !• 
when Magruder crossed the bridge on 
a train of cars, cariying with him his 
troops and field-pieces. He had actual- 
ly reached a point within two squares 
of the camp of the Massachusetts sol- 
diers, and had planted his cannon so as 
to bear upon Renshaw's gunboats. 
His steamboats were now seen in the 
bay. The moon had gone down; it 
was now about four o'clock ; and, under 



THE WESTFIELD BLOWN UP. 



433 



cover of the darkness, a storming party, 
500 strong, and a battalion of sharp- 
shooters, fell with great fury on the 
Massachusetts troops, the Confederate 
cannon, at the same time, opening fire 
on the gunboats. The Massachusetts 
men were found not wholly unprepared. 
Posted behind a breast-work, which 
they had constructed with the torn-up 
planking of the wharf, they offered a 
gallant resistance, and ultimately, not- 
withstanding their inferiority of num- 
bers, succeeded in repulsing the storm- 
ing party, and silencing the guns. But 
the enemy was not to be so easily de- 
feated. The Confederate steamers now 
arrived on the scene. They were well 
manned by a portion of Sibley's bri- 
gade. Two of these steamers — the 
Bayou City and Neptune — rushed at 
once upon the Harriet Lane, the troops 
on board the two former sweeping 
the deck of the latter with a perfect 
storm of bullets. The Han'iet Lane 
ran into the Bayou City, carrying off 
her wheel-guard, but doing little other 
damage. The Neptune then ran in 
upon the Harriet Lane, and so damaged 
herself that she was compelled to fall 
back to the flats, where she sank 
almost immediately. A sixty-eight 
pounder, the only gun on board the 
Bayou City, had burst, and it seemed as 
if she, too, must go down. But no. 
Making another rush for the Harriet 
Lane — and this time her bow penetrating 
the wheel of her rival — the two ves- 
sels became entangled. Sibley's sol- 
diers, dischai'ging volleys of musketry 
on the gunners, began to swarm on 
board the Hariiet Lane. Li the brief 



struggle which ensued. Commander 
Wainright, who refused to surrender, 
was killed, while bravely defending 
himself with his revolver. Lieutenant- 
Commander Lee was also mortally 
wounded. The Westfield had even a 
sadder fate than the Harriet Lane. 
She had gone out to meet the Confede- 
rate steamers in Bolivar Channel, and 
had run aground at high tide. The 
Clinton, Lieutenant-Commander Law, 
hastened to her relief. Scarcely had 
the Clinton arrived when Renshaw, 
hearing the sound of arms, and know- 
ing that the attack had begun, ordered 
Law to return. Having returned, he 
opened fire upon the batteries at Fort 
Point; but as the Ovvasco had ground- 
ed in the attempt to reach the Harriet 
Lane, he did not venture further. 
About sunrise messengers, bearing a 
flag of truce, ariived, demanding a sur- 
render. Law, refusing to take upon 
himself the responsibility, was allowed 
time to communicate with Renshaw, on 
board the Westfield. Renshaw would 
not smrender. He gave orders that 
the National vessels and troops should 
make their escape, if possible. As the 
Westfield was hopelessly grounded, he 
proposed to blow her up, and, with his 
oflacers and crew, make his escape to 
two of the transports. The match, un- 
fortunately, was applied too soon ; and, 
before they had time to escape, Ren- 
shaw himself, Lieutenant Zimmerman, 
Engineer Green and about a dozen of 
the crew were involved in the common 
destniction. They all perished; and 
nearly as many men, who were in the 
Commodore's gig, close to the Westfield, 



434 



POET HUDSOlT. 



shared the same fate. Law, making 
the Owasco his flagship, escaped with 
what remained of the fleet to New Or- 
leans. The Harriet Lane and two coal 
barks, the Cavallo and Elias Pike, were 
left in the hands of the enemy. The 
troops had no choice but surrender. 
This affair at Galveston was hailed as 
a great victory by the South. It was 
claimed by Magruder that the blockade 
of that port was raised, and that " the 
Harbor of Galveston was open for trade 
to all friendly nations." It proved, 
however, but a barren victory ; for be- 
fore the Harriet Lane could get to sea 
in her new capacity as a Confederate 
pirate, Farragut had re-established the 
blockade. 

Emboldened by their success at Gal- 
veston, the Confederates resolved to 
make a similar attempt on Sabine Pass. 
The occupation of this place by the 
Nationals was a great inconvenience to 
the Southern authorities. The Sabine 
River, which the pass commands, is 
the boundary line between Louisi- 
ana and Texas, and is conveniently 
situated for the foreign trade through 
Mexico and the West Indies. It was, 
therefore, of great utility to them in 
exporting cotton and importing muni- 
tions of war and other supplies. The 
pass, since its occupation by the Na- 
tionals in October, had been blockaded 
by two gunboats, the Morning Light 
and Velocity. The Morning Light was 
well armed, carrying a formidable bat- 
tery of nine guns — one of them a thirty- 
pound pivot-rifled gun ; the other eight, 
thirty-two pounders. The Velocity car- 
ried one small howitzer. The Confed- 



erates fitted out four vessels, protec+.ed 
by cotton bales, after the manner of 
the vessels which were employed in 
the capture of the Harriet Lane. Thr 
largest of the fleet — a steamer — carried 
two eighteen-pounders ; another, a long 
thirty-two pounder ; and the others, 
one gun each. On the morn- jan, 
ing of the 21st of January, the 21. 
weather being favorable, they pushed 
down the Sabine, drove the National 
vessels out to sea; where, being pur- 
sued by the John Bell and the Uncle 
Ben, they were captured, with their 
guns, prisoners and a large amount 
of stores. The soil of Texas was once 
more completely in the hands of the 
Confederates. 

General Banks had, meanwhile, been 
giving his attention to the rich sugar 
districts of Louisiana, to the west of 
the Mississippi. This was the more 
necessary that, if the Confederates were 
allowed to concentrate in any strength 
in that region, they would be able to 
give him trouble on his flank and rear, 
and seriously to menace New Orleans. 
Already, as we have seen, a portion of 
that territory had been overrun by the 
National troops ; but there were por- 
tions more particularly in the direction 
of the Red River, into which they had 
not yet penetrated, and the inhabitants 
were, for the most part disloyal. It is 
a peculiar country, badly adapted for 
the movement of large bodies of men 
and artillery — much better adapted, in 
fact, for defense than for attack. There 
are large and productive plantations; 
there are also extensive forests, and 
the entire country is intersected with 



CARNEY'S BRIDGE. 



435 



lagoons, biiyoufe . jd impassable swamps. 
The wateis abound wiv. dligators; and 
the intervening ground, which is for 
the most part soft and slushy, is dark- 
ened by huge cypress trees, which 
spread their umbrageous foliage all 
around. At that particular season, in 
consequence of the overflow of the 
Mississippi and its tributaries, the dis- 
trict was half submerged in water. In 
.iddition to those natural difficulties, 
obstructions had been placed in the 
streams ; and, at points favorable for 
defense, fortifications had been con- 
structed. 

About eighty miles west of New 
Oi leans, at a point where the waters of 
the great Bayou Teche meet those of 
the Atchafitlaya, stands Brashear City. 
This city is connected with New Or- 
1 ans by a single raili'oad. On the 
1 3che, it was known, there was an 
a med steamer, called the J. A. Cotton. 
At different parts on the Teche, and 
al.30 on the Atchafalaya, there were 
stronii: earth-works. Banks resolved 
to draw the Confederates from their 
strono'holds in the Deie;hborhood of 
Brashear City. An expedition for tliat 
purpose was organized, and placed under 
the direction of General Weitzel and 
Commodore McKean Buchanan. About 
the 11th of January, Weitzel was at 
Brashear City. There he placed his 
infantry on the gunboats, his cavalry 
and artillery being sent forwai'd by 
land. At Carney's Bridge, just above 
Pattersonville, they were brought to 
a halt by the demolished structure, 
against which lay a sunken steamboat, 
WJen with brick. Immediately above 



was the formidable steamer, Cotton; 
and on each side of the bayou there 
were powerful batteries, defended, as it 
turned out, by about 1100 men. 

On the morning of the 15th, Buchanan 
opened fire on the enemy's posi- jau. 
tion. The Confederates responded '5. 
sharply, both from the Cotton and from 
the batteries. The engagement had not 
lasted long when a torpedo exploded 
below the gunboat, Kinsman, lifting her 
stei-n, but not doing serious damage. 
Heedless of the warning, Buchanan 
passed on in the Calhoun, in the face of 
a fierce cannonade. He was standing 
on the bow of the boat, with his spy- 
glass in his hand. A spent ball from a 
rifle-pit hit his chief engineer on the 
thigh, "Ah, you've got it," he said. 
The next moment he fell dead, a bullet 
having penetrated his head. By this 
time the Eighth Vermont, having 
reached the Confederate rear, was cleai'- 
ing the rifle-pits, while the batteries of 
the Fourth Maine and Sixth Massa 
chusetts, supported by Fitch's sharp 
shooters and the One Hundred and 
Sixteenth New York, had flanked the 
defenses on the south side of the bayou 
The Cotton, which was now exposed to 
an enfilading fire, was soon compelled 
to retreat. So, also, were the land 
forces, the latter leaving forty of theii 
number prisoners. The Cotton more 
than once retui-ned to the fight, every 
time to be terribly punished ; and, on 
the morning of the Kith, she was seen 
floating on the bayou, deserted and in 
flames. It was a swift, sharp, bitter 
fiffht. The monster vessel having been 
destroyed, it was deemed unnecessary to 



436 



PORT E^r^jON. 



proceed further. Including Buchanan, 
whose death was a great calamity, for 
he was a brave and deserving officer, 
and had sacrificed much by clinging to 
the National cause, there were 7 killed 
and 27 wounded. On the night of the 
15th — the dead and wounded having 
been placed on a raft — the expedition 
sailed back to Brashear City under the 
pale light of a January moon. 

The forces were now concentrated at 
Baton Rouge. It was resolved to make 
a joint land and naval movement in the 
direction of Port Hudson. Farragut de- 
termined, if he could not do more, that 
he would at least attempt to recover pos- 
session of the river from that point to 
Vicksburg. He, therefore, assembled 
his tleet at Prophet's Island, a few miles 
below Port Hudson ; and, on the same 
day. Banks sent forward 12,000 men 
to engage the attention of the enemy, 
while the perilous attempt at running 
the batteries should again be made. It 
Mar. ^^^ iiow the 13th of March. 
13« Some little progress was made. 
The pickets were driven in ; and fire 
was opened on the Confederate works 
by the gimboats and the mortars. It 
was Farragut's intention to run the 
gauntlet of the batteries next morning. 
The night, however, seemed favorable 
for an attack. It was exceedingly 
dark ; and he was now perfectly fa- 
miliar with the channel. The fleet con- 
sisted of the frigates Hartford, Missis- 
sippi, Richmond and Monongahela, the 
gunboats Albatross, Genessee, Kineo, 
Essex and Sachem, with six mortar 
schooners. The vessels moved in the 
following order : the Hartford, Cap- 



tain Palmer, Farragut on board, with 
the gunboat Albatross lashed to her 
side ; the Richmond ; the Genessee ; 
the Monongahela ; the Kineo ; the Mis- 
sissippi. As they moved along through 
the deep darkness, the mortars kept up 
their fire. The darkness, however, was 
not dense enough to put the Confede- 
rates off their guard, or to make them 
foi'getful of their duty. 

As the vessels approached the fort, 
the batteries suddenly opened fire, and 
immense bonfires were kindled on the 
hill-sides, lighting up the whole scene. 
The bonfires gave a brilliant but local 
light, which was hemmed in, so to 
speak, by the surrounding darkness, 
while what seemed meteors bursting 
now from the batteries on the blufPs, 
and now from the vessels on the river, 
created a pandemonium -like picture 
more horrible than the onlooker, in his 
most imaginative moods, ever before 
conceived. The batteries being high, 
the Confederates had all the advantage. 
It was a most unequal stiniggle. The 
fleet, however, kept moving on, vainly 
replying to the deadly fire, which 
poured like hail from the heights on 
their right. Grape, canister, shrapnel, 
shot, and the scarcely less destructive 
bullets of sharpshooters, swept murder- 
ously over the decks of the vessels as 
they drew nearer and nearer the bluffs 
For an hour and a half the terrific can- 
nonade continued. What had happened 
in that space of time was known only 
on board the separate vessels. 

About one o'clock the firing ceased. 
Only the Hartford and the Albatross 
had passed the batteries. Most of the 



CAPTUEE OF OPELOUSAS. 



437 



other vessels had suffered severely. 
The Richmond received a shot in her 
steam-drum, and was compelled to fall 
back and anchor. The captain of the 
Monongahela was seriously injured; 
that vessel, also, fell back and anchored. 
The Kineo had her rudder-post shot 
through ; her propeller was made foul 
by a hawser ; she, too, floated down and 
anchored. The Mississippi had the 
worst fate of all. Grounding at a point 
where she was exposed to the fire of 
three batteries, she was terribly pun- 
ished. For a time, however, she kept 
up a niost vigorous fire, replying shot 
for shot to every one that struck her. 
As it was found impossible to relieve 
her, it was resolved to abandon her to 
her fate. Her guns, in consequence, were 
spiked ; she was set on fire ; and what 
remained of the ofiicers and crew found 
safety on the shore opposite the bat- 
teries. It was believed that many 
jumped overboard and were made pris- 
oners. Of 133 officers and men, 29 were 
found to be missing. A little later, and 
after she had drifted off and floated a 
short distance down the river, she ex- 
ploded, and went to the bottom, with 
her fine armament of twenty-one heavy 
guns and two howitzers. The fleet, 
with the exception of the two vessels 
which had passed the batteries, fell 
back to Baton Rouge, and there found 
slaelter. It was another failure ; but 
neither Farragut above nor Banks be- 
low had given up their purpose regard- 
ing Port Hudson. 

The Louisiana region west of the 
Mississippi again commands our atten- 
tion. Again there was a concentration 



of forces at Brashear City, General 
Banks commanding in person. Ifc was 
the Teche expedition over again, but 
on a grander scale. When General 
Weitzel i-eturned to Brashear City, 
after the expedition in January, the 
Confederates resumed their old position 
in the neighborhood of the Teche. It 
was resolved to drive them effectually 
out of this rich and productive district. 
On the 10th of April, General April 
"Weitzel, who had been lying at ^^' 
Brashear City, crossed over to Ber- 
wick, on the opposite side of the bayou. 
The landing was not disputed ; but it 
was discovered that the enemy, in con- 
siderable strength, was not far distant. 
General Richard Taylor, it was known, 
was in command. On the next day-— 
Saturday — the infantry advanced a short 
distance. 

On Sunday, the 12th, General Emory 
crossed, with his division. A further 
advance was made, the enemy resisting, 
but not obstinately. General Emory 
slowly moved back to the shelter of 
the works above Pattersonville. On 
the same day on which Emory crossed 
the Teche, General Grover, with his 
division on transports, accompanied by 
four gunboats — the Clifton, Calhoun, 
Arizona and Estrella — moved up the 
Atchafalaya into Lake Chatimacha to- 
wards Irish Bend, his object being to 
fall upon the rear of the Confederates 
and cut off their retreat, in the event 
of their being driven from their posi- 
tion at Fort Bisland. It was difficult 
to effect a landing ; and some time, in 
consequence, was lost. Grover was 
vigorously attacked ; but he succeeded 



»4« 



438 



POET HUDSON. 



in repelling the assailants, who fell back 
into the woods. This success of Grover 
weakened the confidence of the enemy 
in front of General Banks, who was 
Bome eleven miles distant. The entire 
Confederate force, therefore, retreated 
towards Opelousas, making a stand at 
Vermilion Bayou. In their retreat, 
they burned several steamboats at 
Franklin, and destroyed the bridges in 
their rear. So rapid was the pursuit 
made by Weitzel's brigade, supported 
by a portion of Emory's division, under 
Colonel Ingrahara, that Taylor, finding 
it impossible to carry them with him, 
destroyed, at New Iberia, five trans- 
ports laden with commissary stores and 
ammunition, and an iron-clad which 
was in course of construction. On the 
17th, Emory came up vrith Taylor at 
Vermilion Bayou. The contest was 
brief, but sharp, Taylor again retiring, 
and burning the bridges behind him. 
The night of the 17th and the follow- 
ing day were spent in rebuilding the 
bridges. 

On the 19th the march was resumed, 
and continued to the vicinity of Grand 
Coteau; and, on the 20th, General 
Banks entered Opelousas in triumph. 
On the same day on which Banks en- 
tered Opelousas, Lieutenant-Command- 
ing A. P. Cooke captured Butte k la 
Rose, with its garrison of 60 men, 2 
heavy guns, and a large quantity of 
ammunition. The way was thus opened 
through the Atchafalaya to the Red 
River ; and the Arizona, having passed 
through, reached Admiral Farragut, 
above Port Hudson, on the 2d of May. 

Banks '•ontinued to push forward to 



Alexandria, Taylor still retreating be- 
fore him. On the 6th of May, his ad- 
vance, under General William Dwight, 
entered Alexandria ; but Admiral Por- 
ter, who had ascended the Red River 
with a fleet of gunboats, had arrived 
some hours before him and taken posses- 
sion of the place. Weitzel pursued Tay- 
lor as far as Grand Ecore, when the chase 
was discontinued. The expedition had 
been completely successful ; and Banks, 
on the 7th of May, wrote to Washington, 
saying: "We have destroyed the ene- 
my's army and navy, and made their re- 
organization impossible by destroying or 
removing the material. We hold the 
key of the position. Among the evi- 
dences of victory are 2000 prisoners, 2 
transports and 20 guns taken, and 3 
gunboats and 8 transports destroyed." 

While Banks had been thus engaged, 
the division of General T. W. Sherman, 
which had been quartered at New Or- 
leans, had not been idle or inactive. 
At Tickfaw Station, near Lake Pont- 
chartrain, a large quantity of cotton, 
lumber, corn and bacon had been cap- 
tured ; a large tannery, a car-shop, the 
Tangipaho Bridge and other valuable 
property had been destroyed ; and four 
schooners, with cargoes of contraband 
goods, had been burned on the lake. 
A detachment from the force, under 
General Augur, who had returned to 
Baton Rouge, had encountered and 
routed a body of the enemy on the rail- 
road, between Port Hudson and Clin- 
ton. About this same time, Grierson, 
to whose successful raid reference has 
already been made, captured, near Port 
Hudson, some 300 head of cattle. The 



GORDON'S LANDING. 



439 



ground was thus cleared of the enemy 
on both sides of the great river; and 
Banks was left at liberty to concentrate 
his troops, with a view to the fresh at- 
tack on Port Hudson. 

We left Admiral Fan-agnt as he 
passed the batteries at Port Hudson 
with his now veteran flag-ship, the 
Hartford, and the gunboat Albatross. 
Before halting finally with Banks at 
Port Hudson, let us follow Farragut, 
and take note of his experiences until 
the commencement of the siege. The 
Hartford and the Albatross, having 
passed the batteries, proceeded up the 
river. They encountered little or no 
opposition until they reached Grand 
Guli. Here, however, they were rough- 
ly treated, both vessels being more or 
less injured. The Hartford was struck 
fourteen times ; and three of her men 
were killed. In passing Warrenton, 
they experienced a similar fate, the 
Confederate batteries at that point 
opening upon them a heavy cannonade. 
It was not possible, however, to hinder 
Farragut from moving upward. On 
Mar. the 26th of March, he anchored 
2*' below Vicksburg, at the mouth 
of the Williams Canal, to which refer- 
ence has frequently been made in the 
preceding chapter. Here he opened 
communications with General Grant 
and Admiral Porter. The latter, yield- 
ing to his call for reinforcements and 
supplies, sent him two rams — the Lan- 
caster and the Switzerland — together 
with several flat-boats, laden with coal. 
The Lancaster was destroyed while at- 
tempting to pass the batteries at Vicks- 
burg, The Switzerland was disabled ; 



but, being rescued by the Albatross, she 
was towed down to a safe positioa 
The gunboats floated past without dam- 
age. The Switzerland was speedily 
repaired; and the three vessels pro- 
ceeded on their downward course. On 
the 30th of March, the fleet witnessed 
the destruction of the Confederate 
steamer Vicksburg, as already described. 
Warrenton was again passed on the 
morning of the 31st of March ; and, on 
the night of the same day, the three 
vessels, after some fifteen minutes' bit- 
ter experience from the batteries at 
Grand Gulf, had anchored below that 
place. 

On the following day they weighed 
anchor, and proceeded to the iprji 
mouth of the Red River. Over !• 
the mouth of the river and the adjoin- 
ing country, Farragut kept a vigilant 
guard. It was not deemed safe to 
make any further attempt to pass the 
batteries at Port Hudson. It was as 
little desirable to repeat the fruitless 
efforts which had been made in the di- 
rection of Vicksburg, especially with 
the heavier vessels. Farrasfut was 
thus in some danger of falling a victim 
to the enemy. The Switzerland had 
returned and joined the fleet of Ad 
miral Porter, who was now co-operatin£; 
with General Grant against Vicksburg. 
Towards the end of April, Fan-agut, 
who had sailed on an expedition up the 
Red River, had a severe engagement 
with the enemy. He had taken witb 
him, in addition to the Albatross, the 
Esti-ella and the Arizona. At Gordon's 
Landing, he encountered two Confede- 
rate vessels — the Mary T. and the 



440 



POBT HUDSON. 



Grand Duke. The Estrella and the 
Arizona were somewhat in the rear, as 
they had been ordered not to advance. 
The Albatross moved up to within four 
hundred yards of the Mary T. At this 
point, she was stopped by obstructions 
in the river. A vigorous fight, how- 
ever, now began, the Gi-and Duke com- 
ing to the aid of her consort. The firing 
of the Confederate vessels told with 
terrible effect from the very commence- 
ment of the contest. The pilot-house 
of the Albatross was demolished. One 
of the pilots was killed outright ; and 
the other lost his hand. The rigging 
was badly damaged ; and the main-mast 
was cut in two. A ball passed through 
her hull; and her machinery was par- 
tially disabled. The Confederate ves- 
sels were more severely punished. The 
first broadside from the Albatross car- 
ried away the steam-connection pipe of 
the Mary T., at the same time killing 
and wounding some 30 persons. The 
Grand Duke was so severely punished 
that she steamed oif up the stream, 
under cover of the woods. While Far- 
ragut, who had fallen back, was con- 
sulting with Captain Cook as to the 
practicability of capturing the now dis- 
abled Mary T., the Grand Duke came 
back and towed away her cnppled com- 
panion. The fight lasted about forty 
minutes. The Albatross had lost some 
seven men in killed and wounded. The 
Confederate loss on each vessel was 
understood to be much greater. After 
this, Farragut was comparatively inac- 
tive until the first assault was made on 
Port Hudson. 

Banks, as we have seen, had swept the 



entire country, on both sides of the great 
river, from New Orleans to a point be- 
yond the mouth of the Red River. Hav- 
ing returned to the Mississippi, he lost no 
time in pushing his army across to Bayou 



Sara. The landing was effected on 



May 
21. 



the 21st of May. On the follow 
ing day, he was joined by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Sherman and Major-General Augur, 
the latter of whom, on the 22d of May, 
and while taking position, had a severe 
encounter, on Port Hudson Plains, with 
a portion of the enemy's force. On the 
25th, the Confederates were compelled 
to abandon their first line of works. 
On the 27th, all the necessary prepara- 
tions having been made, a general as- 
sault was ordered. 

Port Hudson, originally a place of 
comparatively little importance and of 
no great strength, had lieen strongly for- 
tified, and converted into an almost im- 
pregnable fortress. It stood on the 
east side of the Mississippi, on a bend 
of the river, about twenty-two miles 
above Baton Rouge and one hundred 
and forty-seven above New Orleans. 
Approaching the place by water from 
the south, the front batteries were on a 
bold bluff, about forty feet above high 
water mark. From this point, three 
series of batteries extended along the 
heights above the town to a point on 
Thompson's Creek, making a continuous 
line about three and a half miles long. 
Beyond Thompson's Creek there is an 
impassable marsh, which forms a natural 
defense. From the lower battery there 
stretched out, in semicircular form, a 
line of land fortifications, which termi- 
nated at Thompson's Creek. The place 



THE ASSAULT. 



441 



was strong by nature ; and everything 
which art and science could accomplish 
had been done to make it impregnable. 
But for the fall of Vicksburg, the pre- 
sumption is that it could not have been 
reduced, except by a formal siege. The 
guns on the works were of heavy cali- 
bre ; and there were numerous light bat- 
teries, which could be removed to any 
part of the line. The place was under 
the command of General Frank Gardner. 
"When the order for the assault was 
May given, fire had already, for some 
27» days, been opened on the place 
from the river. Farragut, with the 
Hartford and Albatross, and one or two 
gunboats, were above Port Hudson. 
Commander C. H. B. Caldwell, with 
the Mouongahela, Richmond, Essex 
and Genessee, was below. The filing 
from the land batteries commenced 
about six o'clock on the mornings of 
the 27th, and continued all day. At 
about ten o'clock, and while the bat- 
teries were vigorously at work pour- 
ing shot and shell into the place, an 
attack was made on the right of Banks 
by Weitzel, Grover and Paine. It "was 
long past noon when Augur, in the 
centre, and Sherman got fairly to work. 
For hours the battle raged with great 
fury. The batteries on the land, and 
the batteries on the river, kept up a most 
destructive fire, while the brave soldiers 
rushed forward over the broken ground, 
over abatis, the Confederate shot and 
shell sweeping the entire space like a 
very besom of destruction. Never was 
more bravery exhibited by any troops. 
The fight was most severe on the right. 
Three desperate charges were made. 



They pushed their way across Big 
Sandy Creek; and, by four o'clock, 
they had driven the enemy through the 
woods, and forced their way up to the 
very edge of the works. The attack 
was made with equal bravery in the 
centre and on the left ; and, by sunset, 
the Confederates, who made a gallani 
resistance, were at every point com' 
pelled to seek shelter behind their fop 
tifications. The right continued to hold 
the position which it had won in front 
of the parapet ; but the left, being ex- 
posed to a flank fire, withdrew to the 
cover of a belt of woods close at hand. 
In the evening the troops were with- 
drawn. It was a bold effort, daringly 
and bravely made ; but it proved a dis- 
astrous failure. The National loss was 
293 killed and 1549 wounded. Oa th* 
Confederate side, the killed and wound- 
ed did not exceed 300. 

The employment of negro soldiers 
was a feature of this engagement. It 
was the first time that they had been 
emp'ioyed in any great numbers. The 
bravery which they exhibited, their 
patience and endurance under fire, com- 
manded alike the admiration of their 
white companions -in -arms and the 
praises of their commanders. In his 
report. General Banks makes special 
mention of the manner in which they 
conducted themselves. "The position 
occupied by these troops" (the First 
and Second Louisiana), says that com- 
mander, "was one of importance, and 
called for the utmost steadiness and 
bravery in those to whom it was con- 
fided. It gives me pleasure to report 
that they answered every expectation. 



442 



PORT HUDSON. 



In many respects their conduct wa8 
heroic. No troops could be more de- 
termined or more daring. They made, 
during the day, three charges upon the 
batteries of the enemy, suffering very 
heavy losses, and holding their position 
at nightfall with the other troops on 
the right of oui- line. The highest com- 
mendation is bestowed upon them by 
all the officers in command on the right. 
Whatever doubt may have existed 
heretofore as to the efficiency of organi- 
lations of this character, the histoiy of 
this day proves conclusively to those 
who were in condition to observe the 
conduct of these regiments, that the 
government will find in this class of 
troops effective supporters and de- 
fenders. The severe test to which they 
were subjected, and the determined 
manner in which they encountered the 
enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt 
of their ultimate success. They require 
only good officers, commands of limited 
numbers, and careful discipline, to 
make them excellent soldiers." 

Banks must have been disappointed ; 
but he was not disheartened. He had 
no need to be. The stone walls and 
earth-works, and the powerful and well- 
manned batteries of the enemy were, a 
few miles further up the river, baffling 
the skill and trying the patience of a 
greater soldier than he. The day after 
the assault was occupied in burying the 
dead. It became more and more ap- 
parent that the place might prove too 
strong for the forces at his command, 
and that he might have to depend on a 
regular siege for its final reduction. 
With this probability before him, he 



set his men to work. Under the hot 
June sun, the men worked with a will, 
digging trenches, throwing up earth- 
works, and undermining the enemy's 
fortifications. They were daily and 
hourly exposed to the heavy guns, and 
to the sharpshooters behind the works. 
On both sides, the firing was kept up 
with but little intermission. The shot 
and , shell from the gunboats on the 
river, as well as from the batteries on 
land, allowed the garrison no repose. 
It was the same thing day and night. 
Gardner's position was daily becoming 
more critical. His provisions were 
growing scarce ; his medical stores were 
all but exhausted ; and, what was 
worse, he had but small hope of de- 
liverance. In his case, as in the case 
of Pemberton, everything depended 
upon Johnston. Even if uuable to re- 
lieve Vicksburg, he might succeed in 
sweeping around Grant's rear, and give 
Banks a surprise at any moment. This 
was his strongest consolation. Banks 
was scarcely in a better plight. His 
army was small. Around Port Hudson, 
he had not more than 12,000 effective 
men. The Confederate cavalry were 
concentrating in his rear. General Tay- 
lor was collecting troops, with a view 
to fresh efforts of aggression in the ad- 
joining regions of Louisiana. He, too, 
had his thoughts about Johnston; but 
what was Gardner's hope was Banks' 
fear. 

It was in the last degree desirable, 
so far as the National commander was 
concerned, that Port Hudson be re- 
duced with as little delay as possible. 
Another assault, therefore, was planned 



THE SECOND ASSAULT. 



i43 



The men had done good work in 
ti-enching and throwing up works since 
the last attack. On the llth of June, 
Jnne ^Q attempt was made to establish 

n. a new line within easy attacking 
distance of the Confederate works. If 
this line could be established, all the 
dangers of a movement over a broad 
intervening space would be avoided. 
At three o'clock in the morning, under 
cover of a heavy fire of artillery, the 
National troops advanced. They had 
made their way through the abatis, 
when the garrison came out in force. 
A fierce struggle ensued. The Na- 
tionals not only held their ground for 
a time, but forced some of the Confed- 
erates back behind the fortifications. 
The attempt was gallantly made, but it 
was fiercely repelled. Lieutenant Stan- 
ton Allyn, a brave young officer from 
Connecticut, alone reached the parapet ; 
but both he and his men were driven 
back over the abatis, with a heavy loss 
in killed, wounded and prisoners 

This partial attempt, although a fail- 
ure, did not prevent Banks from making 
a general assault along the whole line 
three days afterwards. He had made 
up his mind to take the place by storm, 
if it were at all possible, and had taken 
some pains to rearrange his troops, 
which at this time lay for the most part 
in two lines — a right and a left, but no 
centre. Joined together, they made a 
right angle. Grover's division, on the 
upper side of Port Hudson, extended 
over three miles from the mouth of 
Thompson's Creek into the interior of 
the country. Augur's division, from a 
point within supporting distance of 



Grover, extended some three miles to- 
wards the river below Port Hudson. 
At its extreme point near the river 
this line was within hailing distance of 
the fleet. The enemy was well posted, 
and not unprepared for the advance of 
those bright lines of glittering steel 
which, stretching out on either side of 
them, met in their front. The defenses 
of the enemy formed a right angle, 
both lines of which extended to the 
river, and enclosed a sharp bend. In 
front of the earth- works, which seemed 
covered with gleaming bayonets, there 
was a deep ditch nearly twelve feet in 
width ; and within short range, enfi- 
lading breast-works commanded every 
approach. The point of attack was the 
extreme northeasterly angle of the Con- 
federate position. The attack was to 
be made by Grover and "Weitzel. Gen- 
ei'ala Augur and Dwight were instruct- 
ed to make a feint or a real attack on 
the enemy's right, as circumstances 
might determine. When the final dis- 
position was made, General Gardner 
was entreated to surrender, and thus 
prevent the effusion of blood which 
must necessanly follow the attack. 
The shot and shell were already spread- 
ing death and destruction all around 
him ; but Gardner, like Pemberton, 
hoping against hope, and still more 
than half believing that Johnston might 
come, refused to yield. 

It was now early dawn, on the morn« 
ing of the 14th of June. The jnn^ 
onward movement had already *'*• 
commenced. There was the same deaf- 
ening roar of artillery as on the occasion 
of the first attack. The Confederate 



944: 



POET HUDSON. 



works literally blazed, while the boom- 
ing of the National land batteries was 
echoed back by the thunders from the 
river. Two regiments of sharpshooters 
— the Seventy-Fifth New York and the 
Twelfth Connecticut — were pushed for- 
ward in advance. These were to creep 
up and lie on the exterior slope of the 
breast- works. Another regiment fol- 
lowed, each man, in addition to his mus- 
ket, cariying a five-pound hand grenade, 
which he was to throw over the para- 
pet. Still another regiment followed, 
carrying sand-bags full of cotton, which 
were to be used in filling the ditch in 
front of the breast- works. These, again, 
were followed by Weitzel's brigade, 
with the brigades of Kimball and Mor- 
gan, in support. In conjunction with 
these, and to the left, moved the old 
division of General Emory, under Geu- 
eral Paine, forming a separate column. 
Both parties were under the command 
of General Grover, who planned the 
attack. It was expected that Weltzel 
would succeed in effecting a lodgment 
in the Confederate works, and thus pre- 
pare the way for the action of Paine's 
column. The advance, as we have said, 
was made about dawn. The troops 
moved along a covered way, until they 
were within three hundred yards of 
the enemy's position. At this point, 
the ground was extremely irregular, 
broken into deep hollows, and covered 
with tangled brushwood and creeping 
,vines. On this almost impassable 
ground, and in full front of the ene- 
my's guns, the advance was met by 
the Confederates, who, advised of the 
intended attack, were massed in great 



force, and offered a most determined 
resistance. 

On, however, the Nationals moved, 
some of the skirmishers actually reach- 
ing the ditch, where they were terribly 
punished, being exposed to an enfilad- 
ing fire. The hand grenades were 
found to be a curse to their bearers ; 
for they were at once caught up by the 
besieged, and hurled back to explode 
in the ranks of the assailants. The 
assaulting column was not deterred by 
what was happening to the skirmishers 
in front. The men pushed boldly for- 
ward, in the face of a tremendous fire, 
making a series of vigorous assaults ; 
but all in vain. The point of attack 
was too strong. It could not be taken. 
Meanwhile, Generals Augur ^nd Dwight 
had not been idle on the right. But 
their efforts were attended with no bet- 
ter success. The Confederates fought 
at all the points attacked with skill 
and determination. At eleven o'clock, 
the Nationals had been repulsed along 
the whole line. The firing ceased; 
and the Confederates remained mas- 
ters of the situation. In this assault, 
Banks lost 700 mer. General Paine, 
whose division had done most of the 
hard fighting, had been wounded. 
The Nationals had gained one advan- 
tage. They had established themselyes 
in strong positions, and on ground con- 
siderably nearer the Confederate works. 
Dwight had carried a hill which com- 
manded the " citadel "; and, from the 
advantage thus gained, he was enabled 
within a few days to advance and se- 
cure a strong position within ten yards 
of the Confedei'ate line. 



CONFEDERATE RAIDS. 



446 



After these repeated failures, the 
conviction was forced upon Banks that 
the place could be reduced only by a 
regular siege. Mining operations were 
carried on with great energy ; and the 
firing was not intermitted either by the 
land batteries or by the vessels in the 
river. Steadily, day after day, the in- 
vesting lines were pushed closer upon 
the doomed city ; and the sufferings of 
the garrison, already reduced to the 
necessity of living upon mule-meat, and 
even upon rats, were greatly aggravated 
by the continuous explosion of shells. 
Thus day followed day, nothing occur- 
ring to relieve the wearisome monotony. 
A huge mine has been all but com- 
pleted ; and, in a few days more, un- 
less the place is surrendered, thirty 
barrels of gunpowder will be exploded 
under the citadel. Gardner's spirit 
now begins to sink within him. It was 
useless any longer to look to Johnston 
for relief. Such was the condition of 
things towards the end of June. The 
heroic little garrison had manifested 
the utmost bravery, and had endured 
privation without murmur or complaint. 

While General Banks, his troops be- 
ing all concentrated at Port Hudson, 
was giving his undivided attention to 
the conduct of the siege, the Confede- 
lates, mainly under the direction of 
General Dick Taylor, reappeared in 
force on the western bank of the Mis- 
sissippi. They overran the Teche and 
Attakapas regions, from which they had 
Ijeen so recently driven by the National 
troops. They seemed specially bent on 
gaining possession of the New Orleans 
and Opelousas Railroad. Opelousas 

»4» 



was soon reoccupied ; a successful raid 
was made upon Plaquemine ; and, press- 
ing southward, the Confederates, before 
the end of June, had made themselves 
masters of Brashear City. At the last- 
mentioned place, the raiders were re- 
warded with immense booty, including 
commissaiy, medical and other stores, to 
the value of several millions of dollars, 
with an indefinite number of horses, 
mules, flags, tents, small arms and siege 
guns. The capture of Brashear City 
was esteemed in the South as almost 
an equivalent for the loss of Vicksburg. 
Having made good their position on the 
western bank of the river, their sharp- 
shooters proved a fruitful source of an- 
noyance to the Nationals. Massing 
themselves now at one point and now 
at another, so as to evade the fire of the 
gunboats, they rendered transportation 
next to impossible. 

On the 28th of June, an attempt was 
made upon Donaldsonville. This jnne 
place had been garrisoned by Gen- 28t 
eral Banks ; and what with the resist- 
ance the garrison was able to make, 
and the spirited aid rendered by the gun- 
boats, the attack proved a failure. The 
Confederates had not yet abandoned all 
hope of regaining possession of New 
Orleans. If they could obtain control 
of its land approaches, it was impossible 
to predict what might be accomplished 
by the many friends of secession still in 
the city. Their main object, however, 
in all these movements, was to distract 
the attention of General Banks, to divide 
his forces, and so aid the beleaguered 
garrison at Port Hudson. It was Banks' 
misfortune, that the force at his com- 



446 



POET HUDSON. 



mand was too small for the demands 
which were made upon it. He could not, 
at one and the same time, successfully 
protect the vast ten-itory committed to 
his care from the incursions of the 
'enemy, and effectively carry on the siege 
of Port Hudson. After the surrender 
of Vicksburg, Grant sent some troops 
to his assistance ; but they were the less 
necessary, that the fall of Vicksburg 
sealed the fate of Port Hudson, and en- 
abled Banks to operate his troops in 
other directions. 

It was near the 7th of July. Loud 
jniy cheering, and other joyous demon- 
T' strations made along the National 
line, reached the ears of the besieged. 
These were accompanied by thunders of 
artillery, which sounded like salutes, 
from the gunboats and the batteries. 
The meaning could hai'dly be mistaken ; 
but doubt was not permitted ; for the 
Confederates on the outer works could 
distinctly hear the words, as they were 
joyously repeated by the advanced pick- 
ets of the besiegers — " Vicksburg has 
surrendered ! " The intelligence was im- 
mediately conmiunicated to General 
Gardner. He was not yet reduced to 
absolute despair. The garrison was not 
murmuring. The mule-meat and the 
fricasseed rats were still quieting, if not 
satisfying, the cravings of nature. He 
could, if he chose, hold out a few days 
longer. But would it be wise ? In this 
state of mind, Gardner summoned a 
council of war on the night of the 7th. 
There were present General Beale, Col- 
onels Steadman, Miles, Lyle and Shelby, 
and Lieutenant Marshal S. Smith. It 
was the unanimous opinion of the officers 



that further resistance would be vain. 
A correspondence was, in consequence, 
immediately opened with General Banks. 
Gardner, in his first letter, referred to 
the rumor regarding the surrender of 
Vicksburg, asked whether the rumor 
were true, and expressed a desire that if 
it were true, Banks would consent to a 
suspension of hostilities, with a view to 
arranging terms of surrender. On being 
assui'ed of the fact that Vicksburg had 
fallen, but that there would be no cessa- 
tion of hostilities for the purposes indi- 
cated, Gardner again wrote, requesting 
the appointment of a commission of three 
officers, to meet a similar commission ap- 
pointed by himself, that they might agree 
upon and draw up the terms of surren- 
der. For this purpose he asked a cessa- 
tion of hostilities. These terms were 
complied with. A committee of three 
were appointed on either side ; and in- 
structions were given by both command- 
ers, to the effect that hostilities should 
cease until further orders. 

Honorable terms were granted to 
the vanquished ; and, on the 9th juiy 
of July, General Andrews, Chief *. 
of Staff of General Banks, with Colonel 
Berge leading his column, followed by 
two picked regiments from each divi- 
sion, with the batteries of Holcomb and 
Bowie and the gunners of the naval 
battery, entered the works. The Na- 
tional troops were then drawn up in two 
lines, with their officers in front. The 
Confederates, their backs to the river, 
were drawn up in line, with their offi- 
cers in front, on the opposite side of the 
road. General Gardner then advanced 
and offered to surrender his sword, with 



THE SUEEENDER. 



447 



Port Hudson. He was politely re- 
quested to retain his sword, in consider- 
ation of the respect which his braver}^ 
commanded in the breasts of his rivals. 
He then said : " General, I will now 
formally surrender my command to 
you, and for that purpose will give the 
order to ground arms." With the post 
thus suri-endered, there fell into the 
hands of the Nationals, 6233 prisoners, 
51 guns, 2 steamers, 4400 pounds of 
cannon powder, 5000 small arms, and 
150,000 rounds of ammunition. The 
Jittle hamlet of Port Hudson, originally 
consisting of a small church and a few 
houses was completely in ruins. After 
the surrender, Farragut moved dovpn 
the river, arriving in time to receive 
the cordial greetings of the victorious 
and exultant troops, and to take part in 
the general rejoicing. So ended the 
protracted struggle for the possession 
of Port Hudson. 

This chapter on Port Hudson, and 
connected engagements, is so intimately 
related to the chapter on Vicksburg, 
that to enlarge on the i Jiportance of the 
fall of Post Hudson, would only be a 
useless repetition of what has already 
been said. It was impossible for the 
Confederates to hold out in Port Hud- 
son, after Vicksburg had surrendered. 



If Vicksburg had not surrendered at 
the time it did, Gardner might have 
held out for a few days, but he could 
not have held out long. Nothing but 
the appearance of a powerful force in 
the rear of Banks could have tempted 
Gardner to make a sortie. Of the ap- 
pearance of such a force there was but 
little hope ; and, even if such a diver- 
sion had been made, it is questionable 
whether, in the exhausted condition of 
the garrison, a sortie would have been 
attempted, or, if attempted, would not 
have resulted in complete and disastrous 
failure. Looked at in the light we 
now enjoy, the glcry attending the cap- 
ture of Port Hudson, waa eclipsed by 
the greater glory of Vicksburg. This 
much, in addition to what has been said 
in this chapter already, it is only fair to 
say in vindication of General Banks 
and the brave officers and men who 
fought under him. He would have 
done better if he had had a stronger 
force at his command, and less territory 
to protect. As it was, Banks reduced 
a fortress second only in importance to 
that of Vicksburg ; and, by the con- 
spicuous service which he rendered his 
country, the hero of Port Hudson shared 
the favors which were then being poured 
out BO lavishly on Meade and Grant. 



«48 



CHAJ!fCELLOESVILLB. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

Ihe West and the East. — After Fredericksburg. — Changes in the Army of the East.— General Hooker. — Hie 
Past Career. — His Personal Appearance. — Hooker's Address to the Army. — The Emancipation Proclama- 
tion. — Its Effect on the Army. — Rearrangement of the Army. — The Position of General Lee. — Condition 
of his Army. — Description of the Ground. — Hooker Preparing to Attack. — His Plan of Battle. — The Na- 
tional Army in Motion. — The Crossing of the Rappahannock. — The Crossing of the Kapidan. — At 
Chancellorsville. — The Position Described. — Sedgwick's Operations Below Fredericksburg. — A Successful 
Feint. — Hooker's Plan 'Working Admirably. — Hooker Advances Towards Fredericksburg. — The Three 
Eoads. — Sykes Compelled to Fight his 'Way. — The Advance Successful. — A Splendid Position 'Won. — 
Fortune Smiling on Hooker and the National Army. — Hooker's First but Fatal Blunder. — The Plan of 
Battle Changed.— On the Defensive. — The Line of Battle. — The Confederate Lines. — Jackson Pushed To- 
wards Chancellorsville. — Disposition of the Confederate Troops. — Lee's Description of the National Posi- 
tion. — Jackson's Plan. — A Bold Experiment. — Jackson's Movement to the National Eight. — Hooker in 
Ignorance of Jackson's Plan. — The Confederate Column Seen at the Furnace. — Advance of Sickles. — Cap- 
ture of the Twenty-Third Georgia Regiment. — An Attempt to Intercept the Confederate Train. — Jackson 
oa the Plank Road and the Turnpike. — Ready to Strike. — The Unsuspecting Nationals. — Startled 
Game. — A Mighty Cheer. — A Panic. — The National Right Demolished. — The Battle of Bull Run Re- 
peated. — Advance of Bimey and Best. — Jackson Checked. — Sickles Recalled from the Furnace. — Hazel 
Grove. — Crutchfield 'Wounded. — A Midnight Battle. — " Stonewall " Jackson Mortally 'Wounded. — Hia 
Death. — A. P. HUl Takes Command, and is 'Wounded. — The Command Devolves upon Stuart. — Hooker's 
Mistake. — Sedgwick ordered to Advance. — Hooker Takes a New Position. — The Battle Resumed. — Sickles 
Ordered to Abandon the Key-Position of the Field. — "Charge, and Remember Jackson." — Tempest of 
Lead. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Lee Pressing on Slocum and Hancock. — The Confederate Line 
'United. — The National Line Melts Away. — 0|ianceUorsvilIe House Abandoned. — Hooker Stunned and 
Stupefied by a Cannon Ball. — A Lull in the Fight. — The New Position. — Lee About to Strike a Decisive 
Blow. — His Arm Arrested.— News of the Advance of Sedgwick. — The Occupation of Fredericksburg. — Tlie 
Storming of the Heights. — Marye's Hill. — The Plank Road. — The Famous Stone 'Wall. — Magnificent At- 
tack on Marye's Hill. — The Shout of Victory. — The National Flag on Marye's Hill. — Howe at Hazel Run. — 
He Captures Lee's Hill. — Sedgwick in Ful» Possession of the Heights. — Sedgwick's Advance. — The Con- 
federate Forces Divided. — Lee's Dilemma. — Estimate of Lee. — He Resolves to Intercept the Advance of 
Sedgwick. — 'Wilcox on the Plank Koad. — Salem Church. — McLaws Arrives with Three Brigades, and 
Takes Command. — The Battle of Salem Church. — Newton's Advance. — Bravery of Bartlett. — The Nationals 
Carry the Crest. — A Temporary Triumph. — The Nationals Driven Back. — A Bloody Rep^jlse. — Lee Re- 
solved to Crush Sedgwick, and then Fall Back on Hooker. — McLaws Reinforced. — Lee at Salem. — The 
Confederate Attack Renewed. — The Fighting Severe. — Sedgwick Crosses the River.— Lee Hurries Back to 
Attack Hooker. — A Fearful Rainstorm. — Hooker Resolves to Retreat. — Crosses the River at Midnight. — 
Disappointment of Lee. — Stoneman and his Cavalry. — A Profitless Raid. — The National Army in its Old 
Encampment at Falmouth. — A Boastful Address. — General Lee to his Army. — Stanton's Despatch. — The 
Draft Proclamation. 



While -we have been gi'ving our at- 
tention to the military and naval 
movements of the West and South- 
■west — to that series o£ events 'which cul- 
minated in the fall of Vicksburg, and 
to that other series of events ■which 
culminated in the fall of Port Hudson — 
movements of equal importance, taking 



place in the East, have been pressing 
themselves upon our notice. In two 
great battles — that of Chancellorsville, 
and that of Gettysburg — the National 
army of the Potomac and the Confede- 
rate army of Virginia had met and 
tested each other's skill and strength. 
The former resulted in a great National 



GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKEE. 



44» 



disaster: the latter was a National 
triumph. The former inspired the Con- 
fedei'ates with hope and confidence, 
and led them to the adoption of daring- 
ly aggressive measures: the latter, oc- 
curring as it did simultaneously with 
the final struggle and triumph at Vicks- 
burg, and being followed so closely by 
the fall of Port Hudson, swelled the 
National heart with joy and gratitude, 
and, by contributing with the other vic- 
tories just named to the establishment 
of fresh confidence and to the creation 
of fresh resolves, gave a new phase to 
the general contest. 

In the present chapter, we propose to 
give an account of the great but ill- 
managed and disastrous battle of Chan- 
cellorsville. In a previous chapter, we 
have related the causes which brought 
about the removals of Genera] s Burn- 
side, Franklin and Sumner from the 
army of the Potomac, and the placing 
of General Joseph Hooker in the su- 
preme command.'-' The elevation of 
Hooker may have given offense to some 
of his brother-officers; but it was on 
the whole, so far as the army was con- 
concerned, a popular and acceptable ap- 
pointment. Outside the army, opinion- 
was divided. There were many who 

• BuBNSiDii; was appointed to the command of the 
Department of the Ohio. Franklin was ordered south, 
'M take command of a corps under Banks in Louisiana. 
Sumner was assigned to the command of the Depart- 
ment of Missouri, then threatened with fresh trouble 
by the guerrillas. While preparing to set out for his 
more distant command, he was taken ill at the house of 
his Ron-iu-law, in Syracuse, N. Y. He died, after a 
few days' illness, on the 2l8t of March, 1811:!. General 
Sumuer had j ust completed his sixty-seventh year. He 
died universally regretted. In him the country lost 
one of its best citizens, and the army on e of its bravest 
noldiers. 



regarded the elevation of Hooker to the 
chief command of the army of th« 
Potomac with extreme satisfaction. 
Since the commencement of the Penin- 
sular campaign, he had been promi. 
nently identified with that mmy. He 
greatly distinguished himself at the 
battle of "Williamsburg ; and, from that 
day to the end of the campaign, he waa 
ever ready with his well- trained and 
devoted division, to perfoi'm any duty, 
to run any risk, to make any sacrifice. 
At the battle of Antietam, where he 
literally covered himself with glory, he 
proved himseif to be the bravest of the 
brave. He was one of the few of Mc- 
Clellan's generals, who gave to Pope a 
willing and honest obedience dui'iug 
his campaign against Lee in- Virginia. 
When the army of the Potomac again 
changed its leader, he did not withold 
his allegiance from Burnside, although 
he was not without reasons for being 
dissatisfied with this appointment ; and 
at the battle of Fredericksburg, \vliere 
he commanded the centre, he yielded to 
duty against his better judgment, and, 
in obedience to orders, attempted the 
performance of a perilous and an impos- 
sible task. In his case, from first to 
last, personal feeling was not allowed 
to interfere with the discharge of public 
duty. His fine appearance and his 
agreeable manners, which made him a 
great favorite with his own men, recom- 
mended him to all with whom he waa 
brought into contact. Tall, erect, mus- 
cular, but not heavily -built ; liglit of 
complexion, with a fresh, ruddy coun- 
tenance; fine, clean-cut, intellectual fea- 
tures, lit up l)y large, cleai', niild }'et 



iSO 



CHANCELLOESVILLE. 



expressive eyes; a lofty forehead, his 
hair brown, but tinged with gray; quick 
and decided in all his movements -such 
at that time was General Joseph 
Hooker. In figure and in bearing he 
had few if any equals among the officers 
of the army. It was hoped that 
under such a leader the amiy of the 
Potomac would yet prove itself worthy 
of the care which had been bestowed 
upon it, and justify the expectations 
which it had raised in the hearts of 
the Northern people. There were not 
a few, however, who regarded the ap- 
pointment of Hooker with doubt and 
misgiving. His bravery, which had 
been put to the test on many a battle- 
field, Avas not to be called in question ; 
his ability as a corps or division com- 
mander had been abundantly estab- 
lished; but the qualities which had 
served him in good stead and canied 
him to victor^', in a secondary capacity, 
might not be sufficient for him as com- 
mander-in-chief. The skilful lieutenant 
has oftentimes been found helpless when 
left alone. " He was my right ai-m," 
said Napoleon of Murat, " but without 
me he was nothing. In battle, he was, 
perhaps, the bravest man in the world ; 
left to himself, he was an imbecile 
without jodgment." Of Ney, he said : 
'He was the bravest of men; there 
terminate all his faculties." The army 
of the Potomac had already furnished 
two examples of conspicuous failure. 
Might not Hooker, like Pope and Bum- 
side, be found wanting? It had cer- 
tainly yet to be proved whether he 
were possessed of the higher qualities 
requisite in a general-in-chief. The 



broad conception, with the power t^o 
combine and utilize the forces at his 
command ; the comprehensive grasp, with 
minute attention to detail; the quick 
eye and the clear head to perceive and 
know where relief is needed or where 
a deadly blow may be struck ; the light- 
ning-like promptitude of action which' 
always implies self-reliance and the full 
courage of conviction — these were the 
qualities needed in the man who would 
lead to victory the army of the Potomac ; 
and if there were some who doubted 
whether these were all united in General 
Hooker, it was not because they under- 
estimated his abilities or disesteemed 
his past career, but because he had not 
been tested in this lofty and exacting 
sphere of duty. 

General Hooker's elevation command 
ed the greater attention, that he had 
been open-mouthed regarding the errors, 
real or supposed, of his predecessors. 
His estimate of his own abilities was 
undoubtedly high. When questioned 
by the Congressional Committee as to 
the cause of the failure of the Peninsu- 
lar campaign, he answered : " I do not 
hesitate to say that it is to be attributed 
to the want of generalship on the part 
of our commander." It was his opinion 
— and he did not disguise it — that 
there were several occasions during 
that campaign, on which, if he had 
been at liberty to act, he could have 
taken Richmond. His views were 
expressed with equal fi'eedom, and 
were of similar import, after the battle 
of Fredericksburg. If, therefore, he 
was about to be judged by a high 
standard, it was a standaj'd which he. 



ADDRESS TO THE ARMY. 



461 



himself, had been mainly instrumental 
in setting up. 

Hooker assumed command on the 
Jan. 26th of January. On the same 
26. day he issued an address to the 
army. " The undersigned," he said, 
" assumes command of the army of the 
Potomac. He enters upon the dis- 
charge of the duties, imposed by the 
trust, with a just appreciation of their 
responsibility. Since the formation of 
this army he has been identified with 
its history ; he has shared with you its 
glories and reverses, with no other de- 
sire than that these relations might re- 
main unchanged until its destiny should 
be accomplished. In the record of 
your achievements there is much to 
be proud of, and, vrith the blessing of 
God, we will contribute something to 
the renown of our arms and the success 
of our cause, "'o secure these ends, 
your commander wiU require the cheer- 
ful and zealous co-operation of every 
officer and soldier in the army. In 
equipment, intelligence and valor the 
enemy is our inferior. Let us never 
hesitate to give him battle whenever 
we can find him. The undersigned only 
gives expression to the feelings of this 
army when he conveys to our late com- 
mander, Major General Burnside, the 
most cordial good wishes for his future. 
"Joseph Hooker." 

When Hooker took command, the 
army of the Potomac was in a dread- 
fully demoralized condition. It still 
lay at Falmouth, and occupied Stafford 
Heights. The emancipation proclama- 
tion had produced a bad effect among 
the officers, many of them openly de- 



claring that had they known what was 
to be done in the matter of slavery, 
they would never have joined the army. 
There was, besides, a lingering affection 
for McClellan, both on the part of offi- 
cers and men ; and neither the one nor 
the other could forgive Hooker for his 
statement that the Peninsular campaign 
had failed on account of bad general- 
ship. The demoralization, which set in 
immediately after the battle of Fred- 
ericksburg, was increased greatly by 
what was called Burnside's "Mud " cam- 
paign. Desertions to the number of 
200 men were occurring daily. Aa 
many as 2922 commissioned officers, 
and 81,964 men were reported absent. 
This was not all. In the spring, 40,000 
men, who would have completed theii 
term, would be at liberty to go home. 
Hooker set himself busily to the work 
of reconstruction. The division system 
was abolished ; and the army was di- 
vided into seven corps. The First 
corps was commanded by Reynolds; 
the Second by Couch ; the Third by 
Sickles ; the Fifth by Meade ; the Sixth 
by Sedgwick; the Eleventh by How- 
ard; the Twelfth by Slocum. The 
cavalry, which consisted of four di- 
visions, commanded respectively by 
Pleasonton, Buford, AveriU and Gregg, 
was consolidated into one corps, under 
Stoneman. The anny of the Potomac 
needed rest; and, for three months, it 
lay Inactive in winter-quarters at Fal- 
mouth. Hooker, however, was not 
idle. Desertions were checked; the 
ranks were gradually filled up by the 
return of absentees ; the discipline was 
improved; and, by the end of April, 



^2 



CHANOELLOESVILLE. 



the army was in a state of high effi- 
ciency. The infantry and artillery 
amounted to 123,000 men; there were 
13,000 cavalry and 400 guns. "All 
were actuated," said Hooker, "by feel- 
ings of confidence and devotion to the 
cause, and I felt that it was a living 
army, and one well worthy of the Re- 
public." 

In front of Hooker, on the south 
side of the Rappahannock, and occupy- 
ing the now famous heights in the rear 
of Fi'edericksburg, lay the army of 
General Lee, 62,000 strong. This army 
which, after the battle of the 13th of 
December, needed rest quite as much 
as the army of the Potomac, had also, 
during the winter months, been brought 
up to a high state of efficiency. Such 
was the effect of the Conscription Act, 
now fairly in operation, that, in three 
months, Jackson's coi-ps increased fi'om 
25,000 to 33,000 muskets. Fredericks- 
burg, and the country in the immediate 
neighborhood, has been fully described 
in a previous chapter. It will be re- 
membered that the hills to the rear of 
that city rise at some little distance 
from the river, leaving not exactly a 
plain but open and comparatively level 
ground between. Above Fredericks- 
burg, and opposite Falmouth, the ridge 
approaches close to the river ; but from 
that point, the distance between the 
river and the heights gradually widens, 
nntil, about four or five miles below the 
town, the open ground is about a mile 
and a half wide. The Confederates, as 
we have said, occupied the heights, 
their line extending from Banks' Ford on 
the left, to Port Royal on the right — a 



distance of twenty-five miles. Their 
cavalry extended to the left as far back 
as Buckley's Ford, on the Upper Rap- 
pahannock, and scoured the countrji as 
far south as the Pamunkey River. 
During the winter, General Lee had 
exerted himself to the utmost to make 
his position secure. He extended and 
strengthened the fortifications in the 
rear of Fredericksburg, and constructed 
a system of elaborate works along his 
whole front. Inside of these lines, he 
might have bidden defiance to an army 
twice or three times the strength of his 
own. Such was the nature of the 
works, and such was the arrangement 
of his troops, that he could concentrate 
with the utmost rapidity, and, with a 
powerful force, resist an attack at any 
point. From this position, however, he 
had only two main lines of retreat — 
one towards Richmond by I'allroad, and 
the other towards^ Gordonsville. 

It was now near the efld of April. 
As it was vain to attempt any du'ect 
attack in his position at Fredericksbiu'g, 
Hooker resolved upon a bold experi- 
ment, the object of which was to com- 
pel Lee to come out of his intrench- 
ments and accept the gage of battle in 
the open ground. He was the more 
encouraged to adopt this cour-e, without 
further delay, that Longstreet had been 
detached, with several of his divisions, 
to the south of the James River. Some 
feigned movements were made as early 
as the 21st of April; but it was not 
until the. 27th, that the real onward 
movement began. Hooker's purpose 
was to effect the complete destruction 
of the Confederate army. With this 



CROSSING THE RIVER. 



453 



end in view, he ordered Sedgwick to 
make a pretense of reversing Burnside's 
plan of attack, by crossing tlie river be- 
low Fredericksburg and making there 
a vigorous demonstration. He him- 
self proposed to move, with the larger 
portion of the army, to his own right, 
and to push his forces by a circuitous 
route across the Rappahannock and the 
Rapidan, to drive off or capture the 
guards at the forts, and then wheeling 
round on his left, as on a pivot, so as to 
face eastward, to march towards the 
river. It was his hope that he would 
thus be able to emerge from the ■wil- 
derness before the Confederates were 
aware of his approach, and, by dealing 
them a deadly blow on their left flank, 
compel them to face abgut and offer 
battle. Fully confident that his plan 
would be successfully carried out, and 
in order to make Lee's retreat to Rich- 
mond impossible, he had already de- 
tached all the cavalry under Stoneman, 
with the exception only of 1000 men 
left in charge of Pleasonton, with in- 
structions to destroy all the bridges 
and tear up all the railroads in the 
Confederate rear. The plan was excel- 
lent; and, as we shall see, it was in 
the first instance at least admirably 
executed. 

It will be observed by referring to 
the map, that about three miles above 
FrtMiericksburg in a straight line, or 
about five following the river, is a 
crossing called Banks' Ford. Some 
seven or eight miles further up, and at 
no great distance from the confluence 
of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, 
or, as they were wont to be named. 



north and south forks, is another cross- 
ing, known as United States Ford. 
Following up the Rappahannock, oi 
north fork, we come to Kelley's Ford, 
about twenty-seven miles from Fred- 
ericksburg. Following up the Rapidan, 
or south fork, we come first to Ely's 
Ford, and then, at some little distance, 
Germania Ford. As Kelley's Ford is 
several miles above the confluence of 
the two streams, it was necessary for 
the troops who crossed the Rapj^ahan- 
nock at that point to cross also the 
Rapidan, either at Ely's or Germania 
Ford, before they could reach their point 
of destination. All these fords, but 
particularly those on the line of the 
Rappahannock, were strongly guarded 
by Confederate troops ; and the water 
in the river, as it generally is at this 
season, was high. 

On tlie 27th, Monday, the weather 
M'as favorable, and the movement April 
commenced. The turning column 27. 
consisted of the Fifth corps. General 
Meade; the Eleventh corps, General 
Howard ; and the Twelfth corps, Gen- 
eral Slocum. On Tuesday, the 28th, 
they reached Kelley's Ford. During 
the night and following morning all 
the troops were safely pushed across. 
The infantry was moved in two col- 
umns — the Eleventh and Twelfth to- 
wards Germania, and the Fifth towards 
Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan. At both 
fords the Confederate pickets were 
driven off without difficulty. At Ger- 
mania, 150 pioneers were attempting 
to build the bridge which Stoneman 
had destroyed some days before. All 
of these were captured. The troopa 



MO 



4U 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



were in the best of spirits. Impatient 
to reach the opposite shore, large num- 
bers of them plunged into the flood, 
wading to the arm-pits, their clothes 
and their cartridge-boxes carried high 
on the points of their bayonets. Bon- 
fires blazed during the darkness ; and, at 
both fords, all were safely got across. 
Once on the south side of the Rapidan, 
the united columns moved eastwardly 
towards United States Ford, driving 
off the Confederate guards. This ford 
being thus uncovered. General Couch, 
who, with a portion of the Second 
corps, had, since Tuesday, been lying 
on the other side, waiting for his oppor- 
tunity, crossed the Rappahannock on a 
pontoon bridge. The combined forces 
April then moved southward, and on 

^^< Thursday night took position at 
Chancellorsville. On the evening of 
the same day, General Hooker, who had 
superintended the crossing of Couch's 
troops, arrived at Chancellorsville ; and, 
at a large and substantial brick house, 
with out-buildings — the only house in 
the near neighborhood, and formerly 
an inn — he established his headquarters. 
The position thus secured offered 
many advantages. Around the house 
was an open, cultivated space; and im- 
mediately in front was a little stream 
which flowed into the Rappahannock. 
It was about eleven miles from Fred- 
ericksburg, and was connected there- 
with by three main roads — the plank- 
road on the right, the river road on the 
left, and the turnpike between them. 
It communicated also with Orange 
Court House, and with Gordonsville, by 
a road through the wilderness. 



"While Hooker had been carrying out 
his plan, and apparently with complete 
success on his right, Sedgwick had not 
been inactive on his left. This general, 
it will be remembered, was left behind 
at Falmouth, with the First, Third and 
Sixth corps, comprising some 30,000 
effective men. His special instructions 
were that he should, at the time ap- 
pointed, throw a portion of his troops 
across the river below Fredericksburg, 
and, by making a vigorous demonstra- 
tion, create the impression that the plan 
of Biu-nside was about to be repeated. 
On Monday, the 27th, the First corps, 
General Reynolds, the Third, General 
Sickles, and the Sixth, in immediate 
charge of Sedgwick himself, moved from 
their camps, and took a position down 
the river, about ten miles below Fred- 
ericksburg. Pontoons were thrown 
across at three points ; and, on the morn- 
ing of the 29th, troops were pushed 
over, and such demonstrations were 
made as seemed to imply that the real 
attack was to be made in that direction. 
So far as Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, 
or any of the National commanders 
could judge, the feint made by the left 
had been completely successful. The 
plan of the commanding general had, 
lip to a certain point at least, worked 
admirably. All the upper foi'ds of the 
Rappahannock were in his hands ; and 
he had massed a powerful army at 
Chancellorsville. Further demonstra- 
tions being considered unnecessary, for 
the present, on the part of the left, 
Sedgwick was instructed to remain at 
Falmouth and assist developments on 
the right. Sickles, meanwhile, was de^ 



A FATAL BLUNDER. 



465 



tached, and ordered to cross with the 
Tliird corps, at United States Ford, and 
join Hooker at Chancellorsville. Rey- 
nolds, in due time, was to follow. 
Sickles arrived at Chancellorsville on 
the morning of the 1st of May. It 
was not wonderful that, at this stage, 
Hooker should have felt elated, or that 
hia men should have been confident of 
victory. It might have been wiser, 
however, if such feelings had been less 
boisterously expressed. On the 30th 
of April, Hooker issued a general order. 
"It is with heartfelt satisfaction," he 
said, "that the commanding general 
announces to the army, that the opera- 
tions of the last three days have de- 
termined that our enemy must either 
ingloriously fly, or come out from behind 
his defenses and give us battle on our 
own ground, where certain destruction 
awaits him. The operations of the 
Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth coips have 
been a succession of splendid achieve- 
ments." Hooker seemed to feel that 
the prize was in his grasp. In the 
hearing of some of his officers and cer- 
tain gentlemen connected with the 
press, who were present at his head- 
quarters, he exclaimed: "The rebel 
army is now the legitimate property of 
the army of the Potomac. They may 
as well pack up their haversacks and 
make for Richmond, and I shall be after 
them."* Hooker really had reason to 
be proud. His plan, as we have said, 
had worked well. Up to this point, it 
could hardly have worked better ; and 

•The -words were spoken in the hearing of Mr. William 
Swinton, who was present on the occasion. — Campaigns 
•fth4 Army of the Potomac, p. 275. 



it is not at all improbable that if the 
head which conceived it, and which had 
so far given it development, had re- 
mained cool and steady throughout^ 
his magniloquent language would have 
been abundantly justified. Lee's po- 
sition was the reverse of enviable. In 
his front there was a well-trained, well- 
equipped army of 70,000 men ; in hia 
rear there was a bi-oad river, guarded 
by another army of 30,000 men ; while 
his retreat was cut off by 12,000 cav- 
alry. Everything, however, now de- 
pended upon steadiness of purpose and 
rapidity of movement. 

Gratified as Hooker was with the 
success which had attended his move- 
ments hitherto, he knew that he had 
only entered on the threshold of his 
great undertaking. He resolved, there- 
fore, to turn his success to account, and 
to press his advantage. On Friday, 
May 1st, having arranged his May 
troops in three columns, he !• 
pushed them eastward towards Fred- 
ericksburg, by the three pi-Incipal roads 
already mentioned. His object Avas to 
get out of the wilderness into the clear, 
open country beyond, where there was 
free fighting room, and where artillery 
and cavalry could be easily and effect- 
ively handled. The left, composed of 
two divisions of Meade's coi-ps — those 
of Griffin and Humphreys — advanced by 
the river road; the centre, Sykes' di- 
vision, also of Meade, supported by Han- 
cock, advanced by the turnpike ; while 
Slocum's coi'ps on the right inarched 
along the plank road. The left marched 
along the river road for five miles, and 
came in sight of Banks' Ford mthout 



456 



CHANCELL0R8VILLE. 



encounteriug any opposition. The cen- 
tre had moved along the turnpike for 
about a mile to the east of Chancellors- 
ville, when it encountered the enemy 
in some force. Vigorous firing was 
kept up on both sides for some hours ; 
but Sykes pressed forward his gallant 
little band, and, the foe falling back, 
he reached the place assigned him early 
in the afternoon. The right moved to 
its destined point without difficulty, and 
without meeting any resistance. It 
would be difficult to overestimate the im- 
portance of the advanced position thus 
gained bj' these different bodies of men. 
It was an elevated ridge, beyond the 
bounds of the wilderness, completely 
protecting Chancellorsville, and com- 
manding the clear, open country in rear 
of the Fredericksbuig Heights. On 
the left it uncovered Banks' Ford. 
Artillery could be planted advanta- 
geously on the face of the I'idge ; Avhile 
the clear open ground in front was ad- 
mirably adapted for the use of artillery. 
This, however, was not all. It short- 
ened by twelve miles the communica- 
tion between the main force at Chan- 
cellorsville and that under Sedgwick 
at Falmouth, and below Fredericksburg. 
It was surely natural to expect that such 
a position would be seized, and held 
at any cost, and that to this vantage- 
ground Hooker would push forward his 
whole army. It was not to be so. 
Fortune was smiling on the National 
commander; but, strange to relate, with 
a perversity which is almost unexam- 
pled, he turned his back upon the favor- 
"Dg goddess, when she was about to con- 
l^r upon him her richest rewards. 



Victory seemed to be within his grasp; 
but he flung away all that he had won, 
and his splendid opportunity besides. 
In spite of the earnest remonstrances of 
his officers, he ordered the columns to 
fall back to Chancellorsville, where he 
resolved to take position, and await 
the attack of the enemy. His original 
plan was abandoned at once. It waa 
Hooker's first blunder in this campaign; 
but it was fatal. 

Hooker now gathered his forces 
around him at Chancellorsville, threw 
up intrenchments, and prepared to re- 
ceive, not to make an attack. The tide 
of battle was thus, by a fatal infelicity, 
turned before the battle was com- 
menced. It was only two days since 
the proud words were uttered ; yet the 
boastful National commander was al- 
ready on the defensive. The ground 
selected was by no means so well 
adapted, either for attack or defense, as 
the ground which he had abandoned. 
It was commanded by high grounds, and 
surrounded on all sides by the forest. 
In this new position, however, the dis- 
position of the troops was not unskil- 
fully made. Not knowing from what 
direction the blow might come, and I'e- 
solved to preserve his communications 
Avith the river. Hooker arranged his 
forces in a form which, for the benefit 
of the reader has been compared not 
inaptly to the letter U. The limbs of 
the U pointed towards the Rappahan- 
nock, the one side facing to the east, 
and the other to the west. The eastern 
side was held by Meade and one di- 
vision of Couch; the centre was held 
by Slocum and one division of Sickles; 



THE RIVAL ARMIES IN POSITION. 



457 



and the right by Howard, Every effort 
was made to strengthen the front by 
rifle-pits and abatis. Howard, who 
little dreamed of an attack on his side, 
took too little pains to prevent a sur- 
prise. Two divisions of the Second 
and two divisions of the Third corps 
were held in reserve. Pleasonton, with 
his cavalry, was also on the right. Such 
was the position of the National army 
on the night of Friday, the 1st of 
May. 

Let us now see what the Confede- 
rates were doing in the interval since 
the National troops began to move on 
the 27th April. It has been claimed 
by Southern writers that Lee was aware 
of Hooker's movements and plans, if 
not from the commencement, at least 
from a much earlier date than is com- 
monly believed. There can be no 
doubt, we think, that up until the 
29th, he was disposed to believe that 
the real attack was to be made from 
Falmouth and by the lower Rappahan- 
nock. The feeble efforts made by 
Sedgwick on the morning of that day, 
and his subsequent inactivity, must 
have filled Lee's mind with doubt, if it 
did not convince him that the threat- 
ened movement from that quarter was 
intended only as a feint. We know 
that, on the afternoon of the 29th, he 
received from Stuart definite informa- 
tion of the fact that heavy columns of 
Nationals had crossed the upper Rappa- 
hannock, and that they were marching 
towards Germania and Ely's fords. 
Anderson, who was hm-ried forward to 
Chancellorsville, occupied that place on 
the night of the 29th. Learning that 



the National troops had crossed the 
Rapidan in great force, he withdrew 
on the following morning. On the 
morning of the 30th, Jackson's corps 
was still in line of battle at Hamilton's 
Ci'ossing, his left extending for upwards 
of a mile towards the northwest, his 
right resting on the Rappahannock, at 
the mouth of Massaponax Creek. Mc- 
Laws' division, of Longstreet, was still 
in its camp, his line extending from 
Fredericksburg some two or three miles 
up the river. Barksdale's brigade oc- 
cupied the town. Pendleton's I'eserve 
artillery was under orders to take posi- 
tion at Massaponax Church. Stuart, 
with Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry, 
having crossed the Racoon Ford during 
the night, was moving to harrass the 
National advance. There was another 
strong Confederate brigade at Culpep- 
per, in Stoneman's front. Anderson had 
taken up a line perpendicular to th^ 
plank and turnpike roads, near theii 
junction vnth the old Mine Road. At 
midnight, McLaws was ordered to movfl 
liis division, with the exception ol 
Barksdale's brigade, in the direction of 
Anderson, and take position on hie 
right. Jackson was ordered to move 
at daylight, on the Ist of May, with 
three of his divisions, in the same di- 
rection, and to take command of the 
field. Early was left to defend the 
works from Hamilton's Crossing to 
Fredericksburg. The force under his 
command for this purpose, as stated by 
a Confederate authorit}', consisted of 
his own command, Barksdale's brigade, 
of McLaws', Andrew's battalion of ar- 
tillery', and a part of the reserve artillery 



C58 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



under General Pendleton, and amounted 
to 8500 muskets and 30 guns. From the 
resistance which Franklin experienced, 
as we shall see by and by, the pre- 
sumption is that this force was much 
stronger. McLaws reached Anderson 
by the early dawn. Jackson came up 
at eight o'clock, and ordered a general 
advance. It thus happened that both 
armies were in motion at the same time, 
but in opposite directions. Jackson 
was moving towards Chancellorsville ; 
Hooker was moving his army towards 
Fredericksburg ; and each was prepared 
to offer the other battle. This advance 
movement of Jackson explains the re- 
sistance which the National centre ex- 
perienced on the old turnpike road, on 
Friday, the 1st of May. 

On the night of the 1st, General Lee 
had come to the conclusion that the 
National position was too strong to be 
taken in front. " The enemy," he said 
in his report, " had assumed a position 
of great natural strength, surrounded 
on all sides by a dense forest, filled with 
a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of 
which breast-works of logs had been 
constructed, with trees felled in front, 
BO as to form an almost impenetrable 
abatis. His artillery swept the few 
narrow roads by which the position 
could be approached from the front, 
and commanded the adjacent woods." 
What was to be done? Was an at- 
tack more practicable on the National 
right? The ground was reconnoitered. 
Hooker's line was reported to be vul- 
nerable in that direction. The next 
question was whether there existed a 
practicable route by which, with speed 



and secrecy, the movement could be 
accomplished. This question also was 
satisfactorily answered. If a route did 
not exist, a route could be made. 
Seated on cracker-boxes, the Confede- 
rate leaders consulted as to what should 
be done. Jackson was familiar with 
the locality. With a map before him, 
he described the ground, suggested that 
a circuitous march of fifteen miles be 
made towards the extreme right of the 
National army, and proposed to strike a 
deadly blow, before the opposing hosts 
should be aware of his presence. It 
was a bold experiment ; but it was just 
the kind of experiment which Jackson 
delighted to make. If it succeeded, he 
would certainly produce a panic in 
Hooker's army — he might even seize 
his communications with United States 
Ford, on which the National commander 
relied in case of retreat. " With what 
force will you attempt this ?" asked 
General Lee. " With my whole corps 
present," replied Jackson. " What, in 
that case, would be left to resist an ad- 
vance of the enemy towards Fredericks- 
burg?" Lee again asked. "The divi- 
sions of Anderson and McLaws," was 
the prompt and confident answer. It 
was a most audacious plan, and in open 
violation of the first principles of the 
military art. As things were, the Con- 
federate commander was confronted by 
superior numbera. With 42,000 mus- 
kets, he was in the presence of 60,000 
or 70,000. Lee reflected for a moment. 
His army was already divided in two. 
If he consented, his army would be cut 
up into three parts. And then, what 
if Jackson failed ? It would be ruin-' 



LEE AND JACKSOK IN COUNCIL. 



458 



hopeless, irretrievable ruin. But Lee 
had faith in his brave and adventurous 
lieutenant. He gave his consent; and 
orders for the march were immediately 
given. 

On Saturday morning, Jackson, with 
May some 22,000 men, set out on his 
2. perilous expedition. He moved 
with great secrecy and with a speed 
almost incredible, considering the nature 
of the ground he had to traverse. Stu- 
art's cavalry was employed to conceal 
his column from view, and to distract 
the attention of the National troops. 
Lee, too, made frequent demonstrations, 
so as to engage attention in front. 
Hooker, however, was not without warn- 
ing, nor was he wholly without sus- 
picion. On Friday night, the Confede- 
rates were obsei'ved cutting a road past 
tlie National picket lines on the right. 
On Saturday morning, trains and ambu- 
lances were seen passing over a hill in 
Sickles' front. When informed of the 
movement of Jackson, Hooker sent 
orders to the officers commanding on the 
right, to be on their guard against ah 
advance of the enemy on their flank, and 
directed them to strengthen that por- 
tion of their line to meet such an emerg- 
ency. Birney reported to Sickles that 
he saw, in the direction of what was 
called the Furnace, a Confederate col- 
umn, as it marched down the hill and 
crossed Lewis' Creek. Sickles went 
forward in person, and satisfied himself 
of the truth of the report. He saw 
the trains of artillery wagons and am- 
bulances which followed in Jackson's 
rear; but he concluded that the Con- 
federates were in full retreat. A bat- 



tery was pushed forward, and the mov- 
ing column was shelled at a distance. 
As it soon disappeared, it was believed 
that the movement, whether of attack 
or retreat, had been abandoned. It 
soon again reappeared ; and Sickles was 
ordered to push forward two divisions 
to develop the sti'ength or the intentions 
of the enemy. This force, which con- 
sisted of the divisions of Birney and 
Whipple, with Barlow's brigade, of 
Howard's corps, soon came up with the 
enemy. A sharp skirmish ensued ; and, 
by the aid of Randolph's battery, some 
400 men, including several officers of 
the Twenty-thii'd Georgia regiment, 
were captured. Information received 
from the prisoners removed all doubt 
as to the character or purpose of the 
mysterious column. It was Stonewall 
Jackson's corps; its redoubtable chief 
was at its head ; and it was moving, 
with hostile intent, to the flank and rear 
of the National right. It was no time 
now for trifling. Jackson, it was evi- 
dent, meant business. Sickles, there- 
fore, pressed forward with fresh energy, 
and with the view of intercepting the 
train in Jackson's rear. Williams, who 
was ordered to co-operate, advanced at 
the same time with his division, of Slo- 
cum's corps, and commenced a vigorous 
flank movement on Jackson's right. It 
was believed, for a moment, that the 
Confederate general would be caught 
in his own trap — that, if not captured, 
he would be compelled to retreat. It 
was a mistaken belief. A Confederate 
battalion of artillery, under Colonel 
Thompson Brown, happened to be close 
at hand. Brown got his guns into po- 



460 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



eition, and supported them by such 
companies of infantry as could be got 
together. Meantime, Archer, with his 
own and Thomas' brigade, of A. P. 
Hill's division, hearing of the capture 
of the Georgia regiment, fell back to 
the menaced point. By these means, 
Sickles was held in check, and Jackson's 
train was enabled to pass on. What was 
more important still to the Confederates, 
time was gained. Jackson was now 
beyond reach. While this skirmishing 
was going on, on his flank and rear, he 
was pushing forward through the tan- 
gled wilderness with incredible speed. 
Obstacles seemed to disappear as he 
advanced. Where there was no open- 
ing in the woods, a passage was soon 
created, the sturdy foi-est trees yielding 
to the vigorous blows of his hardy 
pioneers. When Sickles, who, after 
the Confederates retired, held possession 
of the road in the neighborhood of the 
Furnace, was preparing to follow up 
Jackson and strike him in the rear, the 
Confederate chieftain, having reached 
his chosen ground, was about to burst 
like a whirlwind on his unsuspecting 
foe. 

After passing the Furnace, and 
plunging into the forest, Jackson, being 
under complete cover of the woods, 
pursued his way unmolested. As he 
moved around, he was continually feel- 
ing the National lines. On reaching 
the plank road, he halted for a time, 
and, from a commanding eminence, sur- 
veyed the position and works of his 
antagonist. Fitz Lee's cavalry, sup- 
ported by Paxton's brigade of infantry. 
Was ordered forward on the plank road. 



Jackson himself, with the mass of his 
command, pushed on through the jungle 
to the old turnpike. He was now near 
the outskirts of the National encamp- 
ment. Secrecy had become more im- 
portant than ever. The knowledge ^f hia 
whereabouts, on the part of the National 
commanders, before he was fully pre- 
pared to strike the decisive blow, might, 
at the last moment, mar all his plans. 
Orders were, therefore, given in a low 
tone; the firing of guns was forbid- 
den; no cheering was allowed as the 
general passed by ; and the well-trained 
battalions, disciplined almost to perfec- 
tion, moved along slowly, silently, and 
with cat-like caution. Arrived at the 
turnpike, he turned to the right, and 
moved along that road to some distance 
in the direction of Chancellorsville. 
Here he arranged his troops in three 
lines of battle, perpendicular to the 
turnpike, and extending about one mile 
on either side. Rodes, with his own 
brigade and that of Iverson on the left, 
and those of Doles and Colquitt on the 
right, occupied the first line. Colston, 
who commanded Trimble's division, 
with his own brigade and those of 
NichoUs and Jones, took position two 
hundred yards in the rear of Rodes. 
A. P. Hill's division, as it came up, 
was formed into the third line. Two 
pieces of Stuart's ai-tillery moved along 
the turnpike with the first line. The 
second and third line was to support 
the first when necessary, without wait- 
ing for specific instructions. 

It was now after five o'clock. Let 
us look within the National lines. 
Hooker was still at his headquarters at 



DOWDALL'S TAVEEN. 



461 



Chancellorsville ; and, although watch- 
ful of his whole line, he had a special 
care of his front and the side looking 
towards Fredericksburg. In this latter 
direction, as we have seen, Meade and 
Couch kept guard — Sickles and a por- 
tion of Slocum's troops were at the 
Furnace, preparing to follow Jackson. 
The right of the National army was 
protected by the Eleventh corps. Gen- 
eral Howard, one of the bravest officers 
in the National army. The outworks 
at this point ran parallel to the plank 
and turnpike roads, and faced to the 
south. Steinwehr was on the left, 
Schurz in the centre, and Devens on the 
right. Devens' position was near Tal- 
ley's House. It was now near six 
o'clock. All fear of danger, for the 
day, had been abandoned. Their arms 
were stacked, and the men were cook- 
ing or eating their evening meal. All 
of a sudden there is a commotion in the 
woods. Startled game, as if disturbed 
in their quiet retreats, appear in large 
numbers, and rush to and fro in wild 
bewilderment. Deer leap over the 
works, and dash through the National 
lines into the woods beyond. Jackson 
has given the signal to advance ; and 
these scared creatures of the wood, 
frightened by the presence of man, and 
running they know not whither, are but 
an emblem of what is soon to be wit- 
nessed, on a far grander scale, on the 
right wing of the great and invincible 
army of the Potomac. A second more, 
and the bugles are heard. Then a 
mighty cheer, followed by a terrific vol- 
ley, the deadly missiles coming crashing 
through the trees, and falling like hail 
»si 



among the unarmed and unsuspecting 
Unionists, and it is known that " Stone- 
wall " Jackson is upon them. It is an 
instant panic. The high and com- 
manding ground at Talley's is at once 
abandoned, Devens' men fleeing pre- 
cipitately and in the wildest confusion, 
many of them without having picked 
up their muskets. Schurz's men behave 
even worse — joining in the rout with- 
out even waiting for the attack. In 
vain does the brave Devens, a second 
time wounded, in vain does the heroic 
Howard, galloping among the broken 
columns, urging them by voice and ges- 
ture, and waving, banner-like, his empty 
sleeve, attempt to rally the fugitives, 
and turn them against their pursuers. 
Once and again a regiment is halted, 
but it is only to be torn to pieces by 
the merciless fire of the on-rushing and 
now triumphant Confederates. Sud- 
denly, however, a halt is made on the 
part of both pursuers and pursued. 
The works at Melzi Chancellor's or Dow- 
dall's Tavern, on Howard's extreme 
left, have been reached. Into these 
works Steinwehr has thrown Bush- 
beck's brigade, his other brigades being 
absent with Sickles. Bushbeck has 
been joined by some of Schurz's regi- 
ments, which have been rallied and 
brought to order. At this point a gal- 
lant resistance is made. The Confed- 
erates are held in check, but it is only 
for a brief period. Jackson, impatient 
of resistance, pushes forward his le- 
gions. Rodes, who has been held at 
bay, is speedily joined by Colston ; and 
their united divisions, already flushed 
with success, and uttering their ac- 



46% 



OHANCELLORSVILLE. 



customed yell, rush bounding into the 
works, shivering to pieces the last solid 
remnant of Howard's splendid corps. 
The rout of the I'ight wing was now 
complete. All semblance of organiza- 
tion was gone. Heedless of the dead 
and dying who lay crowded on the 
turnpike and in the adjoining woods, 
and flinging from them their muskets, 
tftieir knapsacks, and every other en- 
cumbrance, the routed troops rushed 
pell-mell towards Chancellors\nlle. Ar- 
tillery, wagons, ambulances, pack-mules 
and cattle, all inextricably commingled, 
were being hurried along in the same 
direction. It was a sce-ne of the wildest 
confusion. No such scene had been 
witnessed since the first battle of Bull 
Run. 

It was now seven o'clock, one brief 
hour since the attack commenced, and 
darkness was coming on. The situation 
was critical in the extreme. Jackson 
was in full possession of the breast- 
works, and within half a mile of Hook- 
er's headquarters. It was necessary for 
the National commander to form a new 
line of battle. This, however, was a 
task of peculiar difficulty. Lee was 
pi-essing Hooker hard, both on his left 
and centre; and the tornado-like rush 
of the retreating hosts had all the effect 
of an invading army. Hooker, on hear- 
ing of the disaster to Howard, sent for- 
ward the choicest division of the army 
— a division which he himself had 
created, and which he had often led to 
victory, and now under the command 
of General Beny. The batteries of 
this division, under Captain Best, posted 
on a ridge across the turnpike, having 



opened a most murderous fire, checked 
the Confederate advance. At this point 
the battle raged fiercely. Sickles was 
recalled from the Furnace, where he had 
been joined by Pleasonton, with 1000 
cavaliy, his instructions being that he 
should attack Jackson in flank. He at 
once hurried forward Pleasonton and 
Bimey. Pleasonton, with two of his 
regiments and his battery, arrived at 
Hazel Grove — where Sickles had been 
compelled to leave a portion of his 
artillery — just as Howard's corps was 
hurrying past in full retreat. Compre- 
hending the situation at a glance, he 
hurled the Eighth Pennsylvania on the 
pursuing columns. The regiment waa 
overwhelmed, and its commander in- 
stantly killed. Disastrous as the charge 
was to the regiment, it nevertheless 
accomplished its object. The Confede- 
rate onrush Avas temporai'ily checked. 
In a few minutes, what with his own 
battery of horse artillery, some guns 
belonging to the routed corps, and those 
which Sickles had left behind him, he 
had thirty pieces in position. A heavy 
cannonade was opened by Colonel 
Crutchfield, from the Confederate bat- 
teries on the plank road, his object be- 
ing to prevent the National troops from 
reforming. Pleasonton replied with 
tremendous energy ; and as often as the 
Confederates came up to the charge, 
their ranks were decimated by his 
double-shotted guns. During this en- 
counter, General Crutchfield was wound- 
ed, and some of his guns were silenced. 
It was now night. The daylight had 
sped, but it was not dark ; for the moon 
was bright and full. There was no 



MIDNIGHT FIGHTING. 



463 



dkposition on either side to discontinue 
the contest. It was absolutely neces- 
sary that Hooker should, before morn- 
ing, re-connect his broken lines, and re- 
establish his communications. It was 
necessary, in fact, that he should take 
a new position. Jackson, on the other 
hand, felt the importance, if not neces- 
sity, of pushing the advantage he had 
won. The relative positions of both 
armies was much the same as at night- 
fall. Lee continued to claim a large 
amount of Hooker's attention on the 
left. Jackson held the advanced posi- 
tions he had won on the old turnpike 
and plank roads. Berry kept the 
ground he had taken towards the close 
of the eveninfy's contest. His artillery, 
under Best, crowned the crest at the 
western end of the clearing around 
Chancellorsville. Birney had come up 
and taken position on the left. Ward's 
brigade, of his division, was ordered to 
be ready to make an attack on the 
enemy's lines at 11 o'clock. Meanwhile 
Jackson was impatiently awaiting the 
arrival of A. P. Hill, to replace the 
divisions of Rodes and Colton, which, 
after the severe work of the afternoon, 
and because of the thick and tangled 
woods in which much of the fighti.ig 
was done, had fallen into confusion. 
At the appointed time. Best opened a 
tremendous fire on the Confederate 
lines, and Ward's men rushed to the 
charge with terrific fury. It w;is again 
and again repeated. In one of these 
charges, a portion of the artillery lost 
by General Howard, was gallantly re- 
taken. This almost midnight attack has 
been described as presenting one of the 



grandest and most soul-rousing scenes 
of the war. " The moon," says an eye- 
witness, " shone bright, and the foe 
could be seen at good musket range. 
The air was very still, and the roar and 
reverberation of the musketry and ar- 
tillery exceeded all conception. Mal- 
vern Hills was a skirmish compared to 
this, except in the degree of slaughter." 
The attack was completely successful, 
the Confederates having been driven 
back half a mile. The battle ceased ; 
but there was little repose in either 
camp during that anxious night. 

At the very commencement of the 
night attack, a terrible calamity befell 
the Confederate army. General "Stone- 
wall" Jackson, the author of that day's 
splendid achievement, in many respects 
the greatest soldier of the Confederacy, 
fell mortally wounded. While waiting 
for Hill, and just before the batteries of 
Best opened fire and Ward made his 
attack, he rode forward to reconnoitre 
the ground. He was accompanied by 
a portion of his staff, couriers and other 
officers. On setting out, he gave posi- 
tive orders to his troops not to fire un- 
less cavalry approached from the direc- 
tion of the enemy. He advanced to a 
considerable distance beyond his own 
pickets. When near what was called ■ 
the Van Weii; House, some one re- 
marked to him, " General, you should 
not expose yourself so much." "There 
is no danger," he said. "Go back and 
tell General Hill to press on." When 
returning, and, as he approached his own 
lines, he and his escort, mistaken for Fed- 
eral cavalry, were received with a vollej' 
of musketry. Several of the party fell. 



*u 



CHANCELLOESVILLB. 



some of them killed, others of them 
severely wounded. Tnrning aside, the 
party entered a thicket, still moving 
towards the Confederate lines. A mo- 
ment more, and being still mistaken 
for Federal cavalry, they were again 
fired upon, and at a distance of not 
more than thirty or forty yards. Jack- 
son received three balls, one in the 
right hand, and two in the left arm, 
one of which shattered the bone two 
inches below the shoulder, and severed 
the artery. Half of his escort, includ- 
ing Captain Boswell, of his staff, were 
killed or wounded. His fi'is'htened 
horse iTished towards the National lines. 
Quickly recovering himself, he managed, 
with his bleeding hand, to rein it up 
and turn it into the plank road. Cap- 
tain Wilbourn, of his staff, now rushed 
to his aid. Bleeding and fainting, the 
general was taken from his horse, car- 
ried to the road side and laid under a 
tree. It was at this moment the guns 
of Best opened fire ; and the National 
troops, coming up in great force, 
charged over Jackson's body. The Na- 
tionals again falling back, he was 
placed upon a litter ; but Berry's guns 
were now sweeping the road ; and, one 
of the litter-bearers being shot down, 
the wounded general fell to the ground, 
receiving a severe contusion on his right 
side. As the firing continued, the 
whole party lay flat on the ground, till 
the storm of grape and canister was 
turned in another direction. He was 
soon afterwards conveyed safely to the 
hospital in the rear. It was found 
necessary to amputate the arm. Jack- 
son died on Sunday, the 10th of May. 



He lived to see the fruit of this day's 
work. His death was a great blow to 
the Confederate cause. It was equal 
to a National victory. General Stone- 
wall Jackson will live in histoiy as the 
hero of Chancellorsville.* 

Hill came to the front just as Jackson 
was wounded, and prepared to assume 
the command. Scarcely, however, had 
he issued his first instructions, when he 
too was disabled, having received a 
severe contusion from a piece of shell. 
General J. E. B. Stuart was the oflScer 
next in rank ; but he had moved off in 
the direction of Ely's Ford, his inten- 

• In an ably-written paragraph, which is evidently 
intended to be eulogistic of General Stonewall Jackson, 
Swinton, yielding to a spirit of detraction, which 
is too common a characteristic of Northern writers, 
makes some remarks which are scarcely just to the 
Confederate soldier. He speaks of Jackson as "devoid 
of high mental parts, and destitute of that power of 
planning and combination, and of that calm, broad, 
military intellect which distinguished General Lee." 
He has just described him as " essentially an executive 
officer. " Without referring to General Jackson s entire 
military career, we have no hesitation in saying that 
such remarks were singiilarly inapplicable to the man, 
after the first day's fighting at ChanceUorsvUle. The 
Chancellorsville plan of battle was Jackson's through- 
out. It was his conception : and it was he who gave 
it development, and determined its success. It is 
not too much to say that but for the death of 
Jackson, the National army might have been cap. 
tured or cut to pieces. It would certainly have been 
placed in great peril. Such was Jackson's own opinion. 
" If I had not been wounded," he said, " I would have 
cut the enemy off from the road to United States Ford ; 
we would have had them entirely surrounded ; and 
they would have been obliged to surrender or cut theii 
way out — they had no other alternative. " Nor do w« 
think it fair to characterize Jackson as a " fanatic in 
religion." The word "fanatic" has come to have an 
offensive meaning. In the sense in which it is now 
generally used, it certainly cannot be applied to Jack- 
son. In the sense in which Jackson was a fanatic, so 
was Ohver Cromwell ; so, too, in a milder sense, was 
George Washington. Thus applied, the epithet is not 
opprobrious ; but, in this latter sense, it is now rarely 
used. He was certainly a religious enthusiast; but k 
fanatic, in the offensive sense, he was not. 



JACKSON MORTALLY WOUNDED. 



465 



tion being to seize that place and occupy 
it. Such was part of General Jackson's 
plan. In the circumstances, and until 
the arrival of Stuart, who was at once 
recalled, the comnaand of the Confede- 
rate left devolved upon Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Rodes. It was a trying moment. 
Jackson had fallen, mortally wounded ; 
Hill had been disabled ; and Stuart 
was some miles distant. This, how- 
ever, was not all. Berry was repeating 
his tremendous assaults ; and his artil- 
lery, under the dii-ection of Best, was 
maintaining a fierce cannonade. It is not 
wonderful that Bodes should have hes- 
itated to make any attack or run any 
aerious risk until the morning. In this 
view of the case Stuart, on his arrival, 
concurred. It had the approval, also, of 
Hill who, although disabled and placed 
on a litter, had not been removed from 
the field. Stuart sent a messenger to 
Jackson, asking for instructions. Jack- 
son was so feeble and suifering so much, 
that he could only give for answer: 
'' Tell General Stuai't that he must use 
Lis own judgment." The night was 
spent by the new commander and his 
staff in visiting the different parts of his 
line, in locating his troops, and in making 
the other necessary arrangements for 
the coming day. 

It had already become apparent to 
the different oiBcers of the National 
army — it must have been apparent to 
General Hooker himself — that a great 
blunder had been committed on the 
Thursday, when no effort was made to 
bring up the three corps under Sedg- 
wick at Fredericksburg, so as to make 
the army a unit, and that, if possible, a 



still greater blunder was coiumitted on 
the Friday, when the entire right wing, 
having advanced towards Fredericks- 
burg by three different roads, and hav- 
ing gained advantageous positions in 
the clear, open country beyond the 
woods, was compelled by the mere will 
of its chief to fall back, and wait for 
the onset of the enemy in the tangled 
jungles of the wilderness. These blun- 
ders—one or other or both— had brought 
about all the soitows of Saturday; 
and superior as were thef Nationals in 
numbers, and excellent as was the spirit 
of the troops, it was a doubtful ques- 
tion with many whether greater sorrows 
were not in store for thein. The dis- 
cipline of the army, however, was well 
preserved. Hooker, showing no indeci- 
sion, adopted his course with firmness, 
and after the disasters of the afternoon 
and evening made his arrangements for 
the morrow. On the eveninsr of that 
day, Reynolds, with his corps of some 
17,000 men, having come up from before 
Fredej-icksburg and crossed the United 
States Ford, joined the forces immediate- 
ly under Hooker, and by their presence 
more than compensated for the losses 
sustained by the Eleventh corj^s. Sedg- 
wick was still below Fredericksburg 
with his own entire corps, which num- 
bered some 24,000 men. Late on Sat- 
urday night. Hooker sent instructions 
to Sedgwick to put himself in motion 
immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, 
to seize the heights in the rear, to gain 
the plank road leading thence to Chan- 
cellorsville, and to move out, fighting 
his way, as best he might, with the view 
of joining the main body by daylighi 



«6« 



CHANCELLOKJSVILLE. 



on Sunday morning. It was, beyond 
all questioij, of the utmost importance, 
that Sedgwick should be able to accom. 
plish the task thus assigned him. The 
best results might naturally enough be 
expected to flow from it. But it was an 
almost impossible task. Hooker made 
little account of the more than possible 
difficulties to be encountered in seizins: 
the heights in the rear of Fredericks- 
burg — difficulties of which he himself 
had had so bitter an experience in 
the Burnside campaign. It would have 
been more wise, if the order had been 
given at an earlier hour, or on an earlier 
day. It was not unwise to give it now ; 
but most certainly it was the duty of 
the general-in-chief to think of the 
obstacles which might hinder the pro- 
gress of his lieutenant, and by every 
conceivable means to facilitate his ad- 
vance. 

During the night, the National com- 
mander succeeded in rean-anging his 
lines, and taking a new position. His 
new line resembled somewhat the letter 
V, or rather a triangle slightly prolonged 
at the apex, the left leg being consider- 
ably larger than the right, and both ex- 
tremities reaching close to the river, thus 
covering United States Ford. His lines 
were conti-acted, as compared with those 
of the previous day, and he had drawn 
nearer the river. He held possession 
of the heights between Melzi Chancel- 
lor's and Fairview, including Hazel 
Grove — an eminence which commanded 
the apex, and the holding of which was 
essential to the safety of the new posi- 
tion. Reynolds was on the extreme 
right, at the upper end of the left limb 



of the triangle. Meade's forces came 
next; then those of Sickles, command- 
ing the line on the left of the apex; 
then those of Slocum on the right of the 
apex ; and then, connecting with Slocum, 
but more to the north on the right limb 
of the triangle, came Howard's corps, 
which, with mai'vellous rapidity, had 
been brought together, and restored to 
something like order. On the left limb 
of the triangle, the National forces were 
heavily massed. In the centi-e of the 
triangle or V, and almost behind Meade, 
was stationed Couch, that he might be 
able to act in either direction, as occasion 
might require, Reynolds and Meade 
were some distance on the north of the 
turnpike. Sickles covered the road; 
Berry, with Whipple in his rear, being 
on the north side ; and Birney, with 
Williams, of Slocum's corps, in his rear. 
Slocum, with his other division, that of 
Geary, guarded the apex. Hancock's 
division of Couch was on Slocum's left, 
and stretched out towards Howard. 
Sickles' artilleiy, under Best, was massed 
on the ridge in the centre of the open 
ground, all the guns pointing west, so 
as to command the approaches to the 
turnpike. Hooker had 60,000 infantry 
immediately available at Chancellors- 
ville. The combined forces of Lee and 
Jackson were far short of that num- 
ber, not much exceeding 40,000 men. 
Hooker had, besides, the prospect of 
being joined by Sedgwick, whose corps, 
some 24,000 strong, was ecj^ual to a 
large army. Sedgwick was only tea 
miles distant. He had, it is true, 
some difficulties in his way ; but these 
might be overcome. Tt' Sedgwick 



THE CONFEDERATE BATTLE-CRY. 



467 



should come up in time, might not 
Hooker yet be able to destroy first the 
Confederate right, and then fall back 
with all his force and deal a deadly 
blow to the Confederate left ? If such 
is to be the result, the National com- 
mander must exhibit at once more skill 
and nerve than he has revealed since the 
fighting commenced. 

The Confederate commander had 
been equally active during the night. 
He had drawn up his men in three lines 
of battle. Hill's division was in ad- 
vance. Its different brigades were ar- 
ranged across the road in the following 
order : Archer's, McGowan's, and Lane's 
were on the right of the road ; Pender's 
and Thomas's were on the left. Hill's 
brigade was in reserve, supporting Lane 
and Pender; Archer and McGowan 
were thrown back, somewhat obliquely, 
so as to confront Sickles. The rest of 
the line was perpendicular to the road. 
Colston's division formed the second 
line, and that of Rodesthe third. The 
ridge, occupied by the right of the corps, 
was covered by artillery. Such was 
the disposition of the left wing of the 
Confederate army, on the morning of 
May Sunday, the 3d of May. Lee, 
^ meanwhile, had concluded to ef- 
fect a junction, if at all possible, of his 
right and left mngs; and instructions 
were given to Stuart, McLaws and An- 
derson, that they should direct their 
movements accordingly. It will be re- 
membered that Sickles held a command- 
ing position at Hazel Grove Tt was 
the key-point of the battle ground, and 
advantageous, not only because it com- 
manded the enemy's flank, but because 



if occupied by the enemy, it would 
imperil the safety of Slocum's entire 
line. Sickles, who was naturally proud 
of the position, had been at great 
pains to strengthen and turn it to the 
best account. It was not, therefore, 
without mingled surprise and pain that 
he received orders from Hooker, before 
daylight on Sunday morning, to the 
effect that the ground, the holding of 
which he deemed of so much importance, 
should be immediately abandoned. It 
was another of those inexplicable blun- 
ders which Hooker had been making 
since the moment he first felt the pres- 
sure of his antagonist. Quick as light- 
ning, and with the earliest dawn, Stuart 
saw the advantage which the blundering 
mismanagement of his opponent had 
given him, and immediately occupied 
the abandoned position. In so doing, he 
became engaged with Sickles' rear. The 
crest, however, was seized ; thirty pieces 
of artillery were got into position ; and 
a heavy fire was opened at once ou the 
open ground around Chancellorsville 
House. The battle of the 3d of May 
was begun. In a few seconds, it was 
raging along the whole line. " Charge, 
and remember Jackson ! " was the Con- 
federate battle-cry ; and never was 
battle-cry more effective in evoking mili- 
tary enthusiasm. With a fury which 
seemed to be blind, with an energy 
which was irresistible, and with a pur- 
pose and determination which death 
only could restrain, on came the brave 
Confederates. Jackson was not with 
them ; but, it was evident, his spirit 
was there. Brave as they were, how- 
ever, they were about to encounter foe- 



468 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



men worthy of their steel — men who 
feared no foe, who knew how to resist 
and how to attack. Sickles was on 
hand with his well-trained and war- 
hardened veterans — Berry on the right, 
Birney on the left, Whipple and Will- 
iams supporting — ready to receive the 
onslaught. Best's forty pieces of artil- 
lery were all pointed to the road along 
which the attacking column was ap- 
proaching. As the Confederates came 
forward, they were received with a 
perfect tempest of lead, which burst 
upon them, tornado-like, from the firm 
lines of Berry and Birney, and also, 
from Whipple and Williams, who had 
already been pushed to the front. 
Reckless of this tempest of lead, and 
reckless, also, of the more destruct- 
ive tempest, of grape and canister, which 
bursts upon them from the batteries on 
the hill, the column still advances. It 
is cut up and gashed, as if "pierced, 
scarred, ploughed by invisible light- 
ning." Companies, whole regiments 
even, seem to melt away ; but still they 
come. No such bravery, in assault, has 
been exhibited by the Confederates 
since the famous battle of Corinth, when 
they advanced against the storm of 
bullets " with faces averted, like men 
striving to protect themselves from a 
driving storm of hail." Will nothing 
check their forward rush ? Berry and 
Birney, now massing their troops, rush 
upon them with the weight and impetus 
of an avalanche. The shock is terrific. 
Like waves driven by contraiy winds, 
the opposing hosts, dash and roil against 
each other, but dash and roll apparently 
in vain. Neither prevails * neither 



yields. It seems an endless, wasteful 
struggle. Now the Nationals fall back ; 
and it seems as if the Confederates are 
about to win the victoiy. It is only, 
however, for a moment. The Nationals 
charge again ; the batteries pour forth 
their destructive fire ; and Jackson's men, 
their ranks literally torn to pieces, their 
dead and wounded lying in groups on 
the field, are driven back to their original 
position. Again there is a Confederate 
charge; again a terrific shock and stub- 
born resistance ; again victory oscillates, 
yielding now to the one side, and now 
to the other ; and so the battle rages 
until about eight o'clock, when Stuart, 
putting forth all his disposable strength 
on that point, drives the Nationals 
back and back, and captures the works 
in Sickles' front. 

The struggle, however, is not yet 
abandoned. The Confederates have 
undoubtedly gained an important ad- 
vantage. They have pressed the Na- 
tionals back from their first line of 
works. It is, in a qualified sense, a Con- 
federate victory. But Sickles, if dis- 
couraged, is not yet dismayed. He has 
already sent for reinforcements. If 
these should arrive in time, he may jet 
turn the tide of battle. He, therefore, 
boldly holds his ground. The battle 
rages again with tremendous fury. The 
works are repeatedly taken and retaken. 
The Confederates, becoming more con 
fident, press upon the National columns 
with increasing energy. As it has be- 
come dangerous or impossible to make 
any very effective use of the National 
artillery in his front, Sickles is com- 
pelled to depend on the resisting power 



LEE'S TWO WINGS UNITED. 



466 



of the bayonet. As yet, no response is 
made to his repeated calls for assistance. 
In obedience to orders from headquar- 
ters, French has sent out some regi- 
ments, under Carroll ; but these, instead 
of moving to the aid of Sickles, have 
moved to the south of Meade, and 
struck the enemy's flank. These regi- 
ments are quickly repulsed ; and Stuart, 
again massing his troops, falls upon 
Sickles with his entire weight and 
with undivided strength. Sickles had 
done his utmost. He had used his 
men wisely ; and they had nobly re- 
sponded to his every call. Berry's 
division, formerly Hooker's own, had 
sustained its high character. The men 
fought like heroes of the olden time. 
The same was true, also, of Birney's 
division. But they were confronted 
by a body of men who, for discipline, 
dash and endurance, were perhaps 
never surpassed in the whole history 
of war; and they were overpowered 
by superior numbers. And so it came 
to pass that while the corps of Rey- 
nolds and Meade and Howard, number- 
ing together some 40,000 men, were 
doing nothing, Sickles, after having re- 
sisted for hours the persistent attacks of 
Jackson's battalions, and after having 
held at bay, successively, his first, his 
second and his third lines, was com- 
pelled, at last, to fall back in the di- 
rection of Chancellorsville, only, how- 
ever, to offer a fresh resistance under 
cover of the guns at Fairview. 

While these things wei'e taking 
place on Hooker's right, the Confed- 
erates were not idle on his front, or 
at the apex of the triangle. Slocura, 



as we have seen, was holding the apex 
on the eastern side, with Geary's di- 
vision, Hancock, of Couch's, being on 
his left. On this point, Lee, from an 
early hour, had been directing all his 
disposable strength. We have already 
mentioned that instructions had been 
sent to Anderson and McLaws to direct 
their movements so as to form a junc- 
tion with Stuart's right, and thus unite 
the Confederate line. The Confederate 
guns at Hazel Grove had made Slocum's 
position almost untenable from the com- 
mencement of the fight in the early 
morning. Anderson, having been 
pushed along the plank road, which 
connects Chancellorsville with Freder- 
icksburg, fell with tremendous weight 
on Slocum. McLaws, moving in a 
dii'ection a little further north, pressed 
heavily upon Hancock. After repeated 
attacks and repeated failures, McLaws 
not only found it impossible to make 
any impression on Hancock, but was 
handsomely repulsed. Anderson's ef- 
fort was attended wdth better success. 
Pressing with great stubbornness on 
Slocum at the point of the triangle, he 
contrived to throw around hie left, and 
thus, by a thin line, to form a junction 
with Stuart. The object, so ardently 
desired by Lee, was at last effected. 
His army, which had been divided 
since the morning of the 2d, was again 
united. His two wings thus brought 
together, Lee bore in upon the Nationals 
with his whole line. Sickles and Slo- 
cum Avere f oiced back ; and the National 
line seemed to melt away, Hancock 
alone holding his position, and resisting, 
with great firmness and determination. 



»S!i 



470 



CHANCELLORSVILLB. 



the fierce and persistent onslaughts of 
the already triumphant Confederates. 
Hooker ordered the troops to fall back 
upon Chancellorsville ; and hei'e again, 
at the angle of the woods, the battle for 
a time raged with great fury, the artil- 
niery on both sides doing terrible execu- 
tion. The Chancellorsville House, which 
was still General Hooker's headquarters 
was now discovered to be on fii-e, and 
had to be abandoned. The National 
line, in this new position, began to 
waver ; and the Confederates, already 
flushed with success, seeing their oppor- 
tunity, made a tremendous dash, and, 
springing forward with wild yells, 
captured Chancellorsville, with a con- 
siderable number of prisoners. It was 
now a few minutes past ten o'clock. 
The battle had lasted, almost without 
intermission, for more than five hours. 
The Nationals, although pressed vigor- 
ously by the tiiumphant Confederates, 
whose gims were sweeping the open 
ground around Chancellorsville, fell 
back in good order, and took a new 
and well-fortified position about a mile 
nearer the river. The new line waa 
still in the form of a triangle, or V, but 
shorter and somewhat flatter than be- 
fore. The apex was at Bullock's House. 
The left limb extended along the Ely's 
Ford road, towards the mouth of Hunt- 
ing Run. The right extended along 
Mineral Spring road, towards what is 
known as Scott's Dam. Thus ended the 
second great battle at Chancellorsville, 
fought on the 3d of May, 1863. 
Among the many brave men who per- 
ished that day was General Berry. 
At an early stage of the contest, a 



severe misfortune befell the National 
aiTuy. While the conflict was at its 
height. General Hooker was standing 
on the balcony of the ChancellorsviUe 
House, leaning against one of the pillars. 
The pillar was struck by a cannon-ball ; 
and the general was thrown down by 
the violence of the concussion. He was 
stunned and stupefied, and rendered 
incapable of command. This misfortune 
goes far to explain some of the mys- 
teries of that mysterious day, when 
Sickles and French and Slocimi were 
struggling against the superior numbers 
of the enemy, and vainly calling for 
reinforcements, while 40,000 men, com- 
posing the corps of Reynolds and Meade 
and Howard, were doing nothing. 
Hooker was still insensible, and unfit 
for duty. The responsibilities of gen- 
eral-in-chief, at this supreme crisis, and 
in these peculiar circumstances, devolved 
upon General Couch, who, from some 
as yet unexplained cause, did not prove 
himself equal to the requirements of 
the situation. Had these 40,000 men, 
who were unused, and, therefore, useless 
in the fight, been hurled against the foe 
at the different points of attack, there 
can be no reasonable doubt that thp 
tide of victoiy would have rolled in an 
opposite direction. The Nationals, in 
such a case, would certainly have fully 
engaged Lee's attention, and occupied 
his army. The plank road would have 
been preserved ; and Sedgwick, if his 
arrival at the point of destination must 
still have been a little late, would at 
least have been able to march compara- 
tively unmolested from Fredericksburg 
to Chancellorsville. The mystery of 



HOOKER STUNNED. 



471 



Chancellorsville will, perhaps, never be 
explained. It is certainly but little 
likely to be explained during the lives 
of the principal actors in the great and 
traffic drama. The accident which be- 
fell Hooker was undoubtedly a misfor- 
tune to the National army. It explains 
much ; but it does not explain all. 

Sunday, the 3d of May, was yet young. 
Sacred as was this day, and severe as 
had been the work already accomplished, 
there was no disposition to rest on 
either side. Hooker, now partially re- 
covered, busied himself in strengthen- 
ing his line, and preparing for another 
attack, as well as securing his lines of 
communication with the United States 
and Ely's Fords, in the event of further 
retreat being judged necessary. Howard 
and Slocum were stationed on his left ; 
Meade and Reynolds were on the right ; 
and, at Bullock's House — a commanding 
plateau, the vertex and key of the pos- 
sition — Sickles and Couch were massed 
with a large number of pieces of artil- 
lery. 

Lee had not been less active. He had 
already displayed his army on the pla- 
teau at Chancellorsville. The scattered 
regiments, brigades and divisions which 
had been broken in the confusion of 
battle, were again brought together. 
A line of battle was formed along the 
plank road to the west of Chancellors- 
ville, and extending down the old turn- 
pike, to the east of that place. Rodes, 
with his right on Chancellorsville, ex- 
tended up the plank road. On his left 
was Pender, with half of the division 
of A. P. Hill. To the east of Chan- 
cellorsville was Colston, with Ander- 



son and McLaws in order, on his 
right. 

There was quiet on the battle field, 
but everything indicated preparation 
and readiness for a resumption of the 
fight. While the armies were in this ex- 
pectant condition, a fire broke out in the 
forest, on the north side of the plank 
road, where the battle had raged in the 
morning. In consequence of the dry- 
ness of the leaves and the brushwood, 
it spread with great rapidity. The 
wood was filled with the dead and 
wounded of both armies ; the wounded 
were most the objects of anxiety and 
care; but it was found impossible to 
remove them in time to save them from 
the flames. The smoke arising from 
the burning material had a strange, 
offensive odor. It was a sad sight. It 
revealed the demon of war in one of 
his most horrid aspects. In spite of 
all this, however, Lee, resolved to push 
his advantage, was hurrying forward 
his preparations for a fresh attack on 
the National army behind its rear line 
of works. His troops and artillery 
were ordered into position, and recon- 
noissances were made of the National 
line. It was evidently Lee's intention 
to strike at Hooker a deadly blow be- 
fore Sedgwick could have time to come 
up from Fredericksburg. If he could 
drive Hooker from behind his new line 
of fortifications, force him towards the 
river, he might, in the confusion which 
must result from any attempt at crossing, 
succeed in capturing or destroying the 
greater portion of the National army. 
Success was not to attend him from such 
calculations. His arrangements were 



472 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



all but completed ; his arm was, so to 
speak, uplifted and ready to strike, 
when the blow was arrested, and his 
piu'pose changed by a despatch, which 
informed him of the capture of Marye's 
Hill, and of the advance of Sedgwick. 

Leaving the ai-my of Hooker and the 
army of Lee in the positions Avhich we 
have described, let us now turn our at- 
tention to certain important movements 
which have been made, or which are just 
about to be made, in the immediate neigh- 
boihood of Fredericksburg. In an ear- 
lier part of this chapter, we have shown 
how, and for what purpose, Sedgwick 
was left behind at Falmouth, with his 
own coi-ps— the Sixth — and also with the 
First and Third. We have seen how, 
after the demonstration successfully 
made on the 29th of April, the Third 
corps, imder Sickles, advanced by the 
north bank of the river, crossed at 
United States Ford, and joined Hooker 
at ChancelloT'sville. We have seen how 
the First corps, under Reynolds, follow- 
ing the same path, joined the main army 
on the night of the 2d of May. We 
have also seen how, on the same night 
after the fatal surprise by Jackson, 
Sedgwick, who had already crossed the 
Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, 
was ordered to put his troops in motion 
immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, 
by Gibbon's division, of Couch, which 
had been left behind at Falmouth, to 
seize the heights in the rear of the city, 
to gain the plank road leading to Chan- 
cellorsville, to move along that road 
towards the main body of Hooker's 
army, and to be at the place assigned 
by daylight the following morning. It 



remains to be seen how this order was 
executed. 

It was past eleven o'clock, on the 
night of Saturday, the 2d, when the 
order Avas received. The officers and 
men had already gone to sleep; and it 
was midnis'ht before the instructions 
to advance were fully communicated. 
Sedgwick was lying on the south bank 
of the I'iver, about three miles below 
Fredericksburg. Without delay, he 
put his corps in motion by the flank, 
proceeding towards the town. It was 
a critical march. On the right was the 
river, about a mile distant ; on the left 
was the range of heights on which the 
watch-fii'es of the enemy could be dis- 
tinctly seen. The column was long, 
and exposed along its whole flank 
to the enemy on the heights. It 
was moonlight; but a heavy fog had 
settled over the low ground and the 
river. Newton led the advance ; and 
his instructions were that, in the event 
of any attack being made, the regiments 
attacked should face the hills and 
charge without further instructions. 
The head of the column had advanced 
but a short distance, when it encoun- 
tered the Confederate pickets. There 
was some slow marching, and some little 
delay was experienced ; but the Confede- 
rates fell back. On the outskirts of the " 
town, on the banks of a small creek, the 
Confederate skirmishers were again 
encountered; but they were driven 
back without much diflaculty. The 
column was now within a short distance 
of Marye's Heights. At two o'clock, 
General Warren arrived from Hooker's 
headquarters, his object being to hasten 



ATTACK ON MARYE'S HILL. 



473 



forward the movement. It was near 
dawn when the head of the column 
entej'ed Fredericksburg. Here Sedg- 
wick was joined by Gibbon, with his 
division of the Second corps. 

We have already mentioned what 
provision Jackson made for the protec- 
tion of Fredericksburg and the heights, 
when he set out to meet Hooker at 
Chancellorsville. He left behind him 
Early's division of four brigades, with 
Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' divi- 
sion. Barksdale was charged with the 
protection of the heights immediately in 
the rear of the town, including Marye's 
Hill and the stone wall, made famous 
by the Burnside campaign. His bri- 
gade consisted of some 1400 men. It 
was disposed as follows : seven compa- 
nies of the Twenty-First Mississippi 
were posted between the Marye House 
and the plank road ; the three remaining 
companies of the Twenty-First were 
posted on the telegraph road, at the 
foot of Marye's Hill; his other two 
regiments were on the hills further to 
the light. Batteries were set up at Lee's 
Hill, and at the Harrison House ; while 
four pieces of General Pendleton's 
artillery were stationed at the Marye 
House, two on the right and two on the 
left. As soon as Early was made aware 
of Sedgwick's movement, he sent Hays' 
brigade to reinforce Barksdale. The 
Confederates, it is manifest from the 
small number of troops left at this point, 
had perfect confidence in their ability 
to hold the heights. 

As soon as the opening dawn per- 
mitted it, Sedgwick moved forward 
(our regiments from the town in the 



direction of the heights. As they ad- 
vanced stealthily over the ground, so 
sadly memorable, not a sound disturbed 
the death-like stillness of that dull, dark 
Sabbath morning. The stillness, how- 
ever, is not to be of long duration. A 
few paces moi-e, and the regiments will 
have reached the fatal stone wall. Sud- 
denly, and simultaneously, light flashes 
from the summit of the hill and from 
the rifle-pits at the base. The Con- 
federates have opened upon them with 
both artillery and musketry. The regi- 
ments fall back under cover of the fog, 
but not without considerable loss. This 
attempt having failed, Sedgwick now 
resolved to turn the Confederate posi- 
tion. Howe was ordered to advance 
on the left of Hazel Run, and to attack 
the Confederate right, while Gibbon 
was ordered to move up the river and 
make a vigorous attack on the Confede- 
rate left. Howe found his progress 
barred by the strength of the works in 
his front ; and the stream deterred him 
from moving to the right and attacking 
in flank the works at Marye's Hill. 
Gibbon, who attempted to carry out 
Sedgwick's instructions on the extreme 
right, had no better success. Having 
advanced by the river road, he found 
the canal impassable ; and the vigorous 
fire which was opened upon him from 
Taylor's Hill, where Wilcox, who had 
hurried up from Banks' Ford, had 
planted two pieces of artillery, com- 
pelled his men to seek shelter in t^'^ 
cuts of the road. These experimentb 
were so far unsuccessful ; and yet it 
would be unjust to pronounce them 
failures; for it is oftentimes only by 



474 



CHANCE LLO IIS VILLE. 



such experiments that a knowledge of 
what it is right to do can be arrived at. 
It was by such experiments that Gen- 
eral Grant was, at last, to make himself 
master of Vicksbtirg. Benefiting by the 
experience thus acquired, and knowing 
at least what could not be done, Sedg- 
wick felt that he was left no alternative 
but to make a powerful, concentrated 
effort, and take the works by storm. 

It was now near ten o'clock. Precious 
time had unavoidably been lost. If 
this work was to be done, it must be 
done without further delay. Newton 
was ordered to send forward two storm- 
ing columns against Marye's Hill and 
the adjoining works. Howe, who was 
more to the left, was oi'dered to repeat 
his attack up Hazel Run, on the second 
line of heights. Newton's right-hand 
column was composed of the Sixty-First 
Pennsylvania, and Forty-Third New 
York, supported by the Sixty-Seventh 
New York and the Eighty-Second Penn- 
sylvania, and was commanded by Colonel 
Spear, of the Sixty-First Pennsylvania. 
His left was composed of the Seventh 
Massachusetts, and Thirty-Ninth New 
York, and was commanded by Colonel 
Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts. 
Th«8« columns moved up the plank 
road, and to the right. Colonel Bum- 
ham, with four regiments, at the same 
time moved to the left of the plank 
road, and directly against the rifle-pits 
at the base of Marye's Hill. The Na- 
tional columns meet with but Kttle re- 
sistance, until they are within three 
hundred yards of the Confederate works. 
At this point, the guns on the hill pour 
from their murderous throats a tre- 



mendous shower of canister. Nothing 
dismayed, the columns push on, until 
within close musket range. Here the 
Confederate infantry, rising from behind 
the stone wall, open uj^on them, a ter- 
rific fire. The Nationals reel and stag 
ger, and threaten to break. Quickly i 
rallied, they rush again to the attack. ' 
The stoiTQ of lead abates not. The 
volleys are swifter and more sure. 
Nothing, however, can damp the cour- 
age, check the enthusiasm, or arrest the 
progress of these heroic men. Right, 
left and centre, each emulous of the 
other, nerved by the same purpose, and 
inspired by the same hope, press eagerly 
forward. Spear falls ; but Shaler is at 
hand. The right is rallied ; and the 
attack is resumed. Johns is wounded ; 
but Colonel Walsh, of the Thirty-Ninth 
New York, takes the brave fellows in 
charge ; and the left, in the rivalry and 
onward rush, resumes and maintains its 
proud position. The supporting column 
vies with the other two ; and Burnham, 
of the Sixth Maine, performs deeds of 
daring, which command at once admij 
ation and envy. It is a race for a prize ; 
and the prize is on the summit of the 
hill. The stone wall has been cleared ; 
the rifle-pits have been seized and 
silenced; but the artillery ou the hill 
still thundei's and belches forth its mur- 
derous shell and canister. Ploughed 
through and through, and torn to pieces, 
their comrades falling in dozens by their 
side, these gallant fellows rush fearlessly 
on. There is a lull in the thunderstorm 
of artillery. There is a loud-resound- 
ing cheer. It is the shout of victory. 
The race is run; the task is accom 



MAKYE'S HILLi CAPTURED. 



475 



plished; and the Union flag waves 
proudly on tlie crest of Marye's Hill. 

While Newton has been carrying 
the National standard to victory in the 
centre, success not dissimilar has been 
attending Howe on the left. When 
pressing forward on the left of Hazel 
Run, he was vigorously confronted by 
the Confederate skirmishers, who were 
intrenched in rifle-pits behind the em- 
bankment of the Richmond, Fredericks- 
bars: and Potomac Railroad. Lee's 
Hill and the adjacent heights, which 
constituted Howe's objective point, 
were occupied by the Confederate ar- 
tillery, and by their main line of infan- 
try. Howe advanced with two col- 
umns — six regiments composing that 
on the right, three that on the left. 
There was a third column, which moved 
still further to the left, and which was 
instructed to strike the Confederate 
position in the rear, and then co-operate 
with the others when they should have 
carried the woi'ks in front. Three reg- 
iments of the principal column to the 
right, getting separated from the others, 
crossed the Run, and took part in the 
attack on Marye's Hill. The remain- 
der pushed forward, and soon obtained 
a firm footing on Lee's Hill. Here, for 
a time, the struggle was vigorously 
maintained. After the capture of 
Marye's Hill, Lee's Hill and the ad- 
joining heights were no longer tenable. 
The Confederates, therefore, abandoned 
the works, and fell back by the tele- 
graph road. In addition to the actual 
gain of the position, five guns and a 
considerable number of prisoners re- 
warded this brilliant feat of arms. 



Early hurried up from Hamilton's 
Ci'ossing, and the pursuit of the retreat- 
ino: Confederates was discontinued ; but 
the entire range of hills in the rear, 
and to the south oi Fredericksburg, 
was in Sedgwick's possession. 

It was as yet only eleven o'clock. 
In this brief struggle, there had been a 
fearful loss of life. In the space of 
ten minutes, when the conflict raged 
most fiercely at the base of Marye's 
Hill, nearly 1000 men were killed or 
wounded. The Confederates suffered as 
severely, as they bravely fought. The 
rifle-pits were full of dead and dying 
men, who fell, many of them, in a hand- 
to-hand struggle. In addition to the 
loss of the rank and file, the Nationals 
lost some of their ablest officers, 
among whom was the gallant Colonel 
Spear, and Majors Bassett, Faxon and 
Haycock. But the saci'ifice had not 
been made in vain. The heights had 
been carried ; the Confederate forces 
were divided ; and the plank road 
which led direct to Chancellorsville 
was open. Sedgwick was now free to 
advance to the assistance of Hooker. 
He did not know that the latter had 
ali-eady been driven behind his last line 
of intrenchments. 

It was this alarming state of things 
which was reported to Lee when, elated 
with success, he was about to strike a 
final blow at Chancellorsville. Lee 
found himself in a most critical situa- 
tion. There were several courses open 
to him ; but every one of them was be 
set with difiiculty. He might carry out 
his original purpose, and fall on Hooker 
with all his might, cripple or destroy 



476 



CHANOELliOESVILLB. 



him, and then give his attention to 
Sedgwick ; but in that case, he would 
expose himself to the risk of being at- 
^ tacked by Sedgwick in flank and rear. 
[ He might fall back towards Fredericks- 
; burg, meet and demolish Sedgwick, and 
[ being relieved from all danger in this 
direction, face about and press matters 
to a final issue with Hooker; but in 
that case, he would be exposing him- 
self to a similar and even greater risk ; 
for Hooker might sally forth from his 
intrenchments and fall with crushing 
effect on his rear. He might remain in 
his present position, defer his meditated 
attack on Hooker, detach a suflicient 
number to check or destroy Sedgwick, 
leaving events themselves to determine 
in which direction the first crushing 
blow should be dealt ; but in that case, 
he would run the risk of being com- 
pelled to fight two battles at once, if in- 
deed, he was not caught as in a vice, 
between two powerful armies. The 
last course, perilous as it was, was the 
one he adopted. It was a course justi- 
fied by the highest principles of the 
military art, and sanctioned by some of 
the greatest examples of the past. 
Never over-bold, Lee had an advantage 
over most of the generals, either in the 
Confederate or National armies, in cool- 
ness of head and clearness of vision. 
He had, also, great steadiness of pur- 
pose. In some of these qualities he was 
approached by McClellan ; but the un- 
questionably great talents of that gen- 
eral were ruined by his excess of caution. 
In all that made Lee a great general, 
he was equalled only by Grant ; but 
Grant surpassed him in self-reliance, in 



strength of will, in deep intensity of 
purpose, and in a certain bull-dog tena- 
city of grip. In the present instance, as 
the result proved, Lee's judgment stood 
him in good stead. He had wisely 
measured Hooker. He believed that 
with a reasonable show of force, he 
could keep him behind his intrench- 
ments. Without delay, therefore, he 
detached McLaws, with his own three 
brigades — those of WofFord, Semmes 
and Kershaw — together with Mahone's 
brigade, of Anderson's division, with 
instructions to advance towards Fred- 
ericksburg, to co-operate with Wilcox 
and Barksdale, and the other troops 
under Early, with a view to the inter- 
ception or destruction of Sedgwick. 

After the capture of the heights, 
Sedgwick pursued the retreating Con- 
federates about two miles along the tele- 
graph road; but at that point. Early, 
who had come up from Hamilton's 
Crossing, halted the commands of Barks- 
dale and Hays, and reinforced them 
with three regiments of Gordon's bri- 
gade. Sedgwick had no motive in 
pushing along the telegraph road. His 
destination was Chancellorsville. He, 
therefore, discontinued the pursuit, and 
turned towards the plank road. He 
had advanced but a little way when he 
found the Confederates in some strength 
on the ridge, which stretches along 
the road from Guest's to Stansbury. 
It was Wilcox's brigade. W^ilcox, it 
will be remembered, was at Taylor's 
Hill, when the attempt was made by 
Gibbon to cross the canal and turn the 
Confederate left. Hays was at Stans- 
bury's Hill. When the combined attack 



THE TOLLGATB. 



477 



was made on Marye's Hill and to the 
left, they had been ordered to come up, 
but they had not had time ; and so 
rapid was the advance of Sedgwick, 
that they found themselves — Wilcox 
with his whole brigade, and Haya 
with a portion of his — cut off from 
the main body of the Confederates, and 
left on the north side of the plank road. 
Hays, by retreating parallel to the 
road, succeeded in getting round the 
head of the National advance, and re- 
joining Early. Wilcox remained be- 
hind ; and, yielding to the instincts of 
a true soldier, as well as resolved to 
make the best use possible of the means 
at his disposal, drew up his brigade in 
line on the ridge above referred to, and 
placed in position foiu* pieces of artil- 
lery. Sedgwick was now advancing 
slowly, and with great caution. Wil- 
cox, for a time, offered a spirited resist- 
ance, and greatly annoyed the National 
advance. The Nationals coming up in 
greater force, Wilcox, fearing lest he 
should be surrounded, fell back to the 
river road, about half a mile in rear of 
Taylor's House. Sedgwick was still ad- 
vancing with slow and cautious steps. 
Taking courage from the leisurely move- 
ment of the National troops, and deter- 
mined to retai'd their progress as much 
as possible, Wilcox again pushed for- 
ward his brigade, with the artilleiy, 
this time taking position in the neigh- 
borhood of Salem Church, some five 
miles distant from Fredericksburg. The 
heights in the vicinity of the church, 
extending on both sides of the road, 
and about two hundred and fifty yards 
to the east, were thickly wooded. Be- 



yond the wood, and on slightly lower 
ground, there were cleared fields spread- 
ing out on both sides of the road, and 
reaching as far as and beyond the toll- 
gate, which was distant from the church 
about one thousand yards. Advancing 
his troops to the toll-gate, and placing 
two rifled pieces on the road, Wilcox 
awaited the approach of Sedgwick. He 
had not long to wait ; for Collins and 
the cavalry skirmishers came up almost 
immediately. The artillery on both 
sides opened fire at once. Meanwhile, 
McLaws, who had come up with his 
three brigades, was taking position on 
the high ground in the rear of Wilcox, 
and to the right and left. Aa soon as 
McLaws came up, he ordered Wilcox 
to fall back on Salem Church. 

It was now four o'clock. The Con- 
federates were well posted. The ground 
was high, and, as we have seen, well 
wooded. McLaws had drawn up his 
line of battle perpendicular to the road. 
Mahone was on his extreme left, then 
Semmes, then Wilcox — who, having 
fallen back, crossed the road, having 
three regiments on the right or south 
of it, and two on the left — and then 
Kershaw. Wofford came up later, and 
took position on Kershaw's right. The 
artillery was so disposed as to command 
the road, and to cover both flanks. On 
the road, in the front of his centre, 
Wilcox had four guns. Troops were 
posted in the church, and also in the 
school-house, some sixty yards in ad- 
vance. Scarcely had these arrange- 
ments been completed, when the Na- 
tionals came up in force. Sedgwick 
threw forward Brooks' division, which 



»Ba 



476 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



had moved up the road and on both 
sides of it. Brooks was followed by 
Newton, in support. Bartlett's brigade 
was on the National left, and the First 
New Jersey on the right. Getting his 
guns into position at the toll-gate, 
Sedgwick opened a terrific fire, shell- 
ing the woods to the right and to the 
left. The Confederate artillery for 
some minutes replied with great spirit. 
Gradually, however, the fire slackens; 
and the skirmishers fall back, first to the 
wood and then to their line of battle. 
The Nationals, having passed on to the 
edge of the road, uttered a loud and 
triumphant cheer, and then rushed for- 
ward to the charge. When within 
about eighty yards of the opposing 
line, the Confederates, who had re- 
served their fire, opened upon them a 
tremendous volley. The efFect was 
dreadful. The National line wavered, 
but it was only for a moment. Bartlett 
dashed forward ; and, in a second, the 
school-house was surrounded, and the 
garrison captured. A few minutes more, 
and he has fallen with crushing weight 
on the line in the rear, and nearly de- 
molished a whole regiment. The Con- 
federates waver and bi-eak, yielding the 
ground to the advancing and triumph- 
ant Natioaals. The crest has been won. 
At this point, however, the tide of vic- 
tory turned. Wilcox had still in re- 
serve the Ninth Alabama regiment. 
At this supreme moment, when all 
seemed lost, he hurled this regiment 
upon the advancing Nationals. Firing 
at close quarters, the Alabamians 
charged with great fury. The shock 
was irresistible. The Nationals yield- 



ed, and fell back in terror. In vain did 
Bartlett strive to hold the advantage 
he had won. At this point the strug- 
gle was most fierce. Sedgwick hurried 
forward his second line ; but it was to 
little purpose. The fury of the Con- 
federate onset, the weight of the pres- 
sure, was irresistible. Step by step the 
Nationals were driven back — back be- 
hind the school-house, which was recap- 
tured and reoccupied by the Confed- 
erates — back through the open fields, in 
which it was found impossible to make 
a fresh stand — back to the toll-gate, 
where the retreating columns wei-e 
sheltered, and the enemy's advance Avas 
checked by the well-directed fire of 
Tompkins' batteries. It was now night ; 
and neither the one side nor the other 
seemed anxious to prolong the contest. 
Sedgwick had not been defeated ; but 
he had met with a bloody repulse. 

Sunday, the 3d of May, in spite of 
the ray of promise revealed on the 
heights of Fredericksburg, was a day 
of disaster to the National cause. All 
the plans of the morning had been 
frustrated. Lee, in place of being 
crushed between the two wings of the 
National army, had whipped first the 
one and then the other ; and while 
Hooker, with his splendid army, was 
shut up, prisoner-like, behind his own 
intrenchments, Sedgwick was being 
effectually hindered from coming to his 
relief. 

On Monday, the 4th, the opposing ar- 
mies found themselves in a pecu- May 
liar plight. The final upshot of *• 
the campaign was revealing itself more 
and more clearly. But it could not be 



SALEM CHUECH. 



479 



eaid that on either side the danger was 
past; nor could it be predicted with 
confidence which should win the vic- 
tory. Lee, so far, had been successful 
in wooing or forcing the favors of for- 
Imne. But his hands were full. Hooker \ 
was evincing no signs of a disposition 
to resume the offensive, and was, to all 
appearance, contented to remain inac- 
tive behind his lines at Chancellors- 
ville; but he had under him a mighty 
army, whole divisions of which had 
taken no part in the contest. Sedg- 
wick had been checked ; but his num- 
bers were considerably greater than 
those by which he was opposed ; and 
any attempt made by Lee to strengthen 
his right wing would necessarily weaken 
his left, already too weak to resist a 
vigorous sortie, if Hooker should make 
up his mind to rush from behind his 
iutrenchments, Lee, however, was not 
slow to decide. His final success seemed 
to him to depend on his first crushing 
Sedgwick, or driving him across the 
Rappahannock, and then falling back 
with his whole weight and dealing a 
decisive blow on Hooker. Early was, 
therefoi'e, ordered up from below Fred- 
ericksburg, with instructions to retake 
the heights in the rear of the town, 
and to press on against Sedgwick's 
right. At the same time, leaving three 
of Jaclison's divisions to hold Hooker 
ill check, Lee pushed forward the 
three remaining brigades of Anderson 
in the direction of Salem Church. Thus 
stiengthened, the Confederate force 
in front of Sedgwick amounted to 
23,000 men. The rival forces in 
this direction were now about equal. 



Anderson was to take position on 
McLaAvs' right, with the view of forming 
a connection with Early. Lee went for- 
ward in person to direct operations. 

On Monday morning, Sedgwick found 
himself confronted by McLaws, and 
threatened in the rear by Early. The 
latter had experienced little difficulty 
in recapturing the heights. Sedgwick, 
although not j'et aware of the approach 
of Anderson and Lee in person, tele- 
graphed to General Hooker that lai-ge 
masses of the enemy were moving from 
his right to his left, and asking whether 
the main army could support him. The 
answer was that no support must be 
expected. Sedgwick, cut off from Fred- 
ericksburg by the advance of Early, 
formed his line so as to cover Banks' 
Ford and the pontoon bridge near 
that point. Howe was upon his left; 
Brooks was upon the right of Howe, 
and at right angles to him on the plank 
road ; and Newton Avas on the right of 
the line, perpendicular to the road, 
much as he had been the previous 
evening. It was noon before Anderson 
arrived at Salem Church, Preparations 
for the attack were not completed until 
about six o'clock, although there had 
been skinnishing, both on the National 
right and left, from an early hour. 
Sedgwick, perceiving that he was about 
to be attacked both in front and rear, 
had notified Hooker that his position 
was untenable, and that the bridges 
might be sacrificed, and had received 
for answer that he must not cross the 
river "unless compelled to do so." At 
the appointed time — it was close upon 
six o'clock — the signal was gi^en, 



480 



CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 



and tte Confederates moved to the at 
tack alonsj the whole line. It was 
made with great impetuosity. The Na- 
tionals resisted with great stubborn- 
ness ; but they were compelled to fall 
back towards the river, Sedgwick still 
holding possession of Banks' Ford. 
The fighting was severe, both armies 
suffering terribly. Darkness ensued; 
and the nature of the country was such 
that the Confederates were prevented 
from following up their advantage, 
tinder cover of the night, having re- 
ceived permission to withdraw, Sedg- 
wick recrossed the river at Banks' Ford 
with his whole force.* The last bri- 
gade had crossed before day-break. In 
the three engagements — the storming 
of the heights, the battle of Sunday, 
and the battle of Monday — Sedgwick 
had lost 5000 men. 

It was, no doubt, a great misfortune 

• At one o'clock, A. M., on the 5th, in reply to a des- 
patch sent to Hooker at 11.45 on the night of the 4th, 
General Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick to "withdraw 
under cover. " The movement to recross was at once 
commenced, and by five o'clock on the following morn- 
ing, the troops were all on the other side, and the 
bridges taken np. When the last brigade was crossing, 
an order was received from Hooker countermanding 
the withdrawal. This latter order was based on a 
despatch of Sedgwick, sent in the afternoon, stating 
that he could hold a position south of the Bappahan- 
nock — a despatch which reached Hooker subsequent to 
the one which called forth the permission to withdraw. 
We subjoin the last order and the reply. 

"■May 5, 1863—1.20 A. M. 
" Genebax Sedgwick : 

"Yours received one A. M., saying that you should 
hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. 
Acknowledge both. 

"Joseph Hooeeb, 
"Major-General Commanding." 
To this Sedgwick replied, at 5 A. M. : 
" The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung, and in pro- 
cess of being taken up. The troops are much exhaust- 
ed. The despatch contermanding my movement over 
the Tiver was received after the troops had crossed." 



that Sedgwick did not succeed in formr 
ing a junction with Hooker. That he 
did his best to accomplish this object, 
no impartial mind, in view of all the 
facts, can i-efuse to admit. It is greatly 
to be regretted that General Hooker, in 
his testimony before the Committee of 
Congress on the conduct of the war, 
should have so far forgotten himself as 
attribute his defeat at Chaucellorsville 
to the failure of Sedgwick to join him 
on Sunday morning. The I'eader of 
these pages, unless we greatly mistake, 
must have come to another and very 
different conclusion ; and we do not 
see how the cruel and most unjust charge 
of Hooker can ever be endorsed by the 
impartial historian. "In my judgment," 
says Hooker, " General Sedgwick did 
not obey the spirit of my order, and 
made no sufficient effort to obey it. 
His movement was delayed so long that 
the enemy discovered his intentions; 
and when that was done, he was neces- 
sarily delayed in the further execution 
of the order." It is unnecessary to re- 
peat what we have already said, believ- 
ing, as we do, that our narrative is suf- 
ficient disproof of these assertions. We 
agree with Swinton — whose observa- 
tions, at the close of his account of the 
battle of Chancellorsville, reveal the 
keen sense of the military critic, and 
whose arguments are unanswerable — in 
pronouncing this statement of Hooker 
to be " a cruel charge to l)ring against 
a commander, now beyond the reach 
of detraction ; whose brilliant exploit 
in carrying the Fredeiicksburg Heights, 
and his subsequent fortitude in a try- 
ing situation, shine out as the one r« 



EETEEAT ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 



481 



Ueving brightness, amid the gloom of 
that hapless battle." 

It was felt by both parties that the 
struggle and defeat of Sedgwick on 
Monday had decided the contest. Some 
of the National generals were willing, 
and even anxious, to make another ef- 
fort. All fight, however, seemed to 
have passed out of Hooker ; and he re- 
solved to retire his troops to the north 
bank of the river. Preparations for 
May this movement were begun on the 
5' morning of Tuesday, May 5th. 
The engineers were ordered to prepare 
a new line near the river, so as to cover 
the crossing. The roads and bridges 
were, in consequence, repaired ; and an 
interior line of works was constructed 
from Scott's Dam to the mouth of 
Hunting Run, on the Rapidan, a dis- 
tance of three miles. Lee, eager to 
push the advantage he had gained, and 
impatient to deal a deadly blow before 
his antagonist should have time to es- 
cape, left Early's division and Barks- 
dale's brigade to guard the river from 
Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg and the 
crossings below, and ordered Anderson 
and McLaws to hurry back to Chancel- 
lorsville. Early in the afternoon, a vio- 
lent rain-storm broke out. It continued 
during the remainder of the day, 
deluging the spongy soil, swelling the 
streams to ovei-flow, and covering, the 
low flats with water. It was late, 
in consequence, when the Confederate 
troops had reached their destination at 
Ohancellorsville. As the storm con- 
tinued to rage, nothing could be done 
till the following morning. The ele- 
ments on this occasion, while they de- 



layed the Confederates, and made an 
attack impossible on the National posi' 
tion, were scarcely less unkind to the 
Nationals. The river was rising rapid- 
ly, and the bridges were in peril. The 
National generals were divided as to 
the course which should be pursued. 
Some of them were in favor of an ad- 
vance. Others deemed it more prudent 
to withdraw. The attempt was made. 
Straw and branches were laid on the 
bridges, to deaden the noise of the 
trains, which were sent over first. The 
trains having been safely transported, 
the troops followed in order; and so, 
during a night in which nature seemed 
strangely in sympathy with the situa- 
tion, fretting and fuming^ and as if 
scowling upon defeat, the great army 
of the Potomac, which was to put the 
enemy to inglorious flight, found itself, 
after a feeble campaign of six days, in-^ 
gloriously transported to the northern 
banks of the Rappahannock, In the 
morning, when Lee advanced to attack, 
he found that his enemy was gone. 

The losses in the battle of Chancel, 
lorsville were heavy. The Confederate 
loss, according to General Lee, amount- 
ed to 13,000, of whom 1581 were killed, 
8700 wounded, and nearly 3000 prison- 
ers. Hooker's loss was 1 7, 1 9 7, of whom 
5000 were unwounded prisoners. He 
had lost, also, 14 pieces of artillery and 
20,000 stand of arms. 

It will be remembered that it was 
Hooker's intention that the cavalry 
force of his army should play an im- 
portant pai-t in this campaign. We 
mentioned in the eailier portion of this 
chapter that the entire cavalry force of 



482 



OHANOELLORSVILLE. 



the army of the Potomac had been or- 
ganized in four divisions, making one 
distinct and separate corps, under the 
command of General Stoneman. His 
four division officers were Pleasonton, 
Buford, Averill and Gregg. The corps 
numbered from 10,000 to 13,000 sabres. 
Neither at Chancellorsville nor at Fred- 
ericksburg nor at Salem have we seen 
much of this branch of Hooker's army. 
Some account of the operations of 
this corps is necessary, to complete 
the story of the Chancellorsville cam- 
paign. 

As early as the 12th of April, Stone- 
man went forth on his expedition, the 
principal object of which was to de- 
stroy the railroads, bridges and other 
means of communication in Lee's rear, 
and so cut him ofp from Richmond. 
fle rode up the Rappahannock, and 
attempted to effect a crossing. On the 
14th, he had succeeded in throwing 
over one division ; but a violent storm 
coming on, and the low grounds becom- 
ing flooded, the division was recalled, 
the horses taking to the water, and 
bravely swimming to the opposite bank. 
As the weather did not improve, and 
the upper Rappahannock was still 
flooded, Stoneman remained inactive 
until the general advance movement of 
the whole army was commenced on 
the 27th. On the 28th, he crossed the 
Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford, at the 
same time with the main body. On 
the following day, he crossed at Mor- 
ton's Ford and at Racoon Ford. In 
the meantime, by order of General 
Hooker, Stoneman had divided his 
troops into two columns. One coliunn, 



which consisted of about 4000 men, 
under General Averill, was ordered to 
move on the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, the main body, under Stone- 
man in person, being charged with the 
destruction of the Richmond and Fred- 
ericksburg Railroad. Averill encoun- 
tered a cavalry force, under W. H. F. 
Lee, on the 1st of May, near Rapidan 
Station. Lee, after burning the bridge 
over the river, retired to Gordonsville. 
Averill moved to the north along the 
railroad as far as Culpepper, dispersing 
some Confederate troops who were 
there assembled, and destroying a large 
quantity of the enemy's stores. On the 
2d, he was recalled, and ordered to 
join Hooker at Chancellorsville. At 
10.30 that night he reached Ely's Ford. 
Later the same night, he was sur- 
prised by the Confederate cavalry ; and 
it is more than probable that he would 
have suffered severely, had it not been 
that the fall of Jackson and the acci- 
dent which befell Hill almost imme- 
diately afterwards, compelled Stuart to 
return with all haste, and take com- 
mand of the Confederate troops near 
Chancelloi'sville. Finding it difficult, 
or, as he thought, impossible, from the 
character of the country, to opei-ate 
cavalry on the Confederate left, he re- 
mained inactive in camp, taking no 
part in the engagements of Sunday, 
the 3d of May. Hooker, on account 
of this, displaced him, and turned over 
his command to Genei-al Pleasonton. 

It was the 3d of May before Stone- 
man reached Louisa Court House, and 
before the important line of communi- 
cation by the Richmond aud Fred- 



CAVALEY MOVEMENTS. 



488 



ericksburg Railroad was struck. The 
troops were divided into six bodies, 
and, having received special instruc- 
tions, were sent out in all directions. 
Colonel Wyndham, with his party, 
proceeded to Columbia, on the James 
River. Here the river is crossed by 
the Lynchburg and Richmond Canal. 
An attempt was made to destroy the 
aqueduct. It was not successful; but 
the canal was greatly damaged, and 
much pxiblic property destroyed. Pitz- 
Lee, hearing of what was being done in 
that direction, made a rush towards 
Columbia. Wyndham retired down the 
river, and then, changing his course, re- 
joined Stoneman at Thompson's Cross- 
Roads at ten o'clock the same night. 
Colcaiel Kilpatrick, who was ordered 
to move in the direction of the Chicka- 
hominy, having travelled all day and 
all night Sunday, reached Hungary 
Station, on the Fredericksburg Rail- 
road, at daylight on Monday. At this 
point, he destroyed the depots and tore 
up the railroads. Crossing to Brook 
Turnpike, he advanced to within two 
miles of Richmond. He then moved 
to Meadow Bridge, where the Central 
Railroad crosses the Chickahominy. 
Having destroyed this bridge, and an 
engine which he intercepted, he crossed 
the Pamunkey at Harristown, to avoid 
pursuit. On the 7th, after having 
crossed the Mattapony, and having 
raided through Essex and the neighbor- 
ing counties, he reached Gloucester 
Point, having encountered by the way 
but little opposition. Colonel Davis, 
who was sent down the South Anna, 
struck the Fredericksburg Railroad at 



Ashland on Sunday evening. He first 
captured an ambulance, filled with the 
wounded from Chancellorsville. Hav- 
ing destroyed the engines and torn up 
a portion of the railroad, he pushed on 
towards Hanover Court House, on the 
Central Railroad. Here he burned the 
depot and tore up the rails. At Tun- 
stall's, near the White House, he en- 
countered a small body of infantry, 
with some artillery, and fell back upon 
Gloucester Point, reaching it without 
much further difficulty. Colonel Gregg 
destroyed the bridge across the South 
Anna, on the road from Columbia to 
Spottsylvania ; thence he moved east, 
and destroyed the road to Beaver Dam 
Station. On Tuesday, the 5th, the 
whole command, except Davis and Kil- 
patrick, was concentrated at Yancey- 
ville, on the South Anna; and, on the 
evening of that day, the retrogade 
movement commenced. On the 8th, 
the whole force recrossed Kelley's Ford, 
on the Rappahannock. 

This raid must be pronounced a fail- 
ure. No doubt it did much damage to 
Confederate property ; and it must have 
struck terror into the hearts of the 
peaceful inhabitants. But it failed of 
its object. It did not seriously inter- 
fere with General Lee's operations. It 
did not affect his commissariat to any 
appreciable extent. It did not cut him 
off for any length of time from his 
communications with Richmond ; for in 
three or four days the railroad was re- 
paired and in excellent running order, 
and navigation on the canal was resumed. 
This was all that was accomplished by 
that splendid army of mounted troops- 



484 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



in appearance one of the most magnifi- 
cent bodies of cavalry that ever went 
forth to battle. Employed as they 
were, they contributed nothing towards 
the possible success of the campaign; 
they won no glory, for they found no 
foe; and, when General Hooker most 
needed them, they were not available. 

On "Wednesday, the 6th of May, the 
army of the Potomac — with the excep- 
JHay tion of the cavalry, which, as we 
*• have seen, did not cross the river 
till two days later — resumed its old 
quarters at Falmouth. On that day — 
and with a bad taste which was only 
in keeping with his blundering con- 
duct since the moment he first felt the 
enemy, in the advance towards the open 
ground in the rear of the heights at 
Fredericksburg — Hooker issued the fol- 
lowing address to his army : 

" Headqcabte83 Army ok the Potomac, ) 
May 6, 1863. j" 

" The major-general commanding ten- 
ders to this army his congratulations 
on its achievements of the last seven 
days, [f it has not accomplished all 
that was expected, the reasons are well 
known to the army. It is suflicient to 
say, they were of a character not to be 
foreseen or prevented by human sagacity 
or resource. 

"In withdrawing from the south 
bank of the Rappahannock, before de- 
livering a general battle to our adver- 
saries, the army has given renewed 
evidence of its confidence in itself, and 
its fidelity to the principles it repre- 
sents. On fighting at a disadvantage, 
we would have been recreant to our 
trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our 



country. Profoiindly loyal, and con- 
scious of its strength, the army of the 
Potomac will give or decline battle 
whenever its interest or honor may de- 
mand. It will also be the guai-dian of 
its own history and its own arm. By 
your celerity and secrecy of movement, 
our advance and passage of the rivers 
was undisputed; and, on our with- 
drawal, not a rebel ventured to follow. 

"The events of last week may swell 
with pride the heart of every officer 
and soldier of this army. We have 
added new lustre to its formei' renown. 
We have made long marches, crossed 
rivers, surprised the enemy in his en- 
trenchments, and, wherever we have 
fought, have inflicted heavier blows 
than we have received. We have taken 
from the enemy 5000 prisoners; 15 
colors; captured and brought off 7 
pieces of artillery ; placed hors de com- 
bat 18,000 of his chosen troops, de- 
stroyed his depots, filled with vast 
amounts of stores; deranged his com- 
munications ; captured prisoners within 
the fortifications of his capital, and 
filled his country with fear and con- 
sternation. We have no other regret 
than that caused by the loss of our 
brave companions, and in this we are 
consoled by the conviction that they 
have fallen in the holiest cause ever 
submitted to the arbitrament of battle. 
" By command of 

"Major-General Hooker. 

" S. Williams, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General." 

General Lee, who had certainly more 
reason to use boastful language, is- 
sued an address to his soldiers on the 



LEE'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY. 



485 



7tli ; but he writes with a dignity and 
modesty becoming the occasion. 



' Hbadquarters Army op Northern Virginia 
May 7, 1863. 



1 



" With heartfelt gratification, the 
general commanding expresses to the 
army his sense of the heroic conduct 
displayed by officers and men, during 
the arduous operations in which they 
have just been engaged. 

" Under trying vicissitudes of heat 
and storm, you attacked the enemy, 
strongly entrenched in the depths of a 
tangled wilderness, and again on the 
hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles 
distant, and, by the valor that has 
triumphed on so many fields, forced 
him once more to seek safety beyond 
the Rappahannock. While this glori- 
ous victory entitles you to the praise 
and gratitude of the nation, we are es- 
pecially called upon to return our grate- 
ful thanks to the only Giver of vic- 
tory, for the signal deliverance He has 
wrought. It is, therefore, earnestly 
recommended that the troops unite, 
on Sunday next, in ascribing to the 
Lord of Hosts the glory due His name. 
Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, 
the brave soldiers who have fallen in 
defense of their country; and, while 
we mourn their loss, let us resolve to 
emulate their noble example. The 
army and the country alike lament the 
absence, for a time, of one to whose 
bravery, energy and skill they are so 
much indebted for success. 

" The following letter from the pres- 
ident of the Confederate States, is 
communicated to the army as an ex- 



pression of his appreciation of its 
success : 

* I have received your despatch, and rever- 
ently unite with you in giving praise to God 
for the success with which He has crowned 
our arms. 

' Irj the name of the people, I offer my cor- 
dial thanks to yourself, and the troops under 
your command, for this addition to the unpre- 
cedented series of great victories which yom 
army has achieved. 

'The universal rejoicing produced by this 
happy result will be mingled with a general 
regret for the good and the brave who are 
numbered among the killed and wounded.' 

"R. E. Lee, General." 

On the 8th, the following des- 
patch was sent by the secretary of 
war to the governors of the Northern 

States : 

"Washington, May 8, 1863. 

"The president and general-in-chief 
have just returned from the army of 
the Potomac, The principal opera- 
tions of General Hooker failed, but 
there has been no serious disaster to 
the organization and efficiency of the 
army. It is now occupying its former 
position on the Rappahannock, having 
recrossed the river without any loss in 
the movement. Not more than one 
third of General Hooker's force was en- 
gaged. General Stoneman's operations 
have been a brilliant success. Part of 
his force advanced to within two miles 
of Richmond, and the enemy's communi- 
cations have been cut in eveiy direction. 
The army of the Potomac will speedily 
resume offensive operations. 
"E. M. Stanton, 

"Secretary of War.'* 



JM4 



t86 



OHANCELLORSVILLE. 



On the same day, President Lincoln 
issued the famous proclamation, an- 
nouncing his intention to enforce the 
law of enrolment and draft, which had 
been passed by Congress at its previous 
session. All able-bodied male citizens, 
and persons of foreign birth, who, al- 
though not yet citizens, had declared 
their intention to become such, were 
proclaimed to constitute the National 
forces, and to be liable to perform mili- 
tary duty in the service of the United 
States, when called out by the presi- 
dent for that purpose. It was evident 
that, if the Confederates had acquired 
fresh courage and fresh hope from 
this Ktest triumph, the government at 
WashiiXgton had become more resolved 

Oekzbal Geoboe Hibam Bebet. — This brave and 
talented oiEcer was killed, as has been mentioned in the 
text, during the second day's fighting at Chancellorsville. 
It was hia division, formerly Hooker's own, which, on 
the first day, saved the National army from destruction. 
The situation was already desperate when Hooker or- 
dered forward this choice division. ' ' Go in, general, " 
said Hooker; "throw yonr men into the breach; don't 
fire a shot — they can't see you — but charge home with the 
bayonet. " Never was a charge more nobly made or more 
gallantly snstained. For three hours, almost alone, this 
division resisted, and even repelled, the fierce onslaughts 
of the already triumphant enemy. On the ground 
which he had won, Berry resumed the battle early the 
following morning. Determined to drive the Confed- 
erates back, he thrust his brigades forward, making 
(everal successful charges. In one of these, while at 
the head of his men, and cheering them on, he was in- 
Itantly killed. Berry was a native of Bockland, Maine, 
Vhere he was bom on the 27th of August, 1824. Bred 
~ >'iwpant«r, h* nibaeqiMntly davoted Hmolf to aavi- 



than ever to put down the rebellion 
and to restore the Union. The spirit 
which prevailed at Washington was 
the same spirit which, except among 
certain classes who had never been in 
favor of the war, pervaded and ani- 
mated the whole people. 

Such, then, is the story of the great 
but, to the National forces, disastrous 
battle of Chancellorsville — a battle in 
which, as has been well said, " the 
rank and file had been foiled without 
being fought, and caused to retreat 
without the consciousness of having 
been beaten." After the battle, Gen- 
eral Hooker's reputation suffered an 
eclipse from which it has not yet 
fuPv recovered. 

gation. Later, he cultivated a taste for military affaitB, 
and was the originator of the Rockland Guard — a vol- 
unteer company which, before the war, had attained a 
high state of efficiency. He was several times elected 
to the State legislature by hia fellow-townsmen, and 
was once mayor of Eockland. 'WTien the war broke 
out, he entered the volunteer service as colonel of tha 
Fourth Maine regiment. He fought at Bull Run. He 
was raised to the rank of brigadier-general in April, 
1SG2. He was in the peninsula with McClellan, and, 
as commander of the Third brigade of the Third divi- 
sion, of Heintzelman's corps, took part in most of the 
engagements. He followed the fortunes of Pope in 
■Virginia, and those of Bumside at Fredericksburg. 
At the latter battle, he greatly distinguished himself. 
In March, 1803, his nomination as major-general ol 
volunteers was confirmed by the Senate ; and he was 
placed in command of the Second division of the Third 
army corps, then under Sickles. In this capacity he 
fought at Chancellorsville. Berry was greatly ]ament«(i 
by the armjr and by the nation at larca. 



GETTYSBURa 



48*< 



CHAPTER XXVII. 



Dftrk Days. — After Chancellorsville. — The Army of Lee and the Sontheru People. — High Hopes. — The Inya- 
gion Mania. — Hooker Watchful. — Lee's Army in Motion. — Longstreet at Culpepper. — A. P. Hill at Fred- 
ericksburg. — Hooker and Sedgwick Deceived. — Pleasonton Kecounoitres. — The Discovery. — Both Armies 
Moving North. — Hooker Protects Washington. — At Fairfax and Manassas. — The Confederates at Winches- 
ter. — Milroy Abandons the Place. — A Blunder. —BerryviUe and Martinsburg. — Harper's Ferry. — The Valley 
Cleared of National Troops. — Hooker's Mistake. — Too Much Advice. — Excitement in the North. — Maryland 
and Pennsylvania Aroused. — Confederate Raids.— Chambersburg Open to the Invader. — Hooker No Longe 
Doubtful. — Crosses the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. — At Frederick. — Hooker Removed. — Meade in Com- 
mand. — Sketch of Meade. — Modest, but Firm. ^His Request. — Lee Moving on Harrisburg. — Stuart's De- 
tour. — Lee's Ignorance of the Whereabouts of the National Army. — The Cumberland Valley. — Lee's Dis- 
covery. — His Change of Purpose. — Moving Towards Gettysburg. —Meade's Purpose. — Gettysburg. — Its 
Position and Surroundings. — Buford at Gettysburg. — The Battle Begun.— Arrival of Reynolds. — The Iron 
Brigade. — Reynolds Killed. — Doubleday in Command. — Arrival of Howard. — Cemetery Ridge Occupied. — 
The Tide Turns. — EweU on the Field.— The Stonewall Brigade. — Howard's Mistake. — The Nationals Driven 
Back. — Terrific Fighting. — ^ Arrival of Hancock. — Buford, the Good Angel of Gettysburg. — The Nationals 
Again in Position. — The Confederate Skirmishers Recalled. — End of the Fir.st Day's Fighting. —Meade 
Coming up from Taneytown. — The Whole Army Moving towards Gettysburg. — Arrivals of the Different 
Corps. — Disposition of the Troops. — The Confederate Prospect. — The Relative Strength of the Two 
Annies. — Lee's Original Intention. — Necessity. — One Opportunity Lost. — The Morning of the 2d of July. — 
A Peaceful Scene. — Lee's Order of Battle. — Waiting for the Attack. — Sickles' Mistaken Position. — The 
Round Tops. — Longstreet's Fierce Attack on the National Left. — Severe Fighting. — Hood's Texans. — Gen- 
eral Warren on Hand. — Terrible Slaughter. — Little Round Top Secured. — Birney's Left. — The Salient. — 
Peach Orchard. — Terrible Pressure. — The Orchard Captured. — Birney's New Position. — Birney's Brigades. — 
Caldwell's Division. — The Battle Boils and Bubbles. — The Nationals Again Driven Back. — The Confederate 
Advance Checked. — Crawford's Splendid Charge. ^Humphrey's Peculiar Position. — His Successful Retreat. — 
Hancock to the Rescue. — The National Position in Danger. — Slaughtered Heaps. — The Ridge Secured. — 
The National Right Weakened. — The Confederate Attack on the Left a Failure. — Ewell's Attack on the 
National Right. — The Bravery of Greene. — Cemetery Hill.^The Ravine. — Benner's Hill. — A Tremendous 
Onset. — A Terrible Reception. — Culp's Hill — Johnston's Attack. — Seizure of the Vacant Breast- Works. — 
The Darkness. — The Breast- Works Held. — End of the Second Day's Fight.^Heavy Losses on Both Sides. — 
Lee Not Dissatisfied. — Meade Still Confident. — The Troops Restored to the National Right. — Ewell's At- 
tack Resumed. — General Geary on Hand. — A Terrible Morning's Fighting. — The Confederates Driven 
Back. — The Position on the National Right Secured. — A Lull in the Fight. — Arrival of the Cavalry. — Lee 
Preparing for Another and Final Attack. — A Terrific Cannonade. — The Advancing Columns. —Mowed Down 
by the National Artillery. — Pickett's Brave Virginians. — Stannard's Brave Vermonters. — Caught on Flank. — 
In Front of Hancock. — A Terrific Musketry Fire. — Pettigrew's Lines Broken and Routed. ^Pickett's Men 
Stand Firm. — A Tremendous Charge. — The National Line Penetrated. — Doubleday 's Men to the Rescue. — 
The Lines Re-formed. — The Confederates Repulsed. — Havoc and Victory. — Wilcox's Vain Attempt. — Cav- 
alry Charges on the Left and Right. — Driven Back at all Points. — The Battle Ended Lincoln's An- 
nouncement of the Victory. — Lee's Disappointment. — Imboden and Lee. — "We Must Return to Virginia."— 
Burying the Dead. — The Retreat. — The Pursuit. — Williamaport.— Crossing the Potomac. — On to the R»pi- 
dan. — ^End of the Campaign. — Reflections. 



The months of May and June, 1863, 
will be remembered as a period 
of great darkness in the histoi-y 
of the Civil War. The year, so far. 



IMS. 



had been marked by n(i great National 
triumph. On- the contrary, reverse had 
followed reverse in rapid and alarming 
succession, until it seemed as if the laat 



(88 



GETTYSBURG. 



ray of hope were about to be extin- 
guished, and until the hearts of many 
brave men were failing them for fear. 
Galveston, which had been restored to 
the Union at the close of 1862, was 
again in the hands of the Confederates ; 
Beauregard, at Charleston Harbor, was 
successfully resisting all the skill and 
energy of Dupont ; Rosecranz, who had 
accomplished nothing since the famous 
encounter at Murfreesboro, was effec- 
tually held in check by Bragg at Chat- 
tanooga; Banks was vainly courting 
victory on the lower Mississippi ; Vicks- 
burg had not yet yielded to the stub- 
born pertinacity of General Grant ; and 
in two great battles — at Fredericksburg 
and at Chancellorsville — the army of 
the Potomac had sustained inglorious 
defeat. It was of all things most 
natural that, in such circumstances, 
there should be soiTow in the North, 
and contrasted joy and hope in the 
South. 

The state of things which existed 
after the battle of Chancellorsville was 
not unlike that which supervened upon 
the defeat of Pope, in August of the 
previous yeai'. Now, as then, it seemed 
as if fortune were smiling on the South, 
and as if a favorable opportunity had 
arisen for abandoning the defensive, 
and stiiking a final and decisive blow. 
The Confederate troops were in excel- 
lent spirits ; and General Lee was not 
to be blamed if he shared their feelings. 
In two great buttles, although con- 
fronted by superior numbers, they had 
come off victorious, and inflicted terri- 
ble punishment on the National forces. 
If victory was so easily won on their 



own territory, might not similar success 
attend them on the territory of theii 
enemy ? They had twice over repelled 
an invading army, which was supposed 
to be invincible : were they not justi- 
fied in playing the part of invaders in 
turn ? The morale of Lee's army could 
never again be higher. If, therefore, 
a bold and vigorous effort were not 
made now, the opportunity might be 
lost forever. It was well known to 
General Lee, and to the authorities at 
Richmond, that Hooker's army had 
been largely reduced, because of the 
extensive out-mustering of short-term 
troops. Lee's army, on the other hand, 
had gained in strength. Longstreet 
had come up from the south of the 
James, where he had been operating at 
the time of the battle of Chancellors- 
ville ; and a rigidly enforced conscrip- 
tion had brought up the total of the array 
to over 70,000 men. The resources of 
arbitrary power had been exhausted to 
clothe, equip and otherwise put the 
army in a condition to undertake what 
some were sanguine enough to hope 
might prove a successful and final cam- 
paign. The army of Northern Virginia 
had never before been so well provided 
with all the essentials of war. It was, in 
the words of Longstreet, " in condition to 
undertake anything." If there was de- 
ficiency anywhere, it was in the commis- 
sariat; but this was the less an inconven- 
ience that, in the rich gi'anaries of Penn- 
sylvania, which awaited their approach, 
there was enough and to spare. In ad- 
dition to these various reasons, which 
prompted the Southern leaders to im- 
mediate and vigorous action, there was 



THE ARMIES IN MOTION. 



489 



unquestionably this other : there was 
the inspiring hope that a successful 
campaign in the free States of the 
North would take fiom foieign govern- 
ments their last excuse for refusing 
to recognize the independence of the 
Confederation. By the end of May, 
Lee's army, leorgauized into three sepa- 
rate army corps, commanded respective- 
ly by Longstreet, Hill and Ewell, was 
ready to launch forth on what seemed a 
promising but in reality, as the result 
proved, an ill-starred expedition. 

The two armies, since the battle of 
Chaucellorsville — the one paralyzed, and 
unable to strike, the other in seeming 
idleness, and apparently without plan 
or purpose — lay encamped on the op- 
posite sides of the Rappahannock. 
Hooker was at Falmouth, his left ex- 
tending several miles down the river. 
Lee, on the south and west of the river, 
occupied that line of impregnable earth- 
works which, from one extreme to the 
other, dotted the country for thirty 
miles. On neither side had any de- 
monstration been made. Behind this 
mask of idleness, there was real ac- 
tivity in the Confederate ranks. Lee 
was busy perfecting his arrangements 
for his projected movement toward the 
North. Hooker was ignorant of the 
plans of his antagonist; but he was 
watchful and not unprepared to act, as 
icon as the movements of the enemy 
should reveal his purpose. 

It was now the 3d of June. On that 
June ^^J) Lee began to move his troops, 
3« McLaws' and Hood's divisions, 
of Longstreet's corps, being pushed for- 
ward in the direction of Culpepper 



Court House. On the 4th and 5th, 
Ewell's corps was marched in the name 
direction. In order to disguise his 
movement, and to keep the National 
commander off his guard, Lee left the 
corps of A. 1/. Hill to occupy the lines 
of Fredericksburg. It was not possible, 
however, that so gigantic a movement, 
as that which Lee contemplated, could 
be conducted for any length of time in 
secrecy. Discovering signs of more 
than ordinary activity in the camp of 
the enemy, and suspecting its cause. 
Hooker sent instructions to Sedg- jnne 
■vvick, on the 6th, to throw a por- 6i 
tiou of his troops aci'oss the Rappahan- 
nock at Franklin's Crossing, and make 
a close reconnoissance of the enemy's 
position. The reconnoissance was made 
accordingly. Hill held his position 
with such tenacity, and made such a 
display of strength, that Sedgwick and 
Hooker were, for the time, deceived. 
It was the con' ction of both that, 
whatever might be Lee's immediate 
purpose, the Confederate forces had 
not, as yet, in any veiy large numbers, 
been removed from their old encamp- 
ments. It soon became manifest, how- 
ever, that Lee was bent on a movement 
to the North. On Tuesday, the jnne 
9th, General Pleasonton, taking 9. 
with him two divisions of cavalry, 
under Buford and Gregg, with two 
picked brigades of infantry, under Rus- 
pel and Ames, crossed the Rappahan- 
nock at Kelley's and Beverley's Fords, 
his intention being to move by converg- 
ing roads on Culpepper. It was Known 
that Stuart was already at Culpepper ; 
and it was Hooker's expectation thalj 



«90 



GETTYSBtJRa. 



by sending his whole cavalry corps for- 
ward, he might succeed in breaking up 
Stuart's camp. Stuart, meanwhile, had 
moved on from Culpepper to Brandy 
Station, his object being to form the 
advance, and to cover the flank of the 
main movement. Having crossed at 
Beverley's Ford, Buford came imme- 
diately into contact with a Confederate 
brigade, under General Jones. This 
brigade he drove back for a couple of 
miles, when he found himself checked 
by the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and 
Wade Hampton, who had come to the 
support of their companion in arms. 
At this point, some severe fighting en- 
sued. Meanwhile, Gregg had crossed 
at Kelley's Ford ; and, having pushed 
on toward Brandy Station, he was 
about to fall with effect on Stuart's 
rear. Stuart was compelled to draw 
ofif from Buford's fiont, so as to face 
this new foe. Getting into position, 
Stuart fell with tremendous force upon 
Gregg. A spirited contest at once took 
place for the possession of the heights. 
For a time, the battle raged with great 
fierceness. It was one of the very few 
genuine cavalry engagements during 
the whole war, and possessed additional 
interest from the fact that it was be- 
tween the entire mounted force of both 
armies. Gregg carried the heights; 
but finding that the other column was 
dot able to come up and form a junction 
with him, he fell back toward his right 
and rear, and united with Buford. 
Pleasonton then retired his whole com- 
mand across the Rappahannock, but 
not until he had discovered, through 
captured correspondence, that Lee was 



present in foi'ce at Culpepper, and thai 
the object of the Confederate leaders 
was the invasion of the North. In this 
engagement, the loss on each side was 
about 600. Among the wounded on 
the Confederate side was W. H. F. Lee. 
There was now no longer any doubt 
as to the intention of the enemy. His 
object was invasion. It was still un- 
certain, however, whether Lee meant 
to move on Washington or to push his 
way into Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
It was known that the Confederates 
felt sore because of the raids of Grier- 
son in Mississippi, and of Davis and 
Kilpatrick in Virginia ; and threats had 
been made against both the States 
above named. At the same time, 
Washington would be a rich prize to 
the Confederates; and it was not im- 
probable that an attempt would be made 
to capture the National capital. Hook- 
er's first move was to throw his army 
along the line of the Rappahannock, 
his right being advanced so as to cover 
the fords of that river. While Hooker 
was thus occupied, Lee had actually 
turned his right, and thrown the head 
of a column into the Shenandoah Val- 
ley. Hill was left in his old position 
at Fredericksburg ; Longstreet remained 
lit Culpepper; while Ewell, on the 
10th, was pushed forward to the west 
and north. Striking the Blue Ridge, 
he moved along the eastern side of that 
range until he reached Chester's Gap. 
Passing through the gap, he crosse(i 
the Shenandoah at Front Royal. Burst- 
ing into the valley, he advanced by 
forced marches toward Winchester, at 
which piHce he arrived on the evening 



MILROY'S DISASTROUS RETREAT 



491 



June of the 13th, having accomplished 
*3' the distance from Culpepper, 
some seventy miles, in three days. 

While Ewell was making this rush 
towards "Winchester, Hooker was still 
guart'irg the fords of the Rappahan- 
noct. It was not until the 13th that 
he y~fl,s made aware of the march which 
his mtagonist had stolen upon him. 
The intelligence fell upon him like a 
thui derbolt. Abandoning his camp 
on the Rappahannock, he fell back to- 
wards Washington, taking positions 
wh'ch would enable him, if necessary, 
to defend the capital, while at the 
san^e time he could watch the develop- 
ment of Lee's plan of operations. On 
the 15th and 16th, he had fallen back 
as far as Fairfax and Manassas. Here, 
for some days, he remained. As soon 
as Hill, who had been left behind at 
Fredericksburg, observed the disappear- 
ance of the Union army, he marched 
towards Culpepper, where Longstreet 
still held position. Jenkins, with his 
cavalry brigade, was ordered forward 
to Winchester to co-operate with Ewell. 
Imboden, M^th his troops, was sent out 
in the direction of Roraney, his instruc- 
tions being to cover Winchester, and 
to prevent reinforcements amving by 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
Ewell had detached Rodes' division to 
Berryville, with the view of cutting 
off communications between Winches- 
ter and the Potomac. General Milroy, 
then in command at Winchester, had 
under him a force of 7000 men, with 
three pieces of field-artillery, and six 
siege pieces in a fort. Milroy held out 
against the vigorous and persistent at- 



tacks of the rapidly increasing forces of 
the enemy during the 13th and June 
14th, repelling some of the as-*^»*4. 
saults with great spirit ; but, on the 
niglit of the 14th, discovering that the 
whole corps of Ewell and of Long 
street were at hand, he attempted to 
retreat. It was too late. He was al- 
most surrounded. Only a small por- 
tion of his troops managed to effect 
their escape, some finding their way tc 
Harper's Ferry, and some to Pennsyl- 
vania. His losses were 4000 taken 
prisoners, 29 guns, 277 wagons and 400 
horses. General Milroy was severely 
taken to task by some for his conduct 
at Winchester: he was vindicated by 
others. President Lincoln, pronouncing 
on the evidence laid before him by the 
judge -advocate -general, declared that 
neither Milroy nor Schenck, his imme- 
diate superior, and between whom the 
blame must be divided, were seriously 
to blame, and that a court-martial was 
not necessary in the case. The mistake 
was in not abandoning the place at an 
earlier day. It is doubtful Avhether 
Milroy could have held out until succor 
reached him ; but certainly defeat and 
surrender could not have been more 
disastrous than was the retreat. 

Berryville and Martinsburg, at the 
same time, yielded to the attacks of 
General Rodes; and the garrison at 
Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland 
Heights. The valley was thus cleared 
of National troops. 

Judged from a high military stand- 
point, General Hooker's line of action, 
after he was made aware of the surprise 
at Winchester, is open to severe criti- 



402 



GETTYSBURG. 



cism. It was clearly the duty required 
by the situation to interpose between 
Hill at Fredericksburg and Longstreet 
at Culpepper. A blow vigorously dealt 
ought to have resulted in the capture 
or destruction of Hill. Even if neither 
of these results followed, the presump- 
tion is that such a movement would 
have brought Lee back to the assistance 
of his lieutenant, and so made an end 
of the invasion. It is only just to 
Hooker to say that, if we are to judge 
from the correspondence which took 
place between him and Halleck and 
President Lincoln, a short time before 
Lee began his Northern movement, the 
course which Hooker did adopt was 
opposed to his own better judgment. 
The course which we have indicated as 
the right course to follow in the circum- 
stances was the course which he actual- 
ly suggested, in the event of Lee moving 
as he did. It was condemned by Hal- 
leck, and, in the most emphatic and 
characteristic manner, discouraged by 
Lincoln. " If Lee," said the president, 
" should leave a rear force at Freder- 
icksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, 
he would fight you in entrenchments, 
and have you at disadvantage ; and so, 
man for man, worst you at that point, 
while his main force would, in some 
way, be getting an advantage of you 
northward. In a word, I would not 
take any risk of being entangled upon 
the river, like an ox jumped half over a 
fence^ and liable to l)e torn by dogs front 
and rear^ without a fair chance to gore 
one way or to kick the others * 

* Despatch from Freaidaut Liaooln to General 
Hooker, June 5th. 



The disaster at Winchester, and th» 
appearance of Confederate troops on 
their borders, created the wildest excite- 
ment in Maryland and Pennsylvania, 
The excitement was shared, in fact, by 
the whole of the Northern States. Ap- 
peals to the people were published by 
the governors of Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania ; and, on the 15th of June, june 
a proclamation was issued by the *5. 
president, calling for 120,000 militia. 
Pennsylvania was to furnish 50,000 ; 
Ohio, 30,000 ; Maryland, 10,000 ; West 
Virginia, 10,000 ; New York, 20,000. 
These calls were promptly and heartily 
responded to. Meanwhile, lively scenes 
were being witnessed in the larger 
towns, threatened by the invading 
troops. Of some of those scenes stir- 
ring descriptions have been preserved. 
The 16th, in Harrisburg, is thus jnne 
described by an eye-witness : '*• 
" The morning broke," he tells us, " up- 
on a populace all astir, who had been 
called out of bed l>y the ' beat of the 
alarming drum,' the blast of the bugle, 
and the clanging of bells. The streets 
were lively with men, who were either 
returning from a night's work on the 
fortifications, or going over to relieve 
those who were toiling there. As the 
sun rose higher, the excitement gath- 
ered head. All along the streets were 
omnibuses, wagons and wheelbarrows 
taking in trunks and valuables, and 
rushing them down to the depot, to be 
shipped out of rebel range. The stores, 
the female seminaries and almost every 
private residence were busy all of the 
forenoon in swelling the mountain of 
freight that lay at the depot. Every 



THREATENED INVASION. 



493 



horse was impressed into service, and 
every porter groaned beneath his 
weight of responsibilities. The scene 
at noon at the depots was indescrib- 
able, if not disgraceful. A sweltering 
mass of humanity thronged the plat- 
form, all furious to escape from the 
doomed city. At the bridge, and across 
the river, the scene was equally excit- 
ing. All through the day a steady 
stream of people, on foot and in wagons, 
young and old, black and white, was 
pouring across it from the Cumberland 
Valley, bearing along with it house- 
hold gods and all manner of goods and 
stock. Endless trains, laden with floui', 
grain and merchandise, hourly emerged 
from the valley, and thundered across 
the bridge and through the city. Miles 
of retreating baggage wagons, filled 
with calves and sheep tied together, 
and great, old-fashioned furnace wagons, 
loaded with tons of trunks and boxes, 
defiled in continuous procession down 
the pike and across the river, raising a 
dust that marked the outline of the 
road as far as the eye could see." 

Pittsburg, on the 19 th, presented a 
Jane scene of great activity. " Work 
19. on the city defenses is still pro- 
gressing vigorously, and some of the 
more important works are now ready 
to receive the guns. The number of 
men employed on the fortifications yes- 
terday was 4605. The works are on 
Herron's Hill, on Harrison's Hill, on 
Mount Washington, on Squirrel Hill, 
and on Negley's Hill. Theie are up- 
ward of 5000 men in the trenches to- 
day; and, with such a large working 
force, it cannot take many days to finish 



the works now in hand. General Ber- 
nard,with a competent staff of engineers, 
was engaged in laying out new worka 
yesterday on the outer side of the Alle- 
ghany, so as to render the city secure 
against an advance x'rom that direction. 
Works have also been laid out near Tur- 
tle Creek and other impoi'tant points." 

In Baltimore, similar preparations 
were made for the approach of the inva- 
ders. " The work of erecting barricadeg 
progressed rapidly on Friday and Satur- 
day, and, on Sunday morning, the entire 
circle of the city was completed, and 
ready for military occupation at any 
moment that the scouts should an- 
nounce the approach of the enemy. 
The erection of lines of entrenchments 
and fortifications on all the approaches 
to the city have also progressed rapidly. 
On Saturday, about 1000 colored men 
were gathered by the police from dif- 
ferent sections of the city, causing much 
excitement among that portion of our 
population, as they were marched out 
to the different locations for the defen- 
sive works. At night another force was 
secured, to relieve those who had been 
at work throughout the day, and an- 
other relief gang was provided on Sun- 
day morning and evening, so that rapid 
progress has been made, and the works 
are now ready for immediate use." 

While Hooker remained at Fairfax 
and Manassas, there were occasional 
cavalry skirmishes in the neighbor- 
hood of Ashby Gap. In some of these* 
the fighting was severe ; in all of them 
the National troops distinguished them- 
selves for dash and daring, not '>nly 
holding their own, but driving the 



XJU 



494 



GETTYSBURG. 



enemy before them. These encounters, 
however, exercised no perceptible influ- 
ence ou the campaign. Lee was not hin- 
dered from posting himself in strength 
in the Shenandoah Valley, where he 
was ready to meet Hooker, if he should 
deem it prudent to attack him, and 
where also he could send foraging par- 
ties into Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
Jenkins' troopers had already pene- 
trated as far as Chambersburg, and 
ravaged the country for miles around, 
frightening the peaceful inhabitants, 
and carrying off much booty, particu- 
larly in cattle and horses. On the 
Jane 22d, Hill and Longstreet having 

22. come up and relieved him in the 
valley, Ewell, at the head of the in- 
vading columns, passed into Maryland, 
Imboden moving to the west, and 
breaking up the lines of communication 
by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. 
The whole region of Western Pennsyl- 
vania, up to the Susquehanna, was 
now open to the invaders. On the 
24th and the 25th, Longstreet and 
Hill followed Ewell. The objective 
point of the Confederates was Cham- 
Jnne bersburg. On the 26th, the entire 

26« Confederate army had crossed at 
Williamsport and Shepherdstown. On 
the same day, Hooker, no longer in 
doubt as to Lee's plan, led his army 
across the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, 
and moved towards Frederick. This, 
as we shall see, was a wise and politic 
movement on the part of the National 
commander. It led to the happiest 
results, although Hooker himself was 
not to reap the glory. 



At this conjuncture there occurred an 
unlooked-for circumstance, which jnne 
might have had a most disastrous* 27. 
effect on the campaign and on the 
prospects of the North. On the 27tK, 
when Hooker had marched upon Fred 
erick, and when it became manifest 
that a great battle was imminent, the 
public were astounded by the intelli- 
gence that General Hooker had resigned 
the command of the army of the Poto- 
mac, and that the important and some- 
what perilous trust had been committed 
to General Meade. What was it that 
brought about this sudden, unexpected, 
and, to all appearance, untimely change ? 
The story can be briefly told. At the 
time Lee began his movement north- 
ward, the National forces in the east 
were divided into several separate and 
independent commands. General Heint- 
zelman commanded the department of 
Washington, with a force of 36,000 
men ; General Schcnck had charge of 
the middle department, including the 
garrisons at Harper's Ferry, Winches- 
ter, and other contiguous places; and 
General Dix, with a considerable force, 
lay idle on the peninsula. Hooker, 
who had expressed a strong desire that 
the troops of Heintzelman and Schenck 
should be placed under his control, had 
at length so far overcome the scruples 
of Commander-in-Chief Halleck, that he 
obtained a reluctant consent. Hooker 
had sent General Slocum to Harper's 
Ferry, with the understanding that he 
should be joined by the 10,000 or 
11,000 troops stationed there under 
French, and that the united force 
should make a demonstration on Lee'e 



RESIGNATION OF HOOKER. 



49» 



rear by a movement up the Cumberland 
Valley. Such an arrangement implied 
the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, but 
to this Halleck would not consent. It 
was in vain that Hooker reasoned, 
showing that the place was compara- 
tively of no importance, that it com- 
manded no ford of the Potomac, that 
the removal of the troops would not 
affect the fortifications, that it was 
without public stores, and that there 
was only a very small likelihood that 
the enemy would think of taking pos- 
session. He was met by the reply, 
"Maryland Heights have always been 
regarded as an important point to be 
held by us, and much expense and 
labor incurred in fortifying them. I 
cannot approve their abandonment, ex- 
cept in case of absolute necessity." 
Hooker requested to be relieved from 
the command of the army. His request 
was at once complied with. Hooker 
has been severely blamed for deserting 
his post at this critical juncture. It 
was a perilous experiment to change 
the commander-in-the-field, on the eve 
of what, it was evident, must prove 
a great and decisive battle. It does 
seem, on the surface, as if Hooker al- 
lowed personal considerations to tri- 
umph over what he ought to have 
regarded as the welfare of the nation. 
But, undoubtedly, Hooker had other 
reasons for the course he took than 
that which he openly assigned. His 
relations with the government had not 
been cordial from the first. His claims, 
after the removal of McClellan, had 
been passed over in favor of Burnside ; 
and when, after the battle of Fred- 



ericksburg, it was found impossible 
longer to ignore him, the command of 
the army of the Potomac was grudg- 
ingly given him. He had scarcely en- 
tered upon his duties, when the presi- 
dent wrote him, informing him of 
strange charges which were rumored 
against him, such as ambition to play 
the role of dictator, reminding him 
that the most effective method of se- 
curing the gratification of desires so 
ambitious was to overthrow the insur- 
gents, and make an end of the rebel- 
lion, and assuring him that, if he allowed 
disaster to befall the army of the Po- 
tomac, he would never be at the head 
of the American or any other govern- 
ment. Hooker's relations with the 
government were not improved by his 
failure at Chancellorsville. On the 
14th of May, Lincoln wrote him: "I 
must tell you that I have some fearful 
intimations that some of your corps 
and division commanders are not giving 
you their entii'e confidence. This would 
be ruinous, if true." These things being 
known, it is not much to be wondered at 
either that, in the circumstances. Hooker 
should have resigned, or that his resig- 
nation should have been so promptly 
accepted. On the morning of the jnne 
28th of June, an order arrived from 28t 
Washington, transferring the command 
of the army to Major-General Meade, of 
the Fifth army corps. On the same day 
appeared the two following orders : 

" Headquarters Army of thp Potomac, ) 
Frederick, Md., June 28, 18G3. ) 

"In conformity with the orders of 
the War Depaitment, dated June 27th, 
1863, I relinquish the command of the 



496 



GETTYSBURG. 



army of the Potomac. It is transferred 
to Major-General George G. Meade, a 
brave and accomplished officer, who 
has nobly earned the confidence and 
esteem of the army on many a well- 
fought field. Impressed with the be- 
lief that my usefulness as the com- 
mander of the army of the Potomac is 
impaired, I part from it, yet not ■with- 
out the deepest emotion. The sorrow 
of parting with the comrades of so 
many battles is relieved by the convic- 
tion that the courage and devotion of 
this army will never cease nor fail ; 
that it will yield to my successor, as 
it has to me, a willing and hearty 
support. With the earnest prayer 
that the ti'iumph of its arms may 
bring successes w^orthy of it and the 
nation, I bid it farewell. 

" Joseph Hooker, 

"Major-General." 

" Headquarters Army op the Potomac, ) 
June 28. 1863. j 

"By direction of the president of 
the United States, I hereby assume 
command of the army of the Potomac. 
As a soldier, in obeying this order — an 
order totally unexpected and unsolicit- 
ed — I have no promises or pledges to 
make. The country looks to this army 
to relieve it from the devastation and 
disgrace of a hostile invasion. What- 
ever fatigues and sacrifices we may be 
called upon to undergo, let us have in 
view constantly the magnitude of the 
interests involved, and let each man de- 
termine to do his duty, leaving to an 
all-controlling Providence the decision 
of the contest. It is with just diffidence 
that I relieve, in the command of this 



army, an eminent and accomplished 
soldier, whose name must ever appear 
conspicuous in the history of its achieve- 
ments ; but I rely upon the hearty sup 
port of my companions in arms to assist 
me in the discharge of the duties of the 
important trust which has been confided 
to me. Geoeoe G. Meade, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

The change produced some surprise 
in the army; but the appointment of 
General Meade was generally well 
received. The report of the change 
soon extended to the several corps, 
and their commanders hastened to bid 
farewell to General Hooker. By three 
o'clock, a large number of officers had 
assembled, and, soon after, the gen- 
eral appeared in the avenue before his 
tent. Some time was spent in social 
intercourse, and, to the last, all formali- 
ties were dispensed with. The parting 
was painful to every one, particularly to 
those who had become endeared to the 
general by old associations. General 
Hooker was deeply grieved. He had 
been identified with the army of the 
Potomac, he said, since its organization, 
and had hoped to continue with it to 
the end. It was the best army of the 
country, worthy of the confidence of 
the nation, and could not fail of success 
in the apj^roaching struggle. He spoke 
of his successor as a glorious soldier, 
and urged all to give him their earnest 
support. 

Major-General George G. Meade, to 
whom the destinies of the army of the 
Potomac were now entrusted, was born 
in Spain, in 1815, his parents residing, 
at the time of his birth, in Barcelona 



GENERAL MEADE IN COMMAND. 



497 



He graduated at "West Point, June 30th, 
1835, and entered the regular army of 
the United States as second lieutenant 
of artillery. In 1836 he resigned his 
commission, and lived in retirement for 
six years. On the 19th of May, 1842, 
he resumed his connection with the 
army, and took part in the Mexican 
War, winning special distinction in the 
battles of Palo Alto and Monterey. 
When the call was made by the pre- 
sident for ,oOO,000 volunteers, and 
■IcCall's division was organized at 
Tcnallytown, Meade was appointed to 
rhe command of the second bris-ade. 
A.t Mechanicsville, at Gaines' Mill, at 
Charles City Cross Roads, at the second 
battle of Bull Run, at South Mountain, 
at Antietam, at Fredericksburg, and at 
Chancellorsville, General Meade had 
given evidence of soldierly abilities of 
the very highest order; and the manner 
in which he conducted the retreat from 
Chancellorsville marked him out as the 
probable future commander of the army 
of the Potomac. 

The appointment of General Meade to 
the chief command of the army of the 
Potomac, a surprise to many, was per- 
haps the gi'eatesfc surprise to General 
Meade himself. He had been disgusted 
with the conduct of Hooker at Chancel- 
lorsville ; and his conviction of Hooker's 
incapacity, as revealed in that campaign, 
lie had had the courage frankly to ex- 
press. It was known to some that 
Meade's conduct at Chancellorsville had 
attracted the attention of the president, 
and commanded his admiration. " I tell 
you," said Lincoln a few days after 
the Chancellorsville retreat, "I think a 



great deal of that fine fellow, Meade." 
It is doubtful, however, whether Meade 
was aware that he stood so high in the 
good graces of the president. One 
thing is certain. He knew that he had 
given ofFense to Hooker; and when, 
on the night of the 27th, he was awak- 
ened from sleep in his tent, by the mes- 
senger from Washington, his first ques- 
tion was whether he had come with an 
order for his arrest. General Hardie 
evaded the question, told him to strike 
a light, and then put in his hand a 
paper, which he found appointed him 
to the command of the army of the Po- 
tomac, with almost absolute power to 
conduct the war according to his own 
judgment. Meade was not what might 
be called a popular ofiicer, but yet he 
was held in high esteem by all his com- 
rades in arms. Some forty-eight years of 
age, taU and sliie in person, long vis- 
aged ana tnougntiul, ne bad tlie aspect 
of a scholar rather than that of a sol 
dier. He was an excellent tactician, 
and imbued with sound military ideas. 
The well-known character of the man, 
and his Ion? and intimate connection 
with the army of the Potomac, secured 
for him the confidence of both officers 
and men. They knew that in his case, 
at least, performance would be equal 
to promise. 

To Meade was granted a large amount 
of authority — much larger than had 
been enjoyed by Hooker. The presi- 
dent waived in his favor all the powers 
of the Executive and the Constitution. 
Meade, in fact, was untrammelled. But 
he made a wise and cautious use of the 
power entrusted to him. He made an 



<d8 



GETTYSBURG. 



few changes as possible, and only those 
which were absolutely necessary. He 
retained the officers who had formed 
General Hooker's military family — 
General Butterfield, chief of staff; Gen- 
eral Warren, chief of engineers ; Gen- 
eral Hunt, chief of artillery ; and Gen- 
eral Williams, adjutant-general. His 
desij'e was to understand and give 
effect to the plans and purposes of his 
late chief. In his telegram, accepting 
the chief command of the army of the 
Potomac, he said: " Totally unexpect- 
ed as it has been, and in ignorance of 
the exact condition of the troops, and 
position of the enemy, I can only now 
say that, it appears to me I must 
move towards the Susquehanna, keep- 
ing Washington and Baltimore well 
covered, and, if the enemy is checked 
in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, 
or, if he turns towards Baltimore, 
to give him battle. I would say that 
I trust every available man that can be 
spared will be sent to me, as, from all 
accounts, the enemy is in strong force." 
In response to this request, the garri- 
son at Harper's Ferry was placed at 
his disposal; so, also, was the entire 
force of militia, under Couch, at Har- 
i-isburg; and, in addition, such forces 
as could be spared from West Virginia, 
Baltimore, Washington and Fortress 
Monroe, with the returning troops from 
North Carolina, M'ere hurried to his 
Buppoj't. Sykes was placed in com- 
mand of the Fifth corps, which had 
been Meade's ; Hancock had charge of 
the Second, since the assignment of 
Couch to the department of the Sus- 
quehanna; Reynolds commanded the 



First ; Sickles the Third ; Sedgwick the 
Sixth ; Howard the Eleventh ; Slocum 
the Twelfth. The entire effective force 
was about 100,000 men. 

The opposing armies, at this time, 
were nearly equal in point of numbers. 
Lee's force, as it passed through Hagers- 
town, was estimated at 97,000, with 
280 guns. This, however, did not in- 
clude the strong cavalry force which, 
as we shall see, was moving by a route 
different from that followed by the 
main army. When General Meade 
took the place of General Hooker, the 
army of the Potomac was lying at 
Frederick. General Lee had his head- 
quarters at Chambersburg, with the 
corps of Longstreet and Hill. Ewell 
had advanced as far as York and Car- 
lisle. On the 27th, Lee issued the fol- 
lowing order to his army : 

" Hkadquaktebs Army of Northern Virginia. ) 
Chambersburg, Pa., June 27, 1863. j 

"The commanding general has ob- 
served, with marked satisfaction, the 
conduct of the troops on the march, 
and confidently anticipates results com- 
mensurate with the high spirit they 
have manifested. No troops could 
have displayed greater fortitude, or 
better performed the arduous marches 
of the past ten days. Their conduct, 
in other respects, has, with few excep, 
tions, been in keeping with their charac 
ter as soldiers, and entitles them to 
approbation and praise. 

"There have, however, been instances 
of forgetfulness, on the part of some, 
that they have in keeping the yet 
unsullied reputation of the army, and 
that the duties exacted of us by civili- 



MEADE ADVANCES NORTHWABD. 



499 



sation and Christianity are not less ob- 
ligatory in the country of the enemy 
than in our own. 

" The commanding general considers 
that no greater disgrace could befall 
the army, and through it our whole 
people, than the perpetration of the 
barbarous outrages upon the innocent 
and defenseless, and the wanton de- 
struction of private property that have 
marked the course of the enemy in our 
own country. Such proceedings not 
only disgrace the perpetrators, and all 
connected with them, but are subver- 
sive of the discipline and efficiency of 
the army, and destructive of the ends 
of our present movement. It must be 
remembered that we make wai" only 
upon armed men, and that we cannot 
take vengeance for the wrongs our peo- 
ple have sufPered, without lowering 
ourselves in the eyes of all whose ab- 
horrence has been excited by the atroci- 
ties of our enemy, and offending against 
Him to whom vengeance belongeth, 
without whose favor and support our 
efforts must all prove in vain. 

"The commanding general, therefore, 
earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, 
with most scrupulous care, from un- 
necessary or wanton injuiy to private 
property ; and he enjoins upon all offi- 
cers to arrest and bring to summary 
punishment all who shall in any way 
offend against the orders on this subject. 
"R. E. Lee, General." 

The actual conduct of the Confed- 
erates was in striking contrast with the 
spirit of these instructions. They were 
living on the country, making requisi- 
tions on the farmers and tradesmen, 



and exacting ransoms from the towns. 
The severity of these exactions may be 
illustrated by one example. On the 28th 
of June, the little town of York alone 
was ordered to furnish 165 barrels ot 
flour, or 28,000 pounds of baked bread; 
3500 pounds of sugar; 1650 pounds 
of coffee; 300 gallons of molasses ; 1200 
pounds of salt; 32,000 pounds of fresh 
beef, or 21,000 pounds of bacon or 
pork; 2000 pairs of shoes or boots; 
1000 pairs of socks; 1000 felt hats, 
and $100,000 in money. Such was the 
comfort which the invasion brought to 
Maryland and Pennsylvania. 

On the morning of the 29th, Meade 
put his army in motion. Giving june 
up the idea of moving to the 29. 
west of the South Mountain, he took a 
course due north, ascending the course 
of the Monocacy towards the Susque- 
hanna. The army moved in three col- 
unms, covering, as it advanced, the 
lines of approach to Baltimore and 
Washington. The First and Eleventh 
corps were directed on Emmettsburg; 
the Third and Twelfth on Taneytown ; 
the Second on Frizzleburg; the Fifth 
to Union; and the Sixth to Windsor. 
On the evening of the 29th, the Na- 
tional army was in position — its left at 
Emmettsburg and its right at Windsor. 

The same day on which Meade put 
his army in motion, General Lee had 
completed all the necessary preparations 
for an advance on Harrisburg. On that 
day, however, he learned for the first 
time, by means of a scout, that the Na- 
tional army, having crossed the Poto- 
mac, was advancing northward, and 
that the head of the column had reached 



500 



GETTYSBURG. 



the South Mountain. Lee's ignorance 
of the whereabouts of the National 
army is explained by the fact that 
Stuart, on whom he depended for in- 
formation, had been left behind to 
guard the passes of the mountains, and 
to obstruct, as much as possible, the 
progress of the enemy. In the event 
of the Nationals succeeding in crossing 
the Potomac, his instructions were to 
follow, crossing the river to the east or 
west of the Blue Ridge, as he deemed 
the more convenient, and take position 
on the Confederate right. Unable to 
hinder the Nationals from crossing the 
river, and anxious to execute the re- 
maining portion of his instructions, 
Stuart was compelled to make a wide 
detour to the east by way of Fairfax 
Court House. When, on the evening 
of the 27th, he reached the Potomac at 
the mouth of Seneca Creek, he found 
the river greatly swollen by recent 
rains ; and it was only by tremendous 
exertions he gained the Maryland shore. 
He then leai-ned that the Nationals, 
having crossed the day before, were on 
their way to Frederick. The National 
army thus lay between him and Lee ; 
and he was compelled to march north- 
ward, through Westminster, to Han- 
over, in Pennsylvania, where he arrived 
on the 30th of June. It was Hooker's 
misfortune to fight without his cavab'y, 
at Chancellorsville. A similar misfor- 
tune had now befallen Lee. Without 
those eyes of the army, he had been 
moving about in ignorance of the where- 
abouts of his antagonist. 

The Intelligence of the near approach 
of the National army fell upon Lee 



like a thunderbolt. Dreading an irrup- 
tion of the National forces into the 
Cumberland Valley, and foreseeing the 
peril which thus threatened his com- 
munications, Lee resolved to concen- 
trate on the east side of South Moun- 
tain, and prevent, if possible, the fur- 
ther progress of the oppo&ing army. 
The movement on Harrisburg was, 
in consequence, countermanded. Long- 
street and Hill were directed to proceed 
from Chambersburg, defiling through 
the South Mountain range towards 
Gettysburg ; and Ewell was ordered to 
countermarch from York and Carlisle, 
on the same point. 

On the 30th, Meade was still ignor- 
ant of the change of purpose on jaae 
the part of Lee. It was his be- ^^' 
lief that the Confederates were pressing 
northward to the Susquehanna. He 
had little doubt, however, that a col- 
lision was imminent. On that day, he 
pushed his right forward to Manches- 
ter, his left still remaining at Emmetts- 
burg, where three coips — the Fii'st, 
Eleventh and Third — weie under or- 
ders of Major-Greneral Reynolds. Re- 
alizing the gravity of the situation, he 
issued to the army the following order : 

HEADQnARTERS ArMY OF THE PoTOKAC, ) 

June 30, IB63. J 

"The commanding genei'al requests 
that, previous to the engagement soon 
expected with the enemy, corps and all 
other commanding officers address their 
troops, explaining to them the immense 
issue involved in the struggle. The 
enemy is on our soil. The whole coun« 
try looks anxiously to this army to de- 
liver it from the presence of the foe. 



THE BAlThB GROUKD. 



511 



<-mr failure to do so will leave us no 
such ^velcome as the swelling of mill- 
ions of hearts with pride and joy at 
our success would give to every soldier 
of the army. Homes, firesides and do- 
mestic altars are involved. The army 
has fought well heretofore. It is be- 
lieved that it will fight more desperate- 
ly and bravely than ever, if it is ad- 
dressed in fitting terms. Corps and 
other commanders are authorized to 
order the instant death of any soldier 
who fails to do his duty at this hour. 

" By command of 

" Major-General Meade. 

"S. Williams, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General." 

It was not until the night of the 
30th that Meade became satisfied that 
Lee was concentrating his forces on the 
east side of South Mountain. He at 
once proceeded to select a position on 
which he might make a rapid concen- 
tration of his troops, and so receive 
battle on advantageous terms. The 
general line of Pipe Creek seemed to 
offer the advantage sought ; but its 
final adoption was left to be determined 
by the necessities which might arise. 
Orders were issued for an inttnediate 
advance of the different corps. The 
Sixth corps, Sedgwick's, forming the 
right wing of the army, Avas ordered 
to Manchester, in rear of Pipe Creek ; 
headquarters and Second corps, Han- 
cock's, were directed to Taneytown ; the 
Twelfth C01-J1S, Slocum's, and the Fifth 
corps, Sykes', forming the centre, were 
to move on Two Taverns and Hanover ; 
and the left wing, consisting of the 
Fii-st, Reynolds', Third, Sickles', and 

S56 



Eleventh, Howard's, all under Genera 
Reynolds, was ordered to GettysVjurg 
The movement of the left wing was in- 
tended only as a mask, behind which 
the army could take position at Pipe 
Creek. It was not the intention of 
either Lee or Meade to make Gettys- 
burg the battle field ; but, unconscious- 
ly to both, a collision was becoming 
more and more inevitable in the im- 
mediate neighborhood. 

The little town of Gettysburg, which 
was soon to Ije rendered immortal as 
the theatre not only of the greatest 
battle of the Civil War, but of one of 
the greatest battles of modern times, is 
about ten miles east of the South 
Mountain range. The topographical 
features of the neighborhood are pe- 
culiar, presenting a series of ridges 
which, for the most part, run parallel 
with South Mountain, and give to the 
landscape a rolling and diversified 
character. Some of the streams flow 
to the northeast, and empty themselves 
into the Susquehanna ; others flow 
southward, and find an outlet into the 
Potomac, The town is built at the 
ba.se of one of the ridges, and is the 
centre from which radiate a large 
number of roads. There is the Cham^ 
bersburg road, leading to the north 
west ; the Carlisle road to the north , 
the Han'isburg road to the northeast 
the Baltimore road to the southeast; 
and others, which lead in the direction 
of the Potomac to the southwest. To 
the immediate south of Gettysburg, 
and extending some four or five miles, 
is a ridge which bears a close resem- 
blance to a fish-hook. The point of ihn 



£02 



aETTYSBUEO. 



hook is known as "Wolfs Hill ; the 
barb is known as Gulp's Hill; while 
the stem — a succession of ridges — end- 
ing in Little Round Top and Round 
Top, bears the general name of Ceme- 
tery Ridge. Little Round Top is about 
two hundred and eighty feet high. 
Round Top, which shoots up from the 
former, reaches a height of some four 
hundred feet. These two elevations 
constitute the military keys of Ceme- 
tery Ridge. At their base runs a 
marshy stream, called Plum Run. Be- 
tween Wolf's and Culp's Hills flows 
what is called Rock Creek. The nearer 
part of the bend, which fronts the town, 
had been used as a Cemetery — hence 
the generic name of the ridge. The 
broken character of the ground, abound- 
ing with rocky ledges and covered with 
huge boulders, make it a sort of natural 
fortification. It is an admirable posi- 
tion for defensive operations. On the 
west side, the ground falls off into a 
cultivated valley, which it commands, 
and then gradually rises until, nearly a 
mile distant, it foraas another and a 
parallel crest, called Seminary Ridge — 
from a theological school which crowns 
one of its heights and forms a conspic- 
uous feature of the landscape. This 
ridge is covered with oaks, and is local- 
ly known as Oak Ridge. In the valley 
between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges 
is the Emmettsburg road. Such was 
the ground on which, for three consec- 
utive days, the contending hosts of 
North and South were about to strive, 
in bloody and merciless contest, for the 
mastery of the Republic. 

On the morning of Wednesday, the 



Jnly 
I. 



Ist of July, General Buford, who 
had been occupying Gettysburg 
for the two days previous, passed through 
the town with his cavalry, and, advanc- 
ing beyond Seminary Ridge to the next 
ridge, more to the west, about two 
miles distant, took position on the near 
side of Willoughby Run. His line was 
drawn up across the Charabersburg 
road, along which Longstreet and Hill 
were advancing. It was about nine 
o'clock. All of a sudden, he found 
himself in collision with the leading 
division of Hill, under Heth. It was 
the commencement of the battle of 
Gettysburg. Knowing that Reynolds, 
who had bivouacked the night before 
at Marsh Creek, only four miles off, 
was within striking distance, Buford 
resolved to hold the Confederates in 
check until the arrival of his chief. It 
was a perilous undertaking; but by 
skilful deployments, he accomplished 
his task. He had fallen back some- 
what; but his ranks were unbroken, 
and his men were offering a spirited 
resistance when, at about ten o'clock, 
Reynolds arrived with Wadsworth's 
division. Reynolds had no instructions 
to bring on a battle ; but the necessi- 
ties of the situation supplied the place 
of instructions. Buford was sorely 
pressed, and he must support him. 
Swinton suggests that, probably, his 
fine military eye took in at a glance 
the features of the rocky ridge of Get- 
tysburg as an eminent vantage ground 
for a defensive battle, and that his ob- 
ject in bringing on the battle was to 
hold the enemy in check beyond the 
town, and thus give the armv time tr 



DEATH OF REYNOLDS. 



508 



concentrate on the fastness of hills. 
'Phis, of course, is mere conjecture ; and 
whether he had such thoughts, and 
was influenced by such motives, we 
shall never know. But for his own 
untimely loss, there would be little 
cause for regiet that he acted as he did. 
Wadsworth's troops were immediately 
deployed; and Reynolds sent instruc- 
tions to Howard to advance as prompt- 
ly as possible. Wadsworth was ordered 
to place his only battery — that of Hall 
— in position by the side of the road 
leading to Cashtown. Cutler's brigade 
was thrown into position on the right, 
while Doubleday, who had just come 
up with the van of the infantry, was 
ordered to move Meredith's Iron Bri- 
gade, as it was called, to the left of the 
road, into a piece of wooded ground 
which skirted Willoughby Run. De- 
termined to bring matters to an imme- 
diate issue, Reynolds, with animating 
words, gave the regiments in the skirt 
of the woods the command to charge. 
The order was being gallantly obeyed, 
when, shot through the neck, he fell 
mortally wounded, dying before he 
could be removed from the field. The 
command now devolved on Doubleday. 
There was no pause in the battle. The 
Iron Brigade fell with tremendous force 
on the flank of Archer's brigade, which 
was pushing its way across Willough- 
by Run, capturing Archer himself and 
several hundreds of his men. While 
these events were taking place, there 
was desperate fighting on the right. 
Hall's battery, left for a time unsup- 
ported, was in imminent danger of being 
raptured, when the Fourteenth Brook- 



lyn and the Ninety-Fifth New York, 
joined by the Sixth Wisconsin, having 
made a change of front, charged to the 
relief of the guns. Such was the im- 
petuosity of the onset that Davis' two 
Mississippi regiments were driven for 
shelter into the cut of an unfinished 
raih'oad, surrounded, and captured with 
their battle-flags. So far, success had 
been with the Nationals. 

The tide of battle was destined soon 
to turn. Reinforcements, in increasing 
numbers, were coming up and joining 
both of the contending parties. The 
Nationals were strengthened by the 
arrival of the two remaining divisions 
of the First corps, under Rowley and 
Robinson, the former having taken 
command of Doubleday's men. Robin- 
son's division remained for a time in 
reserve on Seminary Ridge ; but the 
other division was pushed forward at 
once to the assistance of the sorely 
pressed left. These fresh troops were 
in excellent spirits. One of the brigades 
of Rowley's division, commanded by 
Colonel Roy Stone, having been as- 
signed to a position dangerously ex- 
posed to the fire of the enemy's artil- 
lery, Stone remarked to his men, " We 
have come here to stay." The saying 
was promptly taken up. "We have 
come here to stay !" resounded through- 
out the ranks. The words were too truly 
prophetic ; for a very large number of 
the brave fellows never left the ground. 
The battle continued to rage with great 
fierceness, the Nationals still firmly 
maintaining th eir posi tiou. Meanwhile, 
Hill was reinforced by another division, 
under General Pender. It was now 



«U4 



GETTYSBURG. 



past noon. The sun had been blazing 
Bince early morning. The heat was in- 
tense. About one o'clock, General 
Howard arrived on the battle ground, 
and took command of the field. He 
had brought with him the divisions of 
Bchuiz and Barlow, the former now 
commanded by Schimmelpfenig, Schurz 
being in charge of the corps. These 
divisions Howard posted to the right 
of the First corps, and in such a manner 
as to prolong the general lines and 
cover the approaches to Gettysbui-g from 
the north and northwest. The other 
division, under Von Steinwehr — an 
experienced and skilful officer, who 
had been bred in the service of Prussia, 
and who had done good work on that 
fatal first day at Chancellorsville, when 
Jackson fell on Howard's corps with 
the force of an avalanche — he had left 
as a reserve on Cemetery Ridge. It 
was a wise and prudent step, as the 
result proved, and was taken, it is un- 
derstood, in obedience to the instruc- 
tions of Reynolds. 

It was now about two o'clock. 
Howard had had little more than time 
to get his men in position, when the 
spectator on Cemetery Hill might have 
seen a long, gray line, serpent-like, 
creeping down the pike, and near the 
railroad on the northeast side of the 
town. They were " Stonewall " Jack- 
son's men — led now by General Ewell, 
Jackson's most trusted and loved lieu- 
tenant — who were hui'rjdng from York 
and Carlisle to decide the issues of 
that day. Their march seems to 
quicken as they approa^'h the battle- 
ground. Before tlnee o'clock, they 



have come up from the York road, de- 
bouched into the woods, and, with 
their old, wild battle-yell, fallen with 
crushing effect on Howard's right. 
Early's division, of Ewell, was thrown 
upon the right face of the Eleventh, 
commanded by Barlow. Rodes' divi- 
sion, of the same corps, moved further 
round and formed a connection with the 
left of the corps of General Hill. There 
was a commanding height, called Oak 
Hill, opposite the National line, where 
the left of the Eleventh and the right 
of the First corps approached each 
other, but did not meet. With the eye 
of a skilful general, Rodes perceived 
that this was the key-point of the field, 
and seized it immediately. The Elev- 
enth, confronted by their old antagon- 
ists, seemed resolved to redeem the 
honor lost at Chancellorsville. They 
fought with the utmost braveiy. But 
the battle had now become unequal — it 
was 50,000 men against 21,000; and 
Howard had fallen into an error not 
uncommon during the war. He had 
attempted to cover too much. It was 
impossible for his extended line, atten 
uated almost to feebleness, to resist the 
persistent attacks and now overwhelm- 
ing numbers of the enemy. From his 
high vantage ground, where he had 
planted ai'tillery, Rodes poured an ob- 
lique and destructive fire on the left of 
the Eleventh. A general advance was 
ordered about three o'clock, Rodes, 
having massed his infantry, came sweep, 
ing down through the opening of tha 
National line in his front, breaking 
and cramping the left of the Eleventh, 
and turning and forcing back the right 



THE FIRST DAY-SEMINARY RIDGE. 



5&3 



of the First. Early, at the same mo- 
ment, fell with equal energy on the right 
of the Eleventh. The gallant Barlow 
made a stubborn resistance near the 
almshouse ; but, in the midst of the 
struggle at this point, he was wound- 
ed, and fell helpless into the hands of 
the enemy. Schimmelpfenig was also 
taken prisoner, but he subsequently 
contrived to escape and rejoin his regi- 
ment. The National right was thus 
driven back in confusion into Gettys- 
burg. The troops on the right of the 
First, or National left, were in a simi- 
lar plight. They, too, were driven into 
the town, where they became entangled 
with Howard's corps. Ewell pursued 
the disordered mass into and through 
the sti-eets of Gettysburg, capturing 
Bome five thousand prisoners and occu- 
pying the place. 

Such was the state of things on the 
National right, and on the right of the 
National left, at a comparatively early 
hour in the afternoon of July 1st. 
How was it on the extreme left of the 
National line ? These troops had been 
under fire from the commencement of 
the fight — some of them for five, some 
for six hours. At the same moment 
that Ewell, with the two divisions of 
Rodes and Early, came thundering 
down upon the Eleventh, A. P. Hill, 
strengthened by Ewell, renewed the 
attack upon the heroic and not yet 
completely exhausted First. Robinson 
and Doubleday and Wadsworth did 
their best to keep their men in position, 
and to hold the enemy at bay ; but 
they, too, began to feel themselves 
weak under the fierce and persistent 



pressure of superior numbers. "We 
have come to stay," was still the watch- 
word and battle-cry of many of the 
men. They were willing to wait and 
fight to the bitter end. But when it 
became known that the right of their 
corps had been turned, and that the 
Eleventh had been routed, the convic- 
tion of danger in their present position 
was forced upon them. It was with 
a stubborn reluctance they began to 
retire, and not until they had suffered 
most severely. They had saved and 
moved to the rear all their artillery, 
with the exception of one piece, and 
all their ambulances, before they let go 
their hold on Seminary Ridge. When 
they fell back behind the town, they 
did so in something like order. Double- 
day handled his men during this crisis 
with marvellous ability. In managing 
affairs on the National left, he had re- 
ceived little or no assistance from 
Howard, whose attention was engrossed 
from the first with his own corps and 
the general state of things on his right. 
The fighting, as we have seen, was 
severe on the left during the whole day. 
There were special moments, howevei", 
when the firing was terrific. Some of 
the men had been through all the great 
battles of the East. They had been in 
the Peninsula, and under fii'e at Mal- 
vei-n Hills ; with Pope, and under fire 
at Cedar Mountain, at Manassas, and 
at Centreville; with Burnside, and 
under fire at Fredericksburg; with 
Hooker, and under fire at Chancellors- 
ville ; and they gave it as their opinion 
that the firing of that day was the most 
terrific they had ever experienced. In 



506 



GETTYSBURG. 



one brigade alone — that of Cutler — in 
the biief space of twenty minutes, 
every staff-officer had his horse shot 
under him. Some of them lost two, 
some three horses. In thirty minutes, 
not a horse was left to the general or 
his stafF, but one, and that one was 
wounded. 

The remnants of the two shattered 
corps, reduced to one half of their 
original strength, found a refuge and a 
resting-place on Cemetery Hill. The 
wisdom of leaving Steinwehr behind to 
strengthen and fortify the position was 
now apparent to all. Steinwehr had 
made excellent use of his time. His 
guns were admirably posted, so as to 
guard the approaches to the heights ; 
and behind every ledge of rock, every 
stone wall, every building, there was a 
living barrier — an abatis of bayonets. 
When the disordered masses were 
pouring through Gettysburg and to- 
wards the ridge, Hancock had arrived 
on the ground. Meade was still at 
Taneytown, some thirteen miles distant. 
So soon as he was made aware of the 
battle, and of the death of Reynolds, 
be sent Hancock forward to take com- 
mand. He was to use his own judg- 
ment as to whether the forces should 
be retained at Gettysburg, or retire to 
the line of Pipe Creek. If he found 
the ground advantageous, he was so to 
advise the commander, and the troops 
would be ordered up at once. HuiTy- 
ing forward in an ambulance, and 
8tud)ang the map by the way, Hancock 
arrived on the field at about half-past 
three o'clock. " I found," he says, 
"that practically the fight was over. 



The rear of our column, with the ene- 
my, was then coming through the town 
of Gettysburg. General Howard was 
on Cemetery Hill, and there had evi- 
dently been an attempt on his part ^iq 
stop and form some troops there.' 
Hancock was a great favorite with the 
rank and file of the army of the Po- 
tomac. His fine personal presence, 
and the magnetism of his manner, did 
much towards restoring the confidence 
of the men and reestablishing order. 
There was a nucleus of order in Stein- 
wehr's division, and in the cavalry of 
Buford, which having been deployed 
in the plain to the left of the town, 
and in front of the ridge, presented a 
bold and firm front. Buford has been 
described as the good 'angel of Gettys- 
burg. He certainly performed heroic 
services on the morning of that first 
day, and also at this supreme moment, 
when weakness or hesitation would 
have been ruin. Never were cavalry 
more superbly handled. Never did 
mounted men more heartily or more 
effectively obey the behests of their 
chief. As the routed Nationals came 
up, Hancock quickly formed them into 
line. He was soon able to present 
what seemed a formidable front to the 
enemy. The National anny, however, 
was really in great peril. The day 
was yet young ; several hours had to 
elapse before sunset. If Lee had made 
a vigorous attack with all the forces at 
his command, it is scarcely possible 
that Hancock could have offered an 
effective resistance. To his surprise, 
and, no doubt, to his delight, the Con- 
federate skirmishers, who were already 



THE SECOND DAY— READY FOR BATTLE. 



60» 



breasting the hill, were recalled; and 
thus ended the first day's fighting at 
Gettysburg. General Lee made a mis- 
take in not pressing the advantage he 
had won. But he acted up to the best 
of his knowledge. "The attack was 
not made that afternoon," he tells us, 
"because the enemy's force was un- 
known, and because it was considered 
advisable to await the arrival of the 
rest of our troops." It was a fatal 
pause — fatal to the hopes of Lee him- 
self, and to the plans and purposes of 
the Confederate rulers. 

Hancock lost no time in reporting to 
Meade. Soon after arriving, he sent a 
message informing him that he could 
hold the ground till dark. Shortly 
after five o'clock, he sent the following 
despatch : " When I arrived here, an 
hour since, I found that our troops had 
given up the front of Gettysburg and 
the town. We have now taken up a 
position in the cemetery, which cannot 
well be taken ; it is a position, how- 
ever, easily turned. Slocum is now 
coming on the ground, and is taking 
position on the right. But we have, 
as yet, no troops on the left, the Third 
corps not having yet reported ; but I 
suppose that it is marching up. If so, 
his flank march will, in a degree, pro- 
tect our left flank. In the meantime. 
Gibbon [who had been left in com- 
mand of the Second] had better march 
so as to take position on our right or 
left to our rear, as may be necessary, 
in some commanding position. * '•' "' 
The battle is quiet now. I think we 
shall be all right until night. I have 
sent all the trains back. When nijilit 



comes on, it can be told better what 
had best be done. I think we can re- 
tire ; if not, we can fight here, as the 
ground appears not unfavorable, with 
good troops." Having completed his 
dispositions, and having turned over 
the command to Slocum, who out- 
ranked him, and who had just arrived, 
he went back to Taneytown to see 
Meade personally. Meade had already 
made up his mind ; and he set his army 
in motion at once. 

The Twelfth corps, Slocum's, which 
had been urgently summoned by Gen- 
eral Howard during the afternoon, and 
which had been pushed forward with 
as little delay as possible, arrived be- 
fore six o'clock. It was immediately 
put into position. The Third corps, 
Sickles', which had also been sum- 
moned up by Howard, arrived some of 
them that night at sunset, and the re- 
mainder during the night and follow- 
ing morning. The Second corps, Han- 
cock's, which had only to travel from 
Taneytown, a distance of thirteen miles, 
came up shortly after midnight. The 
Fifth corps, Sykes', was at Union 
Mills, twenty-three miles distant, when 
the order was given , but it was on the 
ground at an early hour in the mom- 
ing. The Sixth, Sedgwick's, was at 
Manchester, thirty-two miles distant. 
It was known that its commander 
would hurry forward with all possible 
despatch'; and it was confidently ex- 
pected that he would reach the field 
in time to take part in the fight of the 
following day. Meade, himself, as 
soon as he had received Hancock's rep- 
icsentations, broke up his headquarters 



608 



GETTYSBUBG. 



at Taneytown, sent his trains to West- 
minster, and hastened to Gettysburg, 
which he reached at one o'clock on 
the morning of the 2d. Soon after 
he arrived on the ground, he fixed 
his headquarters at a little frame 
house on the Taneytown road, in 
rear of and to the south of Zeigler's 
Grove. It was sheltered from infantry 
fire by a swell in the ground; but 
there was nothing to prevent it from 
becoming a target for the enemy's 
artillery. 

With the earliest light Meade was 
July up, inspecting the ground, and 
2« making arrangements for the dis- 
position of his troops. Some of the corps 
were already in position. The others 
were placed as they came up. The Elev- 
enth retained its position on Cemetery 
Hill, and was supported by Robinson's 
and Doubleday's di\'isions, of the First, 
now commanded by General Newton. 
On the extreme right was the Twelfth, 
Avhich, with the division of Wadsworth, 
also of the First, held Gulp's Hill. 
The Second and Third were ordered to 
occupy the continuation of Cemetery 
Ridge, to the left of the Eleventh. 
The Fifth was held in reserve. When 
Sedgwick came up, he was to be placed 
on the extreme left, behind the Round 
Tops The order, from right to left, 
was, therefore, as follows : Slocum, 
Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sickles. 
The entire army was concentrated on 
an area of about three square miles. 
The reserve forces were within thii'ty 
minutes' march of any part of the line. 
Batteries were posted along the crest ; 
and rock-ledges, improvised earth-works 



and stone walls in the rear gave shelter 
to the soldiers. 

On the morning of Thursday, the 
Confederate prospect was not quite so 
bright as it had been the night before. 
True, Longstreet had arrived; but it 
was manifest at a glance that the Na- 
tional army had been largely reinforced, 
that it occupied a position of foi'mid- 
able strength, and that to attempt to 
dislodge it meant a tremendous expen- 
diture of force, as well as a fearful sac- 
rifice of life. At early dawn, Lee, 
Longstreet and Hill were in eager con- 
sultation on Seminary Ridge. The 
summits of the ridge were covered with 
oak and pine trees ; so, also, was its 
western slope, thus affording excelleot 
concealment for the troops. Along this 
ridge, and round to the east of Gettys- 
burg, in the form of a vast crescent, 
over five miles in length, its concavity 
facing the National line, the Confede- 
rate army was arranged. The eastern 
slope was dotted thickly with artilleiy, 
which looked frowningly over the in- 
tervening valley. Longstreet was on 
the right, Hill in the centre, and Ewell 
on the left. Between Ewell and Hill 
there was a gap of neai'ly a mile. The 
army was about 80,000 strong, numer- 
ically equal to that on the opposite 
heights, even if Sedgwick should get 
up in time. Lee's one inconvenience 
was the extent of his line, and the con- 
sequent difficulty of communication. 
Meade had the advantage of compact- 
ness ; and communication was easy. 

It was evident already that the at- 
tack, if there was to be an attack, 
would come from the Confederates 



LEE'S MISTAKE. 



560 



Meade's position was merely defensive. 
It was for this purpose, and this pur- 
pose alone, that Cemetery Ridge had 
been occupied and strengthened. It 
was no part of his intention at this par- 
ticular juncture to initiate aggressive 
measures. It had not been the oriojinal 
intention of Lee to fight so far from his 
base, unless attacked by the enemy ; but 
it had become difficult, next to impos- 
sible, to withdraw his troops now that 
they had come into actual contact with 
the National army, and tasted somewhat 
of the sweets of victory. It may well be 
doubted whether, if an order had been 
given for retreat, his men, elated as 
they were with past successes, and 
flushed as they were with the fresh 
triumphs of yesterday, would have 
calmly submitted. General Lee was 
not ignorant of the difficulty and dan- 
ger of assaulting a powerful foe behind 
entrenched lines, and in so command- 
ing a position as that now occupied by 
the National army. Still, as he him- 
self tells us, a battle had become, in a 
measure, unavoidable; and, "encouraged 
by the successful issue of the engage- 
ment of the previous day, and in view 
of the valuable results which would 
ensue from the defeat of the army of 
General Meade, it was tliought advis- 
able to renew the attack." The Con- 
federate commander, however, made 
one mistake when he paused, on the 
eve of victory, on the afternoon of the 
Ist, He made another mistake when 
he delayed his attack on the morning 
and forenoon of the 2d. A vigorous 
assault made on the afternoon of Wed- 
uesday, or even on the early hours of 

^7 



Thursday, could scarcely have failed 
of success. Bent on invasion as he 
was, he flung away his opportunities. 
By delaying as he did, he gave the 
National forces not only time to come 
up and concentrate in strong positions 
in his front, but time to enjoy, after 
the fatigues of their march, some hours 
of refreshing rest. 

It was still, however, early morning. 
The Confederate generals had not yet 
completed their plans. Meade was un- 
certain on what part of his line the 
first blow would be dealt, but he was 
guarding every point with scrupulous 
care. All was calm and still. There 
was a balmy sweetness in the summer 
air; music in the woods; beauty in 
the landscape. As the eye of the spec- 
tator on the heights fell upon the val- 
ley below, it was attracted by bloom- 
ing orchards, by smiling fields, already 
growing yellow with rich crops of 
ripening grain, by contented cattle 
grazing at will on the meadow, or lazily 
resting in the shade. Nature seemed 
all-unconscious of the terrible tempest 
of human wrath which was about to 
burst forth, and which was so soon to 
convert those scenes of peace and hap- 
piness into scenes of tumult and horror, 
to fill the air with the sounds of de- 
struction and the shrieks of agony, to 
cover the valley and the hillsides vrith 
the ghastly bodies of the slain, and to 
deluge those fields and redden those 
streams with blood. 

It was four o'clock in the afternoon 
before Lee had completed his arrange- 
ments for attack. There had been 
some lively skirmishing earlier in the 



olU 



GETTYSBUEG. 



day. In the morning, Ewell's move- 
ments created the impression that an 
attack was about to be made on Gulp's 
Hill; and General Meade was disposed 
for a time to assume the initiative at 
that point ; but the ground being found 
unfavorable, and the enemy not making 
further demonstrations, the purpose was 
abandoned. General Sedgwick arrived 
on the field, with the Sixth corps, about 
two o'clock, having accomplished his 
long march with marvellous rapidity; 
and General Meade immediately there- 
after directed Sykes, who, with the 
Fifth corps, had been in reserve on the 
right, to move over and take position 
as a reserve on the left. Meantime, 
General Lee had decided on his plan 
of assault. " It was determined," he 
tells us, " to make the principal attack 
on the enemy's left, and endeavor to 
get a position from which it was 
thought that our artilleiy could be 
brought to bear with effect. Long- 
street was directed to place the di- 
visions of Hood and McLaws on the 
right of Hill, partially enveloping the 
enemy's left, which he was to drive in. 
General Hill was ordered to threaten 
the enemy's centre, so as to prevent re- 
inforcements from being drawn to either 
wing, and to co-operate with his right 
division in Longstreet's attack ; General 
Ewell was instructed to make a simul- 
taneous demonstration on the enemy's 
right, to be converted into a real attack, 
ihould opportunity offer." 

Let us now see how this plan was 
carried out. It was Meade's intention, 
in posting his troops, to occupy the 
ridge continuously from Cemetery Hill 



to the Round Tops. Sickles had been 
instructed in the morning to form his 
corps in line of battle on the left of 
Hancock's corps ; his right flank to rest 
on Hancock's left; and his left to ex- 
tend to the Round Top, occupying it, 
if practicable. At the point indicated, 
there is a depression on the ridge ; and 
General Sickles, believing that he would 
be more advantageously posted an the 
intermediate crest, about three quarters 
of a mile in front, and along which 
runs the Emmettsburg road, assumed 
the responsibility of occupying that 
position. It was not till within a few 
minutes of four o'clock, when General 
Meade arrived at this part of the ground 
in person, that he discovered the peril- 
ous position in which Sickles had placed 
himself, his men, and, indeed, the en- 
tire National army. Instead of connect- 
ing with the left of Hancock, Sickles 
had thrown his right flank forward 
some four hundred yards in front, thus 
leaving a gap between his right and 
Hancock's left ; his left, instead of being 
near the Round Top Mountain, was in 
advance of it; and his line, instead of 
being a prolongation of Hancock's line, 
made an angle of about forty-five de- 
grees with that line. Meade expressed 
his disappointment, Sickles his regret; 
but it was too late to make any radical 
change. Sickles, undoubtedly, meant 
well ; but it was a weak, exposed, and 
otherwise faulty position. Round Top 
was really the key of the battle ground ; 
and it was at once uncovered and unoc- 
cupied. Lee discovered at once the 
blundei which had been committed. 
In his report he says : '* In front o^ 



LONGSTREET'S ADVANCE. 



511 



General Longstreet, the enemy held a 
position from which, if he could be 
driven, it was thought that our army 
could be used to advantage in assailing 
the more elevated ground beyond, and 
thus enable us to reach the crest of the 
lidge." Sickles, who was thus singled 
out as the special object of attack, was 
to j)ay dearly for his temerity. His 
interview with Meade had not ended; 
the latter, in fact, was just expressing 
hifj fear that the enemy would not per- 
mit him to withdraw, and that there 
was no time for any further change or 
movement, when the Confederate bat- 
teries opened upon the position, and 
the action was commenced. 

It was, as we have said, about four 
o'clock in the afternoon when the signal 
for battle was given. The sis^nal came 
in the character of a terrific cannonade 
from the Confederate artillery. The 
National guns soon hurled back defi- 
ance. The din was deafening, and the 
air was alive with missiles of every de- 
scription. This, however, was but the 
prelude to more desperate work. Meade 
did not lose his self-possession. As- 
suring Sickles of every assistance pos- 
sible, he hurried off to give more general 
direction. Sickles' right, commanded 
by Humphrey, was disposed along the 
Emmettsburg Road. On Humphrey's 
left the line was continued by Graham's 
brigade, of Birney's division, as far as 
the Peach Orchard. At this point the 
remaining brigades of Birney's divi- 
sion — those of De Trobriand and Ward 
— were refused, and thrown back ob- 
liquely towards Round Top. The sa- 
lient or apex of the angle was Sickles' 



weakest point. It was the point which 
most invited attack, and the driving in 
of which offei'ed the greatest advan- 
tages. Under cover of a heavy artil- 
lery fire, and partially concealed by th« 
smoke, Longstreet was seen to be press- 
ing forward with his whole corps— 
nearly one third of the Confederate, 
army. Batteries were quickly got into 
position ; and Sickles was already under 
a most murderous fire, both of artillery 
and musketry. The Confederate flank, 
it was observed, extended far beyond 
the National left. As Longstreet came 
up, with his warrior columns, defiance 
in their eyes and destruction in their 
firm and steady tramp, his extreme 
right, under Hood, was seen to bend in 
towards the National left and in the 
direction of Little Round Top. As the 
Confederate line draws near, it bends in 
more and more. It is evidently Long 
street's intention to overlap Sicklee 
left, and to fall wath accumulated force 
on the extremity of his line. His pur- 
pose is quickly revealed. Rushing for- 
ward at the double-quick, the men in 
gi-ey fell with tremendous energy up- 
on Ward's brigade, who held the ex- 
tremity of the National line. Ward was 
not unprepared. This was the point 
which was struck first; but Hood's 
men kept closing in along the whole 
of Birney's front, until the battle raged 
from the orchard to the base of Little 
Round Top. At the orchard, and 
along the refused line towards Little 
Round Top, the waves of battle surged 
and rolled for weaiy hours, victory 
now inclining to the one side and now 
to the other. Ward and De Trobriand 



61» 



GETTYSBURG. 



and Graham pei-formed prodigies of 
valor; Birney, too, and even Sickles, 
were ever at the point of danger, cheer- 
ing the men by their words, and in- 
citing them by their example; but no 
amount of valor or self-sacrifice could 
atone for the inherent weakness of the 
position. 

Little Round Top was the objective 
point of this well-directed Confederate 
attack. It was the prize which the 
Confederates wished to wdn, and which 
the Nationals wished to keep. We 
have already described this hill, and 
pointed out its connection with the 
general range, on the crest of which 
the National forces, for the most part, 
were posted. It is a steep and rocky 
spur of the loftier Round Top. It is 
bald and naked, its summit and its 
sides being cut up into ledges, and cov- 
ered with mighty boulders. This hill 
was destined to be the scene of one of 
the most heroic, and, at the same time, 
most savage encounters, during that 
awful, yet glorious, 2d of July, at Get- 
tysburg. While the battle was raging 
along Birney's front, the fiery and im- 
petuous Hood had discovered that Lit- 
tle Round Top was not occupied, and 
that only a thin curtain of soldiers — the 
Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania — hung in 
its fi'ont. If that position were in his 
hands, the whole army of Meade could 
not again dislodge him. Nay, more: 
the battle of Gettysburg would be the 
crowning triumph of the Confederate 
cause. Selecting his chosen band of 
Texans, his most trusted soldiers, he 
pointed out the black and rugged mass, 
and sent them on theii* mission. With 



the speed of lightning, they rushed for- 
ward to give effect to the behests of 
their chief. But they were too late. 
The path was blocked when they 
reached Plum Run, a stream which 
skirts the base of the hill on its west 
ern side. 

Let us see how this came about 
When the battle commenced, General 
Warren, Meade's chief-engineer, after 
having inspected Sickles' position in 
company with the general commanding, 
proceeded to Little Round Top, whence 
he had a magnificent view of the whole 
field of battle. He saw the ilrst fierce 
onset of the enemy, and how nobly it 
was resisted by the division of Birney. 
But it was not that which fixed his at- 
tention and engaged his thoughts. It 
was the unprotected condition of Little 
Round Top, the key of the National 
position, and the tei-rible consequences 
which must inevitably follow, if it 
should fall into the hands of the Con- 
federates. There was no time for delay. 
The hill had been used as a signal sta- 
tion ; and the signal-men, when they 
beheld the onward rush of the Confed- 
erate masses, commenced to fold their 
flags and otherwise to prepare for re- 
tiring. At this moment, the head of 
Barnes' division, of Sykes' corps, was 
approaching at the double-quick to i-e- 
inforce Sickles. Warren assumed the 
responsibility of detaching Vincent's 
brigade from that division, and order- 
ing it upon Little Round Top. Haz- 
litt's battery, also, was immediately or- 
dered up; and by almost superhuman 
efforts, it was raised to the crest of th " 
hill, and placed in position. Vincent 



LITTLE ROUND TOR 



513 



BO disposed his men around the base 
of the hill, that the a]>proaches were 
guarded at every point. 

The arrangements were completed not 
a moment too soon. Scarcely had Vin- 
cent's regiments — the Sixteenth Michi- 
gan, Lieutenant-Colonel Welch ; the 
Forty-Fourth New York^ Colonel Rice ; 
and the Twentieth Maine, Colonel 
Chamberlain — taken position behind 
the huge boulders, when, in the words 
of one of the officers present, there was 
hear>l " a loud, fierce, distant yell, as if 
all pandemonium hud broken loose 
and joined in the chorus of one grand, 
universal war-whoop." Three lines 
deep, at double-quick, on they came. 
Hazlitt's battery opens upon them its 
murderous fire ; musketry blaze forth 
from behind every boulder; but in 
vain. Those impetuous Texaus will 
not be checked. On, on they come 
in ever-increasing numbers. Assault 
follows assault; but each time they 
are driven back, broken, bleeding and 
thinned, their dead and dying com- 
rades left lying in heaps among the 
rocks. For over half an hour the sav- 
age contest lasted; but Vincent's men 
stood firm ; and being joined by Weed's 
brigade, of Ayres' division, also of the 
Fifth corps, the Confederates were 
di'ivt n from the slope and over the 
rocky ledges, and the position was se- ! 
cu)-ed. Not yet, however, ^\■as the i 
struggle ended. Clinging to tlie rocky 
hollow which divides the Kouud Tops, 
they pressed forwai'd, and, although 
received by a withering musketry fire, 
succeeded in turning the left flank of 
the brigade. At this stage, the fight- 



ing was furious. Chamberlain's Twen- 
tieth Maine fell upon their assailants 
with the energy of despair, and, with 
the butts of their muskets, clubbed 
tljcm to death. The enemy was re- 
pulsed, but not destroyed. They still 
clung to the rocky hollow. Chamber- 
lain's left flank was dangerously ex- 
posed. He called for help, but in vain. 
Suddenly, the enemy began to show 
S(jnie signs of weakness; and Chamber, 
lain, finding his opportunity, rising to 
the dignity of the occasion, and. yield- 
ing to the severe reciuirements of the 
emergency, oidered his men to fix bay- 
onets, and, sweeping like a whirlwind 
upon the now dispirited Texaus, he 
drove th:;-m before him iu utter rout. At 
this opportune moment, a brigade of the 
Pennsylvania reserves charged up the 
hill, under the personal leadership of 
General Crawfoid ; and the enemy, be- 
lieving that hea\-y reinforcements had ar- 
rived, gave up the contest. The hollow 
ground between the Round Tops was 
cleared of the foe. Little Round Top, the 
key of the position, was secured. The 
victory was complete ; but it had been 
won at a great sacrifice. The slaughter 
had been terrible. It recalled the mem- 
ory of Ball's Bluff, and the valley of 
the shadow of death, at Pittsburg 
Landing. The dead were found piled 
in heaps behind the rocks; and the 
narrow valley was literally covered 
with the mangled bodies of the dead 
and wounded. The gallant Vincent 
had yielded up his life. Weed, too, 
had been killed; and Hazlilt, when 
bending over the prostrate form of hi» 
chief, had I'eceived his death-\vound. 



au 



GETTYSBURa. 



While this struggle was going on 
for the i^ossession of Little Round Top, 
there was even more severe fighting on 
Birney's right, and at the salient in the 
Peach Orchard. We have already seen 
that at the same time that Hood pushed 
his men on Birney's left, and worked 
his way through the gap between the 
left and the Round Top, he drew his 
line steadily in, and pressed more 
closely upon Birney's right, until the 
battle raged between the Round Top 
and the Peach Orchard. In this at- 
tack on Birney's right, and particularly 
on the salient at the orchard. Hood 
was assisted by McLaws, and eight 
regiments of Anderson's division, of 
Hill's corps. Longstreet's great object 
was to break Sickles' line at the salient, 
or as it may be called, the centre, and 
obtain possession of the orchard. The 
onset of Hood and McLaws on Biraey's 
front was made with gi-eat vigor; and 
such was the pressure that Sickles was 
compelled immediately to send for re- 
inforcements. It was in response to 
this call that Barnes' division, of Sykes', 
was sent forward. Vincent's brigade 
of this division was, as we have seen, 
detached by General Warren, and sent 
to hold Little Round Top. The other 
two brigades — those of Tilton and 
Sweitzer — hastened to the' support of 
Birney. The struggle, at this point, 
was fierce and terrible. The Nationals 
made a gallant and determined fight. 
The Confederates, however, getting 
their guns into advanced positions, 
were able to enfilade the National line. 
The pressure was now iiTesistible. 
Sickles' men fell back. The National 



line was broken; and the much cov- 
eted orchard was in possession of the 
enemy. 

Birney, still resisting fiercely, made 
a gallant stand on a new position on 
wooded ground adjoining the wheat 
field, and intermediate between his last 
front and the Round Top. De Trobri- 
and's bi-igade, which had fought most 
bravely since the first moment of the 
attack, and which had offered a most 
stubborn resistance to the advance of 
the enemy, after the occupation of the 
orchard, had by this time melted 
away. The battle was now at its 
height, and Sickles, who fearlessly ex- 
posed himself, was wounded and car- 
ried from the field. The command for 
the time being devolved upon Birney. 
In his new position, he placed Sweitzer 
on his left and Tilton on his right 
Here again, for a time, the battle raged 
with great fury. Attempts were again 
and again made to regain lost giound, 
and to repel the enemy's advance. It 
was all in vain. Birney's original front 
had already been pierced ; and Barnes' 
brigades, after some stubborn fighting, 
had been compelled to fall back. Not 
yet, however, was the struggle to be 
abandoned. Hancock, made aware of 
the distressed condition of Birney, de- 
tached from his front Caldwell's splen- 
did division, and sent it to his aid. 
Arrived on the already blood-stained 
wheat field, Caldwell pushed his men 
into action. Cross and Kelley were in 
advance, and were soon in the thick of 
the fight. The Confederates, as if 
gathering fresh strength, fell upon 
them with destructive fury. Both 



THE PEACH OEOHAKD. 



516 



brigades were terribly punished; and 
the gallant Cross, whose braveiy had 
been exhibited on many a battle field, 
was killed. Caldwell then advanced 
his other two brigades, those of Brooke 
and Zook. At this moment, as one has 
put it, the " hot battle boiled and bub- 
bled as though it were some great hell 
caldron." Zook fell, mortally wounded, 
as he led his men into action. Brooke 
was more fortunate. He advanced gal- 
lantly against the enemy, and drove 
him from a strong position which he 
held under cover of the woods. Cald- 
well's troops performed deeds of valor ; 
and, for a moment or two, it seemed as 
if the tide of battle would be turned. 
But no. The Confederates come rush- 
ing forward in tremendous force, through 
the opening made at the Peach Or- 
chard, and, falling upon him with resist- 
less energy, envelop his right and pen- 
etrate almost to his rear. After losing 
one half of his men, Caldwell, like 
Birney and Barnes, is compelled to 
retire. The victorious Confederates 
now rush through the woods, fall upon 
Sweitzer, who has joined in this last 
attack, and hurl him before them. 
Ayres has just come up, with two bri- 
gades of regulars, from the Fifth corps. 
In their onward and triumphant riish, 
the Confederates strike his right and 
rear, and almost completely envelop 
him. It was only with great difficulty, 
and after much sacrifice, that he was 
able to fight his way back to his orig- 
inal line of battle. Ayres was thus 
made to share the fate of Birney, of 
Barnes and of Caldwell. The Con- 
federates have now reached the base of 



the hill. Here they halt, and well 
they may ; for the heights are crowned 
by the battalions of the Fifth and Sixth 
corps. Disorganized by their advance, 
and suffering terribly, although for 
the moment victorious, they hesitate 
as to what to do. The moment is op- 
portune for a parting blow. Crawford, 
now on the heights with his brave 
Pennsylvania reserves, sees his oppor- 
tunity, and turns it to account. Steal- 
ing down the heights, he flings his men 
on the triumphant but now baffled foe. 
A severe struggle ensues for the pos- 
session of a stone wall. For a time, 
the battle rages at this point again 
with tremendous fury. The Confede- 
rates, eager to hold the position, offer 
a most stubborn resistance; but they 
are ultimately driven back to the 
woods, beyond the wheat field, where 
they rest for the night. 

Such was the end of the struggle, 
which for hours raged so fiercely on 
Sickles' left and left centre. The posi- 
tion held by that wing at the com- 
mencement of the contest, and which 
had been defended by Birney with so 
much valor, had been finally aban- 
doned. In the original disposition of 
Sickles' troops, as we have seen al- 
ready, Humphrey's division, with the 
brigade of Graham, held the right, 
above and beyond the salient, and fac- 
ing to the west. Humphrey's position 
had been peculiar from the commence- 
ment of the fight. It will be remem- 
bered that on his right, in consequence 
of the advanced position of the corps, 
there was a gap of nearly half a mile 
between him and Hancock. For 6 



516 



6ETTYSBUEG. 



time, after the action commenced on 
the left, Humphrey was left unassailed. 
When Birney was sorely pressed, and 
when the combined strength of Hood 
and McLaws was brought to bear upon 
the salient at the Peach Orchard, Hum- 
phrey was able to send assistance to 
the sister brigade. The Peach Or- 
chard had been taken ; the Confede- 
rates had rushed through the gap in 
the National line; Birney had fallen 
back to the new position at the wheat 
field, where, reinforced first by Cald- 
well and then by Ayres, the tide of 
battle again surged and rolled like a 
tempest-tossed sea ; but still Humphrey 
was unassailed. Why was this ? Let 
us see. In the disposition of his troops, 
as has already been noticed, General Lee 
had so far extended his right beyond the 
National left, that it was able to overlap 
or outflank the latter by at least two 
brigades. The result of this was that 
Longstreet's left was pushed so far 
to the right that Humphrey was con- 
fronted not by Longstreet, but by 
Hill. Lee's instructions to Hill were 
that, in the first stages of the contest 
at least, he should content himself 
with making demonstrations against 
the enemy's centre, so as to prevent 
reinforcements being drawn to the as- 
sistance of either the right wing or the 
left. Thus it was that, while the battle 
raged most fiercely on his left, Hum- 
phrey remained untouched. About six 
o'clock in the evening, and when Bir- 
ney was about to fall back from his 
position facing south — a position which 
was nearly at right angles with the 
<ii''ision on his right — Birney notified 



Humphrey that Sickles had been 
wounded, and that he was in command 
of the corps, and requested him also 
to fall back, so as to connect with his 
right. This meant that Humphrey, 
while holding on to the crest on the 
Emmettsburg road with his right, 
should swing back with his left, so as 
to make change of front, and at the 
same time keep the line intact. It 
Avas a most difiicult operation ; but it 
Avas performed with skill and success. 
As the immediate result of this ma- 
noeuvre, Humphrey's right was thrown 
entirely out of position; and when, 
finally, the whole left, and the troops 
which had been sent in support, were 
driven back, and the forces of Hood 
and McLaws came rushing through the 
gap thus created, liis right was fearfully 
exposed, his own coolness and intrepid- 
ity alone saving it from complete de- 
struction. Hancock — who was now in 
command of Sickles' corps, as well as 
his own — ever watchful, and seeing the 
exposed condition of Humphrey's right, 
sent to its support two regiments, the 
Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Eighty- 
Second New York from Gibbon's di- 
vision; and, to protect him on the 
left, he pushed forward Willard's bri- 
gade, of Hays' division. At the same 
time that the triumphant Confederates, 
having pierced Sickles' line, were fall- 
ing heavily on the left, Hill, aVjandon- 
ing his passive attitude, came down 
like a thunderbolt on the right. Hum- 
phrej' was thus caught between two 
fires. "I was attacked," he says, "on 
my flanks, as we}' as on my front. I 
never have been under a hotter artil- 



HUMPHREY SEVERELY ATTACKED. 



617 



lery and musketry fire combined. I 
may have been under a hotter musketry 
fire. For a moment, I thought the 
day was lost. I did not order my 
troops to fall back rapidly because, so 
far as I could see, the crest in my rear 
was vacant, and I knew that when 
troops got to moving rapidly, it was 
exceedingly difficult to stop them just 
(vhen you wanted to stop them. At 
that moment, I received an order to 
fall back to the Round Top Ridge, 
which I did slowly, suffering a very 
heavy loss." 

Humphrey, in truth, was for some 
time in most difficult and critical cir- 
cumstances. His division, when left 
alone by the retirement of Birney, 
bore a general resemblance to the one 
side and the two ends of a parallelo- 
gram; and, upon both his front and 
flanks, the enemy was rushing with 
demon-like fury. The attacking party, 
consisting of the brigades of Wilcox, 
Perry and Wright, from Anderson's 
fresh division, had not been engaged 
in the previous struggles of the day, 
having been held in readiness for this 
supreme effort, when the proper time 
should come. Humphrey was most 
savagely attacked by Wright ; but he 
cautiously retired his men until he 
reached the ridge in his rear, which 
was still, in consequence of the origi- 
nal mistake of Sickles, imperfectly pro- 
tected. So fierce were the attacks, and 
so great was the pressure, that he was 
compelled to leave behind him three 
of his guns, the horses having been 
killed. Back to the base of the hill 
and up the crest he was compelled to 



move, the enemy still pressing heavily 
on liis front. Wilcox and Wright were 
both well advanced. Ceineter}^ Ridge, 
it will be remembered, is at this point 
slightly depressed. It was also, as 
we have pointed out already, in con- 
sequence of the advanced position taken 
by Sickles, but imperfectly defended. 
Determined to effect a lodgment here, 
the Confederate battalions rush up 
the hill, past the National guns, and 
threaten to take possession of the 
ridge. A little more success, especial- 
ly if well supported, and they will be 
almost masters of the position. Their 
apparent success, however, is to be 
their ruin. They are now within range 
of the musketry of the Second corps, 
which lias concealed behind a stone 
wall; The men of the Second rise be- 
fore them like an apparition. The 
stone wall seems to blaze. The Con- 
federates, reeling and staggering under 
the terrific volley, fall back, leaving 
their comrades in slaughteretl heaps on 
the blood-stained ground. 

Not yet, however, was the contest 
abandoned. The Confederates seemed 
confident in the thought that the at- 
tack would become general, and that 
thus they would be able to hold their 
advanced position. In this expectation, 
they were doomed to disappointment. 
Posey and Mahone, of Anderson's divi- 
sion, did not advance. Pender's divi- 
sion, and that of Heth to his left, re- 
mained inactive. Perry's brigade had 
been driven back ; but the brigades of 
Wilcox and Wright kept their face to 
the foe, and performed prodigies of 
valor. But it was all in vain. The 



518 



GETTYSBURG. 



National position was momentarily 
gaining strength. Meade had been 
busy filling up the gap between the 
corps of Hancock on the right and that 
of Sykes on the left. Both those corps 
were drawn upon largely to meet the 
emergency. A large portion of the 
First corps and the greater portion of 
the Twelfth were brought over from 
the right, to strengthen the weak and 
menaced left. Sedgwick's troops, too, 
although weary and footsore with the 
long march which they had just ac- 
complished, gladly responded to the 
call which was made upon them, and 
came to the front. The series of charges 
and counter-charges, made at this part 
of the line for the possession of the 
ridge, gave to some of the regiments 
and brigades splendid opportunities for 
winning distinction. The First Min- 
nesota, coming up at a critical and 
most opportune moment, performed 
gallant service, and mightily increased 
its already rapidly rising reputation. 
The same was true, to a greater or less 
degree, of the Thirteenth Vermont, of 
the One Hundred and Forty-Ninth and 
One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsyl- 
vania regiments ; and Lockwood's Mary- 
land brigade, of Ruger's division, of 
the Twelfth corps, on that 2d day of 
July, on the National left, covered it- 
self with glory. The Confederates had 
now well-nigh exhausted themselves. 
Their losses had been heavy. Some 
of their best and most daring officers 
had fallen. Barksdale, the most im- 
petuous leader of the boldest attack 
which had been made in that direction, 
was lying, in his death-agony, inside 



the National lines. Gathering up his 
strength for another and closing ef- 
fort, Hancock fell upon the persistent 
foe with tremendous energy. It was 
all that was needed. The Confede- 
rates were driven back, with great loss 
and in much confusion ; and, as it was 
now dusk, the fighting ceased. In this 
final charge, Humphrey's little band 
took part : and the general had the 
satisfaction of recapturing and bringing 
back his lost guns. Thus ended the 
great struggle on the National left. 
The position held by Sickles in the 
forenoon was lost; but Little Round 
Top had been secured, and the enemy 
had failed to effect a lodgment on 
Cemetery Hill. What the Confede- 
rates had now won was but sorry com- 
pensation for what they had lost. Be- 
fore morning, Little Round Top will 
be rendered all but impregnable ; and 
what with the shattered remnants of 
Sickles' divisions, and the divisions of 
Doubleday and Robinson, from the 
First corps, and a powerful detachment, 
under Williams, from the Twelfth, a 
new line will be formed where the or- 
iginal line ought to have been, and the 
National front will be closed. 

Such was the issue of events on the 
National left. Let us now turn our 
attention to the National right. This 
position, it will be remembered, was 
held by Slocum, by Wadsworth's divi- 
sion, of the First corps, and by How- 
ard, and in the order named, Slocum 
being on Culp's Hill, at the extreme 
right- Opposed to these, on the Con- 
federate left, were the forces of GeneifJ 
Ewell. According to the order giv en 



GULP'S HILL. 



S19 



by General Lee to his corps command- 
ers, Ewell, when Longstreet had fallen 
on the National left, was to attack 
" directly the high ground on the ene- 
my's right, which had already been 
partially fortified." For some unex- 
plained leason, the attack was not made 
until about six o'clock. During the 
two hotirs which had elapsed since the 
fighting commenced on the left, Meade, 
discovering no signs of any aggressive 
movement on the part of Ewell, sent 
detachment after detachment to the as- 
sistance of the left. The whole of the 
Twelfth corps, with the exception of 

s division. 



Greene's brigade, of Gear 



}■ 



had thus been harried away. The re- 
sult was that the forces on the right 
were greatly reduced, and that the po- 
sition was comparatively unprotected. 
But for the nerve of Greene, this uufoi'- 
tunate arrangement might have proved 
ruinous to the National army, and de- 
cided the fortunes of the day. Between 
Cemetery Hill and Gulp's Hill, there 
is a little ravine or depression which 
inaiks the end of the one hill and the 
1). ginning of the other. To the left of 
this ravine, and extending around the 
breast of Cemetery Hill, was Howard's 
corps, under cover of the stone wall, 
the summit of the hill being crowned 
by the batteries of Wiedrich and Rick- 
etts. To the right of the ravine, and 
on the extreme left of Gulp's Hill, 
guarding the ravine and the approaches 
from the town, was Stevens' Maine 
battery, which had done some excellent 
work during the action of the fiist 
day. On the right of the battery 
was the breast-work which had been 



thrown up by WadswortJ, and which, 
being carried around the hill, was 
taken up by Greene. Greene had re 
fused his right and carried his breast 
work back so as to protect his flank 
On Benner's Hill, a little to the north- 
east of Gulp's Hill, Ewell had planted 
his advance batteries. 

About six o'clock, the Confederate 
guns on Benner's Hill opened a tre- 
mendous fire. The National guns were 
quickly got in range; and, an eye- 
witness has told us, that in about 
twenty minutes, the batteries on Ben- 
ner's Hill were "knocked into pV 
The sun was already near his setting, 
and the fire of the Confederate guns 
was noticeably slackening, when Ew.ell 
pushed forward from the town the two 
divisions of Early and Johnson — the 
former on Cemetery, the latter on 
Gulp's Hill. Early's columns consisted 
of the brigades of Hays and Hoke, 
and were headed by the famous Louisi- 
ana Tigers. On they came in magnifi- 
cent array. A terribln reci^ption they 
knew awaited them; but there was 
neither fear in their look? nor trem- 
bling in their footsteps. "Whan within 
eight hundred yards, Stevens opened 
upon them with all his guns, WK'drich 
and Ricketts speedily joining in the 
chorus. Quickly wheeling into line, 
they dash up the hill, a very tempest 
of shrapnel and canister falling upon 
them, and ploughing huge gaps in their 
unmasked front. Fearless of the death- 
dealing battei'ies, and heedless of the 
cries of agony which come from com- 
rades falling by their side, on they 
press. They are now within musk»t 



020 



GETTYSBUKG. 



range of the stone wall. While the 
batteries are being fired at the rate of 
four shots a minute, Howard's men leap 
from their concealment, and pour vol- 
ley after volley into their already deci- 
mated ranks. On their left, and at the 
centre, the Confederates are beaten 
back. Theii' right, however, pushes 
on with a stubbornness which is heroic, 
and with an energy which is irresist- 
ible. With one wild leap, and utter- 
ing their accustomed yell, they clear 
the stone walls. Nationals and Con- 
federates are now mixed up in inextri- 
cable confusion. Stevens, fearful lest 
he should be killing friend as well as 
foe, is compelled to cease firing. Wied- 
rich's batteiy is overrun, his supports 
and his own men being swept away as 
with the force of a whii"lwind. At 
Ricketts' battery, a tremendous strug- 
gle takes place. It is man to man — 
hand to hand. Bayonets are crossed ; 
guns are clubbed, emd when these fail, 
handspikes, ranuners, stones are freely 
used. " Death on our own State soil, 
rather than give up the guns!"— such 
was the cry of the brave cannoneers. 

The situation really had become crit- 
ical. Howard's men had been broken 
and demoralized by the fierceness of 
the onset. At this critical moment, 
help arrived. Carroll's brigade, vol- 
untarily sent by Hancock when he 
heard the firing, rushed upon the scene. 
The Confederates, surprised by this 
fresh opposition, fell back in confusion ; 
and Ricketts' men, again at their guns, 
gave them a parting salute in the form 
of double-shotted canister. Such was 
the end of Early's grand charge, led 



by the famous, and hitherto invincible, 
Louisiana Tigers. The Tigers went 
back bravely, 600 strong, and were 
never aftei'wards known as a separate 



organization. 



While this daring and desperate, but 
unsuccessful, efPort was being made for 
the possession of Cemeteiy Hill, a no 
less daring and equally desperate eifort 
was made for the possession of Culp's 
Hill, on the extreme right of the Na- 
tional line. The attack was made, as 
we have already indicated, by John- 
son's division, of Ewell's corps, and 
was led by the redoubtable " Stonewall 
bi'igade." The position, as we have 
seen, was held by Wadsworth's divi- 
sion, of the First corps, and by Greene's 
cue Itrigade of the Twelfth. In the 
absence of the greater portion of the 
Twelfth corps, the works which had 
here been thrown up, and which were 
of considerable strength, were peculiar- 
ly at the mercy of a daring antagonist. 
Sweeping across Rock Creek, which at 
this season of the year is easily ford- 
able, the attacking columns, fired with 
the spirit of their fo'.mer leader, rushed 
through the woods, wliich spread out 
from the base of the hill and down 
towards the creek. As yet, they have 
encountered no resistance ; for the Na- 
tional skirmishers, thrown out towards 
the front, yield and fall back at the 
first touch. They are now in full view, 
and within musket range of the breast- 
works, behind which Greene and Wads 
worth are entrenched. The breast- 
works blaze; and there is heard the 
sharp, clear rattling, as of thousands oJ 
musket shots. Volley succeeds volh^y 



CLOSE OF THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHTING. 



52\ 



with, amazing rapidity ; and before this 
murderous fire, the Confederate bat- 
talions for a moment recoil. Discov- 
ering that the breast-works to Greene's 
right are unoccupied, they make an- 
other tremendous rash, and, almost 
unresisted, gain a foothold within the 
National lines. The burden of the 
attack now falls upon Greene. This 
veteran soldier had but few men ; yet 
he had a brave heart and an enduring 
spirit; and happily, too, he had strong- 
ly secured his right flank by a powerful 
earth-work. On this point, the Con- 
federate leader concentrates his strength. 
Assault after assault is made, but in 
vain. Greene makes a gallant resist- 
ance, repelling every advance of the 
foe with tremendous loss; and Wads- 
worth, no longer so sorely pressed on 
his front, comes nobly to his aid. Such 
was the state of things when darkness 
fell upon the scene, and Ewell, happily 
for the National army, discontinued 
the contest. Greene still held his posi- 
tion ; and Johnson's men occupied the 
vacated breast-works. So ended the 
second day's fighting at Gettysburg. 
Both sides had suffered severely. Gen- 
eral Meade lost 10,000 men. The 
Confederate loss must have been much 
greater. 

General Lee was not dissatisfied 
with the result of the day's fighting. 
It was his belief that, from the success 
which had attended the efforts of the 
day, "he would ultimately be able to 
dislodge the enemy." It was his de- 
termination, therefore, to continue the 
assault next day. Nor, it must be ad- 
mitted, was General Lee without good 



reason for so regarding the situation, 
Longstreet, if he had not been com- 
pletely successful, had driven the Na- 
tionals before him, and occupied the 
whole front held by Sickles and his 
Third corps at the commencement of 
the fight ; Ewell, having thrust his ex- 
treme left inside the breast-works on 
the National right, held a position from 
which, if he was not driven, he might 
be able to take Meade's entire line in 
I'everse ; and although the losses ou the 
National side could not be greater than 
his own, they had been so heavy as to 
wan-ant the opinion that they would 
have a demoralizing influence on the 
troops. On the whole, Lee was not to 
be blamed if he arrived at the conclu- 
sion that fortune was on his side. If 
he had known more, he would have 
known that the battle was lost when 
Ewell allowed the darkness to inter- 
rupt the fighting; for, knowing what 
we know now, there is scarcely room 
for doubt that, if that general had 
pushed his advantage, he miglit have 
played havoc with the trains, and 
forced the whole National army into 
an inglorious retreat. As it was, Lee's 
inferences were more reasonable than 
just or correct ; for the position gained 
in front of the National left was a gain 
more apparent than real ; and, before 
the morning light, the front of the left 
will be restored, and made strong and 
secure in what Avas intended to be its 
original position, and the troops with- 
drawn on the previous day, unwisely 
and at serious peril, will be massed 
again on the exposed and almost de- 
fenseless right. It was not, therefore. 



522 



GETTYSBUEG. 



without good reason that, while Lee 
was counting with confidence on vic- 
tory on the morrow, Meade and his 
generals, in council assembled, should 
have resolved to abide in their position, 
and to "fight it out at Gettysburg." 

During the darkness, Johnson's force, 
which had gained a position of advan- 
tage, held close to Gulp's Hill. His 
numbers were largely increased; and 
the position was strengthened. Meade, 
however, determined to continue the 
fight, was not idle. A large num- 
ber of guns were got into position, 
so as to beai' upon the point entered 
and held by the enemy. Geary's divi- 
sion, in obedience to orders, returned 
to occupy the "abandoned works. When 
moving towards them, all unsuspicious 
of danger, the advance was suddenly 
arrested by a volley from behind a 
stone wall. It was not until then that 
Geary became aware that the works 
were in the possession of the enemy. 
He then took position on the right of 
Greene; and his men, disturbed only 
by the occasional firing of skirmishers, 
slept on their arms. Later, Williams' 
division, of the same corps, now under 
Buger — Williams having assumed chief 
command — came up, and was posted 
on the flank and rear of the enemy. 

As early as three o'clock on the 
jniy morning of the 3d, there were 
3« signs of activity in the enemy's 
front. It was evident that an attack 
was intended ; and Geary, having been 
informed by General Kane, who com- 
manded his first brigade, of what was 
going on, resolved to seize whatever 
advantage might be gained by opening 



the battle himself. His men were 
aroused ; and at twenty minutes before 
four o'clock, he gave the signal for at- 
tack by discharging his pistol. The 
battle at once became general. A fear- 
ful struggle ensued. A heavy artillery 
file was opened at once on the enemy's 
position. But, as the ground was rug- 
ged and broken, and also covered with 
trees, and as every advantage was taken 
of places of shelter and concealment, 
the fight partook very much of the 
character of sharpshooting on a grand 
scale. As the battle progressed, the 
contestants got intermingled; and it 
became more and more difficult to use 
the artillery. The Confederates not 
only held their position, but charged 
again and again, in heavy masses, on 
the National lines, only, however, to 
be repulsed with tremendous loss. The 
slaughter was temble. The sun arose ; 
the day advanced; the air became 
clouded with dust and smoke ; the heat 
became almost intolerable ; but still 
the battle raged. At last there is a 
lull in the long-continued tempest. 
Then, suddenly, there is a fierce yell 
from thousands of throats ; and Ewell's 
men, having gathered up their strength 
for a final effort, are seen rushing 
forward vrith tremendous fury. They 
are allowed to come within easy mus- 
ket range, when the men in blue, 
springing to their feet, pour in upon 
them a deliberate volley. It was the 
last charge on this part of the line. 
Discomfited and discouraged, torn and 
bleeding, their dead and wounded com- 
panions piled in heaps on the ground 
where they fell, the survivors drew 



EWELL DEFEATED. 



623 



back through the woods towards Rock 
Creek, fighting, as they retired, with a 
courage which commanded the admira- 
tion of their foes. Shouts of victoiy 
now filled the air. "Men," says one 
who was present, and shared in the 
triumph, " cheered themselves hoarse, 
laughed, rolled themselves on the 
ground, and threw their caps high in 
air, while others shook hands with com- 
rades, and thanked God that the Star 
corps had again triumphed." Geary, 
not uisposed to allow the Confederates 
to re-form, as soon as this charge was 
repelled, made a vigoi'ous counter- 
charge ; and the enemy, yielding easily, 
the breast-works were reoccupied, and 
the right flank secured. Thus ended 
the fighting on the right. 

Ewell had been completely baffled 
in his plan. He had flung away his 
opportunity the night before; and, to 
reclaim it, he had now done his best, and 
failed. He could not find fault with 
his men ; for never, even under Jack- 
son, had they fought more bravelj'. 
"It cannot be denied," says General 
Kane, who, with his glorious first bri- 
gade, of Geary's division, bore the 
burden of that morning's fight, " that 
they fought most courageously." But 
they were pitted against men of equal 
bravery, of equal detennination with 
themselves — men who were now on 
their own soil, and fighting for the 
sanctity of their own homes. Never, 
perhaps, before, since the war com- 
menced, had the fighting been more 
determined and severe than it was dur- 
ing those long, dreary morning hours. 
The ground, after the battle, red with 



gore, and thickly covered with the 
bodies of the slain, gave evidence of 
the terrible character of the struggle. 
The gi'ey and the blue uniforms were 
sometimes found in one common heap. 
Some poor fellows, after hours of suf- 
fering, and having almost bled to 
death, were found writhing in mortal 
agony. The wood in which the battle 
raged was "torn and rent with shells 
and solid shot, and pierced with in- 
numerable minie balls." In the follow- 
ing summer, the trees were leafless, as 
if the mute but stalwart giants of the 
forest had yielded up their lives with 
those who fell beneath their shade. 

It was now shortly after ten o'clock. 
The last sounds of battle had died 
away. There was silence over the 
whole battle field. It was evident, 
however, that preparations were being 
made inside the Confederate lines for 
another gigantic and possibly crown- 
ing effort. The morning sky had been 
obscured by broken clouds. As the 
forenoon advanced, the clouds dis- 
persed ; and a hot July sun poured 
down his rays with a tropical intensity. 
Pickett's division, of Longstreet's corps, 
which had not come up on the previ- 
ous day, had now arrived on the field. 
Stuart, also, after his long detour, had 
joined Lee with his cavalry. It soon 
began to be manifest that the point of 
attack was to be the National left 
centre — the depressed part of the ridge 
immediately north of Little Round 
Top. By noon, the guns were got 
into position on the ridge occupied by 
Longstreet and Hill. Meade had an 
abundant supply of the same instru- 



624 



GETTYSBURG. 



ments of war; but, owing to the pe- 
culiarity of the ground, he could only, 
out of 300 guns, make use of 80, 
against those of the enemy. About 
one o'clock, the report of a Whitworth 
gun was heard. It was the signal for 
attack. Seminary Hill seemed as if 
swept with a tongue of flame. Then 
came the loud, thundering roar of artil- 
lery; and 145 guns, from their angry 
mouths poured death and destruction 
ju the National lines. The National 
commanders ordered their men to lie 
flat on the earth, and to take every ad- 
vantage of objects of protection. All 
this M^as done ; but, notwithstanding 
every precaution, the desti'uction of 
life and property was terrible. Solid 
shot, chain-shot, shrapnel, sheila, fell 
with deadly effect inside the National 
lines. Men and horses were dread- 
fully cut up; caissons filled with am- 
munition were exploded ; and gun- 
carriages and other pieces of war ma- 
terial were shattered to pieces. The 
shot and shell and canister fell thick 
and fast in and around General Meade's 
headquarters, killing men and horses, 
ripping up the roof and knocking away 
the pillars of the cottage. 

General Hunt, Meade's chief of ar- 
tillery, was in no haste to reply. Wait- 
ing until the first hostile outbreak spent 
itself, he then ordered the batteries to 
open fire. Instantly, the whole ridge, 
from Cemetery Hill to the Round 
Tops, seemed ablaze. The din was ter- 
rific, the thunder of artillery rivalling, 
in fierce grandeur, the most magnificent 
displays of nature. For two hours this 
artillery duel lasted ; and, during that 



time- war was exhibitf:! in its sublimer 
and more imposmg aspects. In hia 
Decisive Battles of the War, Swinton 
tells us that " as a spectacle this, the 
grandest artillery combat that ever oc 
curred on the continent, was magnifi- 
cent beyond description, and realized 
all that is grandiose in the circumstance 
of war." A spectator in the Confede- 
rate army says "the air was made hide- 
ous with discordant noises. The very 
earth shook beneath our feet; and the 
hills and rocks seemed to reel like a 
drunken man." 

At the expiration of two hours, there 
was 1 lull in the cannonade. Hunt, 
dreading the possible exhaustion of his 
ammunition, and not willing to bring 
up loads of it from the rear, lest it 
should be exploded, had ordered p 
gradual slackening of the fire. The 
Confederates were deceived. It was 
Lee's belief that he had silenced all the 
enemy's guns, except a few which still 
kept firing from a clump of woods. 
Now came the more serious business of 
war. The fire of the Confederate guns 
also slackened ; and the columns oi 
attack were seen forming on the edge 
of the woods which ci'own the summit 
of Seminary Ridge. It was jr.st three 
o'clock. When formed, the front was 
about a mile in extent; and, as it 
emerged from the woods, and began to 
move steadily and firmly down the 
slope of Seminary Ridge, a thrill of 
admiration passed through the National 
ranks. It was a splendid sight, and 
well fitted to call forth admiration, even 
in the breast of an enemy. The divi- 
sions of Hood and McLaws, as we have 



THE THIRD DAY'S PiaHTING. 



b'iS 



seen, had been sorely tried in the 
fighting of the 2d ; and it was part of 
the arrangement of Longstreet, who 
this day again was to play the part 
of the aggressor, that these divisions 
should cover his right flank, while he 
made the attack. The fresh division 
of Pickett, composed mostly ot veteran 
Virginians, was, therefore, singled out, 
and appointed to lead the van. Pick- 
ett's men were fonned, arranged in 
double line of battle, the brigades of 
Kemper and Garnett being placed in 
front, and that of Armistead slightly 
in the rear. On Pickett's advanced 
right was one brigade, of Hill's corps, 
under General Wilcox, formed in col- 
umn by battalions ; and on his left, but 
somewhat in the rear, was Heth's divi- 
sion, also of Hill's corps, commanded 
by Pettigrew. The attacking force 
numbered about 18,000 men. On came 
the Confederates in the order which 
we have described. The distance be- 
tween the two lines of battle was about 
a mile. For the attacking party, there 
was a hill to descend and a hill to climb, 
and a valley between. It was matter 
of observation that, as the columns 
advanced, the Confederate guns were 
silent. " Why ?" was the question put 
by the men who were rushing into the 
jaws of death. " Why ?" said the men 
on the heights behind. "Why?" said 
the Nationals on the heights in front. 
The reason was not known till after- 
wards. It was not then known to Lee 
himself. His ammunition was already 
exhausted. The silence of the guns in 
their rear did not affect the finn and 
steaily step of the advancing columns. 



It did not encourage the Nationals to 
slacken their artillery fii-e. On came 
Longstreet's men, in face of the wither- 
ing tempest of bullet and canister and 
shell which, at each successive step, deci- 
mated their front. On, on they came; and 
it was already a question in the National 
ranks whether their own thin line of 
defense could resist the fierce onset of 
those firm and compact battalions who 
seemed to fear no fii'e, to dread no foe. 
The Nationals, however, were not 
ill-prepared for the attack. Doubleday 
was on the left, with Staunard's bri- 
gade, of Vermont troops, well advanced 
in a little grove on his own right, and 
at an angle with the main line. Han- 
cock was more to the right, with his 
two divisions, of Gibbon and Haj^s, in 
front. From the direction in which the 
assaulting columns were moving, it 
seemed for a time as if the first heavy 
blow would fall upon Doubleday. 
Such, however, was the severity of the 
artillery fire from Little Round Top, 
that they were foi'ced to bend more to 
their own left. Still they moved on, 
their line of march now bringing them 
more directly in front of Hancock's 
position. Now came the opportunity 
for Stannard's brave Vermonters. In 
the original line of march, the direction 
was such that Pickett's centre would 
have struck the grove in which Stan- 
nard's men were sheltered. The doub- 
ling in towards their own left carried 
the attacking columns somewhat to the 
north of the grove, but only so far 
north as to leave their exposed, right 
flank within easy range of Stannard's 
muskets. The Vermonters were in no 



v<» 



526 



GETTYSBUKO. 



haste to waste their ammunition. The 
Confederate columns were allowed to 
come so well forward that their right 
flank was fully exposed. Then, at the 
signal given, the Vermont men pour 
forth a well-directed and most destruc- 
tive -fire. Volley succeeds volley in 
rapid succession ; and the now trem- 
bling lines, already torn and tattered, 
are under the oblique fire of eight bat- 
teries, in charge of Major McGilvray. 
Not a few of Pickett's men, unable to 
endure this terrific fire, were compelled 
to surrender. The main, body, how- 
ever, presses on ; and, inclining still 
more to his own left, Pickett is moving 
straight on the divisions of Gibbon and 
Hays. "Hold your fire, boys 5 they 
are not near enough yet," was Gib- 
bon's injunction, as he moved calmly 
and composedly along the ranks. The 
rifled guns of the National artillery, 
having fired away all their canister, 
were now withdrawn to await the issue 
of the struggle between the opposing 
infantry. The hostile lines are now 
within two and three hundred yards of 
the National front. Gibbon and Hays 
simultaneously open upon the advanc- 
ing columns a most destructive fire. 
The response is swift and well-directed, 
the Confederates using their muskets 
for the first time since they began to 
face this terrific storm of artillery and 
musketry. All at once the battle be- 
comes general. 

The swing made by the advancing 
columns to their own left, after the 
terrific blow received by them from 
Stannard, had the effect of flinging 
Pettigrew, who commanded Heth's di- 



vision, of Hill's corps, well towarda 
Hays' right. Pettigrew's men were, 
for the most part, North Carolina 
troops, and were comparatively raw 
and unused to battle. They had been 
deceived into the belief that they 
would meet only the Pennsylvania mili- 
tia. They were quickly undeceived. 
Hays' men were admirably posted. 
His right was well advanced ; and the 
nature of the ground was such as to 
enable him to open a simultaneous fire 
on Pettigrew's troops, not only with 
his right and front, but also with 
several lines in his rear. Woodruff's 
battery was also in position; and the 
destructive effects of a very tempest 
of bullets were to be aggravated by 
showers of grape and canister. All at 
once, this tremendous fire tell upon the 
already torn and decimated lines on 
Pickett's left; and they knew they 
were in the presence of the army of 
the Potomac. There was no more fight 
in them. Terror-stricken, Pettigrew's 
men broke in utter confusion, large 
numbers of them flinging down their 
arms, and accepting mercy at the hands 
of their antagonists. General Pettigrew 
himself was wounded ; but, being able 
to retain command, he vainly strove 
to rally his men. Fifteen colors, and 
2000 prisoners rewarded the skill and 
activity with which Hays met the 
threatened attack. 

While disaster was thus befalling 
the Confederate columns on the right 
and left, Pickett's brave Virginians 
were pressing forward vigorously to- 
wards Gibbon's front, and were about 
to fall with all their weight on Owen's 



THE NATIONAL LINE PENETRATED. 



527 



brigade, now temporarily commanded 
by General "Webb. This brigade com- 
prised the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania — 
Owen's own — composed mostly of Irish- 
men renowned for their gallantry in 
the Peninsula; the Seventy- First, or- 
iginally recruited and led by Baker, 
who perished at Ball's Bluff, and now 
commanded by Colonel R. Penn Smith ; 
and the Seventy-Second, commanded 
by Colonel Baxter. It was a veteran 
brigade, and was now to be sorely 
tested. General Gibbon, to allow the 
artillery to play upon the advancing 
column with grape-shot, had ordered 
this brigade to fall back behind the 
batteries. The Sixty-Ninth and the 
Seventy-First took position behind a 
low stone wall, with a slight breast- 
work in front : the Seventy-Second was 
behind the crest, some sixty paces in 
the rear, and was so placed as to be 
able to fire over the heads of those in 
front. In spite of the dreadful fire of 
artillery and musketry which was 
mowing down their ranks, Pickett's 
men rush bravely on. They are now 
close to the stone wall. The two Na- 
tional regiments in front yield and fall 
back to the regiment in the rear. 
Webb and his officers are at hand ; the 
retreating regiments are quickly rallied 
and re-formed ; and the second line is 
held. But the Confederates have pushed 
themselves over the breast-works, and 
planted their battle flags on the wall. 
The straggle now becomes fierce and 
terrific in the extreme. It is a hand- 
to-hand conflict, man facing man, and 
fighting with the energy of despair. 
The clothes of the men are actually 



being burned by the powder of the ex- 
ploding cartridges; and the National 
cannoneers, refusing to retire, are 
clubbed and bayoneted at their guns. 
Pickett, however, is now left entirely 
alone. The forces which were intended 
to cover his left have been defeated, 
captured or driven from the field. 
Wilcox, whose duty it was to come up 
and cover his right, has failed to ad- 
vance. The right of his own division 
has been badly cut up and destroyed. 
Hancock, who this day revealed all 
the qualities of a great commander in 
actual conflict, now massed his men on 
the point which was in danger. Hall 
and Harrow, who had now no longer 
an enemy in their front, were brought 
over with their brigades to reinforce 
the centre. The Nineteenth Massachu- 
setts, Colonel Devereux and Mallou's 
Forty-Second New York, both of Gate's 
brigade, of Doubleday's division, of 
the First corps, were moved in the 
same direction. Stannard, at the same 
time, moved forward two of his Ver- 
mont regiments to strike the enemy on 
the right flank. The situation, Han- 
cock tells us, had now become very 
peculiar, "The men of all the bri- 
gades had, in some measure, lost their 
regimental organization, but individual- 
ly, they were firm. The ambition of 
individual commanders to cover the 
point penetrated by the enemy, the 
smoke of the battle and the intensity 
of the engagement caused this confu. 
sion. The point, however, was covered. 
In regular foi'mation, our line would 
have stood four ranks deep." Pickett's 
men were now pressed on all sides. 



i28 



GETTYSBURG. 



The colors of the different National 
regiments were well advanced. Cheered 
by the words, and fired by the example 
of their officers, the men pressed brave- 
ly forward. It is the climax of the 
fight ; but the end is at hand. Pickett's 
men had done their best and their ut- 
most — they had fought like true heroes; 
but now, utterly overpowered, and re- 
duced to the last stage of desperation, 
they give up the fight. Flinging their 
arms from them, many of them raise 
their hands in token of surrender; 
others fall upon the ground to escape 
the destructive fire ; the remainder 
seek safety in flight. 

In this last struggle, Gibbon's divi- 
sion took 12 colors and 2500 prisoners. 
So far, Hancock had captured 27 battle 
flags and 4500 prisoners. It was a 
magnificent trophy. The losses on both 
sides were veiy hea\'y. The face of 
the hill and the low ground was 
literally covered with the dead and 
wounded. In no previous battle had 
the officers suffered so severely. On 
the National side, large numbers had 
been struck down, Generals Gibbon 
and Hancock being among the wounded. 
The Confederates left on the field four- 
teen of their field-officers, only one of 
that rank escaping unhurt ; and, of the 
three bi-igade commanders, of Pickett's 
division, Garnett was killed, A.rmitage 
fell within the National lines, fatally 
wounded, and Kemper was carried off 
the field, dangerously hurt. 

Substantially, the battle of Gettys- 
burg was now ended. Another feeble 
and foolish attempt, however, was made 
on the National lines. Wilcox's com- 



mand, it will be remembered, had origin- 
ally been placed on Pickett's right, the 
intention being that it should cover 
that flank. Wilcox, however, failed to 
advance, keeping to the right when 
Pickett bent towai'ds the left. After 
the repulse of Pickett, Wilcox ad- 
vanced to the attack alone. In passing 
over the plain, and when within a few 
hundred yards of Hancock's line, he 
was met by a tremendous fire of artil- 
lery ; and Stannard, who was again in 
position, fell upon his flank and rear, 
doing terrible damage, and capturing 
several hundred prisoners. While the 
battle was raging in Hancock's front, 
there was evidence that vigorous move- 
ments were about to be initiated by 
Ewell against the extreme National 
right, and by Longstreet against the 
extreme National left. The main at- 
tack, however, was so much of a failure 
from the commencement that neither 
of those commanders felt justified in 
rashly risking the lives of their men, 
and making what might prove to be a 
useless and costly sacrifice. Some of 
Longsti'eet's men had remained in the 
woods beyond the wheat fields, in front 
of Little Round Top; but, after Pickett 
and Wilcox had been driven back, 
Crawd^ord charged through the woods, 
driving the enemy in confusion before 
him, and capturing some hundreds of 
men, with a large quantity of arms. 
During the day, there had been some 
severe cavalry engagements, Kilpatrick 
holding the enemy's horse in check on 
the National left, and Gregg having a 
severe but successful encounter with 
Hampton on the right. Farnsworth, 



A NATIONAL VICTORY. 



539 



while heading a charge on the left 
against one of Hood's brigades, sup- 
ported by Stuart's cavalry, was killed, 
with many of his officers. The final 
charge, made by Gregg on the right, 
is said to have been one of the most 
brilliant sabre charges made during 
the war. It had evidently been Lee's 
intention, in the event of success crown- 
ing his infantry attack, to make a 
liberal use of his cavalry force, and, if 
he found himself \inable to surround 
and destroy the National army, at least 
to harass its retreat. Happilj', success 
was denied him ; and the execution of 
this contingent purpose was rendered 
unnecessary. 

What remained of the broken and 
shattered Confederate columns, after 
having been driven across the lower 
ground and terribly punished by the 
National artillery, was at length cov- 
ered by Wright's brigade, which had 
been moved forward by Lee for that 
purpose, and was thus finally brought 
back within the lines on Seminaiy 
Ridge. Lee did not choose to resume 
the attack ; and Meade did not follow 
up the victory. The armies, when 
night came, had resumed their respec- 
tive positions on the opposing heights. 
Thus was fought, for three weary days, 
and thus was ended, the famous battle of 
Grettysburg — "the greatest in respect 
of its proportions, and the weightiest 
in reapect of the issues involved, of all 
the actions waged during four years, 
between the mighty rival armies of the 
East." The losses alone entitle it to 
rank with the first-class battles of his- 
tory. The Confederate loss reached 



the enormous aggregate of 36,000 men, 
of whom .5000 were killed, and 23,000 
wounded. The National loss was 
23,000, of whom 2834 were killed, 
13,733 wounded, and 6643 missing. 

On the evening of the 3d, at 8.30 
o'clock. General Meade wrote to General 
Halleck : "The enemy opened at one 
o'clock P. M., from about 150 guns. 
He concentrated upon my left centre, 
continuing without intermission for 
about three hours, at the expiration of 
which time he assaulted my left centre 
twice, being, upon both occasions, 
handsomely repulsed with severe loss 
to him, leaving in our hands nearly 
three thousand prisoners. Among the 
prisoners are Major-General Armistead, 
and many colonels and officers of lesser 
note. The enemy left many dead upon 
the field, and a large n umber of wound- 
ed in our hands. The loss upon our 
side has been considerable. Major- 
General Hancock and Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Gibbon were wounded. After the 
repelling of the assault, indications 
leading to the belief that the enemy 
might be withdrawing, an armed recon- 
noissance was pushed forward from the 
left, and the enemy found to be in 
force. At the present hour, all is quiet. 
Brio-ades of our eavalrv have been en- 
gaged all day on both flanks of the 
enemy, harassing and vigorously attack- 
ing him with great success, notwith- 
standing they encountered superior 
numbers, both of cavalry and artillery. 
The army is in fine spirits." On the 
following day, he issued an address to 
the army of the Potomac, in which, in 
behalf of the country, he expressed his 



530 



GETTYSBURG. 



thanks to officers and men for the 
glorious result of the recent operations. 
"Our enemy," he said, "superior in 
numbers, and flushed with the pride of 
a successful invasion, attempted to over- 
come or destroy this army. Utterly 
baffled and defeated, he has now with- 
drawn from the contest. The priva- 
tions and fatigues the army has en- 
dured, and the heroic courage and gal- 
lantry it has displayed, Avill be matters 
of history, to be ever remembered Our 
task is not yet accomplished ; and the 
commanding general looks to the aitny 
for greater efforts, to drive fi-om our 
soil every vestige of the presence of 
the invader. It is right and proper 
that we should, on suitable occasions, 
return our grateful thanks to the Al- 
mighty Disposer of events that, in the 
goodness of His providence. He has 
thought fit to give victory to the cause 
of the just." On the same day, the 
following suitable announcement was 
issued by the president : 

" Washington, D. C, July 4, 1863—10 A. M. 

"The president of the United States 
announces to the country that the news 
from the army of the Potomac, up to 
ten o'clock P. M., of the 3d, is such as 
to cover the army with the highest 
honor, to promise great success to the 
cause of the Union, and to claim the 
condolence of all for the many gallant 
fallen ; and that for this he especially 
desires that on this day, * He whose 
will, not ours, should ever be done,' 
be eveiywhere remembered and rev- 
erenced with the profoundest gratitude. 
"Abraham Lincoln." 



Lee's disappointment, by the complete 
failure of his attack on the 3d, must 
indeed have been great. His dream 
of invasion was at an end. A second 
time he had entered the Northern 
States in triumph. A second time he 
had been compelled to abandon his 
purpose, and to fall back towards Rich- 
mond. This time, he had confidently 
believed that victory wa9 within his 
grasp. After an effort so mighty and 
so persistent, and after a failure so de- 
cided, he could hardly hope for another 
opportunity. One of his colonels, who 
was present at his headquarters when, 
on the third day, the attacking columns 
broke and fell back in wild disorder, 
says, speaking of Lee : " If Longstreet's 
behavior was admirable, that of Gen- 
eral Lee was perfectly sublime. He 
was engaged in rallying and encourag- 
ing the broken troops, and was riding 
about, a little in front of the wood, 
quite alone — his staff being engaged in 
a similar manner, further to the rear. 
His face, Avhich is always placid and 
cheerful, did not show signs of the 
slightest disappointment, care or an- 
noyance ; and he was addressing to 
every soldier a few words of encourage- 
ment, such as, 'All this will come out 
right in the end : we vdll talk it over 
afterwards; but, meanwhile, all good 
men must rally.' He had words of 
kindness for the wounded, many of 
whom, as they were carried past, took 
off their hats and cheered him. ' We 
cannot expect,' he said, 'always to win 
victories.' To Wilcox, when he came 
up with his shattered division, he said, 
* All this has been my fault ; it is I 



GBlfEKAL LEJfl AFTER THE i5ATTLB. 



531 



w^ho have lost this battle.'" Imboden 
has preserved for us a touching picture 
of the general, as he saw him about one 
o'clock on the morning of the 4th of 
July. He had been sent for by Lee,, 
who directed him to wait for him at his 
own headquarters. When Lee joined 
him, there was not even a sentinel on 
duty, and no one of his staff was about. 
"The moon was high in the heavens, 
shedding a flood of silvery light, al- 
most as bright as day, upon the scene. 
When he approached and saw us, he 
spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed 
to dismount. The effort to do so be- 
trayed so much physical exhaustion 
that I stepped forward to assist him ; 
but before I reached the saddle, he 
had alighted. He threw his arm across 
his saddle to rest himself, and, fixing 
his eyes upon the ground, leaned in 
silence on his equally weary horse, 
the two forming a striking group, as 
motionless as a statue. The moon 
shone full upon his massive features, 
and revealed an expression of sadness 
I had never seen upon that fine face 
before, in any of the vicissitudes of the 
war through which he had passed. I 
waited for him to speak until the silence 
became painful and embarrassing, when, 
to break it and change the current of 
his thoughts, I remarked, in a sympa- 
thetic tone, and in allusion to his great 
fatigue : ' General, this has been a hard 
day on you.' This attracted his atten- 
tion. He looked up and replied, mourn- 
fully : ' Yes, it has been a sad, sad day 
to us,' and immediately relapsed into 
his thoughtful mood and attitude." A 
little later, he turned to Imboden, and, 



straightening himself to his full height, 
with energy and excitement in his 
manner, and in a voice tremulous with 
emotion, said : " General, I never saw 
troo}3S behave more magnificently than 
Pickett's division of Virginians did to- 
day in their grand charge upon the 
enemy. And if they had been sup- 
ported, as they ought to have been — > 
but, for some reason unknown to me, 
they were not — we would have held 
the position they so gloriously won, at 
such a fearful loss of noble lives, and 
the day would have been ours." After 
a moment, he added, in a tone almost 
of agony : " Too bad ! too bad ! ! oh, 
too bad ! ! ! " Into the inner agonies of 
that noble soul, at that trying moment, 
it is not for us to penetrate. " We 
must go back to Virginia," he soon 
afterwards exclaimed ; and Imboden 
received his instructions to guard the 
trains in their backward course. 

It was Lee's conviction that another 
attack would be beset with serious 
danger. He puts it mildly, in his re- 
jjort, when he says : " The severe loss 
sustained by the army, and the reduc- 
tion of its ammunition, rendered an- 
other attempt to dislodge the enemy 
unadvisable." He, therefore, made im- 
mediate preparations for a retreat. 
Ewell was drawn back, on the morning 
of the 4th, from the base of Gulp's Hill 
and from Gettysburg; and a strong 
line of works was thrown from the 
seminary towards the northwest ; while 
another line was formed on the right 
flank, perpendicular with the general 
front, and extending back as far as 
Marsh Creek In this position, he re- 



532 



GETTYSBURG. 



mained over the 4th, burying his dead, 
sending off the wounded, not disposed 
to resume the aggressive, but, accord- 
ing to good and reliable authority, not 
unwilling to be attacked. The day 
was similarly spent by the National 
army. It had been Lee's intention to 
retire his whole aimy on the night of 
the 4th. But a severe storm had come 
on shortly after midday ; and the rain 
fell in torrents during the afternoon, 
and continued far into the night. The 
condition of the roads made a rapid 
retreat impossible. It was not, there- 
fore, until the forenoon of Sunday, the 
5th, that Ewell's corps, which brought 
up the rear, left its position near Get- 
tysburg. After a difficult and toilsome 
march, by the Chambersburg and Faii-- 
field roads, through South Mountain, 
the Confederate army reach Hagei'ston 
on the afternoon of the 6th and the 
morning of the 7th of July. 

As soon as the Confederates had 
abandoned their position at Gettysburg, 
General Meade made preparations to 
follow lip the retreat. There were two 
courses open : he might make a du-ect 
pursuit, pass through the South Moun- 
tain in their i-ear, and press them down 
the Cumberland Valley; or he might 
make a flank movement by the east 
side of South Mountain, defile through 
the Boonsboro' Passes, and either head 
off the enemy or take him in flank. 
Sedgwick's corps, the freshest in the 
army, was ordered to follow the enemy 
by the Fairfield road, and harass his 
rear. On the evening of the 6th, Sedg- 
wick overtook the Confederates at the 
Fairfield Pass ; but they were so strong- 



ly posted that he deemed it unadvis- 
able to attack. Meanwhile, Meade had 
made up his mind to pursue the other 
route; and Sedgwick was recalled. 
General French, who since the evacua- 
tion of Harper's Ferry had been occupy- 
ing Frederick, was thereupon ordered 
to seize the lower passes of South 
Mountain in advance, and also to re- 
possess himself of Harper's Ferry. All 
this he did; and, in addition, by push 
iug forward a cavalry force, he succeed- 
ed in destroying a Confederate pontoon 
biidge which, at that point, had beea 
thrown across the Potomac. When 
Lee's army reached Williamsport, the 
river was still greatly swollen, and the 
pontoon bridge had been destroyed. 
On the 12th, when Meade came up 
with his whole army, Lee had taken a 
strong position on the Potomac, ex- 
tending from Williamsport to Falling 
Waters, and had thrown up entrench- 
ments along his whole line. Meade 
had once more an opportunity of strik- 
ing the enemy in what seemed advan- 
tageous circumstances. But the reasons 
which prevailed and prevented an at- 
tack after the battle of the 3d, pre- 
vailed again, and prevented an attack 
on the 12th. On the 13th, Lee's 
engineers had succeeded in throwing 
over another pontoon bridge ; and the 
waters had fallen so much that, at a 
certain point, they were fordable. By 
the aid of the bridge and the ford, the 
Confederate army was safely pushed 
across to the southern side of the Po- 
tomac. Meade crossed the river im- 
mediately afterwards ; but Lee, still 
refusing battle, fell back to the banks 



MEADE 4JfJj tICKLEIS. 



533 



of the Rapidan, where the opposing 
armies took position. This was the 
end of the Gettysburg campaign. 

This campaign, from first to last, has 
been a fruitful theme of discussion 
among military critics. Militaiy criti- 
cism, in any high sense, is not the pur- 
pose of this work. Our aim, rather, is 
to give a clear, intelligible and interest- 
ing account of what actually took place, 
leaving the reader to come to his own 
conclusions. There are, however, con- 
nected with this campaign, questions 
which are still discussed, and some of 
which will never be settled. These it 
is impossible to pass over in absolute 
silence. There is the unsettled ques- 
tion between Meade and Sickles. It is 
undeniable that the advanced position 
which Sickles took on the 2d en- 
couraged the Confederate attack on 
that day, and very nearly ruined the 
National prospect. It is as little to 
be denied that Sickles, in assuming the 
responsibility of taking such a position, 
made a mistake. A more perfect mili- 
tary training, a more practised military 
eye would have made such a choice of 
ground impossible. But Sickles was 
not alone to blame. It was Meade's 
business to attend not to one part of 
his line, but to the whole of it ; and it 
is notorious that, on his first arrival on 
the field, his anxiety for his right made 
him neglectful of his left. It is true 
that he gave Sickles instructions to 
continue the line on the ridge between 
Hancock and the Round Tops. But 
it is also true that Sickles notified him 
of the peculiarity of the ground in the 
position assigned him, and of his desire 



and intention to occupy the elevated 
ground in front. Then, again, it waa 
only at the last moment, when the first 
thundering discharge of the enemy's 
artillery was about to fall upon the 
doomed position, that Meade came to 
inspect the ground. If Sickles erred 
in judgment, it does seem as if Meade 
was neglectful of duty. It is impor- 
tant also to bear in mind that, but for 
the accidental presence of General War- 
ren at a most critical moment. Little 
Round Top, the key of the National 
position, would have been at the mercy 
of the enemy. Meade was, no doubt, 
justified in believing that his orders 
would be obeyed ; but it was clearly 
his duty to see in time that they were 
strictly carried out. 

There is the other question on which 
so much difference of opinion exists, 
and which probably ever will exist. 
Meade has been blamed by many — he 
has been justified by not a few — for his 
excessive caution in following up the 
victory of the 3d. It does seem, at 
first sight, as if he ought to have pur- 
sued his advantage at once, and made a 
vigorous onset on the Confederate lines, 
when they were thrown into confusion 
by the rout of Pettigrew, Pickett and 
Wilcox. This was the opinion of Gen- 
eral Hancock ; and it was his belief 
that, if Meade had advanced at once, h^ 
would have won a great victory. It 
was Meade's own intention to make an 
immediate assault; and he has given 
us his reasons why it was not done. 
"The great length of the line," he says, 
" and the time required to can-}- these 
orders out to the front, and the move- 



931 



GETTYSBURG. 



ment subsequently made, before the re- 
ports given to me of the condition of the 
forces in the front and left, caused it to 
be so late in the evening as to induce 
me to abandon the assault vrhich I had 
contemplated." Possibly, it was just 
as well that the assault was not made. 
Mr. Swinton tells us that, in a conver- 
sation had with Longstreet, in regard 
to the proposed attack, the latter said 
to him : " I had the divisions of Hood 
and McLaws, that had not been en- 
gaged during the day ; I had a heavy 
force of artillery ; and I have no doubt 
that I should have given the Federals 
as severe a repulse as that received by 
Pickett." Meade was, perhaps, more 
to blame for the manner in which he 
conducted the' pursuit when the enemy 
abandoned his position and fell back 
towards the Potomac, He chose the 
longer route for a questionable advan- 
tage ; and his movements were so slow 
that Lee reached the Potomac six days 
before him. When he came up in 
force, on the 12th, he had certainly a 
splendid opportunity to strike his an- 
tagonist; and it will ever partake of 
the character of a mystery why Lee, 
with the National army in his front, 
was able, with so much ease and so 
little molestation, to retire his whole 
army across the Potomac. There was 
a sting in what Lincoln said to Meade 
shortly afterwards : " The fruit seemed 
80 ripe, so ready for plucking, that it 
was very hard to lose it." 

The commanding generals on both 
sides had causes for regret and causes 
for joy and rejoicing. General Lee 
made some mistakes during the three 



days' fighting at Gettysburg, He at- 
tenuated, and therefore weakened, his 
lines by too much extension, in order 
to cover the entire front of the National 
position ; his assault on the 2d ought 
to have been more concentrated, and, 
where concentrated, more forcefully 
sustained, or made along the whole 
length of his line; and "the attack" 
on Hancock's front, on the 3d, to quote 
the words of Longstreet, "should have 
been made with 30,000, instead of 
15,000 men," But, if General Lee 
had reason to regret the result at Get- 
tysburg, he was not without reason 
for being proud of his retreat. Gen- 
eral Meade was in a position not whol- 
ly dissimilar. His conduct of the pur- 
suit reflect^.d on him but little credit. 
The victory at Gettysburg was due 
more, perhaps, to the intelligence, the 
skill, the pride, the pluck of the individ- 
ual soldier, than to the superior genius, 
the tactical skill, or the wise ar- 
rangements of the commander-in-chief. 
But the ai'my of the Potomac, after a 
series of painful and even shameful 
reverses, had at last won a splendid 
victory ; and to General Meade, as its 
chief, legitimately and fairly belonged 
the glory. 

This great National victory marked a 
turning-point in the history of the Civil 
War. A Confederate success at Getty* 
burg would have had a most damagi 
ing influence on the National cause. 
It might, as we have already hinted, 
have had the effect of permanently di- 
viding the Union, It would certainly 
have greatly encouraged that growing 
dislike of the war which was finding 



REYNOLDS. 



5M 



powerful expression in the large centres 
of population ; and there is reason to 
fear that it would have given foreign 
governments a pretext for recognizing 
the South. Meade's great victory, oc- 
curring as it did simultaneously with 
Grant's equally glorious victory at 
Vicksbui'g, and followed so quickly by 

AuoNO the illustrious men who perished at Gettys- 
burg, there was no greater or more honored name than 
that of Major-General John Fulton Reynolds. He was 
bom in Lancaster, Pa., in 1820. He graduated at West 
Point on the 30th of June, 1841, and, on the 23d of 
October following, received his commission as second 
lieutenant in the Third artUlery. He attained the rank 
of first lieutenant in June, 1846, and served through 
the Mexican War ; and, for his gallant and meritorious 
conduct at Monterey and Buena Vista, was brevetted 
captain and major. After having been engaged in 
military service in California, and against the Indians 
on the Pacific Coast, he was appointed aide to General 
Wool ; and, on the 3d of March, 1855, he was promoted 
to a captaincy in the Third artillery. In May, 1801, he 
was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Fourteenth U. 
S. Infantry. On the 20th of August, 18G1, he was 
commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers, and ap- 
pointed to the command of the First brigade of the 
Pennsylvania Reserve corps, then under General Mc- 
Call. In June, 18G2, the reserves joined the army of 
the Potomac •, and General Reynolds took part in the 



the surrender of Port Hudson, turned 
the tide of popular sentiment. The 
Confederacy was doomed. Its com- 
plete collapse was now merely a ques- 
tion of time. After two years of 
darkness and sorrow, the rainbow of 
promise was revealed: and the Na- 
tional heart was glad 



battles of Mechanicsville and Gainet Mi\t He was 
also engaged at Savage's Station, and at Charles City 
Cross Roads, where he took command of the division, 
when McCall was made prisoner. Later on the same 
day, he himself was captured, and sent to Richmond. 
After his release, he returned and took command of his 
division on the 26th of September, soon afterwards tak- 
ing command of the First army corps by virtue of seni- 
ority of rank. He commanded this corps at the battle of 
Fredericksburg. In January, 18Ci3, he was nominated 
major-general of volunteers. At ChaneeUorsville, ha 
was in the reserve, and took no active part. On the 12th 
of June, he was appointed to the command of the right 
wing of Hooker's army, having charge of three corps. 
How he brought on the engagement at Gettysburg, and 
how he came by his sudden and untimely end, has j ust 
been shown. In General Reynolds, the National army 
lost one of its ablest soldiers, and the Union one of it& 
noblest defenders. But for him, the National arm} 
might have failed to occupy Cemetery Ridge and th« 
adjoining heights; and the non-occupation of tbo»* 
heights mjfitht have led to defeat at Gettysburg. 



636 



OHIOKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Dm Army of the Cumberland. — Bragg and Bosecranz. — Positions of the Rival Armies. — Attempt to ReobpttiM 
Fort Donelson. — Eaid by Davis. — Spring Hill. — Thompson's Station. — Van Dom and Forrest. — Franklin. — 
Defeat of Van Dom. — Minty's Expedition. — Streight's Expedition. — Drivers' Gap. — Duck Eiver. — The Army 
of the Cumberland StiU Inactive. — The Government Impatient. — Chattanooga. — The National Army in Mo- 
tion. — Rosecranz Fully Prepared. — His Plan of Battle. — Hoover's Gap.— Tullahoma. — Bragg Falls Back to 
Bridgeport. — Bumside Ordered to Co-operate with Rosecranz. — GiUmore Defeats Pegram. — Sanders' Raid. — 
Backner at Knoxville. — Knoxville Relieved. — Great Rejoicing. — Cumberland Gap Occupied by the Na- 
tionals. — WUd Rumors. — Bragg and Rosecranz Preparing for Action. — Bragg Abandons Chattanooga. — 
Victory Without a Battle. — A Grand Opportunity Lost. —Rosecranz' Mistake. — Chickamauga. — The Armies 
Confronting Each Other. —Disposition of the Forces. — Opening of the Fight. — Thomas in Peril.— Haeen 
Comes to the Rescue.— Fighting all Along the Line. — Close of the First Day. — The Advantage with the 
Nationals. — The Second Day's Fighting. — A Terrific Cannonade. — Breckenridge's Fierce Onset. — Thomas 
Calls for Help.— A Sad Mishap.— The National Centre Pierced.— The Right Driven Back.— Thomas Stands 
Firm, like a Wall of Iron. — The Rock of Chickamauga. — General Gordon Granger. — Longstreet's Impetu- 
ous Attacks.— Thomas Holds His Ground.— The Nationals Fall Back to Chattanooga. —Thomas the Hero 
of Chickamauga. — Chattanooga Invested. — The National Communications Cut. — The Army of the Cumber- 
land an Object of National Anxiety. ^Grant Summoned to Chattanooga. — Rosecranz Removed From Com- 
mand. — Grant at Louisville. — In Command. —Instructions to Thomas. — Reinforcements. — Arrival of Hooker. — 
Smith's Movement.— Grant at Nashville.— Brown's Ferry . —Lookout Valley.— Wauhatchie.— Severe Fight- 
ing. — Geary's Men Performing Prodigies of Valor. —Hooker Victorious. —Commendations. — Sherman's Ap- 
proach.— His Arrival at Bridgeport.— Grant's Plana Working Admirably. —Bragg's Mistake.- He Detaches 
Longstreet.— Preparations for the Attack. — Disposition of the Troops. — Deception. — Bragg Supposed to be 
About to Retreat. — Sherman at Brown's Ferry. — Grant Impatient of Delay. — Thomas Ordered to AJvanc-?.— 
A Splendid Sight. — Orchard Knob Captured. — An Important Position Gained.— Hooker at Lookout Moun- 
tain. — Sherman Crosses the Tennessee, and Takes Position on the North of Missionary Ridge. — Lookout 
Creek Swollen and Impassable. — Geary's Movement to Wauhatchie. — Across the Creek.— A Heavy Mist. — 
Geary's Success. — A Firm Foothold on the Mountain. —Lookout Mountain Abandoned by the Confede- 
rates. — Another Point Gained.— A Battle Above the Clouds. —Chattanooga Valley Abandoned. — The Con- 
federates Concentrate on Missionary Ridge. —The Blockade of the Tennessee Ended.— The Na«oual Lma 
United.— Grant's Headquarters. —Preparations for the Final Blow.— The Battle Plan.— Hooker's Delay.— 
Sherman's Advance. — Hooker on Missionary Ridge. — Great Success. — Sherman Fiercely Resisted. — Bragp 
Concentrates on His Own Right. —Sherman Sorely Pressed. — Repeated and Persistent Attacks on Sher- 
man's Front. — Grant Remembers Shiloh. —Hooker's Victory. — Bragg OutgeneraUed. — Thomas Ordered to 
Advance.— The Thunderbolt Launched.— A Terrific Struggle.— The Thunder of Artillery.- Scrambling Vp 
the Heights. — The Advancing Colors. — Fighting in Groups. — The Crest Scaled. — The Confederates Driven 
from the HiU.— Flight of Bragg and Breckenridge.— Sherman at the Railroad Tunnel.— The Battle Htill 
B«glng. — The Confederates Driven Back at All Points. — A Great and Glorious Victory.— Grant's Modesty. — 
The Pursuit. — Knoxville. — Bumside Besieged. — Longstreet's Fierce Assaults. — Bumside on His l/ast bay's 
Provisions. — A Gallant Defense. — Advance of Sherman to Knoxville. — Granger's Cavalry. — Longstreet's Last 
Assault.— A Terrible Repulse.— Dead and Wounded Piled Up in the Ditch.— Longstreet's Retreat.— End oi 
the Siege.— Sherman's Brave Army. — Bumside Thanks Sherman. — End of the Campaign. — Honors to Grant.— 
Congratulations. — ^Universal Rejoicing. — Grant the National Hero. — Bragg Removed from Command —Tbs 
Confederates Discouraged. 



OuE attention must now be given to 

.„„ the army of the Cumberland. In 

* a previous chapter, ve*^ Have de- 



scribed the famous battles of Perryvill^ 
and Murfreesboro, in both of -vyhicb 
engagements the Nationals were vi© 



FORT DONELSOWo 



587 



torious. On the night of the 3d of 
January, 1863, Bragg withdrew from 
Murfreesboro ; and Rosecranz at last 
grasped his blood-clotted piize. The 
army of the Cumberland, in these two 
battles, had really covered itself with 
glory ; and the gallantry and skill ex- 
hibited by its brave commander had 
drawn towards him the affections and 
hopes of the nation. 

After the occupation of Murfrees- 
boro by Rosecranz, Bragg took a 
strong position to the north of the 
Duck River, his infantry extending 
from Shelbyville to Wartrace, his cav- 
alry stretching out on his right to Mc- 
Minnville, and on his left to Columbia 
and Spring Hill. He had outposts at 
Hoover's and Liberty Gaps, about ten 
miles from Murfreesboro. His main 
base of supplies was at Chattanooga. 
He had also a large depot at TuUa- 
homa. From January until June, the 
two armies thus confronting each other 
lay in comparative idleness, neither 
making any serious attempt to provoke 
battle. 

Although there had not, during those 
six months, been any general engage- 
ment, there had been some severe 
skirmishing, and several important side 
encounters. Early in February, an at- 
tempt was made by General Wheeler, 
Bragg's chief of artillery, with 4500 
mounted men, to recapture Fort Donel- 
son. The garrison was small, consist- 
ing only of some 600 men, mostly of 
the Eighty-Third Illinois, with a sec- 
tion of Flood's battery, and a 32-pound 
siege gun — the whole under the com- 
mand of Colonel A. C. Harding. The 



object of the Confederates was, by re- 
occupying Fort Donelson, to interrupt 
the navigation of the Cumberland, and 
so prevent the transportation of sup- 
plies to Nashville for the use of the 
National army. On the 3d of pebt 
Februarj^, a little after mid-day, a ^* 
demand was made for the surrender oi 
Fort Donelson and the garrison. Weak 
in numbers, Harding was strong at 
heart. He defied the foe, and sent a 
small steamer down the river to sum- 
mon to his aid some gunboats, which 
he knew were not far off. Meanwhile, 
Wheeler and his men had approached 
within cannon range. Harding opened 
upon them vrith his 32-pounder and 
his four smaller guns. Thf fight con- 
tinued till dark, Harding holding his 
position, although he had lost 45 of his 
60 artillery horses. At eight o'clock 
in the evening came up the gunboat 
Fair Play, Lieutenant- Commanding 
Fitch, and opened upon the Confede- 
rates a raking fire. Wheeler and his 
men were dismayed ; and, as other gun 
boats were seen coming up to take part 
in the contest, they fled precipitately, 
leaving behind them, dead on the fields 
some 150 men, and about the same 
number of prisoners. Harding lost 
126 men, of whom 50 had been made 
prisoners. Fort Donelson was hence- 
forth left undisturbed. While Wheeler 
was on the Cumberland, General J. C. 
Davis, with two brigades of cavalry, 
under Colonel Minty, was operating in 
his rear. Moving westward from Mur- 
freesboro, Davis scoured the country, 
and, at the end of thirteen days, he re- 
turned to camp, with 141 of Wheeler'9 



538 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



men as prisoners, among whom were 
two colonels and several officers of 
rank. 

There was a period of repose. Early 
in March, however, it became known 
that General Van Dorn, with a large 
mounted force, was in the vicinity of 
Franklin. General John Colbum, who 
was stationed at Franklin, and General 
Sheridan, who was with the main araiy 
at Murfreesboro, were ordered, with 
their respective commands, to move 
simultaneously against Van Dorn. Col- 
Mart burn, on the 4th of March, with 
^« some 2700 men, some 600 of 
whom were mounted, set out in the 
direction of Spring Hill. He had ad- 
vanced but a little way when he came 
into contact with the Confederate 
ekirmishers. These, however, were 
easily repulsed. Colburn experienced 
no further resistance during the remain- 
der of that day; but, as evening ap- 
proached, the enemy appeared in his 
front, in very considerable force. Halt- 
ing, and encamping for the night, Col- 
burn resumed his forward movement 
early next morning. Soon after start- 
ing, he found himself attacked by a 
vastly superior force, under Van Dorn 
and Forrest. The Nationals made a 
bold resistance ; but, being greatly out- 
numbered, and his ammunition being 
exhausted, Colburn was compelled to 
fall back and seek safety in flight, leav- 
ing some 1300 of his men in the hands 
of the enemy. Sheridan, with his di- 
vision, and some 1800 cavalry, under 
Colonel Minty. moved first towards 
Shelbyville and then round in the di- 
rection of Franklin, After various 



skirmishes, he encountered Van Dorn 
and Forrest at Thompson's Sta- Mar. 
tion, on the 14th of March. There !*• 
was a sharp fight; but the Confede- 
rates were ultimately driven back be- 
hind the Duck River. Sheridan re- 
turned to Murfreesboro, after a ten 
days' ride, having lost only 5 men 
killed and 5 wounded. He brought 
with him 100 prisoners. 

In the beginning of April, Van Dorn 
again appeared in force in the neigh- 
borhood of Franklin. General Gordon 
Granger was in command of the Na- 
tional troops at that station. Granger 
had timely warning of the approach of 
the enemy, and made every preparation 
to give him a warm reception. Granger 
had all but completed a new fort — which 
afterwards bore his name — on the north- 
ern side of the Harpeth River, and on a 
commanding eminence about fifty feet 
above the stream. The fort, on which 
already were in position two siege guns 
and two rifled cannon, completely com- 
manded the approaches to Franklin. 
Granger's infantry and artilleiy were 
under the immediate command of Gen- 
erals Baird and Gilbert. Generals 
G. C. Smith and Stanley had charge of 
the cavalry. Baird was posted so as 
to guard the ford below Franklin ; 
Gilbert was placed so as to meet an 
attack in front ; Stanley was pushed 
out four miles on the road towards 
Murfreesboro ; while Smith was held 
in reserve, to be ready, if occasion 
should call for it, to rush to Stanley's 
assistance. On the 10th of April, April 
Van Dorn, with a mounted force l^* 
of about 9000 men and two regiments 



RAIDING PARTIES. 



5S» 



of foot, came up the Columbia and 
Levvisburg turnpikes, and fell heavily 
on Granger's front. Granger, how- 
ever, was ready to receive him. The 
National troops stood firm; and the 
guns from the new fort opened upon 
the assailants a most destructive fire. 
Stanley, seizing his opportunity, rushed 
forward and struck Van Dorn a tre- 
mendous blow on the flank. Smith's 
troops were already in motion, to sup- 
port Stanley; and Baird's men were 
already across the river and taking part 
in the fight. For a time, it seemed as 
if the Confederates would be over- 
whelmed, and driven ingloriously from 
the field. In Granger's front, they 
were completely defeated; they had 
sustained a heavy loss in killed and 
wounded ; and some 500 men had been 
made prisoners. Van Dorn, however, 
was a daring and capable officer, and 
not easily induced to believe in defeat. 
Gathering up his whole strength, he 
flung himself upon Stanley, before 
Smith had found time to come to his 
aid; and such was the vigor and 
weight of the onset, that Stanley was 
compelled to fall back, thus permitting 
Van Dorn to recover most of his cap- 
tured men, and, at the same time, to 
make good his escape. The Confede- 
rate commander retired to Spring Hill, 
with a loss of about 300 men in killed, 
wounded and prisoners. Granger's loss 
was comparatively trifling, amounting 
in all to about 37 killed, wounded and 
missing. 

During the month of April, there 
were many such skirmishes, not all of 
equal importance, and some of them 



resulting advantageously, some of them 
disastrously to the National cause. 
Prominent among the expeditions sent 
out at that date was that of Colonel 
Minty, who, starting from Murfrees- 
boro, with a powerful force, scoured 
the country in the direction of Mc- 
Minnville, and destroyed a large 
amount of property, making many 
prisoners, and capturing large numbers 
of mules and horses. About the mid- 
dle of that month, an expedition, com- 
posed of the Fifty-First Indiana, Eigh- 
teenth Illinois, and a part of two Ohio 
regiments — some 1800 men in all — and 
commanded by Colonel A. D. Streight, 
set out from Nashville, on a mission 
from which great things were expected. 
This force was called " an independent 
provisional brigade," and was created 
for "temporary purposes." Streight's 
instructions were that he should de- 
stroy the railroads, the stores, the 
manufactories, in the rear of the Con- 
federate army, and in every way 
make retreat difficult, if not impossi- 
ble. With his command on board 
steamers, Streight left Nashville on the 
11th of April. On reaching Dover, he 
disembarked his troops, and marched 
them across the country to Fort Henry, 
on the Tennessee River. There he 
waited for the boats which had gone 
around by the Ohio. Embarking again, 
he went up the Tennessee to Eastport, 
where he landed ; then, moving south- 
ward, he joined General Dodge, who 
was moving towards Tuscumbia, on the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad. It 
was not intended that he should remain 
in conjunction with Dodge, but only 



MO 



OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



that he should march with him long 
enough to create the impression that 
his troops formed a part of that leader's 
command, and at the proper time to 
strike off from Tuscumbia towards 
Russelville or Moulton. On their de- 
parture from Nashville, Streight's men 
were not provided with horses. It was 
expected that they would be able to 
pick them up by the way. "When they 
joined Dodge, one half of the command 
was still on foot. At Tuscumbia, the 
joint forces encountered and defeated 
a strong body of Confederates ; and, as 
his men were well mounted, Streight, 
without delay, set out for Russelville. 
Having reached that place, he turned 
to the east, his object being to strike 
the important cities of Rome and At- 
lanta, in Northern Georgia. At Rome 
there were extensive iron-works; and 
Atlanta was a great railroad centre. 
Streight was not to be allowed to pro- 
ceed on his mission unmolested. He 
had scarcely commenced his march, 
when he was pursued by a powerful 
cavaliy force, under the Confederate 
leaders, FoiTest and Roddy. The Na- 
tionals were overtaken in the neighbor- 
hood of Moulton, Lawrence County, 
Alabama. At Drivers' Gap, of the 
Sand Mountain, there was a severe en- 
counter, which lasted the greater part 
of a day. Then commenced a running 
fight, which continued for four days, 
and during which there were two severe 
battles and several spirited skirmishes. 
In a circuit of about one hundred miles, 
the Nationals destroyed a large quan- 
tity of corn, collected for the use of 
the Confederate army, burned several 



bridges and one cannon foundry, and 
captured many animals. When about 
fifteen miles from Rome, a detachment, 
which had been sent forward to that 
place, fell back on the main body ; and, 
at the same time, the pursuers, now 
4000 strong, under Forrest, fell with 
great force on the National rear. His 
ammunition being now exhausted, and 
his men overpowered by fatigue, Streight 
had no choice but surrender. The cap- 
tives were sent to Libby Prison, where 
they were held until Februar}', 1864. 
when they effected their escape by dig- 
ging under the foundations of the 
building. Meanwhile, Dodge had had 
better success. When Streight set out 
for Rome and Atlanta, he struck off to 
the south ; and having made a sweeping 
raid in Northern Alabama and Missis- 
sippi, he returned to his headquarters 
at Corinth. 

During the month of May and the 
greater portion of June, the armies of 
Rosecranz and Bragg remained in their 
old positions, the former at Murfrees- 
boro, the latter along the general line 
of the Duck River, neither evincing any 
signs of a disposition to attack. Ih 
this month, there was a prevailing feel- 
ing of disappointment, because of the 
long-continued inaction of the army 
of the Cumberland. In some quarters, 
this sentiment found free and full ex- 
pression. By his victory at Murfrees- 
boro, Rosecranz had w^on the affections 
and confidence of the people. What 
he had done, it was thought, was but « 
proof of what he could do, and an earn- 
est of greater things yet to be accom- 
plished by the army of the Cumber 




UL 



W 1 L L I A \1 I . ^^L 




GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE 



THE BATTLE GEOUND. 



541 



land, under its skilful and accomplished 
leader. One half year of inaction, after 
a victory so splendid, had been suffi- 
cient to give an entirely altered tone to 
the sentiment of the North. Rose- 
cranz, however, was not without good 
reasons for his delay. His army, after 
Murfreesboro, was in a dreadfully shat- 
tered condition ; and when gradually, 
through rest and reinforcements, he 
became strong enough to justify an 
offensive movement, he felt restrained, 
by military considerations, from resum- 
ing the conflict. It was the opinion of 
Rosecranz that it would be unwise for 
him to hazard a battle until the fate 
of Vicksburg should have been deter- 
mined. Considering the relative posi- 
tions of hLs own army and that of 
Grant, he deemed it impolitic " to risk 
two great and decisive battles at the 
same time." Such, however, were not 
the views entertained at headquarters 
at Washington. It was the opinion of 
Halleck that the time was opportune 
for Rosecranz to put his army in mo- 
tion, and, by falling heavily on his 
antagonist, driving him into Georgia, 
and relieving East Tennessee, to pierce 
the very heart of the Confederiicj^ 
Orders were given accordingly. In a 
former chapter we have pointed out the 
importance of this natural stronghold. 
Its strategic worth was seen and ad- 
mitted alike by the National and 
Confederate leaders from the com- 
mencement of operations in the West. 
Buell, it will be remembered, was de- 
tached from the army of the West, 
after the battle of Corinth, and ordered 
by Halleck to advance and take pos- 



session of Chattanooga. Bragg, how- 
ever, was intent on the same purpose : 
and, pushing forward with the utmost 
rapidity, he outstripped Buell and se- 
cured the stronghold. In spite of the 
defeat at Perryville, and the mors 
crushing blow received at Murfrees- 
boro, Bragg remained master of Chat- 
tanooga and the mountain fastnesses 
around. The possession of the place, 
however, had not ceased to be an object 
of ambition with the National govern- 
ment ; and the contest, suspended since 
the battle of Murfreesboro, was about 
to be resumed. 

The majestic folds of the earth's 
surface, known as the Appalachian 
Ranges, separate the Atlantic portion 
of the Southern States from the Mis- 
sissippi Valley. These folds, for the 
most part, run parallel to each other, 
and are crossed at intervals by trans- 
verse depressions or gaps. Such pas- 
sages, it can readily be understood, are 
of gi-eat commercial, political, and mili- 
tary importance. From the region of 
Chattanooga, the earth-folds range in a 
southwesterly direction, the more ele- 
vated ridges being named respectively 
Chickamauga Hills, Pigeon Mountain, 
Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, 
and Racoon or Sand Mountain. The 
name Chattanooga signifies, in the Che- 
rokee language, "Hawk's Nest." The 
town of that name is built in one of 
those transverse depressions, on the 
south bank of the Tennessee River, 
and at the mouth of Chattanooga Val- 
ley. This valley, through which runs 
a stream of the same name, is flanked 
on the west by Lookout Mountain, 



»02 



£42 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



which rises to the height of 2400 feet, 
and on the east by Missionary Ridge, 
eo named, because it was an early and 
influential seat of Catholic missions 
among the Cherokee Indians. The de- 
pression between Missionary Ridge and 
Pigeon Mountain is called Chickamauga 
Valley. The two valleys, Chattanooga 
ana Chickamauga, spring from a com- 
mon centre, McLemore's Cove, which 
is shut in by Lookout on the west and 
Pigeon on the east. Such was the re- 
gion now about to become the theatre 
of a series of desperate and bloody 
contests. 

On the 24th of June, Rosecranz, in 
Jane obedience to instructions from 
24. headquarters, set his army in mo- 
tion. He had under him some 60,000 
effective men. General Burnside, who 
was in Kentucky, was ordered to ad- 
vance through the mountain passes into 
East Tennessee, and connect his right 
with Rosecranz's left. 

Bragg's army, which consisted of 
some 40,000 men, was strongly posted at 
ShelbyvUlo and at Wartrace, with out- 
posts at Hoover's and Liberty Gaps. 
He held a strong position also at Tul- 
iahoma. 

Rosecranz was well aware of the 
strength of Bragg's position; and it 
was his purpose, from the outset, so to 
manoeuvre as to tempt him to take less 
advantageous ground. His real object 
was to turn the Confederate right. His 
ostensible object, as he wished it to be 
regarded, was to fall heavily on the 
Confederate left and centre. In the 
midst of a rain-storm of almost unpre- 
cedented severity, the National army 



began its forward movement. The 
right, which was under McCook, moved 
towards Shelbyville. The centre, under 
Thomas, moved towards Manchester. 
The left, under Crittenden, marched in 
the direction of McMinnville. Gen- 
eral Gordon Granger's reserve corps 
moved forward in support of McCook 
and Thomas. The orders were strictly 
obeyed and successfully executed. Sher- 
idan's division, of McCook's command, 
led the advance on the right. This was 
followed, at the distance of a few miles, 
by the divisions of Johnson and Davis. 
While Sheridan kept moving towards 
Shelbyville, those latter divisions turned 
off to the left, and moved in the direc- 
tion of Liberty Gap. Wilder, with hia 
mounted infantry, led Thomas' advance. 
General Reynolds followed, with the 
remainder of the division. Wilder was 
instructed to halt at Hoover's Gap 
until the arrival of Reynolds. This he 
intended to do, but finding the place 
unoccupied, he pushed through, cap- 
turing a wagon-train and a di'ove of 
beeves. At the other extremity of the 
gap he was met by the Confederates 
in great force. He was able, however, 
to hold the gap until the arrival of 
Reynolds, when it was secured. In the 
meantime, McCook had been equally 
successful at Liberty Gap. Near the? 
entrance, General Willich, whose bri 
gade led the column, encountered the 
enemy in very considerable force. At 
the conimand of General Johnson, Wil- 
lich fell upon the Confederates with 
tremendous energy, driving them be 
fore him, and capturing their tents, 
baggage, and supplies. Johnson sent 



TULLAHOMA ABANDONED. 



his 



Colonel Baldwin forward to clear the 
upper end of the gap. The order was 
promptly executed ; and, after a sharp 
encounter, the position was occupied. 
These were important gains. But suc- 
cess was attending Rosecranz in other 
directions. Granger had started from 
Triune, on the extreme right of the 
National army, on the morning of the 
23d, and, having pushed rapidly for- 
ward, he reached Christiana without 
difficulty. At that place he was joined 
by Stanley and his cavalry. The com- 
bined foices pressed on to Guy's Gap, 
securing it after a struggle of about 
two hours. The Confederates tied, but 
were closely pursued for about seven 
miles. About three miles from Shel- 
byville, they halted, taking position in 
their rifle-pits. A vigorous charge was 
made by Stanley's horsemen. The Con- 
federates were driven from the rifle- 
pits, and compelled to fall back on the 
near defenses of the town. It was now 
six o'clock in the evening. Granger 
came up with his infantry; Stanley 
charged again ; and before seven o'clock 
Shelbyville was in the possession of 
the National troops Wheeler and his 
troopers escaped by swimming Duck 
River. In addition to the possession 
of Shelbyville, three guns, a quantity 
of corn, and 500 pnsoners rewarded 
the daring and enterprise of Gi'anger 
and Stanley. 

Not Slow to perceive the advantages 
Avhich lie had gained, Rosecranz pressed 
through the mountain passes; and on 
the 27th he had established his head- 
quarters at Manchester. Two days 
later, McCook and Thomas had also 



arrived, with all their forces. Prepara. 
tions were at once made to flank Tulla- 
homa, whither Bragg had now retired. 
Wilder was ordered to move around 
and strike the railroad in the Confeder- 
ate rear at Decherd, and to destroy the 
bridge over the Elk River. Wilder 
had little difficulty in reaching De- 
cherd; the railroad was injured, but 
the ]>ridge defied all his efforts and all 
his skill. Convinced that the National 
army was about to move upon him in 
force, and believing that his position 
was untenable, Bragg, on the night of 
the 30th of June, abandoned his en- 
trenched camp at Tullahoma, and fell 
back to Bridgeport, Alabama. The 
extensive works which had been con- 
structed during a period of several 
months, between Shelbyville, Wartrace, 
Tullahoma and Decherd, were thus 
abandoned, without any serious blow 
having been struck in their defense. 
"Thus ended," says Rosecranz in his 
report, " the nine days' campaign, 
which drove the enemy from two forti. 
fled positions, and gained possession of 
Middle Tennessee. Conducted during 
one of the most extraoi'dinary rains 
ever known in that country, at that 
period of the year, and over a soil that 
seemed almost a quicksand, our opei'a- 
tions were retarded thirty-six hours 
at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at 
and in front of Manchester, which 
alone prevented us tVora getting posses- 
sion of his communications, and forcing 
the enemy to a very disastrous battle." 
The National loss in these various 
operations was about 560 killed, wouu 
ded and missing. The Confederate 



044 



CHICK AM AUGA AKi^ (JHATTANOOGA, 



loss was about 6000, large numbers of 
these having deserted during the re- 
treat. Bragg managed to carry with 
him all his guns and supplies along 
the railroad, which he destroyed as he 
went on. He pushed on through the 
Cumberland Mountains, crossed the 
Tennessee River at Bndgeport, where 
he burned the railroad bridge behind 
him, and made his way to Chattanooga. 
If it must be said of Bragg that he 
showed lack of generalship in offering 
so little resistance to the National ad- 
vance, it must also be admitted that he 
conducted his retreat vnth marked 
ability and with signal success. So 
complete was the destruction which he 
worked, as he moved along, that it was 
not until the 16th of August that the 
National forces commenced to cross the 
Cumberland Mountains. 

We have already stated that General 
Burnside, who had been assigned to 
the command of the army of the Ohio, 
was ordered to co-operate with the 
army of the Cumberland. Burnside 
assumed his new command in March. 
He had had several small encounters 
with the enemy before he was ordered 
to act in conjunction with Rosecranz. 
By one detachment, under Gillmore, he 
had defeated the Confederate general, 
Pegram, at Somerset, and thus pre- 
vented a dangerous incursion into 
Southeastern Kentucky. By another 
detachment, under Sanders, he had 
made a successful raid against the Con- 
federates, in the direction of Knoxville. 
Sanders passed through the Cumber- 
land Mountains from Kentucky, struck 
the East Tennessee and Georgia Rail- 



road at Lenoir Station, destroyed a 
large portion of the road which led 
to KnoxviDe, passed round that city, 
struck the road again at Strawberrji 
Plain, and burned two bridges. After 
destroying a large quantity of war ma 
terial, Sanders made his way back to 
Kentucky, having sustained but little 
loss, and bringing with him three of 
the enemy's guns, 10,000 small arms, 
and 500 prisoners. At the time this 
call was made upon Burnside to co- 
operate with Rosecranz, his command 
had been considei-ably diminished, num- 
bering not more than 20,000 men, the 
Ninth army corps having been de- 
tached, some time before, to assist 
Grant before Vicksburg. When Burn- 
side began his march to form a conne(»- 
tion with the army of the Cumberland. 
General Simon B. Buckner, acting un 
der instructions from Bragg, was in com 
mand of about 20,000 men in East Ten 
nessee, with his headquarters at Knox- 
ville. Buckner might have been able, 
had he been allowed, to interpose serious 
obstacles to Burnside's advance. Buck- 
ner, however, was elsewhere needed. 
It was all-important to the Confederacy 
that Chattanooga should not be allowed 
to fall into the hands of the Nationals. 
As soon, therefore, as Bragg found 
that he was in peril, he ordered Buck- 
ner to evacuate the valley and hasten 
to his assistance at Chattanooga. On 
the approach of Burnside, Buckner fled; 
and Knoxville was occupied by the 
National troops, after a long and fa- 
tiguing majch, during which the Con- 
federates offered little other resistanci 
than that of burning the bridges ;>n 



BURNSIDE AT KNOXVILLE. 



54ft 



their rear. It was on the 3d day of 
gep, September that Buiuside entered 
3' Knoxville. By the citizens and 
by the people of the neighborhood, he 
was hailed as a great deliverer. " As 
we neared Knoxville," says one who 
was present, " the evidences of the in- 
tense devotion to the Union, dwelling 
in the hearts of the people, became 
more and more apparent. Along the 
entire route, especially the last ten or 
fifteen miles, the whole population 
seemed gathered on the roadside to 
give welcome to the Yankees. On the 
appearance of General Burnside on the 
outskirts of the town, the news of his 
arrival spread, and everybody, rich and 
poor, the lame and the halt, rushed out 
to greet him. It was no vulgar curi- 
osity to see a man famous in the world's 
history — it was the greeting of an op- 
pressed people to their deliverer. Un- 
covered, and at a slow pace, the general 
rode through the streets to his head- 
quarters. His progress was constantly 
impeded by the rushing of men to his 
horse's side, to seize him by the hand 
and say, * God bless you.' On arrival 
at headquarters, a large crowd assem- 
bled in the yard, and were clamorous 
for speeches. Brigadier-General S. P. 
Carter, a native of East Tennessee, 
came forward, and in a few words con- 
gratulated them on their deliverance. 
In response to repeated calls, General 
Bxirnside then appeared, and said that 
although his profession was arms, and 
not speaking, yet he would take the 
occasion to say that, from the moment 
he took command of the department of 
Ohio, it had been his fervent wish to 



lead an army into East Tennessee to 
their deliverance; and he took great 
pleasure in saying that he had come 
with means sufficient, with their assist- 
ance, to hold the country permanently 
and securely." The same witness tells 
us that, when the speaking was ended, 
the wildest enthusiasm was manifested 
by the people. " The garrison flag of 
the United States was flung from the 
portico, and the crowd rushed up and 
seized it in their hands, many of them 
pressing it to their lips. WhUe this 
was taking place at headquarters, the 
troops had been waylaid all over the 
city, and can-ied off by violence, to be 
feasted, without money and without 
price, on the best which the land af- 
forded." Nor did this bounteous hos- 
pitality find expression towards the 
officers alone ; it extended to the rank 
and file, all of whom, without any dis- 
tinction, were regarded as deliverers. 

At Knoxville, the Nationals took 
possession of a large amount of Con- 
federate property — such as locomotives, 
cars, and machine shops. On the 4th, 
a movement, under the immediate di- 
rection of General Shackelford, was 
made upon Cumberland Gap. On the 
7th, the gap was invested ; and a call 
was made for surrender. This, General 
Frazier, who was in command of the 
Confederate force at that point, refused 
to do, believing, as he said, that he was 
able to hold out. It was not until the 
arrival of Buniside himself, on the 9th, 
that Frazier would listen to any pro- 
posals. On that day terms were agreed 
upon; and a surrender was made uncon- 
ditionally. The officers retained their 



646 



OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



side-arms. About 40 wagons, 200 mules, 
4000 pounds of bacon, 2000 bushels of 
wheat, a large quantity of other stores, 
and ten pieces of artillery, were sur- 
rendered. Some 2000 men were made 
prisoners. Cumberland Gap was thus 
again in the possession of the National 
troops; and the great valley between 
the Alleghany and the Cumberland 
Mountains, from Cleveland to Bristol — 
of which Knoxville may be regarded 
as the chief city — was, for the time at 
least, rid of armed Confederates. 

Chattanooga now became the object 
of universal attention. It was felt 
that in that region the next great 
etruggle for supremacy was to be made. 
It might not be final and decisive ; but, 
however it might result, it would be 
certain to exercise a determining influ- 
ence on the ultimate issue of the con- 
test. Both amiies were the objects of 
anxious care to their respective govern- 
ments. The Richmond authorities, 
trembling for the safety of the At- 
lantic States, exerted themselves to the 
very utmost to strengthen Bragg, so 
that he might turn on Rosecranz and 
deal him a crushing blow, or force him 
towai'ds the Cumberland. Buckner, 
as we have seen, was ordered to join 
him. Johnson sent him a strong bri- 
gade from Mississippi, under General 
Walker. Polk had come up in force 
from Alabama, Longstreet's corps, 
detached from the army of General 
Lee, was hurrying forward from Vir- 
ginia. A merciless conscription was 
enforced in Georgia and Alabama; 
and eveiy available man was pushed 
forward in the diiection of Chatta- 



nooga, Nor was this all. In shameful 
violation of the terms of the surrender, 
and contrary to the usages of civilized 
warfare, Bragg's ranks were swelled by 
thousands of prisoners who had been 
paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hud- 
son. Altogether, the Confederate gen- 
eral was able to count on an effective 
force, under his own immediate direc- 
tion, of fully 80,000 men. 

Rosecranz was not less the object of 
solicitude on the part of the National 
government. It was found difficult, if 
not impossible, to penetrate the designs 
of the enemy. It was rumored that 
Bragg was sending reinforcements to 
Lee, and that prepai'atlons were being 
made for another and more successful 
invasion of Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania, This rumor received encourage- 
ment from the slis^ht resistance which 
had been offered, as yet, either to the 
advance of Rosecranz or to the advance 
of Burnside. It was soon discovered 
that the rumor had no foundation in fact 
Trains were heard running night and 
day, for thirty-six hours, on the Peters- 
burg and Richmond Railroad ; and 
Meade was able to report that, in hia 
judgment, Lee's anny had been re- 
duced by the whole of Longstreet's 
corps, and by some regiments from 
Generals Ewell and HiU. Halleck 
took immediate steps to reinforce 
Rosecranz. Burnside received fresh 
instructions to make the required con- 
nections with the army of the Cumber- 
land, General Hurlbut, who was at 
Memphis, was ordered to send all his 
available forces to Corinth and Tuscum- 
bia, so as to be ready to check any 



fiOSECRANZ IN CHATTANOOGA. 



647 



flank movement which might be at- 
tempted by the enemy. He was au- 
thorized to call upon Grant or Sherman 
for reinforcements, if such were needed. 
A telegraphic communication was sent 
to the commander at Vicksburg, to send 
all his available forces to the line of 
the Tennessee River. Instructions of 
like import were sent to Schoileld in 
Missouri, and to Pope in the North- 
western Department. It was the deter- 
mination of the National government 
that Kentucky and Tennessee, once 
more reclaimed, should not again fall 
under the domination of the Confed- 
eracy ; and now that both Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson had fallen, .nd the 
great armies of the West and South 
were so far liberated, and able to lend 
a helping hand, there seemed to be no 
good reason why this determination, if 
expressed with sufficient vigor, should 
not be attended with practical and sat- 
isfactory results. 

Rosecranz reached the Tennessee on 
the evening of the 20th of August. 
He made arrangements at once for the 
crossing of the river. Crittenden, with 
the left wing, was to cross at Battle 
Creek, and move on Chattanooga; 
Thomas, with the centre, was to pass 
his corps over the river — one division 
at Caperton's Ferry, one at Battle 
Creek, and one at Shell Mound. He 
was to concentrate at Trenton, and 
then to move by way of Stevens' and 
Cooper's Gaps, through Lookout Moun- 
tain, into McLemore's Cove. McCook 
was to push two of his divisions across 
at Caperton's Feriy, while his other 
division, that of Sheridan, was to cross 



at Bridgeport. He was to concentrate 
at Winston's Gap. Bridges were thrown 
across the river at the points indicated ; 
and by the 8th of September, the troopa 
had crossed and taken the position* 
assigned them. Thomas was at Tren- 
ton, and in possession of Stevens' and 
Cooper's Gaps, on Lookout Mountain 
McCook having reached Valley Headj 
was in possession of Winston's Gap, 
Crittenden having crossed to Wauhafr 
chie, was communicating with Thomas' 
right, and threatening Chattanooga by 
the pass over the point of Lookout 
Mountain. It was the expectation of 
Rosecranz that these combinations would 
have the effect of inducing Bragg to 
abandon Chattanooga. In this expecta- 
tion he was not to be disappointed 
The National generals had conducted 
their operations with great expedition 
and with wonderful secrecy. It was 
not until the cavalry of Rosecranz, hav- 
ing advanced up the Will's Valley Rail- 
road, were already at Wauhatchie, that 
Bragg was convinced that his antago 
nist had crossed or was crossing the 
river ; and, supposing that he was about 
to be flanked ou his left, he made pre- 
parations for the abandonment of Chat- 
tanooga. It was now the 7th o£ Sep- 
tember. Bragg left Chattanooga on 
the 8th, and concentrated strongly at 
Lafayette. On the following day, gep. 
Crittenden, from the summit of *• 
Lookout Mountain, discovered that 
the place was abandoned. His corps 
quickly entered in and took possession. 
Thus, without any fighting, was accom- 
plished the first great object of the 
campaign. 



148 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANCX)GA. 



Affairs now looked hopeful in the 
extreme for the National arms. There 
was great joy all over the North, when 
it became known that Chattanooga was 
occupied. There was corresponding de- 
pression of spirit in the South. From 
the Confederate standpoint, the outlook 
now seemed gloomy enough. Pember- 
ton had quite recently sun-endered a 
large army at Vicksburg. Gardner had 
surrendered another army at Port Hud- 
son. Lee had been compelled to fall 
back from Pennsylvania, after sustain- 
ing heavy losses. And now Bragg, 
without striking a blow for its defense, 
had abandoned Chattanooga. 

To the army of the Cumberland there 
had now arrived a great opportunity. 
A concentrated effort and a well-di- 
rected blow might be sufficient to crush, 
or drive into helpless retreat, the Con- 
federate army. The star of Rosecranz 
was still in the ascendant. Nothing 
had yet happened to tarnish the glory 
which he had won at Mm'freesboro. It 
was not doubted — there was no reason 
why it should be doubted — that the 
conqueror at Murfreesboro would add 
to his laurels by a greater and more 
decisive victory at Chattanooga. Let 
us see how matters turned out. 

It was the conviction of Rosecranz 
that Bragg was in full retreat towai'ds 
Rome. Impressed with this belief, and 
not yet informed of the fact that Long- 
street was rapidly coming up to swell 
the forces of his antagonist, Rosecranz, 
instead of concentrating his army at 
Chattanooga, scattered them over a 
wide surface of rough, broken country. 
Crittenden was ordered to leave one 



brigade at Chattanooga, as a garrison, 
and to move with the rest as far as 
Ringgold; Thomas was to march ou 
Lafayette ; while McCook was to move 
in the direction of Alpine and Summer 
Creek. These movements were prompt- 
ly made; and when, on the 12tb, ^^p, 
it became positively known that '2t 
Bragg was not retreating but, on the 
contrary, concentrating in great force 
at Lafayette, and preparing to strike a 
decisive blow, the National army was 
scattered over an immense space of 
rough, broken country, the line extend- 
ing from the east side of Chickamauga 
Creek to Alpine — a distance of fifty- 
seven miles from flank to flank. Rose- 
cranz, in truth, was completely deceived 
as to the movements and intentions of 
his antagonist. While, on the 9tb, he 
was giving orders for pursuit, Bragg 
was actually preparing to assail Thomas 
in McLemore's Cove ; and but for mis- 
understandings among the Confederate 
officers, the battle might have been pre- 
cipitated, and serious detriment might 
have resulted to the National army. 
It is difficult to acquit Rosecranz of 
blame in this matter. He was certainly 
found wanting in vigilance. Before 
attempting the hazardous experiment 
of so extending his line, and thus ren- 
dering himself incapable, at any one 
point, of resisting a vigorous attack, he 
ought, by a more thorough reconnois- 
sance, to have been more accurately in- 
formed of the whereabouts of the ene- 
my. The truth seems to be that, in 
his excessive desire to win renown by 
capturing his foe, or driving him in 
confusion to the gulf, the National 



"THE RIVEE OP DEATH." 



549 



commander partially lost his head. It 
was the opinion of more than one of 
his officers that the general-in-chief was 
in error. As early as the 11th, a negro 
had reported to Wood that " the bulk 
of the rebel army, under Bragg in per- 
son, was at Lee and Gordon's Mills." 
Subsequent developments, according to 
Wood, proved that report to be singu- 
larly correct. In a letter to Thomas, 
Negley remarks that he is "confident 
that Rosecranz is totally misinformed 
as to the character of the countiy, and 
the position, force and intentions of the 
enemy." 

If Rosecranz was to blame for the 
disposition he made of his troops, Bragg 
was even more to blame for not seizing 
the opportunity which Rosecranz had 
created for him. With the forces at 
his disposal, he might easily have 
crushed Thomas, Crittenden and Mc- 
Cook in rapid succession ; and, having 
done so, he could then have moved 
along the Cumberland, and fallen, like 
a destroying angel, on Burnside's rear. 
The opportunity presented to Bragg 
was similar to that which Napoleon, 
by protracted and skilful manoeuvring, 
secured at Marengo. Had Bragg been a 
Napoleon, he would have destroyed the 
ai'my of the Cumberland. Fully alive 
to the peril of the situation, Rosecranz 
ordered a concentration of his forces. 
For six days, Bragg remained compara- 
tively inactive. W hen the six days were 
ended, his opportunity was gone for- 
ever ; for Rosecranz had already brought 
his scattered forces within supporting 
Sep, distance of each other; and on 
»8. the night of Friday, the 18th, 



the concentration was completed, and 
the anny well in hand. 

The two armies were now confronting 
each other on the opposite banks of the 
Chickamauga — a stream which, rising 
at the junction of Missionary Ridge and 
Pigeon Mountain, at the southern ex- 
tremity of McLemore's Cove, flows in 
a northern direction down the cove by 
Crawfish Spring. At Lee and Gordon's 
Mills, it reaches the Lafayette and Chat- 
tanooga Road Further on, it joins the 
main creek, and empties into the beau- 
tiful Tennessee, a little above Chatta- 
nooga. Chickamauga, in the Indian 
tongue, means "The River of Death" — 
a name which was soon to be literally 
and terribly appropriate. 

Rosecranz was on the west bank of the 
stream. His right was no longer at Mc- 
Lemore's Cove, but where his left had 
been, at Lee and Gordon's Mills. His 
left was near the road across from Ross- 
ville. His reserves were in the rear of the 
right. In this position, as vsdll be seen 
by a reference to the map, he covered 
Chattanooga. It was Bragg's inten- 
tion, by a flanking movement, to inter- 
pose between the National left and Cha^ 
tanooga. In order, however, to deceive 
his antagonist, he had sent Wheeler, 
with his cavalry, to press the National 
right. It deserves to be borne in mind, 
at this stage, that Bragg had been great- 
ly reinforced. Buckner had come up 
from East Tennessee, with the rem- 
nants of the army of the Mississippi; 
and the advance of Longstreet's corps, 
under Hood, was already on the fleld. 

The morning of the 19th was sep< 
bright and beautiful. A crisp, *•• 



««i 



550 



OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



white frost had collected on the grass, 
but it soon disappeared, under the genial 
heat of the September sun. Soon as the 
morning mist was dispersed, the rival 
hosts were ready for battle. McCook 
was in command on the National right ; 
Crittenden was in the centre ; Thomas 
was on the left. During the night, 
Bragg had contrived to push across the 
creek some 30,000 men. His army was 
arranged in two coi'ps, the right com- 
manded by Polk and the left by Hood, 
Longstreet not yet having arrived in 
person. It was Bragg's intention to 
strike and bring on a battle. It was 
Thomas, however, who had the honor 
of striking the first blow. It was now 
about ten o'clock. Thomas, on being 
informed by Colonel D. McCook that a 
Confederate bfigade was on the west 
side of the Chickamauga, and appa- 
rently alone, and that as Reed's Bridge 
behind them was destroyed, he thought 
they might be easily captured. Thomas 
ordered General Brannan to advance, 
with his brigades, on the road to Reed's 
Bridge, while Baii'd was to throw for- 
ward the right of his division on the 
road to Alexander's Bridge. It was 
expected that, by this double move- 
ment, the isolated brigade would be cap- 
tured. The battle commenced at once. 
It was soon discovered that what 
seemed a solitary brigade was really the 
advance of the opposing army. Brannan 
soon became engaged with Forrest's cav- 
alry, which was strongly supported by 
two infantiy brigades, from Walker's 
column. Baird, having come to the aid 
of Brannan, the Confederates, after a 
terrible struggle, were driven back with 



great loss. Liddle's division was now 
thrown into the fight ; and the Nation- 
als, in their turn, were driven back, 
losing two batteries and over 500 pris 
oners. In this charge, Lieutenant Van 
Pelt, who commanded one of the bat- 
teries, died gloriously by the side of 
his guns, resisting the enemy to the 
last. Thomas now threw into the fight 
the division of Reynolds; McCook 
pushed forward ihe division of John- 
son; and Crittenden came to the res- 
cue, with Palmer's division, which took 
position on Baird's right. The Nation- 
als, thus strengthened, and outnumber- 
ing and outflanking the Confederates, 
fell upon them with great fury, driving 
them back in disorder for a full mile 
and a half, on their reserves near the 
creek. By this charge, one of the lost 
batteries was recovered. It was now 
near four o'clock in the afternoon. 
There was a lull in the battle for about 
an hour. In the interval, Biannan and 
Baird re-formed their shattered col- 
umns, and took a commanding position 
between McDaniel's House and Reed's 
Biidge. The battle was resumed at 
five o'clock. The divisions of Liddle 
and Gist fell with great weight and 
with more than ordinary fury on Rey- 
nolds' right; and, while Thomas was 
endeavoring to concentrate his forces, 
they fell with equal weight and fury 
on Johnson, Baird and Van Cleve. 
Thomas, at this crisis, was in great 
penl. His men were falling back in 
the wildest confusion. At this critical 
moment, Hazen, who covered himsell 
with gloiy, and saved the day at Mup- 
freesboro, came gallantly to the rescue. 



ORDER OF BATTLE— SECOND DAY. 



551 



He had been sent back to the Rossville 
Road to take charge of a park of artil- 
lery, consisting of four batteries, twenty- 
one guns in all. These, it appears, had 
been left without guards. Hazen had 
arrived in time, not only to save the 
guns, but to turn them to good account. 
They were already in position, on a 
commanding ridge, and manned with 
such infantry supports as he could has- 
tily collect, when the Nationals fell 
back, closely pursued by the victorious 
Confederates. Hazen made no haste to 
use his guns until the pursuers were 
within easy range. As soon, however, 
as they came fully up, he opened upon 
them a tremendous fire. The effect was 
terrific. Checked in full career, and 
torn to pieces by the merciless missiles, 
the Confederates, leaving their com- 
rades in slaughtered heaps on the 
ground behind them, fell back towards 
the creek in confusion and despair. 
Thanks to Hazen's prompt interference, 
the day was saved on the left. A charge 
was made, also, by General Clebui-ne, 
full on Johnson's front, about the hour 
of sunset; but he failed to make any 
impression on the National lines. 

Although the fighting had been main- 
ly on the left, the right had not re- 
mained wholly unattacked. From an 
early hour, there had been lively artil- 
lery firing on both sides. While the day 
was yet young, a vigorous attack was 
made by three Confederate brigades, in 
rapid succession ; and one of the Na- 
tional batteries was captured. The as- 
sailants, however, were in turn driven 
back, and the guns recovered. Later 
in the day, about three o'clock. Hood 



threw two of his divisions heavily on 
Davis, of McCook's corps. So irresist- 
ible was the attack that Davis was 
driven back; and his Indiana battery 
fell into the hands of the enemy. The 
triumph of Hood's men, however, was 
but short-lived ; for Bradley's brigade, 
of Sheridan's division, immediately came 
up and joined Davis. A countercharge 
was made, and with complete success. 
The Confederates were driven back in 
disorder ; a large number of them were 
made prisoners ; and the lost battery was 
recovered. When night came the bat- 
tle ceased, with apparent advantage to 
the National army. 

The night was spent by both armies 
in vigorous preparations for a renewal 
of the conflict in the morning. As soon 
as the engagement closed, Bragg sum- 
moned his generals around him ; and, 
under the light of the blazing camp- 
fire, he gave them their instructions. 
At midnight, Longstreet arrived in per- 
son at headquartei's, and the remainder 
of his troops was fast coming up. Bragg 
divided his army, as he had done on 
the pre\aous day, into two wings. "The 
right, as before, . remained under the 
command of General Polk ; but General 
Longstreet assumed command on the 
left. The right wing was composed 
of Hill's corps of two divisions, under 
Cleb'^rne and Breckenridge ; with the 
divisio** of Cheatham, of Polk's corps, 
and the division of W. H. T. Walker. 
The left was composed of the divisions 
of Stewart Preston and Johnston, of 
Buckner's coi-ps; with Hindman's, of 
Polk's corps ; and Benning's and Laue'h 
and Robertson's brigades, of Hood's di 



K2 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



vision; and Kershaw's and Humphrey's, 
of McLaws' division. The front line 
of the right wing consisted of three di- 
visions — Breckenridge's, Cleburne's, and 
Cheatham's — which were posted from 
right to left, in the order named. Walk- 
er's division was in reserve. The line 
of the left wing was composed of Stew- 
art's, Hood's, Hindman's, and Preston's 
divisions, from right to left, in the 
order named. Rosecranz had also gath- 
ered his corps commanders around him. 
After hearing their reports, he ordered 
General Negley, who had come down 
from the extreme right, to report to 
General Thomas early in the morning. 
McCook was ordered to replace Negley's 
troops by one of his own divisions, and 
to close up well on Thomas. Critten- 
den was to hold his two divisions in 
reserve, and in the rear of the centre. 
Thomas remained on the left, reinforced 
by the two divisions of Johnson and 
Palmer, with Brannan and Negley in 
reserve. 

On Sunday, the 20th of September, 
8ep. ^^ ^^6 blood-red sun rose on the 
20. valley of the Chickamauga, gild- 
ing with roseate hues the summits of 
the surrounding hills, an impenetrable 
mist hovered low on the ground be- 
tween the two armies ; and in the air 
there was a breathless stillness which 
well became the day of sacred rest, but 
which contrasted strangely with the 
approaching din and tumult and carnage 
of war. It had been Bragg's intention 
to resume the battle at earliest dawn ; 
and instructions to that effect had been 
given accordingly. Polk was to stiike 
the National left ; and the attack was 



to be followed up in rapid succession 
all along the line. "The left wing," 
says Bragg in his report, " was to await 
the attack by the right, and take it up 
promptly when made, and the whole 
line was then to be pushed vigorously 
and persistently against the enemy 
throughout its extent.'"" Bragg was in 
the saddle before daybreak — waiting 
anxiously for the sound of Polk's guns. 
But one hour and another passed ; and 
the battle was not yet commenced. This 
delay has been variously explained. It 
had been arranged that Hill should 
make the first onset ; but that general, 
it is said, was so far in the rear at Ted- 
ford's Ford, that Polk's order did not 
reach him until long after sunrise. An- 
other explanation is that, owing to a 
want of precaution, a portion of the 
Confederate left wing, amounting to a 
whole division, had been formed in 
front of Polk's line, and that if the at- 
tack had been made at the time ap- 
pointed, that division mu^ have been 
slaughtered. Whatever the cause, the 
delay was a grievous disappointment to 
General Bragg. His indignation knew 
no bounds, when he learned of the 
coolness and indifference manifested by 
Polk. Bragg's staff-officer, who had been 
sent to ascertain the cause of the delay, 
found Polk and his officers brilliantly 
attired and seated at a comfortable 
breakfast. "I have ordered Hill to 
open the action," said Polk, "and I am 
waiting to hear the sound of his guns. 
Do tell General Bragg," he added, 
with great emotion, "that my heart 
is overflowing with anxiety for the 
attack — overflowing with anxiety, sir." 



A TEEKIFIC STETTGGLE. 



55S 



What was a disappointment and a posi- 
tive loss to Bragg was a gain — a 
great gain to Rosecranz. His men had 
been working like beavers all night 
through. The lines had been drawn 
closer together than on the previous 
day. Breast-works and abatis had been 
constructed in their front. Rosecranz, 
however, was not fully prepared to 
receive the onset of the enemy. His 
troops were not sufficiently concentra- 
ted ; and Thomas, on whom it was all 
but certain the weight of the battle 
would fall, not yet joined by Negley, 
was comparatively weak. The delay 
gave the National commander time to 
perfect his arrangements. When the 
fog lifted, and the enemy commenced 
his advance, Rosecranz was ready. 

It was now between nine and ten 
o'clock. All of a sudden, the thunder 
of artillery was heard on the extreme 
left. With their usual tactics, the Con- 
federates did not feel their way towards 
the National position, but, with concen- 
trated strength, fell with overwhelming 
weight on the left which, as we have 
seen, was held by Thomas. The attack 
was made by Breckenridge's division, 
of Hill's corps, which moved forward 
in splendid style, in order as perfect as 
if on dress parade, and was followed 
closely by a magnificent battery of ar- 
tillery. Breckenridge was accompanied 
by Cleburne, who advanced on his left, 
and more towards the National centre. 
Scarcely had the onward movement of 
the Confederates commenced, when the 
din of battle became terrific. The shai-p 
rattle of musketry, mingling with the 
roar of artillery, gave intensity "to the 



war thunder which echoed through the 
forest. Breckenridge swung around so 
as to flank Thomas' left. Cleburne 
moved directly against the breast- works 
in Thomas' front. As the first lines of 
the enemy approached the works, they 
were received by a withering fire. The 
breast-works literally blazed. It was 
one continuous, incessant flame, out of 
which rushed death-dealing volleys on 
the advancing foe. The Confederates, 
however, seemed rather to court death 
than to fear danger. On and up against 
the tempest of lead and iron they 
moved with desperate valor. Line after 
line was mowed down, as it advanced. 
Still, the tide rolled on. The broken 
heads of columns were continually re- 
formed from the ranks in the rear ; and 
the brave Confederates, as if heedless 
ol death, trampling on the bodies of 
their dead or dying companions, pressed 
on towards the breast- works. It seemed 
as if they were determined " to quench 
that volcano with human blood, and to 
choke it with living victims." For a time 
it seemed as if nothing could check their 
advance. Cleburne was gaining ground 
in front ; and Breckenridge was making 
visible progress against the National 
left. So overwhelming was the strength, 
and so vigorous were the onsets of the 
enemy, that Thomas was under the ne- 
cessity of making repeated calls to Rose- 
cranz for help. 

It was now about noon. Repeat- 
edly held in check, and sometimes even 
diiven back, the Confederates contrived 
again and again to re-form and renew 
the attack. Despite the terrific fire to 
which they were expusud, and th« awful 



554 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



c'arnage which they witnessed as they 
advanced, the dark gray masses were 
gradually closing on the National left. 
It was Bi'as;a''s determination that that 
wing should be turned — it was the key 
of the pos'tion; and, to give effect to 
that determination, Breckenridge, rein- 
forced by division after division, exer- 
cised all his skill, and strained to the 
utmost all his energies. Reinforcements 
coming up on both sides, the battle 
raged with tremendous fury, "Victory 
leaned now to the one side and now to 
the other. It was doubtful with whom 
the palm should remain. In one of 
those fierce encounters, when Vande- 
ver's brigade, of Brannan's division, 
and a portion of Stanley's, of Wood's 
division, came up and strengthened the 
wavering line on the extreme left, 
Breckenridge, in what seemed a mo- 
ment of triumph, was thrown back in 
great confusion, with the loss of Gen- 
eral Helmond Desher, killed; General 
D. Adams, at the same time, being se- 
verely, and Major Graves, chief of artil- 
lery, mortally wounded. Breckenridge 
rallied again on a commanding ndge ; 
and having got his guns into position, 
and been reinforced by Walker and 
Cheatham, as well as by Cleburne, he 
resumed and maintained the fight with 
the energy of despair. Thomas' left 
showed signs of yielding ; but, aided by 
his gallant lieutenants, he got his men 
well together again in a new position — 
his light on Missionary Ridge, his left 
on an eminence by the Lafayette Road — 
where they stood like a wall of iron. 

At this supreme crisis in the progress 
of the fight, occurred one of those mis- 



haps, which are all the more liable to 
prove disastrous, because they cannot 
be foreseen or provided against, and 
which, when they do occur, sometimes 
more than neutralize all the skill of 
the general and all the braveiy of the 
troops. Thomas, hard pressed, was 
still asking for reinforcements. Negley 
had been ordered forward to his aid. 
So, too, had Van Cleve. Rosecranz, see- 
ing that the left centre was in peril, 
ordered Wood to move towards the 
left and close in upon Reynolds; Davis 
and Sheridan were to move in the same 
direction, so as to prevent a break in 
the line. It so happened, however, 
that Brannan was en echelon, slightly 
in the rear of Reynolds' right ; and 
Wood, in carrying out the oi'deis, as 
he understood them, moved by Bran 
nan's rear, so as to reach Reynolds. It 
was a grievous, and, as it proved, irre- 
parable blunder. A gap was thus cre- 
ated ; quick as lightning, Longstreet, 
with his experienced eye, discovered 
his opportunity. With the swiftness of 
thought, and with the fury of a thun- 
derbolt, Hood's division was thrown 
into the fatal opening; and, striking 
right and left, it cut the National army 
in two. It was in vain that Davis, of 
McCook's corps, tried to close in and 
resist the advance of the enemy. His 
division was literally cut to pieces. 
Palmer and Van Cleve, of Crittenden's 
corps, shared a similar fate. Sheridan, 
whose position was to the right of Davis, 
was left alone, and, for a time, made a 
gallant fight. Brave as he was, how- 
ever, Sheridan could not perform im- 
possibilities. He, too, was compelled 



"THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA." 



556 



to give way. The National right and 
centre, shattered to fragments, were 
soon flying in wild confusion towards 
Rossville, and onwards to Chattanooga. 
It seemed a total rout. To some who 
were present, it recalled the memory of 
the first battle of Bull Run. The road 
to Rossville and Chattanooga presented 
a picture not unlike that which, on that 
fatal 21st of July, was witnessed on the 
load to Centreville and Washington. 
The field was covered with thousands 
of dead and dying men ; and all along 
the line of retreat, artillery, caissons, 
wagons, horses, mules, and a motley 
multitude of fugitives were mingled to- 
gether in inextricable confusion. Pow- 
erless to resist the refluent tide, Rose- 
cranz, Crittenden, McCoc\, and most 
of their officers were borne backwards 
towards Rossville. Tn front of the gap 
in Missionary Ridge, through which 
passes the road ^ > Rossville — Sheridan 
and Davis having come up by the Dry 
Valley Road — McCook rallied his shat- 
tered corps, and presented a change of 
front, determined, at all hazards, to re- 
sist the further advance of the enemy. 
Meanwhile General Garfield, chief of 
Btaff" to Rosecranz, had ridden back, and 
joined Thomas, to whom he rendered 
valuable assistance during the battle. 

Never, perhaps, in the history of war, 
did more depend on the firmness of one 
individual will, than now depended on 
the will of General Thomas. Weak- 
ness, or want of decision on his part, 
it this trying crisis, would most cer- 
tainly have brought about a terrible 
National disaster; and Chickamauga 
would have been remembered with 



shame, regret and sorrow. Thomas, 
however, was not found wanting. His 
clear vision, his caution, his decisive 
purpose, his strong will, were all to 
find admii'able illustration. It was a 
fortunate circumstance that there was 
a perfect rapport between him and his 
men, from the division and brigade-otfi- 
cers down to the humblest soldier in 
the ranks. Thomas could trust them ; 
they had perfect faith and confidence in 
him. It was not till towards the close 
of the day's fighting, that the commander 
of the left wing of the National army 
was mad^ aware of the disaster which 
had befallen the centre and right. Fully 
alive, however, to the difficulties of his 
own position, he was waiting anxiously 
for the arrival of Sheridan, whose sup- 
port had been pi'omised him, when 
Wood came up and took position on 
the left of Brannan. Thomas now with- 
drew from his breast-works, and con- 
centrated his command on a slope of 
Missionary Ridge, his line assuming the 
form of a crescent, the flanks resting on 
the lower spurs of the mountain. This 
new position was a little to the west of 
the Rossville Road, and was well forti- 
fied with artillery. Wood had scarcely 
had time to arrange his troops in the 
position assigned them, when the Con- 
federates fell upon Thomas' line with 
redoubled energy, Polk on his centre 
and left, and Longstreet on his right. 
Thomas, however, was not to be diiven 
from his position, nor was his line to be 
broken. Like a rock he stood, firm 
and invincible, the forces of the enemy, 
like surging billows, dashing themselves 
to pieces at his feet 



556 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



It was now about half-past three 
o'clock. Longstreet, impatient of resist- 
ance, and eager for an opportunity to 
precipitate the final issue, had discov- 
ered an opening in the hills, on Thomas' 
right, communicating with a gorge di- 
rectly in his rear. Into this opening 
he was already pouring his massive col- 
umns. It was, indeed, a critical moment. 
It seemed as if all were lost. Fully 
turned in front and flank, the National 
line was now to be attacked heavily 
in the rear. Destruction or surrender 
seemed to be the only alternatives. In 
the moment of agony, relief came. Gen- 
eral Gordon Granger, who had heard 
the roar of artillery in the direction in 
which he knew Thomas to be posted, 
hurried forward from Rossville, with- 
out orders, at the head of Steadman's di- 
vision. As soon as he arrived on the 
field, Thomas directed him to the point 
of danger. Steadman was quickly on 
the crest of the hill, with a battery of 
six guns, and in perfect command of the 
gorge. It was not a moment too soon. 
Two divisions, of Longstreet's corps, 
were pressing forward with all their 
might They were already ascending 
the southern slope of the ridge, and 
only a few yards distant from the newly- 
erected battery. Opening a well-di- 
rected fire, and at the same time hurling 
against them the brigades of Whitta- 
ker and Mitchell, himself heading the 
charge, Steadman drove the too-daring 
Confederates down the ridge and back 
into the gorge, with terrible slaughter. 
Steadman had his horse killed under 
him; and he was himself badly injured 
by a falL But he had saved Thomas 



from destruction. It was now sunset; 
and the attack in this direction was not 
repeated. 

While this was going on in the rear, 
Thomas was hotly engaged by the Con- 
federates, both on front and flank. In 
vain did Polk dash against his centre 
and left. In vain did Longstreet hurl 
his well-tried and war-hardened vet- 
erans on his right. "The Rock of Chick- 
amauga" — the name which Thomas 
that day won — was not to be moved. 
When night fell, and the battle was 
ended, his line was unbroken, his posi- 
tion unmoved. Leaving his dead and 
wounded in the field, Thomas, in obe- 
dience to orders from Rosecranz, who 
was at Chattanooga, fell back to Ross- 
ville, and took command of all the 
forces. His ammunition was all but 
exhausted. Bragg did not pursue. On 
tho night of the following day, the 
entire National army was withdrawn 
into the defenses, in front of Chatta- 



nooga. 



Such was the battle of Chickamauga. 
It was a Confederate victory; but it 
was barren of results. Chattanooga 
had not been recovered. The losses 
on both sides were heavy. The Na- 
tionals lost about 16,350 men, and 51 
guns. The Confederate loss was about 
18,000. Chickamauga was a battle 
almost without a plan. It resulted to 
the credit of neither of the generals-in- 
chief. It made an end of General Rose- 
cranz ; and it nearly ruined Bragg. It 
had but one hero ; and that was Gen- 
eral Thomas. "The Rock of Chick* 
mauga " will live forever in Americaa 
history. 




{ 










l,^-_ 



GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE 



. •■ <<ja 



GRANT IN COMMAND. 



55? 



After the battle of Chickamanga, 
Rosecranz proceeded to throw up forti- 
fications around Chattanooga. In this 
work, he found an able and efficient 
assistant in General James St. Clair 
Morton. Within twenty-four hours 
after falling back from Rossville, he 
was strongly entrenched — so strongly 
that Bragg could not, with safety, 
venture upou an offensive movement. 
Bragg, in truth, was in great trouble. 
He felt bitter disappointment because 
the late battle had not resulted in more 
complete success. He was dissatisfied 
with the conduct of several of his offi- 
cers. He had not lost the confidence of 
Jefferson Davis ; but with the authori- 
ties at Richmond generally, he was in 
bad odor. He was expected by them 
to perform impossibilities. The sug- 
gestions offered him were as numerous 
as they were absurd. Bragg, however, 
had will enough to abide by his own 
counsel, and sense enough to attempt 
the one thing which was practicable. 
If he could not force his way into Chat- 
tanooga, he might at least starve the 
army of the Cumberland into submis- 
sion or retreat. 

With this end in view, the Confed- 
erate general drew a cordon around the 
city, and inten'upted or cut off the va- 
rious lines of communication. He made 
himself master of the south bank of 
the Tennessee, opposite Mocassin Point, 
and then broke the line of communica- 
tion between Chattanooga and Bridge- 
port. He destroyed the bridge at the 
latter place, and thus severed the com- 
munication with Nashville, the base of 
supplies. He had, also, entire command 



of the river. Winter was rapidly ap' 
proaching ; and heavy rains had already 
deluged the country, making the roads 
impassable. There was left but one 
way by which the wagon-trains, which 
supplied Rosecranz' army, could move ; 
and that was a circuitous route along 
the bottom-land of the Tennessee and 
Sequatchie Valleys, and over the Wal- 
dron Ridge. On this route, the supjaly- 
trains were almost entirely at the mercy 
of the Confederate cavalry. In one day, 
Bragg's troopers destroyed about 300 
wagons, and killed or captured some 
1800 mules. It was not long until dis- 
tress began to reveal itself in the Na- 
tional army. The animals died in large 
numbers from sheer starvation. Their 
dead bodies lined the roadsides; and 
the soldieis, unable to work their way 
through the deep mud, used them as 
they would have used stepping-stones. 
It was calculated that at least 10,000 
horses and mules had perished in sup- 
plying half rations to the men. Such 
a state of things, it was manifest, could 
not long continue. 

The army of the Cumberland became 
a cause of great anxiety to the authori- 
ties at Washington. It was felt that 
if something were not done to relievo 
it, and that quickly, the army ran the 
risk of being utterly destroyed; and 
Chattanooga and East Tennessee would 
again be brought under Confederate 
rule. In these circumstances, the gov- 
ernment fell back on the conqueror of 
Vicksburg. Gi'ant was ordered to Chat- 
tanooga, to take sole command. He 
was then at New Orleans, confined by 
an injury sustained in falling from his 



658 



CHICKAMAUGA A'.sB (JHATTANOOGA. 



horse. As soon as he was able, he has- 
tened to Indianapolis, where he met 
Stanton, the Secretary of War, and re- 
ceived from his hands the order ap- 
pointing him to the command of the 
new military division of the Mississippi, 
comprising the three departments and 
armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland 
and the Tennessee. By the same order. 
General Rosecranz was relieved of the 
command of the department and army 
of the Tennessee. At the request of 
General Grant, the department of the 
Cumberland was given to Thomas, and 
that of the Tennessee to Sherman. On 
Octt the 18th of October, Grant, hav- 
18. ing arrived at Louisville, formally 
assumed the command, and issued his 
first order. Rosecranz, on the 19th, 
after issuing a touching farewell ad- 
dress to the troops, left for Cincinnati. 
Thither, also, were ordered Generals 
McCook and Crittenden, whose corps 
were now consolidated into one. 
From Louisville, Grant telegraphed to 
Thomas, " Hold Chattanooga at all 
hazards." " I will hold the town until 
we starve," was the prompt and charac- 
teristic reply. 

It was not enough, however, to bring 
Grant to Chattanooga. It was neces- 
sary that he should have under him a 
competent aimy. Arrangements had 
already been made for increasing the 
strength of the National army at Chat- 
tanooga. As soon as it became known 
that General Longstreet had gone to 
Tennessee, instructions were sent to 
Grant, and other commanders in the 
south and west, to send Rosecranz all 
possible assistance. Grant was yet at 



New Orleans ; and as Sherman, who 
represented him at Vicksburg, did not 
receive the despatch until several days 
had elapsed, there was some unavoid- 
able delay in sending reinforcements 
from the neighborhood of Vicksburg. 
As early as the 27th of September, 
Sherman, with the Fifteenth corps, in 
obedience to orders from Grant, had 
set out for Memphis, on his way to 
Chattanooga. Meanwhile, fearful of 
the constquences which must result if 
Rosecranz should be tempted to abandon 
his position, and attempt a retreat, the 
government had detached the Eleventh 
and Twelfth corps from the army of the 
Potomac, and placing them in charge of 
General Hooker, hurried them along by 
rail to Chattanooga. Never before — 
not even at Solferino and Magenta 
— had railroads been more effectively 
used for transporting troops and all the 
necessary material of war, than on this 
occasion. It was Stanton's project ; and 
in giving it effect, he bent ui)on it all 
the energies of his powerful mind and 
will. His purposes wei-e admirably 
carried out by General Meigs, the 
quartermaster-general, and by Colonel 
D. C. McCallum, the government super- 
intendent of military railroads. Mc- 
Callum, who alone was responsible for 
the conveyance of the troops, was ably 
assisted by W. Prescott Smith, master 
of transportation on the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad. In seven days the two 
corps, some 23,000 strong, with artillery, 
trains, baggage and animals, were trans- 
ferred from the Rapidan to Stevenson, ' 
Alabama — a distance of 1192 milea 
Grant reached Nashville on the 



WAUHATCHIE. 



559 



Oct. 
21. 



2l8t of October. He there met and 
had an interview with Rosecranz 
and Hooker. On the 23d, he arrived at 
Chattanooga. Next morning he made 
a reconnoissance of the ground, and de- 
termined on his plan of action. He 
found that Rosecranz had allowed the 
enemy to occupy all the heights around 
his position, and that neither the river 
nor the railroad could be used. Un- 
less the river or the roads could be 
opened, there was no choice but retreat ; 
and retreat, in the present condition 
of the army, would be certain ruin. 
Thomas, and his chief engineer, General 
William F. Smith, had decided upon a 
plan by which they hoped to be able 
to regain possession of Lookout Val- 
ley, and to re-establish communications 
with Bridgeport by way of Brown's 
Ferry. Hooker, by order of Thomas, 
had already concentrated at the latter 
place. This plan met the hearty ap- 
proval of General Grant, who proceed- 
ed immediately to put it in execution. 
Hooker was to cross the Tennessee at 
Bridgeport, and push on by the main 
wagon-road to Wauhatchie, in Look- 
out Valley. Palmer, who was now 
opposite Chattanooga, was to move 
down the north side of the I'iver to a 
point opposite Whiteside, where he 
was to cross the river and hold the 
road passed over by Hooker. W. F. 
Smith was to go down the river from 
Chattanooga, under cover of the dark- 
ness, with about 4000 troops, to cross 
at Brown's Ferry, and to seize the 
range of hills at the mouth of Lookout 
Valley. A pontoon bridge was to be 
thrown over the river at Brown's Ferry, 



so as to open communications between 
Hooker and Thomas. The movements 
of Hooker and Palmer might be made 
in open day ; but Smith's success de- 
pended largely on secrecy. 

These movements were promptly and 
successfully executed. On the morn- 
ing of the 26th, Hooker crossed Oct. 
at Bridgeport on pontoon bridges. 26. 
He effected a landing on the south side 
without any opposition, and pushed on 
to Wauhatchie, which he reached on*, 
the 28th. Palmer followed, according 
to instructions, and took position at 
Whiteside, in his rear. Smith's part 
of the plan, although beset with greater 
difficulty, because he was within reach 
of the enemy's sharp-shooters during 
his whole course, was carried out with 
equal success. His force consisted of 
about 4000 men. Of these, 1800, under 
General Hazen, embarked on pontoon 
boats at Chattanooga ; and during the 
dark hours of the night of the 26th and 
the morning of the 27th, they floated 
noiselessly down the river, without 
oars, passing the point of Lookout 
Mountain, and, unnoticed by seven 
miles of the enemy's pickets, reached 
Brown's Ferry just about dawn. The 
material for the consti'uction of the 
pontoon bridge was thus at the point 
desired. Landing without difficulty, 
Smith drove in and scattered the Con- 
federate pickets, and seized a low range 
of hills, which commanded Lookout 
Valley. A firm foothold having been 
secured, skirmishers were thrown for- 
ward ; and by means of felled trees, 
which the axe-men soon laid low, an 
impassable abatis was thrown up in 



560 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



front of Hazen's troops. The Confed- 
erates, unwilling to abandon the posi- 
tion, returned and made a fierce at- 
tack ; but finding their efforts useless, 
they withdrew up the valley towards 
Chattanooga. The remainder of Smith's 
force, some 1200 strong, under General 
Turchin, having moved, meanwhile, 
down the north bank of the stream, 
across Mocassin Point, reached Brown's 
Ferry before daylight. They were rap- 
idly femed across ; and, by ten o'clock, 
a pontoon bridge connected the north 
and south banks of the Tennessee. 
On the morning of the 28th, as has 
been stated, Hookei-, with the Elev- 
enth corps, Major-General Howard, 
and Geary's division, of the Twelfth 
corps, appeared in Lookout Valley, at 
Wauhatchie, his left connecting vdth 
Smith at the pontoon bridge. These 
movements secured for the Nationals 
the possession of the roads and the 
river; and all fears of starvation in 
Chattanooga were now abandoned. 
"General Thomas' plan," said Grant, 
in his telegram to Halleck, "for se- 
curing the river and southside road to 
Bridgeport, has proved eminently suc- 
cessful. The question of supplies may 
now be regarded as settled." 

Bragg was not willing that his 
antagonist should retain the great 
advantage he had won, without mak- 
ing another attempt to dislodge him. 
Lookout "Valley, which lies between 
Racoon and Lookout Mountains, and 
which has an average width of about 
two miles, is divided towards its centre 
by a series of wood-crowned heights, 
8ome of them rising to an elevation of 



200 and 300 feet. These heights, as 
well as the more commanding positions 
on Racoon and Lookout Mountains, 
were in the hands of the Confederates. 
From these eminences, the position and 
movements of the National army could 
be easily seen. McLaws, of Long 
street's corps, was on Lookout Mourt 
tain, eagerly watching Hooker. It was 
his determination to fall upon and 
crush that branch of the National 
army, so soon as he should see a favor- 
able opportunity. On the night of the 
28th, Geary's division, on Hooker's 
right, was lying at Wauhatchie, How- 
ard's corps, as has been mentioned, 
having been thrown out in the direc- 
tion of Brown's Ferry. McLaws, de. 
sirous to take Geary by surprise, de- 
scended at midnight, and with fiercs 
energy, his men uttering wild screams 
as they advanced, fell upon Geary's 
pickets, driving them in. The batteries 
on Lookout Mountain now opened fire ; 
and while Geary's camp was furiously 
attacked on three different sides by the 
on-rushing Confederates, his men were 
exposed to a very tempest of shot and 
shell. Geary, however, was not unpre- 
pared. Knowing that he was liable 
to be attacked at any moment, he 
had been holding himself in a state of 
readiness. When, therefore, McLawa' 
men came up, they were warmly re- 
ceived. Full in the faces of the too 
confident Confederates, Geary's brave 
fellows poured a deadly fire of mus- 
ketry. Such a reception had not been 
expected. The advancing columns re- 
coiled. Geary, however, was greatly 
outnumbered,' and the battle continued. 



OKLAN SMITH. 



561 



Hooker was aroused by the boom- 
ing of cannon and the shrill rattling 
of musketry. He knew, from the di- 
rection whence these sounds issued, 
that Geary had been attacked. How- 
ard was ordered to double-quick his 
nearest divi^n — that of Schurz — to the 
aid of Geary. " Forward to their re- 
lief, boys ! " shouted Hooker, as Schurz's 
men streamed past him through the 
darkness. They had advanced but a 
short distance, when, suddenly, there 
came a blaze of musketry from the 
hills, showing that the Confederates 
were close at hand, as well as in force 
in the neighborhood of Geary's posi- 
tion. Tyndale's brigade was detached, 
and ordered to charge the heights, 
while Schurz, with the remainder of 
his troops, moved on towards Geary. 
A thin bris^ade of Steinwehr's division, 
commanded by Colonel Orlan Smith, of 
the Seventy-Third Ohio, now came up; 
and it was found that the hill to the 
rear of Schurz was occupied by the 
enemj'. This hill Smith was ordered 
to cany with the bayonet. The moon 
was shining bright and clear ; but the 
hill was precipitous, seamed with ra- 
vines, covered with thick brushwood, 
and rose to the height of 200 feet. It 
was a daring — it seemed almost a fool- 
hardy — experiment ; but the order had 
been given, and it must be obeyed. 
On and up the slope rushed the brave 
fellows of the Seventy-Third Ohio and 
of the Thirty-Third Massachusetts un- 
til they had almost reached the rifle- 
pits, when they were received by a 
volley from some 2000 muskets, and 
driven back in confusion to the foot of 



the hill. There, however, they re- 
formed; and, although now fully aware 
of the nature of the ground and of the 
difficulties to be encountered, those 
noble resriments again breasted the 
hill; and in spite of the destructive 
volleys which tore through their ranks, 
and the shouting and yelling and taunt- 
ing sneers of the men on the summit, 
they pressed on, without firing a shot, 
towards the blazing rifle-pits, and then, 
■ttnth one bound, bayonet in hand, swept 
the enemy before them. It was not 
until the enemy was in full retreat, 
and until shouts of victory were rend- 
ing the midnight air, that the first vol- 
ley was fired. It was a sort of parting 
salute, given in a species of wild glee 
by the Nationals, but not particularly 
agreeable to the retreating foe, and not 
likely soon to be forgotten by any of 
the Confederates who survived that 
moonlight struggle. Geary, meanwhile, 
although contending with vastly supe- 
rior numbers, and sometimes nearly 
overborne, held his ground with char- 
acteristic tenacity ; and at length, after 
three hours' fighting, he hurled his as- 
sailants back towards Lookout Moun- 
tain. Thither they retired for refuge^ 
leaving on the field 150 of their num- 
ber dead, and in Geary's hands ovei 
100 prisoners, with several hundred 
small arms. It was now a little after 
four o'clock in the morning; and the 
battle of Wauhatchie was ended. 

The charge made by Orlan Smith 
has l)een singled out as one of the most 
brilliant chai'ges of the war. It de- 
lighted and astonished Hooker. " No 
troops," he said, " ever rendered more 



662 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA, 



brilliant service." It Avon special com- 
mendation from so reserv^ed a man as 
Thomas. " The bayonet charge of 
Howard's troops," said he, in his letter 
of congratulation to Hooker, "made 
up the side of a steep and difficult 
hill, over 200 feet high, completely 
routing and driving the enemy from 
his barricades on its top, and the re- 
pulse, by Geary's division, of greatly 
superior numbers, vs^ho attempted to 
sui'prise him, will rank among the most 
distinguished feats of arms in this war." 
The victory at Wauhatchie secured 
the possession of the communications 
which Smith had opened up two days 
before. Bi'agg's plans were defeated. 
Soon afterwards, two little steamboats 
were put upon the river; by means of 
these, the raih'oad, and the other roads 
on the south of the Tennessee, supplies 
were conveyed to Chattanooga ; and the 
army was saved from actual famine. 
Fortune was smilinof a<jain on the Na- 
tional arms ; and the star of General 
Grant was still in the ascendant. 

While these events were taking place 
at Chattanooga, Sherman was pressing 
forward from Memphis. He had left 
Vicksbur'g for Memphis, on his way to 
Chattanooga, on the 27th of September. 
His own corps followed liim up the 
river in steamboats. He had been pre- 
ceded by the divisions of Osterhaus 
and John E. Smith. Arriving at Mem- 
phis on the 2d of October, he i-eceived 
a letter from Halleck, instructing him 
to move by the line of the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad to Athens, 
and to report thence to Rosecranz, at 
Chattanooga. He was to repair the 



railroads as he advanced, and to de- 
pend on his own line for supplies. On 
his way to Corinth, on Sunday, the 
11th, having with him, as an escort, a 
battalion of the Thirteenth regulars, ht 
arrived at Colliersville about noon, just 
in time to save the Sixty-Sixth Indiana, 
Colonel D. C. Anthony, from being 
overwhelmed and probably destroyed 
by a body of Confederate cavalry, some 
3000 strong, with eight guns, under 
the command of General Chalmers. 
He reached Corinth that Sunday even- 
ing. Without delay, he pushed on to 
luka. At Tuscumbia, on the 27th, his 
advance, under General Frank Blair, 
came into contact with a Confederate 
force, some 5000 strong, under General 
S. D. Lee. The Confederate cavalry 
were severely punished ; and Lee gave 
no further annoyance to the troops on 
their march. The National troops had 
been repairing the roads, as they moved 
along, in oljedience to instructions re 
ceived from Halleck. On the same 
day on which Blair chastised Lee, 
Sheraian received a despatch from 
Grant, urging him to discontinue his 
work on the railroad, and hasten for- 
ward with all possible despatch, with 
his entire force, to Bridgeport. Hap- 
pily, he had made arrangements with 
Admiral Porter to have boats waiting 
for him at Eastport. By means of 
these, he passed his troops across the 
Tennessee and hurried eastward, Blair 
covering his rear, and reached Bridge- 
port on the 14th. On the day follow- 
ing, he joined Grant at Chattanooga; 
and the two together reconnoitered the 
ground, Grant explaining his proposed 



GEANT'S BATTLE PLAN. 



563 



plan of attack, so soon as the army of 
the Tennessee was forward and ready 
for action. 

Sherman arrived at Chattanooga at 
a most opportune moment. It seemed 
as if the fates were working in the in- 
terest of General Grant and the army 
under his command. The plans of the 
general commanding had worked to 
perfection ; they had been admirably 
carried out ; and they had been attend- 
ed, so far, with complete success. And 
now, when Sherman, his trusted right 
arm, came up with his well-trained 
veterans, Bragg had invited attack by 
committing a huge and irreparable 
blunder. It was known to the Con- 
federate commander that Burnside, at 
an earlier date, had general instructions 
to push forward from Knoxville, and 
form a connection with Rosecranz. Be- 
lieving that if such a connection were 
now formed, it would be fatal to his 
prospects, and in the vain hope of cut- 
ting his rival off, and beating him in 
detail, he detached Longstreet from the 
aiiny in front of Chattanooga, and or- 
dered him to attack Burnside, and take 
possession of Knoxville. A more fatal 
blunder he could not have committed. 
He could not, had such been his object, 
have played more completely into the 
hands of his antagonist. Grant saw 
his opportunity ; but he resolved to 
wait until the arrival of Sherman, so 
as to be able to turn it to full and sat- 
isfactory account. He was now ready. 

Grant was not insensible to the peril- 
ous position in which Burnside was 
now placed ; nor was he indifferent to 
his calls for help. But he knew that 



Burnside would be relieved most effect- 
ually by the plan which he himself 
proposed to cany out — that the threat- 
ened catastrophe at Knoxville would be 
best averted by a decisive victory at 
Chattanooga. Colonel Wilson, of his 
staff, accompanied by Assistant-Secre- 
tary of War, Charles A. Dana, was, 
therefore, sent to Knoxville to explain 
to Burnside the situation. He was to 
make the best show possible in the 
presence of the enemy, to allow him- 
self to be besieged, but to hold Knox- 
ville at all hazards. Grant, meanwhile, 
hurried forward his plans, and made 
all the necessary arrangements for the 
attack. 

The great battle of Chattanooga — by 
far the most picturesque battle in the 
war, and the one in which General 
Grant most conspicuously showed that 
he was not only the fortunate winner of 
battles, but the possessor of military 
abilities of the very highest and rarest 
order of excellence — was now about to 
be fought. Grant's plans, as we have 
seen, were matured and ready for exe- 
cution. It was now the middle of No- 
vember. Sherman's corps had arrived 
at Bridgeport on the 14th. Grant 
made up his mind to make the general 
attack on the 2l8t. He had discovered 
that the north end of the Missionary 
Ridge was imperfectly guai'ded, as 
also, the western bank of the river, 
from the mouth of the South Chick 
araauga, down towards Chattanooga 
This point invited attack. This, how 
ever, was not all. A successful blow 
given in that direction would make a 
junction impossible between Bragg and 



964 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



Longstreet. The northern end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge, therefore, he singled out 
as the special point of attack. While 
the attack should seem to be general, 
and bearing heavily on the Confed- 
erate left, he proposed to mass his con- 
verging forces on the point thus indi- 
cated. Sherman, with his own troops 
and one of Thomas' divisions, was to 
cross the Tennessee just below the 
mouth of the South Chickamauga, and 
secure the heights, as far as the rail- 
road tunnel. Thomas was to co-operate 
with Sherman, by concentrating his 
troops on his own left, leaving a thin 
line to guard t,he works on the right 
and centre. Hooker was to assail the 
Confederate left, and drive it from 
Lookout Mountain. Grant was the 
more auxious to make the attack on 
the 21st that, on the day before, he 
received from Bragg a letter, suggest- 
ing the removal of non-combatants from 
Chattanooga — a letter intended to con- 
vey the idea that an attack on that 
place was meditated, but which really 
confirmed the report brought by a de- 
serter, and confirmed Grant in the be- 
lief that Bragg was about to retreat. 

The general attack which was to be 
made on the 21st was countermanded. 
Sherman had experienced unexpected 
difficulty in passing his troops across 
Brown's Ferry, in consequence of the 
heavy rains. The pontoon bridge at 
last gave way. Osterhaus, whose divi- 
sion was still on the southern side of 
the river, and without the means of 
crossing, was ordered to report to 
General Hooker, with whom he re- 
mained. Howard was, at the same 



time, called to Chattanooga, and tem- 
porarily attached to the command of 
General Thomas. On the afternoon of 
the 23d, the Fifteenth corps, under the 
immediate command of General Blair, 
having flung pontoon bridges across 
the Tennessee at the point indicated 
above, and also across the Chicka- 
mauga, were advancing to their posi- 
tion on the extreme left of the National 
army. 

Grant, now impatient of delay, and 
determined that if Bragg really meant 
to retire, he should not retire unin- 
jured and in good order, had instructed 
Thomas, on the morning of the pjoy. 
23d, to advance and give the en- 23. 
emy an opportunity of developing his 
lines. The day was unusually beauti- 
ful The men, now that they were 
relieved from their prison-house in 
Chattanooga, and well fed, were in 
excellent spirits. They were dressed 
in their best uniforms, and accompanied 
by new bands of musia The neigh bor- 
ing heights were crowded with specta- 
tors. The magnificent array, the steady 
step, the splendid uniforms, the burn- 
ished bayonets, glittering in the clear 
November sunlight— it was a holiday 
picture. It seemed a dress-parade or re- 
view, and was so I'egarded for a time by 
the Confederates, who witnessed the 
spectacle from the side and summit of 
Missionary Ridge. Wood's division, of 
Granger's corps, moved in advance on 
the left ; Sheridan's division of the same 
corps, being on the right. Palmer, of the 
Fourteenth corps, supported Granger's 
right, with Baird's division refused; 
Johnson's division, of Palmer's, remain- 



OECHAED KNOB. 



565 



ing under arms in the entrenchments, 
to be ready to reinforce at any point. 
Howard's corps was formed in mass 
behind that of Granger. As soon as 
Thomas' men began to move forward, 
the heavy guns of Fort Wood opened 
upon the enemy's first position. Upon 
the ramparts of the fort. Grant, Thomas, 
Granger and Howard stood watching 
the advance. It was a splendid sight. 
On moved the mighty mass, as if it had 
been one solid unit. Cheers were 
heard to arise from the ranks of the 
advancing columns. The pickets of 
the enemy were seen to break and fly 
in confusion before them. In spite of 
che well-directed fire from its summit, 
Wood had already reached the base of 
Orchard Knob — a steep, craggy hill, 
rising above the general level of the 
valley, midway between the river and 
the ridge, and about a mile from Fort 
Wood. Without halting. Wood or- 
dered his men to charge. It was done 
in gallant style, the rifle-pits on the 
summit being carried, and 200 men 
made prisoners. A heavy battery was 
advanced to the captured position fi'om 
Fort Wood, and the place was held. 
This was an important gain to the 
Nationals. 

Simultaneously with this movement 
of General Thomas against Orchard 
Knob, a cavalry brigade, by order of 
General Grant, was operating on 
Bragg's extreme right and rear. This 
movement was scarcely less successful 
than the other, resulting as it did in 
the Ijurning of Tyner's Station, the cut- 
ting of the railroad leading to Cleve- 
\nd, the capture of 100 wagons, with 

»*4 



200 prisoners, and the destruction of a 
large quantity of stores. 

No other movement of any conse- 
quence took place on the 23d. Thomas 
held his advanced position On Or- 
chard Knob, and the low range of hills 
to the south, his troops entrenched 
themselves; and every available point 
was covered with artillery. Hooker 
had general instructions from Grant to 
take Lookout Mountain, to cross the 
Cliattanooga Valley to Rossville, and 
thence, by the Rossville Gap, to advance 
upon Missionaiy Ridge. His immedi- 
ate instructions were that he should 
take a position so as at least to be 
able to make a strong demonstration, 
but that if he felt himself equal to the 
task, he was not to hesitate to make 
the attack and drive the enemy from 
the mountain. Sherman, all night 
through, waa pushing his troops across 
the river. As eai'ly as daylight, on the 
morning of the 24th, he had 8000 jjov, 
men, with artillery and horses, 24. 
on the south side of the Tennessee. 
At one o'clock, P. M., the march was 
taken up by three columns oi echelon, 
each head of column covered by a line 
of skirmishers, with suppoits. It was 
a dull, drizzly day. The clouds were 
low ; and the movements of the troops 
could not be easily seen by the enemy. 
At half-past three o'clock, Sherman had 
possession of the whole northern ex- 
tremity of Missionary Ridge, as far 
almost as the railroad tunnel. In the 
afternoon and during the night, he 
thi'ew up entrenchments, and estalv- 
lished himself in a really strong posi- 
tion. Sherman had thus, so far, car- 



566 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



ried out his part of the general plan. 
Such W6S the state of things on the 
National left, at the close of Tuesday, 
the 24th. 

On the National right, matters were, if 
possible, even more favorable. Hooker 
had performed a brilliaut feat of arms 
on Lookout Mountain. At four o'clock, 
on the morning of the 24th, he had re- 
ported that his troops were in position, 
and ready to advance. Soon after- 
wards the movement commenced. It 
had been Hooker's intention to push his 
men across Lookout Creek, and strike 
the enemy in front. It was a hazard- 
ous undertaking; for Lookout Moun- 
tain, with its high, palisaded crest, its 
steep, rugged slopes, its numerous rifle- 
pits, its encircling lines of earth-works 
and redans, was deemed by Bragg im- 
pregnable. It so happened, however, 
that Lookout Creek was so swollen by 
the recent heavy rains, that it was im- 
passable. A direct movement by the 
main road could not be attempted until 
temporary bridges were constructed. 
Hooker, therefore, ordered Geary, with 
his own division, and Whittaker's bri- 
gade, of Cruft's division, to march to 
Wauhatchie, to cross the creek there, 
and move down on the right bank, 
while he employed the remainder of 
his forces in throwing bridges across 
on the main road. The day was favor- 
able for conducting such operations. 
A heavy mist enveloped the mountain, 
and spread itself over the adjoining 
valleys. The attention of the enemy 
had been drawn to the bridge-builders, 
of whom an occasional glimpse could 
be had, as the mist drifted with the 



breeze ; but no notice had been taken 
of Geary, who reached his appointed 
place at Wauhatchie, unobserved. It 
was about eight o'clock when he began 
to cross the creek. Passing over with- 
out molestation, he surprised and cap- 
tured the picket-guard; and immedi- 
ately facing to the north, he extended 
his line on the right to the base of the 
mountain. The Confederates, caught 
at once on both flank and rear, offered 
a stubborn resistance. Meanwhile, the 
bridges were constructed; and Oster- 
haus' division, having been brought up 
from Brown's Ferry, the Nationals were 
soon in gi'eat force on the right bank 
of the creek. Under cover of the two 
batteries — the Ohio, on Bald Hill, and 
the New York, on the hill in the rear 
— Hooker's men went dashing down 
the valley, sweeping everything before 
them, capturing the rifle-pits, and mak- 
ing a large number of prisoners. At 
the same time the troops to the right, 
passing directly under the muzzles of 
the Confederate guns, were rushvjig up 
the rugged sides of the hill, leaping 
over boulders and ledges of roc^, cut- 
ting their way through the abatis, and 
gradually forcing position after posi- 
tion until the plateau was cleared, and 
the retreating Confederates were seen 
plunging themselves down the jagged 
and precipitous face of the mountain, 
and flying in confusion and utter rout 
towards Chattanooga Valley. Hooker 
had not expected to accomplish bo 
much in the same space of time. Nay, 
he had been unwilling that his men 
should attempt so much. Not know- 
ing to what extent ^he enemy miglit 



LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. 



567 



be reinforced, and fearing disaster from 
the rough character of the groiiud, he 
had given directions that the men 
should halt when they reached the 
high ground. But aroused to the 
highest pitch of enthusiasm, and with 
a flying foe before them, a halt was 
impossible. 

It was now about two o'clock in the 
afternoon ; and such was the density of 
the mist which shrouded the mountain 
and hung heavily over the valley, that 
it was found necessary, temporarily at 
least, to suspend operations. Hooker, 
not deeming it advisable to descend 
into the valley in pursuit, established 
his line on the east side of the moun- 
tain, his right resting on the palisades, 
his left near the mouth of Chattanooga 
Creek. The battle had literally been 
fought above the clouds. It was not 
until nightfall that the sky cleared, 
and revealed to thousands, in the val- 
ley below, the actual progress which 
Hooker had made. As soon as it be- 
came known that behind that veil of 
clouds a great battle had been fought 
and won, and that the National arms 
bad been victorious, the soldiers gave 
way to the wildest enthusiasm ; and 
loud cheers for " Old Hooker " coming 
up, resounding from the valley, were 
echoed and re-echoed among the blood- 
stained hills. The night which fol- 
lowed was beautiful in the extreme. 
The mist disappeared ; and a full moon 
shed her mellow light over a scene of 
matchless magnificence. It was Hook- 
er's conviction that the enemy would 
withdraw from the summit of the 
mountain before daylight. In antici- 



pation of such a movement, he de- 
tached parties from several regiments, 
with instructions to scale the palisades. 
When morning came, the Confederates 
were gone. In their haste, they had 
left behind them 20,000 rations, the" 
camp and garrison equipage of their 
brigades, and a large quantity of other 
war material. The Eighth Kentuck- 
ians were the first to reach the crest; 
and at sunrise, in the clear, crisp No- 
vember air, amid echoing cheers from 
the troops below, they had the honor 
of unfurling the National banner from 
Pulpit Rock. The importance of this 
victory at Lookout Mountain, it is 
hardly possible to over-estimate. It 
enabled Grant greatly to contract his 
line of battle, and bv so much to con- 
centrate his strength. It made an end 
of the blockade of the Tennessee ; and 
from that day there was no more diffi- 
culty about supplies for the National 
army. 

Such was the condition of things on 
the night of the 24th and the morning 
of the 25th of Noveriiber. The Na- 
tional army maintained au unbroken 
line, with open communications from 
the north end of Lookout Mountain, 
through Chattanooga Valley to the 
north end of Missionary Ridge. Car- 
lin had taken position so as to connect 
Hooker with the centre ; and Howard^ 
with the Eleventh corps, having been 
moved up from the right, connected 
the centre with Sherman. The Con- 
federates, having abandoned Chatta- 
nooga Valley, concentrated on Mission- 
ary Ridge. Their line extended from 
Tunnel Hill to Rossville. Bragg'a 



668 



CHICKAMATJflA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



right, consisting of the divisions of 
Cleburne, Walker, Cheatham, and Ste- 
venson, was commanded by Hardee; 
his left was commanded by Brecken- 
"idge, and was composed of that gen- 
eral's own division, now under Lewis, 
and those of Stewart and Anderson. 
General Grant's headquarters had been 
removed from Fort Wood to Orchard 
Knob, or as it was also named, " Indian 
Hill" — a commanding eminence which 
Thomas had now strongly fortified, and 
from which could be seen the embattled 
hosts spread out, as in a vast amphi- 
theatre. 

The morning of the 25th rose in 
jjov. beauty. Far almost as the eye 
25« could reach, the sun fell upon the 
compact lines of polished steel. In 
front, towering up, the huge form of 
Missionary Ridge, its precipitous sides 
defying attack, its summit swarming 
with armed men, and crowned with 
artillery ; away to the right, and stand- 
ing out clear and well-defined, the bold 
outlines of Lookout Mountain ; Hook- 
er's men spread out in the valley below 
to the right, Shennan's massed in com- 
pact phalanx above to the left, while 
Thomas' well-trained bands, eager and 
ready for the fray, are gathered together 
in close array around the headquarters 
of the chief — such was the sight which 
met the eye of the beholder, as he stood 
on Orchard Knob, on the morning of 
the day which was to witness the final 
struggle and the crowning National 
victory at Chattanooga. It was a mag- 
nificent spectacle, and one which it 
rarely falls to the lot of mortals to 
witness. 



At an early hour the preparations 
were complete. The sun had arisen, 
however, before the bugle sounded 
" Forward ! " Hooker had received 
orders to move on the Confederate 
left ; Sherman was to move against the 
right ; while the centre, under the im- 
mediate eye of General Grant, was to 
advance later in the day, and wlienever 
the developments made on either wing 
should justify the attack. Shortly after 
sunrise, Hooker, who has left a small 
force on Lookout Mountain, is seen, 
with the mass of his troops, moving 
down the eastern slope of the moun- 
tain, and sweeping across the valley. 
Sherman moves at the same time on 
the Confederate right ; and it soon be- 
gins to be evident that Bragg, believ- 
ing that the main attack is to be made 
on his right, is massing his troops on 
Sherman's front. A fiei'ce artillery 
duel at once commenced between Or- 
chard Knob and Missionary Ridge. 
Hooker, pressing on towards Rossville 
Gap, encountei'ed an unexpected obsta- 
cle at Chattanooga Creek. -The bridge 
had been destroyed by the Confederates 
as they retired from the valley in the 
early morning. It was an anfortunate 
circumstance, necessitating as it did a 
delay of three houis. As soon as 
the bridge was completed, the troops 
were pushed over. Rossville Gap was 
quickly occupied ; and Hooker, moving 
Osterhaus along the east side of the 
ridge, Geary at its base, with the bat- 
teries, on the west side, and Crvit on 
the ridge itself, marched northward, 
driving the enemy before him. The 
Confederates did not yiiJd withou/ 



MISSIONARY RIDGE. 



669 



offering a stubborn resistance. It was 
found impossible, however, to with- 
stand the energy and dash of the Na- 
tional troops. The skirmishers were 
speedily driven in and pressed back 
upon the main body. Cruft, now form- 
ing his column in battle-line, fell with 
all his weight on the front line of the 
enemy, Geary and Osterhaus, on both 
flanks, opening a murderous fire. The 
fighting continued till sunset, when the 
Confederates, having been driven stead- 
ily backward from one strong position 
to another, although they resisted nobly, 
broke and fled in wild confusion. The 
fugitives who sought safety by running 
down the eastern slope, fell into the 
hands of Osterhaus ; those who tried 
to escape by the western slope, fell into 
the hands of Geary ; while those who 
retreated along the ridge ran helplessly 
into the ranks of Johnson's division of 
the Fourteenth corps, and were cap- 
tured. Shortly after sunset, the victory 
on the National right was complete. 
Breckeuridge had proved himself no 
match for Hooker. 

Let us now see what was going on 
towards the left and at the centre. 
On the morning of the 25th, Sherman 
was in the saddle before it was light. 
During the night he had strongly en- 
trenched his position. His order of 
battle was similar to that of Hooker. 
General Corse, with three of his own 
regiments and one of Lightburn's, 
moved forward on the crest of the hill ; 
General Morgan L. Smith, with his 
command, advanced along the eastern 
base ; while Colonel Loomis, supported 
by the two reserve brigades of General 



John E. Smith, advanced along the 
western base. The bi-isjades of Cock- 
erell and Alexander, and a portion of 
Lightburn's, remained behind, holding 
the position first occupied. Almost 
from the commencement of the forward 
movement, the advancing columns were 
exposed to the guns of the enemy. 
Without experiencing any very great 
inconvenience, Sherman's troops de- 
scended the hill on which they had 
been drawn up in battle order, crossed 
the valley in their front, and rushed 
up the opposite hill, which they seized 
and held. At this point, it was dis- 
covered that the ground to be traversed 
was not so free from obstructions as 
had been supposed. It was not a con- 
tinuous ridge, but rather a chain of 
hills, each well wooded and fortified. 
This secondary crest, on which Corse 
had obtained a foothold, was com- 
manded by a higher hill, and thus 
exposed to a plunging fire. Between 
these hills was a deep gorge, through 
which passed the railroad tunnel, and 
in Avhich the Confederate commander 
sheltered his masses until they could 
be brought into, action. Corse called 
forward his reserves, and asked for re- 
inforcements. The ridge, however, 
was narrow; and as the enemy, from 
his superior position, could bring to 
bear upon the assaulting columns a 
destructive, enfilading fire of artillery 
and musketry, it was not well to crowd 
the men. A severe hand-to-hand con- 
test ensued, and continued for more 
than an hour. The tide of battle 
ebbed and flowed, victory now leaning 
to the one side and now to the other 



670 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



It was a desperate grapple, and the 
loss of life was terrible. No decided 
progress was being made on either 
side. Corse found it impossible to 
carry the works in his front ; the Con- 
federates were equally unable to drive 
him from the position he had won. 
The columns which, under Loomis and 
Smith, moved along the sides of the 
ridge, encountering fewer difficulties, 
were attended with better success. 
Smith kept gaining ground on the left 
spur of Missionary Ridge, while Loomis 
on his side got abreast of the tunnel 
and the railroad embankment. The fire 
of the one and the other, striking the 
Confederates on both flanks, and slight- 
ly in rear of their front, had the effect 
of withdrawing attention, and thus to 
a certain extent of relieving the as- 
saulting party on the crest of the hill. 

It was now about three o'clock. 
The battle was raging with tremen- 
dous fury. Column after column of 
the enemy came streaming down upon 
Sherman's men, gun upon gun pouring 
upon them its concentrated shot from 
every hill and spur, as they vainly 
struggled in the valley and attempted 
to force their way to the further height. 
Neither, however, was gaining any ad- 
vantage. Almost at the crisis of the 
fight, it seemed to the anxious watch- 
ers at Chattanooga as if Sherman was 
losing ground. There was, indeed, a 
backward movement. It had seemed 
to General J. E. Smith that Colonel 
Wolcott, who now commanded on the 
crest — Corse having been wounded 
early in the day — was sorely pressed, 
and in danger of being overpowered. 



He, therefore, sent to his aid the two re- 
serve brigades of Runion and Mathias. 
Having crossed the intervening fields 
and climbed the hillside, in spite of a 
most destructive fire of artillery and 
musketry, they effected a junction with 
Wolcott. The ridge, however, being 
narrow, they were forced to take posi- 
tion on the western face of the hill, 
where, being exposed to attack on right 
and rear, the enemy, rushing from the 
tunnel gorge, fell upon them in over- 
whelming numbers, driving them down 
the hill and back to the lower end of 
the field. There they were re-formed; 
and the Confederates, who had ventured 
to pursue, were struck heavily on their 
flank, and compelled to retire to the 
shelter of their works on the wooded 
hills. It was this backward movement 
of Smith's brigades which, being seen 
at Chattanooga, created the impression 
that a repulse had been sustained by the 
National left. Shei'man has taken some 
pains to correct this false impression, 
and informs us that the " real attack- 
ing columns of General Corse, General 
Loomis and General Morgan L. Smith, 
were not repulsed," but, on the con- 
trary, held their ground, and struggled 
" all day persistently, stubbornly and 
well." 

Long and wearily had Sherman 
waited for the attack in the centre 
An occasional shot from Orchard 
Knob, and some artillery and musket- 
ry fire, away in the direction of Look- 
out, were the only signs of activity in 
the Natibnal ranks on his right. It 
was not until shortly after three 
o'clock, that he saw a white line of 



THE THUNDERBOLT HURLED. 



671 



smoke in front of Orchard Knob — the 
line extending further and further to 
the right. It was evident that some- 
thing decisive was happening. He had 
faith in the result ; for he knew that, 
by his repeated and persistent attacks, 
he had compelled Bragg to concentrate 
lai'ge masses of his troops on his own 
right. He had thus weakened the 
Confederate centre, and created the 
opportunity for Grant and Thomas. 

During these hours of sore trial and 
deep anxiety, Grant's attention was 
quite as much directed to the left as 
was that of Sherman to the centre. 
Grant's headquarters, as we have seen, 
were at Orchard Knob. He had a 
commanding view of the entire battle- 
ground. He knew that Biagg was 
concentrating on his own right, and, 
determined to penetrate the National 
left and force his way to Chattanooga, 
was hurling against Sherman his well- 
disciplined legions in overwhelming 
masses. He feared lest his trusted 
lieutenant, sorely pressed, should be 
yielding to impatience, because of the 
continued inaction at the centre. But 
it was necessary to wait for Hooker, 
who, as has been stated, had been de- 
layed three hours in reconstructing the 
bridge across Chattanooga Creek. It 
was desii'able, at least, that the Con- 
federate left should be well engaged, 
as well as the Confederate right, be- 
fore the decisive blow was dealt at the 
centre. With any other commander on 
his left, Grant might have risked too 
much by leaving him so long, unaided 
or unrelieved, to struggle against the 
strong position and the ever-increasing 



numbers of the enemy. Grant, how- 
ever, had not forgotten Shiloh, He 
remembered how, on that day, at the 
foot of the bridge, over Snake Creek, 
Sherman had stood like a wall of ada- 
mant, his men massed around him, and 
presenting to the almost triumphant 
foe what seemed a huge and solid 
shield of shining steel, effectually re- 
sisting, and ultimately turning the tide 
of battle. What he had done then, 
he had, on many a battle field since, 
proved his ability and willingness to 
do again. Grant was asking much 
from his lieutenant; but he felt con- 
vinced that Sherman would not be 
found wanting. Meanwhile, he had 
the satisfaction of perceiving that his 
plan was working admirably. Bragg, 
completely out-generalled, was weak- 
ening his own centre, and preparing 
for him his opportunity. 

It was now half-past three o'clock. 
Grant was pacing to and fro on 
Orchard Knob. Concerned for the 
welfare of Sherman, seeing his oppor- 
tunity rapidly ripening, and impatient 
to strike, yet unwilling by premature 
action to imperil the hoped-for and 
what seemed now the inevitable re- 
sult, he kept turning his eyes wistfully 
in the direction in which Hooker 
should make his appearance. Still 
there were no signs of his coming. 
Hooker, as the reader knows, was suo 
cessfully moving along the ridge and 
driving the enemy before him. But 
Grant was, as yet, ignorant at once of 
the cause of his delay, and of the pro- 
gress he had made. The opportune 
moment, however, had come. He saw 



572 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



that Bragg had greatly weakened his 
centre to support his right ; and having 
faith that Hooker must be close at 
hand, he gave Thomas the order to 
advance. The thunderbolt was hurled. 
The signal guns were fired — one — two 
three — four — five — six ; and the divi- 
sions of Wood, Baird, Sheridan and 
Johnson, long since impatient of delay, 
advanced with firm and steady step. 
These were preceded by a double line 
of skirmishers, drawn mostly fi'om the 
divisions of Wood and Sheridan. The 
orders were to carry the rifle-pits at the 
base of the ridge, and then to re-form 
and push their way to the summit. 
The whole movement was conducted 
with the regularity and precision of 
clock-work. The skirmishers dashed 
forward, the main body following 
within easy supporting distance. Mis- 
sionary Ridge all at once seems ablaze. 
On all the forts and batteries the 
heavy guns open fire ; and, from their 
hollow mouths they bellow harsh 
thunder, and vomit forth theii" missiles 
of destruction. Full thirty guns are 
poming shot and shell into the advanc- 
ing columns. Nothing, however, can 
cool the ardor or restrain the impetu- 
osity of the National soldiers. "Roll- 
ing on the foe," on moves this " fiery 
mass of living valor." The picture of 
the poet becomes here a living realitj^ 
The brigades of Hazen and Willich are 
already at the base of the mountain. 
Like "bees out of a hive," to use the 
expressive words of General Grant, 
the gray-coated Confederates are seen 
swarming out of the rifle-pits and rush- 
ing J4P the hillside. Fued now with 



the wildest enthusiasm, the brave Na- 
tionals, scarcely taking time to re-form, 
push their way up the steep and rug 
ged sides of the mountain. They are 
fully exposed now to a terrific fire from 
the enemy's guns, on the heights above 
them. Shell, canister, shrapnel, bullets 
are falling upon them with deadly ef- 
fect. Nothing daunted, however, on 
they press ; and, from Orchard Knob, 
the National colors are seen fluttering 
higher and still higher, and gradually 
nearing the summit. Order now be- 
gins to disappear. The brigades, partly 
because of the nature of the gi'ound, 
and partly because of the severity of 
the fire, break up into groups. There 
is, however, neither lack of purpose, 
nor lack of enthusiasm. Every group 
has its flag, and, in wedge-like form, 
each eager to be first and emulous of 
the other, is seen pressing onward and 
upward. It seems as if the color-bearers 
are running a race. To plant the first 
color on the summit appears to be the 
ambition of every bi'igade, of eveiy 
group, of every soldier. Now they are 
clambering over the rugged ledges, now 
they are seeking momentary shelter 
in the ravines or behind the overhang- 
ing rocks ; but they are ever, in spite 
of the heavy guns and the murderous 
volleys of musketry from the rifle-pits, 
nearing the summit. 

Meanwhile, the work of destruction 
had been terrible. The color-beareis 
had suffered fearfully. The first to 
reach the summit was a group of men 
from the First Ohio, and a few others 
from other regiments, under the lead 
of Lieutenant-Colonel Lan^jdon. Six 



VICTOKY. 



573 



color-bearers of this party had fallen, 
when Lsngdon, waving forward his 
men, and leaping over the crest, was 
instai tly shot down. The breach, how- 
ever, had been made; and the brigades 
of Hazen and Willich were soon on 
the rnmmit. These were quickly fol- 
lowed by the brigades of Sheridan's di- 
vision — Sheridan himself taking an ac- 
tive part, and specially commanding 
the attention of General Grant. The 
National advance was within a few 
hundred yards of Bragg's headquar- 
ters. There were still despei-ate hand- 
to-hand straggles after the Nationals 
had reached the summit. But, as the 
shouting victors came pouring into the 
works, bayoneting the cannoneers at 
their guns, the bold and resolute front 
gave way. It was now sunset. The 
Confederates were in full retreat, their 
own guns turned upon them by the 
triumphant Nationals. It was only 
with difficulty that Bragg was able 
to make good his escape, along with 
Breckenridge, who by this time had 
joined him. Missionary Ridge was now 
occupied and held by the National 
troops. Hooker, as we have seen, had 
been victorious on the right ; Sherman 
had held his gi'ound, and, after a gal- 
lant and protracted struggle, against su- 
perior numbers, had driven the enemy 
from his front ; and now the brave and 
well-trusted soldiers of the army of the 
C'umberland had pierced and routed 
the Confederate centre. Tlie battle of 
Chattanooga had been fought and won. 
It was another great victory for Gen- 
eral Grant. Bragg was one of the 
most trusted leaders in the Confed- 

265 



erate army, and a special favorite of 
Jefferson Davis. He was defeated not 
by superior numbers, not by superior 
bravery, but by superior tactics. He 
was defeated, because he was out-gen- 
eralled. He committed his first mis. 
take when he detached Longstreet, 
with his command, and sent him to 
operate against Burnside, at Knox- 
ville. He committed his second mis- 
take when he •\veakened his centre and 
moved his troops to the right to ope- 
rate against Sherman. Both were se- 
rious blunders. It is surprising how a 
general of Bragg's experience could 
have committed the one or the other, 
in the presence of such a commander 
as Grant. The first blunder encour- 
aged immediate action, concentration, 
and aggressive effort against Missionary 
Ridge. The second blundei' provoked 
the attack on the Confederate centre, 
which decided the battle. In the 
glory resulting from the victory, Sher- 
man and Hooker and Thomas were 
fully entitled to share. Each had ac- 
complished the task assigned him, 
nobly and with complete success. It 
was a victory of which the whole 
army, from the general in command 
down to the humblest of the rank and 
file, had reason to be proud. "Im- 
partial history," says Coppee, whose 
description of Chattanooga sometimes 
rises to the grandeur of an epic, " will 
be just to all the acts and the actors, 
but above them all will shine, in 
golden characters, the name of the 
great commander, who, upon the heels 
of one great conquest, transformed a 
beleaguered army of starving soldier* 



074 



CHICKaMAUGA and CHATTANOOGA. 



into fiery columns of attack, and 
snatched an immortal victory out of 
the jaws of disaster and anticipated 
ruin. That man was Grant.'" The 
modesty of the man — the utter absence 
of vain-glory — is strikingly revealed in 
the despatch which he sent to General 
Halleck immediately after the battle. 
"Although the battle lasted," he says, 
" from early dawn till dark this even- 
ing, I believe I am not premature in 
announcing a complete victory over 
Bragg. Lookout Mountain top, all the 
rifle-pits in Chattanooga Valley, and 
Missionary Ridge entire, have been 
carried, and are now held by us." 

The final struggle of the day was in 
the neighborhood of the tunnel on 
Thomas' left and in Sherman's front. 
At that point the Confederates made a 
most obstinate resistance. This resist- 
ance, and the darkness which intervened, 
prevented an immediate pursuit. Dur- 
ing the night. Missionary Ridge blazed 
with Union camp fires, the Confede- 
rates having fallen back in the direction 
of Ringgold, by way of Chickamauga 
Station. Bragg left behind him some 
600 prisoners, besides a large number 
of stragglers, 40 guns, upwards of 
7000 small arms, and a large quantity 
, of ammunition. 

I Next morning Sherman, Palmer and 
doY, Hooker were in eager pursuit. 
26. Sherman pushed on towards 
Greysville, passing Chickamauga Sta- 
tion, where he found everything in 
flames. Palmer and Hooker advanced 
by the Rossville road, intending to 
strike the railroad between Greysville 
and Ringgold. At the latter place, 



Hooker came into contact with the CoH' 
federate rear, under Cleburne, who waa 
covering Bragg's retreat. A severe 
encounter took place, Cleburne turning 
and offering a most stubborn resistance, 
The battle lasted the greater part oi 
the day, both sides suffering severely. 
Cleburne did not retreat imtil he had 
inflicted on the Nationals a loss of 432 
men, of whom 65 were killed, some 
of them being most valuable officers. 
The Confederates left on the field 130 
in killed and wounded. The pursuit 
was now discontinued, as Grant felt it 
to be his first and most important duty to 
relieve Burnside, who was at that time 
closely besieged in Knoxville by the 
Confederate forces, under Longstreet. 
Bragg's army continued the retreat to 
Dalton, where it established a fortified 
camp. The Nationals fell back towards 
Chattanooga ; and the campaign against 
Bragg ended. 

The immediate result of the victory 
at Chattanooga was the relief of Knox- 
ville. With a brief account of the 
operations which took place in that 
direction, we shall close this chapter. 

Burnside, it will be remembered, 
after having V>een relieved of the com- 
mand of the army of the Potomac, was 
assigned, on the 26th of March, to the 
command of the department of the Ohio 
! His headquarters were at Cincinnati :. 
and his army, about 20,000 strong, was 
at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Ken- 
tucky. When Rosecranz commenced 
his onward movement towards Chatta- 
nooga, Burnside, who had been ordered 
to co-operate with him, and to affect a 
junction between his own right r,r>d 



KNOXVILLE. 



67S 



the left of Rosecranz, commenced, on 
the 16th of August, his march for East 
Tennessee. That district of country was 
then held by the Confederate general, 
Buckner, whose headquarters were at 
Knoxville. Burnside, more intent on 
restoring the authority of the National 
government in East Tennessee, moved 
in the direction of Knoxville. We 
have already shown how Buckner re- 
tired at his approach, and with what 
enthusiasm Burnside and the National 
troops were received in that town. 
Burnside remained in Knoxville, al- 
though repeatedly ordered to rein- 
force Rosecranz, believing it to be 
all-important that the place should 
be permanently occupied by National 
troops. 

Early in November, as we have 
seen, Bragg detached Longstreet, with 
1 2,000 men, and a heavy body of cav- 
alry, with instructions to move against 
Burnside. Longstreet's march was 
less rapid, and, in consequence, less 
•successful than it might have been. 
His troops were in wretched condition ; 
and reinforcements and supplies did 
not ari-ive as he expected. It was not 
until the 14th of the month that he 
was able to cross the Tennessee at 
Hough's Ferry, six miles below Lou- 
don. Burnside's advance, which was 
at Loudon, fell back as far as Camp- 
bell's Station, where, on the 16th, they 
turned upon their pursuers. A sevei-e 
encounter took place, Burnside holding 
his own against superior numbers. Ul- 
timately, howevei', he was compelled to 
XoT. fall back within the defenses at 
17, 18. Knoxville; and, on the 17th and 



18th, he was surrounded by Long- 
street. Attempts were made to storm 
the beleaguered town; but Burnside 
being vigilant, and having made excel- 
lent arrangements for defense, these 
attempts failed. Longstreet, already 
fearing that Bi'agg might not be able 
to cope successfully with his skilful 
adversary, and knowing that in the 
event of a Confederate defeat at Chat- 
tanooga, Grant would hasten to the aid 
of Burnside, pressed forward the siege 
with the utmost vigor. On the ^ov, 
25th, he threw a considerable 25. 
force across the Holston. His object 
was to seize the heights which com- 
mand Knoxville from the south side 
of the river. Vigorously opposed by 
the National forces, he was not quite 
successful. He was unably to seize 
the desired position ; but he obtained 
possession of a knob s, little lower 
down, from which, at au elevation of 
one hundred and fifty iect above the 
level of the river, lu- had complete 
command of Fort Sanders, some five 
hundred yards to the north. 

This advantage had just been gained, 
to the immense delight of the Con- 
federates, when information reached 
L(jngstreet of the defeat of Bragg at 
Chattanooga. It had been Longstreet's 
hope that, if he could not take the 
place by assault, he would reduce it 
by famine. Relief was now at hand 
Famine was out of the question. If 
Knoxville was to be taken, it must be 
taken by storm. Preparations for a 
final efFort were accordingly hurried 
forward. The point chosen for attack 
was P'ort Sanders, on the noi'thwest 



576 



CHICKAMATTUa aND CHATTANOOGA. 



angle of the fortifications, and com- 
manding an approach by the nver. 
It was a work of great strength, the 
ditch being ten feet deep, and the 
pa)apet of more than ordinary height. 
Around and in front of it, several 
acres of thick pine timber had been 
slashed ; and a perfect entanglement 
of wire-work had been formed by con- 
necting stump with stump. There 
were, besides, numerous rifle-pits and 
(ibatis. The fort was occupied by the 
Seventy-Ninth New York ; the Twenty- 
Ninth Massachusetts; two companies of 
the Second and one of the Twentieth 
Michigan. The armament consisted of 
four 20-pounder Parrott guns, Lieu- 
tenant Benjamin, Buraside's chief of 
artillery; four light 12-pounders, com- 
manded by Buckley ; and two 3-inch 
guns. The assaulting party was com- 
posed of three brigades of McLaws' 
division, with those of Wolford, Hum- 
phreys, Anderson and Bogart. They 
were picked men, the flower of Long- 
street's army. 

\\\ the gray of the morning of the 
Not, 29th, the assault was made, with 
2*« a vigor and determination not 
surpassed in the previous history of the 
war. What with the fierce yells of 
the Confederates, the rattle of mus- 
ketry, the screaming of shells, the 
thunder of artillery, the tumult for a 
time was awful. The Confederates, 
as they approached, were received with 
a deadly fire from the batteries of the 
fort. Nothing daunted, however, by 
the destructive missiles which flew 
thick and fast around them, or by the 
sight of their fallen comi-ades, on they 



pressed, through the abatis, across the 
ditch and up the parapet, some of them 
forcing their way through the embra 
sures. The obstacles encountered, the 
wire net-work particularly, made th'oi. 
progress slow, and consequently kept 
them long exposed to the double-shot- 
ted guns which Feirero, the commander 
of the fort, kept in active play. When 
the assailants reached the parapet, their 
ranks were greatly thinned, but their 
spirits were not subdued. One ofiicer 
actually reached the summit, and, plant- 
ing upon it the flag of the Thirteenth 
Mississippi, called for surrender. It 
was a vain call ; for the next momen< 
his body, pierced by a dozen bullets, 
the flag still in his hand, was rolling 
into the ditch. Hand grenades were 
freely used by the defenders; and 
they had a teri'ible effect. The as- 
sault, gallant as it was, proved a com- 
plete failure. It was tried a second 
time by another column ; but the re- 
sult was the same. The fighting was 
discontinued. A truce was gi'anted to 
the Confederates to carry .away their 
wounded and to bury their dead. 
Longstreet, still hoping against hope, 
and unwilling to retire, maintained the 
siege.* 

Meanwhile, relief was coming from 
Grant to Bui-nside. Why was this re- 

* The ground in front of the fort was strewn with 
the dead and wounded. In the ditch alone, were over 
200 dead and wounded. "'In this terrible ditch," 
says Pollard, "the dead were piled eight or ten feat 
deep. In comparatively an instant of time, we lost 700 
men in killed and wounded and prisoners. Never, 
excepting at Gettysburg, was there, in the history 
of the war, a disaster adorned with the glory of such 
devout courage, as Longstreet's repulse at Knox jiUti ' 
— Third Tear of the War, p. IfiS. 



THE SIEGE RAISED. 



57? 



lief so long delayed ? On the evening 
of the 25th, as soon as success at Chat- 
tanooga had been assured, Grant had 
ordered General Gordon Granger to 
start for the relief of Knoxville, with 
his own Fourth corps, and detachments 
from others — 20,000 in all. Granger 
was to move with four days' rations, ar- 
rangements having been made to send 
after him a steamer with supplies. 
When Grant returned from the front on 
the 28th he found, much to his aston- 
ishment, that Granger liad not yet got 
ofP, and that he was preparing to 
move "with reluctance and complaints." 
Grant fell back upon Sherman, who 
was ever willing and ever ready. " I 
am inclined to think," said Grant, in 
a letter to Sherman, "I shall have to 
send you. In plain words, you wall 
assume command of all the forces now 
moving up the Tennessee." When he 
received the letter from Grant, Sherman 
was at Calhoun, at the railroad cross- 
ing of the Hiawassee. If he had been 
less of a soldier, he might easily have 
found cause of complaint. It was only 
seven days since he had marched his 
troops from the west side of the Ten- 
nessee, with only two days' rations, 
without change of clothing, with but a 
single blanket or coat to a man, from 
himself to the private soldier. What 
provisions they had were picked up by 
the way. Murmur or complaint, how- 
ever, with Sherman, there was none, i 

i 

To hear was to obey. It was enough 
for him that 12,000 of his fellow-sol- : 
diers were beleaguered at Knoxville, 
eighty-four miles away, and that, if not 
relieved ^vithia three days, they might , 



be at the mercy of the enemy. With 
his hardy and untiring veterans, Sher- 
man was quickly on his way. The 
roads were bad ; and, as the pontoon 
bi-idge at Loudon had been cestroyed, 
there was unexpected diiS-julty and 
consequent delay. After considerable 
progress had lieen made, the troops 
were compelled to turn to -^he east, and 
to trust to General Burt.side's bridge 
ut Knoxville. A bridge was tiuug 
across the Little Tennc-jsee, at Morgan- 
town ; and by daybreak on the oec. 
5th of December, the enti) •. Fif- 5. 
teenth coi'ps was over. Meanwhile 
the cavalry command. whi».h had moved 
forward in advance, had reached Knox- 
ville on the 3d of Deceuber, the very 
day on w^hich Burnside expected his 
supplies would give out. On the night 
of the 5th, a messengei' from Burnside 
arrived at Sherman's headquarters, an- 
nouncing that Longstreet was in full 
retreat towards Virginia, and that the 
National cavalry were in pursuit. As 
soon as Sherman's cavalry appeared, 
Longstreet, discovering that his flank 
was tui'ned, raised the siege, and re- 
treated towai'ds^ Kussellville in the di- 
rection of Virginia. The National 
cavalry followed for some distance in 
close pursuit. Thus ended the siege 
of Knoxville. 

Burnside had offered a noble resist- 
ance, and liad retrieved some of the 
laurels lost at Fredei'icksbiu'g. He 
was not without obligations to Sher- 
man ; nor was he ungiatef ul. In a 
letter to that general, he fully acknowl- 
edged those o})ligations, and thanked 
both him and liis command for so 



378 



OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 



prompt!}' coming to his relief. " I am 
satisfied," he said, "that your approach 
served to raise the siege." Sherman, 
too, had great reason to be proud of 
himself and his command. They had 
been constantly in motion since they 
left the Big Black in Mississippi. For 
long periods they had been without 
regular rations ; and the men had 
marched through mud and over rocks, 
sometimes barefooted, without a mur- 
mur and without a moment's delay. 
After a march of over 400 miles, with- 
out sleep for three successive nights, 
they crossed the Tennessee, fought 
their part in the battle of Chattanooga, 
pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, 
and then turned more than 120 miles 
north, and compelled Longstreet to 
raise the siege of Knoxville. After 
the siege was raised, Sherman, with 
consent of Burnside, leaving only Gran- 
ger's command, fell back to the line of 
the Hiawassee. 

The victories at Chattanooga and 
Knoxville produced very different 
states of feeling in the North and 
the South. There was great indig- 

FoRT Sandees. — This place was named after Briga- 
dier-General William P. Sanders, who received his 
death-wound while gallantly resisting the attack made 
on the 18th of November. Sanders was a native of 
Kentucky, and a graduate of West Point. He had al- 
ready made himself conspicuous by his deeds of daring, 
and had secured the confidence both of his superior 
officers and of the rank and file ; but, by his gallantry 
during the famous and, to him, fatal encount«r on the 
ISth, he won for himself imperishable renown. In his 
General Field Orders No. 31, and bearing date Novem- 
ber 24th, Burnside says : "In memory of the honored 
dead, the fort in front of which he received his fatal 
woond irill be known hereafter as Fort Sanders. " Th« 



nation among the Confederates: and 
Bragg, at his own request, was relieved 
of his command. In the North, joy 
beamed on every countenance, and 
gratitude welled up and ovei-flowed 
from every heart. At the recommen- 
dation of the president, the people 
assembled in their places of worship 
and rendered thanks to Almighty God 
"for His great advancement of the 
National cause." Honors flowed in 
upon Grant. He received a letter of 
congratulation from the president. 
Congress, on the 17th of Decem- oec 
ber, voted him thanks, also a "'• 
gold medal, which was to be struck 
" with suitable emblems, devices and 
inscriptions." In doing him honor, 
town vied with town, city with city, 
State with State, over the leng-th and 
breadth of the Union. He had be- 
come the National hero. 

The Confederates neve, recovered 
from the blow received a"^ Chattanooga. 
The tide continued to rise and swell 
and roll against them. It was evident 
now to all thinking men that the end 
was rapidly approaching. 

final struggle, for the possession of this work, on the 
29th, although comparatively on a small scale, was, »» 
has been shown in the text, one of the fiercest In the 
whole history of the war. The highest valor was dis- 
played on both sides. If victory on that day carried 
with it glory, defeat was attended with no dishonor. 
The National troops, one and all, behaved nob'y, and 
won special commendations from their chief ; but it is 
no disparagement to the other troops engaged, to say 
that the heroic defense of Fort Sanders added fresh 
laurels to the gallant Seventy-Ninth New York High- 
landers, who had already won distinction at Bull Bun. 
at Port Royal Ferry, at James' Island and at Chantilly, 
where the brave Stevens, nobly fighting, fell 



SECESSIONVIJjLE. 



579 



CHAPTER XXIX. 



Operations in 1862. — T. W. Sherman and Dupont. — James' Island. — Secessionville. — Colonel Lamar.— Qunarai' 
fevcvens. — The Gallant Seventy-Ninth. — Pocotaligo. — Battle of Secessionville. — Great Bravery ol the Higu 
ianders and the Michiganers. — General Mitchell in Command of the Department of the South. — Mitchell 
ville. — Death of Mitchell. — General Brannan and Mitchell's Plans. — General Hunter in Command. — Fort Mc- 
Allister.— Three Attempts. — Destruction of the Na.shville. — A Terrific Fire. — The Fort Invulnerable. — The At- 
tempt Abandoned. — The Case of the Princess Royal. — The Confederate Fleet. — The Mercedita and Keystone 
State Badly Damaged. — Proclamation of Beauregard and Ingraham. — Judah P. Benjamin. — The Confederate 
Claim. — The National Government Aroused. — Misunderstanding Between Hunter and Foster. — Preparations 
lOr the Attack on Charleston. — The Fortifications. — Their Number and Strength. —Impregnable. — The Na 
tional Fleet. — Advance of the Fleet. — An Ominous Silence. — Thunders of Artillery. — The WLssahickou. 
The New Ironsides. — The Keokuk. — The Montauk and Catskill.— " The Wars of the Titans."— The Fleet 
Overmatched. — The Keokuk Destroyed. — The Retreat. — Hunter Blamed. — " I Could do Nothing but Pray for 

Ton." — Bravery of Dupont. — Fort Sumter the Great Obstacle. — "It Must be got out of the Way." Quincy 

A. Gillmore. — The Atlanta. — Great Hopes. — Dupont Prepared for Her Approach. — Great Expectations of the 
Confederates. — The Weehawken. — Captain Rodgers. — The Atlanta a Prisoner. — Gillmore's Plans. — Dahlgren 
Succeeds Dupont. — Movements on Land and Water. — Higginson and Terry. — Fort Wagner Attacked. — Na- 
tional Batteries on Folly Island. — Dahlgren's Monitors. — The Confederates Driven From Morris' Island.— 
Assault on Fort Wagner. — In Vain.— Not to be Taken but by Regular Approaches. — Work Resumed.— 
Another Assault. ^Another Failure. — The Jaws of Death. — The Beach Covered with the Dead and Dying — 
Parallels. — Closer and Closer. — Gillmore's Preparations Completed. — Twelve Batteries. — Twenty-Eight Heavy 
Onus and Twelve Mortars. — An Artillery Duel. — Fort Sumter Demolished. — The Fourth Parallel. — Calcium 
Lights. — Preparations for the Final Assault on Fort Wagner. — Forts Wagner and Gregg Abandoned. — Fe >rfnl 
Expenditure of Shot and Shell.— Attempt to Occupy Fort Sumter. — A Disastrous Enterprise. — Two Hundred 
Men KUled, Wounded or Captured. — Operations Discontinued. — The Position Held. — Not a Victory, but a 
Gain. — The Blockade Made Secure. 



In previous chapters of this work, 
we have described at some length 
the more important naval and 
coast operations which were conducted 
in 1861, and in the earlier months of 
1862, special attention being given to 
the expedition under Butler and Far- 
ragut, to that under T. W. Sherman and 
Dupont, and to that under Burnside 
and Goldsborough. Success more or 
less brilliant attended them all ; and, 
as early as the 12th of April, 1862, the 
first anniversary of the attack on Fort 
Sumter, the entire Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts, from Cape Hatteras to Perdido 
Bay, excepting only the harbor of 



Charleston and its immediate surround- 
ings, had been abandoned by the Con- 
federates. Along that whole line, the 
National power was supreme. 

Early in 1862, Hunter had succeeded 
T. W. Sherman in command of the 
department of the South. Hunter 
was bent on doing something whicli 
might pave the way to the reduction of 
Charleston. It would have been vain 
for Dupont, with the fleet at his com- 
mand, to make any direct attempt to pass 
the forts. It was deemed advisable, 
however, to take possession of Wad- 
melaw Island, also John's and James" 
Islands, and to advance on C^iarleston 



680 



CHABLESTON IIARBOK. 



May by land. On the 20th of May, 
20» the gunboats Unadilla, Pembina 
and Ottawa crossed the bar at the 
mouth of the Stono River, and proceed- 
ed up that stream as far as its junction 
with Wappoo Creek, only a few miles 
from Charleston. This expedition might 
have been attended with some success 
if the gunboats had been supported by 
land troops. It was nearly a fortnight, 
however, after the gunboats had reached 
Wappoo, when a portion of the troops, 
commanded by General Benham, ac- 
companied by General Hunter himself, 
landed on James' Island. It was a 
week later when General Wright ar- 
rived with the remainder. Simulta- 
neously \vith these movements, General 
Stevens made a successful raid in the 
uirection of Pocotaligo, destroying sev- 
eral miles of the Charleston and Savan- 
nah Railroad. 

The appearance of the gunboats at 
Wappoo, without a supporting land 
force, was a benefit rather than an in- 
convenience to the Confederates. It 
served to warn them of the intention 
of the National commander. They 
were already in a strong position at 
Secessionville, a delightful little village, 
about two miles from the Stono, almost 
fiurounded by water, and accessible by 
land only on its western side. At this 
plaee, the Confederates, under Colonel 
J. G. Lamar, taking advantage of the 
time afforded them by the non-arrival 
of the land forces, constructed a for- 
midable battery. Benham, as soon as 
he got his troops in order, resolved to 
carry the battery by assault. It was 
^ ow June ; and the morning of the 



11th was fixed for the attack. Lamar, 
however, commenced offensive opera- 
tions the evening before. Some skirm- 
ishing followed; and the meditated 
attack was postponed. After having 
made a vain attempt to silence the Con- 
federate guns by a battery which he 
hurriedly constructed, Benham fell 
back on his original plan of assault. 
By this time Stevens had returned, 
with his troops, from Pocotaligo. On 
the morning of the 16th, Stevens, June 
with aV)Out 3000 men, supported •*• 
by General Wright, with about the 
same number, advanced to the attack. 
The Eighth Micliigan led the way, fol- 
lowed close by the Seventy-Ninth New 
York Highlanders. It was a perilous 
movement. The Confederate battery 
could only be reached by pressing 
along a narrow strip of land. Thy 
Confederate pickets were easily cap- 
tured ; and it was hoped that the 
garrison, also, might be surprised and 
made prisonei-s. Lamar, however, was 
watchful and well prepared. As soon 
as the National troops began to press 
along the narrow strip of land which 
led to the battery, he opened upon 
them a murderous fire of grape and 
canister from si.x masked guns. The 
brave Michifran men and the undaunted 
Highlanders essayed to advance ; but, 
j in addition to this pitiless storm of de- 
I structive missiles in their front, they 
{ found themselves exposed to a severe 
musketry fire on their right flank. 
Progress was impossible. General 
Wright's troops came uji ; and, in the 
struggle which ensued, they took an 
active part. It was soon discovered, 



THE IIIGHLAXDERS. 



581 



however, that the works were too 
strong to be taken hj assault, and that 
to prolong the struggle was only to 
make a useless sacrifice of human life. 
The Nationals, therefore, fell ])ack, 
having lost in the brief encounter 
about 600 men. Such was the battle 
of Secessionville.* Soon afterwards 
James' Island was abandoned by the 

* In no battle during the whole war was greater 
bravery displayed than was witnessed that morning at 
Recessionville. A graphic picture of the affair was 
given at the time by a correspondent of the New York 
Herald. It was the 16th of June, and about half-past 
two o'clock in the morning, when General Stevens 
moved to the attack. When about four hundred yards 
from the fort, the Confederate guns, as has been men- 
tioned in the text, opened a tremendous fire. The at- 
tacking column was terribly cut up, the Eighth Michi- 
gan suffering most severely. Nothing daunted, what 
remained of the Eighth Michigan, the Seventy-Ninth 
New York Highlanders, the One Hundreth Pennsylva- 
nia, the Twenty-Eighth Massachusetts, with portions of 
the Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Sixth New York, 
pressed forward. Captains Ely and Doyle, and Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Morrison, mounting the parapet of the 
work. ' ' Here, " says the Herald correspondent, ' ' lasted 
for a few moments the most exciting scene my pen has 
ever attempted to describe. When the Highlanders 
heard of the terrible slaughter of the Eighth Michigan, 
■*ith whom they had for many months been brigaded, 
they could not be restrained, but advanced with the 
utmost promptness to the support of their old com- 
rades. Colonel Morrison, whose horse was shot early 
in the action, led up his men on foot, shouting, ' Come 
on, Highlanders !' and with Lieutenant Lyons, of Gen- 
eral Steven^ staff, was the first to sc^e the walls and 
mount the parapet of the fort. Both were wounded — 
Colonel Morrison in the head, the bullet entering at 
the temple and coming out behind the right ear, and 
Lieutenant Lyons severely in the arm. Captain Doyle 
was severely wounded ; and Captains Guild, Pratt and 
Church were killed. It was while endeavoring to scale 
these works that Captain Hitchcock, of the Seventh 
Connecticut, was shot down. Nevertheless, the men 
went up, walking unflinchingly into the jaws of death. 
But very few escaped, and those only with garments 
riddled with baUs. Colonel Morrison, even after he was 
wounded, discharged the entile contents of his revol- 
ver at the force within, and had the satisfaction of kill- 
ing one rebel as he was endeavoring to screen himself 
in one of the numerous ' rat-holes, ' with which the in- 
tariot of th« JTork abounded. " 

9C« 



Nationals ; and, for a period, no further 
effoi-ts were made against Charleston. 

In the fall of 1862, General O. M. 
Mitchell, who had been called to Wash- 
ington City from Tennessee, took com- 
mand of the depai'traent of the Soutl.,' 
thus superseding Hunter. On the 
16th of September he reached Hilton 
Head, and established his headquarters 
in the house occupied by his predeces- 
sor. The place was swarming with 
negroes who had escaped from their 
owners ; and Mitchell, with his usual 
vigor, at once took measures to make 
the disorganized, idle crowd more com- 
fortable and more useful. The little 
town of Mitchellville soon gave evi- 
dence of the taste and humanity as 
well as the energy of the new. com- 
mander. Mitchell was actively pre- 
paring for a decisive campaign against 
Charleston, when he was out short in 
his work by an attack of yellow fever. 
He was removed to the more healthful 
locality of Beaufort ; but he died or 
the 30th of October, having been in 
his new command only some six weeks. 

Late in October, an attempt was 
made, under the direction of General 
Brannan, to carry out one of Mitchell's 
plans. Brannan set out wth an effec- 
tive force of about 4500 men. His 
final objective was Charleston. His 
immediate purpose was to reach Poca 
taligo, and at that place destroy the 
Charleston and Savannah Railroad 
Embarking at Hilton Head on gun- 
boats and transports, he proceeded up' 
the Broad River to the Coosawhatchie, 
and pushed on to Pocotaligo with but 
little difficulty. There he encountered 



582 



CHARLESTON HARBOR. 



the Confederate pickets ; and, although 
he managed to drive them before him, 
he was unable to prevent them from 
burning the bridges in their rear, and 
thus interposing serious obstacles to his 
further advance. A heavy fire having 
been opened upon him by General W. 
S. Walker's artillery, which was sup- 
ported by a powerful infantry force, 
Brannan, taking counsel from prudence, 
fell back to Mackay's Landing, where 
he re-embarked for Hilton Head. This 
expedition, which proved utterly fruit- 
less, cost the Nationals at least 300 
men. 

On the death of Mitchell, Hunter 
resumed command of the department 
of the South. Charleston Harbor was 
still the great object of attention. Its 
continued and successful resistance to the 
National forces was a fruitful source of 
annoyance to the authorities at Wash- 
ington. It was one of the original 
cradles of the rebellion ; its precipitate 
action had plunged the nation into all 
the calamities of the Civil War ; and, 
so long as it remained an integral part 
of the Confederacy, it involved the 
neutralization of an army of 30,000 
men. It was of the utmost importance 
that the forts in the harbor should be 
reduced, and the National authority 
restored in the city and neighborhood. 
It was not until the spring of 1863, 
that any vigorous operations were 
made in the direction of Charles- 
ton. Several attempts, however, were 
made early, in the year, to reduce Fort 
McAllister. This M'as a strong wor^, 
which was constructed at Genesis 
Point, on the Great Ogeechee River; 



£863. 



and, under its cover lay the steamer 
Nashville, which was waiting to run 
the blockade and play the part of a 
privateer. On the morning of jan, 
the 27th of January, in obe- 27e 
dience to instructions from Admiral 
Dupont, Commander Worden, of Hamp- 
ton Roads renown, pushed up the river 
with the monitor Montauk, supported 
by several small gunboats, and a murtar 
schooner, and opened fire upon the fort. 
The work was found to be strong be- 
yond expectation. It was a casemated 
earth-work, with boml) proofs, and 
mounting nine guns. Owing to obstruc 
tions in the river, the Montauk was un 
able to advance within effective range, 
The guns of the fort were well handled. 
The Montauk was struck thirteen times, 
but received no injury. Having ex- 
pended her shells, she retired. A 
second attempt was made by Worden 
on the 1st of February. On this peb. 
occasion, the Montauk engaged ^' 
the fort at the distance of 1400 yards. 
Her well-directed fire did some damage 
to the parapets of the fort. She was 
herself struck some sixty-one times, 
without being materially injured. fe\ 
On the 27th of February a third 21c 
attempt was made, and was attendeu 
with more success. A reconnoissancu 
having been made, it was discovered 
that the Nashville was grounded a 
short distance above the fort; and 
Worden, with the Montauk, followed 
by the Seneca, Wissahickon and Dawn, 
moved up the river as far as the ob 
structions would permit, and openef 
fire upon the Nashville. His 12 anO^ 
15-inch shells fell with destructiva 



FORT McAllister. 



583 



effect upon the doomed ship ; and in 
less than twenty minntes she was 
in flames. One by one her heavy 
guns exploded with the heat ; her 
magazine blew up; and in less than 
an hour, the dreaded privateer was 
almost invisible. The Montauk was 
struck five times by the heavy shot 
from the fort, and when beyond the 
range of the guns a torpedo exploded 
under her ; but she sustained compara- 
tively little injury. In this effort, 
•Har. Worden did not lose a man. On 
3' the 3d of March, another and 
even more formidable attempt was 
made against the fort. Dupont was 
greatly encouraged by the success 
which had attended Worden ; and, as 
liis fleet had been reinfoi'ced by the 
arrival of additional iron-clads, he 
resolved to subject their mechanical 
appliances to the full test of active 
service Vjefore entering upon more im- 
portant opeiations. The expedition, 
which consisted of four monitors and 
seveial mortar schooners, was placed 
under the direction of Commander 
Drayton. The Passaic led the way, 
with Drayton on board, being closely 
followed by the Patapsco, Commander 
Ammen, and by the Nahant, Com- 
mander Downes. By means of skil- 
ful pilotage, the Passaic was brought 
up to within 1000 yards of the fort. It 
was not found possible to bring the 
other boats so near. The firing com- 
menced shortly after eight o'clock, and 
was continued all day and during the 
night of the 3d. About 250 shot and 
shell were thrown into the fort ; and 
the fire of the foit fell heavily on the 



Passaic, the other vessels being some- 
what out of easy range. But little im- 
pression, however, was made on cither 
side. Drayton was making but little 
impression on Fort McAllister ; and 
the shot from the fort was rattling 
harmlessly on the turret and iron-bound 
sides of the Passaic. On the second day 
the attack was abandoned. The Pas- 
saic bore away with her some traces of 
the struggle. Where she was struck 
by the bullets of the fort, there were 
some deep indentations, and some of 
the bolts had been started by the vio- 
lence of the concussion. It was Dray- 
ton's opinion that the fort could not be 
made untenable by any number of iron 
clads, because the shallow water and 
narrow space would not permit them 
to be brought into position against it. 
There were other operations con- 
nected with the blockade of the 
Southern ports, some of which were 
of greater, some of lesser importance. 
On the 29th of January, an En- jan. 
glish blockade-nmner, the Prin- 29. 
cess Royal, attempted to I'un into 
Charleston Harbor. She had come 
from Bennuda with a valuable cargo, 
having on board two marine engines, 
several rifled guns, and large quantities 
of arms, munitions and medicines. She 
fell an easy prey to the blockading 
fleet. The loss of this vessel was a 
severe blow to the Confederates. It 
greatly enraged them ; and efforts 
were at once made for its recapture. 
On the morning of the 31st, the Jan. 
rams. Palmetto State, Lieuten- 3*' 
ant Rutledge, and Chicora, Commander 
Tucker, ran out from Chailestoa by 



594 



CHARLESTON HARBOR. 



the maiu ship -channel, and under a 
thick haze, surprised the blockading 
fleet. That fleet then consisted of 
the steamers Housatonic, Mercedita, 
Ottawa, Unadilla, Keystone State, 
(Quaker City, Memphis, Augusta, Stet- 
tin and Flag. The Mercedita was the 
first to suffer. The Palmetto State 
ran into her with great force, at the 
moment of contact, sending into her 
a 7-inch shell, which made a hole 
in her side from four to five feet 
square, and penetrated her steam-drum. 
Most of those on board were scalded 
by the steam, and several were killed 
outright. The officers and crew of the 
Mercedita had no choice but surrender. 
The Palmetto State then rushed upon 
the Keystone State, which was at the 
same time attacked by the Chicora. 
The Keystone State made a vigorous j 
resistance ; but when iu the act of bear- 
ing down upon the nearest ram, with 
the intention of striking and at the same 
moment opening a plunging fire, she 
was hit by a heavy shot, which passed 
through her steam-chest. Neither the 
Mercedita nor the Keystone State was 
lost to the Union. The former, un- 
aided, succeeded in making her way 
to Port Royal ; the latter was taken 
in tow by the Memphis, and moved 
to the same place in a very crippled 
condition. 

It was at this time that a joint 
proclamation was issued by General 
Beauregard, then in charge of Charles- 
ton-, and Flag-Offieer Ingraham, then 
commanding the naval forces of South 
Carolina, declaring the blockade of 
Charleston " to be raised by a supe- 



rior force of the Confederate States.' 
Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate 
Secretary of State, at the same time 
issued a circular to the foreign consuls 
in the Confederacy, reiterating the 
claim of Beauregard and Ingraham 
"This," added Benjamin, "is for the 
information of such vessels of youi 
nation, as may choose to cany on 
commerce with the now open port 
of Chai-leston." 

Such a claim, made at such a time, 
had a powerful effect iu rousing up 
the government at Washington. Gen- 
eral Hunter and Admiral Dupont re- 
ceived instructions to make an attack 
on Charleston without further delay; 
and General Foster, with the greater 
portion of the Eighteenth corps, was 
ordered from North Carolina to the 
assistance of the naval commander. 
Halleck had, unfortunately, neglected 
to write to Hunter, informing him of 
the instructions which he had given to 
Foster; and the result was that when 
Foster arrived, Hunter regarded him 
as an intrudei'. Foster, at his own re- 
quest, was ultimately allowed to return 
to his department, his troops remain- 
ing as reinforcements to Hunter. While 
these events were occurring, Dupont 
was making vigorous preparations for 
the attack. 

It was now Sunday, the 5th day of 
April. On the night of that April 
day, under the light of a full ^' 
moon, the National fleet, consisting of 
fourteen vessels, anchored off Charles- 
ton bar. There were seven Ericsson 
monitors, another iron-clad, called the 
Keokuk. coustructe<l on a new priu 



THE FORTS IN THE HARBOR. 



585 



dple, and the frigate Ii-onsides. Du- 
pont was on board the James Adger. 
The National fleet had 32 guns in 
all. Such a fleet, as the result proved, 
was totally inadequate to the task 
which it was called upon to perform. 
Charleston Harbor was fortified almost 
to perfection. It was well fortified at 
the commencement of the war, as the 
reader has already learned ; but it had 
now been long under the special care 
of General Beauregard, and his genius 
had made it, if not absolutely impreg- 
nable, at least proof against any attack 
which could be made against it by the 
National forces. 

The forts which guarded the harbor 
were numerous and strong. There 
was one on the outward extremity of 
Sullivan's Island and guarding Maffit's 
Channel. There was another strong 
sand battery on the same island, 
near the Moultrie House, called Fort 
Beauregard. A little further to the 
westward was Fort Moultrie; and still 
on Sullivan's Island, but yet more to 
the west, was a strong earth-work, 
called Battery Bee. On the mainland, 
at Mount Pleasant, was another strong 
battery; and in front of Charleston, 
about a mile from the city, was old 
Castle Pinckney. In the channel, be- 
tween Sullivan's and Morris' Islands, 
stood Fort Sumter, the most formid- 
able of all the works. On the southern 
side of the harbor, and near the city, 
was the Wappoo batteiy, on James' 
Island, commanding the mouth of the 
Ashley River. To the right of this, 
and on the same island, was Fort John- 
sun; and about half way between the 



last-named fort and Castle Pinckney, 
on a submerged sand bank, which was 
called the "Middle Ground," stood 
Fort Ripley. In addition to these, 
there were Batteiy Gregg, on Morris' 
Island, at what is called Cummings' 
Point; Fort Wagner, about a mile to 
the south, and another powerful bat 
tery at Lighthouse Inlet. The forts 
mounted, in all, some 300 guns. The 
channels, too, were blocked with heavy 
chains made of railroad iron ; a rope, 
Ijuoyed up by empty casks, extended 
from Fort Ripley to Fort Sumter ; and 
the entire waters were filled with tor- 
pedoes. Such were the contrivances 
which barred the entrance to Charles- 
ton Harbor in the spring of 1863. 

That the harbor was well guarded, 
Dupont was well aware; but of the 
nature and extent of the works he 
had no exact knowledge. On the 
morning of the 7th of April, the Aprjj 
fleet, well brought together, lay ^' 
within the bar in the main channel. 
It was noon on that day, before the 
signal was given to weigh anchor. The 
Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, 
led the way. The other monitors fol- 
lowed in the order here given : Passaic, 
Captain Percival Drayton ; Montauk 
Commander John L. Worden ; Pataps. 
CO, Commander Daniel Ammen ; New 
Ironsides, Commandei- Thomas Turner; 
Catskill, CoininandiT G. W. Rodgers; 
Nantucket, Commander Donald M. 
Fairfax; Nahant, Commander John 
Downes ; Keokuk, Lieutenant -Com- 
mander A. C. Rhind. The gunboats 
were the Canandalgua, Captain J. H. 
Green; Housatonic, Captain "VY R. Tay- 



686 



OHAKLESTON HAKBOE. 



lor; Unadilla, Lieutenant-Commander 
S. P. Quackenbush ; Wissahickon, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander J. G. Davis ; Huron, 
Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Stevens. 
It was Dupont's intention to disregard 
the batteries on Morris' Island, to at- 
tack the northwest face of Fort Sumter, 
and to force his way up to the city. 
He was as yet ignorant of the great 
hawser, and its dreadful appendages, 
which lay in the path he had pre- 
scribed. The Weehawken had a raft- 
like contrivance attached to her bows, 
for the purpose of removing obstruc- 
tions and exploding torpedoes. Scarce- 
ly had the vessels commenced to move, 
when the Weehawken, hindered in her 
movements by the I'aft at her bow, was 
brought to a standstill. The other 
vessels were obstructed by the Wee- 
hawken; and nearly an hour elapsed 
before they were all again under way. 
As they steered towards the entrance 
of the inner harbor, an ominous silence 
prevailed, not a shot being fired either 
from the forts or from the fleet. At 
about fifty minutes past two, just as the 
leading vessel was becoming entangled 
in the horrid net-work of obstructions, 
the silence was broken ; and Fort 
Moultrie began to thunder. A few 
moments afterwards the batteries on 
Sullivan's Island, Morris' Island and 
Foit Sumter also opened fire. The 
Weehawken, in the midst of the ob- 
structions, could not advance ; and 
to remain under this concentric fire 
would be fatal. Rodgers, therefore, 
withdrew his vessel ; and, followed by 
the others, he attempted to pass by 
Fort Sumter, on the southern side. 



He soon found his way blocked by 
the rows of piles which extended be- 
tween the fort and Cummings' Point. 
At this stage the New Ironsides, in 
attempting to turn, was caught in the 
tide-way, and refused to obey her rud- 
der. The Catskill and Nantucket, who 
were in her wake, fell foul of her; 
and, for some fifteen minutes, they re- 
mained in this helpless condition, ex- 
posed to the enemy's fire. 

Dupont, before he commenced the 
action, had transferred his headquarters 
from the James Adger to the New 
Ironsides. Finding himself thus en- 
tangled, and compelled to come to 
anchor, he signalled to the other ves- 
sels to disregard the flag-ship, and take 
such positions as might seem best suited 
for effective • work. This was done at 
once ; and, shortly before four o'clock, 
the remaining eight vessels were ranged 
on the northeast of Fort Sumter, at 
distances varjnng from 550 to 800 
yards. In this position, they were 
fully commanded by Forts Beauregard, 
Moultrie and Sumter, Battery Bee and 
Fort Wagner — a concentrated fire of at 
least 76 guns. The eight iron-clads 
could oppose to this fire not more than 
16 guns. It seemed already a hope- 
less struggle. The iron-clads, how- 
ever, went resolutely to work, bring- 
ing their fire to bear chiefly on Fort 
Sumter. Rhind ran the little Keokuk 
ahead of all the others, and came within 
500 yards of the fort, hurling against 
it her immense projectiles. The Mon- 
tauk and Catskill were close in her 
wake. It was impossible, however, 
for the fleet long to maintain the un- 



THE ATTACK OX THE FOETS. 



587 



equal struggle. The forts and earth- 
works were armed with guns of the 
largest calibre, and of the very best 
construction. " There was soniethinsr 
almost pathetic," wrote an eye-wit- 
ness, " in the spectacle of those little 
loating circular towers, exposed to 
^he crushing weight of those tons of 
metal, hurled against them with the 
terrific force of modern pi'ojectiles, and 
with such charges of powder as were 
never before dreamed of in artillery 
firing." It recalled the pictures of the 
wars of the Titans, in the old myth- 
doolies. 

The contest lasted about forty min- 
utes, not one of the guns having been 
under fire for a longer period. In that 
brief space of time, five of the iron- 
clads were wholly or partially disabled. 
The Keokuk, which was of a peculiar 
construction, and had two turrets, was 
struck ninety-nine times, nineteen shots 
piercing her at and below the water- 
line. Her turrets were riddled, and 
both her guns disabled. She had only 
been able to return three shots. This 
vessel, which was with difficultj^ kept 
afloat during the night by means of her 
pumps, sank next morning. The Pas- 
saic was struck twenty-seven times; 
and her turret was, for a time, so 
jamnied that it could not be turned. 
The Nahant was also terribly pun- 
ished, her turret being effectually 
jammed, and her pilot-house shattered. 
The Patapsco lost the use of her rifle- 
gun after the fifth fire. The Nantucket 
had her 15-inch gun permanently dis- 
abled after the third fire. The casual- 
ties were few. There was but one man 



killed — the quartermaster of the Na- 
hant. In all, there were 29 wounded. 
It was the conviction of all the officers 
that any further attempt would be 
folly. It was Dupont's belief that if 
the attack had been prolonged one half 
hour, the fleet would have been dis- 
abled, and some of them at least left in 
the hands of the enemy. Worden was 
of the same opinion. "Charleston," 
he said, "cannot be taken by the naval 
force now present." The contest was, 
therefore, abandoned ; and, on the April 
12th, the entire fleet, with the *2. 
exception of the New Ironsides, which 
anchored outside Charleston bar, re- 
turned to Port Royal for repairs. Dur- 
ing the brief struggle the forts, from 
76 guns, fired 2209 times; the iron- 
clads, from 14 guns, fired 139 times. 

It was the opinion of some, at the^ 
time, that this attack might have re^ 
suited differently if Dupont had been 
vigorously supported V)y Hunter with 
a land force on Morris Island. Hunter, 
it was thought, might have given the 
garrisons of Battery Gregg and Pt)rt 
Wagner occupation, while the fleet was 
attacking Fort Sumter. It is doubtful 
whether such a diversion would have 
mateiially affected the result. Certain 
it is that the land troops did nothing. 
"I could do nothing but pray for you," 
wrote Hunter to Dupont the day after 
the fight, "which, believe me, I did 
most heartily." 

It had now become apparent to the 
authorities at Washington, that it was 
vain to attempt to force a passage to 
Charleston so long as Fort Sumter 
guarded the channel. The reduction 



588 



CHARLESTOX HARBOR. 



of tdst fort, therefore, became with 
them a fixed purpose. A change was 
made in the commanders. General Q. 
A. Gillmore, who had distinguished 
himself the year before by the cap- 
ture of Foit Pulaski, replacing Gen- 
eral Hunter, assumed command of 
the department of the South ; and 
Admiral Dahlgren took the place of 
Dupont. 

Before the arrival of the new com- 
manders, Dupont had the good for- 
tune to capture the dreaded Confede- 
rate wari'ior ship, the Atlanta. That 
vessel had originally been a blockade- 
runner, bearing the name of Fingal, 
and had been built on the Clyde. She 
had managed to run up the Savannah 
River, about eighteen months before, 
with a valuable cargo, but had found 
ft impossible again to get out to sea. 
The Confederates had converted her 
into a war ship, ai-ming her with a 
thick coat of oak and pine, and cover- 
ing her with heavy bars of iron. She 
carried four guns of large calibre, and 
was furnished with a powerful beak. 
Commanded by Lieutenant A. Webb, 
formerly of the National navy, who 
had imder him a crew of 160 men, it 
was believed by the Confederates that 
the Atlanta would be a match for at 
least any two monitors then afloat. It 
was reported to Dupont that the alter- 
ations on this vessel had been complet- 
ed, and that she was about to force her 
way out to sea. Dupont resolved to 
watch her movements; and, with this 
end in view, he sent the "Weehawken, 
Captain Rodgers, and the Nahant, Com- 
mander Downes, to Warsaw Sound. 



On the morning of the 17th of jnne 
June, the Atlanta was discovered I't 
to be moving down the Savannah River, 
her intention evidently being to fall, 
with all her force, on the two moni- 
tors. She was accompanied by two 
wooden gunboats of Tattnall's Mos- 
quito fleet, which were crowded with 
jieople who had come down from Sa- 
vannah, expecting to see their favoi'ite 
vessel win an easy victory over the 
"Yankee" monitors. Their expecta- 
tions were not to be realized. The 
Weehawken was singled out for the 
first blow. The ram is pushing swiftly 
forward. The Weehawken reserves her 
fire. Rodgers himself is sighting one 
of her heavy guns. Her powerful an- 
tagonist is now within easy range. 
The Weeliawken opens fire. Rodgers 
has aimed well The first shot — a 15- 
inch solid — has carried away the top 
of the Atlanta's pilot-house, wounded 
two of her pilots, and sent the vessel 
aground. In less than fifteen minutes, 
the Atlanta is prisoner to the Wee- 
hawken, Rodgeis having fired only five 
shots in all. The Atlanta was badly 
damaged, the last shot having struck 
her point-])lank. So terrific was the 
impact that it bent in the iron armor, 
shivering the twelve inches of live 
oak and the five inches of Georgia 
pine. The Atlanta was afterwards 
taken to Philadelphia and exhibited. 

On his arrival at Hilton Head, Gill- 
more found that he had an available 
force of near 18,000 men. After picket- 
ing a line along the coast, about 250 
miles in length, and establishing posts 
at different points, he could still count 



ASSAULT ON FOKT WAGNEK. 



589 



on an effective force of 11,000 men, 
mostly veterans. He had 66 guns and 
30 mortars. Dahlgren had at his dis- 
posal the frigate Ironsides and six 
monitors, three of which were being 
repaired at Port Royal With these 
means of offensive warfare, it was re- 
solved to renew the attempt on Fort 
Sumter. 

Gillmore proposed to seize the south- 
ern end of Morris' Island, and, vsdth 
the aid of the fleet, to capture Fort 
Wagner, a strong work near the north 
end, and afterwards Fort Gregg, which 
was beyond. These captured, it was 
his belief that he would be able to 
accomplish the destruction of Fort 
Sumter by shore batteries. His first 
movement was to erect strong batteiies 
on the northern end of Folly Island. 
General Vogdes, whom he found there 
with a considerable body of troops, 
had already constructed, on the south 
end of the island, a battery which 
commanded the mouth of the Stono 
River. The new batteries were com- 
pleted by the beginning of July. They 
were made of sand and marsh sod, and 
were very strong, being embrasured 
and rivetted, and provided with maga- 
zines and bomb and spliutei' proofs. 
Forty-eight heavy guns were quick- 
ly got into position ; and each was 
furnished with 200 rounds of ammuni- 
tion. 

It was necessary for Gillmore to dis- 
guise, as much as possible, his real 
intention. With this end in view, and 
in the hope that he might be able to 
distract the attention of the Confeder- 
ates, he ordered General A. H. Terry 



to take with him 6000 troops, to pro- 
ceed up the Stono River, and make 
a demonstration on James' Island. 
Colonel Higginson was, at the same 
time, sent up the Edisto with a body 
of negro troops, with instructions to 
cut the Charleston and Savannah Rail- 
I'oad. Higginson was compelled to 
fall back, without having accomplished 
his purpose. Terry had better suc- 
cess. His troops were placed on the 
island without difficulty; and, on the 
night of the 9th of July, 2000 juiy 
of them, under Geuei'al Strong, •• 
were ti'ansferred in boats down Folly 
River, to the junction of that stream 
with Lighthouse Inlet. At daylight 
on the 10th, the batteries which had 
been erected on the north end of Folly 
Island, and Dahlgren's monitors, simul- 
taneously opened fire on Fort Wagnei'. 
Every shot from the 15-inch guns of 
the monitors sent a mass of rubbish 
into the air. Clouds of dust and smoke 
hung over the fort. Up to this time, 
Strong and his men had been lying 
in concealment. After a two hours' 
cannonade, and while the attention of 
the Confederates was still occupied by 
the firing from the batteries on the 
north of Foil}' Island, and from the 
monitors. Strong threw his men rapid- 
ly ashore ; and, by nine o'clock in the 
morning, he was in full possession of 
the Confederate works on the south- 
em end of Morris' Island, with 1 1 guns 
and much camp equipage. The Con- 
federates fled to Foi-t Waguei-, the 
Nationals pursuing as far as the Beacon 
House, where they were witliin I'ange 
of the guns of the fort. There they 



267 



390 



CHARLESTON HARBOR. 



halted, Strong resolving not to attack 
Fort Wagner until the next day. Short- 
July ly after daylight, on July 11th, 
i'« the assault was gallantly made. 
Tt seemed for a time as if success was 
about to attend the effort. Some of 
the brave fellows had actually reached 
the parapet. There, however, they 
were met by a fire so withering that 
they were compelled to fall back. 

It was now evident to the National 
commander that Fort Wagner was not 
to be easily taken. Gillmore commenced 
at once to make preparations to assail 
it by regular approaches. The island 
was narrow ; and, while he had no 
reason to dread any flank movements, 
he ccnild rely on the effective co-opera- 
July tion of the fleet. On the 16th, 
'6' General Terry \vas vigorously 
attacked l>y a Confederate force, under 
General Hazard; but, being assisted 
by the gunboats in Stono and Folly 
Rivers, he successfully resisted and ulti- 
mately repelled his assailants. Terry's 
operations on James' Island were, as has 
been mentioned, originally intended as 
a feint. His object having been ac- 
complished, he withdrew his troops, ac- 
cording to previous arrangement, and 
joined the main force on Morris' Island, 
under Gillmore, who was about to re- 
Jnly P<iat the attack on Fort Wagner. 
•8i It was now the 18th of July. 
About noon of that day, tlie batteries, 
which Gillmore had constructed across 
the island, opened fire u])on the fort. 
At the same time, Dahlgren moved up 
his monitors, and opened fire on both 
Fort Sumter and Fort Wagner. Both 
forts replied — the latter feebly, and only 



from two guns. The garrison, fully 
persuaded that the bombardment was 
only a preliminary to anotlier assault 
by troops, had taken shelter in their 
bomb-pi'oofs. To the Nationals, i\ 
seemed as if the garrison must be de- 
moralized. An assault was therefore 
resolved upon. Dai'kness was now 
approaching; and, as the cannonade 
ceased, there burst forth a tremendous 
thunderstorm. Whatever might be 
the condition of the garrison, it was 
observed that the flag was flying over 
the fort. The twilight was deepening, 
and the thunderstorm still raging, when 
the storming party commenced to move 
forward. Strong's briijade moved fii'st, 
and was followed by that of Putnam. 
Strong's brigade consisted of the Fifty- 
Fourth Massachusetts, a colored regi- 
ment, commanded by Colonel Robert 
G. Shaw ; the Sixth Connecticut ; the 
Forty-Eighth New York; the Third 
New Hampshire ; the Seven tj'-Sixth 
Pennsylvania and the Ninth Maine. 
The distance to be passed was about 
1800 yards. When the head of the 
column was within 200 yards of the 
fort, the Confederates opened fire. 
With undaunted courage, their com- 
I rades falling at every step, the Nationals 
pressed forward. They had almost 
reached the ditch when the parapet 
blazed with musketry. The second 
parapet was I'eached, and the National 
standard was planted. One second 
more, and both standard and standard- 
bearer had disappeared. Shaw was 
killed; Strong was mortally wounded. 
The brigade was torn to pieces, the 
colored regiment being almost aunihi- 



"THE SWAMP ANGEL." 



59-, 



latod. Putnam, with the Seventh New 
Hampshire, the Sixty-Second and Six- 
ty-Seventh Ohio, and the One Hun- 
dredth New York, rushed forward and 
renewed the assault. It was a vain 
3fFort — a rush into the jaws of death. 
Putnam fell at the head of his troops ; 
and nearly all his subordinates were 
killed or wounded. The remains of the 
shattered brigades fell back into the 
sheltering darkness ; and the contest 
ceased. The ocean beach was covered 
with the dead and dying. The National 
loss felllittle short of 1500; the Con- 
federates did not lose in the struggle 
more than 100 men. 

Abandoning the idea of assault, Gill- 
more pushed forward the works with 
great energy. The first parallel was 
opened at 1300 yards from Fort Wag- 
ner. Soon afterwards was completed 
the second at 600 yards. The guns of 
this parallel were trained not only on 
Wagner, but on Sumter and Battery- 
Gregg. On the 9th of August, a third 
parallel was commenced about 330 
yards in advance of the right of the 
second. In addition to the works on 
the parallels, Glllmore had, after great 
difficulty, constructed a battery on the 
marsh, on the west of Morris' Island. 
On this battery he had placed an 8-inch 
rifled Parrott gun, called by the sol- 
diers, "The Swamp Angeh" From 
this gun, shells could be throwm into 
Charleston, some five miles distant. 
Beauregard, however, was better sup- 
plied with the means of resistance than 
Gillmore was with the means of attack. 
He had, perhaps, double the number of 
■oaen, and five times as much artillery. 



By this time, the firing from all the 
Confederate works — from the batteries 
on James' Island, from Wagner, Gregg 
and Sumter — had become continuous 
and severe. Gillraore's preparations, 
however, were now completed. He 
had in readiness 12 batteries, mounting 
28 heavy guns, and 12 mortars, j^g^. 
On the 17th, aided by Dahlgren's U- 
gunboats, he opened fire upon Sumter, 
Wagner and Gregg. Sumter was the 
chief object, of attention. The firing 
was renewed eveiy morning until the 
24th. The total number of shots fired 
against Sumter iip to that date was 
5750, of which 1336 missed. On Auff. 
that day, Gillmore sent a des- 24. 
patch to Halleck, informing him of the 
result. "Fort Sumter," he said "is, 
to-day, a shapeless and harmless mass 
of ruins." This was the opiniv^/n of the 
Confederates themselves. The artil- 
lerists were, therefore, withdrawn from 
the M'ork ; and it was garrisoned by a 
body of infantry. 

Gillmore's attention was now given 
to Fort Wagner. While his heavy shot 
was battering down the walls of Fort 
Sumter, he had been busy constructing 
his fourth parallel. It was now com- 
pleted ; and he was able to plant his 
guns within 300 yards of the fort on 
his front. About 100 yards in front 
of him was a ridge of sand dunes, from 
behind which the Confederate sharp 
shooters kept up an incessant fire^ 
greatly to the annoyance of the men 
engaged in the advance parallel. The 
ridge, however, was easily cleai-ed ; and 
a fiftli p;u'allel was establisiied at it-S 
base. At this point, the island is only 



BdS 



CHARLESTON Hi^RBOR. 



twenty-fire yards wide, and barely two 
feet high. In rough weather, this part of 
the island is swept by the sea. It was 
becoming more and more difficult for 
the men to push forward the sap, ex- 
posed, as they were, to the converging 
fire from Fort Wagner and to the flank 
fire from James' Island. Gillmore had 
become fully convinced that another 
assault was necessary. His prepara- 
tions were already completed. The 
light mortars were moved to the front 
and placed in battery ; the advanced 
trenches were enlarged ; the rifled guns 
in the left breaching batteries were 
trained upon the foit ; and calcium 
lights were prepared, for the double 
purpose of giving aid to the cannoneers 
and sharpshooters and of dazzling the 
Sept. 6y6s of the enemy. At dawn, on 
5« the 5th of September, the New 
Ironsides, Captain Rowan, moved up 
to within 1000 yards of the sea face of 
the fort; and simultaneously his broad- 
sides of eight guns, carrying 11-inch 
shells, and the land batteries, opened 
upon the parapet. Foi- forty-two con- 
secutive hours the bombardment was 
continued. In a few hours after the 
firing commenced, the garrison aban- 
doned their guns and took refuge in 
the bomb-proof. The final assault was 
to be made on the morning of the 9th. 
All things were in readiness, when it 
became known that the fort was evac- 
uated. Fort Gregg, it was afterwards 
discovered, was also abandoned. There 
were left in Wagner eighteen guns ; 



in Gregg, seven. During the two days, 
122,300 pounds of metal in the shape 
of shot and shell had rained upon th# 
fort ; yet the bomb-proof was substan 
tially uninjured. The forts were im- 
mediately occupied by the National 
troops ; and General Gillmore was 
able to congratulate his men, by telling 
them that the whole of Morris' Island 
was in their hands, and that the city 
and harbor of Charleston were at the 
mercy of their artillery. 

On the night of the 8th of Septem. 
ber, an expedition of thirty boats sep. 
was sent from the fleet to take 8. 
possession of Fort Sumter. It ^va? 
under the command of Commander 
Stephens, of the Patapsco. It was a 
disastrous enterprise. Three of the 
boats' crews had landed. In the belief 
that the garrison had abandoned the 
fort, they were attempting to run up 
the steep ruins to the parapet, when 
they were greeted with a tremendous 
fire. Two hundred of the assailants 
were killed, wounded or captured. 
In their hurried retreat, the Nationals 
left behind them four boats and 
three colors. Gilkuore maintained 
and strengthened his position ; but 
no further active efforts were made 
against Charleston during the remain- 
der of the year. Gillmore's work 
had not been wholly fruitless. He 
had not captured Charleston ; he had 
not made himself complete master of 
the harbor; but he had made the 
blockade secure. 



SIEGE OF .SUFFOLK. 



593 



CHAPTER XXX. 

Minor Engagements.— General John J. Peck.— Suffolk.— Defenses of Suffolk.— General Longetreet.— Little 
Washington and New Berne. — General Foster. — Siege of Suffolk.— Vigorous Assaults.- A Gallant Defense.— 
The Siege Discontinued.— Longstreet Retires.— What Might Have Been.— Morgan in Kentucky.— His De- 
predations—At Green River.— At Springfield. — At Bardstown. — At Brandenburg.— Seizure of the Alice 
Dean and McCombs. — At Corydon. — General Hobson in Pursuit. — The Alice Dean in Flames. — Burning 
(he Wharf at Brandenburg. — General Judah. — Vandalism at Corydon and Salem. — Morgan in a Tight 
Place. — Sweeping Around CSncinnati. — Parkersburg.— At Buffington Ford. — Morgan Hemmed In. — Eight I 
Hundred Surrender. — Morgan Attempts to Escape with the Remainder. — Captured at New Lisbon. — Taken 
to Columbus, Ohio. — Escape from Prison. — After Knoxville. — Bean Station. — Shacklefoid in Pursuit of 
Longstreet. — A Vigorous Encounter. — The Nationals Fall Back. — Foster Succeeds Burnside. — The Depart 
ment of the Gulf. — General Dick Taylor Again. — The Occupation by the Confederates of Alexandria 
Opelousas and Fort de Russy. — Brashear City also Abandoned. — General Banks and General Grant. — Pro- 
posal to Move on Mobile. — Movement upon Texas. — Sabine City. — General Franklin. — Lieutenant Crocker. — 
A Dis.T.strous Failure. — Atchafalaya. — Another Movement upon Texas. — General C. C. Washburne .Attacked 
by Taylor and Green. — Brazos, Santiago. — Brownsville. — Point Izabel. — Banks at Brownsville. — His Return 
to New Orleans. — Arkansas and Mis.souri. — The Guerrillas. — Marmaduke Falls upon Springfield, Missouri. — 
A Brave Resistance. — Marmaduke Falls Back. — General Brown Wounded. — Marmaduke Attacked by Colonel 
Merrill. — His Defeat. — The Julia Roan. — Little Rock. — The Guerrilla Leaders in Council. — General Sterling 
Price. — Genera! McNeil. — Cape Girardeau Attacked by Marmaduke. — McNeil's Gallant Defence. — Pursuit of 
Marmaduke. — Fort Blunt. — Colonel Coffey. — Honey Springs. — Fort Smith. — Attack on Helena. — The Con- 
federates Repulsed. — McPherson's Expedition to Canton. — Steele's Expedition to Little Rock. — At Browns- 
ville. — Little Rock Captured. — The Massacre at Lawrence. — Attempt on the Life of General Blunt. — Major 
Curtis killed. — Marmaduke and Sandwatie. — Progress Made. 



1863. 



In an earlier portion of this work we 
found it convenient to group to- 
gether some minor engagements 
which, not having direct connection with 
any of the great battles or campaigns, 
and not of sufficient consequence to be 
treated in separate chapters, were yet too 
important to be altogether overlooked. 
In order to cover some such engage- 
ments which took place at different 
iraes in the year 1863, that example 
will, in this chapter, be followed. 

At the close of 1862, Major-General 
John J. Peck was in command of 9000 
men at Suffolk. The Confederate gen- 
orala, Pettigrew and French, with 



about 15,000 men, were at the same 
time on the line of the Blackwater, 
threatening Peck's position. Peck 
took such pains to construct defenses 
for Suffolk, that the authorities at 
Richmond believed he was preparing a 
base of operations for a movement 
against that city, in co-operation with 
the army of the Potomac. Counter- 
vailing measures, in consequence, were 
immediately adopted. A series of for- 
tifications were thrown up from the 
line of the Blackwater to Fort Pow- 
hattan, on the James River ; and 
in February, 1863, General Long- 
street was placed in command of ail 



Feb. 



094 



MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 



April. 



the Confederate troops in that region. 
He had under him a force of about 
30,000 men. The better to conceal 
his purpose, and in order to distract 
the attention and divide the forces of 
the National commanders at Suffolk 
and at Fortress Monroe, where General 
Dix was in command, Longstreet, 
early in April, caused it to \je 
reported that he had gone to South 
Carolina, while D. H. Hill was ordered 
to attack Little Washington, and me- 
nace New Berne. Longstreet, having 
been informed by spies that General 
Foster, who had succeeded Burnside in 
command in that department, had or- 
dered Peck to send 3000 men to oppose 
Hill, deemed it a fitting opportunity 
to carry out his purpose in Suffolk. 
Peck, however, was prepared ; he had 
penetrated Longstreet's designs, and 
notified Foster accordingly. Having 
been reinforced by a division under 
General Getty, he was about to send 
the required number of troops, when 
he learned from General Viele, who 
bad captured a Confederate mail at 
Norfolk, that Hill's movement was 
only intended as a feint. The detach- 
ment was, therefore, detained; and 
Admiral Lee, in obedience to orders, 
Bent several gunboats up the Nanse- 
mond, to co-operate with the land forces 
in the defense of Suffolk. Longstreet 
resolved to concentrate his strength 
and carry the place by assault; Hill 
was recalled from North Carolina, 
the besiegers now numbering about 
40,000 men. Batteries were thrown 
up under cover of the darkness; and 
fire was opened upon the boats in the 



river. The gunboats, however, were 
bravely liandled ; the land forces, with 
equal gallantry, performed their part; 
and, by the resistance thus offered, the 
assailants, although overwhelmingly su- 
perior in numbers, were successfully 
held in check. For twenty-four days 
the siege continued, deeds of great 
daring being performed on both sides. 
Longstreet put forth his best efforts, 
and taxed his skill to the utmost to 
accomplish his object ; but it was all in 
vain. Finding it impossible to give 
effect to his purpose, he turned his 
back upon Peck and retreated. It was 
now the 3d of May — the day on jiay 
which Hooker and Lee had their ^• 
severe battle at Chancellorsville. The 
Confederates were pursued as far as 
the Blackwater. Thus ended the siege 
of Suffolk, " which had for its object 
the recovery of the whole country 
south of the James River, extending to 
Albemarle Sound, in North Carolina, 
the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, 
eighty miles of new railroad iron, the 
equipment of two roads, and the cap- 
ture of all the United States forces 
and property, with some thousands of 
contrabands." It is hardly possible to 
overestimate the great services ren- 
dered by Peck and his brave garrison 
at Suffolk. If the resistance had been 
less stubborn, Longstreet might have 
been able to rejoin Lee at Chancellors- 
ville in time to accomplish the destruc- 
tion of the army of the Potomac. His 
appearance at Chancellorsville on the 
2d or on the 3d of May would cer- 
tainly have proved a calamity to the 
National cause. 



MORGAN'S RAID. 



595 



No account has yet been given in 
these pages of the famous raid 
made by the Confederate parti- 
san ranger, General Morgan, into the 
States of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. 
In the month of June, and before the 
armies of Rosecranz and Bragg came 
into collision at Chickamauga, Morgan, 
with about 3000 mounted men and six 
guns, pushed across the Cumberland 
River, at Barksville, and advanced to- 
wards Columbia. At that place, he 
was encountered and held in check for 
some three hours by a small body of 
cavalry, under Captain Custer. After 
the death of Custer, who was unfor- 
tunately killed in the affray, the Na- 
tionals fell back, leaving Morgan to 
pursue his devastating march. At 
(ireen River, Morgan came into con- 
tact with Colonel Moore, who was at 
the head of 200 Michiganers, and well 
entrenched. A severe encounter en- 
sued, the raiders being repulsed, with 
a loss of more than 200 killed and 
wounded. Morgan now moved in the 
direction of Lebanon, which was held 
by Colonel Hanson and the Twentieth 
Kentucky. The regiment was small 
in numbers; but Hanson, for some 
hours, was able to make a brave resist- 
ance. The raiders fired the town, and 
Hanson and his men were captured. 
Pushing on through Springfield and 
Bardstown, Morgan's advance reached 
jBiy Brandenburg on the 7th of July. 
'• There he seized two steamers, 
the Alice Dean and McCombs, and, 
getting his men on board, proceeded 
across the river. His force had now in- 
creased to eleven regiments, numbering 



over 4000 men, with ten pieces of artil- 
lery, including two howitzers. After 
burning the Alice Dean and the wharl 
at Brandenburg, the raiders pushed on 
towards the north, in the direction of 
Corydon, a small place in Indiana. 

Meanwhile, General Hobson, with a 
force equal in numbers to that of 
Morgan, was following in close pur- 
suit. Hobson arrived in time to see 
the blazing wreck in the stream. Mor- 
gan had crossed on the 8th. On the 
day following, Hobson, with his little 
band, was on the soil of Indiana. A 
considerable portion of General Judah's 
division, which had been stationed in 
Kentucky, between the Cumberland 
and Barren Rivers, was also concen- 
trated and put in motion for the cap- 
ture of Morgan. 

At Corydon, which he reached on 
the 9th, he encountered some re- jniy 
sistance from the Home Guards. *• 
These, however, were overpowered, 
and a wholesale system of plunder, 
combined with vandalism and bru- 
tality, was inaugurated. Having done 
their work at Corydon, the raiders 
proceeded to Salem, the capital of 
Washington County, where they cap- 
tured between 300 and 400 militia- 
men, pillaged the place, destroyed the 
railroads, and ex;icted $1000 each from 
three mill-owners. At each town and 
village, it is the same story — murder, 
plunder, cruel exactions, and wholesale 
destruction of property. The pun uera 
were still behind ; but the pr -pie, 
alarmed, were now rising in thei' i>wn 
defense. At Vernon, on the 12th, Julj 
Morgan was brought to a halt **- 



596 



MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 



by a povveiful body of militia, under 
Colonel Lowe. Stealing away from 
the presence of Lowe under cover of 
the darkness, his men, in scattered de- 
tachments, and plundering as they ad- 
vanced, moved towards Harrison, where 
they concentrated, preparatory to re- 
turning as quickly as possible to Ken- 
tucky. Morgan was already in a tight 
place. Hobson was in his rear ; Judah 
was on his flank; and thousands of 
armed citizens were blocking every 
way by which he might attempt a re- 
trograde movement. Sweeping around 
Cincinnati about a dozen miles to the 
north, still plundering and destroying, 
Morgan pushed on through the rich 
counties of Southern Ohio, in the di- 
rection of Buffingtou Ford, a short 
distance south of Parkersburg. He 
July reached the ford on the 18th of 

^^' July, and attempted to cross 
under cover of an artillery fire. Next 
morning, he found himself completely 
hemmed in. Judah's cavalry had fallen 
on his flank; the head of Hobson's col- 
umn, under General Shackleford, struck 
his rear ; and two armed vessels in the 
river opened on his front. In this ex- 
tremity, about 800 of the raiders sur- 
rendered ; but the remainder, headed 
by Morgan, attempted to cross to 
Belleville, by swimming their horses. 
Only about 300 managed thus to es- 
cape. Morgan, thus foiled, fell back, 
dt the head of a considerable force, to- 
wards McArthur, and then pushed to 
the northeast, in the direction of New 
July Lisbon, where, on the 26th, being 

26' closely pressed by Shackleford's 
cavalry, he was compelled to surrender. 



Morgan and several of his officei-s were 
taken to Columbus, Ohio, where they 
were confined in felons' cells, in the 
penitentiary. The partisan chief, with 
six of his ca])tains, by undermining the 
walls of their prison, and thus opening 
a passage into the yard, effected their 
escape in the following November. 
Moi'gan was spared to make another 
famous raid, but it was to be his last. 
We have already given an account 
of the siege of Knoxville. It was not 
deemed necessary at the time to follow 
up Longstreet in his retreat from that 
place. In this chapter, space must be 
found for a brief reference to the 
struggle which took place at Bean Sta- 
tion, ji^iter his unsuccessful assault at 
Knoxville, and the withdrawal of his 
troops towards Virginia, he was pur- 
sued by cavalry, under Shackleford, 
Wolford, Graham and Foster, into Jef- 
ferson County. At the above-named 
station, on the Morristown and Cum- 
berland Gap Road, Longstreet turned 
sharply on his pursuers. It was about 
two o'clock in the afternoon of Mon- 
day, December 14th, when the Dec. 
National skirmishers felt the **• 
touch of the enemy, and were com- 
pelled to fall back. Shackleford was 
immediately on hand. His men, dis- 
mounting, the horses being sent to the 
rear, were soon got into position on 
the further side of the road. Colvin's 
battery was posted on a knoll, in rear 
of the troops, and three howitzers were 
located on a spur of the adjoining 
mountain, to the left of the National 
line. About four o'clock, the fighting 
became general. The Confederates 



SABINE PASS. 



597 



fell with great force on the divisions of 
Wolford and Foster. The enemy was 
well provided with artillery, which was 
splendidly served. The Nationals held 
their ground with great firmness ; but 
Ihey were compelled, from time to 
time, to give way, and at nightfall, 
when the battle ceased, they had fallen 
back about a mile. Shackleford, who 
was in chief command, confessed to the 
loss of nearly 200 men. Longstreet's 
Joss must have been greater. During 
the struggle, an attempt was made to 
strike Shackleford's rear, by passing a 
force across the Holston, at Kelley's 
Ford ; but this movement was skilfully 
prevented by General Ferrero, who 
took the precaution to guaid the ford 
by a strong force under General Hum- 
phrey. Longstreet held possession of 
Bean Station ; but he was unable, in 
I'onsequence of the severity of the 
weather, to turn it to any practical ac- 
count. He, therefore, withdrew his 
forces to the neighborhood of Bull's 
Gap, a point at which the Uogersville 
)ranch joins the main road. 

It was about this time that General 
Burnside retired fi'om the command of 
the army of the Ohio. Here, again, as 
in North Carolina, he was succeeded 
by General John G. Foster. After the 
battle at Bean Station, and before the 
close of the year, there was some 
skirmishing between the rival forces in 
this department. This petty warfare 
was continued through the spring of 
1864 ; but no event of high importance 
occurred in this region until Morgan's 
famous and final Kentucky raid, in 
May of that year. 



Among the minor operations, of 
which as yet no notice has been taken, 
mention must be made of those which 
were conducted in the Gulf Depart- 
ment, and in the region west of the 
Mississippi, after the fall of Port Hud- 
son. It will be remembered that when 
General Banks withdrew from Alexan- 
dria, on the Red River, and proceeded 
to Port Hudson, he took with him the 
greater portion of his troops, thus leav- 
ing the entire region, from which he 
had driven the Confederates, once again 
at their mercy. General Dick Taylor 
immediately reappeared. Alexandria 
was soon reoccupied; so was Ope- 
lousas ; and a Confederate garrison 
took possession of Fort de Russy. 
Taylor's followers, indeed, found but 
little difficulty in overrunning the 
whole country. The National outposts 
were withdrawn into Brash ear City. 
This, however, was soon abandoned; 
and the way to Algiers being left open. 
New Orleans would have been in peril 
but for the presence of FaiTagut and 
his fleet. After the fall of Port Hud- 
son, Banks again directed his thoughts 
to aggressive measures. He was visit- 
ed by General Grant in September; 
and it was the opinion and desire of 
both commanders that a joint move- 
ment should be made against Mobile — 
the one place of importance on the 
Southern coast then held by the Con« 
federates. Considerations of foreign 
policy, howevei', determined the gov- 
ernment to take steps for the recovery 
and reoccupation of Texas, Banks, ac- 
cordingly, was ordered to move for th* 
conquest of that State. He was per- 



««« 



sm 



MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 



mitted to use his own judgment as to 
the course he should follow ; but it 
was suggested that the most feasible 
route might be found to be by the Red 
River to Natchitoches and Shreveport 
Believing that route to be impractica- 
ble, at that season of the year, he de- 
termined to secure Sabine City, at 
the mouth of the Sabine Pass. To 
give effect to this purpose, an expedi- 
tion of 4000 well-disciplined troops 
were placed under the command of 
General Franklin. The troops were 
to be landed a few miles below Sabine 
Pass. Farragut detached a naval force 
of four gunboats, iinder Lieutenant 
Frederick Crocker, to join the expedi- 
tion. The gunboats were the Clifton, 
Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City. 
The Clifton was the flag-ship. The 
expedition proved a complete and dis- 
astrous failure. In the forenoon of the 
Sep. 8th of September, the gunboats 
^' and transports crossed the bar at 
Sabine Pass. In the afternoon, the 
Clifton, Sachem, and Arizona moved 
towards the fort, the Granite City 
being left behind to cover the landing 
of a division of troops, when the proper 
time should arrive. The fort mounted 
eight heavy guns, three of which were 
rifled. It was evident that the garri- 
son was well prepai'ed. As the ves- 
sels drew near, the whole eight guns 
opened at once. The boilers of the 
Clifton and Arizona were immediately 
penetrated by shells; the white flags 
were raised ; and twenty minutes after 
the attack, the two vessels were in tow 
of Confederate steamers. Franklin re- 
fused to land bis troops, and, with his 



transports, hastened over the bar, and 
returned to New Orleans. He left be- 
hind him 200 men as prisoners, 50 
killed and wounded, 2 gunboats and 
15 heavy-rifled guns. Franklin was 
blamed for not landing his troops ; but 
it is doubtful whether, in the circum- 
stances, he could have acted more 
wisely than he did. 

Banks now concentrated his forces 
at Atchafalaya, his intention being to 
march directly on Shreveport. He 
soon found, however, that the difficul- 
ties which lay in his way were almost, 
if not entirely, insurmountable. Aban- 
doning the attempt, therefore, he re- 
solved to ?ecure a lodgment in Texas, 
by moving upon and taking possession 
of the har)>ors on its coast. 

At this time, the position of General 
Banks was the very i-everse of com- 
fortable. The Confederates seemed 
irrepressible. Driven from one place, 
they quickly reappeai'ed in another. 
Towards the end of September, Gen- 
eral Dick Taylor, of the Confederate 
army, became more than usually active 
He was still west of the Atchafalaya 
General Green, his most efficient lieu 
tenant, with his bushwhackers, was con- 
stantly depredating in the neighborhood 
of Port Hudson. It had become neces- 
sary to make a bold effoi-t to suppress! 
those bands of marauders. With this 
end in view, General Hei-ron was sent 
with a body of men to Morgansia 
Deeming it advisable to establish an out- 
post some miles in the interior, Herron 
sent Colonel Lake with the Nineteenth 
Iowa and Twenty-Sixth Indiana, also 
6 guns and a support of 150 cavalry 



GRAND COTEAIT. 



699 



under Colonel Montgomery. The en- 
tire force was under 1000. The exist- 
en(3e of this post became known to 
Sepi Grreen. On the night of the 
30« 30th of September, he advanced 
stealthily across an adjoining bayou, 
surrounded and surprised the camp, 
and captured Lake and about 400 of 
his men. The cavalry escaped with 
the loss of 5 men. There were 54 
killed and wounded. 

In this connection may be related 
with propriety the xmfortunate affair 
which happened at Grand Coteau. 
When General Banks was about to 
set out on his expedition to Texas, he 
thought it proper to make a demon- 
stration in the direction of Opelousas, 
so as to create the impression that a 
movement which had Alexandria or 
Shreveport for its objective was really 
commenced. Four divisions of the 
army of the Gulf, consisting of two 
divisions of the Nineteenth army corps 
and two divisions of the Thirteenth 
army corps, the whole under the com- 
mand of Major-General Franklin, were 
ordered to Opelousas. The march was 
completed without difficulty; and the 
army encamped at Opelousas and 
Barre's Landing, remaining about eight 
Oct. or ten days. On the 27th of Octo- 
27< ber, the backward movement com- 
menced, the First division, of the Thir- 
teenth corps, falling back upon New 
Iberia. On the 1st of November, the 
other two divisions — the Third and 
Fourth- -commanded respectively by 
Washburne and Burbridge, fell back, 
in obedience to orders, as far as Car- 
rion Crow Bayou and Grand Coteau. 



On the same day, the Nineteenth coi'ps 
fell back in the same direction. Wash- 
burne and Burbridge were ordered to 
encamp at tlie places just mentioned, 
while the rest of the army continued 
to fall back. Washburne assumed su 
preme control of the two divisions ol 
the Thirteenth corps, who were thus 
left to guard the rear. On the morn- 
ing of the 3d, the Confederates jjov, 
showed themselves in considera ^' 
ble strength in the neighborhood of 
Burbridge's position, which was about 
three miles in advance of that of Mc- 
Ginnis, with whor '^ashbimie had 
his headquarters. 

Burbridge, witi: one brigade of the 
Fourth division, about 1200 strong, 
with one 6-gun battery of 10-pounder 
Parrott, and with about 500 mounted 
infantry, under Colonel Fonda, and a 
section of Nim's battery, was on the 
north side of what is called Muddy 
Bayou. McGlnnis, with the Third di- 
vision, 3000 strong, and one battery, 
was at Carrion Crow Bayou. The two 
bayous run in parallel lines to the east, 
the banks being fringed with wood. 
The intervening ground wa3 a smooth, 
level prairie. Bufbridge's right rear 
rested on a" dense thicket; his left 
stretched out about twenty rods into 
the open ground ; the whole fronted to 
the northwest, in the direction of Ope^ 
lousas. Later in the day, the Confed 
erates fell with tremendous fury on 
Biirbridge's position, attacking him 
with an overwhelming force in front 
and on both flanks. The shock was 
iri'esistible ; and for a time it seemed 
as if the entire force would be cap 



rfX) 



MINOR EXGAGEMENTS IN 18C3. 



tured or destroyed. Washburne, who 
had reached the front in time to see 
the commencement of the struggle, 
had already ordered up the Third di- 
vision. McGinnis was ill, and unable 
to command in person ; but his troops 
were hurried forward, at the double- 
quick, by Brigadier-General Cameron, 
of the First, and Colonel Slack, of the 
Second brigade. They did not arrive a 
moment too soon. Burbridge's com- 
mand had been driven entirely out of 
the woods ; and the Confederate cav- 
alry were charging on his left, and 
coming down with force upon his rear. 
As soon as it came up, the Third di- 
vision formed in line ; and the guns, 
already within range, poured shot and 
shell on the almost triumphant foe, 
ind checked his advance. 

In the heat of the fight, and before 
the arrival of the Third division, a tre- 
mendous struggle took place for the 
possession of Nim's battery. Exposed 
to charge after charge of the enemy, 
the gunners were ultimately overpow- 
ered. An infantry regiment — the Twen- 
ty-Third Wisconsin — was sent to their 
eupport ; but it was soon overwhelmed 
and compelled to surrender. One sec- 
tion of this battery was commanded by 
Lieutenant Marland, In spite of the 
strength and fury of the enemy, that 
gallant oflBcer, after an almost unparal- 
leled display of coolness and audacity, 
succeeded in carrying off his own sec- 
tion of the battery. But for the 
bravery of Marland, those guns would 
have been lost. As it was, Burbridge, 
although compelled to fall back, man- 
aged to take with him every wagon 



and all the guns, with the exception of 
a 10-pounder Parrott. 

As soon as McGinnis' division ca,me 
up, Burbridge got his guns again into 
position, and opened upon the Confed- 
erates, now just checked in their ad- 
vance, a raking cross-fire, which tore 
their ranks in pieces. The tide of battle 
was now turned. What was a pursuit, 
became a retreat. The Confederates 
sought shelter in the woods. Thence, 
however, they were quickly driven, 
the infantrj' pursuing for about a mile 
and a half, the cavalry for about three 
miles. The loss of life was not so great 
as the severity of the fight might have 
seemed to imply. The number of killed 
was 26 ; of the wounded, 124 ; of the 
missing, 566. The Confederate loss waa 
about 60 killed. The wounded were 
carried off with them in their retreat; 
65 were made prisoners. Such was the 
battle of Grand Coteau. It cannot be 
called great or decisive ; but it was one 
of the most severely contested battles 
of the war. 

The Nationals lost heavily in offi- 
cers. Among the officers who won dis- 
tinction that day was Captain Guppy, 
of the Twenty-Third Wisconsin. After 
having displayed great gallantry, he 
was wounded and made prisoner, with 
the greater portion of his regiment. 
Burbridge, Guppy, Fonda and Robin- 
son received the special commendation 
of General Washburne. The Nation- 
als marched back in safety to Brashear 
City. 

Meanwhile, General Banks, at the 
head of an expedition consisting of 
6000 troops and some war vessels, had 



THE GUERILLAS. 



SCTi 



sailed from New Orleans directly for 
the Rio Grande. Ranks, although he 
accompanied thtt expedition, had placed 
in immediate command General Napo- 
leon J. T, Dana, an accomplished and 
skilful officer, and supposed to be well 
acquainted with the country about to 
be visited. This expedition was at- 
i:ended with very considerable success. 
But little opposition, in truth was en- 
countered, the enemy always retreating 
as the Nationals advanced. On the 
2d of November, the troops debarked 
at Brazos Santiago, and advanced in 
the direction of Brownsville, some 
thirty miles up the river. Point Isabel 
was reached on the 8th. Banks having 
established his headquarters at Browns- 
ville, sent as many troops as he could 
spare, fui'ther up, to seize and occupy 
the water-passes between the Rio 
Grande and Galveston. Some steam- 
ers were obtained on the Rio Grande ; 
and troops were transported to Mus- 
tang Island, off Corpus Chiisti Bay. 
From that port, General Ransom ad- 
pjov. vanced to the Aransas Pass ; and, 
'8. on the 18th of November, he car- 
ried the place by assault, capturing 
100 prisoners. On the same day, the 
National troops entered and occupied 
Corpus Christi. About the end of the 
month. General Washburne, now in 
command of the Thirteenth corps, 
moved upon Pass Cavallo, at the en- 
trance to Matagorda Bay, where there 
was a strong fort called Esperanza, 
garrisoned by 2000 men. The place 
was invested ; but the Confederates 
blew up the magazine and fled. Banks 
had reason to be proud of the success 



which attended this ex^/edition. In 
one month he had made himself mas- 
ter of every important position on 
the coast between the Rio Grande and 
Galveston, except the works at th^ 
mouth of the Brazos, and those on 
Galveston Island. He was anxious to 
prosecute the work, especially towajdi 
the «ast ; but he knew that MagruJei 
was there in great force, and that with 
the troops now at his disposal, it 
would be hazardous to risk a battle 
with an antagonist of so much daring 
and so much skill. Had it been pos- 
sible for him to obtain sufficient rein- 
forcements, he might have been able 
to sweep the territory clear of the 
Confederate troops. As reinforcements 
could not be found. Banks, leaving 
Dana in command on the Rio Grande, 
returned to New Orleans. 

We have already, in an earlier chap 
tei', recoi'ded the military events which 
took place in Missoui'i and Arkansas in 
1862. In the chapter devoted to the 
guerrillas, the record is brought down 
as far as the battle of Prairie Grove, in 
which the Nationals were completely vie. 
torious. It seemed for a time as if, in the 
entire region west of the Mississippi, 
the National authority was firmly estab- 
lished. It was not long, however, until, 
as has already been related, the Confede- 
I'ates appeared in force in Texas, recap- 
turing Galveston, and establishing their 
authoi'ity over the entire State. Early in 
18G3, the guerrillas again made theii 
presence felt in Missouri and Aikansas. 
to the great inconvenience of the loyal 
inhabitants of thoee States, About 
the beginning of January, Marmaduke, 



•02 



mnon ENGACfEMEXTS IN 1863. 



with some 4000 men, for the most 
part mounted, burst suddenly out of 
Northern Ai'kansas and fell upon 
Springfield, JMissouri, with great fury. 
The place was well fortified with earth- 
works; but the National forces were 
scattered over the country ; and it was 
with some difficulty that Generals 
Brown and Holland, who were in com- 
mand there, were able to bring together 
about 1000 militia-men to resist the 
onslaught of the guerrilla chief. It 
JaOi was about one o'clock, on the 

^' afternoon of the 8th, when the 
Confederate force, some 3000 strong, 
appeared before the town. Firing was 
commenced at once ; and sevei-e but 
somewhat desultory fighting was main- 
tained during the remainder of the day. 
The National troops, although ra\v 
and inexperienced, fought with great 
bravery; and, as evening approached, 
they had comptdled the Confederates 
to abandon one positieu after another, 
until the latter weiv glad to retreat 
under cover of the darkness. The 
battle had lasted five hours. The Na- 
tionals sustained a loss of 164 men, of 
whom 14 were killed. General Brown 
was severely wo aided, and lost the 
use of his right '>>rm. Marmaduke lost 
about 2(J0 nnii, of whom 41 were 
killed and 80 vere left iu the town as 
prison eis. 

Marmad'^k^ now marched eastward ; 
JttUt ^"d, »it dawn on the lOth, his 

1®' advr.nce encountered the Twenty- 
First Iowa, under Colonel Merrill. 
After a sharp skirmish, he succeeded 
m tiiniki;;g the National troops, and 
pushed uu towards Huntsville. Mer- 



rill, however, was there before him 
and was reinforced by the Ninet}-- 
Ninth Illinois, and portions of the 
Third Iowa and the Third Missouii 
cavalry, with a supporting battery, 
under Lieutenant Wald Schmidt. The 
engagement which followed on the 
11th was sharp but brief, Marmaduke 
being compelled to retreat, after sus- 
taining a loss of 300 men, including a 
brigadier-geni ral and three colonels. 
The Nationals lost 71 men, of whom 7 
were killed. Marmaduke was glad 
to abandon Missouri. Moving south- 
ward, he took position, with a portion 
of his forces, at Batesville, Arkansas, 
on the White River. At this point 
he ^vas attacked, on February 4tli, Feb. 
by the Fourth Missouri cavahy, ^• 
under Colonel G. E. Waring, and 
di'iven across the stream, with a con= 
siderable loss in killed and wounded, 
one colonel and a number of privates 
having been made prisoners. After 
the battle at Huntsville, a portion of 
Marmaduke's men made their way to 
Van Buren Cieek; and 300 of tliem 
■\veie captui-ed on the Julia Roan, on 
the 28th of January. His men dis- 
persed oi' fell into the hands of the 
enemy. Marmaduke, greatly discour- 
aged, I'ejtaired to the headquarters of 
the Confederate army corps at Little 
Rock. 

During the next two months theie 
was comj>arative quiet in those regions, 
although the guerrilla leaders at Little 
Rock weie busy increasing and dis- 
ciplining their forces and preparing fo) 
fiitur*; etTorts. The gueirilla bands, 
duriuj^ this j)eiiod, were not, however. 



OAFE GIRARDEAU. 



SW 



wholly inactive. At this time occuri'ed 
the Sam Gatty affair — an aifair which, 
being characterized by great brutality, 
"jevealed the true spirit of the guer- 
rillas, and brought much discredit on 
the Confederate cause. • 

It was the middle of April before 
the Confederate commanders assembled 
at Little Rock felt emboldened to re- 
sume active operations. Fayettevllle, 
since the early spring, had been occu- 
pied by some Union cavaliy and in- 
fantry, under Colonel Harrison. On 
Upril the 18th of April, shortly after 
•8. sunrise, Harrison and his little 
band were attacked by General W. 
L. Cabell, who had come by forced 
marches over the Boston Mountains 
from Ozark. Although Harrison's men 
were greatly outnumbered, they not 
only resisted the attack, but, after six 
hours' fighting, compelled the enemy 
to fall back, with considerable loss, in 
the direction from which he came. 
Harrison had lost 71 men, of whom 4 
were killed; but Cabell had left be- 
hind him 55 j)risoners, 50 horses, and 
100 shot-guns. 

A little later, Marmaduke himself 
was again in motion. With the full 
consent and appi'oval of his superior 
officer, Major-General Sterling Price, 
he set out at the head of a large force 
of infantry and cavalry, with the in- 
tention of moving on Cape Girardeau, 
which was at that time the depot of sup- 
plies for a portion of General Grant's 
army. Cape Girardeau, with its stores, 
was in charge of General John McNiel. 
"When Marmaduke reached Frederick- 
ton, on the 22d, McNiel was at Bloom- 



field, in Stoddard County; but hearing 
of the presence of Marmaduke in that 
neighborhood, and divining his object, 
he hurried to the menaced point, and, 
arriving at Cape Girardeau on the 23d, 
calmly awaited the approach of the 
guerrilla chief. Marmaduke came up 
on the 25th, two days after the arrival 
of McNiel. It was not without reason 
that the Confederates counted on an 
easy victory; for while Marmaduke 
had under him a choice corps of 8000 
men, known as " Price's First Corps 
of the Trans-Mississippi Department," 
McNiel could only muster some 1700 
men, and these, for the most part, be- 
longed to the militia. But McNiel, 
who was a brave and indefatigable 
officer, had made good use of the 
two days of grace. A powerful force 
was immediately transported into Illi- 
nois; four guns, rudely mounted, were 
placed in advantageous positions; and 
the entire ranks were considerably 
strengthened. On the 25th, after Apni 
a slight skirmish, Marmaduke 25. 
called upon McNiel to surrender, giv- 
ing him only thirty minutes to decide 
and I'eturn his answer. McNiel's an- 
swer was prompt and decided. He 
believed he was able to defend the 
place, and he meant to do so. He 
would not surrender. At ten o'clock 
next morning, after a slight artillery 
display, the call was again made for 
' immediate surrender. This time Mc- 
Niel answered with his guns. After 
five hours' fighting, during which the 
National guns were admirably handled, 
Marmaduke, on seeing some armed ves- 
sels in the Mississippi coming to the 



604 



MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 



aid of the besieged, beat a hasty re- 
treat across the St. Francis Rivei', and 
humed into Arkansas, burning the 
bridges behind him. At this time, 
McNiel was ranked by General Van- 
dever ; and the pursuit of Marmaduke 
was conducted by, perhaps, overfliuch 
caution. The Confederate loss at Cape 
Girardeau was some GO killed and 
about 300 wounded, many of whom 
were left behind in the letreat. 

This defeat of Manuaduke did not 
put an end to the Confederate raids in 
those regions. The guerrilla bands 
seemed almost ubiquitous. On the 
jjay 20th of May, the Confederate 
20. colonel, Coffey, acting as briga- 
dier-general, at the head of five regi- 
ments, fell upon Fort Blunt, not far 
from Fort Gibson. The attack was 
made with great energy and determi- 
nation. But Colonel William A. Phil- 
lips, with his garrison of about 1200 
men, some of them Indians, who could 
not be relied upon, made a stubborn 
and successful resistance. CofFey, after 
the loss of a considerable number of 
men, was driven back in disorder, and 
compelled to seek safety on the other 
side of the Arkansas River. On the 
jnly 16th of July, a bold but unsuc- 
**• cessful attempt was made by a 
mixed Confederate force, composed of 
Texans and Creek Indians, to capture 
a train of wagons, laden with supplies 
for Fort Blunt. The assailants were 
repelled with loss; and the train was 
saved. About the same time, another 
attack was meditated on Fort Blunt. 
General Coopei-, with a body of Con- 
federates, some GOOO strong, was lying 



at Honey Springs, behind Elk Creek, 
and about twenty-five miles south of 
Fort Blunt, waiting for the arrival of 
General Cabell, with three regiment* 
from Texas. It was Cooper's inten- 
tion, so soon as Cabell came up, to 
move on Fort Blunt. Happily, Gen 
eral Blunt had been made aware of the 
danger which threatened the post; and, 
by forced marches, he pushed on from 
Fort Scott, arriving at the menaced 
point in time to save it from the 
threatened peril. In five days he had 
accomplished a journey of 175 miles. 
Blunt did not wait for the attack, but 
moved at once on Cooper's camp, Avith 
3000 troops, infantry and cavalry, and 
12 cannon of light calibre. He left 
Fort Blunt at midnight on the 1 6th ; 
and at ten o'clock next day he had, 
with his columns, led respectively by 
Colonels Phillips and Judson, fallen 
heavily on Cooper. The battle lasted 
for two hours; but Cooper, although 
he had superior numbers, never recov- 
ered from the suddenness and severity 
of the attack. The Confederates were 
completely routed. They fled, in wild 
disorder, through the woods into the 
open praii'ie, leaving on the field 150 
killed, 400 wounded, with a large 
number of prisoners, one disabled gun 
and nearly 200 small arms. Blunt 
lost 77 men, of whom 17 were killed. 
When Cabell came up with his Texans, 
3000 strong, the battle was ended. 
Not deeming it prudent to attack the 
victorious Nationals, he moved towards 
the South, and disappeared beyond the 
Canadian River. The National j re- 
turned to Fort Blunt. After at vera) 



LITTLE ROCK. 



60S 



other skirmislies, of greater or lesser 
importance, General Blunt descended 
the Arkansas River, and occupied Fort 
Smith. 

At that time, the army of the fron- 
tier, as it was called, was greatly de- 
pleted, by furnishing reinforcements to 
General Grant, at Vicksburg; and the 
Confederate generals, in the Trans- 
Mississippi Department, seized the op- 
portunity to make an attack on He- 
lena. The attack was made on the 
July 4th of July, with a force of 
^' about 15,000 men, and was under 
the special direction of Price and Mar- 
maduke. It was made about daybreak, 
and with great fury. At fii'st, the Con- 
federates were successful in carrying a 
small fort which formed part of the 
outworks ; but the gunboat Tyler com- 
ing up and opening with its heavy 
guns, the fort was reclaimed, and the 
assailants were driven back with a se- 
vere loss in killed and wounded. Their 
purpose, however, to carry the place 
by storm was not all at once aban- 
doned. The assault was repeated with 
great bravery, Marmaduke's men fall- 
ing in heavy masses on the defenses 
of the town, attacking now the north 
and now the south, but everywhere 
meeting with the most stubborn resist- 
ance, and being terribly cut up by the 
National fire, at shoi't range, and by 
the heavy missiles from the gunboat. 
Foiled at every point, the Confederates 
were compelled to fall back, having 
sustained a loss of over 1000 men in 
killed and wounded, and more than 
1000 prisoners. Seeing that the Na- 
tionals were being reinforced, they re- 

S6» 



two, into the 



treated, after a day or 
interior of Arkansas. 

After the surrender of Vicksburg, tlie 
pressure on General Grant's army was 
relieved, and expeditions were sent out 
in different directions, either to repel 
or to check the movements of the Con- 
federates, who were still committing 
depredations on both sides of the Gi'eat 
Rivei'. One of these expeditions was 
under the care of General McPherson, 
who, with the divisions of Logan and 
Tuttle, pushed out in the direction 
of Canton, where the Confederates 
were known to be assembled in force. 
McPherson, not having sufficient num- 
bers at his disposal to warrant a vigoi-- 
ous or persistent attack, deemed it 
prudent to withdraw, and fell back to 
Vicksburg by way of Clinton. An 
other and more successful expedition 
was entrusted to the care of General 
Frederick Steele, who was sent to 
Helena with instructions to organize a 
body of troops, and to proceed to the 
capture of Little Rock, the headquar- 
ters of the guerrillas. At the begin- 
ning of August, he had collected and 
equipped about 6000 men ; he had also 
secured 22 guns. He was soon joined 
by General Davidson, who had been 
operating in Arkansas, under the com- 
mand of General Hurlbut, and whose 
force consisted of about the same num 
ber of ni'^n, with 18 guns. Davidson's 
men were mostly mounted. The united 
force, numbering in all some 12,000 
men and 40 guns, set out from \ng^ 
Helena on the 10th of August, '<•• 
Davidson and his horsemen taking 
the lead. The White River vas 



606 



MINOE ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 



crossed at Clarendon ; and a reconnois- 
sance was made as far as Brownsville. 
The details of this movement are nu- 
merous; but as there was compara- 
tively little lighting, it is unnecessary 
to enumerate them. Mannaduke had 
been sent out to Brownsville to offer 
Davidson resistance. Brownsville was 
abandoned without a battle, Marma- 
duke falling back to Little Rock, and 
burning the bridges in his rear. The 
National forces were again concen- 
trated at Brownsville, Steele having 
been reinforced by True's brigade, sent 
from Memphis. After a series of suc- 
cessful encounters, and having marched 
over a most difficult country, forcing 
their way across rivers and bayous, the 
Nationals reached the outer defenses 
Sep. of Little Rock on the 10th of 
*<>• September. The final struggle 
was protracted and severe ; but on the 
evening of that day the place was sur- 
rendered to General Davidson. Much 
of the public property had been de- 
stroyed ; eight steamers were found 
in flames, and beyond recovery, when 
the National troops entered the city; 
but the arsenal was uninjured. About 
1000 men were made prisoners. The 
entire National loss did not exceed 100 
in killed, wounded and prisoners. It 
was a campaign of which Steele had 
just cause to be proud. Only forty 
days had elapsed since he arrived at 
Helena. With the capture of Little 
Rock perished one of the most impor- 
tant centres and nurseries of rebeldom 
in the western country. The Confed- 
erates ultimately fell back to Red 
River; and the National troops, on 



the 28th of October, occupied Arka- 
delphia. 

On the 20th of August, one of the 
guerrilla leaders, named Qiian- j^ug. 
trell, at the head of a body of 20. 
800 men, entered the city of Lawrence, 
Kansas, and murdered, in cold blood, 
175 of its citizens, and destroyed by 
fire property to the value of over 
$2,000,000. He was pursued as soon 
as ti'oops could be raised, and some 40 
or 50 of his men were killed, oct^ 
On the 12th of October, a vigoi-- 12. 
ous encounter took place about eight 
miles southwest of Arrow Rock, be- 
tween the Nationals, under General 
E. B. Brown, and a powerful band of 
guerrillas and Indians, under Generals 
Shelby and Coffey. The Confederates 
were broken and routed after a sharp 
contest, and pursued as far as the Ar- 
kansas line. Early in this month, a 
desperate attempt was made to murder 
General Blunt and his staff, who were 
marching towards Fort Scott, Kansas. 
About 300 Confederates had dressed 
themselves as Union soldiers, and 
by this means surprised and captured 
78 of the 100 men under Blunt, all of 
whom, including Major Curtis, son of 
General Curtis, were wounded. Blunt 
and 15 of his men made a vigorous 
resistance, and contrived to escape. It 
was believed by the Confederates that 
General Blunt was among the killed; 
and they rejoiced accordingly. On the 
20th of October, Blunt was relieved of 
the command of the army of the Fron- 
tier, General McNiel taking his place. 
Towards the end of October, Marma 
duke, at the head of 2000 men, marched 



THE INDIANS. 



607 



from Princeton upon Pine Bluff, a post 
on the soutli side of the Arkansas 
River, and about fifty miles below 
Little Rock, then in command of Colo- 
nel Powell Clayton. That officer was 
not unprepared for the attack ; and 
after a vigorous fight, which lasted 
about five hours, Marmaduke was 
forced to retire, having lost in the 
struggle 150 men killed and wounded, 
and 33 prisoners. Clayton's loss was 
Oct. ^'', t>f whom 17 were killed. On 
•8. the 18th of October, Quantrell 
and the Creek chief, Sandwatie, made 
an attack on Fort Gibson, in the In- 
dian country. Fort Gibson was one 
of Colonel Phillips' outposts. After 
a contest of four hours, the assailants 
were dispersed, and driven across the 
Arkansas River. Peace now reigned 
for a time between the Red and Mis- 
souri Rivers. 

In the late winter months and earl\- 
spring of 1863, further trouble was 
given by the Sioux Indians, under 
Little Crow, whose bi-utalities at Yel- 
low Medicine, at New Ulm, and at 
Cedar City, in Minnesota, have al- 
ready been described. The spirit of 
those warriors Avas greatl}' broken b}' 
the execution of tliirty of their num- 
ber at Markato, towards the end 

Note. — After the fall of Vicksbnrg, General Herron, 
with a force of troops uumberiug TjODO, was ordered to 
Port Hudson. He had already embarked, when the 
news arrived announcing Banks' victory. Transfer- 
ring his troops to lighter-draught vessels, he proceeded, 
on the 12th of July, iu obedience to orders, up the 
Yazoo Kiver, as far as Yazoo City, under the convoy of 
the De Kalb and two tin-clad vessels, under the com- 
inaud of Captain Walker. A combined attack of the 



of February. It was not, however, 
until the following summer, when 
General Pope took command of the 
department, that the "Sioux War" 
was brought to a close. Vigorous- 
ly attacked and pursued fi-om place 
to place, the savage bands were brok- 
en and dispersed among the wilds 
of the eastern slopes of the Rocky 
Mountains. Little Crow himself, 
" the foremost huntei- and orator," 
was finally shot near Hutchinson, in 
Minnesota, by a Mr. Lamson. The 
skeleton of the chief is preserved in 
the collection of the Minnesota His- 
torical Society. 

x\t the close of the year, practical 
progress had been made in reducing to 
subjection the entire western country. 
Vicksbui'g and Port Hudson liad fallen ; 
and the Mississippi, throughout its en 
tire length, was under the conti'ol of 
the National government. Missouri 
was placed beyond the danger of inva- 
sion. The military power of the ene- 
my was broken in Arkansas and Kansas. 
A firm foothold had been secured iu 
Texas. Much work had yet to be 
done ; but it was now evident that tlie 
end of the great stiuggle was approach- 
ing, and that the Union was to be 
saved. 

army and navy on the enemy's works resulted in the 
flight of the garrison. Unfortunately, the De Kalb was 
sunk by a torpedo, opposite the city. Herron won 
an easy victory, capturing and destroying a Confede- 
rate vessel, formerly a gunboat, which was sheltered 
there. Ho returned to Vicksburg on the "Jlst July, 
bringing back with him 300 prisoners, (i heavy guns, 
ano small arms, 800 horses and 2000 bales of Confede- 
rate cotton. 



608 



THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION, 



CHAPTER XXXI. 



The Opening of 186+. — Promise of Success. — Much Work yet to be Done. — The Confederacy Crippled, brA 
Not Subdued. — Three Important Strongholds. —Meridian.— Shreveport. — Mobile. — Sherman's Purpose. — 
Delay. — After Chattanooga and Knoxville. — Preparations for the Meridian Expedition. — Instructions to 
McPherson and Hurlbut. — Sooy Smith. — Pontotoc. — Okolona. — Sherman's Army in Motion. — The Big 
Black. — The Positions held by the Confederates. — Polk in Command. — Stephen E. Lee. — The Pearl 
Eiver. — Brandon. — Tallahatta. —Oktibbeha. — Meridian. — Demopolis. — A Burning Train. — An Easy Vic- 
tory. — Terrible Destruction of Property. — "Jeff. Davis' Neckties." — Quitman. — Lauderdale Springs. — 
Non- Arrival of Smith. — Cause of His Delay. — Struck by Forrest. — A Panic. — A Stampede. — Smith's Re- 
treat. — CoUiersviUe. — The Negroes. — Strange Scenes. — Devastation. — Report of an Eye- Witness. — A Great 
Work Done. — Sherman Returns to Vicksburg. — Dissatisfied with Smith. — Forrest in Favor.^The Yazoo 
Expedition. — A Rush into Kentucky and Tennessee. — At Jackson. — Union City. — Colonel Hawkin.s.^ 
Surrender. — Forrest Moves on Paducah. — Fort Anderson. — Bravery of Colonel S. G. Hicks. — The Confede- 
rate General, A. P. Thompson, Killed. — Fort Pillow. — The Gari-ison. — Booth and Bradford. — Description 
of the Fort. — A Savage Assault. — A Heroic Resistance. — Booth Killed. — Bradford in Command. — The New 
Era. — A Flag of Truce. — A Call for Unconditional Surrender. — A Treacherous Game. — Brutal Massacre. — No 
Quarter. — Horrible Scenes. — Report of the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War. — Cruel 
Treatment of Major Bradford. — Infamous Notoriety. — Buford at Columbus. — In Imitation of Forrest. — \ 
Brutal Threat. — Forrest Retreats. — Sturgis' Order to Pursue. — Escape of Forrest. — Gum Town. — A Se- 
vere Engagement. — Defeat of the Nationals. — General Smith in Command. — Another Expedition Against 
Forrest. — A Series of Encounters. — Smith at the Tallahatchie. — Forrest in Memphis. — His Mission so far 
Accomplished. — Reflections. 



The year 1864 opened with promise 
of final success to the National 
cause. The outlook, however, 
was not -without a shadow of gloom. 
Richmond still engaged the attention 
and baffled the efforts of the army 
of the Potomac; Charleston held 
out against the genius and energy of 
Gillmore and Dahlgren ; Mobile and 
Wilmington continued to invite and 
reward the daring but unprincipled 
enterprise of foreign traders ; and pow- 
erful Confederate armies, zealous and 
eager for the fight, were yet in the 
field. But great battles, involving 
great issues, had been won by the 
Northern armies during the previous 



year; and nothing had happened to 
undo the results, or to pi'event the 
Nationals from reaping the full benefit 
of the victories at Vicksburg, at Port 
Hudson, at Gettysburg, and at Chatta- 
nooga. The waters of the Mississippi 
now rolled unchecked from Cairo to 
the Gulf, thus cutting the Confederacy 
in twain ; Chattanooga being held by 
the Nationals, the Richmond govern 
ment was shut out from the valley of 
the Mississippi, and exposed also to 
attack in the rear; while the victory 
at Gettysburg had effectually deli veret? 
the Northern mind from all fear oi 
further invasion. 

On neither side, however, had thi 



SOUECES OF STRENGTH. 



609 



wai- spirit died out. In the North, 
there was a more vio^orous determina- 
tion than ever to force the contest to 
an early and a final issue. In the 
South, aUhough signs of distress were 
apparent, there ^vas no disposition 
to abandon the struggle. Great ar- 
mies, as has been stated, were yet in 
the field. There were, besides, in every 
Confederate State, oi'ganized bodies of 
armed men ; and the States in which 
the National authority had been re- 
stored were exposed to frequent and 
dangerous incursions by those militar}' 
freebooters. 

The loss of VicksLnrg and of Port 
Hudson had terribly fxippled the Con- 
federacy in the west and southwest. 
Existence, however, w.<s still possible. 
There were several inaportant points 
from which the means of subsistence 
could be obtained. Of these, the most 
impoi'tant were Meridian, Shreveport 
and Mobile, In the present chapter, 
we shall confine our attention to Meri- 
dian. A glance at the map will show 
the importance of this position. Situ- 
ated at the intersection of the Moliile 
and Ohio Railroad, which runs north 
and south, and the South Mississippi, 
which runs east and west, it was a 
place of the highest advantage to the 
Confederates, and greatly aided them 
in prolonging the struggle. It was in 
easy communication with Selnia, the 
great iron centre of the Confedei-acy, 
and also with Mobile, the one port, 
besides that of Wilmington, which was 
now open to the blockade ininners. 
After the fall of Vioksburg, it was in- 
tended to move a strong foicc on Meri- 



dian ; but the weather being intensely 
hot, a drought prevailing, and the men 
already greatly exhausted, the move- 
ment was deferred. It became impos- 
sible when Sherman was ordered to 
Chattanooga, to the assistance of Rose- 
cranz. After Chattanooga, and the re- 
lief of Burnside, at Knoxville, Sher- 
man ^vas again in a condition to direct 
his thoughts to Meridian. Having re- 
turned to Mississippi, his command 
was stationed, for a time, along the 
line of the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad. Towards the end of Janu- 
ary, he received instructions to proceed 
to Vicksburg, and place himself at the 
head of an expedition which should 
move eastward from that city, and per- 
form such service foi' the National cause 
as circumstances might allow. 

With as little delay as possible, the 
necessary arrangements were completed,, 
Hurlbut, whose headquarters were at 
Memphis, was ordered to draw in all 
public property to Cairo and Memphis, 
to evacuate all places of minor import- 
ance, and especially o abandon Corinth 
and Fort PilloW. He was at the same 
time ordered to provide two divi- 
sions, of 5000 each, and to have them 
ready for embai'kation not later than 
the 25th of January. McPherson, who 
was in command at Vicksburg, re- 
ceived somewhat similar instructions. 
He also was to provide two divisions^ 
of 5000 each. General W. Sooy Smith, 
chief of cavalry, in the division of the 
Mississippi, was at Memphis, witli a 
mounted force of about 2500. This force 
was increased to about 10,000 strono; 
by additions from Hurlbut's corps. 



610 



THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 



The objective point was Meridian. 
Smith was to move direct on that place 
from Memphis. Hurlbut was to join 
Sherman and MePherson atVicksburg, 
whence the united forces should move 
on Meridian, and there form a junction 
with the cavalry under Smith. Meri- 
dian was distant from Memphis 250 
miles; from Vicksburg, 150. "What 
Sherman proposed to accomplish by 
this expedition, he himself tells us. 
In a letter to General Banks, he says : 
"I propose to avail myself of the 
short time allowed me in this depart- 
ment here to strike a blow at Meri- 
dian and Deraopolis. T think I can do 
it ; and the destruction of the railroads, 
east and west, north and south of Me- 
ridian, vrill close the door of rapid 
travel and conveyance of stores from 
the Mississippi and the Confederacy 
east, and so make us less liable to the 
incursions of the enemy toward the 
Mississippi. I intend to leave Vicks- 
burg about the 25th instant, and hope 
to be near Meridian about February 
8th and 10th." He requested Banks 
to make a feint on Mobile, so as to 
prevent the enemy at that place from 
sending reinforcements to Meridian. 
It was his conviction that if he were 
not resisted by supei'ior numbers, he 
would be able to cut off Mobile from 
all connection with the interior, except 
by way of the Alabama River. Suc- 
cess at Meridian, and a similar success 
afterwards at Shreveport would, he 
thought, settle the main question in 
the southwest 

To give effect to the purposes thus 
indicated, Sherman ordered Sooy Smith 



to move from Memphis on or before 
February 1st, taking with him an ef- 
fective force of 7000 cavalry, lightly 
equipped. He was to march on Pon- 
totoc, Okolona and Meridian, making 
it an object to reach Mei'idian on oi; 
about the 10th. His instructions were 
"to disregard all minor objects; to de- 
stroy railroad bridges and corn not 
wanted ; to break the enemy's com- 
munications from Okolona to Meridian, 
and thence eastward to Selma ; if con- 
venient, to send to Columbus, Mis- 
sissippi, and destroy all machinery 
there, and the bridge across the Tom- 
bigbee, which enabled the enemy to 
draw resources to the east side of the 
valley." With the understanding that 
Smith was already on his ^vay, Sher- 
man set out from Vicksburg, on the 
3d of February, at the head of peb. 
an army of about 23,000 effective 5* 
men. A considerable proportion of this 
force was mounted. The four divi- 
sions of which the army was composed 
were arranged in two columns, which 
were commanded, the one by MePher- 
son, the other by Hurlbut. Sherman 
marched in the advance \\nth McPher- 
son's column. MePherson crossed the 
Big Black, at the railroad bridge ; Hurl 
but crossed at Messenger's. The sol 
diers were provided with twenty days' 
rations. All unnecessaiy baggage was 
left behind. No tents were taken ; and, 
throughout the march, all, from the 
commanding-general to the private, bi- 
vouacked by camp-fires in the open air. 
The weather was all that could be de- 
sired, the days being beautiful and the 
! nights cool, with a slight frost. The 



TEREIBLB DESTEUCTION. 



611 



roads, fortunately, were in excellent 
condition. 

Sherman was not ignorant of the 
position and strength of the ene- 
my. By means of a spy, who had 
brought from Meridian an official re- 
port, it was learned that Polk was in 
chief command there. Scattered all 
over the State, there wei'e companies 
of infantry and cavalry collecting 
taxes and forcing conscripts. Loring 
was at Canton with his infantry divi- 
sion, some 7000 strong, and 18 guns. 
French was at Brandon, with 3000 
men and 10 guns. This force was 
increased to 5000 men, by reinforce- 
ments from Mobile. Forrest command- 
ed the cavalry in the district of North 
Mississippi ; the South cavalry district 
was in charge of Stephen E. Lee. 
Each of these latter commanders had 
under him a mounted force of 4000 men. 
Unless Polk was largely reinforced, it 
was not unreasonable to conclude that 
the expedition would result in com- 
plete success. 

For the first two days, Sherman was 
allowed to march unopposed. On the 
Feb. 5th, tlie enemy was encountered ; 
S" and, for eighteen miles, there was 
continual skirmishing. That night Sher- 
man's advance reached Jackson, and 
found that the Confederates had just 
made a precipitate retreat. It was 
evident that the appearance of the Na- 
tionals had been a complete surprise. 
A pontoon bridge across the Pearl 
River was left comparatively unin- 
jured The bridge having been quick- 
ly repaired, Shennan pushed forward, 
passing rapidly through Biaudou, and 



reaching Morton on the 9th. At this 
place, McPherson, who led the ad- 
vance, was halted to break up and 
destroy the railroads. Hurlbut now 
took the lead, and kept it until he 
reached Meridian. At Tallahatta, 
some twenty miles from Meridian, ob- 
structions were encountered in the 
shape of felled timber. Suspecting 
that the Confederates were trying to 
gain time, in order to cover the move- 
ment of railroad property from Meri- 
dian, Sherman dropped his trains, leav- 
ing them in charge of strong escorts, - 
and hastened to the Oktibbeha. The 
bridge was found in flames and beyond 
recovery. With material obtained fi'om 
an old cotton-gin close at hand, a new 
bridge was speedily constructed; and 
on the l-lth, at 3.30 o'clock in the peb. 
afternoon, Meridian was entered ^^> 
and occupied, the Confederates having 
already retired. Polk had gone to De- 
mopolis that morning at 10.30. One 
entire train was found burning at the 
depot. With this exception, all the 
rolling-stock had been removed to 
Mobile or Selma. It was only eleven 
days since the expedition had left 
Vicksburg. Meridian, as we have seen 
already, was in the very heart of the 
enemy's country, yet the Nationals, iii 
their eleven days' march, encountered 
almost no opposition. This expedition 
did much to reveal the inherent weak- 
ness of the Confederacy. It was a, 
preliminary to the march to the sea'', 
and there can be no doubt that his ex- 
perience on this occasion encouraged 
Sherman to undertake that later and 
more daring enterprise. 



€1-2 



THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 



As General Smith had not arrived, 
it was not deemed prudent to pursue 
the Confederates. Sherman's object 
was to destroy this stronghold of the 
Confederacy. The work of destruction 
Was commenced at once. Ten thousand 
men, anned with axes, sledges, crow- 
bars and clawbars, went to work with 
a will; and, at the end of five days. 
Meridian, with its depots, warehouses, 
arsenal, oiRces, hospitals, hotels, and 
cantonments, was utterly destroyed. 
Fire completed the terrible work of de- 
struction. The inhabited houses alone 
were spared. Hurlbut had charge to 
the north and east of the town. Mc- 
Pherson was entrusted with the south 
and west. They did their work thor- 
oughly. Hurlbut reported the destruc- 
tion of 60 miles of ties and iron 
burned and bent, one locomotive de- 
stroyed, and 8 bridges burned. Mc- 
Pherson reported 55 miles of railroad 
destroyed, 53 bridges, 6075 feet of 
trestle-work below Quitman, 19 loco- 
motives, 28 cars and 3 steam saw-mills 
burned or ruined. To make the work 
of restoration more difficult, the rails, 
in large quantities, when torn up, were 
placed on the blazing piles of timber, 
brought to a red-heat, and then twist- 
ed round a tree or other object into 
what the men playfully called " Jeif. 
Davis' neck-ties." A twisted rail was 
henceforth useless. In addition to the 
destruction wrought in the town itself, 
the railroads were ruined as far south 
as below Quitman ; east as far as Cuba 
Station ; north to Lauderdale Springs, 
and west the whole way to Jackson; 
and among the places which shared 



the fate of Meridian were Jackson, 
Enterprise, Marion, Quitman, Hills- 
boro. Canton, Lake Station, Decatur, 
Bolton and Lauderdale Springs. It 
was rough work, which will not soor 
be wholly forgiven or forgotten ; but 
it was rendered necessary by the exi. 
gencies of the situation ; and, rough as 
it was, it was not a violation of the 
principles of civilized warfare. 

Sherman remained at Meridian for 
several days, impatiently waiting for 
Smith and his cavalry. But he waited 
in vain. Smith, it will be remem- 
bered, who was at the head of 7000 
mounted troops, a brisrade of infantry, 
and a respectable artillery force, was 
ordered to leave Memphis on the 1st 
of February, and so , to regulate his 
movements as to be able to effect a 
junction with Sherman on or about the 
10th. Sherman did not an'ive until 
the 14th. Smith, according to the ar- 
rangements made, ought to have been 
forward. Day after day passes by; 
cavalry are sent out in all directions; 
but tiilings of Smith or of his troops 
are nowhere to be found. What has 
become of this force ? Let us see. 
Smith, it appears, had from some cause 
delayed his departure from Memphis, 
His second in command was Brigadier- 
General Grierson, wlio had won so 
much distinction by his famous raid 
fiom La Grange to Baton Rouge in 
the spring of the previous year. The 
troops were gathered in from Middle 
Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, 
and concentrated at Colliersville, some 
twenty -four miles east of Memphis. It 
was not until the 11th of the month 



SMITH'S RETREAT. 



619 



that tlioy commenced their march from 
Colliersville, a clay later than that fixed 
for their arrival at Meridian. Pushing 
on as rapidly as possible, they crossed 
the Tallahatchie, at New Albany, at 
noon, and encamped four miles south 
of that place. Continuing their march, 
they pressed on in the direction of 
Okolona, passing through Pontotoc at 
one o'clock in the afternoon of the 
17th, and reaching Okolona on the 
18th. On the 20th, they encountered 
the enemy for the first time, in the 
neighborhood of West Point. They 
were now joined by large bodies of ne- 
groes, who, for the first time, saw the 
National troops. There was some hard 
fightinsr on the 20th. It was resumed 
on the 21st; and, on the 22d, Forrest 
fell with tremendous force on the Na- 
tional real' and flank at Okolona. A 
scene of the wildest confusion fol- 
lowed, the Second Iowa becoming panic- 
stricken, and stampeding the whole of 
Colonel McCrellis' brigade. Order was 
speedily restored ; the Seventh Indiana 
and the Second brigade i-al lying, hold- 
ing the enemy in check, and doing 
splendid work. As twilight approached, 
a magnificent charge was made by the 
Seventh Indiana, under the eye of 
General Smith himself, driving the 
enemy l)ack with tenible slaughter It 
was now dark; and Smith, ignorant of 
the strength of the enemy, and believing 
that he was greatly outnumbered, or- 
dere'l a retreat. The dead and wounded 
were left on the field. The mules, pris- 
oners and negroes were placed in the 
advance. At ten o'clock, a halt was 
tiade until four in the morning, when 



the march was resumed. The Confed= 
erates continued to follow. The National 
rear was incessantly engaged, but was 
successful in holding the enemy in check. 
On the afternoon of the 23d, the Talla- 
hatchie, at New Albany, was lecrossed, 
and the bridge destroyed. Colliers 
ville was reached on the 27th, and the 
wearied and dispirited troops, the regi- 
ments torn and tattered, were aijain in 
camp. It was an unfortunate affair, 
and resulted in the loss of at least 200 
men. A little more bravery on the 
part of the National troops, and the re- 
sult must have been altogether differ- 
ent ; for the entire force under Forrest 
did not exceed 3000 men. As it was, 
Smith had the satisfaction of knowing 
that he had burned about 3000 bales 
of cotton and over 1,000,000 bushels 
of corn, and that he had captured over 
100 prisoners, about 1000 mules, and 
a large number of negroes, up to that 
date held in bondage. 

Sherman, meanwhile, had left Meri- 
dian on the 20th, making his peb. 
return march thi-ough Canton, 2ft. 
north of the line of the advance. At 
Canton, 15 locomotives were captured, 
but the train was spared. All along 
his line of march, crowds of fugitive 
slaves flocked to the army for protec- 
tion. An eye-witness has given us a 
vivid picture of this strange scene 
" From 4000 to 7000 slaves accompa- 
nied the return of the expedition. I 
defy any human being to look on the 
scene unmoved. Old men, with the 
frosts of seventy years upon their 
heads ; men in the prime of manhood ; 
youths, and children that could barely 



614 



THE MEKIDIAN EXPEDITION. 



run ; women with their babes at their 
breasts. They came, some of them it is 
true, with shouts and careless laughter, 
but silent tears coursed down many a 
2heek — tears of thankfulness for their 
gi eat deliverance. There were faces in 
that crowd which shone with a joy al- 
most inspired. Smile who will, but 
the story of the coming of the Children 
of Israel out of the land of Egypt can 
never recall to my mind a more pro- 
found emotion than the remembrance 
of that scene. When I looked upon 
the long line of National soldiers filing 
through roads in which our slaughtered 
brotheis lie thicker than sheaves in a 
harvest field, and reflected on the hor- 
rors to which this race has been sub- 
jected by the foes whom we are fight- 
ing, I felt faith in a God of justice 
renewed in my heart." From Canton, 
the fugitive negroes were sent forward 
in an advance train to Vicksburg. 
Sherman had again won for himself 
fresh laurels. He had clone a great 
work. If he had not accomplished 
the great object of the expedition, and, 
by moving upon and destroying Selma, 
by wheeling around and taking posses- 
sion of Mobile, and thus rendering un- 
necessary the future march to the sea, 
he had, at least, severely punished and 
greatly crippled the Confederacy. He 
had destroyed 150 miles of railroad, 
10,000 bales of cotton, 2,000,000 bush- 
els of corn, 20 locomotives, 28 cars, 67 
bridges and 7000 feet of trestle-work. 
He had captured 200 prisoners, several 
thousand horses and mules and 300 
wagons. He had done what was still 
more noble — he had liberated not 



fewer than 8000 negroes. His owe 
loss scarcely exceeded 1 70 men. 

Sherman left the expedition in carb 
of General Hurlbut on the 27th, p^b^ 
and proceeded to Vicksburg, 27. 
whence he started, on the 28th, on a 
hurried visit to New Orleans, to confer 
with Banks and Porter regarding the 
projected campaign against Shreveport 
It was not until his return from New 
Orleans to Vicksburg that he learned 
the result of Smith's attempt to co-ope> 
rate with him at Meridian. He was ill- 
satisfied with Smith's own account of the 
affair. "His reports to me," he says, 
" are unsatisfactory. He delayed his 
start until the 11th, when his orders 
were to be at Meridian on the 10th, 
and when he knew that I was march- 
ing from Vicksburg. The mode of hia 
return to Memphis was not what I had 
expected ; he had nothing to deal vrith 
but Forrest and the militia. I hope 
he will make these points more clear 
to the general-in-chief." 

When Sherman set out for Meridian, 
two important diversions were made iu 
his favor — one by Farragut against- 
Mobile Harbor, another by a portion 
of Porter's fleet and a body of armed 
men, up the Yazoo. The Mobile diver- 
sion was completely successful; for, 
although no fighting was done, the ap- 
pearance of the National fleet led the 
Confederates to expect an attack, and 
prevented them from sending reinforce- 
ments to Polk. The expedition up the 
Yazoo was attended with considerable 
success. The boats, four in number — 
Petrel, Marmora, Echange and Romeo 
— were commanded by Lieutenant E 



YAZOO CITY. 



ei3 



K. Owen. The land troops, which con- 
sisted of the Eleventh Illinois infantry, 
Eighth Louisiana infantry and First 
Mississippi cavalry — the two latter col- 
ored — were commanded by Colonel 
James H. Coates. This expedition 
puslied its way as far as Fort Pember- 
ton. After spending some days in 
loading cotton, Coates re-embarked his 
men ; and the vessels returned to Yazoo 
City, with IGOO bales of cotton. Hav- 
ing established his headquartei's here, 
a Confederate force soon appeared 
iu considerable strenfjth, under Ross 
and Richardson. On the morning of 
Jiar, t^6 5th of March, a severe en- 
s' counter took place; and Coates' 
headquarters were literally I'iddled 
with shot and shell. The fiirht lasted 
the greater pai't of the day. It raged 
most fiercely at an earth-work, in 
the form of a I'edoubt, about half a 
mile from the town. Into this work 
Coates had thrown Major McKee, with 
three companies of his own regiment, 
the Eleventh Illinois. "While Ross was 
engaged with the troops in the town, 
Richardson fell with great fuiy on Mc- 
Kee, flinging into the redoubt shot and 
shell with terrible precision. Richard- 
Boa made a call for surrender, under 
the pi'etense that all the Nationals had 
been taken prisoners. McKee returned 
an indignant refusal, tellinji; him "if he 
wanted them, to come and take them." 
Another call for surrender was made — 
this time, in the name of God and hu- 
manity, and coupled Avith the threat 
th;it, iu case of refusal, the place would 
be stormed and reduced in ten minutes. 
The answer was the same. Riehai'dson 



might come and take it McKee ex- 
pressed his regret that he should have 
coupled his demand with a threat, and 
assured him that if the fight was to go 
on with that understanding, he should 
kill eveiy man he captured. x\t this 
juncture, the Confederates iu the town 
were yielding to the steady pressure of 
the Nationals. At five o'clock in the 
afternoon, the route became general, 
Coates and McKee remaining masters 
of their respective positions. It was a 
spirited contest, and reflected the high- 
est credit on Colonel Coates and hi^ 
entire command. His fighting force, 
including the negroes, scarcely exceed- 
ed 1000 men, w^hile that of the ene- 
my was scarcely under 2300. The 
negroes, it was observed, fought with 
great bravery. In this engagement^ 
the Nationals lost 18 killed, 85 wound 
ed and 19 missing — the larger })ropor 
tion of the killed and M'ounded being 
colored. 

With the results of the expedition 
up the Yazoo, Sherman was but little 
satisfied. It was his opinion, at tlu: 
time, that Coates would have done bet- 
ter if he had retained the boats and 
pushed up the river. Coates, however, 
was best qualified how to judge. He 
liad, by means of a I'econnoissauce, 
made by Colonel Osband and the First 
Missoui-i cavalry, ascertained that For 
rest was in force in Grenada. As it was, 
the expedition drove the guerrillas fi'oiii 
the banks of the Mississij)pi, and, nu 
doubt, occupied troops which otlierwisti 
might have given Sherman annoyance. 

The unsuccessful effort of General 
Smith to reach Meridian, :ind unite KU 



616 



THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 



forces with those of Shorman, redound- 
ed somewhat to the glory of General 
Forrest, He was not unwilling to 
take some praise to himself; and the 
Confederate authorities, fully aware 
that but for him the disasters which 
had befallen them, through the Meri- 
dian Expedition, might have been much 
more serious, were pleased to enlarge 
his sphere of duty and to increase his 
authority. Although still subordinate 
to Stephen D. Lee, commander-in-chief 
of the mounted men in that region, he 
was granted a sort of roving commis- 
sion. It was evident that a great 
struggle was impending, and must soon 
take, place between the opposing forces 
in Northern Georgia. Forrest was 
charged with the special duty of keep- 
ing well employed the National forces 
then on the line of the Mississippi, 
from Vicksburg to Cairo, and so pre- 
vent them from reinfoi'cing the army 
opposed to Johnston. The arrange- 
ments which were being made for the 
Shreveport or Red River Expedition 
had the immediate effect of withdraw- 
ing large numbers of troops from 
Vicksburg, and thus of weakening the 
National line in the direction just men- 
tioned. Forrest at once took full ad- 
vantage of his opportunity. At the 
head of a band of about 5000 men, all 
imbued with his own fierce and trucu- 
lent spirit, he made a rush up from 
Northern Mississippi into West Ten- 
nessee. He rested for a time at Jack- 
son, and then pushed on towards Ken- 
tucky. At that time, Union City, a 
fortified place in the northwestern 
part of Tennessee, was garrisoned by 



450 of the Eleventh Tennessee caval- 
ry, under Colonel Hawkins. Against 
Union City, Forrest sent a detachment, 
under Colonel Faulkner. That officer 
appeared before the place on the 
24th of March, and demanded jjai., 
its surrender. Hawkins refused, 24t 
and was attacked. He succeeded, how 
ever, in driving the enemy back. A 
second attack was made ; and Hawkins, 
against the wishes of his men, surren- 
dered the gan-isou, with about 200 
horses and 500 small arms. A little 
more stubborn determination on the 
part of the National commander, and 
Union City and the garrison might 
have been saved ; for, at the moment 
of surrender. General Brayman, who 
had hurried from Cairo to Hawkins' 
relief, was only six miles distant. 
Hickman, on the Mississippi, after the 
fall of Union City, fell an easy prey 
to the Confederates. FoiTest, embold- 
ened by success, accompanied by Bu- 
ford and General A. P. Thompson, 
moved directly from Jackson on Pa- 
ducah. This latter place was then oc- 
cupied by a force not exceeding 700 
men, under Colonel S. G. Hicks. Made 
aware of the approach of Forrest, 
Hicks threw his troops into Fort An- 
derson, in the lower suburbs of the 
town. Having made a furious but un- 
successful assault on the fort, Forrest 
made a demand for its surrender, 
threatening, in the event of refusal, to 
cariy^ the works by storm and massacre 
the garrison. The threat was unheed- 
ed; and the garrison, obtaining some 
effective assistance from the gunboats 
Peosta and Paw-Paw, the Confederat« 



FORT PILLOW. 



617 



general was compelled to content him- 
self with what plunder he could find. 
Hearing of the approach of rein- 
forcements from Cairo, he decamped 
on the 27th, having lost, it was es- 
timated, over 300 men killed and 
\vomided. Among the killed was Gen- 
eral Thompson, who was torn in pieces 
by a shell. The National loss was 14 
killed and 46 wounded. 

Forrest's attention was next turned 
to Fort Pillow. Hurlbut, it will be 
remembered, was Instructed by Sher- 
man to evacuate that post, before he 
joined him at Vicksburg to take part 
in the expedition to Meridian. These 
instructions, for some reason or other, 
were not fully carried out. The place 
was still garrisoned by about 550 men, 
excluding officers. Of the soldiers, 200 
were colored, and under the immediate 
command of Major L. F. Booth. The 
lemainder were under the command of 
Major AV. F. Bradford. Booth had 
April chief command. On the morning 
•3. of the 13th of April, Forrest ap- 
proached the fort, drove in the pickets, 
and commenced the assault. 

The situation of the fort was pecu- 
liar. It stood on a high bluff, which 
descended precipitately towards the 
river, that side being covered with 
trees, bushes and fallen timber. Above 
and below the fort, and extending 
back from the river, was a ravine or 
hollow. The ravine above the fort, 
known as Cold Creek, was covered 
with trees and bushes. The ravine 
below was covered, for the most part, 
with government buildings. The ar- 
mament of the place consisted of 2 six- 



pounder and 2 twelve-pounder howitz- 
ers, and 2 ten-pounder Parrotts. The 
assault was savagely made. The garri- 
son, however, fought with great brav- 
eiy, fiercely resisting the attempts made 
by the Confederates to force their way 
into the outworks. Both officers and 
men fearlessly exposed themselves. 
The gunboat New Ei-a, Captain Mar- 
shall, was at hand, and attempted to 
render the garrison some assistance; 
but the nature of the ground enabled 
the Confederates to elude the fire of 
its guns. About nine o'clock, Major 
Booth was killed. Bradford immedi- 
ately took command ; and, having called 
the whole force within the fort, he 
made a gallant resistance, until it was 
past the hour of noon. About this 
time, to allow the guns to cool, the 
fire of both parties slackened. The New 
Era withdrew for a similar purpose, 
having fired 282 rounds of shell, shrap- 
nel and canister, which nearly ex- 
hausted her ammunition. At this stage, 
Forrest sent a flag of truce, with a 
demand for unconditional suri'ender 
Bradford asked time to consult with 
his brother-officers and with the cap- 
tain of the New Era. Another flac; ol 
truce, and another demand more per- 
emptory than before. Bradford must 
surrender within twenty minutes or the 
assault Avill be renewed. Bradford 
declined, and prepared to renew the 
struggle. It was not long until it be- 
came apparent that Forrest had been 
jjlaying a most treacherous and cow- 
ardly game. During the progress oi 
the negotiations, he had been pushing 
his men stealthily forward into the rn- 



61s 



THE MERIDIA]^ EXPEDITION. 



vines, and, under cover of the trees 
and bushes, securing advantageous po- 
sitions, from which, at the word of 
command, they couhl eflFectually spring 
npon the fort. This shameful viola- 
tion of one of the most sacred princi- 
ples of civilized warfare was noticed 
by Captain Marshall, but he refrained 
from firing on the foe lest, in the 
event of defeat, it should be made a 
pretext for a ci'uel and barbarous re- 
venge. 

Pretext for brutality, it was soon 
discovered, was not necessary. A bi'U- 
tal massacre had already been resolved 
upon. As soon as Bradford's answer 
was received, the signal was given; 
Forrest's men rushed from the posi- 
tions which they had so treacherously 
abtained ; and, with fierce yells, and 
such cries as "No quarter," "Kill the 
damned niggers," "Shoot them down," 
they went bounding over the parapet 
and into the fort. But little opportu- 
nity was allowed for resistance. Panic- 
stricken, the troops, black and white, 
threw down their arms, madly rush- 
ing to places of shelter, and vainly 
and piteously calling foi- mercy. The 
jicenes which followed were harrowing 
beyond all description. An indiscrim- 
inate slaughter was at once commenced. 
N^o work of the tomahawk or scalping- 
fcnife ever sui-passed in pure savagery 
what then took place. No respect was 
paid to age or sex, to white or black, 
to soldier or civilian. It was a ruth- 
less butchery. Some, in pure despair, 
rushed down the steep bluif, seeking 
shelter in vain under cover of the trees. 
Some flunsr thenr^elves into tlie watei-. 



only to become targets for the Confecj 
ei'ate rifles. The massacre was as de- 
liberate as it was brutal. The hospi- 
tals were entered, and the sick and 
wounded were either butchered where 
they lay, or dragged out to be shot. 
Men, in some instances, were gathered 
together in groups, and shot down 
where they stood. The instances of 
special and wanton cruelty were nu- 
merous. One poor soldier, who was 
wounded and unable to stand, was com- 
pelled to get to his feet, that his tor- 
mentors might have a fair shot at him. 
A negro boy was seen holding a horse 
Avhich a Confedei'ate was mounting. 
As soon as the savage was in the sad- 
dle, the boy was shot dead for his 
pains. The murderous work went on 
until the darkness. It was resumed, 
however, with the return of day. 

A Committee of Congress subse- 
quently took evidence on the affair. 
The facts brought to light were horri- 
ble beyond description. Men, it was 
proved, were not only shot in cold 
blood, and drowned, but were even 
crucified, buried alive, nailed to the 
floors of houses which were then set 
on fire. " No cruelty," says the report 
of this committee, " which the most 
fiendish malignity could devise, was 
omitted by these murderers. Fronr 
300 to 400 men are known to have 
been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom 
at least 300 ^vei-e murdered in cold 
blood, after the post was in possession, 
of the rebels, and our men had thrown 
down their arms and ceased to offer 
resistance." ^he case of Major Brad- 
ford deserves special mention. Ht 



aUM TOWN. 



619 



Avas being conveyed under guard to 
Jackson, Tennessee, when he was sud- 
denly led aside about fifty yards from 
the line of march, and deliberately 
murdered. After having pled in vain 
for his life, on the ground that he had 
made a fair and honorable fight, he 
fell, pierced by three musket balls. 
Bradford was a Southern man by birth. 
He had chosen to remain loyal to the 
Federal government. This was his one 
offense; but it was unpardonable in 
the eyes of Forrest and his myrmidons. 
The moral effect of the Fort Pillow 
massacre was highly detrimental to the 
Southern cause. It revealed a spirit 
which was offensive to the entire 
Christian world ; and from that day 
the number of Confederate sympa- 
thizers was sensibly diminished. For- 
rest won for himself an infamous noto- 
riety ; and the odor of his iniquity 
attached more or less to every member 
of the Confederate government. 

On the day after the capture of Fort 
Pillow, Buford appeared before Co- 
lumbus, and, imitating the example just 
set him by Forrest, demanded an un- 
conditional surrender. " Should you 
surrender," he said, " the negroes now 
in arms will be returned to their mas- 
ters. Should I be compelled to take 
the place by force, no quarter iviU he 
shown negro troops whatever ^ The de- 
mand Avas refused ; and Buford, not 
deeming it advisable to attack, retired 
and joined Forrest, when both made a 
rapid retreat out of Tennessee. Gen- 
eral Sturgis, at the head of 12,000 
men, then at Memphis, was ordered to 
follow in pursuit. Forrest, however. 



had a good start; and by the time 
Sturgis reached Bolivar, the Confede. 
rate raiders had crossed Wolf River, 
and cari'ied their plunder safely into 
Nort.hern Tennessee. A few weeks 
later it became known that Forrest 
was gathering together a powerful 
force, much larger than he had ever 
yet commanded; and the supposition 
was that he meditated another raid 
into Tennessee and Kentucky. Stur- 
gis, who had now been reinforced by 
General A. J. Smith, who had just re- 
turned from the Red River region, 
was again sent after the bold and 
dashing Confederate. The National 
commander had under him a force of 
9000 infantry and artillery, with some 
3000 cavalry, under General Grierson. 
At Gum Town, on the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad, Grierson, who led the 
advance, came into contact with some 
of FoiTest's horsemen. The Confede- 
rates were well posted on a command- 
ing ridge. The battle soon became 
furious ; and Grierson notified Sturgis, 
who, with the infantry and artillery, 
was some six miles in the rear. 
Sturgis hunied forward at the double- 
quick. The day was intensely hot ; 
and the inconveniences of the march 
were increased by a train of about 200 
wagons. When Sturgis came up, he 
found that Grierson was being sorely 
pressed ; and, without resting his men, 
or taking time to consider the propnety 
of a flank movement on the enemy, he 
hurried his men into the very thick of 
the fight. It was a rash act; and it 
resulted most disastrously. The Con- 
federates, flushed with success in their 



630 



THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 



encounter with Grierson and his cavalry, 
fell with tremendous fury on Sturgis' 
infantry ; and, in a brief space, the 
entire National force, utterly defeated, 
and hopelessly out off from the wagon 
train, was driven back in confusion. 
But for the gallant resistance made by 
the Second brigade, imder Colonel 
Winslow, the retreat would have been 
most disastrous. As it was, when 
Sturgis reached Memphis, he found 
that he had left behind 3500 men, with 
everything in the shape of stores. 

This happened in June. Early in 
July, another expedition was sent 
against Forrest. It was placed in 
charge of General A. J. Smith. For- 
rest, it was known, was in the neigh- 
borhood of Tupelo, where he had 
established his headquarters. It was 
estimated that he had under him a force 
of about 14,000 men. General Smith, 
proceeding from Salisbury, about fifty 
miles east of Memphis, marched in the 
direction of Tupelo, with an estimated 
force of 1 2,000. At Pontotoc, on the 
July 12th of July, Smith felt the 

12. presence of the enemy. A vig- 
orous encounter having ensued, the 
Confederates were repulsed. At Tu- 
pelo, on the 13th, the enemy was en- 
countered in still greater force, and 
again repulsed, after a sharp battle. 
On the same day, the attack Vvas re- 
peated, the Confederates, this time, 
being severely punished, and driven 
from the field with heavy loss. Smith 
now retraced his stej)s towards Mem- 
phis, and, for the space of three weeks, 
Aug. I'ested his men. On the 4th of 

^' August h(, again set out, at the 



head of 10,000 men, and, entering Mis- 
sissippi, he advanced as far as the Tal- 
lahatchie. He could find no trace of 
Forrest or of his men. The Confede- 
rate chief, however, was not idle. In 
the absence of Smith from Memphis, 
he made a dash upon that city, enter- 
ing it on the morning of the f^^g^ 
21st, and making directly for the 2li 
Gayoso House, where he expected to 
find Generals Hurlbut, Washburne and 
Buckland. He failed of his intended 
purpose; but he made some prison- 
ers, and earned off considerable booty. 
It was thus that Forrest, during the 



spnng 



and summer of 1864, gave 



occupation to the National troops 
in those regions, and prevented rein- 
forcements from being sent to operate 
against Johnston's army in Northern 
Georgia. 

In this chapter, it has been our duty 
to present war in one of its least attrac- 
tive aspects. Of the pomp, the splendor, 
the magnificence of the battle field we 
have had nothing to record. We have 
seen the war fiend rioting in destruc- 
tiveness and savagery. We have had no 
occasion to admire the generous impulse., 
or to applaud the noble motive. The 
fearful destruction of property accom- 
plished by Sherman was well fitted to 
aggravate the South, and to arouse the 
spirit of revenge ; but his conduct was 
justified by all the higher necessities of 
war. The brutality of Forrest at Fort 
Pillow was not only without excuse — • 
it was in open violation of every princi- 
ple of honor, of every high and g;ener- 
ous motive; and the infamy of tht doed 
must ever attach to his name. 



PEEPAEATIONS. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

freparations for the Campaign. — Sherman and Banks. —Reasons for the Campaign.— Mistaken Opiniona.— 
Banks and Porter.— A. J. Smith.— The Plan of Operations.— The Confederate Forces. —Banks and Frank- 
lin.— Smith Reconnoitering.— Fort do Rusay.— A Brisk Cannonade. -The Gunboats. —Destruction of Fort 
de Russy.- The Way to Alexandria Opened.— At Alexandria.— Porter's Letter.— Arrival of Banks.— Off for 
Shreveport. — The Fleet at the Kapids. — Low Water. — Discouraging Circumstances. — The Fleet Above the 

Rapids. — Banks at Natchitoches. — Porter at Grand Ecore. — Obstructions in the River. — The New Falls City. 

The Fleet at Springfield Landing. —Unpleasant News.— Battle at Natchitoches. —General A. L. Lee in Pursuit 

of the Enemy. — Crump's Hill. — Arrival of Franklin at Natchitoches. — The Enemy at Bay. — Wilson's Farm. 

Patrick's Bayou. — Sabine Cross Roads.- The Confederates in Force.— Kirby Smith. —Banks at the Front and 
Taking Personal Control. —Order of Battle.— The Battle Begim.- The Confederate Attack.— The Nationals 

Driven Back. — Arrival of Franklin and Cameron. — A New Line Formed. — A Disastrous Onslaught.— A Panic. 

A Rout. — "Bull Run Nothing in Comparison. " — Pleasant Grove. — Emory's Division Checks the Retreat. — An- 
other Fierce Encounter. — The Nationals Victorious. ^The Retreat Resumed. — Pleasant Hill — Emory Again 
Attacked. — A Fierce Onslaught. — Arrival of A. J. Smith. — The Confederates Resisted and Routed. — A Coun- 
cil of War. — The Retreat Continued. — Banks as a General. — His Management Defective. — The Fleet on its 
Backward Course. — The Osage Aground. — Gallantry of Kilby Smith. —General Green Killed.— The Eastport 
Aground. — Attempts to Save Her. — Blovra Up. — The Battery at the Month of the Cane River. — The Cricket 
Under the Fire of the Battery. — A Narrow Escape. — The Army at Cane River.— Battle of Cane River.— .\ 
National Victory. — Battle at Clouterville. — The Army at Alexandria. — The Fleet at the Rapids. — The Red 
River Dammed. — A Great Engineering Feat. — Exciting Scenes. — The Rapids Passed. — Honors to Colonel 
Bailey. — The Army Reinforced. ^The Signal, Covington and City Belle Captured. — Alexandria in Flames. — 
Departure of the Army and Fleet. — A Terror-Stricken People. — The Army and Navy at Simmsport. — Gen- 
eral Canby in Command of the Army. — Porter Resumes his Station on the Mississippi. — The Army at New 
Orleans. — Smith Proceeds to Memphis. — Steele's Movements in Arkansas. — Steele at Camden. — His Retreat. — 
Battle at Jenkins Ferry. — The Nationals Victorious. — Steele's Army Safe in Little Rock. — End of an Ex- 
pedition which was Disastrous in All its Parts. 



General Banks, a.s has already been 

. „ . mentioned, was making active pre- 
1864. ,. ,' , ^ f 

parations lora grand movement up 

the Red River, at the time Sherman was 
engaged on liis Meridian campaign. As 
soon as Sherman returned from that 
expedition, he proceeded to New Or- 
leans, and had an interview with Banks. 
A plan of campaign up the Red River 
was agreed upon ; and all necessary ar- 
rangements were comj^leted with the 
utmost despatch. 

There were many reasons why it was 
deemed desirable by the "Washington 

271 



government, an4 particularly by the 
military authorities, to obtain a firm 
hold on the Red River, and to convert 
Shreveport into a National stronghold. 
The operations of the French in Mexico 
had occasioned some disquietude in 
Washington; and the possession of 
Shreveport, it was thought, with the 
necessary communications, would make 
it more easy to re-establish the National 
authority in Texas. It was the opin 
ion of the president that the possession 
of Shreveport would make it less difli- 
cult to establish a loyal government iu 



622 



SHREVEPORT 



Louisiana. Banks, it is understood, 
although not greatly in favor of the 
expedition, on account of the difficulties 
to be encountered and overcome, was 
yet not unwilling to run the risk, be- 
cause of the advantages which success 
would ensure. There were immense 
supplies of cotton in Texas. If these 
could be secured, it would be a pecun- 
iary benefit to the National govern- 
ment. Halleck had long been in favor 
of some such movement as that which 
was about to be made. As early as 
November, 1862, in his letter of instruc- 
tions to Banks, he says: "Having the 
Red Eiver in our possession, it would 
form the best base for operations in 
Texas." Grant, with a clearer insight 
into the situation, never expected 
much from the expedition, believing 
it to be greatly more important to 
win victories in Virginia or Georgia, 
than in Louisiana; and Sherman, al- 
though disposed to lend it encourage- 
ment, was of the opinion that if it 
could not be accomplished with the 
utmost rapidity, say in thirty days, it 
had better not be undertaken at all. 

Shreveport, before the war, was a 
place of considei-able importance and 
wealth. At its port there were annu- 
ally shipped over 40,000 bales of cot- 
ton, besides large numbers of cattle for 
the supply of the New Orleans market. 
The capital of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, 
150 miles west of Vicksburg, and 155 
miles northwest of the mouth of the Red 
River, as the crow flies, it is at the head 
of navigation for large steamers, and the 
only accessible point on the west side 
of the river, for more than 100 miles. 



By the beginning of March, the ar- 
rangements were completed; and the 
expedition was ready to start. Banks 
was to move from New Orleans, by 
railroad, to Brasheai City, and thence 
by the Bayou Teche and Opelousas to 
Alexandria. Admiral Porter was t 
move from Vicksburg, with a powerfUi 
fleet of armed steamers, and proceed to 
the mouth of the Red River. Smith,with 
some 10,000 of Sherman's veterans, was 
to embark at Vicksburg, to join Porter 
and his fleet at the mouth of the Red 
River ; thence to proceed up the river, 
and, after capturing Fort de Russy, to 
form a junction with Banks, at Alex- 
andria. It was distinctly understood 
that General Steele, who was at Little 
Rock with a force of some 15,000 men, 
would co-operate in the general move- 
ment, and form a junction with Banks 
and Smith at or near Shreveport. 

The Confederate forces, it was known, 
were strong in that region, and favor- 
ably posted for offering resistance to 
an invading army. Magruder was in 
Texas, in the neighborhood of Galves- 
ton and Houston, with about 15,000 
men ; Walker, with 7000 men, guarded 
a line which stretched from Opelousas 
to Fort de Russy; Mouton, with 6000 
men, lay between the Black and 
Washita Rivers, from Red River to 
Monroe ; while Price, with about 5000 
infantry, and from 7000 to 10,000 cav- 
alry, occupied a line extending from 
Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia. 
This entire force was under the direo- 
tion of General Kirby Smith. After 
leaving a sufficient number of men to 
guard the Texan coast, and providing 



FORT DE RtTSSY. 



61^3 



for the wants of Arkansas more to the 
north, it would not be difficult for that 
general so to concentrate his forces as 
to have a serviceable army of, at least, 
30,000 men on the line of the Red 
River, and so disposed as to be able to 
give serious annoyance to an invading 
army. 

General Banks, in consequence of 
other and important duties, which re- 
quired his presence temporarily at New 
Orleans, entrusted his part of the ex- 
pedition to General Franklin, formerly 
of the army of the Potomac. Frank- 
lin had instructions to move on the 
Mar. 7th of March, and to be at Alex- 

^' andria, if at all possible, on the 
1 7th. It was the 13th before he was 
able to reach the Teche region. Ad- 
miral Porter was at the mouth of the 
Red River on the 7th, with a fleet of 
15 iron-clads and 4 light steamers; and 
there, four days later, he was joined 
by the transports, with four divisions 
of Sherman's army, under General A. 
J. Smith, and the marine brigade, 
some 3000 strong, under General Al- 
fred Ellet. On the morning of the 
Mar. 12th, ^be entire fleet began to 

12. move up the Old River, the 
Eastport leading the way. The Old 
River is an arm of the Red River, and 
connects with the Atchafalaya. On 
the same evening, the fleet anchored off 
the ruins of Simmsport, that place hav- 
ing been destroyed during the siege of 
Port Hudson. Next morning, there 
being as yet no aigns of Banks or his 
troops, Smith di£>embarked a small force 
for the purpose of reconnoitering. It 
was 800U discovered that the Confede- 



rates had been present in considerable 
numbers at Simmsport, also Bayou 
Glace and Yellow Bayou, but that 
they had fallen back to Fort de Russy, 
some thirty miles distant. Smith de. 
cided to land the whole column and 
march it overland to Fort de Russy. 
At daybreak, on the morning of inar. 
the 14th, the landing was effect- **• 
ed ; and the entire column moved for- 
ward in light marching order, Moore's 
brigade in advance. B 

Fort de Russy, situated at Gordon's 
Landing, on the south bank of the Red 
River, and some seventy miles from its 
mouth, was a formidable quadrangular 
work, with bastions and bomb-proofs, 
covered vpith railroad iron, connected 
with a water battery, the casemates of 
which seemed capable of withstanding 
the heaviest shot and shell. The ar- 
mament, as was afterwards discovered, 
consisted of eight heavy guns and two 
field-pieces. 

About three o'clock on the afternoon 
of the 14th, after a harassing march, 
during which they had frequent and 
severe encounters with the enemy's 
cavalry, the Nationals reached the 
inner edge of the woods which skirt 
the open ground in front of the fort. 
Under cover of the woods, two batter- 
ies were hastily thi-own up. The pres- 
ence of the Nationals had already been 
discovered ; and four guns on the foi-t 
were pouring forth shot and shell on 
their position. The batteiies soon 
opened fire in reply. A brisk cannon- 
ade was kept up for the space of two 
hours, when there was a heavy f usilade, 
and then a vigorous chai-ge, led by the 



«S4 



SHREVEPORT. 



Fifty-Eighth Illinois and the Eighth 
Wisconsin. At this critical moment, 
the obstructions in the river having 
been removed, two of the gunboats — 
the Eastport and the Neosho — came up 
fvithin range of the fort and fired a 
^w shots. It was not deemed safe to 
continue the fire from the gunboats, so 
close now were the laud troops to the 
fort. A few minutes later and the 
ditch was reached ; the garrison sur- 
rendered ; and the flag of the Union, 
planted by the color-sergeant of the 
Fifty-Eighth Illinois, was floating over 
the works of Fort de Russy. The 
Confederate loss was 250 men made 
prisoners, ten guns, 1000 muskets, and 
all the munitions of war. 

It appeared that General Walker, 
having left 300 men to protect the fort, 
had retired some hours before, with 
the expectation of meeting the National 
troops and offering them battle. Hav- 
ing taken a different road from that by 
which they were approaching, be failed 
to meet them. His presence might 
have given a different complexion to 
the fight ; there might have been a 
larger loss of life ; but the final result 
could hardly have been other than it was. 
A small force was left in the fort, with 
instructions to blow it up. The work 
of destruction was hastened and com- 
pleted by an accident on the 1 7th. 

The way to Alexandria, on the Red 
River, about 150 miles above, was 
now open. As soon as Fort de Russy 
bad been captured, Admiral Porter, 
determined to obtain possession of 
Alexandria befo>-e the arrival of the 
fngitivea, hui'ried forwai'd his two fast- 



est vessels, the Ouachita and Lexing- 
ton, followed by the Eastport. Gen- 
eral Smith's troops were at the same 
time put on board the transports and 
sent up the rivei', the remainder of 
the fleet following. Alexandria was 
occupied without opposition on the 
16th, the Confederates, after burning 
two steamboats and a considerable 
quantity of cotton, having made their 
escape up the river, taking with them 
some of their own gunboats. At Alex- 
andria were found several thousand 
bales of cotton ; and food of every 
kind existed in abundance. "There 
is," said Admiral Porter, in a letter to 
the secretary of the navy, " a surpris- 
ing abundance of every kind of food 
in this country, and no suffering among 
the people, except for luxuries. It 
would be folly to suppose they could 
all be starved out. The only way ia 
to take possession of this rich region, 
hold it with a strong military and 
naval force, and enforce the laws. 
There are some good Union men here 
who have suffered much. I hope the 
day of their deliverance has come." 

It has already been mentioned that 
General Franklin had not been able to 
leave the Teche region, with Banks' 
column, until the 13th. On his way 
he met with little opposition ; Mar, 
and, on the 19th, Banks' cavalry, '^» 
under General A, L. Lee, began to 
pour into Alexandria. On the follow- 
ing day, Lee was joined by General 
Charles P. Stone, Banks' chief of staff, 
and other members of that officer's 
military famil3^ Banks, himself, ar- 
rived and established his headquarters 



DlSCOT} RaGjCMENTS. 



bZb 



at Alexandria on the 24th ; but his 
whole column, composed of the Nine- 
teenth and a portion of the Thirteenth 
army corps, was not fully forward until 
the 26th. 

It was the earnest desire of General 
Banks that Porter should accompany 
him as far as Shreveport, so that in any 
encounter with the enemy, he should 
have the full benefit of the gunboats. 
Porter, although brave and ever will- 
ing, could not be expected to perform 
impossibilities ; and difficulties almost 
insuperable lay in his way. Immedi- 
ately above Alexandria there are rapids 
in the Red River. At this time the 
water in the river was very low — so 
low that, in the deeper water below 
the rapids, it was with difficulty Porter 
could move along his heavier iron- 
clads. By main force, the Eastport 
was dragged over the rocks ; other ves- 
sels followed; and, after more than a 
week's incessant toil, one half of the 
fleet was in the deeper waters above. 
The hospital ship, Woodford, was 
wrecked in the rapids. The transports 
could not be got over; and, as they 
were desired by McPherson at Vicks- 
burg, they were permitted to return to 
the Mississippi. This was a great loss 
to General Banks. It robbed him direct- 
ly of 3000 men, and indirectly of 3000 
more, who were now needed to guard 
the depot of supplies at Alexandria, and 
the wagon-trains which conveyed the 
supplies from vessels below to vessels 
above the rapids. Banks, indeed, at 
this particular juncture, had much to 
discourage him. He had not counted 
on any hindrances from low water in 



the river. It was his belief that the 
troops under Smith might be spared 
from the expedition within, at least, 
thii'ty days after their airival at Alex- 
andria; and he had so told Sherman. 
On the 15th of March, General Grant 
wrote Banks, informing him that on 
no account could the troops detached 
from Sherman's army be allowed to 
remain with him more than ten or 
fifteen days longer than the time origin- 
ally specified, and that, unless he felt 
satisfied that the object of the expedi- 
tion could be accomplished within that 
period, he was to return the troops on 
the day at first agreed upon, even if 
the expedition should be abandoned. 
"I had much rather," said Grant in 
another despatch, " that the Red River 
Expedition had never been begun, than 
that you should be detained one day 
beyond the 1st of May in commencing 
the movement east of the Mississippi." 
It had already become apparent to 
many that the expedition was to prove 
a failure. Banks must already have 
had his own misgivings as to the wis- 
dom of proceeding further up the river. 
It was now known that it would be 
impossible to move the heavier gun- 
boats beyond Grand Ecore. The sup- 
plies from that point would have to be 
conveyed partly, at least, in wagon- 
trains. These, of course, would have 
to be guarded ; and to do this efFec 
tually would imply a further dirainii- 
tion of his already unduly diminished 
army. Then, again, information had 
reached him that large bodies of Con- 
federates were airiving from Texas and 
Arkan.sa8, and that Taylor and Price 



626 



SHREVEPORT. 



and Green were concentrating in great 
strength in his front. It was estimated 
that the combined forces of these gen- 
erals amounted to 25,000 men, with over 
70 guns. Add to all this that he had 
heard nothing of Steele, and that he en- 
tertained only a doubtful hope of receiv- 
ing from him any efficient assistance. 
Banks, however, was anxious to pro- 
ceed, and accomplish, if possible, the 
chief object of the expedition — the 
capture of Shreveport. In this desire 
he was seconded by Smith. The men 
in both commands seemed as eager as 
their respective chiefs to complete the 
task they had undertaken. 

Banks was now at Natchitoches. 
April He arrived at that place on the 
4* 4th of April, Franklin, his sec- 
ond in command, having come up with 
the main body of the army the day 
before. On the 6th the march was re- 
sumed in the dii'ection of Shreveport, 
by the Mansfield road. A. L. Lee, 
with the cavalry, led the advance. 
Ransom followed with two thin divi- 
sions, of the Thirteenth army corps. 
Emory brought up the rear with the 
First division, of the Nineteenth army 
corps, and a brigade of colored troops 
which had just come up from Port 
Hudson. A. J. Smith, with his two 
divisions, of the Sixteenth army corps, 
followed two days later. Some 2500 
of Smith's men, under T. Kilby Smith, 
had been sent up the river on trans- 
ports to act as a guard to the fleet. 
Banks' available force at this time was 
estimated to be about 20,000 or 25,000 
men. Porter had reached Grand Ecore 
about the same time that the army 



arrived at Natchitoches. It was at 
this place he was joined by the trans- 
ports, some 20 in number, filled with 
supplies, and having Smith's troops on 
board. Porter, without delay, com- 
pleted his aiTangements for a further 
movement up the river. The river 
was veiy shallow, much to his annoy- 
ance. He had, therefore, to content 
himself with his lighter vessels. The 
others were left behind. On the 7th, 
taking with him the Cricket, Fort 
Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho 
and Chillicothe, and 20 transports, 
with General Smith's troops on board, 
and abundance of supplies, Portei 
started for Shreveport. It had been 
arranged that on the third day the 
fleet should be opposite Springfield, 
and should there come to anchor and 
communicate with the army, a portion 
of which, it was expected, would be 
in the immediate neighborhood. 

In his upward course. Porter tells 
us, he experienced very great difficul- 
ties. He, nevertheless, reached the 
appointed place within an hour of the 
time specified. At that point he met 
his first serious obstruction. The Con- 
federates, determined to bar the navi- 
gation of the river, had sunk a large 
steamer, called the New Falls City. 
It was lying right across the current, 
her ends resting on each bank, and her 
hull, which was broken in the middle, 
resting on the muddy bottom. Porter 
had not had time to commence opera- 
tions to remove this obstruction, when 
a messenger arrived from Banks, bring- 
ing the unwelcome and unexpected in- 
telligence that the army had met witlj 



PORTER AT SPEINGFIELD LANDING. 



627 



a reverae, and at the same time order- 
ing General Smith to return to Grand 
Ecore with the transports and the 
troops. It was a painful surprise to 
ooth Porter and Smith. Porter felt 
that a most abrupt end had come to 
the expedition, at least for the present. 
"We reluctantly turned back," he 
says, " after having nearly reached the 
object we aimed at." His own posi- 
tion now was one of gi'eat peril and 
of serious responsibility. 

What had happened to Banks ? Let 
us see. It has already been stated that 
General Lee, with his cavalry, led the 
National advance. On the 31st of 
March, he encountered a small force of 
the enemy at Natchitoches, and, after 
a sharp skirmish, drove them before 
him. He encountered the same force 
again on the 2d of April, a few miles 
to the west, put them to flight, and 
maintained the pursuit as far as 
Crump's Hill, a distance of twenty 
miles. Lee now waited for the arrival 
of Franklin with the main body of the 
National army. Franklin forwarded 
instructions to Lee to attack the enemy 
wherever he could find him, but to be 
careful to avoid a general engagement. 
On the 7th — the same day on which 
Porter left Grand Ecore — the whole 
army being now in motion, and the 
cavalry force being largely increased, 
Lee skirmished with great activity and 
energy, driving the enemy before him, 
until he had advanced some two or 
three miles beyond Pleasant Hill, 
about thirty miles west-northwest of 
Natchitoches. At this point he found 
himself confronted by the main body 



of the Confederate cavalry, some 2500 
strong, and under the skilful and 
daring leadership of General T. Green. 
They were drawn up in line at the 
edge of a wood, with open fields in 
front. The place bore the name of 
Wilson's Farm. Active skirmishing 
commenced at once, and continued for 
at least two hours, when the Confede 
rates were driven back into the woods 
near Patrick's Bayou, about nine miles 
from Pleasant Hill. Here Lee halted 
for the day. He had lost 92 men. 
He had, however, inflicted heavy loss 
on the enemy. 

Lee was now in a somewhat critical 
and even dangerous position. So, in- 
deed, as the result proved, was the 
entire National army. Lee was push- 
ing forward too much in advance. 
Between him and the main body were 
the wagon trains. If attacked by a 
force superior in strength to his own, 
it would be difficult to fall back ; and 
he ran the risk of being overpowered 
before relief could reach him. This 
was precisely the difficulty of the situa- 
tion, and the source of all the trouble 
which followed. Franklin had not yet 
reached Pleasant Hill ; Banks, who 
had been detained at Grand Ecore, 
superintending the departure of the 
transports, had not yet reached Frank- 
lin's headquarters ; and A. J. Smith 
was still far in the rear. Lee, realizing 
his difficulty, called at once for a sup- 
port of infantry, and asked permission 
to leave his wagon train behind. Lan- 
drum's brigade, of the Fourth division, 
of the Thirteenth corps, was hurried 
forward, Ransom following with wh-it 



628 



BHKBVEPOET. 



remained of the division. On the 
morning of the 8th, Laudrum having 
come up, Lee, who was accompanied 
by four batteries — Nim's, the Chicago 
Mercantile, the First Indiana, and Bat- 
tery G, of the regular army — pushed 
forward, making a liberal use of his 
artillery. The Confederates steadily 
tell back beyond the clearing at Sabine 
Cross Roads, until they had reached a 
clump of trees, about three or four 
miles from Mansfield. At this point, 
the Confederates were found to be 
assembled in great force. It was now 
manifest to all that the advance had 
been made too rapidly. Lee hesitated 
to attack, and so force a battle in the 
circumstances. He was disposed to 
wait until the main body was well for- 
ward. He was no longer, however, 
master of the situation. The Confed- 
erate generals, in truth, saw that their 
opportunity was ripening; and they 
were already preparing to change the 
current of battle, and to turn retreat 
into aggressive action and victory. 

Ransom had come up about noon with 
the remainder of the Fourth division, 
of the Thirteenth corps; and Banks 
arrived at the front a little later. 
Banks had already assumed entire 
control of the field. The cavalry were 
in the centre, Landrum was on the 
right ; Ransom was on the left. The 
skirmishing became gradually more uc 
fcive. The Confederates, having ceased 
to fall back, were already offering a 
stubborn resistance. It was becoming 
more and more apparent that they 
were assembled in strength, and that 
tbey were about to abandon the merely 



defensive, and make a bold aggressive 
effort. Banks sent orders to Franklin 
to hurry forward the infantry, instruct- 
ing Lee meanwhile to hold his ground 
until the arrival of reinforcements. It 
was now about four o'clock. The skirm- 
ishing became more active and more 
general ; and about half-past four, the 
entire Confederate force, some 8000 
foot and 12,000 horse, fell like a thun- 
dei'bolt on the whole National line, but 
bearing most heavily on the right flank. 
The shock was irresistible. The Na- 
tional troops, still fighting bravely, fell 
back over the open space at the Cross 
Roads to the woods in the rear. In 
this struggle, three pieces of Nim's 
battery were lost ; and but for the 
bravery of Lee's cavalry, the National 
riirht would have been turned. The 
battle was raging furiously when 
Franklin came up, about five o'clock, 
with the Third division of the Thir 
teenth corps, under General Cameron. 
A new line was formed. It was of no 
avail. The Confederates, resolute to 
win — determined not to be balked uf 
their prize — having gathered themselves 
up for a final effort, came rushing for- 
ward with redoubled fury. The on- 
slaught was terrific. Cameron's linewaa 
broken, as Ransom's had been before 
it. The National ranks were now 
thrown into confusion ; and large nuni 
bers of the troops, flinging down theii 
arms, began to rush, panic-stricken, 
from the field. The rout soon became 
general. The narrow road, by which 
alone escape was possible, was quickly 
blocked up by wagon trains, by artil- 
lery, by footmen and horsemen, &U 



SABINE CROSS ROADS. 



8M 



mingled together in inextricable confu- 
sion. It was such a scene as baffles all 
description ; and it seemed as if no- 
thing could save the National advance 
from complete destruction. Such was 
the state of things in the front about 
five o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th. 
"Bull Run," said Ransom, afterwards, 
" was nothing in comparison." Lee lost 
about 150 baggage wagons filled with 
supplies. Ransom lost his guns ; and 
about 1000 of his men were captured. 
The National officers suffered severely. 
Several of them were killed, among 
whom were Colonel Webb, of the 
Seventy-Seventh Ohio ; Colonel Vance, 
of the Ninety-Sixth Ohio ; and Captain 
Dickey, of Ransom's staff. Among the 
wounded were Franklin, Ransom, and 
Colonel Robinson, who, with his cav- 
alry, was protecting the wagon train. 
Such was the disastrous battle of Sa- 
bine Cross Roads. 

The day, however, was not yet 
ended; nor was it doomed to close 
wholly in disaster and gloom for the 
National cause. At Pleasant Grove, 
some three miles in the rear, the pursu- 
ers and the pursued were both brought 
to a halt. General Emory with his 
splendid divisions, pressing forward, 
had just reached Pleasant Grove, when 
he learned of the disaster which had 
Itaken placo in the front. With the in- 
stincts of a true soldier, he prepared to 
arrest the tide of retreat. Forming his 
men in line of battle at the edge of a 
wood, with open ground sloping down 
to the front, he awaited the approach 
of the triumphant foe. Making way 
for the flying columns, and allowing 



them to pass through to the rear, he 
caused his men to reserve their fire 
untU the pm-suers were close at hand. 
His orders were faithfully obeyed. 
The Confederates came up with a tre- 
mendous rush, their ranks somewhat 
disordered by success. Full in their 
faces Emory's men poured, in rapid 
succession, murderous volleys of mus- 
ketry. Loth to yield in the hour of 
victor}'', the Confederates endeavored 
to press on. A fierce and sanguinary 
struggle ensued. It was in vain, how- 
ever, that they dashed themselves on 
the solid front which Emory presented. 
They were mowed down in heaps, and 
compelled to retire. Night now fell 
upon the scene ; and the National army 
was saved. 

In this struggle, General Dwight, 
General McMillan, Colonel Kinsey and 
Colonel Benedict greatly distinguished 
themselves — the last-named officer, 
\vith great gallantry, having resisted 
and repelled repeated efforts made by 
the Confederates to turn the National 
right. 

During the night. Banks retired his 
shattered army to Pleasant Hill, some 
fifteen miles in the rear, General Emory 
covering the retreat. Pleasant Hill, 
the position held by General Franklin 
at the commencement of the fight, was 
reached between eight and nine o'clock 
on the following morning. Happily 
General A. J. Smith, who had not as 
yet taken any part in the strife, had 
arnved the night before with a portion 
of the Sixteenth corps. Preparations 
were immediately made to receive an- 
other attack. Pleasant Hill ia a clear- 



650 



SHREVEPOET. 



ing in the w'-fst of the vast pine woods 
with whioh the adjoining country is 
covered. It is about thirty-five miles 
from Red River, on the road leading 
from Natchitoches, and forms a sort 
of plateau, which rises to a perceptible 
height above the surrounding country. 
Two lines of battle were formed — one 
in front by the division of General Em- 
ory, another behind the crest of the hill, 
and as a reserve, by the troops of Gen- 
eral Smith. In the first line, Dwight 
was on the right; McMillan in the 
centre; Benedict on the left. The 
Twenty-Fifth New York battery was 
placed on a knoll between the right 
and the centre. The day was beau- 
tiful, and reminded many of a May 
day in the North. For the greater 
part of the day, as the Nationals, in 
battle array, awaited the attack of the 
enemy, the field resembled a parade- 
srround rather than a battle field. Noon 
came and went ; and, although it was 
manifest that an attack was meditated, 
nothing but the slow shelling of the 
woods, or a stray shot from some im- 
petuous or impatient picket, gave any 
indication of battle. So the day passed 
until about four in the afternoon. 
The skirmishing at that time became 
more active, as well as more general. 
There was again a lull. The storm, 
however, was brewing. It was now 
shortly after five o'clock. Suddenly, 
the Confederate artillery began to 
thunder. Under cover of this fire, the 
gray coats came rushing forth from the 
woods. In overwhelming numbers, and 
marching at the double-quick, they 
came, rolling forward in solid mass 



against the whole National line. The 
National skirmishers fell back as they 
approached. A tremendous onslaught 
was made on Emory's left, held, as we 
have said, by Benedict's brigade. Bene- 
dict was wounded in the arm ; and, a 
few moments afterwards, he was shot 
through the head. His men fell back, 
fighting gallantly, and, reaching the lines 
of General Smith, filed behind Shaw's 
brigade. Sweitzer, with his Texan 
cavalry, in a brave but vain endeavoJ 
to penetrate the covering line, had his 
regiment literally cut to pieces. 

Emory, for a brief space, stood fimi 
in the centre and on the right; but, 
pressed at all points by overwhelming 
numbers, he was compelled to fall 
back to the shelter of the Sixteenth 
corps, behind the crest of the hill. 
The Confederates were already con- 
cluding that they were about to win an 
easy victory. They were in grievous 
error. General Smith was all readiness. 
His men were well trained to his 
peculiar mode of warfare. He did not 
believe in the useless waste of powder 
and shot, or in the useless waste of 
strength. The Confederates, flushed 
with what seems success, have pushed 
their way up the hill, almost to its sum- 
mit. The muzzles of the National 
guns are almost reached. As yet, how- 
ever, the guns are silent. The second 
line of Confederate troops is seen ad. 
vancing up the hill. The opportune 
moment has come. The signal is given. 
There is a loud, deafening roar, mingled 
with the sharp rattle of musketry. 
Seven thousand rifles, and several bat 
teries of artillery, every gun loaded tfi 



PLEASANT HILL. 



031 



the muzzle with grape and canister, 
have- poured their deadly contents on 
the serried ranks of the advancing foe. 
Like a field of grain, over which a tor- 
nado has passed, the entire Confederate 
centre has been swept to destruction 
Scarcely fewer than 1000 men lie dead 
or dying on the sloping ground. The 
word " Charge ! " is heard resounding 
along the National lines; and 7000 
brave men inish upon the shattered 
ranks of the enemy. Emory's division, 
now re-formed, joins the Sixteenth, 
and takes part in the final struggle. 
The struggle is brief; for, in a few 
minutes, the entire Confederate host is 
driven from the slope, through and be- 
yond the woods, in broken and con- 
f»ised masses. The pursuit was con- 
tinued until dark. 

In the final charge, General Mower, 
distinguished throughout all this cam- 
paign, sm-passed all his previous efforts. 
Emory, too, the hero of Pleasant Grove, 
proved himself worthy of the name he 
had already won. To General A. J. 
Smith, however, belongs the chief glory. 
It was his veteran Sixteenth corps 
which determined the day. It is not 
to be forgotten that Smith handled his 
own men in his own way. If Ransom 
had been allowed to do the same on 
the 8th, the result of the first day's 
fighting might have been different. In 
their flijjht, the Confederates left be- 
hind all their dead and wounded, 500 
prisoners, three battle-standards, and a 
large number of small arms. Taylor's 
battery, which had been lost in the 
earlier part of the action, was recap- 
tured. So, also, was a portion of Nira's 



battery, which had been lost on the 8tQ. 
A Parrott gun, which the Nationals 
had lost, the previous fall, at Carrion 
Crow, was also retaken. 

It was at first intended to face again 
to the north, and resume the march to 
Shreveport. The idea was pleasing to 
the rank and file. It was particularly 
agreeable to General Smith, who was 
dissatisfied with the manajremeut and 
result of the campaign. Franklin, how- 
ever, and some of the officers of the 
Nineteenth corps, for a variety of rea- 
sons, deemed it unwise. A council of 
officers was held on the evening of the 
9th, when it was agreed to fall back to 
Grand Ecore. Banks' management of 
the expedition, and particularly the 
want of generalship exhibited by hin"' 
in the first day's fighting, had lost hia 
the confidence of his officers. As an 
administrator or organizer in a civil 
capacity, Banks, at that time, had few 
equals ; but he was not at home on the 
battle field ; nor was he possessed of 
those qualities, or that special kind of 
experience, which fit one for the sue 
cessful management and control of A 
great military movement, conducted at 
different and possibly distant points, 
and by detached bodies of men. His 
military career acquired some lustre 
from Port Hudson ; but the glory thus-' 
acquired came to him rather as a>i acci 
dent, incidental to his position, than a* 
a necessity brought about by his great 
or shining military abilities. His mili-' 
tary position was due to his political 
influence — an influence, however, which 
was fairly and honestly won. He had 
always under him officers greatly more 



«32 



SHREVEPORT. 



capable than himself; and he showed 
his Avisdom most when he consulted 
their opinions and followed their guid- 
ance. The Shreveport Expedition ought 
to have been a success. As it was, the 
National army had lost ali'eady 18 guns, 
small arms in large numbers, 5000 men, 
'30 wagons and 1200 horses and mules, 
mhA had accomplished nothing. 

While arrangements are being made 
for the backward movement, let us turn 
our attention to the fleet and trans- 
ports. Porter and Kilby Smith, it will 
be remembered, had I'eached Spring- 
field Lauding, when they were made 
Rware of the reverses which had at- 
tended the aiTny on the 8th at Sabine 
Cross Roads, and that it would be 
necessary for them to return to Grand 
Ecore. It was no easy task which now 
devolved on Admiral Porter. Not 
without gi'eat difficulty had he suc- 
ceeded in getting the vessels up over 
ihe rapids. Greater difficulty, he had 
t'eason to fear, would attend the return. 
The water in the river had not risen — 
»t had rather fallen— in the interval ; 
and he had the certain prospect of 
ueing seriously annoyed by the now 
disengaged Confederates, who were 
swarming along the banks of the river. 
The backward movement, however, was 
commenced at once. At a place called 
Coushatta, the boats first came under 
ifhe enemy's fire. The Confederate col- 
onel, Harrison, was at that point, with 
nearly 2000 cavalry and 4 guns. The 
progress made by the boats was neces- 
wnily slow. The river was narrow 
a lid snaggy ; and, at night, it was 
flfomed safest to halt, and w^ut for the 



returning light. Harrison had no diffi- 
culty in keeping up with the fleet. As 
he moved down the river, his numbers 
increased. Smith, meanwhile, was ac- 
tive on l)oard the transports. In ordei' 
to protect his men, he threw up barri- 
cades with boxes, barrels, bales of hay, 
raatti'esses, and everj^thing else he could 
lay hold of. The water being so low, 
the gunboats could do little execution 
upon the high banks at short range; 
and Smith knew that the safety of the 
fleet depended largely on his own men. 
On the hurricane-deck of the Emerald, 
he mounted two Rodman guns, which 
did excellent service. On the 12th, 
near Pleasant Hill Landing, a fierce 
attack was made on the rear portion 
of the fleet. At this point, the Osage 
lay agi'ound, a heavy transport, named 
the Black Hawk, being alongside of her, 
and attempting to pull her o£F. The 
Confederates, under General Thomas 
Green, opened with 2000 muskets. 
The gunboats and the transjjorts re- 
plied with promptitude and effect. 
Smith brought his two Rodman guns 
to bear upon the banks of the river, 
where the enemy was massed in great 
force. The destruction of life was 
fearful. It seemed to be the determi- 
nation of Green to capture this poi'tion 
of the fleet. Again and again he 
pushed his men to the edge of the 
bank, till, in one of these encountei's, a 
shot from one of the Rodman guns 
blew ofi^ his head. The Confederates 
again rallied, only, however, to be cut 
and torn to pieces by the raking canis- 
ter-shot from the gunboats and the 
transjwrts. While this struggle was 



CANE ErVEE. 



63S 



in progress, Harrison appeared on the 
opposite side of the river ; but so de- 
structive was the fire which was brought 
to bear upon him that he was compelled 
to fall back and remain at a distance. 
In this engagement, excellent service 
was rendered by Lieutenant Bache, 
with his gunboat, Lexington ; also, by 
Lieutenant T. O. Selfridge, of the 
Osage. Although ultimately compelled 
to seek shelter in the casemates of the 
Osage, too much praise cannot be given 
to Smith's men, who, on the transport, 
BO nobly handled the Rodman guns. 

These vessels, without encountering 
other serious difficulties, proceeded down 
the river as far as Campti, where they 
rejoined the advance portion of the 
fleet, which was grounded, and exposed 
to the enemy's fire from the banks. 
From this point, Porter, on board the 
Cricket, which had just narrowly es- 
caped capture at the hands of the guer- 
rillas, hurried down to Grand Ecore, 
where he found Banks, who had arrived 
with the land troops. At Porter's re- 
quest. Banks sent a strong force up the 
river to protect the transports and the 
gunboats. Soon after the arrival of 
the troops, the entire fleet began to 
move towards Grand Ecore, which was 
reached without further trouble. 

The retreat was resumed with as lit- 
tle delay as possible. Porter started 
with his fleet on the 17th." Banks set 
out with the army on the 21st. Alex- 
andria was the next point of destina- 
tion. Porter's difficulties now began. 
Eight miles below Grand Ecore, the 
Eastport, struck by a torpedo under 
kev lK)ttom and near her bow, was 



sunk. This proved a great hindrance. 
It was not until the 21st she was got 
afloat — the day on which Banka re- 
commenced his backward march. Day 
after day, for six days, the Eas'-port 
passed through the same ordeal ; and 
the same laborious process of hauling 
her over the bars had to be repeated. It 
was wearisome work, and could hardly 
fail, were we to enter into all the details, 
to pi'ove an equally wearisome recital. 
On the 25th, when about sixty miles 
below Grand Ecore, she again ground 
ed. So much time had been wasted, 
and so apparently inextricable she 
seemed in her present position, that all 
further attempts to save her were aban- 
doned. About half-past one o'clock, on 
the 26th of April, she was blown April 
into fragments, having been pre- ^6. 
viously charged with one ton of pow' 
der and other combustibles. The East- 
port was one of Porter's best vessels; 
and both he and her commander, 
Phelps, did their utmost to carry her 
off in safety. Almost at the moment 
appointed for the blowing up of the 
Eastport, the Confederates made a 
daring but unsuccessful attempt to 
capture the Cricket. The guerrillas 
were quickly routed. The vessels 
which were accompanying the East- 
port, as soon as she was blown up, 
proceeded down the river, encountering 
no opposition until they had reached 
a point at the mouth of Cane River. 
The Cricket led the way, with Admi 
ral Porter on board, followed close by 
the Juliet, the Champion, and the Fort 
Hindman. As they neared the point, 
they discovered that the OonfederateB 



634 



SHREVEPORT. 



were present in considerable strength. 
Rounding the point, the Cricket still 
in front, and opening with their bow- 
guns, they found themselves exposed 
to the fire of a powerful battery of 18 
guns, which the Confederates had 
quickly got into position. When the 
Cricket came fully up, each of the 18 
guns poured forth its deadly and de- 
structive missile. Every shot took ef- 
fect on the little vessel, most of them 
penetrating through and through. The 
shock was terrific, and the destruction 
almost complete. One gun was dis- 
abled. Every gunner was killed or 
wounded. The chief engineer and one 
of the pilots were killed at their re- 
spective posts. In the fire-room only 
one man escaped — all the others being 
either killed or wounded. Strange to 
say, Admiral Porter escaped unhurt, 
and the machinery was comparatively 
uninjured. Making use of some ne- 
groes, who were on board. Porter 
manned the guns, and ran the vessel 
past the battery. A few miles down 
the river, he found the Osage and the 
Lexington engaged fighting a field-bat- 
tery. It was his intention to take these 
vessels back to the assistance of those 
he had left behind ; but darkness com- 
ing on, this was found to be impossi- 
ble. Lieutenant Phelps brought the 
Juliet and the Fort Hindman past the 
battery during the evening gloom. 
Both, however, were severely pun- 
ished. The pumpboat. Champion, hav- 
ing been disabled, was set on fire, and 
left behind. "In five minutes" says 
Porter, in his graphic report of this ac- 
tion, "the Cricket was struck thirty- 



eight times with solid shot and shell, 
with a loss of 25 killed and wounded ; 
the Juliet about the same, with 15 
killed. The Fort Hindman lost 3 
killed and 4 or 5 wounded." No fur- 
ther interruption was experienced until 
the fleet reached the rapids. 

While Admiral Porter was thus 
pushing his way down the river, Gen- 
eral Banks, with the land forces, had 
made a successful march to Alexandria. 
His advance, under General Emory, 
left Grand Ecore on the 22d of April. 
General A. J. Smith followed with his 
column, his rear being covered by a 
command under General Kirby Smith, 
On the first day, the National army 
marched forty miles. It had reached 
Cane River, on the east side of which, 
and near a ferry, on an elevation called 
Monet's Bluff, the Confederates, to the 
number of 8000, with 16 guns, had 
taken a strong position. This bluff 
was flanked by the unfordable river on 
one side and by an almost impassable 
swamp on the other. It was the inten- 
tion of General Banks to force a pas- 
sage across the river at this place, by 
making a vigorous attack early on the 
morning of the 23d. It was the deter- 
mination of the Confederates to offer a 
stubborn resistance; and it was their 
hope and belief that, by drawing the 
National advance into a sharp engage- 
ment, they would be able, with the re- 
mainder of their forces, then not far 
distant, to fall with destructive effect 
on the National flank and rear. Emory, 
however, had moved with such celerity 
that he anticipated their plans. The 
Confederates were not ready. Their 



BAILEY'S DAM. 



636 



pickets on the west side of the stream 
were easily driven in; but the main 
portion was found to be too strong to 
be taken by direct assault. A flank 
movement was resolved upon. Gen- 
eral Birge, taking with him his own 
brigade — that of Colonel Fessenden — 
and General Cameron's division, of the 
Thirteenth corps, crossed the river 
three miles above the ferry, and, late in 
the afternoon, after weary marching, 
reached the desired position, in the 
rear of the enemy's stronghold. Mean- 
while, the advance of the main body of 
the National army was moved towards 
the Cane River, and mthin range of 
the guns on the bluff, on the opposite 
side. The Confederates immediately 
opened fire ; and a spirited artillery 
duel was maintained for some hours. 
It had been arranged that as soon as 
Birge commenced the assault in the 
Confederate rear, the National reserves 
should force the passage of the river. 
The plan worked admii-ably. The as- 
sault on the rear of the Confederate 
position was made by Colonel Fessen- 
den's brigade, the colonel leading his 
men. It was made with great gal- 
lantry and with signal success. When 
darkness set in, the Confederates were 
flying in confusion along the Fort Jes- 
sup road ; and the bluff was occupied 
by the Nationals. In this attack, the 
Nationals lost about 200 men in killed 
and wounded. Among the wounded 
was Colonel Fessenden. On the mom- 
April ing of the 23d, the Confederates 
23. fell with great force on tlie rear 
of General A. J. Smith's column, which 
was covered by the command of Gen- 



eral Kilby Smith. The last-named 
general turned upon the enemy at 
Clouterville, on the Cane River ; and, 
after a three-hours' engagement, Gen- 
eral Mower fighting with great brav- 
ery on his right. Smith repulsed the 
Confederates at every point, and com- 
pelled them to withdraw. The march 
towards Alexandria was resumed on 
the afternoon of the following day; 
and, on the 27th, after an absence of 
twenty-four days. Banks and his army 
were back in Alexandria. The back- 
ward march from Grand Ecore was 
successfully managed ; and while it did 
honor to General Banks, it redounded, 
also, to the credit of Generals Emory, 
A. J. Smith and T. Kilby Smith, who, 
by their skill, bravery and promptitude 
of action, greatly added to the laurels 
they had already won. 

At Alexandria, all hopes of resum- 
ing the Shreveport Expedition van- 
ished. General Hunter had arrived 
with orders from General Grant, in- 
structing Banks to close the campaign, 
as Sherman's troops wei'e now all 
needed to the east of the Mississippi. 
Those orders were final. It was im- 
possible, however, to abandon Porter 
and his fleet to the tender mercies of 
the enemy. Hunter, therefore, returned 
to Grant with a letter from Banks, ex- 
plaining the situation, and claiming- 
such time as might be needed to make 
a fair effort to save the fleet. 

We left Porter at the rapids, above 
Alexandria. The water had become 
so low that he had no hope of getting 
his vessels over the falls. " I saw 
nothing before me," he says, "but the 



636 



SHREVEPOET. 



destruction of the best part of the 
MissiftBippi squadron," The difficulty, 
howdver, had not been unforeseen ; and 
its solution had already, for some time, 
been engaging the attention and tax- 
ing the genius of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bailey, Banks' chief engineer. It was 
Bailey's conviction that by a system of 
damming, which he explained to both 
Banks and Porter, he could bring the 
fleet safely over the rapids. Banks 
shared in the belief of his lieutenant. 
Porter douV)ted. Banks gave the ne- 
oessary orders; and, on Sunday, the 
iMay. 1st of May, Bailey went to work. 
'• On condition that he should be 
ulloWed the use of as many men as he 
might deem necessary, he promised to 
i^omplete the proposed dam within ten 
days. It was a perilous and, appa- 
rently, an impossible task. The falls 
were a mile in length ; the water was 
exceedingly low ; and, in proportion as 
the dam approached completion, the 
■««rork and the workmen would be in- 
(•reasingly at the mercy of a powerful 
<-.urrent. Three thousand men, with 
from two to three hundred wagons, 
were soon busilj^ engaged. The entire 
country around was ransacked for the 
necessary material. The neighboring 
steam-mills were demolished for their 
stone and brick and wood and iion ; 
the adjoining forests echoed with the 
sound of the axe, and, yielding to the 
persuasive blows of the sturdy men 
from Maine, gave up their stalwart 
giants of oak and pine ; the quarries 
resounded with the stroke of the ham- 
mer, and lent their weight and strength 
to the daring enterprise ; wagons rum- 



bled to the river; and flatboats con- 
veyed the stone and, wood to theii 
destined places. Bailey commenced by 
running out from the left bank of the 
river a ti'ee-dam made of the bodiea 
of very large trees, brush, brick and 
stone, cross-tied with heavy timber and 
strengthened in every way which inge- 
nuity could devise. This tree-dam was 
run out about 300 feet, at which point 
were sunk four large coal barges filled 
with brick. From the right bank, 
cribs, filled with stone, were built out 
to meet the barges. At all points the 
work went merrily on, the soldiers 
lightening their toil by singing favor- 
ite army songs and certain plantation 
melodies. In eight days the dam was 
all but completed ; and the water on 
the upper falls had risen so high as to 
allow the Fort Hind man, the Osage 
and the Neosho to move down and be 
in a state to pass through the dam. In 
another day, it was calculated, all the 
vessels would be got down and over the 
falls. Early on the 9th, how- may 
ever, when the above-named ves- *• 
sels were about to pass through, tlie 
pressure of the water, which had risen 
rapidly, and was flowing at the rate of 
nine miles an hour, swept away two of 
the stone barges. Porter galloped to 
the upper falls, and ordered the Lex- 
ington to move down and endeavor to 
pass through the gap in the dam. The 
attempt was made. The vessel got 
over the upper falls in safety, but not 
a moment too soon, as the water was 
already falling rapidly. She then made 
foi- the opening in the dam, through 
wliich the water was now rushing Avith 



PASSING THE RAPIDS. 



637 



tremendous fury. To the thousands 
who lined the banks, and who looked on 
tremblingly and in silence, it seemed a 
foolhai'dy experiment — a certain rush 
to destruction. The Lexington had on 
a full head of steam, as she went bound- 
ing down the roaring torrent. Rolling 
spasmodically, almost like a thing of 
life, she hung for a moment on the 
rocks below ; and then, yielding to the 
force of the current, she made one 
grand leap into the lower deep waters. 
Aloud and long-resounding cheer an- 
nounced the success of the undertaking 
and the delight of over twenty thou- 
sand men. The Neosho followed; but 
she made the passage with less success 
than the Lexington. Her pilot became 
frightened as she approached the abyss, 
and shut off the steam. It was a serious 
blunder, and well-nigh brought the 
vessel to destruction. Her hull disap- 
peared under the water ; and it seemed 
as if she were lost. It was, however, 
only for a moment. Having risen again 
above the surface, she was caught by 
the current, and swept over the rocks, 
fortunately reaching the deep water 
below with only one hole in her bot- 
tom — a damage which was promptly 
repaired. The Fort Hindman and the 
Osage passed over " beautifully," Por- 
ter tells us, and without sustaining any 
injury. 

It was not deemed safe to make the 
experiment with the heavier vessels. 
Bailey, meanwhile, was busy repairing 
his dam. The soldiers, now fully con- 
vinced that they were not working to- 
wards an impossible end, resumed their 
toilsome task with renewed energy. 



The dam was speedily repaii-ed; and 
the remaining six vessels — the Mound 
City, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Ozark, 
Louisville and Chillicothe — with two 
tugs, passed safely through, in the 
presence and amid the loud, hearty and 
prolonged cheera of the entire army. 
The success of this undertaking gave 
Porter a new idea of the possible. 
" Words," says he, " are inadequate to 
express the admiration I feel for the 
abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. 
The highest honors the government can 
bestow on him can never repay him for 
the service he has rendered the coun- 
try." The government was not un- 
grateful. Bailey was honored by Con- 
gress with a vote of thanks and a medal; 
and he was promoted to the rank of 
brigadier-general. 

During the time the army remained 
at Alexandria, waiting for the fleet, 
it was reinforced by a large body of 
troops, which had come up from Mata- 
gorda Bay, under General John A. Mc- 
Clemand. A serious misfortune, during 
the same interval, had befallen two of 
the vessels of the fleet — the Signal and 
Covington — wfiich had been sent down 
the river in advance as a convoy to 
the transport Warner. On the 5th of 
May, at Dunn's Bayou, about thirty 
miles below Alexandria, they were at 
tacked and overpowered by a strong 
Confederate force. The Covington was 
set on fire, and then abandoned. The 
Signal and the transport were cap- 
tured. It was a very unequal sti'ug- 
irle. Of the soldiers on board the 
tiansport, about 100 were killed, and 
150 made prisoners. The remainder 



2T» 



638 



SHREVEPORT. 



took to the shore and escaped. Not 
long afterwards the City Belle was 
captured, having on board 400 Ohio 
troops. These isolated cases seem to 
reflect on the management at head- 
quarters. In such a country, it is the 
first duty of the naval commander to 
keep his vessels well together, as it is 
the first duty of the general in the 
field to move his men in masses. The 
principle involved is fundamental, and 
ought never to be departed from, ex- 
cept in extraordinary circumstances. 

On the 13th of May, Alexandria, 
May by some unknown hands, was set 
13. on fire. In spite of the efforts 
of Generals Banks and Smith, a large 
portion of the place was destroyed. 
On the following day, the town was 
evacuated ; and both the array and 
navy were moving in the direction of 
Simmsport. It was a day of great sor- 
row in Alexandria. General Banks had 
declared his determination that the oc- 
cupation should be permanent. In con- 
sequence of this assurance, the citizens 
in large numbers had given their al- 
legiance to the National cause. Not a 
few of them had joined the army and 
been sent forward to Simmsport. Know- 
ing the fate which awaited them, the 
women and children became frantic with 
grief, and, terror-sticken, begged, but 
begged in vain, to be taken on board 
the transports and conveyed to New 
Orleans. It was one of those sad and 
sorrowful circumstances which are un- 
avoidable in war. On the 16th, the 
army and the fleet had both reached 
Simmsport, Porter's progress having 
been greatly facilitated by a rise in the 



Mississippi, which caused a back-water 
in the Red River. On the morning of 
the 16th, while pressing on towards 
Simmsport, the troops were vigorously 
attacked by a body of the enemy at 
Mansura. On the 20th they had crossed 
the Atchafalaya, when General E. R. 
S. Canby assumed command, and Banks 
hastened on to New Orleans. In obe- 
dience to counter-orders which had come 
from Halleck, with consent of Grant, per- 
mitting that portion of Sherman's troops 
to remain in the West, A. J. Smith pro- 
ceeded up the Mississippi, halting on 
the way at Columbia, and dispersing a 
body of Confederates, under Marma- 
duke. Porter resumed his station on 
the Mississippi ; and, in due time, the 
remainder of the army, under General 
Canby, reached New Orleans. Thus 
ended the Shreveport Expedition — an 
expedition which was conducted with- 
out capacity or discipline, and which, 
as we have said already, revealed the 
lack of true military genius on the part 
of General Banks. 

This chapter would be incomplete 
without a brief allusion to the expedi- 
tion which was conducted under Gen- 
eral Steele. That general, it will be 
remembered, had been instructed to 
move southward and co-operate with 
Banks in the movement against Shreve- 
port. When Banks set out on his 
northward march, Steele was at Little 
Rock. He left there on March Mar. 
23d, with 12,000 infantry, and 23. 
3000 cavalry, under Carr. Camden was 
Steele's first objective; but he expect- 
ed to be joined by General Thayer at 
Arkadelphia, with about 5000 men. 



PRAIKIE D'ANN. 



63k 



At Camden, if no serious difficulty in- 
terposed, he was to be joined by a 
small force under General Clayton. 
Thayer left Fort Smith on the 22d ; 
and, about the same time, Clayton 
marched from Pine Bluff. The roads 
were bad; and the junction of the 
forces according to instructions could 
hardly be relied upon. When Steele 
reached Arkadelphia, Thayer was not 
forward. After waiting for the latter 
in vain for two days, Steele pushed on 
in the direction of Washington, with 
the view of flanking Camden. General 
Sterling Price, it was known, was in 
the neighborhood, with 12,000 Con- 
federates. After a toilsome march, 
and being constantly harassed by the 
cavalry under Marmaduke and Ca- 
bell, Steele reached Prairie D'Ann on 
April the 10th of April, where he was 
10. joined by Thayer. Price was 
understood to be here in great force; 
and Steele at once resolved to offer 
battle. By a series of dexterous move- 
ments, which succeeded in misleading 
Price as to the real objective of his 
antagonist, and after some desperate 
skirmishing, Steele wheeled around 
and pushed his way to Camden, taking 
possession of the place on the night of 
the 15th, in spite of the most persistent 
efforts of the enemy. Here he learned 
of the disaster which had befallen Banks 
at Sabine Cross Roads; and, feel- 
ing convinced that the enemy, already 
at least 25,000 strong, would soon be 
reinforced by the army of General 
Kirby Smith, he gave up all thoughts 
of moving further in the direction of 
Shreveport. His position at Camden 



soon became the reverse of comfortable. 
His supplies were intercepted ; his for- 
aging parties were cut off; Clayton 
could hardly be expected now to join 
him ; and he began to fear for the 
safety of Little Rock. In these cir- 
cumstances, he resolved to retreat to 
his former stronghold. On the April 
night of the 26th, he threw 26. 
his army across the Washita River; 
and, at daylight on the 27th, he be- 
gan to fall back, by way of Princeton 
and Jenkins' Ferry, on the Sabine 
River. The roads were in the most 
wretched condition ; and the rain fell 
in torrents. At Jenkins' Ferry, he was 
attacked by an overwhelming force, led 
by Kirby Smith in person. Steele got 
his men quickly into position ; and the 
battle at once became general. The 
Confederates fell on the National lines 
with tremendous energy. Again and 
again they came up in full force, now 
on the left, and now on the right, and 
finally making a desperate effort to 
crush the left and centre. More than 
once the National lines yielded to the 
tremendous pressure and fierce onsets 
of the enemy ; but nothing could cool 
the courage or relax the energies of 
those brave Western regiments. Every 
charge of the enemy was successfully 
repelled. The battle had commenced 
at early dawn. It was now near noon. 
The critical moment of the fight had 
arrived. The National left, which was 
held by the Thirty-Third Iowa, whose 
ammunition was exhausted, was yield- 
ing to the pressure of the heavy masses 
of the enemy. Four companies of the 
Fortieth Iowa hastened to its support. 



Bio 



MOBILE HARBOB. 



formed under a terrible fire, and re- 
stored the line. The tide of battle now 
turned. The Confederates, not pre- 
pared for this fresh advent of strength 
and heroism, began to fall back. For 
one whole hour, the Nationals pressed 
on their front, the Confederates slowly, 
but steadily, yielding up the ground. 
At noon, the victory was complete ; 
and the Nationals remained masters of 
the field. In this fierce struggle, Steele 
lost 700 men in killed and wounded. 
The Confederate loss must have ex- 



ceeded 3000 men, including 3 gen- 
eral officers. Leaving a burial party 
behind, Steele crossed the Saline River 
and continued his retreat. He was 
not further molested. On the 2d Mgf 
of May, after a weaiy march, over 2. 
a swampy country, his half-famished 
troops, broken and dispirited, were safe 
in Little Rock. The battle at Jenkins" 
Ferry did credit to Steele and to his 
brave soldiers ; but the expedition, like 
that of which it was intended to form a 
part, was ill-omened and disastrous. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 



One of the Sources of Nourishment and Strength. — Sherman's Plan. — Farragnt Eeoonnoitres. — The Obstnio- 
tions Visible. — Need for Caution. — The Defenses. — Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell. — The Coufederata 
Fleet. — The Tennessee, the Selma, the Gaines, the Morgan. — Farragut's Fleet. — Eeinf oroements. — The Mon- 
itors. — A Consultation on Board the Hartford. — Farragut, Canby and Granger. — A Land Force Promised. — 
Description of Mobile Harbor. — The City of Mobile. ^MobUe Point. —Dauphin Island. — Sand Island. — 
Grant's Pass. — Swash Channel. — Middle Channel. — The Position of the Forts. — Description of the Ten- 
nessee. — Preparations for the Attack. — Arrival of Granger with 2500 Men. — Investment of Fort Gaines. ^The 
Fleet in Motion. — August 5th. — The Tecumseh. — The First Shot.— Fort Morgan Thunders. — The Tecumseb 
Disappears. — Torpedoes. — The Brooklyn Pauses, and Falls Back. — A Critical Moment. — The Fleet in Dan- 
ger. — Farragut's Decision and Promptitude. — A Perilous Position. — Fearful Broadsides. — The Hartford 
Ahead. —Past Fort Morgan. — The Tennessee About to Strike. — Missed her Mark. — The Gunboats. — Their 
Baking Fire. — The Metacomet in Pursuit of the Sebna. — The Selma Captured. — The Gaines and the Mor- 
gan Under the Shelter of the Fort. — At Anchor. — Piped for Breakfast. — Keappearance of the Tennessee. — 
Buchanan's Evident Intention. — Too Much Confidence. — Wooden Ships and Iron-Clads. — Monster Kams and 
Monitors. — The Tennessee and the National Fleet. — Magnificent Fighting. — Hard Blows. — The Tennessee 
Apparently Invulnerable. — A Tremendous Shot from the Manhattan. — Closing in Upon the Monster.— Ad- 
miral Buchanan Woimded. — The Crew Demoralized. — The White Flag. — The Surrender. — Traces of Pun- 
ishment. — Joy in the Land. — Praise of Farragut. — The American Nelson. — Two Historical Pictures. — The 
Work not yet Completed. — The Forts Passed, but not Taken. — Fort Powell Abandoned. — Attack on Fort 
Gaines. — The Fort Surrendered. — Investment of Fort Morgan. — Siege Batteries and Engineers from New 
Orleans. — General Richard Arnold. — Keady for the Attack. — The Bombardment Commenced. — The Fort in 
Flames. — Darkness. — The Firing Discontinued. — The Bombardment Resumed. — The Morning of the 23d 
of August. — The White Flag. — Immediate and Unconditional Surrender. — General Page. — Un«oldierly Con- 
duct. — Joy and Hope. 



Although the great battle in Mobile 

Harbor did not take place until 

August, 1864, and, therefore, sub- 

eeqnent to other naval engagements of 



the very first importance, this seems 
to be the fitting time and place to tell 
the stoiy. It was, as we have seen, om^ 
of the three great sources from which 



THE RIVAL FOECES. 



641 



in. the southwest, the Confederacy drew 
nutriment and strength. The reduction 
of Mobile had long since been con- 
templated by the National government ; 
and when, at the beginning of 1864, it 
was resolved to strike at the very heart 
of the Confederacy, by a movement up- 
on Meridian and Selma, and also to cut 
off all communication with Shreveport, 
Mobile was in<;luded in the general 
plan. If General Sooy Smith had suc- 
ceeded in joining General Sheiinan at 
Meridian, according to an'angement, 
Selma, not improbably, would have 
shared the fate of Meridian, and the 
final struggle in Mobile Harbor would 
have beta antedated by several months. 
Simultaneously with the movement up- 
on Meridian, a diversion, it will be re- 
membered, was made in the direction 
of Mobile. Even before that date, the 
defenses of thai, harbor were occupying 
Farragut's atcention. As early as the 
20th of January, he made a personal 
reconnoissance of Forts Morgan and 
Gaines. The dav was fine, and the air 
clear. Although he could not apjjroach 
within a distance of three or four miles 
from the forts, he could distinctly see 
the guns and the men who stood by 
them. He could see, also, the piles and 
other obstructions which, running out 
from Fort Gaines, blocked the channel, 
leaving only a narrow passage-way im- 
mediately in front of Fort Morgan. 
The Admiral -was not encouraged by 
what he saw to make any rash or im- 
mediate attack ; but he did not the less 
feel that the reduction of the defenses 
in Mobile Harbor was the next task to 
which he must devote all the energies 



of his will and all the resources of hia 
daring and fertile genius. 

As soon as the army of General 
Banks returned from the Red River 
country, and General Canby took com 
mand of the Western military division, 
preparations began to be vigorously 
made for a movement upon Mobile. 
Farragut was not disposed to break 
through his policy of caution, until he 
should feel that the force at his dispo- 
sal justified him in assuming the offen- 
sive ; but he held his fleet in a state of 
readiness for any emergency, and was 
prepared to resist any aggressive move- 
ment which might be made by the 
enemy. He had need to be on his 
guard. The Confederate authorities 
had not been inattentive to the requii'e- 
ments of the harbor. Not contented 
with the forts, torpedoes, piles and 
other obstructions which they had 
placed in the channel, they had con- 
structed several powerful iron-clads, by 
means of which they hoped not only to 
repel invasion, but to destroy the Na- 
tional fleet and raise the blockade. The 
largest of these ^vessels — the Tennessee 
— constructed on the same principle as 
the famous Merrimac of Hampton 
Roads renown, appeared in the bay on 
the 17th of March. Having been 
brought down Dog River, she was 
floated over the bar with camels. Re. 
ferring to the circumstance, Fan-agut; 
writing to the secretary of the navy 
says : " Thus you perceive, I am in 
hourly expectation of being attacked 
by an almost equal number of vessels — ■ 
iron-clad against wooden vessels — and u 
most unequal contest it will be, as the 



MS 



MOBILE HaKBOR. 



Tennessee is represented as impervious 
to all their experiments at Mobile ; so 
that our only hope is to run her down, 
which we shall certainly do all in our 
power to accomplish , but should we 
be unsuccessful, the panic in this part 
of the country will be beyond all con- 
trol. They will imagine that New 
Orleans and Pensacola must fall." On 
the 24th of May, he ran in shore, and, 
getting a good view of the monster, 
which was flying the blue flag of Ad- 
miral Buchanan, he satisfied himself of 
her dangerous character. 

Farragut's fleet consisted of fourteen 
wooden ships — the Brooklyn, Hai-tford, 
Richmond, Lackawanna, Monougahela, 
Ossipee, Oneida, Octorara, Metacomet, 
Port Royal, Seminole, Kennebec, Itasca, 
Galena. Fou r monitors — the Tecumseh, 
Winnebago, Manhattan and Chickasaw 
— were promised in addition to these ; 
but it was not until the latter end of 
July that these vessels arrived. As 
soon as they reached him, Farragut felt 
.hat if he was only adequately support- 
ed by a land force, he might venture to 
assume an offensive attitude. Admiral 
Fariagut, Generals Canby and Granger 
held a consultation on board the Hart- 
ford. It was Farrasrut's desire that the 

O 

two principal forts — Fort Morgan and 
Fort Gaines — should both be invested, 
and that, when the attack was made 
by the fleet, the land forces should co- 
operate and create a diversion in their 
favor. General Canby agreed to send 
all the troops at his disposal. It was 
soon discovered, however, that he could 
not spare a suflicient number of men to 
invest both forts; and, at Fanagut's 



suggestion, it was finally resolved that 
the troops who were under the com- 
mand of General Gordon Granger 
should give their attention first to 
Fort Gaines. 

A general description of the city of 
Mobile, of the bay of the same name, 
and of its means of defense, will enable 
the reader to understand the events 
about to be detailed. The city of 
Mobile is situated at the head of the 
bay, about thirty miles from the Gulf 
of Mexico, and at the mouth of the 
Alabama River. At the commencement 
of the war, it had a population of about 
20,000, and was the most important 
place in Alabama. It was used for a 
time by the Confederates as a naval 
depot ; but latterly, fearing for its safe- 
ty, they had the stores removed up the 
river to Selma. Mobile Bay, which 
is lai'ge and commodious, is well land- 
locked, a narrow peninsula, about fif- 
teen miles in length and terminating 
in Mobile Point, shutting it in on the 
east and southeast. On the west, it is 
closed in by a chain of low sand banks 
and by Dauphin Island, which separate 
Mississippi Sound from the Gulf of 
Mexico. Dauphin Island is about 
twelve miles long from east to west, 
narrow at its western extremity, about 
a mile in width towards the east, and 
having a narrow, projecting peninsula 
towards the south, terminating in what 
is called Pelican Point. To the nortli 
of Little Dauphin Island, there is a 
channel, called Grant's Pass, which con- 
nects the bay with Mississippi Sound. 
This channel, however, is narrow, aji<] 
never has a depth of water over sever 



THE TENNESSEE. 



643 



feet. The mouth of the bay, there- 
fore, is between Mobile Point and the 
eastern extremity of Dauphin Island. 
About three quarters of a mile to the 
southwest of Mobile Point is Sand 
Island, about half a mile long from 
east to west, with an attached reef run- 
ning west for about three miles. This 
little island, with its chain of sand 
banks, covers the principal mouth of 
the harbor. The entrance from the 
southeast, between Mobile Point and 
Sand Island, is called Swash Channel. 
The entrance from the southwest is 
known as Middle Channel. 

The bay was well guarded. At its 
mouth, to the east and west, stood 
Forts Morgan and Gaines. These were 
old works, built by the United States 
government, before the war, at great ex- 
pense, and on the most approved prin- 
ciples of modern construction. They 
were fully garrisoned, and well supplied 
with stores of all kinds. Fort Morgan 
was built on the western end of Mobile 
Point, and had an armament of 48 
guns. Fort Gaines was built on the 
eastern end of Dauphin Island, and 
mounted 21 guns. Grant's Pass was 
guarded by Fort Powell, a pentagonal 
work without ditches, but surrounded 
by piles which served also as a break- 
water. Across the Swash and Middle 
channels were placed rows of piles; 
piles and other obstructions were mn 
across from Fort Gaines, so as to com- 
pel the vessels attacking to come fuUy 
under the guns of Fort Morgan ; and 
the channel was filled with torpedoes, 
the location of which Farragut had no 
means of knowing. In addition to all 



this, there were three gunboats — the 
Gaines, Selma and Morgan — and the 
iron-clad ram, Tennessee. The gun- 
boats were of superior construction, 
and were well armed. The Tennessee 
was of gigantic proportions, and of im- 
mense strength. She was 209 feet in 
length, 48 feet in breadth, and drew 
14 feet of water. Her sides, 8 feet 
thick, had a covering of two layers of 
iron, each 2 inches thick. Her deck 
was covered with a 2-inch iron plating. 
Her casemates, which projected and 
overhung so as to protect the hull, were 
shielded with 6 inches of iron. She 
was fitted with tower and turret ; and 
she carried six rifles — two pivots, 7^ 
inches bore, and four 6-inch broadsides, 
capable of flinging projectiles weighing, 
respectively, 110 and 95 pounds. She 
was propelled by two powerful high 
pressure engines. Such were the ob- 
structions; and such were the actual 
means of resistance which had to be 
encountered and overcome, before the 
harbor of Mobile could be said to be 
restored to the National government. 

A consultation, as has already been 
stated, was held on the 8th of jniy 
July, on board the flag-ship Hait- '*• 
ford, by Farragut, Canby and Granger. 
At this consultation, it was agreed 
that Canby should send from New 
Orleans 10,000 men, under General 
Granger, and that the troops should 
invest both Fort Gaines and Fort Mor- 
gan, while the fleet was pressing intd 
the harbor. It was subsequently found 
that so many troops could not be 
spared; and, about the 1st of August, 
Granger arrived with 2500 men. It 



6U 



MOBILE HARBOR. 



was concluded, therefore, only to invest 
Fort Gaines. Preparations were now 
made for an immediate attack. 

On the 5th of August, as early as 
Aug. half-past five o'clock, the fleet was 
^' in motion. The vessels proceed- 
ed two abreast, and were lashed together 
in the following order : The Brooklyn, 
with the Octorara on the port side ; the 
Hartford vrith the Metacomet ; the Rich- 
mond with the Port Royal ; the Lacka- 
wanna with the Seminole ; the Monon- 
gahela with the Kennebec; theOssipee 
with the Itasca ; the Oneida with the 
Galena. On the starboard side were the 
monitors, and in order as follows : The 
Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago and 
Chickasaw, The monitors were thus 
between the fleet and Fort Morgan. 
A slight wind was blowing from the 
southwest. The Brooklyn was per- 
mitted to take the lead, because she 
carried four choice guns and was armed 
with an ingenious contrivance for pick- 
ing up torpedoes. Farragut took an 
elevated position in the main rigging 
of the Haitford, near the top, from 
which he could overlook all the vessels 
of the fleet. At 47 minutes past six 
o'clock, when the fleet was steaming 
steadily up the main channel, the Te- 
cumseh fired the first shot. Almost 
immediately afterwards, Fort Morgan 
began to thunder. The Brooklyn re- 
plied; and at once the action became 
general. In a few moments more, 
the Tecumseh, which was about 300 
yards ahead of the Brooklyn, was 
seen to disappear below the water, 
carrying with her her gallant com- 
mander, T. A. M. Craven, and nearly 



all her crew.* She had struck a tor- 
pedo, which exploded, tearing a great 
hole in her bottom. At this critical 
moment, when full under the guns of 
the fort, and when suffering severely^ 
the Brooklyn, as if appalled by what 
had happened, paused and backed, so 
as to move round out of the way of the 
torpedoes. This action of the Brooklyn 
brought the whole fleet to a standstill, 
and, for a moment, threatened to hud- 
dle the ships together, and bring about 
a disaster similar to that which hap- 
pened in Charleston Harbor, on the 
occasion of Dupont's attack. FaiTagut, 
however, was found equal to the emer 
geney. Calling upon Drayton, he or- 
dered him to push forward the Hart- 
ford, heedless of possible consequences, 
and gave directions for the rest of the 
vessels to follow. The Brooklyn waa 
soon under headway again, and follow- 
ing the Hartford. No more torpedoes 
exploded. A very tempest of sliot was 
now brought to bear upon the fort by 
the entire fleet. A light wind blew 

• Captain Tunis Anousros M. Craten was a native of 
New Hampshire. He entered the navy in June, 1829, 
and served on different vessels till 1837, when, at hia 
own request, he was placed on the Coast Survey. Aftei 
having filled different commands, and done various 
service, he was, when the war broke out, placed in 
command of the Crusader, which was stationed at Key 
West. In September, 1861, he was transferred from the 
Crusader to the new screw-sloop Tuscarora, which waa 
sent across the Atlantic to look after Confederate cruis 
ers. Though he failed to overtake the Alabama, he yet 
did good service in blockading the Sumter at Gibral- 
tar, and in finally compelling the rebels to abandon 
that vessel. Early in 1864 he was, at his own request, 
placed in conunand of the monitor Tecumseh, an4 
sailed in that vessel for Hampton Roads, where h« 
joined the James River flotilla, and arrived among the 
first at City Point. After some stay there, he wa« 
ordered, with the Tecumseh, to join the squadron oi 
Admiral Farragut. 



FIGHT WITH THE FLEET. 



645 



the smoke from the guns of the fleet in 
the direction of the fort, thus blinding 
the Confederate gunners. From the 
time the Hartford turned to the north- 
west to clear the middle ground, so 
rapid and well-directed were her broad- 
sides, that the batteries on the fort 
were comparatively silenced. 

At 10 minutes before eight o'clock, 
when the Hartford had just passed the 
fort, the other vessels following, Far- 
ragut saw the Tennessee, with a full 
head of steam on, bearing down, the 
evident intention being to strike the 
flag-ship. Happily, the monster missed 
her aim. Her guns opened on the 
Hartford as she passed ; but Farragut 
made a vigorous response, and kept 
moving along. The Confederate gun- 
boats Morgan, Selma and Gaines were 
ahead, and were greatly annoying Far- 
ragut by a raking fire, which he was 
unable to return. " The shots from the 
gunboats," Drayton tells us, "were 
delivered with great deliberation and 
consequent effect, a single one having 
killed ten men and wounded five." He 
could only direct his fire on one of the 
gunboats at a time. Irritated by this 
persistent and destructive fire, Farragut 
detached the Metacomet, ordering Cap- 
tain Jouett to go off in pursuit of the 
Selma. Jouett executed his appointed 
task nobly, and with complete success. 
The Confederate gunboats were each 
armed with three powerful guns at 
their stern. Although exposed for a 
time to the concentrated fire of each of 
them, Jouett gained on his antagonist ; 
and, within an hour, he had captured 
'he Selma, with her captain and the 



entire crew, and driven the Morgan 
and the Gaines — the latter in a crippled 
condition — under cover of the fort. 
When night fell, the Morgan escaped 
and made her way to Mobile. The 
Gaines was run ashore and burned. 

It was now 45 minutes past eight 
o'clock. The foi-ts were passed ; and, 
the vessels having for the most part 
been brought to anchor, the men were 
piped to breakfast. The repast was not 
to be long or quietly enjoyed. Farragut, 
from his commanding position, espied 
the Tennessee again making directly 
for the National fleet, with a full head 
of steam on, and making splendid time. 
It was his opinion that whatever might 
be her ultimate purpose, she had sin- 
gled out the flag-ship as the first object 
of her attention. The result proved 
that he had rightly divined. Without 
a moment's delay, he made preparations 
for the reception of the monster iron- 
clad. The monitors, and such other 
vessels of the fleet as he thought best 
adapted for the purpose, were imme- 
diately ordered to attack the ram, aa 
soon as she came forward, not only 
with their guns, but with their " bows 
on at full speed." Buchanan, the Con- 
federate admiral, who was on board 
the Tennessee, had evidently made up 
his mind that he was more than a 
match for the whole fleet. He had, 
however, underestimated the power of 
the National fleet quite as much as he 
had overestimated the fighting qualities 
of his own iron-clad. Of the fourteen 
wooden vessels which constituted the 
main portion of Farragut's fleet, three 
of them were sloops of 2000 tons 



*M 



646 



MOBILE HARBOR. 



burden, carrying heavy armaments of 
9-inch Dahlgrens and 100-pounder 
rifles. Even the smaller vessels were 
heavily armed. Of the monitors, two 
had 11-inch guns, and one — the Man- 
hattan — was supplied with guns of 
15-inch bore. Powerful as Buchanan's 
vessel was, it revealed a vast amount 
of both daring and confidence to at- 
tack, single-handed, such a fleet as that 
which obeyed the behests of a com- 
mander having the skill and experience 
of Admiral Farragut. Yet Buchanan 
was not wholly without reason for 
trusting his own ship and distrusting 
the ships of the enemy. The Merri- 
mac, it was true, had been defeated 
by the Monitor ; but competent critics 
had declared that the Memmac had not 
been injured by 11 -inch shot. The 
Atlanta, a vessel of the same class as 
the Merrimac, had been captured ; but 
her armor was only four inches thick ; 
and, then, as will be shown in a sub- 
sequent chapter, the Albemarle bad 
already beaten off a whole fleet. If 
he could get a fair blow at each of the 
ships in succession, it was Buchanan's 
opinion he might destroy the whole 
National fleet, without himself being 
seriously injured. Buchanan's calcula- 
tions might have turned ouo to be 
more correct, if the National fleet had 
been commanded by another than Far- 
.ragut. The merits of the respective 
antagonists were now, however, soon 
to be tested. 

The ram was close at hand. A 
warm reception awaited her. The 
Monongahela, a vessel of 1400 tons, 
carrying thirty pounds of steam, her 



screw working sixty revolutions, was 
the first to hit her. Moving in at 
full speed, she struck the monster a 
fair blow full in the side. The Mo- 
nongahela punished herself more than 
she punished her huge antagonist. She 
lost her iron prow and her cutwater. 
On retiring, she swung around, and 
fired into the iron-clad her 11-inch guns. 
The Tennessee was yet apparently un- 
harmed. The next blo^v was struck 
by the Lackawanna. She, too, suf- 
fered severely. Her stern was cut 
and crushed to the plank ends, from 
three feet above to five feet below the 
water's edge. The ram was still, to 
all appearance, uninjured. The Hart- 
ford was the next to move as'ainst the 
apparently invulnerable iron-clad. As 
the Tennessee shifted her helm and 
shied, so to speak, the blow was a 
glancing one. The Hartford, as she 
rasped along, gave her a whole port 
broadside of 9-inch solid shot. The 
Tennessee did not as yet show any 
signs of distress. The vessels were 
now moving in a sort of circle around 
the giant, the monitors more slowly 
than the others, but hitting hard blows 
as opportunity offered. The Chicka- 
saw now got under the stern of the 
Tennessee; and a 15-inch shot from 
the Manhattan went tearing through 
the iron plating and heavy wooden 
backing of the casemate of the monster. 
Farragut, now determined to force the 
fighting, ordered Drayton to strike 
again. At this moment, unhappily, the 
Hartford and the Lackawanna came in- 
to awkward collision, the former being 
struck just forward of the mizzen-mast, 



SUERENDER OF THE TENNESSEE. 



64? 



and cut down to within two feet of 
the water's edge. The two vessels 
soon got disentangled, and were mak- 
ing again for the Tennessee. Mean- 
while, the Chickasaw was pounding 
away at the monster's stern ; the Os- 
sipee was about to deal a deadly 
blow; and the Monougahela, as well 
as the Lackawanna and the Hartford, 
was bearing down upon her at full 
speed. The end had now come. The 
Tennessee had been sorely punished. 
Her smoke-stack had been shot away ; 
her steering-chains were gone ; and 
several of her port-shutters had been so 
jammed that they could not be opened. 
Admiral Buchanan had been severely 
wounded in the leg ; and the entire 
crew had become demoralized. Further 
resistance was felt to be vain. Before, 
therefore, the threatened ])low could 
be struck, the white flag was hoisted. 
In a few moments more, the captain of 
the Tennessee came on board the Hart- 
ford, and surrendered his own sword 
and that of Admiral Buchanan. Such 
was the end of the famous naval en- 
counter in Mobile Harbor. 

This gi'eat victory had not been won 
without some loss. Farragut had 166 
killed and drowned. Of these, 113 
went down in the Tecumseh. There 
were 25 killed and 28 wounded on 
board the Hartford. The Oneida had 
8 killed and 30 wounded. Among the 
latter was her commander, I. R. M. 
Mullauy. It is a fact worthy of notice 
that, on board the monitors, no one 
was either killed or wounded. The 
ships bore signs of severe punishment, 
having suffered more severely at Mobile 



than at New Orleans. A 7-inch shell 
penetrated the boiler of the Oneida. 
The Chickasaw received one plunging 
shot through her deck. The turrets 
of all the monitors were more or les» 
injured. All the wounded of both fleets, 
including Admiral Buchanan, were sent 
to Peusacola. Buchanan's leg had to be 
amputated. 

The victory in Mobile Bay caused 
great joy throughout the entire North, 
and among all, everywhere, who wer» 
friendly to the National cause. Far 
ragut became the National idol. Hif^ 
name resounded throughout the lengt^ 
and breadth of the land. Men spoke 
of him as the American Nelson ; and, 
although there was a marked contrast, 
in many particulars, between the mod- 
est American and his brilliant English 
prototype, the picturesque grandeur of 
Farragut's two great battles — that at 
New Orleans and that in Mobile Bay — 
fully justified the comparison. Far- 
ragut in the shrouds of the Hartford, 
with the tempest of war raging below 
him, is a grand historic picture, not un- 
worthy to hang side by side with the 
" Death of Nelson." 

Farragut's work was not ended with 
the defeat of the Confederate fleet. 
The forts had been passed; but they 
had not yet been taken. On the night 
of the 5th, however, Fort Powell \n^, 
was abandoned and blown up. »• 
This was a positive gain to Farragut, 
as it opened up Grant's Pass, and yu 
relieved him of all anxiety in regard 
to supplies. Fort Gaines and Fort 
Morgan remained, the latter »s yet 
comparatively uninjured. We h^'w 



648 



MOBILE HAKBOB. 



already eeen that Granger, with 2500 
troops, proceeded to invest Fort Gaines 
simultaneously with the advance of 
the fleet. A battery of Rodman guns 
had been planted on a sand hill, with- 
in three quarters of a mile from the 
fort. This battery was well served, 
under the direction of Captain Classen. 
The best gun in the fort was soon 
disabled ; and so completely swept 
were the works that Colonel Ander- 
son, who was in command, could render 
no assistance to Buchanan and his fleet. 
On the morning of the 6th, Farragut 
sent the Chickasaw to the assistance of 
h»g. Granger. On the 7th, deeming 
'• further resistance useless, Ander- 
son made an unconditional suiTender of 
the fort, with 800 men. The Western 
channel was now under the control of 
the National fleet. 

Fort Morgan, the older and the 
stronger work, still held out. Built on 
the mainland, it had a better chance 
than Fort Gaines of receiving supplies 
and reinforcements. It was commanded 
by General Richard L. Page, a Vir- 
ginian. Page had signalled to Ander- 
son, " Hold on " ; and, when that officer 
surrendered, he cried, "Coward!" — a 
slander which was echoed throughout 
the entire Confederacy. An opportu- 
nity was now to be given Page to 
display his heroism. Granger's troops 
were transferred from Dauphin Island 
to the rear of Fort Morgan. Granger 
Boon discovered that regular siege oper- 
ations would be necessary. He sent, 
therefore, to New Orleans for heavy 
siege artillery and a body of engineers. 
These were speedily at hand, under the 



care and command of General Richard 
Arnold. Batteries were rapidly con- 
structed behind some sand hills, within 
800 yards of the fort; and, by Aug, 
the afternoon of the 20th, all 20. 
the guns were in position. On this 
line of batteries there were four 9-inch 
Dahlgrens, on naval gun carnages, 
eight 30-pounder Parrotts, and sixteen 
mortars, of which twelve were 10- 
iuch, and four 8-inch. Another line of 
batteries was established about 400 
yards nearer the fort. On the inner 
line there were four Napoleon guns 
and two 3-inch rifles. On the even- 
ing of the 21st, General Granger 
notified Farragut that he would be 
ready to open fire next morning at 
daylight. Farragut took position that 
night; and, on the morning of jvug; 
the 2 2d, at five o'clock, the bom- 22. 
bardment commenced. It was contin- 
ued with great vigor and accuracy 
during the whole day. It was discov- 
ered in the afternoon that a fii'e had 
broken out inside the fort. At dark 
the bombardment ceased. The flames 
were still visible ; and it seemed as if 
the fire was gathering strength. About 
nine o'clock, it began to be manifest 
that attempts were being made to gain 
the mastery of the devouring element. 
It was not the desire of either of the 
National commanders that the fir« 
should be extinguished. It was doing 
their work. The bombardment was, 
therefore, resumed, and maintained for 
two hours, when it was discontinued 
for the night. At five o'clock next 
morning, the bombardment was again 
re Bumed. Two hours later, an oflScei 



SUKRENDER OP FORT MORGAN, 



§"49 



with a white flag, accompanied by 
about 40 men, carrying a boat, were 
seen marching out at the main sally- 
port. It was evidently their intention 
to proceed to the flag-ship with a letter 
from General Page. General Bailey, 
of the land forces, advanced towards 
them, obtained the letter, and handed 
it to General Granger. This latter 
officer promised to communicatte its 
contents to the admiral, and to dic- 
tate the terms of surrender wb^sn his 
answer should be receivef^. Soon 
afterwards. General Arnold and Cap- 
tain Drayton appeared at the tort, and 
demanded its immediate and uncondi- 
tional surrender, with the garrison and 
all the public property. Page wished to 
stipulate for the removal of the sick and 
wounded to Mobile. This, however, 
could not be allowed. At two o'clock 
the formal surrender was made. Out 
from the main sally-port marched 600 
men, and stacked arms. The National 
flag again waved over the battered and 
smoking walls of Fort Morgap 



It was found, on entering, that the 
fire had worked terrible destruction, 
and no. doubt hastened the surrender. 
Dreading an explosion of the magazine, 
some 90,000 pounds of gunpowder had 
been thrown into the cisterns. Page, 
whooe conduct was severely animad- 
verted on by Farragut, in his letter to 
the secretary of the navy, was charged 
with throwing his sword into a well, 
and with spiking the guns after the 
surrender. With the defenses of Mo- 
bile, there were taken 104 guns and 
1464 men. Farragiit's victory was 
now complete. The National banner 
floated supreme in the harbor of Mo- 
bile ; and blockade-running in that 
quarter was ended. The joy which 
was occasioned by the victor _, over 
the fleet, was increased and intensified 
when it became known that the forts 
had fallen ; and the conviction gath- 
ered strength all over the land, and 
found free and full expression, that 
the hour of final triumph was close 
"+. hand. 



u56 



THE -WTLDBRNESS. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 



^t«r Oaattanooga. — Divided Cotmsels. — Grant the Popular Hero. — General Halleck. — "Like a Banlky Team.*-- 
A Change for the Better. — Grant in Command of All the Armies. — Heavy Responsibilities. — His Flan 
for Reducing the Confederacy. — Letters to Sherman. — Instructions to Banks. — Sherman's Command. — 
The Army of the Potomac. — Meade Retained in Commamd. — Grant at Meade's Headquarters. — Wistar'a 
Raid. — Kilpatrick's Raid. — Custer and Dahlgren. — Death of Dahlgren. — The Army of the Potomac Re- 
organized. — The Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders. — Co-operative Arrangements. — Butler and Sigel. — 
Bumside and the Ninth Corps. —Culpepper Court House. — The General Movement Begun. — The Army 
of the Potomac in Motion. — Crossing the Rapidan. — In the Wilderness. — Lee Watchful and Ready. — Descrip- 
tion of the WUdemess. — A Blood-Red Sun. — Old Wilderness Church. — The Four Roads. — Both Armies in 
Motion. — The Battle Begun. —Terrific Fighting.^— Warren's Corps. — Wadsworth and Crawford — Warren 
Falls Back. — Sedgwick and Getty. — A Lull in the Fight. — A Loud-Resounding Cheer. — Arrival of Hancock. — 
The Battle Resumed.— A Drawn Battle.— The End of the First Day.— The Second Day.— A Great Battle 
Imminent. — The Opposing Armies. — The Order of Battle. — The Attack. — Hancock's Tremendous Onset. — 
An Unfortunate Halt. — Hancock Driven Back. — Longstreet Shot by His own Men. — The Battle Suspended. — 
Fighting Begun Again. — A Fire in the Woods. — Hancock's Men Driven from Their Works. — Carroll's 
Splendid Charge. — The Nationals Saved. — End of the Second Day. — The Rival Armies Bleeding and 
Exhausted. — Grant's New Movement. — Spottsylvania Court House. — Alsop's Farm. — A Warm Reception. — 
Fortune Favoring the Confederates. — An Unfortunate Day for the Nationals. — Vigorous Preparations for 
Battle. — Death of Sedgwick. — Hancock's Advance. — Sheridan's Raid. — Yellowstone Tavern. — Death of J. E. 
B. Stuart. — Co-operative Movements. — Butler's Movements. — Bermuda Hundred. — GUlmore and Beauregard. — 
Kautz. — Butler Bottled Up. — Sigel's Movements. — Sigel Superseded by Hunter. — Hunter at Piedmont. — At 
Ljmchburg. — At Meadow Bridge. — The Army of the Potomac Again in Motion. ^ — At the North Anna. — 
Lee Again Ahead. — The Fords. — The Positions of the Different Corps. — Warren's Corps at Jericho Ford. — 
Warren Severely Attacked on the South Side of the River. — The Confederates Repulsed — Hancock at 
Taylor's Bridge. — Preparations to Take it by Storm — The Assault. — Capture of the Bridge. — Bumside's 
Difficulty. — Lee's Peculiar Position. — His Projecting Centre.- — The Anna Recrossed. — Another Flank Move- 
ment. — Across the Pamunkey. — Another Race for Richmond. — Lee again Ahead. — The New Base of 
Supplies. — The Old Battle-Ground of the Peninsula. — A Contrast. — Both Armies Reinforced. — The Chicka- 
hominy. — Sheridan Pushed Forward. — A Cavalry Encounter at Hawe's Store. — Hanover Court House. — 
Tolopotomy Creek. — Shady Grove. — Lee's Position. — Movement on Cold Harbor. — Cold Harbor Secured. — 
Torbert Sorely Pressed. — Concentrating at Cold Harbor. — Arrival of Smith from Bermuda Hundred. — Line 
of Battle. — The Attack. — The First Confederate Line Penetrated. — The Second Line Impregnable. — A Heavy 
National Loss, but Cold Harbor Held. — A Day of Preparations — The Second Day's Fighting. — A Shock of 
Battle Unparalleled. — Piles of Dead and Wounded. — The Battle Brief, but Decisive — An Emphatic Protest. — 
The American Soldier. — The Battle of Cold Harbor Ended. — Terrific Slaughter. — Coffee and Tobacco. — 
Another Flank Movement. — Sheridan at Trevillian and Louisa Court House. — The Army in Motion. — Across 
the Chickahominy. — On to the James. — South of the James. — The Success of the Movement. — The Campaign. — 
The Losses. — Reflections. 



The victory at Chattanooga, although 

its far-reaching results were not 

immediately visible, marked a 

new departure in the progress of the 

war. There was, as we have seen, 



great joy throughout the land, when it 
became known that Grant had not only 
released the imprisoned and famishing 
araiy, but that he had again plucked 
glorious victory out of disastrous de- 



GRANT, LIEUTEN-ANT-GElfERAL. 



661 



feat, and snatched fresh laurels from 
the ambitious grasp of one of the most 
daiing as well as most trusted generals 
of the Confederacy. General Grant 
pow commanded the confidence of the 
government : he had become, also, the 
favorite popular hero. The crisis de- 
manded such a man. 

It had long been apparent that much 
of the National strength had been 
wasted, because of divided counsels 
and disunited action. The army, as a 
whole, had been badly managed. Gen- 
eral Halleck was, it is true, the nomi- 
nal head of the army. His office, how- 
ever, was moi'e a name than a reality. 
Military operations were directed some- 
times by the president himself, without 
the consent of any of his counsellors, 
sometimes by Halleck or Stanton, with- 
out the consent of the president, and 
not unfrequently by the generals in 
the field at their own volition, and on 
their own responsibility. " The armies 
of the East and West," to use Grant's 
pithy language, "acted independently, 
and without concert, like a haulky team, 
flo iwo ever pulling together." A step 
waj taken in the right direction, when 
Ge neral Grant was placed at the head 
of thri military division of the Missis- 
ei^ypi — a command which virtually in- 
cluded the entire west and southwest. 
7 lie victory at Chattanooga did much 
to justify the wisdom of the arrange- 
ment Concentration of authority in 
the management of the armies of the 
Republic had become more and more a 
necessity. Grant was already singled 
^ut as the man who should take the 
reins in hand, and give unity and direc>- 



tion to all the troops in the field. 
Early in 18(54, the rank of lieutenant- 
general was revived in his favor; jjar, 
and, on the 9th of March, Grant, ''• 
who had been siimmoned to Wa^iing- 
ton, was received in the Executive 
Chambei', and presented to the cabinet. 
In handing him his commission. Presi- 
dent Lincoln said : 

" General Grant — The nation's apprecia- 
tion of what yon have done, and its reliance 
npon you for what remains to be done in the 
existing great struggle, are now presented with 
this commission, constituting you lieutenant- 
general in the army of the United States. 
With this high honor devolves upon you, 
also, a corresponding responsibility. As the 
country herein trusts you, so, under God, it 
will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, 
with what I here speak for the nation, goes 
my own hearty personal concurrence." 

Grant's reply was as modest as it 
was brief. He said : 

" Mr. President — I accept the commission, 
with gratitude for the high honor conferred. 
With the aid of the noble armies that have 
fought on so many fields for our common 
country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to 
disappoint your expectations. I feel the full 
weight of the responsibilities now devolving 
on me; and I know tliat if they are met, it 
will be due to those a^ niej, and, above all, to 
the favor of that Providence which leads both 
nations and men." 

On the 10th, he made a rapid visit, 
with Meade, to the army of the Mir. 
Potomac. On the same day, a *®» 
special order of the president assigned 
him to the command of all the ai-mies. 
The next day, he hurried westward to 
Nashville, where he had made arrange- 
ments to meet Sherman for consuita 
tion- 



THE WILDERNESa 



Grant had great reason to be proud 
of the position to which he had attained. 
Success had attended his efforts on the 
field of battle; and a grateful people, 
lavish of their favors, had showered 
upon him their choicest gifts. His, 
however, was not a head to be easily 
turned. Vanity or vainglory found no 
place in his character. He bore his 
honors meekly; and, soldier-like, he 
thought of his companions-in-arms — 
those who had shared with him the 
hardships and perils of the battle field, 
^nd who \vere now fully entitled to 
participate in his honors. When first 
made aware of the intentions of the 
government, he wrote to Sherman a 
characteristic letter. 

" Wliile I have been eminently successful in 
the war, in at least gaining the confidence of 
the public, no one feels more than I how 
much of this success is due to the energy and 
skill of those whom it has been my good for- 
tune to have occupying subordinate positions 
under me. There are many ofiicers to whom 
these remarks are applicable, in a greater or 
less degree, proportionate to their ability as 
soldiers; but what I want is to express my 
thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to 
whom, above all others, I feel indebted for 
whatever I have had of success. How far 
your advice and assistance have been of help 
to me, you know. How far your execution of 
whatever has been given you to do entitles 
you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot 
know as well as I. I feel all the gratitude this 
letter would express, giving it the most flatter- 
ing construction." 

In his new position, heavy responsi- 
bilities (^"evolved on General Grant. 
He was entrusted with the care of all 
the armies of the Republic. It was 
necessary for him to take into consider- 
ation not one army only, or one section 



of the country, but the entire field of . 
actual and possible operations. The 
theatre was large. The National navy 
had succeeded in blockading almost 
the entire sea-coast. There were garri- 
sons at Plymouth, Washington and 
New Berne, in North Carolina. Foot- 
holds had been secured at Beaufort, 
Folly Island, Morris' Island, Hilton 
Head and Port Royal, in South Caro- 
lina. The same was true of Feruan- 
dina, St. Augustine, Key West and 
Pensacola, in Florida. New Orleans, 
with its river approaches, was in the 
hands of the Nationals ; and a small 
garrison had been established at the 
mouth of the Rio Grande. The Mis- 
sissippi was gamsoned at various points 
from St. Louis to its mouth. Posts 
were established along the entire line 
of the Arkansas. The line of the Ten- 
nessee and the Holston was guarded by 
National troops ; and a small but firm 
foothold had been secured in Georgia, 
south of Chattanooga. Although Vir- 
ginia was still debatable territory, the 
Nationals were in possession of Nor- 
folk, Fortress Monroe and some adjoin- 
ing territory. It was necessary to 
maintain all these garrisons, to pre- 
serve these various footholds, to protect 
their communications, and to provide 
them with needed supplies. This, how- 
ever, was not all. The Confederates 
were yet strong in the field. Ono 
powerful ai'my, under Lee, lay along 
the south bank of the Rappahannock, 
confronting the army of the Potomaa 
Another powerful army, under Johns- 
ton, was securely encamped at Daltoo, 
guarding the approaches to Atlanta 



GRANT'S PLANS. 



868 



the second capital and stronghold of 
the Confederacy. A third powerful 
army, under Kirby Smith, held sway 
in Texas and Southern Arkansas, In 
Northeastern Mississippi, Forrest, with 
a strong body of cavalry, was scouring 
the country at will. After three years 
of hard fighting, during which there 
had been an almost unparalleled ex- 
penditure of blood and treasure, such 
was still the situation. In order to re- 
store the Union, it was necessary to 
crush out those armies, and so break 
the military power of the Confederacy. 
Such were the onerous duties and re- 
sponsibilities which now devolved upon 
General Grant. Success had hitherto 
attended his movements and crowned 
his efforts. It remained to be seen 
whether, in his new position, he would 
be as faithfully accompanied by the 
smiles and favors of fortune. 

Let us now see how Grant proposed 
to accomplish these herculean labors. 
Sherman, it is to be remembered, simul- 
taneously with the elevation of Grant, 
was placed in command of the military 
division of the Mississippi, composed 
of the departments of the Ohio, the 
Cumberland, the Tennessee and the 
Arkansas. General J. B. McPherson 
was, at the same time, assigned to the 
command of the department and army 
of the Tennessee. General Halleck, 
having been relieved from duty as 
general-in-chief, was appointed chief 
of staff at Washington, under the di- 
rection of the secretary of war and the 
lieutenant-general commanding. Grant, 
as we have seen, had gone to Nashville 
on the 11th of March, to consult with 

275 



Sherman. On the 17th, and juar. 
while still with Sherman, he is- Is- 
sued General Orders No. 1. In obedi- 
ence to the order of the president, he 
assumed command of the armies of the 
United States; and his headquarters 
were to be in the field and, until further 
orders, with the army of the Potomac. 
On the 19th, he left Nashville for 
Washington, and proceeded thence, 
with as little delay as possible, to the 
headquarters of General Meade, at Cul- 
pepper Court House. Steps were im. 
mediately taken for reconstructing the 
ariny, and getting it ready for battle. 
Meanwhile, Grant's plans were assum- 
ing somewhat of a definite shape. He 
had discussed with Sherman, at Nash- 
ville, the course which ought to be 
pursued all over the battle area. In a 
letter written to Sherman on April 
4th, Grant stated his views with great 
freedom and with considerable fulness. 
It was his intention, if the enemy did 
not anticipate him, to take the initia- 
tive in the spring campaign. With this 
end in view, he had sent a special ;'ie&- 
senger to Banks — at that time, aa has 
already been related, on his y/T,y to 
Shreveport — instructing him tc finish 
up the expedition, to send l>d,ck to 
Sherman the men he had r,orrowed, 
and to hurry forward prepa; ations for 
an attack on Mobile. For ij-.msolf, he 
had decided to stay with the army of 
the Potomac; and he was making ready 
to attack Lee's army wherever it might 
be found. In a few days he would be 
strengthened by the addition of 25,000 
effective men, under Genera] Barn«ida 
Co-opei'ative movements wer'~ to V ■• 



654 



THE WILDERNESS, 



conducted by General Butler and by 
General Sigel. Butler was to be 
joined by Gillmore, with 10,000 men 
from the department of the South. His 
force would thus be increased to 30,000 
men. With W. F. Smith commanding 
his right wing and Gillmore his left, 
Butler was to move on Richmond, from 
Fortress Monroe, by the south side of 
the James River. Sigel, who had been 
charged with the protection of West 
Virginia and the frontiers of Pennsyl- 
vania and Maryland, was to collect all 
his available forces, to arrange them in 
two columns, and to move them — one 
from Beverley, Virginia, and the other 
from Charlestown, on the Kanawha — 
against the Virginia and Tennessee 
Raihoad. Advancing from opposite 
points, and converging towards a com- 
mon centre, it was expected that these 
co-opei'ative movements would distract 
Lee's attention, and compel him to send 
detachments from his main force to 
protect his westward lines of supplies. 
For Sherman, Grant had no instruc- 
•iions other than those ah'eady given. 
He did not propose to lay down for 
bim a plan of campaign. He was 
to move against Johnston's army, to 
break it up, to advance into the ene- 
my's country, and to inflict what dam- 
age he could. Some ten days later, 
writing to Sherman, Grant was more 
explicit : 

"What I now want more particularly to say 
is that, if the two main attacks — yours and 
the one from licre — should promise great suc- 
cess, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, 
abandon one part of their line of defense and 
throw their whole strength upon a single army, 
believing a defeat with one viotorj to sustain 



them better than a defeat all along theii 
whole line, and hoping, too, at the same time, 
that the army, meeting with no resistance, 
will rest perfectly satisfied with its laurels, 
having penetrated to a given point south, 
thereby enabling them to throw their whole 
force first upon one and then on the other. 
With the majority of military commanders, 
they might do this ; but you have had too 
much experience, travelling light, and subsist- 
ing upon the country, to be caught by any 
such ruse. I hope my experience has not been 
thrown away. My directions, then, would be, 
if the enemy in your front shows signs of join- 
ing Lee, follow him up to the extent of your 
ability. I will prevent the concentration of 
Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of 
this army to do it." 

Such was the general plan of cam- 
paign for the armies generally for the 
spring of 1864, It is evident, from the 
tenor of these instructions, that Grant's 
thoughts were becoming more and 
more occupied with two main centres 
of action. There was the army of Lee 
guarding Richmond; and there was 
the army of Johnston, who had suc- 
ceeded Bragg, covering the approaches 
to Atlanta. If these two armies could 
be broken and scattered, or destroyed, 
the Confederacy would be at an end. 
Richmond and Atlanta, with their rival 
armies — these were now to become the 
absorbing centres of attraction. It 
was part of Grant's plan that when 
the proper hour arrived, the blow 
should be struck simultaneously in the 
west and in the east. Leaving Sherman 
for the present, let us now turn our 
faces eastward, and contemplate the 
mighty hosts who are preparing for 
battle on the banks of the Rapidan. 

During the winter of 18G3-4, the 
army of the Potomac and the army of 



WISTAE'S RAID. 



655 



Northern Virginia lay, the former on 
the northern, the latter on the south- 
ern bank of the Rapidan. Meade's 
headquarters were at Culpepper Court 
House, on the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, about seventy -five miles 
northwest of Richmond in a direct 
line. Lee's headquarters were at 
Orangfe Court House, on the same line 
of railroad. The battle of Gettysburg 
had been fought and won on the 3d of 
July, 1863. On the 5th, Lee com- 
menced his reti'eat back towards Vir- 
ginia. The pursuit was continued as 
far as Williamsport, where, on the 
12th, the Confederate chief succeeded 
in retiring his whole army across the 
Potomac. Meade followed into Vir- 
ginia ; and, aftpr a s n-ies of daring, 
sometimes perilous, but withal ineffect- 
ual manoeuvres, made on both sides, 
the rival armies went into winter quar- 
ters, as above indicated. 

In the earlier months of the year, 
and befoi'e the commencement of the 
great campaign, there Avere several de- 
sultory and unimportant movements, 
which, although not destined to exer- 
cise any perceptible influence on the 
war, were yet sufficient to break up 
the dull monotony of camp life in win- 
ker time. 

The first of these movements occurred 
early in February, and originated with 
General Butler, then commanding in 
Virginia and North Carolina. Public 
feeling was greatly excited all over the 
North because of the cruel treatment of 
the National pnsoners of war at Rich- 
mend Butler resolved to make a bold 
effort to effect the deliverance of the 



prisoners. His suggestions found favor 
at headquarters; and arrangements were 
made by which he was to have a species 
of co-operative aid fi-oni the army peb. 
of the Potomac. On the 5th of 5- 
February, General Wistar, with a coh 
umn of cavaliy and infantry, about 
1500 strong, set out from New Kent 
Court House, and pushed rapidly to 
the north. Suitable demonstration was 
made by the array of the Potomac, 
General Sedgwick pushing portions of 
the army aci'oss at three different fords 
— Ely's, Barnett's and Germania. Wis- 
tar reached Bottom Bridge at half-past 
two on the morning of the 6th, having 
marched forty -seven miles in sixteen 
and a half hours. His presence there 
became known in Richmond, and cre- 
ated the wildest excitement. A large 
portion of the garrison had been with- 
drawn to reinforce Pickett in North 
Carolina. It was feai'ed that the city 
might be successfully invaded, and that 
the National prisoners would be liber- 
ated. The alarm bells were, therefore, 
rune, and the Home Guard assembled. 
The raid, however, proved a failure. 
Such were the obstructions at Bottom 
Bridge, and so well guarded was the 
\vhole line of the Chickahominy, that 
Wistar found it impossible to cross the 
stream. The attempt was finally aban- 
doned about noon ; and the return 
march was made to New Kent with 
great rapidity an(l without loss. 

Later in the same month, there was 
another and more formidable move- 
ment, similar in its origin and general 
character, and having the same end in 
view — the liberation of the National 



656 



THE WILDERNESS. 



prisoners in Richmond. It was spoken 
of at the time, and afterwards, as Kil- 
patrick's raid. The movement was 
Peb, manifold. On the 27th, a body 
27» of infantry, under General Sedg- 
wick, left camp near Culpepper Court 
House, and moved in the direction of 
Madison Court House, some fifteen 
miles to the southwest. The day fol- 
lowing. General Birney advanced, with 
a division, in the same direction. Sedg- 
wick occupied Madison Court House 
and the heights along Robertson's River. 
Birney occupied James City, somewhat 
to the west of Culpepper Court House. 
On the 28 th, a body of cavalry, under 
General Custer, was pushed forward in 
the direction of Charlottesville, where 
the railroad from Lynchburg forms a 
junction with that of the Orange and 
Alexandria. The capture of this place 
would have been most damaging to 
Lee's communications with the west. 
In ten hours, Custer was within four 
miles of Charlottesville, where he sur- 
prised a camp of Stuart's cavalry, with 
horse batteries. The camp equipage 
was destroyed; and six caissons were 
blown up. For the want of the neces- 
sary material, it was found to be im- 
possible to spike the guns. The enemy 
rallied rapidly and in great force ; and 
Custer found it necessary to retreat. 
On his backward course, however, he 
worked considerable damage, destroy- 
ing mills and other property. Night 
coming on, he lost his way, and was 
compelled to bivouack in the woods. 
Next morning, about nine o'clock, hav- 
ing discovered his way, he found his 
passage completely blocked by Stuart's 



cavalry. He was near Stannardsville. 
Ordering a charge, he cut his way 
through in the most gallant manner, 
and returned to Madison Court House, 
without the loss of a single man, and 
bringing with him about 50 prisoners, 
a large number of negroes and some 
300 horses. 

General Kilpatrick, on the 28th, left 
Culpepper, at the head of some Feb. 
5000 or 6000 cavalry and horse 28. 
artillery. Crossing the Rapidan at Ger- 
mania and Ely's fords, and sweeping 
around Lee's right flank, he reached 
Spottsylvania Court House on the even- 
ing of the 29th. At this point, he des- 
patched Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, with 
about 500 of his picked men, with in- 
structions to move in a southwesterly 
direction towards Frederickshall, where 
it was known a large number of Con- 
federate guns were stored. It wa&, 
Kilpatrick's hope that Dahlgren, after 
making a successful raid through Louisa 
and Goochland counties, would be able 
to strike Richmond on the south, while 
he himself was entering it from the 
north or northwest. Kilpatrick, mean^ 
while, pushed rapidly forward, leaving 
evidence of his desolating visit every- 
where behind him. At Beaver Dam 
Station, he encountered and defeated 
the Confederates, under Bradley T. 
Johnson. He then struck across the 
South Anna, and cut the Fredericks- 
burg and Richmond Railroad, at Kilby 
Station. On the 1st of March, he was 
close upon the Confederate capital. He 
advanced within the first and within 
the second lines of defense ; buf he 
looked in vain for any signs of *;he 



KILPATllICK'S RAID. 



Gbl 



presence of Dahlgren. When within 
half a mile of the city, he was effectual- 
ly resisted, and compelled to fall back. 
Seeking safety in flight, he moved in 
the direction of Mechanicsville, the 
enemy foEowiug in vigorous pursuit. 
Having succeeded in crossing the Chick- 
ahominy, he pushed towards the Pa- 
munkey. This latter, however, he found 
it impossible to ford. Crossing the 
Richmond and York River Railroad, 
he moved in the direction of White 
House, where he met a relief party, 
which Butler had sent up from New 
Kent Court House. At this point the 
pursuit ceased, the retreat being con- 
tinued down the peninsula. Kilpatiick 
had failed in his main purpose, and 
he had lost 150 men; but, by the de- 
struction of stores and railroad prop- 
erty, and by the capture of 500 prison- 
ers and a lai'ge number of horses, he 
had inflicted a damaging blow on the 
Confederacy. 

What, meanwhile, had become of 
Dahlgren ? He had faithfully, as far 
at least as was possible, carried out 
the instructions given him. Following 
the prescribed route, he had reached 
Frederickshall, and destroyed the rail- 
road. Had he been an hour eai'lier, he 
would have intercepted Lee, who had 
just passed over. Pushing forward, he 
would have been on the outskirts of 
Richmond in sufficient time to co-oper- 
ate with Kilpatrick, but for the treach- 
ery of a negro guide, who led him out 
of his way. As it was, he did not 
reach the outer lines until late in the 
afternoon of the 2d of March. Hurry- 
ing down the north bank, he passed 



the outer works without difficulty, and 
was pressing forward with great energy 
towards the inner, when the enemy fell 
upon him with overwhelming force. 
Observing no signs of Kilpatrick, and 
soon learning that his attempt had 
failed, Dahlgren deemed it prudent to 
retrace his steps. It was his only 
chance of safety. The situation, how- 
evei", was desperate. The Confederate 
militia, aroused by the unwelcome visit 
of Kilpatrick, swarmed around him,' 
panting for revenge. He had to fight 
his way at eveiy turn and bend. In 
one of his encounters he, with Major 
Cook and about 100 men, became sep- 
arated from the main body of his com- 
mand. Thus isolated, he had, on the 
night of the 3d, fought his way to the 
Mattapony, and crossed at Dabney's 
Ferry. Here, however, he fell into an 
ambush, and was completely surround- 
ed. Dahlgren and several of his com- 
panions were killed. The remainder 
of his little band were made prisoners. 
The fate of this unfortunate young 
leader created great excitement in the 
North. He w^s the son of Admiral 
Dahlgren ; and, although only twenty- 
one years of age, he had given proof 
not only of great daring, but of singu- 
lar ability as a cavalry officer. He had 
already lost a foot in the service of liis 
country ; and, at the time of his death, 
he was still suffering from the unhealed 
wound. 

These expeditions, although inspired 
by the noblest and V)est of motives, and 
in every sense ^praiseworthy, all proved 
more or less abortive. Richmond was 
not to be taken ; the jjrisoners were 



668 



THE WILDERNESS. 



not to he delivered by such means. 
The woik, however, was now to be 
done in a diiferent and more effective 
style. 

March was drawing to a close when 
General Grant arrived at Culpepper 
Court House, and established his head- 
quarters with the army of the Potomac. 
His first attention was given to the re- 
organization of that army. Consoli- 
dation had become a necessity, from 
the reduced numbers of some of the 
divisions. Preliminary to all other ar- 
I'angements, Grant had wisely conclud- 
ed to retain in chief command Major- 
General Meade. By his victory at 
Gettysburg, Meade had won the re- 
spect and confidence of the army, 
the approbation of the public, as 
well as a world-wide renown. He had 
.proved himself to be a skilful tactician; 
and he had the advantage of possessing 
a thorough knowledge of the army in 
all its departments. Under the new 
arrangement, he sustained to Grant the 
same relations that the corps command- 
ers sustained to himself. Meade and 
Sherman stood on the same level. 
They were Grant's first-lieutenants. 
Grant gave his instructions to Meade, 
who had the handling of the army and 
the working out of all the details. 
The arrangement proved to be agree- 
able to both parties ; and it was, doubt- 
less, the best possible in the circum- 
stances. Gi'aut said, afterwards : 

"Commanding all the armies, as I did, I 
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade 
in independent command of the army of the 
Potomac. My instructions for that army were 
all through him, and were general in their 
nature, leaving all the details and execution 



to him. The campaigns that followed proved 
him to be the right man in the right place. 
His commanding always in the presence of 
an officer superior to him in rank has drawn 
from him much of that public attention which 
his zeal and ability entitled him to, and which 
he would otherwise have received." 

In its new form the army of the Po- 
tomac was consolidated into three corps 
— the Second, Fifth and Sixth — ^which 
were commanded respectively by Han- 
cock, Warren and Sedgwick. These 
were men of high character and of 
proved ability, although their excel- 
lences were naturally not all of the 
same kind. Major-General Winfield 
Scott Hancock had long been a prom- 
inent leader in the army of the Poto- 
mac. His magnifient personal presence 
won for him, at Williamsburg, the title 
of " superb" ; and he was possessed of 
those magnetic qualities which, on the 
field of battle, attract and inspire the 
soldier. At Gettysburg he shone like 
a star of the first magnitude ; and, while 
he saved the National army and con- 
verted defeat into victory, he co/ered 
himself with glory. I\Ia rrr-General 
Governeur K. Warren, pla /jO in com- 
mand of the Fifth corps, ra ^P;cer of 
engineers, and comparativv>l^ a young 
man, had, on several iija^rcant occa- 
sions, revealed not '^nly dash and 
daring, but the higher qualities of gen- 
eralship, such as qu'^kness of percep- 
tion of danger or of opportunity, pres- 
ence of mind, promptitude of action, 
and skill in combination. But for hia 
quick discernment and prom})t and de* 
termined action, at Littlff Round Top, 
on the second day at Gettysburg, the 
National left might have beet turned- 



REORGANIZATION. 



658 



and the whole army thrown into con- 
fusion, and probably routed. His ad- 
vancement had been rapid, but it had 
not been beyond his deserts. The com- 
mander of the Sixth corps was Major- 
General John Sedgwick, of Freder- 
icksburg renown, the man who, more 
than any other, sustained the reputa- 
tion of the army of the Potomac and 
the dignity of the National cause, at 
Chancellorsville. Sedgwick was as 
brave as he was modest, as able as he 
was unpretentious. The high honor 
of commanding the army of the Poto- 
mac he had more than once declined. 
Such were the three men on whom 
Meade depended for the execution of 
his orders and the directions of the 
genei-al-in-chief. A better choice could 
hardly have been made. 

The division commanders had been 
chosen with equal care. Those of the 
Second corps were respectively Barlow, 
of the First division ; Gibbon, of the 
Second ; Birney, of the Third ; Carr, of 
the Fourth. Those of the Fifth corps 
were, in the same order. Griffin, Robin- 
son, Crawford, Wadsworth. Those of 
the Sixth corps were Wright, Getty 
and Prince. 

The brigade commanders, also, were 
men of known capacity and tried abili- 
ty. They were, of the Second corps. 
Miles, Smyth, Frank and Brooke, of 
the First division ; Webl), Owens and 
Carroll, of the Second; Ward and Hays, 
of the Third ; Mott and Brewster, of 
the Fourth. Of the Fifth corps, they 
were Barnes, Bartlett and Ayres, of 
the First division ; Leonard, Baxter 
and Deunison, of the Second; McCand- 



less and Fisher, of the Third; Cutler, 
Rice and Stone, of the Fourth. Of 
the Sixth corps, they were Torbert, 
Upton, Burnham and Shaler, of the 
First; Wheaton, Grant, Neill, Eustis, 
of the Second ; Morris and Russell, of 
the Third. 

The inspectors-general were reaper 
tively Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Mor- 
gan, of the Second ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
H. C. Bankhead, of the Fifth ; Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel M. T. McMahon, of the 
Sixth. The chiefs of artillery, taking 
them in the same order, were Colonel 
J. C. Tidball, Colonel C. 8. Wainright 
and Colonel C. H. Tompkins. The cav- 
alry were entrusted to the able hands 
of Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. 
Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt re- 
mained in charge of the artillery. Col- 
onel H. S. Burton being second in 
command. The onerous duties of the 
quartermaster's department still de- 
volved on the able shoulders of Briga- 
dier-General Rufus Ingalls.* 

* GenebaIj Gbant's staff waa composed as follows. 
Brigadier-General John A. KawUns, chief of staff, 
Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bowers, assistant adjutant, 
general ; Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, senior 
aide-de-camp ; lieutenant-Colonel O. E. B. Babcock, 
aide-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Dent, aide- 
de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, aido-de- 
camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel \V. L. Duff, assistant in- 
spector-general ; Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Rowley, 
secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel Ad»m Badeau, secretary; 
Captain E. S. Parker, assistant adjutant-general ; Cap- 
tain George K. Leet, assistant adjutant-general, in 
charge of office at Washington ; Captain P. T. Hudson, 
aide-de-camp ; Captain H. W. Jones, assistant quarter- 
master, on duty at headquarters; First-Lieutenanlj 
William Dunn, junior, Eighty-Third Indiana Volun- 
teers, acting aide-de-camp. 

General Meade's chief of staff was Major-General A. 
A. Humphrey, a iield-officor of engineers, who, as a di- 
vision commander, had won distinction at Gettysburg. 
His adjutant-general was General Soth Williams, an offl- 
«er admirably (qualified for the special duties of his poa^ 



660 



TUB WlLDEB?j:i;SS. 



Such, under its new organization, 
was the army of the Potomac. This, 
however, was not the only force on 
which General Grant could rely. On 
its way from East Tennessee, the Ninth 
army corps, under General Bumside, 
had rendezvoused at Annapolis, where 
it had recruited and added a whole di- 
vision of colored troops. On the 23d of 
Iprll April, Burnside's troops were re- 
23. viewed in Washington by Presi- 
dent Lincoln, and marched at once to 
Culpepper to join the army of the Poto- 
mac. Burnside remained for a time in 
separate command, receiving his orders 
not through Meade, but directly from 
Grant. The united strength of the four 
corps gave Grant a movable column 
of about 140,000 men of all arms. 
These figures, however, did not fully 
^present his effective strength. There 
"tvere, in addition, the co-operative 
forces — those under Butler, 33,000 
strong, and those under Sigel, some 
20,000 strong; and Grant could count 
with confidence on a portion, at least, 
of the 100,000 men promised for one 
hundred days by the governors of Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois and Iowa. 

The army of Northern Virginia, as 
General Lee's army was called, was 
greatly inferior in numbers to that of 
the Potomac. It had, for the time, 
been much reduced by furloughs. At 
the beginning of May, the entire force 
at Lee's disposal — foot, horse and artil- 
lery — did not exceed 60,000. It was 
divided into three corps, commanded 
respectively by Ewell, Hill and Long- 
street. The three corps lay en echelon. 
Kwell was on the left and somewhat in 



advance, his own right resting on the 
river ; Hill was in the centre, at Orange 
Court House ; Longstreet was further 
to the south, at Gordonsville. 

By the end of April, General Grant's 
arrangements were completed ; and 
everything was in readiness for a gen- 
eral forward movement. Sherman, 
whose operations will be detailed in a 
subsequent chapter, was awaiting the 
signal to march from Chattanooga. 
Meade was ready to march the array 
of the Potomac across the Rapidan, his 
instructions being to turn, if possible, 
the Confederate right, and interpose 
between Lee and Richmond. Butler, 
who had been fully instructed as to 
the part he should take in the cam- 
paign, was ready to move up the 
James, in the direction of City Point. 
Sigel, having arranged his army in two 
columns — the one under General Crook, 
to operate on the Kanawha, the other 
under his own care, to operate on the 
Shenandoah — was prepared to move 
whenever the signal should be given. 

On the night of the 3d of May, the 
army of the Potomac broke up May 
its encampments; and, in two col- 3. 
umns, it began to move toward the 
Rapidan, the right from Culpepper, 
and the left from Stevensburg. On the 
same day, Butler moved from Fortress 
Monroe. Sigel had already set out as 
directed, two days before. 

For the present, we shall remain 
\\ith and follow the fortunes of the 
army of the Potomac. The right col- 
umn of that army, made up of the corps 
of Warren and Sedgwick, moved in 
the direction of Germania Ford. The 



ACROSS THE RAPIDAN. 



66, 



left, which consisted of Hancock's corps, 
moved in the direction of Ely's Ford. 
All during the night and the greater 
jiart of the following day, the banks of 
the river presented a lively scene. It 
was such a scene as even the eye of the 
war-hardened veteran rarely looks up- 
on. One hundred and forty thousand 
men, including some 10,000 cavalry, 
rt^ith artillery in proportion, and an 
army-train of 4000 wagons, were press- 
ing towaids the river, or crossing the 
biidges, or spreading themselves out in 
huge masses on the banks beyond. Be- 
fore night, Meade had taken his entire 
army across the river, Warren's corps, 
forming the advance of the right col- 
umn, *vith Wilson's cavalry division in 
front, reached Germania Ford at six 
May o'clock on the morning of Thurs- 
■*• day, the 4th , and, as soon as the 
bridge was laid, began the passage, 
wliich was completed bj one o'clock. 
Sedijwick's column followed immediate- 
ly afterwards. Hancock, with the left 
column, Gregg's cavalry division pre- 
ceding, crossed at an early hour; and 
by nine o'clock he was at Chaucellors- 
ville, where he rested for the remainder 
of the day. Warren, after crossing 
the river, had pushed on to Old Wil- 
derness Tavern, where he bivouacked. 
Sedgwick, who was the last to cross, 
remained for the night near the river. 
The cavalry were well thrown out 
towards Orange Court House, Fi'ed- 
ericksburg and Todd's Tavern. Burn- 
eide, with the Ninth corps, was still 
at Culpepper Court House, where he 
had been ordered to remain for twenty- 
four hours', when, it was supposed. 



! the first and second columns would be 
safely on the southern banks of the 
Rapidan. The wagon-trains, also, for 
the present, were left on the northern 
banks. Such was the general posi-j 
tion of General Grant's forces on the 
night of the 4th and the morning of 
the 5th, 

Lee had not been ignorant of Grant's 
movements. From the signal-station 
on the summit of Clark's Mountain, he 
had a wide and commanding view of 
the entire country ; and the beacon-fires 
which blazed throughout the night, 
rendered conspicuous by the all-sur- 
rounding gloom, showed that he was 
concentrating his scattered forces, and 
preparing for the onset of the foe. It 
was evident that Lee had concluded 
that it was best for him to allow Grant 
to cross the river unopposed, and to 
offer him battle afterwards. He might 
have acted differently. He might have 
allowed a portion of the opposing army 
to pass, and then, by destroying the 
means of passage, attempted to destroy 
the isolated fraction. He might have 
directly opposed the passage of the 
river, and, by occupying advantageous 
positions, prevented them from deploy- 
ing. Neither of those courses, however, 
commended themselves ; and following 
the example which he had set at Fred- 
ericksburg, he gave his antagonist full 
opportunity to cross the river, to taka 
position, and more fully to develop his 
plans. His position behind Mine Run 
was strong ; and for a whole winter it 
had defied the skill of Meade, and 
all the valor of the army of the Po- 
tomac. Even if Grant did attempt 



1(76 



Mi 



THE WILDERNESS. 



to turn his right, he could rely on his 
well-trained legions for support; and 
the country, with which he was thor- 
oughly familiar, was better adapted for 
purposes of resistance than for purposes 
of attack. 

We are now fairly in the Wilderness. 
It is a wild and desolate region of worn- 
out tobacco-fields, covered with scraggy 
oaks and pines, sassafras and hazel, and 
intersected with narrow roads and deep 
/•avines. It is a strange battle-ground ; 
yet it is here, amid these jungles, on 
these narrow wood roads, and in these 
deep ravines, that is about to be fought 
one of the mightiest and most bloody, 
if not most decisive, battles of the war. 
Manifestly, Grant had not intended that 
the battle should take place in the 
forest. He felt proud because of the 
success which had attended the crossing 
of the Rapidan. It was confessedly a 
perilous operation ; and the fact that it 
had been accomplished " in the face of 
an active, large, well-appointed, and 
ably-commanded army," was well fitted 
to relieve his mind of the most " serious 
apprehensions." It was his hope, if 
not his conviction, that another day's 
march would euaVjle him to push the 
army beyond the Wilderness, and, using 
it as a mask, to advance rapidly on Gor- 
donsville, and take a position between 
Lee's army and the Confederate capital. 
It was Grant's expectation, in fact, that 
Lee, as soon as he was made aware of 
the movements of the National army, 
would fall back towards Richmond. 
With this end in view, Sheridan was 
instructed to move, with Gregg's and 
Torbert's divisions^ against the Confed- 



erate cavalry in the direction of Hamil' 
ton's Crossing ; Wilson, with the Third 
cavalry division, was to move to Craig's 
Meeting House on the Catharpin Road, 
and thence to send out detachments 
along the different avenues by which 
the enemy might approach ; Hancock, 
with his Second corps, was to ad- 
vance to Shady Grove Church, and 
thence to extend his right towards the 
Fifth corps, at Parker's Store; Wari'en, 
with his Fifth corps, was to move to 
Parker's Store, and to extend his right 
towards the Old Wilderness Tavern, 
where Sedgwick was ordered to take 
position. 

On the morning of Thursday, the 
5th, these orders were put in ex- ^ay 
ecution. As early as five o'clock, 5* 
the different columns were in motion, 
and pushing towards the positions 
respectively assigned them. A blood- 
red sun, as if ominous of the dread- 
ful slaughter which was soon to fol- 
low, was pouring his slanting beams 
through the openings in the woods, al- 
ready beautiful and richly clad with the 
green robes of early summer. It soon 
became apparent that Lee was neither 
ignorant of the plans of his antagonist, 
nor willing to allow him to execute 
his purpose without offering at least a 
stubborn resistance. From the Con- 
federate centre at Orange Court House, 
about twenty miles from Grant's pre- 
scribed line of march, two roads run, 
in a northeasterly direction, towards 
Fredericksburg. That to the north is 
an old turnpike ; the other is a plank- 
road. There is another road, called the 
Stevensburg plank road, which, run 



THE rOE FELT. 



60;^ 



ning from Culpepper Court House in 
a southeasterly direction, crosses the 
tui'iipike before mentioned, and termi- 
nates in the plank road. At the junc- 
tion of the Stevensburg plank road 
with the turnpike is the Old Wilder- 
ness Tavern. Five miles more to the 
southeast, where the two plank roads 
meet, is the Old Wilderness Church. 
Before the Stevensburg road unites 
with the plank road, there branches off 
another road, called the Brock road, 
which runs first almost due south, 
crossing the plank road, and then more 
to the southeast to Spottsylvania Court 
House. The two almost parallel roads 
running northeast from Orange Court 
House ai'e generally spoken of as the 
Orange t-u^^npike and the Orange 
plank road along these two roads, 
Lee, having already rightly divined 
•the purpose of Grant, had pushed the 
larger portion of his army. It was his 
intention to strike the National army 
in the flank, and force a battle in the 
Wilderness. He had left behind him 
the strong defenses of Mine Run ; but 
he could fall back upon them, as a 
place of refuge, in the event of disaster. 
On the morning of the 5th, Ewell, 
who had moved by the Orange turn- 
pike, and Hill, who had moved by the 
Orange plank road, were both in the 
near neighborhood of Old Wilderness 
Tavern ; but the Nationals knew it not. 
Thus it happened that Warren, almost 
as soon as he commenced his forward 
movement, found himself in collision 
with the enemy. 

Warren's orders, it will be remem- 
bered, were that he should resume his 



march by the earliest dawn, on the 
morning of the 5th, and that he should 
take position at Parker's Store on the 
Orange plank road, his right extending 
to Old Wilderness Tavern. By way of 
precaution, and in order to secure the 
route for Sedgwick's corps, he threw 
the division of Griffin out on the Orange 
turnpike; and, taking advantage of a 
wood road which led in a southwester- 
ly direction towards Parker's Store, he 
pushed forward the division of Craw- 
ford, followed by that of Wadsworth 
and that of Robinson, to the point in- 
dicated. These movements were scarce- 
ly begun when the foe was felt. All 
of a sudden. Griffin's skirmishers on the 
turnpike fell back; and, at the same 
moment almost, Crawfoi-d's advance, 
which was now near Parker's Store, 
was surprised to see the troops in front 
galloping back. Griffin had touched 
Ewell; and Crawford had come into 
contact with the van of Hill's column. 
Further advance was deemed perilous. 
The presci'ibed movements were, there- 
fore, temporarily suspended. Such was 
the condition of affairs when, about 
eight o'clock. Grant and Meade arrived 
at Old Wilderness Tavern. It was 
not the opinion of either of those com- 
manders that the Confederates were 
present in any great force. On the 
contrary, it was the belief of both that 
Lee had fallen back, that he was con- 
centrating his forces further to the 
south, and that the troops with which 
Griffin and Crawford had come into 
contact were portions of the Confed- 
erate right, which had been left as a 
rear-guard to cover the retreat. To 



«ti4 



THE WILDERNESS. 



capture or brush away this force, and 
to obtain possession of the defenses at 
Mine Run, now became their object; 
and orders were given accordingly. 
As the strength of the Confederates 
had been developed mainly on the 
turnpike and in Griffin's front, it was 
resolved to make the attack at that 
point. Crawford was, accordingly, or- 
dered to suspend operations on the 
"ilank road, while Wadsworth's divi- 
sion was disposed in line on Griffin's 
left, with the sister division of Robin- 
son in support. Wadsworth, having 
ordered Mc .'andless' brigade to take 
position oi Wadsworth's left, with- 
drew with the remainder of his divi- 
sion, but not without experiencing 
some shp,' p treatment at the hands of 
the ener-y, who followed and fired into 
the /'.ar of his column. Meanwhile, 
Hancock, who, as we have seen, had 
that morning mai'ched southward from 
Chancellorsville in the direction of 
Shady Grove Church, and who was 
therefore quite out of position for a 
battle at Chancellorsville, was recalled, 
and was ordered to unite with the 
main body, by a movement up the 
Brock road. 

The ground on which the struggle 
was about to begin, — a struggle greatly 
more severe than was anticipated by 
the National leaders — was a sort of 
clearance in the forest. As seen from 
Warren's headquarters, near the Old 
Wilderness Tavern, there was a little 
brook flowing in a northeasterly direc- 
tion. The brook is bi'idged at the 
turnpike, which soon afterwards rises 
to a ridge, on the southern slope of 



which is Major Lacy's house, in th« 
midst of a lawn and green meadows. 
Beyond, the hills were covered with 
pines and cedars. On the right of the 
turnpike the thicket was very dense. 
A little more to the right was a ravine 
which divided the forces of Griffin and 
Ewell. On this strange battle field 
were soon to meet, in the deadly shock 
of battle, nearly a quarter of a million 
of civilized troops. At noon the pre- 
parations were completed ; and War- 
ren, with the divisions of Giiffiu and 
Wadsworth, advanced to the attack. 
It was made with tremendous energy, 
and at first with jomplete success. 
The Confederate advance, which con- 
sisted of Johnson's division alone, was 
easily driven back; i.nd if the brigades 
of Ayres and Bartlett had been nioi'e 
vigorously suppoi-ted, EvvelFs corps 
might have been involved in hopeless 
disaster. As it was the Nationals, in 
what seemed the moment of victory, 
were speedily brought to a standstill. 
•fohnson had V)een driven back to the 
main body of Ewell's command. Rodes, 
with his fresh division, rushed to the 
rescue, when the shattered column 
quickly re-formed. At this moment 
the battle raged with tremendous fury. 
It had been intended that Warren's 
right should be sustained by Wi-ight'f 
division, of the Sixth corps; but owing 
to the denseness of the M'oods, and the 
total absence of roads, Wiight was un- 
able to get up in time. On Wari'en's ex- 
posed flank, therefoi'e, the Confederates 
fell with fearful enei'gy. The tide of 
battle was now turned. Griffin's bri- 
gades, overwhelmed by the force of the 



ARRIVAL OF HANCOCK. 



665 



enemy, were driven back with the loss of 
two guns and several prisoners. Wads- 
worth's division, on the left, had been 
equally unfortunate. In striving to 
form a connection with that of Griffin, 
it had moved in a wrong direction, 
completely exposing its left flank. On 
this the Confederates opened a murder- 
ous fire, compelling the entire division 
to fall back in disorder. McCandless' 
Ijrigade, of Crawford's division, which, 
as we have seen, was stationed to the 
left of Wadsworth, fared even worse. 
Occupying an isolated position, and 
exposed at all points, it offered pecu- 
liar temptation for attack. Not slow 
to take advantage of the opportunity, 
the Confederates rushed upon it with 
great fury and in overwhelming num- 
bers. For a moment, it seemed as if 
the entire brigade was doomed to cap- 
ture or destruction. After severe fight- 
ing, during which were performed 
deeds of great valor, McCandless suc- 
ceeded in cutting his way through, but 
not without the loss of two whole 
regiments. Warren, having thus lost 
all he had gained by the first suc- 
cessful onset, and having sacrificed at 
least 3000 men, fell back and formed 
a new line of battle more to the rear, 
but still in front of the Old Wil- 
derness Tavern, and across the turn- 
pike. 

While Warren was thus engaged in 
the centre, Sedgwick, with the Sixth 
corps, having come up, was ready to 
take position on his right. Hancock, 
however, had not had time to return, as 
ordered, and take position on his left. 
Some four miles east of Parker's Store, 



as has already been ir.dicaled, the 
plank road is intersected by the Brock 
load. Hill, it will be remembered, 
was jiressing along the plank road. 
Hancock, by the Brock road, waf. 
pushing forward to tlie point of inter 
section. It was all-important that this 
strategic point should not fall into the 
hands of the enemy. As there was 
danger that Hill might reach that 
point })efore the arrival of Hancock, 
Meade ordered Genei'al Getty, with 
his division of the Sixth corps, to ad- 
vance and hold the position. The order 
was promptly obeyed. It Avas not, 
however, a moment too soon, for Hill's 
divisions were already well forward; 
and Getty, long before the arrival of 
Hancock, felt the presence and pressure 
of the foe. In spite of the rapidly 
increasing weight of his antagonist, 
Getty stoutly held his position. The 
situation, however, was becoming every 
moment more critical. It was now- 
near three o'clock in the afternoon. 
There was a lull in the fight. Sud- 
denly there was heard a loud-resound- 
ing cheer. It came from Hancock's 
men, who, w\th almost incredible ra- 
pidity, were pushing through the de- 
files of the forest. 

On his arrival, Hancock took posi 
tion along the Brock road, facing west- 
ward. He immediately commenced to 
thi'ow up breast-works. These, how- 
ever, were not yet completed, when he 
was ordered to attack with his whole 
corps, Getty supporting the advance. 
Birney, with his own command and 
that of Mott, was thrown forward on 
Getty's right and left, on both sides f ' 



663 



THE WILDERNESS, 



the plank road. A section of Ricketts' 
l)attery, and a company of the First 
Pennsylvania artillery, followed close 
in the ?ear of the infantry. It soon 
became manifest that the enemy was 
present in great force, although such 
was the density of the forest that nei- 
ther army could see the other. Getty, 
strengthened as he was by Birney and 
Mott, was making no headway. Han- 
cock, now pushing forward the bri- 
gades of Carroll and Owen, of Gib- 
bon's division, and the Irish brigade, 
of the Second Delaware, under Colonel 
Smythe, made, to use the language of 
General Lee, " repeated and desperate 
assaults "; but it was all in vain. Hill's 
corps, which consisted of the divisions 
of Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, all of 
them West Point men, not only suc- 
cessfully resisted but repelled every 
attack. The afternoon was wearing 
away. The battle continued to rage 
with great fury, the tide of victory 
inclining now to this side, now to 
that, but remaining with neither. ^ Dur- 
ing the heat of the fight, and when 
the Confederates made one of their 
desperate and apparently successful 
onslaughts, the section of Ricketts' 
battery, which was moved along the 
plank i-oad, was actually captured, 
the men and horses suffering terri- 
bly. It was soon, however, recap- 
tared by Carroll's brigade. It was 
afterwards withdrawn and replaced by 
a section of Dow's Sixth Maine bat- 
tery. Hancock had done his best, but 
apparently in vain. Mott's command 
bad already given way; and Hays, 
while attempting to fill up the break 



in the line, was shot dead, at the head 
of his brigade.* 

The heavy and long-continued firing 
towards the junction of the plank 
and Brock roads, had already attracted 
the attention of Grant and Meade. It 
was evident that the battle was fierce- - 
that the Confederates were present in 
great force, and that Getty and Han- 
cock were being taxed to the very ut 
most. By way of furnishing relief to 
these two commanders, Wadsworth, 
with his own division and Baxter's 
brigade, of Robinson's division, was 

• Alexander Hats, brigadier-general of United 
Slates volunteers and brevet lieutenant-colonel in the 
United States army, was bom at Pittsfield, Pa., in 
1820. He graduated at West Point in 1844. Among 
his classmates were Grant, Hancock and Pleasonton. 
He entered the army as brevet second-lieutenant of 
the Fourth United States infantry. As a second-lieuten- 
ant of the Eighth infantry, he entered upon the Mexi- 
can campaign, during which he greatly distinguished 
himself and rose in his profession. Soon afterwards, he 
was appointed acting-assistant adjutant-general to Bri- 
gadier-General Lane, and won distinction in the battle 
near Atlixo. In April, 1848, he resigned his position 
in the army, and engaged in the manufacture of iron, 
in Venango county. Pa. On the outbreak of the Civil 
War, he entered the service as colonel of the Sixty- 
Third Pennsylvania volunteers, and was appointed 
captain in the Sixteenth regiment of infantry, to date 
from May 14, 1861. In the Peninsula he was attached, 
with his regiment, to the First brigade of Kearney's 
division, of Heintzelman's corps. At the close of the 
seven days' contest, he was nominated for a brevet of 
lieutenant-colonel. He took part in the Maryland 
campaign, and was appointed a brigadier-general of 
volunteers. He was wounded at Chancellorsville, while 
at the head of the Second brigade, of the Third division, 
Second army corps. At the batUe of Gettysburg, he 
commanded the Third division of his corps, and, after 
the wounding of Hancock, was temporarily in com 
mand. When the army of the Potomac was reorgan- 
ized, Hays was placed in command of the Second 
brigade, Bimey's Third division, of the Second corps. 
In this capacity he fought, and gahantly met his death, 
in the Wilderness. Hays was frank, brave, quick and 
energetic, and greatly beloved by his men. Although 
not in the highest position, his death waa a serious loss 
to th» army of the Potomac. 



PEEPARING FOR THE SECOND DAY. 



667 



ordered to move southward through 
the forest, and strike Hill on the flank 
and rear. It was a most difficult ope- 
ration. Such was the density of the 
forest, and so great were the obstacles 
encountered in the face of skirmishers 
who were evidently familiar with every 
inch of the ground, that darkness had 
set in before Wadsworth was in a po- 
sition to strike as directed. His troops 
rested on their arms for the night, 
ready to take advantage of their fa- 
vored position in the morning. To- 
wards midnight, all was silent in the 
Wilderness. Hancock had failed to 
drive Hill back on the plank road. 
Hill had been equally unsuccessful in 
his attempt to dislodge Hancock. All 
along the line the Nationals and Con- 
federates lay so close to each other that 
the soldiers of both armies drew water 
from the same brook. As in the earlier 
part of the day, a ravine divided both 
the opposing armies in two. Hancock 
was separated from Warren and Sedg- 
wick. Ewell was unable to form a con- 
nection with Hill. The battle-ground 
was thickly strewn with dead and dy- 
ing men. Such was the end of the 
first day in the Wilderness. 

It wa? evident to all that a great 
battle would be fought on the morrow. 
The ground was ill adapted for civil- 
ized warfare. Other ground, however, 
could not now be chosen. The incon- 
veniences, it was felt, were common. 
On both sides the commanders were 
hopeful, if not confident ; and the rank 
and file were in excellent spirits. If 
neither had been successful, neither had 
any reason to be ashamed of defeat. 



Lee had failed to defeat Grant by 
striking him on his flank. Grant had 
failed to carry out his purpose of turn- 
ing Lee's right. Each had failed in 
his original purpose ; but both were 
now face to face, with tlie inevitable 
of battle before them. 

Night was spent by both command, 
ers in preparing for the conflict of the 
coming day. Buruside, it will be re- 
membered, had been left at Culpepper 
Court House with the Ninth corps, his 
instructions being to hold that place 
for at least twenty-four hours after the 
departure of the main body of the 
army. He had already been ordered 
forward ; and shortly after day-break, 
on the morning of the 6th, he was on 
the field, and taking position between 
the troops of Warren and Hancock. 
He had marched with great rapidity a 
distance of thirty miles, and crossed 
both the Rappahannock and the Rapi-' 
dan. Grant's line of battle was five 
miles long, and was facing westwai'd. 
It lay in the following order: Sedg- 
wick on the right; Warren in the cen- 
tre ; then Burnside ; then Hancock on 
the extreme left. Hancock, in addition 
to his own powerful corps, had Getty's 
division, of the Sixth corps, and Wads- 
worth's division, of the Fifth, both on 
his own right. On the Confederate 
side, Ewell was on the left ; Hill on 
the right; and Longstreet, who had 
been left at Gordonsville, was hurrying 
forward to reinforce Hill. Tiie point 
of convergence of both armies embraced 
the turnpike and plank road, and the 
space between. It had become evident 
to both commanders that the real con- 



668 



THE WILDERNESS. 



flict would take place iu the neighbor- 
hood of the plank road, on Grant's left. 
It was to be the same battle field as on 
the previous day — ground on which it 
would be impossible to use either artil- 
lery or cavalry, and on which manoeu- 
/ring of any kind would be totally 
out of the question. The 300 guns of 
the combatants were to remain idle ; 
and of the 200,000 men about to meet 
in a great death struggle, not more than 
1000 would be visible at any one mo- 
ment to any one man. Grant's order 
was given as soon as he heard the re- 
ports of the different commanders. It 
was simple. " Attack along the whole 
line at five in the morning." Lee had 
decided to deliver an overwhelming 
blow on Grant's left ; but as it would 
be impossible to do so before the ani- 
val of Longstreet, he resolved to dis- 
tiact attention, and so gain time by 
making a demonstration on the Na- 
tional right. Just fifteen minutes be- 
fore the time appointed by Grant for 
the general attack, a sudden discharge 
of musketry in the direction of Sedg- 
wick announced the fact that Lee was 
as ready for battle as his antagonist. 
This attack, however, was not of seri- 
ous moment. It was not pushed with 
vigor. Sedgwick was able to hold 
his own, and even to push his front 
forward a few hundred yards. The 
general plan of battle, as Grant had 
arranged it, was, therefore, imdis- 
turbed. 

At five o'clock precisely, Warren and 
Hancock advanced to the attack. Han- 
cock, however, was doomed to bear 
the principal burden of the fight. 



With him, therefore, we must remain 
and witness the tide of battle, as it 
ebbs and flows iu his front. Dreading 
an attack in great force, he had taken 
the precaution to throw up earth-works 
on the Brock road. Holding these 
works with his left, he threw forward 
his right and centre, consisting of two 
divisions, under Birney, Getty's com- 
mand, and the brigades of Owen and 
Carroll, of Gibbon's division. Half 
and half work formed no part of Han- 
cock's calculations. He meant to strike 
a firm and decisive blow. While Bir- 
ney and G°tty made the direct attack 
along the plank road and on both 
sides of the same, Wadsworth, ha%'ing 
worked his way across that part of the 
Second corps which was advancing 
along the right of the plank road, was 
ready to strike Hill clean on the left 
flank. The direct and flank move- 
ments were made almost simultane- 
ously; and so furious was the onset 
that, after an hour's severe fighting, 
the ground along Hill's entire front 
was carried, and the line driven back 
through the woods for about a mile 
and a half. Hill's troops, in fact, could 
not be halted until they had oveiTun 
the trains, artillery, and even the head- 
quarters of the Confederate commander. 
The rifle-pits had been captured, with 
many prisoners, and five stands of 
colors. It seemed as if the battle were 
already \vou. Anothei' vigorous onset, 
and the presumption is that Lee's army 
will be cut in two. The divisions of 
Heth and Wilcox, of Hill's corps, h<»v« 
been literally shattered to pieces. 

At this supreme momeot, from <i>imfc 



^HalU Or WADS WORTH. 



66'^ 



cause not yet sufficiently explained — 
most probably because of the disen- 
tegration of Hancock's line, brought 
about by the rough and tangled gi'ound 
over which it had passed — the victors 
paused in their tnumphant progress. 
The pause was fatal. It was now 
about seven o'clock. Hancock set 
about rearranging his troops, and get- 
ting them into battle order. He had 
been reinfoj-ced by Stevenson's divi- 
sion, of Burnside's corps ; and Wads- 
worth's division was now brought into 
proper line of battle. Getty's divi- 
sion, now completely exhausted, was 
replaced by Webb's brigade, from 
Gibbon's command on the left; and 
Frank's brigade, of Barlow's division, 
was pushed forward from the same 
flank. In making these arrangements, 
however, two precious hours were wast- 
ed. These hours of inaction proved 
a great gain to the Confederates. Hill's 
remaining divisions found time to come 
up. Longstreet, too, was already close 
at hand. Hancock was as yet ignorant 
of the near presence of Longstreet. 
He had looked for him in another di- 
rection. It was known the night pre- 
vious that he was marching up from 
Orange Court House ; and the unavoid- 
able conviction was that his object was 
to strike Hancock in the left flank and 
It was because of this conviction 



rear. 



that Hancock had only advanced his 
right divisions, leaving his left, under 
Gibbon, in charge of the works on the 
Brock road. Hancock had correctly 
judged. Longstreet had really been 
making such a movement. So sudden, 
however, and so overwhelming had been 



the attack on his front, that Lee, fear- 
ing for the safety of his whole armj^, 
ordered Longstreet to discontinue his 
flank movement, and to come to the 
assistance of Hill. His arrangements 
completed, Hancock resumed the ad- 
vance T/ith great energy. The line in 
his front no longer yielded to his touch 
Again and again he attempted to prew 
back the enemy; but it was all ir 
vain. The battle now raged agait 
with great fury, deeds of daring being 
performed on both sides. Lee had ex- 
hibited great personal bravery. When 
Gregg's Texans came up, he put him- 
self at their head, and was with diffi- 
culty dissuaded from leading them to 
the attack. For i: vvo hours the tide of 
battle ebbed and flowed. It soon began 
to be evident that Longsti'eet was pre- 
sent in force, and that he was directing 
the movements of the Confederates in 
Hancock's immediate front. Finding 
it impossible to make any headway, 
nay, feeling more and more the irre 
sistible pressure of the foe, Hancock 
ultimately falls back, and re-forms on 
the original line along the Brock road. 
It is now about eleven o'clock. The 
situation is becoming more critical 
every moment. Wadsworth, after ex- 
hibiting great gallantry, has just fallen, 
pierced through the head with a bullet ; 
and his command is in utter rout.* Ii 

* James Samuel Wadsworth, brigadier-general ol 
volunteers, was bom in Geneseo, Livingston county, 
N. Y., October 30th, 1807. He was the son of 
James Wadsworth, extensive landowner and philan- 
thropist of Geneseo. He studied at Hartford and 
afterwards at Yale, where he graduated. Choosing law 
as a profession, he spent some time in the office of tho 
great lawyer and statesman, Daniel Webster. He took 
an active part in the Free-SoU movement, which dividbd 



»77 



670 



THE WILDBKNESS. 



seems as if no force can check the fierce, 
onward rush of the now triumphant 
Confederates. 'A few moments more 
and Hancock may be driven from his 
works, and the National left doubled 
ap. At this supreme moment, when 
the Confederates seem about to reap 
the rewards of \actory, there is a sud- 
den pause in the battle. Why, no one 
could tell. It afterwards appeared 
that, when about to deal a decisive 
blow both on Hancock's front and left 
flank, Longstreet was shot, by mistake, 
by his own men. He had been riding 
with his stafF at the head of his col- 
umn, when the cavalcade suddenly con- 
fronted a portion of the flanking force, 
and was mistaken for a party of Na- 
tional horsemen. It was an unfortunate 
DccuiTence for Longstreet, and, indeed, 
for the whole Confederate army ; but 
it was the salvation of Hancock, and, 
probably, of the entire army of the 
Potomac. 

Although the fighting had, so far, 
been mostly done by the National 
left, the centre and right had not been 
idle. Sedgwick, who was attacked in 
the early morning, but who had suc- 
cessfully maintained his position, had 

• 

tue democracy of the State. He voted for the repub- 
lican candidates for presidential honors in 1856, and 
again in 1860. Like his father, he took a deep interest 
in all educational and philanthropic movements. He 
iras commissioner to the Peace Convention held in 
Washington, in 1861. When communication with the 
capital was cut off, he chartered two ships on his own 
responsibility, loaded them with provisions, and pro- 
ceeded with them to Annapolis. He commenced his 
military career as a volunteer aide to General McDowell, 
and was present at the first battle of Bull Bun. On 
McDowell's recommendation, he was appointed briga- 
dier-general of volunteers, August, 1861. In March, 
1862, he became military governor of the District of 



labored in vain to carry certain in- 
trenchments, behind which Ewell had 
sheltered his men. His attempts had 
been frequently repeated; his losses, 
in consequence, were great. Two of 
Warren's divisions had been detached 
and sent to the assistance of Hancock. 
The other two divisions — those of Grif- 
fin and Crawford — held a simply defen- 
sive attitude. It was part of the plan 
of the day that Burnside, advancing 
through the opening between Warren 
and Hancock, should co-operate in the 
general advance. It was not, however, 
until the afternoon that he became en- 
gaged with the enemy ; and the results 
were unimportant. It had, in fact, 
already become apparent that a mistake 
had been committed, in permitting 
Burnside to remain in independent 
command. 

After the repulse -of Hancock by 
Longstreet, there was an almost un- 
broken lull along the whole line of 
battle until about four o'clock. When 
Longstreet was wounded, Lee took for- 
mal charge of that part of the field. 
He was slow, however, in making his 
dispositions. Hancock had turned to 
good account the time which had been 

Cohmibia. In November of that year, he was the re- 
publican canditate for governor of New York, but waa 
defeated by Mr. Seymour, the democratic candidate. 
In December following, he was assigned to the com- 
mand of a division in the army of the Potomac. At 
Fredericksburg and at ChanceUorsviUe, he revealed 
some of the first qualities of a military commander; 
and at Gettysburg, his division saved the first day. 
When the army of the Potomac was reorganized. Gen- 
eral Wadsworth was assigned to the command of the 
Fourth division, of the Fifth corps. At the head of 
this division, as has been shown in the text, he bravely 
met his death. Wadsworth'a career illustrated all the 
higher and nobler characteristic > of the genuine patriot 



CAKilOLL'S SPLENDID CKAEGB. 



&n 



allowed him. Reinforcements had been 
sent him by Meade ; his position had 
been greatly strengthened ; and, his 
front having been cleared by a well- 
Bxecuted movement made by Colonel 
Leasure, he was fully prepared to meet 
the enemy. He had already received 
orders from Grant to resume the attack 
at six o'clock. He was not to be al- 
lowed to wait so long. Shortly after 
four o'clock, Lee, who by this time had 
got the troops of Longstreet aud Hill 
well jn hand, hurled them against Han- 
cock's lines. It was evidently intended 
that the blow should be fatal. The 
Confederate columns, four in number, 
tame rolling forward, firm, solid and 
resolute, as if they meant destruction. 
Without halting or firing a shot, they 
approached the edge of the abatis, less 
than a hundred paces from Hancock's 
front. Here they paused and opened 
a furious fire of musketiy, which was 
kept up with great vigor. It had 
little effect, however, on Hancock's 
men, who were safe behind their 
breast-woi'ks, and who replied with lie- 
coming energy to the Confederate mus- 
keteers. While this was going on, a 
fire, which had broken out in the 
woods in the afternoon, communicated 
with the log breast-works, which soon 
became a mass of flame. The smoke 
and flame, which were driven by the 
vvind in the faces of the Nationals, thus 
preventing them from firing from the 
parapet, gave an advantage to the Con- 
federates. Not slow to seize the oppor- 
tunity, Lee's men rushed forward, broke 
through the first line, pressed into the 
breast-works, and crowded them with 



their standards. At this critical mo- 
ment, when some of the Nationals were 
already in full retreat towards Chan- 
cellors ville, Carroll, of Gibbon's divi- 
sion, in obedience to orders from 
General Birney, rushed forward by the 
left flank, and, falling with tremendous 
fury on the triumphant Confederates, 
routed them with great slaughter, re- 
claimed the works, and saved the day. 
At this point the attack was not re- 
sumed. 

Later in the day ai/d just before 
dark, a vigorous attack was made by 
Ewell on the right and front of Sedg- 
wick's corps, on the extreme National 
right. It was a complete surprise to 
the Nationals ; and, although Sedgwick 
quickly got his corps into order, and re- 
pelled the attack, it was not until Gen- 
erals Seymour and Shaler, of Ricketts' 
division, had been captured, with about 
4000 of their oflicers and men. It was 
now dark. The sound of battle ceased. 
The wearied soldiers, lying in many 
cases beside dead or wounded com- 
rades, fell asleep on their arms. The 
piteous moanhigs of the wounded alone 
disturbed the surrounding solitude. 
The battle of the Wilderness, proper- 
ly so called, was ended. 

The two days' fighting had result^ 
ed in serious loss to both armies. 
The loss on the National side leached 
the high figure of 20,000 men, of 
whom probably 5000 were made pris- 
oners. On the part of the Con- 
federates the loss was proportionate- 
ly great, the lowest estimate being 
10,000, of whom but few were cap- 
tured. Among the killed on the 



679 



THE WILDEKlfESS. 



National side were Generals Wads- 
worthy Hays and Webb; and Han- 
cock, Getty, Gregg, Owen, Bartlett 
and C,irroll were wounded, some of 
them severely. Of the Confederate 
officers. Generals Jones, Jenkins and 
Stafford were killed; and Generals 
Long-street, Pegram, Pickett and Hun- 
ter were wounded. Such a bush-fight 
had never been fought before. 

The 7th was Saturday. On the 
May morning of that day, the rival 
?• armies still confi-onted each other 
in the Wilderness. Both were bleed- 
ing and exhausted ; and on neither the 
one side nor the other was there any 
disposition to renew the contest. In 
the National ranks, there were not a 
few who were of the opinion that a 
backward march across the Rapidan 
would soon be ordered. Such thoughts, 
however, found no place in the mind 
of General Grant. His eye was fixed 
on Richmond ; and, although seas of 
blood might lie between him and the 
Confederate capital, he was not to be 
driven from his purpose, or turned aside 
from the object of his ambition. Dur- 
ing the course of the day, it became more 
and more apparent that Lee was falling 
back in the direction of Richmond. It 
was Grant's belief that Lee, convinced 
of his inability to maintain the contest 
in the open field, had decided to retire 
and await an attack behind his own 
works. His own mind was quickly 
made up ; and he resolved, by a flank 
movement on the Confederate right, 
to interpose his whole force between 
Lee and Richmond. Orders were given 
accordingly; and, shortly after night- 



fall, the entire National army was on 
its way to Spottsylvania Court House, 
some thirteen miles further to the 
southeast. Wan-en led the way, fol- 
lowed by Hancock, both on the Brock 
road. Sedgwick and Burnside moved 
on an exterior route, by way of Chan- 
cellorsville, where, during the course 
of the afternoon, the army trains had 
been parked. By this movement, it 
will be perceived, Grant abandoned 
Germania Ford, and gave Lee an 
opportunity to cut off his communica- 
tions. This, however, was of the less 
consequence, that the latter general 
was now under the necessity of taking 
care of his own communications, his 
right flank being already seriously 
threatened. Germania Ford, in fact, 
was now of little use to Grant; and 
Lee might take possession, or not, as he 
thought fit. Lee was not slow to dis 
cover the real object of his antagonist 
and to take measures accordingly 
Anderson, who now commanded Long 
street's corps, received orders to movn 
from the breast-works and take a posi 
tion from which he would be able to 
advance on Spottsylvanid Court House 
in the early morning. Not finding a 
suitable place for bivouacking, in con- 
sequence of the fire in the woods, An- 
derson kept moving on all night in 
the direction of the Court House. It 
thus happened that Warren and An- 
derson, the former by the Brock road, 
the latter by a parallel road a little 
further to the west, were simultane- 
ously marching to the same point. 

It was about nine o'clock in the 
morning when Warren began to move 



ALSOFS FARM. 



673 



his column. His desii-e was to reach 
Spottsylvania Court House before the 
enemy could have time to be there in 
anything like force. Unfortunately, 
however, his course was greatly ob- 
structed, and his progress hindered. 
At Todd's Tavern he was delaj^ed for 
two hours, the road being blocked by 
Meade's cavalry escort. About two 
miles further on, and near one of the 
tributaries of the Po, he was again 
brought to a standstill by the cavalry 
division of General Merritt, who, the 
day before, and up to a late hour of 
the night, had been engaged fighting 
Stuart. At this point he lost three 
hours. It was already daylight; and 
when he resumed the advance, the 
road was obstructed with barricades of 
heavy trees. Considerable time was 
consumed in removing these ; and it 
May was not until eight o'clock on 
8e Sunday morning that the head 
of WaiTen's column, composed of two 
brigades, under Robinson, emerged 
from the woods, and took position on 
the open ground at what was called 
Alsop's Farm. This open ground or 
clearing covered a space of about 150 
acres, and was distant from Spott- 
isylvania Court House some two miles. 
At this point, the road from Todd's 
Tavern forks — one biauch leading to 
the Court House, a>id the other to 
Laurel Hill. The open space was 
traversed by an inconsiderable stream 
called the Ny ; and the ground be- 
yond, which ascended towards Spottsyl- 
vania, was again covered with woods. 
Warren's advance was half way across 
the clearing, and on the point oi 



commencing the ascent of the crest, 
when, all of a sudden, the ridge 
blazed with cannon, and a mui'der- 
ous musketry fire burst forth from 
the woods. It was an unlooked-for 
reception. The National line stag- 
gered, and fell back. A stampede 
seemed to be imminent. Robinson 
exerted himself to the utmost to hold 
his men to their work. Getting his 
batteries into position on the right, he 
returned the enemy's fire promptly and 
with vigor. He was soon, however, 
severely wounded in the knee; and 
his men, thus left without their leader, 
and retaining a lively recollection of 
their bitter experience in the Wilder- 
ness, fell back in some confusion to 
the woods, where, through the personal 
exertions of General Warren himself, 
they were, after some difficulty, rallied 
and re-formed. Soon afterwards cam6 
up Griffin's division, which met with a 
similar reception, with a like result. 
Meanwhile, Crawford's division and 
that of Wadsworth, now commanded 
by Cutler, had reached the battle- 
ground. Crawford advanced on Grif- 
fin's left ; Cutler advanced on his right; 
and, in a brief space, the woods on 
both flanks were cleared of the enemy. 
Warren's entire corps was now drawn 
up in battle line; and the troops, as 
if convinced that another fierce and 
bloody battle was about to be fought^ 
proceeded of their own accord to thro\^ 
up intreuchmeuts. Such was the com. 
mencement of the great sti-uggle at 
Spottsylvania Court House. The fight- 
ing had been severe. The losses were 
heavy. On the Nationsil side, about 



674 



THE WILDERNESS. 



1300 men were put hors de combat. 
Some of the regiments were almost 
cut to pieces. The Fii'st Michigan, 
which went into the fight 200 strong, 
came out with only 23 men uninjured. 
The heat was most intense ; and large 
immbers of the men suffered from sun- 
etroke. The engagement of Sunday 
morning, the 8th of May, is known as 
the battle of Alsop's Farm. 

It was the head of Longstreet's 
corps, commanded, as we have already 
seen, by Anderson, with which Warren 
had come in collision. It was an imex- 
pected collision; and, resulting as it 
did, it was in the last degree iinfortu- 
nate to the National cause. If Ander- 
son had not been at Spottsylvania 
Court House ahead of WaiTen, there 
can be no doubt that the story of 
that morning's fight would have been 
altogether different. How mysterious- 
ly the fates seemed to be working in 
the interest of the Confederates ! How 
much had been done for them by that 
fire in the woods ! It had given them 
their opportunity, and almost a victory, 
the day before. It had prevented 
Anderson from bivouacking, and, by 
compelling him to march all night, had 
enabled him, without any knowledge 
or purpose of his own, to anticipate 
the arrival of Warren, and so to inter- 
pjite an obstacle to the advance of 
irrant's army. And how strange that 
Meade's own cavalry should have 
blocked the way of his own infantry ! 
Every obstruction put in Warren's way 
was a benefit to Lee. Every moment 
Warren was delayed was a double gain 
to the Confederates. But for the fire 



in the woods, which hastened Ander- 
son's onward march, and but for the 
unfortunate obstructions which hin- 
dered Warren's progress, the National 
advance, it is reasonable to presume, 
would first have reached the clearing 
at Alsop's Farm. In such a case, the 
first great purpose of General Grant 
would have been accomplished — Gen- 
eral Lee's right would Lave been turned. 
As it was, Lee had succeeded in plant- 
ing his army right across Grant's line of 
march, and in establishing a powerful 
bulwark of defense on the Spottsyl- 
vania Ridge. This movement upon 
Spottsylvania brought prominently in- 
to view, and shed fresh lustre on, the 
great abilities of the two rival com- 
manders. The hand of Lee and the 
hand of Grant were distinctly visible. 
Skill in combination, promptitude of 
action and rapidity o£ movement en- 
titled the one to the victory ; and tem- 
porary failure only served to bring into 
more conspicuous relief the military 
science which characterized the general 
plan of the other. 

After the experience of the morning, 
Warren did not feel himself strong 
enough to renew the attack. He 
awaited, therefore, the arrival of Sedg- 
wick, who came up in the afternoon, 
and, in the absence of Meade, assumed 
command. Meade, with the whole of 
Hancock's corps, except the division 
of Gibbon, had remained at Todd'i 
Tavern, where, it was feared, the Con* 
federates were about to make an attach 
in force. With the two corps, Sedg 
wick believed himself strong enougl 
to attempt to drive the enemy froa 



DEATH OF SEDGWICK. 



676 



his favored position on the ridge ; but 
it was nearly sundown before his dis- 
positions were completed. Towards 
evening, a fruitless assault was made 
by a New Jersey brigade, under Gen- 
eral Neill ; and General Crawford, 
who again attempted to advance, was 
vigorously encountered by Ewell, and 
driven back a full mile, with tlie loss 
of about 100 men made prisoners. On 
the whole, Sunday, the 8th, was an 
unfortunate day for the Nationals. In 
the race for Spottsylvania, the Confed- 
erates were clearly the winners ; and 
the prize was of almost inestimable 
value. On the night of the above- 
mentioned day, Lee's army was well 
forward, and firmly entrenched on the 
high ground on the Spottsylvania side 
of the clearing. 

On the morning of Monday, the 
fliay 9th, Meade's entire army, having 
®' arrived, was formed in order of 
battle in front of the Confederate lines. 
Sedgwick took position on the left of 
Warren. Burnside was posted on the 
left of Sedgwick. Hancock, who had 
come up from Todd's Tavern at an 
early hour, formed in line on Warren's 
right, on high ground which over- 
looked the valley of the River Po. 
The disposition was, therefore, as fol- 
lows : Burnside on the left; then Sedg- 
wick ; then Warren, with Hancock on 
the right. The wings were thrown 
forward, so as to encircle the Confede- 
rate position. A small creek, a branch 
of the Ny, lay between the position of the 
enemy and that of Warren and Sedg- 
wick ; it also separated Hancock from 
Warren. Sheridan, with a strong cav- 



alry force, set out, in the morning, on 
a grand raid, his object being to cni- 
Lee's railroad communications with 
Richmond. The day was spent chiefly 
in throwing up intrenchments, and 
otherwise preparing for battle. Thero 
were frequent skirmishes ; and, all day 
long, the Confederate sharpshooters, 
taking advantage of their peculiarly 
favored position, were unusually active. 
While the day was yet young, not a 
few of the Nationals had fallen vic- 
tims to their unerring and deadly aim. 
Among these was General Sedgwick. 
He had been standing in the breast- 
works, on the extreme right of his own 
corps, and giving instructions as to the 
posting of some guns. He was at- 
tended by certain members of his staff. 
The balls of the sharpshooters were 
whistling past them, some of them 
dangerously near. One or two of those 
present showed signs of nervousness. 
"Pooh! pooh! men," said Sedgwick, 
"they could not hit an elephant at that 
distance." He had scarcely uttered 
the words, when he fell dead on the 
ground, the blood streaming from his 
nostrils. A bullet had pierced his face 
just below the left eye. Death was 
instantaneous. A serene smile rested 
on his features, as if connected with 
his last words. The death of Sedg- 
wick was a severe blow to the National 
cause. He was one of the most conv 
petent and most trusted soldiers in the 
army of the Potomac. He was sincere- 
ly lamented by the entire army; and, 
as soon as the fact of his death became 
known, the nation mourned the loss of 
a true patriot, a brave soldier and a 



676 



THE WILDERNESS. 



true man.* General Wright succeeded 
to tlie command of the Sixth corps. 

On the morning of Tuesday, the 
May 10th, everything indicated com- 
iv. plete preparation for ^^attle. 
Grawt occupied substantially the srnie 
position as on the previous day. His 
line stretched about six miles on the 
north ban^' of the Po, in the form 
of a crescent, the wings thrown for- 
ward. The Second corps, across the 
Po, held a line on the right, .laarly 
parallel to the road from Shady Grove 
Church to the Coui't House ; the Fifth 
held the centre, on the east side of the 
Po; the Sizth held the left, facing 
the Court House ; the Ninth was still 
further to the left; and in front of all 
was a dense forest. Lee held Spottsyl- 

• Major-Genebal John Sedgwick was bom in Con- 
lecticut about ISlfi. He graduated at West Point in 
|837. Among his classmates were Benham, Hooker, 
irnold and French, of the National army, and Bragg, 
vCarly and Pemberton, of the Confederate service. He 
<ook part in the Mexican War, and distinguished him- 
«elf in the attack on the San Cosmo Gate, which re- 
dulted in the capture of the city of Mexico. At the 
outbreak of the Civil War, he held the position of lieu- 
ienant^colonel of the Second United States cavalry. 
On the 3lBt of August, ISIJl, he was commissioned a 
brigadier-general of volunteers, and placed in command 
of a brigade of the army of the Potomac. We soon 
after find him commanding the Third division, of the 
Second corps, under General Sumner. He fought, and 
won distinction, in the Peninsular campaign. At An- 
iSetam he bore himself like a very hero of romance, 
Deing twice wounded. With his record at the battle 
of Chancellorsvllle and at Gettysburg, the reader has 
(dready been made familiar. On the reorganization of 
the army of the Potomac, he was one of three corps 
•ommanders whom Meade wished to see retained 
Ih high command. Meade loved and trusted him, 
And, on more than one occasion, left him in command 
of the entire army. His career in the Wilderness, with 
its untmaely end, has been related in the text. Kind 
and gentle in his bearing, h<» was yet firm of character, 
and a strict disciplinarian. His corps was, in conse- 
quence, one of the best in dfiscipUne and morale in the 
whole army. 



vanla and the groimd to the north oi 
the Court House. His left rested on 
Ghidy Run, bending to the north, and 
was sheltered by strong works; hia 
right, curving also to the north, rested 
on the N)'; his centre, slightly thrown 
forward, was posted on commanding 
ground. The entire position was well 
supported by breast-works. Not much 
fighting had been done on the Monday. 
Towards the evening, Hancock made 
a movement across the Po, his object 
being to capture a wagon train which 
was seen moving along the road lead- 
ing to Spottsylvania. The river was 
crossed without difficulty; but night 
came on before tbe operation could be 
completed. When morning dawned, 
the original object of the movement 
no longer existed ; for the Confederate 
train was already safe behind the lines 
at the Court House. Hancock, how- 
ever, was bent on giving effect to his 
purpose, to the extent, at least, of se- 
curing a lodgment nearer the enemy's 
position. In developing his movement, 
he found it necessary again to cross 
the Po, which runs first almost due 
east, and then, as it nears the Court 
House, makes a sharp bend to the 
south. Two miles west of the Court 
House, it is spanned by a wooden 
bridge. The approaches to the bridge, 
however, were all so completely com- 
manded by the enemy, tliat a passage 
at that point was deemed impractica- 
ble. Not to be hindered in his pui 
pose, Hancock had just succeeded in 
throwing across the brigade of Biooke, 
a short distance above, when, by order 
of General Meade, the whole movement 



LAUEEL HILL, 



67^ 



was suspended. It had been decided 
at headquarters to make an attack on 
Lanrel Hill, a strong position in front 
of Warren and Wright ; and Hancock 
was ordered to send two divisions to 
assist in the proposed assault. The 
divisions of Gibbon and Birney were at 
once retired, the enemy taking advan- 
tage of the backward movement, and 
falling heavily on Birney's rear. Bar- 
low's division, of Hancock's corps, was 
left alone on the south side of the Po. 
As the enemy showed a disposition to 
attack, this, too, was quickly with- 
drawn. It was already almost too 
late; for Barlow's skirmishers were 
ab'eady yielding to the vigorous pres- 
sure of the enemy. Two brigades of 
the division were got off without seri- 
ous difficulty ; but the brigades of 
Brooke and Brown were fiercely at- 
tacked, and compelled to hold off the 
foe at every step of their backward 
progress. The difficulties of their po- 
sition were aggravated by a fire, which 
broke out in the woods between them 
and the river. Those five brigades, 
however, were not to be dismayed. 
They succeeded at once in repelling the 
assailants and in recrossing the stream. 
The remarkable coolness and self-pos- 
session of the men alone saved them 
from great disaster. As it was, they 
sustained the loss of many men in 
killed and wounded, and one gun — 
the first gun ever lost by the Second 
corps. Not a few of the wounded 
were left to perish in the flames. 
This movement of Hancock was as un- 
fortunate in its result, as it was ill- 
judged in its inception. It revealed 



the metal of the men, and the pluck 
and endurance of the chiefs of brigades 
and divisions; but it reflected no glory 
on the corps commander. 

Meanwhile, the Nationals had made 
two unsuccessful attempts on Laurel 
Hill. This was, perhaps, the most for- 
midable point along the entire front 
of the enemy's position. It had been 
attacked in the forenoon by the bri- 
gades of Webb and Carroll. It was 
attacked more fiercely in the after- 
noon by the divisions of Crawford and 
Cutler. These attempts but revealed 
the enormous strength of the position. 
When Hancock arrived and joined 
Warren, arrangements were made for 
a united assault by the entire strength 
of the Fifth and Sixth coi"ps. It 
was now five o'clock in the afternoon. 
The assault was made in splendid style. 
In the face of a most withering firt^ 
the Nationals in thousands — now in 
steady line, now as if in broken groups, 
their standard-bearers always conspicu- 
ous — were seen struggling up the slopes, 
and, at one or two points, even pene- 
trating the breast- works. It was found 
impossible, however, to effect a lodg- 
ment or to press on against the 
decimating fire. The Nationals were 
compelled to fall back, and not with- 
out dreadful loss. An hour later, 
notwithstanding the fearful loss of life 
in the previous encounter, the assault 
was repeated. It was made, if possi- 
ble, with even greater bravery : it was 
repulsed with a still more dreadful 
slaughter. The army of the Potomac 
had already witnessed much dreadful 
work. It had never before witnessed 



»78 



«78 



THE WILDERNESS. 



such work as this. Not once, since 
the commencement of the war, had 
such masses of men, in obedience to 
orders, marched to destruction. In 
these two assaults alone, the Nationals 
lost nearly 6000 men. Among the 
killed were Generals J. C. Rice* and 
T. G. Stevenson. 

It was not, however, a day of dis- 
aster alonsf tbe whole line. To the 
left of WaiTen, a vigorous assault was 
made on what seemed a weak point in 
the Confederate line by two brigades 
of the Sixth corps — twelve picked regi- 
ments, under Colonel Upton. The at- 
tack was a complete success. The first 
line of intrenchments was carried ; and 
several guns, with over 900 prisoners, 
were captured. Upton expected assist- 
ance from Mott ; but the latter failed 
to come to the rescue. Unable, with- 
out support, to maintain the advantage 
he had won, Upton fell back to the 

* Jaices Clay Rioe, a brigadier-general of volun- 
teers, was bom at Worthingtxjn, Mass., December 27th, 
1829. His eariy life was spent in a struggle to obtain 
an education ; and, in 1854, he graduated with high 
honors at Yale College. After some experience as a 
teacher and editor, he studied law in Natchez, Miss., 
and was admitted to the bar in that State. He was in 
New York and practising law when the Civil War broke 
out. He entered the service as a private in the Gari- 
baldi Guard. He soon rose to be colonel of the Forty- 
Foiirth New York volunteers, which he led through 
the Peninsular campaign, under McClellan, and at 
Manassas, under Pope. He was sick and unable to be 
present at Antietam ; but he fought at Fredericksburg, 
at the head of his regiment, also at ChanceUorsville, 
where he was temporarily in command of a brigade, 
and again at Gettysburg, where he greatly distinguished 
himself. After Gettysburg, on the recommendation of 
Meade, he was made brigadier-general of volunteers, 
in which capacity he fought in the Wilderness and on 
the banks of the Po, where he gallantly met his death. 
His last words were, "Turn me over, that I may die 
with my face to the enemy." Bice was a maa of deep 
religious principle. 



National lines, carrying with him his 
prisoners, but leaving the captured 
guns behind. 

Such was the terrible 10th of May 
at Spottsylvania Court House. The 
losses on both sides, for the whole day, 
were heavy. The National loss was 
estimated at 10,000. The Confederate 
loss, including killed, wounded and 
missing, was probably not under 9,000. 
On neither side, however, was there 
any disposition to yield. On the con- 
trary, both commanders were resolved 
to renew the conflict on the morrow; 
and preparations were made accord- 
ingly. 

On the morning of the 11th, Gen- 
eral Grant sent a characteristic may 
despatch to the secretary of war. !*• 
"We have now," he wrote, "ended 
the sixth day of very hard fighting. 
The result to this time is much in our 
favor. Our losses have been heavy, as 
well as those of the enemy. I think 
the loss of the enemy must be greater. 
We have taken over 5000 prisoners in 
battle, while he has taken from us but 
few, except stragglers. / propose to 
fight it out on this line, if it takes all 
summer.'''' As to the wisdom of the 
determination expressed in this final 
sentence, different opinions have been 
entertained and expressed. General 
Grant had certainly another course open 
to him. He might have executed an 
effective turning operation, by moving 
southward and crossing the Jamea 
River; and many competent critics 
have declared that by adopting such a 
course at this stage, the success which 
ultimately rewarded his efforts would 



THE SALlEffT. 



679 



have been secured with at least equal 
ejrpedition, and cei'tainly at a less costly 
sacrifice of human life. It is always 
more easy to say what might have 
been done, and what could have been 
done, when the past is looked at in the 
light of the present. General Grant 
knew he was confronted by a powerful, 
wily, skilful antagonist — a commander 
iu every respect his equal, and in some 
eenses his superior. He knew that he 
could count on superior numbers ; but 
he was aware also that he was opposed 
by an ai'my which, in discipline and 
mo7'ale, had never been surpassed in the 
history of human warfare. What diflfi- 
culties might be attendant on a change 
of base he could neither foretell nor 
foresee. In this overland campaign, in 
truth, as at Vicksburg, General Grant, 
while holding tenaciously to his pur- 
pose, was climbing the ladder of expe- 
rience. His success had not yet been 
great; but it had been encouraging. 
Each successive day was giving force 
to his determination and strength to 
his grasp ; and out of the darkness, if 
darkness it could be called, he was 
gradually working his way to a clearer 
light — to a fuller knowledge of the 
necessities and possibilities of his at- 
uation. He would fight it out on this 
line if it took all summer — such was 
his determination ; but it did not by 
any means follow that, if another and 
more advantageous course offered, he 
would close his eyes to the opportu- 
nity. Whatever might be the inherent 
value of the determination, the declara- 
tion of the same gladdened the Na- 
tional heart, and filled it with hope; 



and the words in which it was 
couched have assumed permanent form, 
and added a fresh phrase to English 
speech. 

The 11th was Wednesday. The 
morning rose bright and clear. The 
two opposing armies lay in close prox- 
imity to each other. As the day ad- 
vanced there was some skirmishing; 
but on neither side was any attempt 
made to provoke a general engage- 
ment. Both commanders, it was evi- 
dent, were preparing for battle; nor 
could doubt remain in any mind that, 
whatever might be the result, another 
and even more fearful encounter at 
Spottsylvania was imminent. Grant 
was still bent on carrying out his 
policy of continuous hammering. His 
success, however, on the Tuesday, in 
his repeated attacks on the enemy'a 
left and left centre, had not been en- 
couraging. There was no reason to 
hope that another attack, made in the 
same direction, would be attended mth 
any better results. It was resolved, 
therefore, to strike a bold and effective 
blow on the enemy's right centre. At 
that point, and near the Landrum 
House, Lee's lines formed a salient. 
It was Grant's conviction that the 
point was vulnerable. Arrangements 
for the attack were made forthwith. 
Hancock, who was chosen to strike the 
blow, was ordered to leave his en- 
trenchments in front of A. P. Hill, and, 
by moving to the left, to take position 
between the Sixth and Ninth corps. 
The movement was to have the sup- 
port of the entire army. Wright was 
to extend his left, and to concentrate 



«80 



THE WILDERNESS. 



on that wing. Warren was to make a 
diversionary movement on the Confed- 
erate left, in his own front, the object 
being to give the enemy sufficient em- 
ployment in that direction, and so pre- 
vent the withdrawal of his troops for 
the relief of the menaced point. Burn- 
side, for a similar reason, was to make 
a vigorous assault on the extreme left. 
Rain fell heavily in the afternoon. 
When night came the rain-storm had 
not abated ; and, as the moon was in 
its first quarter, the night was dark 
ind dismal. Soon after midnight, un- 
der cover of the darkness and the 
istorm, Hancock moved out from his 
jntrenchments, and, guided by the 
sompass, passed in rear of Warren 
and Wright, and took position within 
1200 yards of the enemy's front, at 
the point to be attacked. Barlow's 
division, in two lines of masses, was 
placed on the left ; Birney's division, 
in two deployed lines, was placed on 
the right; Mott's division, Hancock's 
Fourth, supported Birney; and Gib- 
bon's division was held in reserve. 
Of the actual strength of the position 
about to be attacked, the Nationals 
knew nothing. It might be weak and 
defenseless. It might be well forti- 
fied_ and proof against any attack. It 
mattered not. Hancock was ready, 
wairing for the first streak of early 
dawn, to launch forth his brave battal- 
ions to victory or to death. 

It is now half-past four o'clock on 
yay the morning of Thursday, May 
12t the 12th. A heavy fog is rest- 
ing on the entire surrounding country ; 
«ind the feeble light of the rising sun 



struggles hard to penetrate the gloom. 
Hancock's divisions are already in mo- 
tion. Steadily and silently they move 
towards the salient — Barlow over open 
ground, which extends up to the Con- 
federate lines, Birney through the 
thickly wooded ground more to the 
right. Not a shot has yet been fired 
— not a word uttered. More than 
half of the intervening distance has 
already been crossed. Suddenly, there 
is a loud -resounding cheer, which 
rings along the whole line. Sponta- 
neously, the men take the double- 
quick. On they roll, like a resistless 
wave. Nothing can now restrain their 
fierce impetuosity. They have reached 
the abatis, torn it up, and tossed it 
aside. With wild cries, they rush 
bounding over the intrenchments. Bar- 
low and BLrney's men entering almost 
simnltaneously. Inside the intrench- 
ments there is a terrible hand-to-hand 
struggle, the bayonet and the clubbed- 
musket being freely used. Nothing, 
however, can save the doomed Confed- 
erates. Some 4000 men, including 
General Johnson, of Ewell's corps, and 
General Geoi-ge H. Stewart, are sur- 
rounded and captured ; and with them 
thirty pieces of artillery and as many 
colors. Meanwhile, the remainder of 
the Confederate force, stricken with 
terror and thrown into the wildest con- 
fusion, have fallen back, seeking safety 
in the rear. 

This attack of Hancock's was justly 
regarded as the most brilliant feat of 
amis yet accomplished in the cam- 
paign. Never was surprise more com- 
plete or more successful. The officers 



A GREAT BATTLE. 



68] 



were taken at their breakfast. The 
captured generals were greatly morti- 
fied. When brought into his presence, 
Hancock received them courteously, 
extending his hand. Johnson took it, 
but, with tears in his eyes, declared 
that he would rather have died than 
been made a prisoner. Stewart be- 
haved with less gallantry. Hancock 
had known him before. "How are 
you, Stewart?" said Hancock, as he 
offered him his hand. The reply was 
haughty and indignant. " I am Gen- 
eral Stewart, of the Confederate army ; 
and, under present circumstances, I de- 
cline to take your hand." "And un- 
der any other circumstances, general," 
said Hancock, with great coolness* "I 
should not have offered it." 

An hour only had elapsed since the 
column of attack was formed. Along 
with the prisoners, which he sent to 
Grant, Hancock sent a note hastily 
written in pencil, saying: "I have 
finished up Johnson, and am now 
going into Early." This second task, 
as we shall soon see, he found to be 
less easy of accomplishment than the 
former. Early, like Johnson, com- 
manded a division of EwelFs corps. 
At the point penetrated, Lee's army, 
as we have seen, formed a salient. 
Hancock had, therefore, by his first 
success, thrust a wedge between the 
Confederate right and centre. It was 
his hope that he would be able to cut 
Lee's army in two ; and there can be 
no doubt that if sufiicient provision 
had been made, promptly and in force, 
to follow up the advantage Hancock 
had won by his first brilliant assault, 



the desired end would have been ac- 
complished. As it was, Hancock's 
troops, flushed with success, and incaj> 
able of being restrained after the cap- 
ture of the intrenchments, pressed on 
through the forest in the direction of 
Spottsylvania, driving the flying enemy 
before them. At the distance of half 
a mile, they were suddenly brought 
to a halt in their triumphant career. 
They had reached a fresh line of 
breast-works. Behind these works 
Ewell had taken shelter; and rein- 
forcements had reached him from the 
corps of Anderson and Hill. The 
National advance was now effectually 
checked. It was not only impossible 
to make headway — it was impossible 
to remain in the position in which they 
found themselves. The tide of battle 
was now turned. Gathering them- 
selves up for a supreme effort, the 
Confederates, in overwhelming num- 
bers and in magnificent array, rushed 
from the breast-works, and, falling with 
crushing weight on Hancock's men, 
now slightly disordered by their feai-- 
less rush through the woods, drove 
them back to the line which they had 
captured in the early morning. Here, 
however, Hancock managed to rally 
his troops ; and, getting them into line 
on the right and left of the angle of 
the works, he stoutly resisted the fierce 
and repeated onsets of the enemy, and 
firmly held his position. His situation, 
however, was becoming every moment 
more critical. Lee was resolved, if 
possible, to recover the lost line of 
works ; and, with this end in view, he 
was putting forth the most Herculean 



682 



THE WILDERNESS. 



efforts, and bringing his entire strength 
to bear on the one point. It was now 
six o'clock — one hour and a half since 
the first onset. Hancock was still 
holding his position ; but relief was 
sorely needed. At this opportune mo- 
ment, when most needed, relief came. 
Wright, who had been hurried foi'ward 
with his Sixth corps, arrived on the 
ground, and took position on the right 
of the salient. Hancock, thus relieved, 
concentrated his troops on the left of 
the angle. A little later, about eight 
o'clock, and with a view to relieve the 
pressure on Hancock and Wright, 
Burnside and Wai-ren were ordered 
to attack along their whole fi'onts. 
The battle now raged furiously at 
eveiy point. No evidence was given 
that Lee had changed his purpose. 
The last line at the salient was still the 
object of his ambition. On Hancock 
and Wright he dealt his heaviest and 
most terrific blows. Again and again, 
and in rapid succession, he rolled 
against them his heavy masses. He 
seemed resolved to dislodge them. 
Seeing this, and becoming convinced 
that Burnside and Warren were pro- 
ducing no impression on their re- 
spective fronts. Grant detached two 
divisions from the Fifth corps — those of 
Cutler and Griffin — and sent them to 
the aid of the Second and Sixth corps 
lit the angle which was still regarded 
AS the piize of battle, and where was 
the focus of the fight. Five times did 
Lee hurl his heavy columns against the 
National lines entrusted with the de- 
fense of this position. Five times, 
afttfl" severe hand-to-hand fighting, in 



which the slaughter on both sides was 
dreadful, were the attacking columns 
repulsed. It was not until after mid- 
night that Lee withdrew his shattered 
and bleeding lines and re-formed them 
in his interior position. Hancock held 
the works he had captured in the morn- 
ing. The battle had lasted twenty 
hours. The losses on either side were 
about 10,000 men. 

Such was the great battle of Spott- 
sylvania Court House. Although not 
a decisive victory, it was a positive 
gain to the National cause. Its moral 
effect was great. It was one of the 
bloodiest battles of the war. The 
sight presented at the angle where the 
tide of battle surged and roared from 
earliest dawn till past midnight of that 
summer day, as described by eye-wit- 
nesses, was something shocking to wit- 
ness. The bodies of the dead and 
wounded were piled in heaps, and min- 
gled together in wild confusion. It 
was, as one has said, "an angle of 
death — one hideous Golgotha." The 
severity of the musketiy fire was evi- 
denced by the condition of the forest 
after the battle. The trees were not 
only pierced by the bullets, but literally 
cut down. At Washington, as a relic of 
this fight, there is preserved the trunk 
of an oak tree which was cut through 
and through by bullets. The trunk is 
about twenty inches in diameter. 

On the morning of the 13th, the two 
armies confronted each other. May 
Hancock holding his advanced **• 
position, and the Confederates firmly 
intienched behind an inner and shorter 
line. Lee's position, in truth, was »i 



MEADE'S ADDRESS TO THE TKOOPS. 



68J 



invulnerable as ever. The troops on 
l)oth sides, as well they might be, wei-e 
sorely exhausted. The rain which set 
in on the 11th continued to fall. The 
ground, in consequence, was soaked, 
jnd the roads were heavy. On this 
day there was some manoeuvring; 
and a severe engagement, which lasted 
several hours, took place between the 
forces of Burnside and those of A. P. 
Hill. Nothing was gained on either 
side. It was now the ninth day since 
the army of the Potomac crossed the 
Rapidan. In that brief space of time, 
it had lost nearly 30,000 men, includ- 
ing a large number of officers. It was 
a fearful sacrifice of human life, suffi- 
cient to appal the stoutest heart. There 
were, indeed, throughout the land not 
a few, who, looking only at the sacri- 
fice, and heedless of the results, pro- 
nounced the battles in the Wilderness 
and at Spottsylvania useless butcheries. 
Such was not the opinion of the gen- 
erals in the field. It was not the 
opinion of Secretary of War Stanton, 
who nobly sustained Grant, and who, 
by his daily bulletins, cheered and 
buoyed up the hopes of the people. 
Taking advantage of the lull on the 
13th, General Meade addressed the 
following stirring, congratulatory epis- 
tle to his troops : 

" Soldiers : The moment has arrived when 
your commanding general feels authorized to 
address you in terms of gratulation. 

"For eight days and nights, almost without 
intermissioB, in rain and sunshine, you have 
been gallantly fighting a desperate foe, in po- 
sitions naturally strong, and rendered doubly 
so by intrenchments. 

"You have compelled him to abandon his 



fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire and 
attempt to stop your onward progress; and 
now he has abandoned the last intrenched po- 
sition so tenaciously held, suffering a loss in 
all of 18 guns, 23 colors, and 8000 prisoners, 
including two general officers. 

"Your heroic deeds and noble endurance 
of fatigue and privations will ever be memor- 
able. Let us return thanks to God for the 
mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for 
its continuation. 

" Soldiers! your work is not yet over. The 
enemy must be pursued, and, if possible, over- 
come. The courage and fortitude you have 
displayed renders your commanding general 
confident your future efforts will result in 
success. 

" While we mourn the loss of many gallani 
comrades, let ua remember the enemy must 
have suffered equal, if not greater losses. 

"We shall soon receive reinforcements, 
which he cannot expect. Let us determine 
to continue vigorously the work, so well 
begun, and, under God's blessing, in a short 
time the object of our labors will be accom- 
plished." 

For five days more, from the 1 3th to 
the 18th, the armies remained rela- 
tively in the same position — Grant con- 
tinually throwing out towards the left, 
in the hope of overlapping and break- 
ing the Confederate right, the enemy 
ever bristling out in breast-works, and 
successfully repelling every assault. 
The result of this continual manoeu- 
vring was that Grant's army, which on 
its arrival occupied a position four or 
five miles to the northwest of Spottsyl- 
vania Court House, was, at the end of 
ten days, occupying a position almost 
due east of that place, the left resting 
at Massaponax Church, seme four miles 
distant. Grant having gradually be- 
come convinced of the impossibility of 
making any impression on Lee's front 



684 



THE WILDERNESS. 



or flank, at last resolved upon a turn- 
ing operation, by which he hoped to 
bring him out of his intrenchraents. 
On the 19th, he received from Wash- 
ington reinforcements sufficient to 
make up for all his losses ; and in the 
afternoon of that day, much to the de- 
light of the soldiers, who were glad to 
turn their backs on the bloody lines at 
Spottsylvania, orders were given for a 
movement, to be made at midnight, 
towards the North Anna. Lee, quick 
to discern the purpose of his antago- 
nist, and sleeplessly vigilant, from 
some cause or other suspected Grant's 
design. Resolved to hinder the in- 
tended movement, and so gain time for 
the transference of his own troops to a 
new base, he ordered Ewell to make a 
visrorous demonstration on the extreme 
National right. Late in the after- 
noon, Ewell executed the movement as 
directed. He crossed the Ny, above 
the right flank, seized the road leading 
to Fredericksburg, and captured the 
ammimition-train coming up from that 
place. The National right flank was 
guarded by a body of foot artillerists 
who had just come up from the de- 
fenses at Washington, and who had 
never before been in battle. They 
were under the command of General 
R. O. Tyler. Ewell's attack was 
promptly met, the artillerists, ignorant 
of the Indian devices to which the 
veterans were accustomed to resort 
while fighting in the woods, fearlessly 
exposing themselves, firing furiously, 
and ultimately compelling the enemy 
to fall back from the road and into the 
woods beyond. Tyler's men suffered 



severely; but the honor of repulsing 
the enemy belongs to them. Soon 
afterwards, some of the veterans of the 
Second and Fifth corps came up, and, 
continuing the pursuit, captured sev- 
eral hundred prisoners. In conse 
quence of this attack^ the movement to 
the North Anna was delayed until the 
following night. Grant's losses, which 
we have already enumerated up to the 
13th, had been greatly increased in the 
interval, probably by not less than ' 
10,000 men, making the fearful aggre- 
gate, since the crossing of the Rapidan, 
over 40,000 men in killed, wounded and 
missing; yet it was not without hope 
and confidence he turned his face to- 
wards Richmond. Fredericksburg had 
been the base of supplies since the 
army entered the Wilderness. Thither, 
cilso, had been conveyed the sick and 
wounded. As the army moved in the 
direction of Richmond, new bases were 
opened at Port Royal and afterwards 
at White House. The management 
of this department continued to reflect 
the highest credit on Chief-Quarter- 
master Ingalls. 

It is time now that our attention 
should be given to certain outside 
movements which were being carried 
on simultaneously with those events con- 
nected with the main army in the Wil- 
derness and at Spottsylvania. These 
were Sheridan's raid and the co-opera 
tive movements of Burnside and Sigel 

Sheiidan, it will be remembered, ir 
obedience to orders, set out on the 
morning of the 9 th with por- May 
tions of the three divisions of •• 
his corps, commanded respectirely by 



SHERIDAN'S RAID. 



689 



Merrit, Wilson and Gregg. His instruc- 
tions were to engage the enemy's cav- 
alry, to destroy the Fredericksburg and 
Vii'ginia Central railroads, to threaten 
Richmond, and finally to communicate 
with, and draw supplies from Butler's 
force on the James River. Cutting 
loose from the main army, he swept 
over the Po and the Ta; and crossing 
the North Anna, he struck the Vir- 
ginia Central, and captured Beaver 
Dam Station. Sending out his men, 
he destroyed about ten miles of the 
track, also two locomotives, three 
trains of cars, and 1,500,000 rations. 
There, too, he recaptured 400 Na- 
tionals, who had been made prisoners 
in the Wilderness, and who were on 
their way to Richmond. At Beaver 
Dam Station he was overtaken by a 
body of Confederate cavalry, under 
General J. E. B. Stuart, who had fol- 
lowed him from the Rapidan. Stuart 
fell upon him heavily, both on flank 
and rear; but Sheridan, although he 
sustained some losses, was npt hin- 
dered in his onward progress. He 
crossed the South Anna at Ground- 
squirrel Bridge ; and by daylight on 
the morning of the 11th, he had 
captured Ashland Station, on the Fred- 
ericksburg road. After destroying six 
iiiles of the road, a train, and a large 
quantity of stores, he proceeded to- 
vvards Richmond. On the same day, 
at Yellowstone Tavern, a few miles 
north of Richmond, he again came into 
collision with Stuart. A severe con- 
contest ensued, Sheridan finally obtain- 
ing possession of the turnpike, and 
driving the Confederate cavalry back 



towards Ashland and across the north 
fork of the Chickahominy. In this en- 
counter. General Stuart was mortally 
wounded ; and thus passed out of sight 
one of the most conspicuous figures of 
the war.* Sheridan pushed on, his 
men greatly emboldened by their success 
at Yellowstone Tavern ; and approach 
ing Richmond, he niade a bold dash on 
the outer line of works. This he easily 
carried — Custer's brigade capturing a 
section of artillery and 100 men. Find- 
ing the second line too strong to be 
assailed with any prospect of success, 
Sheridan retraced his steps, and retired 
rapidly to the crossing of the Chicka- 
hominy, at Meadow Bridge. There he 
found the bridge partially destroyed, 
with the enemy in some force in his 
front and pressing also on his rear. 
Repulsing the enemy in his rear, he 
rebuilt the bridge, under a most gall- 
ing fire, and crossed a poi'tion of his 
ti'oops. The remainder made a detour 
by way of Cold Harbor, and crossed 



•James E. B. Stnart, a major-general in the Confed- 
erate service, was born in Patrick County, Virginia 
about 1833. He graduated at West foiut in 1854, and 
was commissioned a cavalry officer. He had reached 
the rank of first-lieutenant when he resigned. May 
14th, 1861. He had seen some active service in the 
Indian country, and had come to be known as a bi-ava 
soldier and a dashing, fearless rider. He was present 
and fought at Bull Run, became brigadier-general in 
September, 1861, and afterwards organized the Con- 
federate cavalry in Virginia. He became conspicuous 
by his celebrated raid on McClellan's rear on the 13th 
and 14th of June, 18G2. When Lee entered Maryland, 
in August of that year, Stuart, in the midst of a terrific 
thunderstorm, fell upon Pope's headquarters, and cap. 
tnred many private papers and some plans of campaign 
In all the subsequent movements, up until his deaih, of 
the army of Northern Virginia, Stuart played a promi- 
nent part. After being wounded at Yellowstone Tav- 
ern, he was conveyed to Bichmoud, where he died 
a day or two atterwards. 



«8d 



THE WrLDERNESS. 



the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge — 
ground rendered forever memorable by 
the Peninsular campaign. Haxall's 
Landing was reached on the 14th. 
Communication from that point was 
©pened with General Butler; supplies 
were received ; and the wearied troops 
were allowed three days to rest and 
refit Sheridan then returned leisurely, 
by way of Baltimore Store, White 
House and Hanover Court House ; and, 
on the 25th of May, he rejoined the 
army of the Potomac. 

Let us now see what success had 
attended the co-operative movements. 
Butler, as has been stated, moved from 
May Fortress Moni-oe on the 4th of 
*• May, and concenti'ated at York- 
town and Gloucester. He had already 
been joined by Gillmore, with the 
Tenth corps, and W. F. Smith, with a 
portion of the Eighteenth. He had, 
also, a division of horse at Norfolk and 
Portsmouth, under General Kautz, 
His entire force amounted to over 
S0,000 men. Gillmore had built up a 
great reputation by his approaches on 
Morris Island, and by his splendid 
artilleiy practice against the city of 
Charleston. Smith had won distinction 
under McClellan in the peninsula, and 
ander Grant at Chattanooga, where 
his skilful engineering greatly contri- 
buted to the success of the Nationals. 
Kautz, too, was a daring and capable 
officer. At first, it seemed as if Butler 
proposed to move upon Richmond by 
the old route of McClellan. This view 
of the case received some encourao-e- 
ment from the fact that he had already, 
jU the 1st of May, sent to West Point 



a brigade of infantry and a body of 
cavalry, some 1800 strong — the former 
by water, the latter by land. The real 
object of this movement was to mask 
his main design. It was his belief 
that the presence of these troops at 
West Point would attract the enemy 
towards Richmond, and that in the 
meantime he would be able to execute 
the principal part of his programme. 
As soon as this was accomplished, and 
he had reached the point intended, the 
troops at West Point were to march 
across the peninsula, and join the 
main body. 

On the night of the 4th, Butlei 
embarked his troops on transports, 
dropped down the York, passed For- 
tress Monroe, turned into the James, 
and advanced up that river, preceded 
by a fleet of gunboats. On the fol- 
lowing day, and without encountering 
any opposition, he put on shore, on the 
south side of the James, at Wilson's 
Avharf, one brigade of colored troops 
under General Wild, at Fort Powhat- 
tan two regiments, at City Point 
Hinks' division, and landed the main 
body a mile or two above, at Ber- 
muda Hundred — a neck of land 
formed by the James and the Appo 
mattox, and capable of being strongly 
fortified. Butler immediately pi'o- 
ceeded to throw up intrenchments; 
and the gunboats were disposed bo as 
to protect the flanks. 

Simultaneously with this movement 
of the main body, Kautz, with 3000 
cavalry, started from Suffolk, forced a 
passage over the Blackwater, and, push- 
ing westward, struck the Weldon Rail 



THE AEMY OP THE JAMES, 



687 



»oad at Stony Creek, and burned the 
bridge. 

Butler's advance had not been made 
a moment too soon. After the depar- 
ture of Gillmore for the north — Beau- 
regard, having no foe in his immedi- 
ate neighborhood, hastened to follow. 
Gathering together what ti'oops could 
be obtained from Charleston, Savan- 
nah and Florida, he hurried towards 
the James. By the time Butler reached 
Bermuda Hundred, the van of Beaure- 
gard's army had reached Petersburg. 
The cutting of the railroad by Kautz, 
and the destruction of the bridge, i-e- 
tarded for a time the arrival of the 
main body; but Butler was soon to 
have in his front a powerful and skil- 
ful antagonist, one who would test his 
strength and fully tax his ingenuity. 

At Bermuda Hundred, the 6th was 
spent in strengthening the defenses, and 
in making i-econnoissances. Early on 
May the 7th, General Brooks was sent, 
7» with five brigades, to destroy the 
Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. 
The enemy was found in a strong 
position, covering the I'oad from Wal- 
thal Junction to Chester Station. The 
cavalry at first fell back to the line 
of the infantry. A line of battle was 
immediately formed; and Brooks ad- 
vanced to the attack, driving the Con- 
federates from their vantage ground 
back upon the railroad. There, how- 
ever, a determined stand was made. 
After some severe fighting, during 
which a bridge which crossed one of 
the tributaries of the Appomattox was 
destroyed, the National right was 
pushed back in turn ; and, finally, both 



parties withdrew. On the 9th, ^ay 
another and more vigorous ad- 9. 
vance was made upon the railroad. 
The great object was to hinder or pre- 
vent the arrival of the troops from the 
South. Beauregard's men, however, 
were already well forward ; as Kautz, 
unable to hold the road, or to advance 
to Petersbui'g, had returned to City 
Point, and left the Confederates free 
to push their way to Petersburg. The 
attack on the 9th was made by three 
divisions of the Tenth corps, under 
Terry, Ames and Turner, with two di- 
visions of the Eighteenth, under Weit- 
zel and Wistar — Gillmore and Smith 
commanding their I'espective _ corps. 
They marched from camp at daylight, 
and reached the railroad at four differ- 
ent points. By noon, not less than 
four miles of i-ail were torn up and 
destroyed. The Confederates were en- 
countered in force near Snake Creek, 
where they occupied a strong line of 
earth-works. A severe battle ensued, 
the Nationals finally driving the enemy 
across the creek, and destroying the 
railroad. 

Elated by his successes on the 9th, 
General Butler sent to Stanton a des- 
patch in which, taking too hopeful a 
view of his own position, he unwisely 
belittled the resources and ability of 
his antagonist. Ignoi-ant as yet of the 
fate which had befallen Kautz, he en- 
larged on the successes of that general 
as well as of his own. He had ob- 
tained a position, he said, in which, 
with proper supplies, he could hold 
out against the whole of Lee's army; 
he had cut Beauregard's army hope- 



§83 



THE WILDERNESS. 



lessly in two ; he had whipped D. H. 
Hill, after a severe and well-contest- 
ed fight; and he assured the war 
secretary that Grant would not be 
troubled with any further reinforce- 
ments to Lee from the army of Beau- 
regard. A few days more will shoAv 
how greatly General Butler was de- 
ceived. He had made up his mind to 
effect a passage across Snake Creek on 
the morrow, and crowd the enemy to- 
wards Petersburg. That night, how- 
ever, he received information to the 
effect that Lee was in full retreat to- 
wards Richmond, with Grant in pur- 
suit; and fearing that he might soon 
have the aiTuy of Northern Virginia on 
his hands, he recalled his troops from 
Snake Creek, strengthened his lines, 
and prepared to march north to take 
part in the investment of the Confed- 
erate capital. During the 10th, there 
was some fighting at Snake Creek, 
some charges and counter-charges — nei- 
ther party gaining on the other. On 
the 11th, both armies rested. 

How much General Butler haa de- 
ceived himself, and what precious op- 
portunities had already been lost, was 
soon to be made apparent. It ought 
to have been possible for the army of 
the James to capture Petersburg. It 
might even have succeeded in captur- 
ing Richmond. The capture of the 
one or the other would certainly have 
had the effect of placing the Confed- 
erates at a serious disadvantage ; and it 
could hardly have failed to hasten the 
inevitable end. With the arrival of 
the army of Beauregard, the opportu- 
nity offered to the army of the James 



was hopelessly gone, Petersburg was 
secured to the Confederates: and Rich- 
mond was not to be taken from them ■ 
except by the destruction of the army * 1 
of General Lee. It would be unjust, 
perhaps, to blame either General Bui^ 
ler or General Grant, because richer 
fruit was not already plucked by the 
army of the James ; but it is not to be 
denied that the clockwork-like accu- 
racy of motion which characterized 
the army of General Grant at luka and 
Corinth, which was a prominent and 
striking feature at Vicksburg, which 
was, if possible, even a more promi- 
nent and still more striking feature at 
Chattanooga, was wanting to that huge 
and complicated machine which was 
set in motion on the 4th of May, when 
the army of the Potomac advanced 
from Culpepper Court House to the 
fords of the Rapidan. There is a 
limit, after all, to the ability of mor- 
tals. General Grant's instructions to 
Butler may have been imperfect or 
they may have been indefinite; Gen- 
eral Butler may, on the other hand, 
have been wanting in discretion ; but 
it surely implied a condition of mind 
at once over-exacting and unrea- 
sonable, to expect that the original 
plan of campaign for the entire army 
would be carried out according to the 
strict letter of the instructions given, 
or that success would attend its every 
movement, and at every point. 

After the rest on the 11th, there 
were signs of life and activity again 
inside the lines of the army of tlie 
James. On the 12th, a general advance 
was made in the direction of Ricb 



CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS. 



681 



May mond. General Butler ordered 
12. a heavy column northward — 
the right under General Smith, who 
moved on the turnpike, leading to 
Fort Darling; the left under General 
Gillmore, who followed the line ot 
railroad further to the west. The 
Confederates fell back before them ; 
and Generals Butler and Smith estab- 
lished their headquarters that night at 
the mansion of Dr. Friend, about nine 
miles from Richmond. Gillmore was 
equally well advanced on the National 
left. It was an'anged that a general 
attack should be made next morning 
on the enemy's position at Proctor's 
Creek. When morning dawned, it 
was discovered that he had retired to a 
strong line of intrenchments in his 
rear. General Gillmore succeeded in 
turning the right of this new position ; 
but such was the strength of the 
works, and so formidable seemed the 
interior lines of defense, that the as- 
sault was delayed until the 16th. 

The night of the 15th was calm and 
beautiful. A lovely moon, but slightly 
obscured by a few fleecy clouds which 
floated across the heavens, lit up the 
scene. In the National camp all was 
quiet; but everything indicated pre- 
paredness for the proposed assault in 
the early morning. As the morning 
hours advanced, but before it was yet 
dawn, a thick fog arose from the river 
and enwrapped the surrounding coun- 
try in gloom. As yet there were no 
signs of life in the National camp. 
All of a sudden the stillness of the 
early morning hours was disturbed, 
ind the lone echoes were aroused 



by a fierce outburst of musketry and 
the loud thundering of artillery, jfay 
Beauregard, taking advantage of *6« 
the fog, had fallen upon the National 
army with his entii'e force. It was a 
complete surprise to Butler, who was 
ill-prepared to resist such an attack. 

Beauregard had evidently made him- 
self familiar with Butler's position. 
He knew the ground; and he had 
made his arrangements with admirable 
skill. The National line, although 
unduly extended, failed to reach the 
river on the right. There was a mile 
and a half of open, undulating country 
between Smith's right and the James. 
Beauregard's object was to turn Butler's 
right flank and get to his rear; but 
the more effectually to accomplish his 
purpose, he resolved to strike heavily 
in front, while he had given instruc- 
tions to General Whiting — who had 
been left behind on the Petersburg and 
Richmond Railroad, in the rear of Gill- 
more — to make a simultaneous onset, 
and so cut off the National retreat. 
Such a plan, if fully carried out, could 
hardly have failed to prove disastrous 
to Butler's army. 

It seemed for a time as if Beaure- 
gard's expectations would be fully re- 
alized. The first fierce blow fell upon 
Smith's right, which was held by Heck 
man's brigade, of Weitzel's divnsion. 
The blow was as overwhelming as it 
was sudden. Heckman made a gallant 
fisrht : but he was soon surrounded and 
made prisoner. The much-coveted po- 
sition was already all but won. The 
right flank had been turned ; and the 
Confederates were pressing on to seize 



690 



THE WILDERNESS. 



the road which leads to Bennuda Hun- 
dred. It seemed as if all were lost. 
Happily, deliverance was at hand. The 
night before, General Butler had or- 
dered three regiments of Ames' divi- 
sion, of Gillmore's corps, to pass over 
and reinforce Smith on the right. 
During the darkness they had been 
pressing forward to their appointed 
position. The advance regiment — the 
One Hundred and Twelfth New York — 
was just coming up. It was almost im- 
mediately joined by the Ninth Maine, 
when the two met the Confederates at 
the point where the transverse road, 
along which they were moving, crosses 
the road which leads to Bermuda Hun- 
dred. At the moment of what seemed 
victory — when about to seize the road 
on which his hopes were so ardently 
bent, and on the possession of which so 
much depended — the triumphant foe 
was brought to a standstill ; and, per- 
plexed by this sudden and unexpected 
manifestation of strength, he quickly 
withdrew. The line of retreat, if re- 
treat should be necessary, was so far 
safe. 

Meanwhile, a fierce attack had been 
made on Smith's front. It was at- 
tended with less success than the 
attack on his flank. A device which 
had proved a means of salvation to a 
portion of Burnside's army in front of 
Fort Sanders, at Knoxville, was here 
again adopted with success. Tele- 
graph wire, it appears, was found plen- 
tifully in the neighborhood. Smith, a 
day or two before, had caused a large 
amount of this Avire to he wound 
around the tree-stumps which were 



abiindant in the front of his lines. 
The wire was carried from stump to 
stump, and formed a species of vnre 
net-work. When, therefore, the Con. 
federates, unconscious of the danger 
which awaited them, came rushing 
forward through the dense fog, they 
tripped and stumbled, becoming inex- 
tricably entangled in the meshes of 
wire, and falling an easy prey to the 
bayonet or rifle of the National soldier. 
Discovering that no impression could 
be made on the front of the National 
right, and apparently indifferent to the 
National left, Beauregard massed his 
forces again, in larger numbers, against 
Smith's right, this time taking fuller 
advantage of the opening between him 
and the river. Smith fell back and 
formed a new line, his right now more 
close to the James. Gillmore, also, 
yielded to the movement and fell back. 
Beauregard pressed closer and closer, 
with increasing numbers; he evident- 
ly expected Whiting to strike, as di- 
rected, in the rear of the National 
army, and cut off its retreat. Whit- 
ing, however, for some reason or other, 
failed to obey the behests of his chief; 
and General Butler, trembling for the 
safety of his trains, his communica- 
tions, and the depot on the James, or 
dered the withdrawal of the whole 
army within the lines at Bermuda Hun- 
dred. Beauregard followed him up, 
and, as he could not penetrate the linas, 
proceeded to cast up intrenchments in 
Butler's front. In these operations of 
the 16th, the Nationals lost over 4000 
men. The Confederate loss exceeded 
3000. Butler was now in a position in 



BUTLER AND SIGEL. 



691 



which he had no reason to dread the 
enemy ; but he was literally locked in 
on the land side. On both flanks, 
however, he had the rivers at his com- 
mand; and it was still possible for 
him, taking advantage of his water 
communications, to strike a vigorous 
blow for the capture of Petersburg. 
He was, indeed, making preparations 
for some such effort, when he received 
orders fi-om Grant to send two thirds 
of his effective force to the assistance 
of the array of the Potomac, then in the 
vicinity of the Chickahominy. Thus 
it was that Butler came to be " bottled 
up at Bermuda Hundred." 

General Kautz, meanwhile, made 
another successful raid ; but it had no 
practical bearing on General Butler's 
plans. We have seen already that, 
after his raid on the Weldon Railroad, 
Kautz, finding it impossible to hold 
the road, returned to City Point. This 
was on the 8th. On the 12th, he ven- 
tured forth again. Moving from rail- 
road to railroad, over a wide extent of 
country, he struck a large number of 
stations, among which were Coalfield, 
Powhattan, Cbula, Wilson's, Welville, 
White and Black, Jarrett's and others, 
and then returned to City Point on the 
17th. At most of these points, he 
burned the depots, tore up the tracks, 
destroyed the stores, and made havoc 
generally with freight-trains and loco- 
motives wherever he found them. It 
is true that this raid was not of any di- 
rect or immediate benefit to General 
Butler; but it nevertheless brought 
forth precious fruit, and, like all the 
other raids of a similar kind, had a 



most important bearing on the final 
issue. It weakened the South generally; 
and it tended to isolate Richmond, and 
hasten the end. So much for the co-oper- 
ative movement under General Butler. 
It is time now to turn to Sigel, 
and see how he carried out his part 
of the general plan. It will be re- 
membered that he was ordered to 
divide his troops and make a con- 
joint movement up the Shenandoah 
and up the Kanawha. Sigel himself, 
with one portion, was to move up the 
Shenandoah. Crook, with another por- 
tion, accompanied by a division of cav- 
alry, under Averill, was to move up 
the Kanawha. The objectives were 
respectively Staunton and Lynchburg. 
These movements, which commenced 
on the 1st of May, were less produc- 
tive of good results than those of But- 
ler and Kautz. Crook advanced from 
Charleston, with Averill's cavalry in 
advance. On the 10th of May, Ave- 
riWf who, with 2000 cavalry, had been 
ordered to move towards Wytheville, 
for the purpose of destroying the lead 
mines at that place, was met by a cav- 
alry force, undei* Morgan, and was de- 
feated. Crook himself, with 6000, 
moved towards Dublin Station, where 
he was met by a Confederate force, 
under McCausland; and although he 
proved himself the victor, after a se- 
vere fight, it was not until he had lost 
700 men, of whom pome 125 were 
killed. He destroyed eome miles of 
railroad; but on Morgan coming up 
with a strong force, he withdrew, fall- 
ing back to Meadow Bridge. Sigel 
had no better luck than his subordi- 



692 



THE WILDERNESS. 



aates. When near New Market, on 
the 15th, he was met by General 
Breckenridge, whom Lee had sent to 
resist the invasion. Breckenridge fell 
upon Sigel with tremendous fury, driv- 
ing him down the valley to the shel- 
ter of Cedar Creek, near Strasburg, 
with a loss of 700 men, 6 guns and 
1000 small arras. Sigel's expedition, 
in all its departments, whatever the 
cause, had proved a complete failure. 
It is not wonderful that, in the circum- 
etances, General Grant should have 
thought fit to relieve him. General 
Hunter, who had already made a figure 
in the war, particularly on the southern 
coast, was placed in command. 

Hunter, according to instructions 
received from Grant, at the head of 
about 9000 men, moved upon Staunton 
with the view of destroying the rail- 
road leading thence towards Charlotte- 
ville. He had instructions, also, to 
move upon Lynchburg. At Piedmont, 
near Middle River, a tributaiy of the 
Shenandoah, in Augusta County, and 
not far from Staunton, on June 5th, 
he encountered a Confederate foice of 
about the same number of men, under 
Generals Jones and McCausland. These 
were all the concentrated forces in that 
region, Breckenridge having been re- 
called, with the greater part of his 
command, to assist in the defense of 
ilichmond. Hunter had a complete 
success. After a severe and obstinate 
battle, which ended only with the day- 
light, he was master of the field, hav- 
ing routed his antagonist, and captured 
ir.OO prisoners, with 3 pieces of artil- 
l' ;y. The Confederate general, Jones, 



was killed. On the 8th, he was joined 
by Crook and Averill, when he moved 
from Staunton towards L}Tichburg, by 
way of Lexington. By taking this 
course, it appears, he disappointed 
Grant, who expected him to appear 
at Gordonsville, whither he had sent 
Sheridan to meet him. Arrived be- 
fore Lynchburg, Hunter found the 
place too strong to justify any serious 
attempts at its reduction; and as re- 
inforcements were coming by railroad 
from Lee's army, while his own sup- 
plies of ammunition were all but ex- 
hausted, he deemed it prudent to retire. 
Not considering it safe to fall back by 
the road he had come, he retreated by 
way of Salem, hotly pursued by the 
enemy. At Meadow Bridge, he ex- 
pected to find abundant supplies; for 
only a few days before, Crook and Ave- 
rill had left at that place 1,500,000 
rations, in charge of two Ohio regi- 
ments. The place had been set upon by 
a band of guerrillas ; and rations and 
men had equally disappeared. It was 
not until the 27th, nine days after his 
retreat from Lynchburg, five days after 
he had visited Meadow Bridge, that 
Hunter obtained rations for his troops. 
They had suffered terribly ; but they 
had inflicted vast injury on the Con- 
federates, by the destruction of foun- 
dries, factories, mills and other prop- 
erty. Such were the results of ihs 
co-operative movements under Butler 
on the one hand, and under Sigel and 
Hunter on the other. They weakened 
the South ; but they were not other 
wise of any immediate practical benefit 
to General Grant. 



GRANT AT THE SORTK ANNA. 



693 



We now return to the army of the 
Potomac. We left it at Spottsylvania 
Court House, about to resume its 
march towards Eichmond. The move- 
ment was commenced about midnight, 
May on the 20th. Hancock led the 
^ way, with Torbert's cavalry in 
advance. Moving first eastwaTd as far 
as Mattaponax Church, under cover of 
the remaining corps, he then turned to 
the south and pushed his way to Mil- 
ford Station, on the Fredericksburg 
and Richmond railroad, some seventeen 
miles south of his point of starting. 
He crossed the Mattapony at Milford 
Bridge, from which the enemy had 
been dislodged by Torbert's cavalry, 
and about a mile from the river, on a 
vidge of hills, formed his column in 
line of battle. Lee, no doubt, antici- 
^)ated some such movement; and, al- 
though unwilling to run any risk by 
striking his antagonist while executing 
his flank march, he was not prepared 
to be outstripped in the race for Rich- 
mond. As noon as he was made 
aware of Hsacock's advance. Long- 
street's corps was headed southward, 
and set in motion. Warren followed 
Hancock on the morning of the 21st, 
when Ewell was pushed after Long- 
street. Wright and Burnside, with 
the Sixth and Ninth corps, were still 
within the lines at Spottsylvania, where 
they were confronted by Hill. Burn- 
side left on the afternoon of the 21st, 
having first made a demonstration with 
Ledlie's brigade, of Crittenden's divi- 
sion, so as to deceive the enemy and 
detain him in his position. Later, 
Wright was preparing to follow, when 



Hill, deeming the opportunity favor- 
able for a deadly blow, fell upon his 
retiring column with great weight. 
The assault, howevei-, was repulsed 
without difficulty; and Wi-ight pro- 
ceeded on his southward mareh, Hill 
at the same time following in the 
wake of Longstreet and Ewell. may 
On the morning of the 23d, the 23. 
National army, having marched over a 
country which, for beauty and fertility, 
presented a striking contrast to the 
Wilderness and the region around 
Spottsylvania, amved on the northern 
bank of the North Anna. Lee, having 
the inside track, had won the race. 
He was already well posted on the 
south side of that stream. 

Grant's position was now one of con- 
siderable difficulty. In pursuing his 
flank movement, it was necessary for 
him to cross the river. It was natural 
to conclude that Lee would offer a 
stubborn resistance. To accomplish 
his purpose Grant must needs hold his 
troops well together, and handle them 
with caution and with delicate skill. 

The Grand Army, as we have said, had 
reached the banks of the North Anna — ■ 
the right, under Warren, at Jericho 
Mills ; the left leaning upon the Rich- 
mond and Fredericksburg railroad, and 
covering Taylor's Bridge. In front of 
the aiTuy there were three fords, known 
respectively as Jericho, Island, Chester- 
field or Taylor's Bridge. Grant, who 
had already reached the railroad cross- 
ing, was resolved to push across the 
river with as little delay as possible. 
Warren, with the Fifth corps, was or- 
dered to cross at Jericho Ford; Han- 



Ssa 



694 



THE WILDERNESS. 



cock, with the Second corps, was to 
cross at Taylor's Bridge. These cross- 
ings were about four miles apart. 

Warren was allowed to cross with- 
out opposition. Lee's attention had 
been so fully occupied with what he 
considered the necessities of the lower 
ford, that he had wholly neglected the 
ford above. Warren, however, was not 
to be allowed to have things entirely his 
own way. He had just got his corps 
into position — Cutler on the right. Grif- 
fin in the centre, and Crawford on the 
left — when he was set upon in the 
most savage manner by a strong body 
of Confederates, under Colonel Brown. 
Brown, whose force did not prove so 
strong as at first it seemed — being 
only one brigade of Wilson's division 
of Hill's corps — was easily repulsed. 
This brigade was quickly joined by 
the three other brigades of the divi- 
sion ; and as Heth's division, also of 
Hill's corps, at the same time came up, 
the Confederates resumed the attack 
with great energy. The attack fell 
chiefly on Griffin, who held his ground 
with great firmness. While fully en- 
gaging Grifiin's attention in front, 
the Confederate commander detached 
Brown, with his brigade, for the pur- 
pose of assaulting Warren on his right 
flank. Brown was at first completely 
successful. Cutler, who, as we have 
seen, held Warren's right, was just 
getting into position when he was 
struck heavily, his whole division 
thrown into confusion, and Griffin's 
right flank exposed. Griffin saved 
himself by refusing the exposed flank, 
and by hurrying forward Bartlett's 



brigade to the menaced point, thus re. 
storing the line. It was while exe- 
cuting this movement that one of 
Bartlett's regiments — the Eighty-Third 
Pennsylvania — ran full against Brown's 
column, and, by securing the first 
fire, completely turned the tide of 
battle. One of McCoy's men caught 
Brown, and dragged him inside the 
National lines. The ho'itile brigade 
turned and fled in utter contusion, the 
gallant Eighty-Third pouring a volley 
of musketry into its flank and rear. 
At all points, in front of the National 
right, the repulse of the enemy was 
complete. Warren had lost 350 men ; 
but he had inflicted a much heavier 
loss on the enemy. He held 1000 
piisoners ; and he had secured the 
position. 

Hancock, on the left, had a much 
more difficult task to perform. At 
Taylor's Bridge, the Confederates had 
constructed works of great strength. 
The ground was peculiarly favorable for 
defense. On the north side there is a 
tongue of land, formed by the Norti 
Anna and Long Creek, which for some 
distance runs parallel with the river. 
On this piece of ground, Hancock had 
established himself. In his front, and 
guarding the northern approach to the 
bridge, was an extended redan, with a 
wet ditch in front and rifle-trenches in 
the rear. On the southern bank, which 
commands the northern, there was 
another work of similar construction. 
These works were held by McLaws' 
division, of Longstreet's corps, the 
larger number of troops being, of 
course, on the south side. Severj*) 



BtTKNSIDE EEPULSED. 



695 



bundred yards intervened between 
Hancock's lines and the bridge-head. 
The ground was bare, and gradually 
ascended as it neared the bridge. It 
was necessary, in order to gain a foot- 
ing on the other side, to cany the 
bridge and the defenses. To Birney's 
well-tiied division, Hancock assigned 
the perilous duty. Birney selected for 
the work the two brigades of Pierce 
and Egan. In order to afford some 
protection to the storming party, Col- 
onel Tidball got into advantageous po- 
sition three sections of artilleiy. It 
was now within an hour of sundown. 
All things were ready for the attack. 
At a given signal, the storming bri- 
gades begin to advance. At the same 
instant, the guns of the enemy open 
upon them a most murderous fire. 
The wisdom of Tidball's arrangement 
is now brought prominently to light. 
His batteries reply to those of the 
enemy with excellent effect. Over 
the open ground, and up the incline, 
the brave fellows rush at the double- 
quick. In a few seconds, they are 
seen clambering over the parapet. A 
second more, and the National and 
regimental colors are floating over the 
redan. It was, indeed, a perilous un- 
di^rtaking; it was a brave, even heroic 
effort; but it was an easy victory. In 
that brief, rapid rush over the open 
ground, 150 brave men had perished; 
but the garrison had fled precipitately 
over the bi'idge, leaving behind some 
30 men, who, unable to escape, were 
captured in the ditch. During the 
night, several unsuccessful attempts 
were made to regain what had been 



lost, and even to burn the bridge. On 
the following morning it was discov- 
ered that the advanced works on the 
south side of the river were also aban- 
doned ; and Hancock, without expe- 
riencing any further resistance, pushed 
across the bridge his entire corps; 
Wright, at the ianie time, effected a 
crossing at Jericho Ford, and took po- 
sition on Wan'en's right. 

Three of the army corps — the Second, 
Fifth and Sixth — were thus on the 
south side of the North Anna River. 
The Ninth corps— that of Burnside — 
forming the National centre, alone re- 
mained on the north side. It was ne- 
cessary that this corps should be got 
across before any further advance wa? 
made by the other troops. This, it 
was soon found, was a difficult, nay, in 
the circumstances, an impossible task. 
Lee, as we have seen, when Warren 
crossed the river, flung back his left 
wing, resting it on Little River; and 
when Hancock crossed, be flung back 
his right, resting it on the Hanover 
marshes. With his centre, he still 
clung to the river. Thus it was that 
his line assumed the form of an obtuse- 
angled triangle, the vertex thrust out 
towards the North Anna. It followed 
from this arrangement that, while he 
could easily move from wing to wing 
by interior lines, bis strongest poini 
was bis centre. By a singular coinci- 
dence, resulting also from the peculiar 
form his line had assumed, Grant's 
centre was bis weakest point. When, 
therefore, Burnside, on the 24th, Maj 
attempted to cross, his advance 24. 
division, under Crittenden, was quickly 



696 



THE WILDEKNESS. 



met and repulsed, with heavy loss. 
An attempt was made by Warren to 
connect with Burnside, by sending 
Crawford's division in that direction. 
This attempt also failed, Crawford 
being attacked by an overwhelming 
force, and only after much difficulty 
and great loss regaining his position. 

Grant was thus completely check- 
mated. After a pause of two days, he 
came to the conclusion that Lee was 
too firmly intrenched to be dislodged 
by any further movement on his front. 
He had recourse again to his flanking 
tactics. Ordering Wan'en and Wright 
to make demonstrations in their front, 
and sending Wilson, with a cavalry 
force, to destroy the Central Railroad, 
he recrossed the North Anna on the 
May night of the 26th; and heading 
26» first well to the east, then to the 
south, he resumed his march towards 
Richmond. His immediate objective 
was the Pamunkey, which is formed 
by the junction of the North and South 
Anna rivers. The Sixth corps, pre- 
ceded by two divisions of cavalry, 
under Sheridan, who had rejoined the 
main army, led the van. It was fol- 
lowed by the Fifth and Ninth. Han- 
cock, with the Second, held position 
till the morning of the 27th, when he 
covered the rear. On the same morn- 
ing, about nine o'clock, Sheridan took 
possession of Hanover Ferry and Han- 
overtown, the latter on the south side 
of the Pamunkey, and distant from 
Richmond about fifteen miles, from 
White House about sixteen. On the 
following morning, Saturday, the 28th, 
the entire army was south of the Pa- 



munkey, and in communication with 
its new base at White House. Lee 
was already in motion by a shorter 
route, and was intrenching himself in 
a strong position, prepared to dispute 
the passage of the Chickahominy be- 
fore the army of the Potomac had 
reached the Pamunkey; but Grant had 
really made a great gain by establish- 
ing a new base of supplies at White 
House, on the York Rivei", and in 
easy communication with the waters 
of Chesapeake Bay. 

We are now back on the old bat- 
tle-ground of the peninsula — ground 
which, if not sacred, has at least been 
rendered famous by a campaign which, 
in spite of some noble examples of he- 
roism and self-sacrifice, in spite of cer- 
tain splendid exhibitions of military 
skill, in spite even of a magnificent 
and memorable retreat, must ever be 
regarded as a National disaster, and, to 
a certain extent, also, as a National 
disgrace. The great army of the Po- 
tomac is again here ; but, happily, it is 
now in different hands. Now, as then, 
the public is interested and excited by 
frequent reports of changes of base; 
but the reported changes of base imply 
victory, not defeat. They imply that 
the enemy is being driven closer and 
closer to his last stronghold, nearer 
and nearer to his final harbor of hope. 
Lee never handled his men with more 
consummate skill; his war-hardened 
veterans were never more enduring, 
more active or more subservient to his 
will ; but he is now opposed to an an- 
tagonist who is single of pui'pose, in- 
flexible of will, tenacious of his grasp, 



AT THE TOLOPOTOMY. 



691 



and who uses his armies to win battles, 
rather than to win political distinction 
or the praises of men. 

At this stage, both armies were 
being considerably strengthened by 
reinforcements. The bottling up of 
Butler at Bermuda Hundred allowed 
Bfeauregard to send the greater portion 
of his troops to the assistance of Lee; 
acd Breckenridge, relieved from any 
severe pressure in Western Virginia, 
was reported to be already in the 
neighborhood of Hanover Court House, 
with 5000 infantry and two brigades 
of cavalry, uudei' Wickhatn and Lomax. 
Grant was also receiving reinforce- 
ments, W. F. Smith being now on his 
way from Bermuda Hundred, with 
about two thirds of Butler's best 
troops. Convinced that a crisis was 
at hand, both parties had been vigor- 
ously concentrating. Now that the 
Nationals were on the southwestern 
bank of the Pamunkey, the direct road 
to Richmond was across the Chicka- 
hominy. Gi'ant immediately made ar- 
rangements to ascertain the position 
and strength of the enemy. Sheridan, 
May on the 28th, was pushed forward 
28* on the Hanover road, with three 
brigades of cavalry, under Davis, Gregg 
and Custer. At Hawe's Store they 
encountered the Confederate cavalry, 
under Fitz-Hugh Lee and Hampton. 
A sevei-e battle ensued, the troopers 
dismounting, and fighting for several 
houi's with great obstinacy. The Con- 
fedei'ates finally retired across the To- 
lopotomy, leaving Sheridan in posses- 
sion of the position which commanded 
an important junction of roads. Re- 



connoissances were now made by the 
army in force. Wright moved on Han- 
over Court House ; Hancock moved on 
the road leading from Hawe's Store, in 
the same direction; Warren advanced 
towards Shady Grove Church ; while 
Burnside's troops were so disposed as 
to be in readiness to go to the support 
of either the Second or Fifth corps. 
Wilson's cavalry covered the right 
and rear of the National army; while 
Torbert and Gregg were moving in 
front of the left. These movements 
wei-e not completed without some hard 
experience. Wright reached Hanover 
Court House without much opposi- 
tion. It was otherwise, however, with 
Hancock and Warren, both of whom 
encountered stubborn opposition, and 
were temporarily held in check. Han- 
cock's progress was arrested at Tolo- 
potomy Creek; and, in spite of the 
most vigorous efforts, he found it im 
possible to make any headway. War- 
ren was brought to a standstill not 
far from Shady Grove Church, at a 
point where the road is crossed by the 
main branch of the Tolopotomy. At 
this point, i^ was found, Ewell was 
posted in great strength. It soon 
began to be apparent that the enemy 
was bent on turning Warren's left, by 
moving along the Mechanicsville pike. 
Crawford quickly covered that road 
by a brigade of his reserves, under 
Colonel Hardin. This brigade was fu 
riously assailed by Rodes, at Beth- 
esda Church, and compelled to fall 
back to the Shady Grove road, the 
enemy pressing closely. At this point, 
Crawford biought up the remainder of 



tf98 



THE WILDERNESS. 



the reserves, and, with the aid of a 
powerful battery, effectually repelled 
the assailants. At dusk, the National 
left was extended so as to cover the 
Mechanicsville road. When Meade 
>va8 made aware of the assault made 
on Warren, he ordered an attack along 
the whole line. Only Hancock, of the 
other corps commanders, received the 
order in time to act before dark. 
With characteristic promptitude, he 
pressed forward Barlow's division, 
drove in the Confederate pickets, and 
captured the rifle-pits. These move- 
ments had the effect of developing 
the enemy's position. Lee, it was 
found, was posted in great strength in 
advance of the Chickahominy ; his left 
at Hanover Court House, and covering 
the railroad; his centre in front of 
Atlee's Station; his right at Mechan- 
icsville, and covering, as we have seen, 
Shady Grove. Such was the general 
condition of affairs on the night of 
the 30th. 

Grant, bent upon his purpose, impa- 
tient of delay, but realizing the diffi- 
culty, if not impossibility, of foi-cing 
his army across the Chickahominy by a 
dii'ect attack on Lee's front, fell back 
on his old tactics — a flank movement 
by Lee's right. A movement was, 
therefore, made upon Cold Harbor — a 
point which commanded all the roads, 
leading on the one hand to White 
House, and on the other to Richmond. 
May It was now the Slst of May. 

3I« On that day, a division of Sheri- 
dan's cavalry, under General Torbert, 
captured and held the place, in spite 

of the efforts of a strong conjoint force 



of Confederate cavalry and infantry. 
On the following day, Wednesday, the 
1st of June, an effort was made June 
by a body of Confederates, under '• 
General Hoke, to regain possession of 
Cold Haibor. The Confederates were 

! repulsed. Hoke, however, was quickly 
reinfoi'ced ; and about noon he returned 

j to the attack. It was now evident 

i that the Confederate commander had 
divined the object of his antagonist, 
and that he was also fully awaje of 
the value of the position. Sheridaii 
sent word back that Torbert was sore- 
ly pressed. He was immediate i_y "•'- 
rected to hold on at all hazards, until 
he was relieved by the infantry. Mean- 
while, Wright, with the Sixth corps, 
after marching all night from the ex- 
treme right of the National army, was 
approaching the scene of conflict. So, 
too, was W. F. Smith, with the 
Eighteenth corps, which had been 
strengthened by four divisions of the 

j Tenth, making an aggregate of 16,000 
men. Smith, his command on board 
transports, had left Bermuda Hundred 
on the 29th May. After passing down 
the James, and ascending the York 
and Pamunkey, he reached White 
House on the following day. There 
he received orders to move upon New 
Castle. It was not until he had 
reached that place, and when he had 
gone out of his way some twelve or 
fifteen miles, that he was informed that 
a mistake had been committed, and 
that he must make a counter-march im- 
mediately on Cold Harbor. Without 
a moment's delay, the ordered move- 
ment was commenced ; and about three 



COLD HAEBOE. 



699 



o'clock in the afternoon o£ the 1st of 
June, shortly after the arrival of Wriglit, 
Smith, with his coramaud, reached Cold 
' Harbor. His men sorely needed rest, 
' after a continuous march of twenty- 
five miles; but no rest was yet to be 
granted them. Orders here a\vaited 
him from Genejval Meade to take posi- 
tion on the right of the Sixth corps, 
and to co-operate with Wright in an 
immediate attack on the enemy. Pre- 
parations for attack were made accord- 
ingly. "Wright, with the Sixth corps, 
took post in front of Cold Harbor — 
Ricketts on his right, Russell in the 
centre, and Neill on the left. Smith, 
with his command, took part on the 
right of the Sixth — Martindale on his 
right, W. H. T. Brooks in the centre 
and Devens on the left. 

It was now past five o'clock, and the 
day was fast speeding to its close. Be- 
tween the two armies there was a 
broad, open, undulating field, about 
two thirds of a mile in width. Beyond 
this open ground, there was a thin 
strip of woods ; and a little further be- 
yond there was somewhat of a forest. 
In the interval, and immediately in the 
rear of the first woods, the Confed- 
erates had constructed lines of rifle- 
trenches. At a given signal, the Na- 
tionals rushed over the open space; 
and, in spite of a murderous fire, they 
carried the first line of rifle-trenches. 
The success was most complete in front 
of Smith's left and the right of the 
Sixth corps. Vigorous efforts were 
made to capture the second line. Several 
desperate struggles ensued. The second 
line was found to be impregnable. The 



first line, however, was held; and in 
the thin wood, under the shelter of the 
trees, and under hurriedly-constructed 
bullet-proofs, which the last few weeks' 
experience had taught them to make, 
the men went to sleep on their arms. 
In this encounter. Grant had lost 2000 
men ; but the sacrifice had not been 
made in vain ; for he had laid his hands 
firmly on Cold Harbor. 

Thursday, the 2d of June, was spent 
in making preparations for an- jnn^ 
other vigorous assault. With not *• 
a little difficulty, and with some sacri- 
fice, Grant and Me^.de succeeded in 
completing their arrangements. In at- 
tempting to take the positions assigned 
them, both Buruside and Warren were 
vigorously assailed and severely pun- 
ished. The new disposition of the dif- 
ferent corps, from left to right, was as 
follows : — Hancock, Wright, Smith, 
Warren, Burnside. The line of battle 
extended from Tolopotomy Creek, cov- 
ering Bethesda Church, across the road 
from Cold Harbor to the Chickahom- 
iny. Sheridan, with a large body of 
cavaliy, was •guarding the left flank, 
all the lower fords of the Chicka- 
hominy, and as far east as White 
House. Wilson, with another cavalry 
force, was guarding the right flank. 
During the 2d, Lee had been quite as 
active as his antagonist. He kept him- 
self well informed of all the move- 
ments of the opposing forces; and he 
greatly strengthened his position, which 
was naturally very strong, by means of 
slashings and rifle-trenches. Loiigstreet 
was in the centre, A. P. Hill on the 
right, Ewell on the left. Reference to 



700 



THE WILDERNESS. 



the map will show that we are here on 
what may be called classic or historic 
ground. It was here that was fought, 
some two years before, the battle of 
Gaines' Mill. The positions of the 
combatants, however, happened to be 
reversed — Lee occupying that formerly 
held by McClellau, and Grant occupy- 
ing that formerly held by Lee. Such 
was the situation of the rival armies 
on the night of the 2d of June. But 
for a severe thunderstorm which broke 
out, accompanied by heavy rains, the 
assault would have been made that 
evening. As it was, orders were given 
by Grant for a general attack along 
the whole line, at half-past four, on the 
following morning. Lee was equally 
prepared ; and, if not equally sanguine 
of ultimate success, he was equally reso- 
lute to win, if he could. 

At- earliest dawn, on the morning of 
June Friday, the 3d, the National 
3« army was in motion. A driz- 
zling rain was falling, as the troops ad- 
vanced silently, but swiftly, over the 
open ground towards the Confederate 
intrenchments, in which could already 
be seen, through the dim morning light, 
the well-known grey uniform and the 
rows of glittering steel. The onset 
was terrific, and on a scale of magni- 
tude surpassing anything yet witnessed 
in the war. The resistance was equal- 
ly grand, and on a scale of proportion- 
ate magnitude. Never, perhaps, in the 
history of previous warfare was such 
a shock of battle experienced. In a 
space of time which has been various- 
ly estimated from ten minutes to half 
an hour, the battle was fought and 



won, and some 15,000 men were killed 
or wounded. " It took hardly more 
than ten minutes of the figment men 
call time," says Swinton, " to decid* 
the battle. There was along the whole 
line a rush — the spectacle of impreg- 
nable works— a bloody loss — then , a 
sullen falling back, and the action was 
decided. Conceive of this in the large, 
and we shall then be able to descend 
to some of the points of action, as they 
individualize themselves along the line." 
Of such a battle it may safely be said 
that no one, during the actual minutes 
it covered, could think of it, far less 
witness it, as a whole. Unlike most 
of the other great battles, such as Au- 
tietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellors- 
ville, Gettysburg, and the assaults on 
Vicksburg, which were of some dura- 
tion, and could be contemplated as a 
whole, this could be seen and known 
only in fragmentary detail ; and so 
brief was the struggle that it was a 
memory almost as sooa as it became an 
experience. 

Some facts, however, have been pre- 
served, and with the help of these, wq 
are enabled to glance along the lines at 
the moment of attack, and while the 
struggle lasted. Hancock, who held 
the National left, pushed forward at 
the hour appointed the divisions of 
Barlow and Gibbon, with Birney sup- 
porting. Barlow, with his division 
formed in two lines, encountered the 
enemy in a piece of hollow ground, in 
front of his works. Driving him fi-om 
it, he pressed into the works them- 
selves, capturing several hundred pris- 
oners, a battle-flag and three guns, turn 



THK ]\AT1UJNALS REPULSED. 



701 



i g the guns upon their owners, and 
ft rcing them back in confusion. It 
■was only a brief victory; for before 
Barlow's second line had time to come 
up, Hill's men rallied in stronger force, 
and, returning with tremendous en- 
ergy, reclaimed the captured works. 
Barlow was driven back some fifty or 
sixty yards. Here, howevei', in an ad- 
vantageous position, far in advance of 
his original line, he halted ; and quick- 
ly covering his front, he held his 
ground so firmly that he could not be 
dislodged. Gibbon advanced at the 
same time with Barlow: but his pro- 
gress being checked by a -swamp, which 
widened as he neared the enemy's 
works, his command was separated, 
and, consequently, weakened. With 
great bravery, however, the troops 
pressed forward; and in spite of the 
destructive fire which fell full in their 
faces, some of them actually gained the 
works. Colonel McMahon, with a 
portion of his brigade, reached the 
parapet, and planted upon it his colors. 
The next moment he fell mortally 
wounded, and died in the hands of the 
enemy. Among the officers of Gib- 
bon's command who met a similar fate 
were Colonels Porter, Morris, McKeen 
and Haskell. General Tyler was 
wounded. Gibbon was unable to hold 
any part of the Confederate works; 
but some of his troops gained an ad- 
vanced position in which they could 
not be reached, and from which they 
could not with safety escape. Han- 
cock had already lost 3000 men. 

The National centre, under Wright 
and Smith, was not more fortunate. 



They made the assault with great gal- 
lantry, and were rewarded with a tem- 
porary success. They were soon, how- 
ever, repulsed, and with tremendous 
loss of life. The most they could do 
was to hold a position somewhat in 
advance of their original lines. The 
fighting in front of Warren and Burn- 
side was unimportant. Warren's line 
was too thin and too extended to 
justify a concentrated effort. Except 
with his artillery, of which he made 
good and effective use, he remained si- 
lently on the defensive. Burnside did 
not advance at the hour designated; 
and when, later in the day, he claimed to 
have gained an advantageous position 
from which, with two of his divisions, 
he could fall effectively on Lee's right 
flank, the attack on the Confederate 
right had failed. Meade, therefore, 
countermanded the attack on the left. 
General Wilson, it will be remem- 
bered, was posted with his cavalry on 
the extreme right of the National 
army. During the course of the morn- 
ing he had a severe but unsuccessful 
encounter with the Confederate caval- 
ry, under Wade Hampton. Later, he 
fell upon an infantry brigade, of Heth's 
division, which had been sent to en- 
velop Burnside, and routed it, taking a 
number of prisoners. 
■ The unsuccessful effort made in the 
early morning by the National left, 
and also by the National centre, had 
really determined the issue of the bat- 
tle. It was the feeling of the officera, 
as well as of the men themselves, that 
more could not be done — that any fur- 
ther attempt to force the Confederate 



702 



THE WILDERNESS. 



lines would be a useless waste of life. 
That such was the general judgment, 
received a striking confirmation, during 
the course of the forenoon, from a cir- 
pumstance which is, perhaps, without 
a parallel on any battle field. Some 
hours after the first attack, General 
Meade, yielding, no doubt, to the stub- 
born and unconquerable will of Grant, 
sent orders to each corps commander 
to renew the attack, without any re- 
gard to the troops on his right or left. 
The order was communicated in the 
usual way by the commanders to their 
subordinate officers, by these again to 
their subordinates, and so on through 
the accustomed channels, until it 
reached the men. By a singular unan- 
imity of sentiment and will, not a man 
stirred. It was a silent but emphatic 
"No!" — an unexampled manifestation 
of unanimous conviction, and a striking 
proof of the intelligence of the Ameri- 
can soldier. 

By one o'clock, the bloody battle of 
Cold Harbor was ended. The Na- 
tional loss in this engagement and in 
Ae preliminary skirmishes, was re- 
ported at over 13,000 men in killed, 
wounded and missing; The Confed- 
erate loss was trifling in comparison. 

For ten days the two armies con- 
fronted each other, each endeavoring 
to strengthen its position. There was 
severe but partial fighting on the 4th, 
5th and 6th, the Confederate assaults 
in every instance being vigorously re- 
pelled. During those days, so close 
were the opposing lines that friendly 
salutations were exchanged, and much 
kindly, good-natured feeling manifest- 



ed. The National soldier had plenty 
of coffee, but he was not so well sup 
plied with tobacco. The Confederate 
soldier had plenty of tobacco, but he 
was ill-supplied with coffee. The com 
modities were freely exchanged, to the 
gratification of both parties. On the 
7th, there was a brief truce of two 
hours, during which the dead were 
buried and the wounded removed. 

Meanwhile, Grant had become con- 
vinced of the impossibility of accom 
plishing more by direct assault on the 
enemy's lines. It had been his hope 
that he would be able to beat Lee 
north of Richmond ; and then, after 
destroying his communications north 
of the James, to besiege Richmond or 
follow his antagonist south, if he should 
retreat. .It was still possible for Grant 
to move by Lee's left flank, and to in- 
vest Richmond from the north ; but 
while, by adopting that course, he 
would still be easily able to cover the 
approaches to Washington, he would 
be exposed to other and serious incon- 
veniences. Abiding by the example 
which he had followed throughout the 
campaign hitherto, he resolved to exe- 
cute another flank movement by his 
own left, and, forcing his way across 
the Chickahomiuy, to press towards 
the James. It was all-important that 
Washington should be rendered as , fa 
as possible against any incursions 
the enemy. It was important, also, 
that while pushing his way across the 
Chickahomiuy, Lee's cavalry should be 
engaged in some other direction. To 
accomplish this double purpose, Sheri- 
dan was despatched, with two divisiona 



ACROSS THE CHJCKAHOMINY. 



705 



of hia cavalry, to destroy more effect- 
ually all the railroads in Lee'3 rear. 

On the 7th, Sheridan started with 
Jane the divisions of Torbert and 

'• Gregg. He accomplished his 
work with promptitude and success. 
He struck and destroyed the Rich- 
mond and Fredericksburg Road, at 
Chesterville Station. He struck and 
destroyed the Virginia Central, at 
Trevillian Station, where he encoun- 
tered and routed some of Hampton's 
horsemen. The work of destruction 
was carried on as far as Louisa Court 
House, where a stronger force was en- 
countered. Sheridan then fell back upon 
Trevillian, at which place the Confed- 
erate cavalry had concentrated in great 
strength. After a severe and bloody 
battle, Sheridan withdrew; and, sweep- 
ing aroutid by way of Spottsylvania 
Coui't House and Gurney's Station, he 
reached White House, and rejoined 
the army of Grant. 

Preparations, meanwhile, had been 
steadily going on, with a view to a 
rapid movement on the James. Still 
maintaining the appearance of a desire 
to strike some of the bridges of the 
Chickahominy, in the neighborhood of 
Cold Harbor, Grant was steadily mov- 
ing more and more in the direction of 
his own left. By gi-adually ref usuig his 
right and developing his left, he had 
put a large poi'tion of his army within 
easy distance of the lower crossings of 
that river. There was no evidence, as 
yet, that Lee had any suspicion of his 
real motive ; although it is difficult to 
h>elieve he was ignorant of some of the 
•operation* which were being carried on. 



On the 10th and the 11th, Grant had 
caused to be destroyed the railroad 
from Despatch Station to White House, 
and had shipped ou barges all the rails, 
sleepers and ties to the latter place for 
use below. The work, it is true, had 
been done with the utmost quietness; 
but still the doubt remains whether 
Lee did not close his eyes to a move- 
ment which, probably, he did not wish 
to hinder. On the night of Sunday, 
the 12th, the movement to the jnm 
James was commenced. Warren, 12. 
who took the lead, preceded by Wil- 
son's division of cavalry, crossed the 
Chickahorainy at Long Bridge; and, 
taking position on the Long Bridge 
!oad where it crosses White Oak 
Swamp, he made certain dispositions 
calculated to mislead the enemy as to 
the purpose of the National com- 
mander. Hancock followed Warren, 
and marched at once to Wilcox Land- 
ing, on the James. Wright and Burn- 
side, taking an exterior route, crossed 
at Jones' Biidge, lower down, and 
marched to Charles City Court House. 
Smith, with his command, marched at 
the same time to White House, where 
he took transports, and returned to 
Bermuda Hundred by water. The 
trains crossed the Chickahomiuy at 
Cole's Fei-ry. 

Lee discovered the withdrawal of 
the National army on the morning of 
the loth; but in place of following it 
up, he retii-ed at once to Richmond. 
Some delay was experienced in cross- 
ing the James, in conse(j^uence of the 
absence of sufficient pontoon material 
On the night of the 14th. a pontoon 



704 



THE WILDERNESS. 



bridge, over two thousand feet in 
length, was thrown across the river 
at Douthard's; and by noon of the 
June 16th, the entire army of the Po- 
'6< tomac was south of the James. 
On all concerned, the crossing of the 
Chickahomiuy, the march to and cross- 
ing of the James, reflected the highest 
credit. The success of the whole 
movement was complete. Thus ended 
a campaign of forty-three days — one of 
the most momentous and certainly one 
of the most interesting in the war. It 
had, on the whole, been well con- 
ducted; in some respects, indeed, the 
management was perfect. During that 
lengthened period, in that tangled wil- 
derness, where wagon travel was next 
to impossible, and where the base was 
so often changing, the vast National 
army, of more than 100,000 men, never 
suffered for want of food. It had 
been, however, a bloody and ruinous 
campaign, and fearfully destructive of 
human life. The losses on the one 
side and on the other have been vari- 
ously estimated. Swinton, who in 
these matters is generally both careful 
and accurate, gives the enormous ag- 
gregate of the National loss at 60,000 
men — a number greater than the entire 
strength of Lee's army at the opening 
of the campaign. Lee's loss, accord- 
ing to the same authority, was about 
18,000 or 20,000, the ratio being one 
to three. Dr. Draper, who has written 
more recently, but who is exndently 
disposed to lessen the disproportion, 
estimates the National loss at over 
54,000 and the Confederate loss at 
32,000. The truth, it is possible, lies 



between. The presumption is that in 
Draper's columns, the Confederate loss 
is greatly exaggerated. When we re- 
member that the Confederates fought, 
for the most part, behind their de- 
fenses, and that the Nationals, after 
the first two days' fighting in the Wil- 
derness, were always the aggressors, 
the estimate of Swinton seems to be 
the more reasonable. Swinton's esti- 
mate, of course, includes Burnside's 
losses; but neither he nor Draper in- 
cludes in his estimate the losses sus- 
tained by Butler's command and by 
that of Sigel and Hunter. 

The story told in this chapter — the 
story of the Overland Campaign, as it 
has properly been named — will ever be 
read with pride, if not with pleasure, 
by the American jjeople. The justice 
or the injustice, the right or the wrong 
attaching to the contending parties, will 
ultimately be forgotten ; but to latest 
generations, men will proudly speak 
of the army of the Potomac and the 
army of Northern Virginia — of Grant 
and Lee ; of Meade and Hancock, and 
Sedgwick and Wan-en, and Wright 
and Burnside ; of Longstreet and Hill 
and Ewell; and of the glorious rank 
and file of both armies. It was one of 
those grand, protracted contests of 
which no section of the American 
people have, or will ever have, any just 
cause to be ashamed. On the merits 
of the campaign, as a whole, much has 
been said and wiitten ; and not a little 
difference of opinion exists. Harsh 
things have been said of General 
Grant ; and by not a few the policy 
pursued in this campaign, from first to 



SOUTH OF THE JAMES. 



705 



last, has been severely condemned. 
He fought, we are told, when he might 
have flanked; he dashed his men to 
death against the invulnerable lines of 
the enemy, when he might have accom- 
plished all he actually did accomplish 
\vith comparative ease and with but lit- 
cle loss of life. His tactics have been 
contrasted with those of his great rival 
Lee, on the one hand, and with those 
)f his great lieutenant, Sherman, on the 
other; and the National commander 
has been exhibited in the unfavora- 
ble light of being unnecessarily and 
recklessly wasteful of the lives of his 
men. These judgments, based on too 
narrow a view of the entire situation, 
have had no effect on the masses of 



The Overland Campaign was, as has been mention- 
ed in the text, largely destructive of human life. The 
officers suffered severely. Among those already named, 
but of -whom no notice has yet been given, was Briga- 
dier-General Thomas G. Stevenson. He was killed at 
Spottsylvania on the 10th of May, ISfU. Stevenson 
was a Bostoniau by birth. At an early age he mani- 
fested a predilection for military life. He rose from 
the ranks, and was major of the 4th battalion of Mas- 
sachusetts infantry at the commencement ot the war. 
As a driU-master, he acquired a great reputation. 
He was colonel of the 24th regiment of Massachusetts 
infantry, and served under Foster in Burnside's North 



the American people, who choose to 
see in General Grant the hero who 
proved himself the saviour of his 
country, and ^^'ho at this stage of his 
career was, by hard blows and contin- 
uous hammering, crushing out the life 
of the rebellious Confederacy. It is 
not claimed that the conduct of the 
campaign was perfect. It would not 
be difficult to exhibit defects — defects 
in the general plans themselves, de- 
fects in the mode of execution — to 
show where opportunities were lost 
and blunders committed ; but in view 
of so much heroism, so much unex- 
ampled courage, such splendid work, 
we have a voice only for praise ; none 
for censure or complaint. 

Carolina Expedition, in 1862. He took part in the 
capture of Koanoke Island and New Berne. He was 
appointed brigadier-general in December, 1862. He 
afterwards took part in the operations in Charleston 
Harbor, assisting in the reduction of Morris Island, 
and commanding the reserves at the assault on Fort 
Wagner. Having returned to the North to recruit 
his health, in the fall of 1863, Burnside, who had a 
high opinion of his ability, placed him in command 
of the First division of the Ninth corps. In this 
capacity he took part in the battle of the 10th of May 
at Spottsylvania. He wa.i cut down at the pp-'v -.r? of 
tweitv-eight. « 



706 



ATLANTA. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 



berman'a AtlanUi Campaign. — Strength of hi« Anny. — General JobnMon's Army. — Deeeriptlon of Atlanta.— 
Operations against Dalton. — Buzzard Roost. — Snake Creek Gap. — Eilpatrick wounded. — Johnston evacuates 
Dslton. — Operations against Resaca. — Johnston crosses the Etowah. — Occupation of Rome.— Johnston 
falls back on Allatoona Pass. — The March upon Dallas. — Battles of Pumpkin Vine Creek and New Hop* 
Church. — Allatoona Pass turned. — General Blair joins Sherman with the Seventeenth Corps. — Garrisons left. 
—Maich to Big Shanty. — Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains. — Confederate Defenses. — Georgia MUitia. 
— Operations against Pine Mountain. — Death of General Polk. — Lost Mountain taken. — Continuous rain. — 
Battle of Kulp House. — Assault on Eenesaw Mountain. — Death of General Harker. — Johnston abandons 
Keneeaw Mountain. — Occupation of Marietta. — Nickajack Creek. — Advance to the Chattahoochee. — John- 
ston's Position again turned. — His Defenses on the Chattahoochee. — Mills destroyed at Roswell. — Sherman 
erossea the Chattahoochee. — Johnston retires upon Atlanta. — Approach to Atlanta. — General Rousseau's 
Raid. — Johnston superseded by Hood. — Battle of Peach Tree Creek. — Hood Abandons his Outer Line of 
Defenses. — Battle of July 22d. — Death of General McPherson. — Wheeler's Attack on Decatur. — Attack on 
the Fifteenth Corps. — Biographical Sketch of General McPherson. — General Garrard's Operations at Cov- 
ington. — Expeditions against the Macon and Western Railroad. — General Stoneman's Raid. — Destruction 
effected at Gordon. — Defeat and Capture of Stoneman. — General McCook's Raid. — General Howard succeeds 
General McPherson. — Sherman's Lines extended southward. — Attack on the Fifteenth Corps. — Resignation 
of General Hooker. — Change in important Commands. — Hood's Defenses. — The City shelled. — New Plans 
of General Sherman. — Wheeler's Raid. — Kilpatrick's Attempt on the West Point and Macon Railroads. — 
Movement of Sherman's Entire Army towards the Railroads. — Battle of Jonesboro. — Hood evacuates and 
General Slocum enters the City. — Repulse of General Wheeler at Dalton. — Defeat of General Sturgis. — 
Depopulation of Atlanta. 



It has already been made plain to 
the reader that General Grant's 
* entire attention was not given to 
the army of the Potomac. His battle- 
plan contemplated the dealing of two 
deadly blows — one on Richmond the 
other on Atlanta. To ejffect this double 
purpose he had concentrated at two 
separate points, two powerful armies. 
The one was on the northern bank of the 
Rapidan, its right at Culpepper Court 
House, and was imder the immediate 
direction of General Meade. The other 
was in the neighborhood of Chatta- 
nooga, and was entrusted to the care of 
General Sherman. We have already 
traced the progress of Meade's army 
from the Rapidan to the James. Let us 



now give our attention to the army of 
General Sherman. 

The total force under Sherman W8«i 
over 98,000 men of all arms, with 254 
gims. It was composed of three separ 
ate organizations, the army of the Cwai 
berland, Major-General Thomas; the 
army of the Tennessee, Major-Genera] 
McPherson ; and the army of the Ohio, 
Major-General Schofield. The army of 
the Cumberland comprised the Fourth 
corps, Howard; the Fourteenth corps. 
Palmer; and the Twentieth corps. 
Hooker— in all 60,773, including 3828 
cavalry. The army of the Tennessee 
comprised the Fifteenth corps, Logan 
the Sixteenth corps, Dodge; and after 
wards the Seventeenth corps, Blair — in 



DESOEIPTION OF ATLANTA. 



ro7 



all 34,465 men, including 624 cavalry. 
The army of the Ohio consisted of the 
Twenty-third corps; in all 13,559, in- 
clnding 1679 cavalry. As soon as Grant 
had crossed the Rapidan, he telegraphed 
Sherman to advance from Chattanooga, 
On the morning of the 6th of May, and 
when about to move, the position of 
the three armies was as follows: the 
army of the Cumberland was at Ring- 
gold, on the Western and Atlantic Rail- 
road, twenty-three miles southeast of 
Chattanooga ; the army of the Tennessee 
was at Gordon's Mill, on the Chicka- 
mauga, eight miles west of Ringgold; 
and the army of the Ohio near Red Clay, 
about ten miles northeast of Ringgold. 

The Confederate army, commanded 
by Lieutenant-General Joseph E. John- 
ston, lay in and about Dalton, fifteen 
Qiiles south of Ringgold, on the railroad, 
his advance at Tunnel Hill, about mid 
v^ay between Ringgold and Dalton. 
The force under Johnston, consisting 
mostly of veteran troops, comprised the 
corps of Generals Hardee, Hood, and 
Polk, and General Wheeler's division 
of about 10,000 cavalry, niunbering in 
all not more than 60,000 men. 

In some respects the campaign before 
General Sherman resembled that of 
General Grant from the Rapidan against 
Richmond. Its objective point was 
Atlanta, the possession of which it was 
believed was hardly of less importance 
to the Confederacy than the capital of 
Virginia. Atlanta had been before the 
war an important centre of railroad 
communication for the Western, Atlan- 
tic, and Gulf States, and a principal 
manufacturing town of the South, with 



a population of about 15,000. Laid out 
in a circle two miles in diameter, in its 
centre was the passenger depot of fouj 
railroads, radiating to Chattanooga, 
Augusta, Macon and Montgomery. 
Here also were railroad machine-shops, 
an extensive rolling mill, foimdries, raan 
uf actories of gun-carriages, pistols, tents, 
caps, cartridges, shot and shell, shoes 
clothing, and other military supplies, 
under the direction of the Confederate 
government. The population had risen 
diuing the war, by the accession of per 
sons employed under the government 
and the arrival of refugees, to not less 
than 20,000. It was supposed that the 
capture of Atlanta, with its vast military 
stores and costly machinery, would be 
a blow to the resources of the Confed- 
eracy hardly less fatal than the captui'e 
of Richmond. 

The utmost efforts were put forth b} 
the Confederate authorities to make 
Atlanta secure. The line of approach 
was made as difficult for Sherman as the 
nature of the coimtry — in itself easy of 
defense — and the resources of Johnstoa 
would admit. Shoiild Sherman succeed 
in making his way over the mountain 
region and in crossing the rivers, both oi 
which afforded many strong defensible 
positions for Johnston's army, he would 
stiU have his hardest task before hmi iu 
the formidable works around Atlanta, 
with an army depleted by many battle? 
and the necessity for leaving garrison? 
at various points. Sherman's line o. 
conununication would, at the same time, 
be lengthened and exposed, while John 
ston in falling back ujMm Atlanta would 
be approaching his base and his sujipUes 



ro8 



ATLANTA. 



A reconnoissance of General Jolm- 
j[ay ston's position at Dalton satisfied 
6. General Sherman that it could 
not be carried by an attack in front, 
even should the enemy abandon his 
works at Tunnel HilL Immediately 
south of Tunnel HUl is a valley about 
three miles long and about three-quar- 
ters of a nule wide, bounded by 
Rocky Face Ridge, a thickly wooded, 
steep, and rugged mountain, which com- 
mands the railroad and other approaches 
to Dalton, and extends southward many 
miles on the west side of the railroad 
and of the Oostanaula. A narrow moun- 
tain pass called Buzzard Roost, about 
midway between Tunnel Hill and Dal- 
ton, is the outlet to the valley, and 
through this pass runs the railroad to 
Dalton. By means of oiflt^, formidable 
batteries, and a line of rifle-pits at its 
northern entrance, this pass had been 
rendered impregnable, so that Dalton 
was absolutely secure against attack 
from the northwest; on its northeast 
aide the town was protected by strong 
works on MUe Creek. General McPher- 
9on was therefore directed to move 
rapidly southward with the army of 
the Tennessee from his position at Gor- 
don's MUl, by way of Ship's Gap, VU- 
\anow, and through Snake Creek Gap— a 
pass in Rocky Face Ridge further south 
—upon Resaca, a station about eighteen 
miles south of Dalton, where the rail- 
road from that place crosses the Oostar 
naula. The object of this movement 
was to compel General Johnston to 
evacuate his position at Dalton, when 
McPherson would be in a position to 
harass his flank, while the main body 



of the National army pushed him south 
ward. WhOe McPherson's flanking 
movement was in progress, Genera] 
Thomas was to make a show of attack- 
ing in force in front of Buzzard Roost, 
and Schofield with the army of th*' 
Ohio was to close up with jjj^y 
Thomas' left. Accordingly on 7. 
the 7th, General Thomas advanced from 
Ringgold to Tunnel HOI, which was 
easUy carried by the Fourteenth corps 
under General Palmer, the enemy retir- 
ing to his stronger position at Buzzard 
Roost. The same evening the National 
line was established about a mile south 
of Tunnel HiU. A demonstration in 
force was made on the 8th against 
Rocky Face Ridge and Buzzard Roost 
The Fourth corps under Howard suc- 
ceeded in carrying the ridge, but its crest 
was found too narrow to permit of an 
attack being made from it on the pass 
with any prospect of success. General 
Schofield in the mean time brought 
up the army of the Ohio and closed 
with the left of Thomas, which was held 
by Howard. 

On the same day McPherson suc- 
ceeded in passing through Snake Creek 
Gap, surprising a force of Confederate 
cavalry there, and approached within 
a mile of Resaca, which, however 
proved too strong to be carried by 
assault. He therefore fell back to a 
strong position at the west end of Snake 
Creek Gap. General Sherman finding 
that McPherson's flank demonstration 
had failed of its intended effect, set the 
whole of his army in motion for Snake 
Creek Gap, with the exception of two 
divisions of Howard's corps and »om« 



EVACUATION OF DALTON. 



70S 



.cavalry, left to threaten the front of 
Buzzard Roost. The National loss on 
the 8th and 9th was about 750 killed, 
wounded, and missing, the greater 
number being only slightly wounded. 

Resaca is situated on a peninsula 
formed by the junction of the Conasauga 
with the Oostanaula, across which, from 
river to river, the Confederates had con- 
structed a continuous line of rifle-pits 
with strong field-works, their flanks 
being protected by the two rivers. A 
line of retreat southward was left open 
across the Oostanaula. 

On the 13th of May the army of 
May General Sherman passed through 
13. Snake Creek Gap and got into 
position in Sugar Valley, a tract on the 
east side of the ridge mn^b broken by 
hills covered with a dense undergrowth. 
In covering the movement, while press- 
mg the enemy toward Resaca, General 
Kilpatrick received a flesh-wound, 
which imfitted him for active duty for 
several months. The National lines 
were advanced during the day toward 
Resaca, so that the right, under McPher- 
son, rested on the Oostanaula about 
two miles below the town, and extended 
north to the centre under Thomas — the 
left, imder Schofield, extending from 
Thomas' left to the Conasauga, near 
Tikon. a railroad station about midway 
between Resaca and Dalton. 

In the mean time General Johnston 
had observed Sherman's movement and 
detected its object ; and considering his 
position at Dalton no longer tenable, he 
had moved southward on the 12th, and 
having the shorter line of march, reached 
Resaca with his entire force before the 
»»» 



army of Sherman had got through 
Snake Creek Gap. Dalton was immedi 
ately occupied by the divisions of 
Howard's corps left before Buzzani 
Roost, which follownug in the rear oi 
Johnston joined the National left on the 
14th near Tilton. Sherman, in thus com 
pelling Johnston to evacuate a position 
of such extraordinary strength as that 
of Dalton, demonstrated his ability to 
make his way to Atlanta, between 
which and Dalton no jiosition was likely 
to be held by the Confederates which 
might not be as easily turned. 

On the morning of the 14th the 
Confederates were in complete ji^j 
readiness to receive an attack, 14. 
having spent the previous night in 
strengthening their already formidable 
earth-works. General Hardee held 
their right, General Hood their centre, 
and General Polk their left. At an 
early hour skinnishing commenced. A 
body of infantiy with cavalry' was sent 
across the Oostanaula to tii'eaten Cal- 
houn in the rear, fuiiher south on the 
railroad, by which movement General 
Shei-man hoped to turn Johnston's left, 
and thus cut off his retreat, but this 
the natiu-e of the ground rendered 
impossible. At noon there was heavy 
firing along the whole line. About one 
o'clock an attempt was maxle by 
Palmer's coi-ps from the left centre to 
break the enemy's line and force him 
from an elevated position in the immedi- 
ate front. To* reach the point aimed at, 
it was necessary to descend the slope of 
a hill commanded by the enemy's artil- 
lery, to ford a stream bordered with a 
thick growth of bushes and vines, and 



710 



A'MjAITIA. 



then to cross a space intersected by 
ditches and otherwise obstructed. 
Under a miirderous fire of musketry 
and artillery the hill was descended 
and the stream crossed; but the troops 
becoming confused among the ditches 
and obstructions, and finding no shelter 
from which the plunging fire of the 
enemy might be returned, were forced 
to retire, after losing 1000 of their 
number. Further to the left, about the 
same time, General Judah's division of 
the Twenty-Third corps and Newton's 
division of the Fourth, drove the enemy 
from an important position on their 
outer line. By this means, although 
the position taken was not held, the 
National line was advanced. Artillery 
was also got into a position which pre- 
sented the enemy from occupying the 
works. At both extremities of the line 
heavy skirmishing took place, the den- 
sity of the woods and undergrowth 
preventing the use of artillery. 

About three in the afternoon, General 
Johnston massed a heavy force on the 
road to Tilton vdth the view of turning 
the National left flank, held by Stanley's 
division of the Fourth corps. The 
attack was made with overwhelming 
numbers, who rushed on with loud yells, 
and with such impetuosity that Stanley's 
troops were forced in confusion from 
the hill on which they were posted. 
The movement ordered by Johnston 
had been detected eai'ly enough to per- 
mit of Haoker's corps being moved fi'om 
the centre to reinforce the National 
left. The enemy's advance was soon 
checked; and Stanley's troops having 
l>een raided, the Confederates were. 



about dusk, driven back to their line* 
with severe loss. 

While this movement was going on, 
General McPherson sent the Fifteenth 
corps with a portion of the Sixteenth 
across Camp Creek, to carry a hill and 
rifle-pits on the enemy's left in front of 
Resaca. This was effected, and -with 
little loss. As this position commanded 
the works, the railroad, and the trestle 
bridges across the Oostanaula, desperate 
efforts were made by the enemy after 
dark to retake it, but in vain. Heavy 
columns Avith fixed bayonets moved up 
to the very crest of the hill, but were 
compelled to retire in confusion before 
the steady fii-e of the National troops. 
At ten o'clock fighting was over fur the 
day. 

Both armies strengthened their posi- 
tions during the night; and on ji^y 
the morning of the 15th, under 16. 
cover of severe skirmishing, prepara- 
tions were made by General Sherman 
for an assault upon two fortified hills, 
on the enemy's extreme right, the key 
of the whole position. General Hook- 
er's coi-ps was moved to the extreme 
left, Howard's, Schofield's, and Palm- 
er's to the right. Soon after one 
o'clock. Hooker sent Butterfi eld's divi- 
sion forward as the assaulting column, 
sii})ported by the divisions of Geary 
and Williams. After several attacks 
the Confederates were driven fi'om a 
portion of their Lines ; and a lodgm^n 
was secured under the projecting work 
of a lunette mounting 4 guns. Furthei 
advance, however, was found impossi 
ble, owing to a severe fii'e from neigh- 
boring lifle-pits, and the troops seeking 



JOHNSTON RETREATS. 



71- 



such shelter as was available, contented 
themselves with holding the position 
gained. Towards the close of the after- 
noon General Hood's corps made an 
unavailing effort to dislodge them. 
Later under cover of night, and in 
epite of a sharp fire from the Confeder- 
ates, the ends were dug out of the works 
and the guns hauled out with ropes. As 
soon as a breach was made the troops 
rushed in, and after a fierce struggle 
made themselves masters of the lunette. 
General Johnston abandoned his 
position during the night, leaving 
behind another four-gun battery and a 
quantity of stores, and retreated toward 
Kingston, thirty-two miles south of 
Resaca on the railroad. Resaca was im- 
mediately occupied by the troops of 
General Thomas, who succeeded in saving 
the wagon road bridge. The raUroad 
bridge, however, had been biimt. John- 
ston's army owed its escape from Sher- 
man at Resaca to the impracticable 
nature of the valley between the town and 
Snake Creek Gap, whicli greatly retarded 
the passage of troops, and afforded the 
Confederate army time to march from 
Dalton by comparatively good roads, 
which Johnston with wise foresight had 
kept in order. Had the National army 
arrived first at Resaca, nothing could have 
sared the army of the Confederates. 
Once in their strong position at Resaca, 
It cost much severe fighting to make 
them abandon it. The total National 
loss in the two days' fighting was not 
less than 4000 killed and wounded, 
while that of the Confederates probably 
did not exceed 2500, as they fought for 
the most part behind earth-works. 



The Confederate loss included Koout 
1000 prisoners. 

The whole army started in poisnit of 
Johnston, General Thomae, directly ot 
his rear, crossing the O^stanaula at 
Resaca, General McPleraon at Lay's 
Ferry, a few miles to the southwest, 
while General Schofleld, making a wide 
detour to the left of Thomas, ma'-ched 
by obscure roads Across the Conasauga 
and Coosawatteu rivers, which unite 
near Resaca to form the Oostanaula. 
On the 1 7th the march was contin- jj^j 
ued southward by as many roads 17. 
as could be found, in a direction parallel 
with the raUroad, but no enemy was 
seen till within the vicinity of Adairs- 
ville, thirteen miles south-southwest of 
Resaf^a, between the railroad and the 
Oostanaula. There, about sunset, the 
advance division imder General Newton 
had a sharp skirmish with the enemy's 
rear-guard. Next morning the Confed- 
erates had disappeared, but were found 
again in force four miles beyond King- 
ston, on ground comparatively open and 
well adapted for a grand battle. They 
held strong works at CassvUle, five 
miles east of Kingston, and on the 19th 
dispositions were made for a general 
engagement. While, however, Sherman 
was converging on the Confederate posi- 
tion, Johnston retreated in the night 
across the Etowah, burning the bridge? 
at Cartersville, thus leaving the country 
north of the Etowah in the possession 
of General Sherman. It had, however, 
been completely stripped of supplies 
Shennan now gave his troops a few 
days' rest, the army of Thomas Ipng 
near Cassville, McPherson's about King 



712 



ATLANTA. 



ston, and Schofield's at Cassville depot 
and toward the Etowah Bridge. In the 
raean time the railroad, which had 
received but little injury, was restored 
to running order. Trains laden with 
upplies arrived at Kingston on the 
20th, and tlie wounded were sent back 
to Chattanooga, with which place tele- 
graphic communication also was kept up 
as the army advanced. 

General Jefferson C. Davis had on 
the 17th marched towards Rome, at 
the confluence of the Oostanaula and 
Etowah, fifteen miles west of Kingston. 
After a sharp fight on the 1 9th he got 
possession of the town, several forts, 
eight or ten large guns, and large quan- 
tities of stores, as weD as valuable mills 
and foundries. 

General Johnston retired upon Alla- 
toona Pass, an almost impregnable 
position on the railroad, about five miles 
»outh of the Etowah River. General 
Sherman determined not even to 
ittempt the pass in front, but to turn 
it. Accordingly, on the 23d, leaving 
garrisons at Rome and Kingston, and 
larrying with him in wagons supplies 
'or twenty days, he put the army in 
notion for Dallas, a town about fifteen 
ailes south-southwest of Allatoona 
J 'ass, and eighteen miles directly west 
OS Marietta, hoping by thus threatening 
M irietta to compel Johnston to evacu- 
ate the pass. The roads through the 
rug. ;ed and densely wooded region to 
be t-'aversed were few and bad, and the 
march was necessarily slow. The 
moveTient and its objects were soon 
deteci ^d by Johnston, who also set his 
troopa in motion toward Dallas, to pro- 



tect the approaches to Marietta. In the 
march upon Dallas, McPherson, holding 
the National right, made a detour south- 
westward by Van Wert, about fourteen 
miles west of Dallas, while Thomas 
moved nearly due south, with Schofield 
on his left. On the 25th, Hooker's 
corps, the advance of General Thomns, 
moving on the main road to Dallas, 
when near Pumpkin Vine Creek, met 
portions of Hood's and Hardee's coips: 
and a severe contest took place jig.. 
for a position at New Hope 26. 
Church, where three roads meet, from 
Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. The 
enemy, however, having hastily thrown 
lip earth-works, and night coming on ac 
companied by heavy rain, he retained 
possession of the roads. Hooker lust. 
600 men in this affair. Next morning 
the Confederates were found well 
intrenched, substantially in front of the, 
road leading from Dallas to Maiietta. 
It was necessary, therefore, to make 
dispositions on a larger scale. McPher- 
son was moved up to Dallas, Thomas 
was deployed against New Hope 
Church, and Schofield moved toward 
the left so as to strike and turn the 
enemy's right. Owing to the difficult 
nature of the country, these movements 
occupied two days, and were attended 
with heavy skirmishing ; but as the 
vicinity was for the most part densely 
wooded, artiUery could not be used, 
and the casualties were comparatively 
few. On the 28th, just as McPheiBOB 
was closing up to Thomas in front oi 
New Hope Chm-ch, he was repeatedly 
and desperately attacked by a large 
Confederate force, and the contemplated 



BIG SHANTY AND MARIETTA. 



■:ia 



movement was temporai-ily checked, but 
tlie enemy was finally driven back with 
a loss of 2000 killed and wounded. 

After the delay of a few days the 
movement toward the left was resumed, 
McPherson taking up the position in 
front of New Hope Church which 
rhomaphad previo" > ..^cupied, Thom- 
as and Schofield taking positions still 
further to the left. This movement was 
June effected on the Ist of June. All 
1. the roads leading back to AUa- 
toona and Ackworth were occupied. 
General Stoneman's cavalry pushed into 
the east end of Allatoona Pass, and 
General Garrard's marched around by 
the rear to its west entrance. These 
movements being effected without 
opposition, the pass fell into Sherman's 
possession. He found it admirably 
adapted for use as a secondary base, 
and gave the necessary orders for its 
defense and gamson, and for the recon- 
struction of the railroad bridge over 
the Etowah, thus restoring his commun- 
ications by railroad, by which stores 
were again brought to his camps. 
Still working toward the left. General 
Sherman determined on the 4th to leave 
Johnston in his intrenched position at 
New Hope Church, and moved towards 
the railroad above Ackworth, which was 
reached on the 6th of June. Here the 
army remained several days ; and here 
on the 8th General Blair arrived, with 
two divisions of the Seventeenth corps, 
and Colonel Long's brigade of cavalry 
of General Garrard's division, which had 
been awaiting horses at Columbia. This 
addition to Sherman's forces made up 
for his losses in battle and for the 



diminution of his numbers by gamsons 
left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and 
Allatoona Pass. On the 9th, jm,^ 
communications in the rear being 9. 
secure and supplies abundant, the 
movement was resxmied and the march 
continued to Big Shanty, the next station 
on the railroad east of Allatoona Pass. 
Between Big Shanty and Marietta 
intervenes a mountainous district fall 
of defensible positions, covering per- 
fectly the town of Marietta, and the 
railroad as far as the Chattahoochee. 
Three conical peaks in this region, 
links in a continuous foi-est-covered 
chain, form prominent features in the 
landscape. These are Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. 
Kenesaw Mountain, a double peaked em- 
inence, and hence sometimes called the 
Twin Mountain, 1200 feet high, lies 
immediately northwest of Marietta and 
west of the railroad Lost Moiintain 
lies west of Marietta. Pine Mountain, 
a rugged cone-shaped peak, half a mile 
to the north of these and opposite 
the space between them, forms the 
apex of a triangle of which the others 
form the base. On each of these moun- 
tains the enemy had signal stations from 
which the movements of Sherman's 
army could be easily noted. The hill- 
tops were covered with batteries; and 
on the spurs leading from them 
might be seen large numbers of men 
felling trees, digging rifle-pits and in 
other ways preparing for a desperate 
defense. The Confederate lines extended 
about two miles westward from th* 
railroad, t>n which their right rested. 
Their works, which comprised sever*! 



714 



AILANTa. 



snccessive lines of intrenchments, con- 
sisted of log barricades with earth 
thrown against them, and a formidable 
abatis, to which was added in many 
places a chevaux-de-frise of pointed 
fence-rails. The parapet thus formed 
was from six to eight feet thick at the 
top, for the infantry, and, where field- 
guns were posted, from twelve to fifteen 
feet thick. The force at the disposal 
of General Johnston at this time was, 
according to the reports of prisoners, 
deserters, and scouts, nine division? of 
7000 men each, in addition to which 
Governor Brown had sent to his assis- 
tance an auxiliary force of 15,000 Geor- 
gia militia, who, though imdisciplined, 
were capable of good service behind 
earth- works and as laborers in the con- 
struction of fortifications. Hardee's 
corj^s held the Confederate right, Polk's 
the centre. Hood's the left. Their 
cavalry, to the number of about 15,000, 
operated on the right and left flanks and 
on the National rear. 

The National lines were gradually 
advanced toward the Confederate posi- 
tions. McPherson's command, now 
transferred to the extreme left, moved 
towards Marietta, his right on the rail- 
road ; Schofield, shifted to the right, 
moved on Lost Mountain ; Thomas, 
remaining in the centre, moved on 
Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General 
' Garrard's cavalry covered the left wing, 
and General Stoneman's the right. 
General McCook guarded the rear, the 
railroad communications, and the depot 
at Big Shanty. By the 11th the lines 
were close up; and dispositions were 
*iien made to break the enemy's line of 



defense between Kenesaw and Pine 
Mountains. On the 14th, during jm|g 
a heavy cannonade by the Fourth 14. 
corps, General Polk, who commanded 
on Pine Mountain, was struck by the 
fragment of a shell and killed ; and the 
same night. Hooker's corps, moving 
round its base to cut off their retreat, 
the Confederates abandoned their works 
on Pine Mountain, carrying off, how- 
ever, their guns and war material. On 
the morning of the 15th, Stanley's 
division of the Fourth corj5s quietly 
occupied the position. 

After the abandonment of Pine 
Mountain, General Johnston drew back 
his centre to a strong line of intrench- 
ments connecting Kenesaw and Lost 
Mountains. The 15th, 16th, and 17th 
were occupied with incessant skir- 
mishing. On the afternoon of the 15th, 
General Schofield carried the first line 
of the Confederate works at the foot of 
Lost Moimtain. During the 17th, the 
left and centre, which were so far 
advanced that a general engagement 
would otherwise have resulted, remained 
quiet. The right and left centre were 
advanced more thar a mile, to a line of 
defensive works which the enemy had 
evacuated. Towards evening, after 
heavy skirmishing, the enemy's left 
was dislodged from the intrenchments 
at Lost Mountain and the long line of 
breast-works connecting it with Kene- 
saw Moimtain. The Confederates were 
pressed at all points, and skirmishing 
continued in dense forests and across 
difficult ravines, until they were again 
found strongly posted and intrenched, 
with Kenesaw Mountain as a salient, 



A.SSAirL'1 O^r KENESAW. 



715 



theii" right wing thrown back to cover 
Marietta, and their left behind Nose's 
Creek, covering the railioad back to the 
C'hattahoochee. They were thus enabled 
to contract and strengthen their lines. 
During these operations the rain fell 
almost continuously for three weeks, 
making the narrow wooded roads mere 
mud gulleys and a general movement 
impossible. But every opportunity was 
taken to advance the National lines closer 
and closer to the enemy ; and the men 
kept up incessant picket firing. 

On the 2 2d the enemy made a sudden 
J une attack on portions of Hooker'^ and 
22. Schofield's corps on the National 
right near the Kulp House. The blow 
fell mostly on the divisions of Generals 
Williams and Hascall. The ground 
was comparatively open ; but though 
the skirmish lines and an advanced 
regiment of General Schofield's — sent 
out to hold the enemy in check untU 
preparations for his reception could be 
completed — were drivec in, yet when 
the enemy reached the National line of 
battle he received a terrible repulse. 
Many prisoners were taken, and the 
Confederates were compelled to aban- 
don their dead and wounded. The 
National centre was now established in 
front of Kenesaw Mountain ; but so 
many men were required to hold the 

' railroad and the line along the base of 
the moimtain, that only a small force 

, was left with which to attempt a flank 
movement to the right. There was, 
Lowever, now no alternative but to 
assault the enemy's lines or turn his 
position. Either coui*se had its difficul- 
ties and dangers. Both the enemy and 



his own officera expected Shei-man to 
"outflank." General SheiTuan deter- 
mined to assault. His reason for a 
depart'ore from the course which had 
hitherto been so successful was, that an 
army to be efficient must not settle 
down to one single mode of olfence, but 
must be prepared to execute any plan 
likely to result in success. The part o 
the enemy's lines selected to be assault 
ed was the left centre. A strong 
column, if thrust through at that point, 
and pushed on boldly two and a half 
miles, would reach the railroad below 
Marietta and cut off the enemy's right 
and centre from the line of retreat which 
could then be overwhelmed and de 
stroyed. On the 24th of June, there- 
fore. General Sheiinan ordered that an 
assault should be made at two points 
south of Kenesaw Mountain on the 
27th, thus affording three days for 
preparation and reconnoissance. One 
of these assaults was to J^e made near 
Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's 
troops, the other about a mile furthei 
south by those of General Thomas. 

On the morning of the 27th, at the 
hour and in iho, manner prescribed, 
the assaults were made ; but both f juled. 
and many valuable lives were jn^f 
lost, including that of General 2<. 
Harker. At six in the morning, Blair's 
corps, holding the extreme left of Mc- 
Pherson's line, moved on the east side 
of the mountain, while the corps of 
Dodge and Logan assaulted the adj<>ia 
ing northern slope. The brunt of the 
attack was borne by three brigades o/ 
Logan's corj)8, which, pushing impetu 
ously up the hill scattered *iii Confod 



ne 



ATLANTA. 



srate skirmishers and captured some of 
"heir rifle-pits, making also some pris- 
mers. These troops pressed forward 
rill they arrived at the foot of a pre- 
'"ipitous cliff thirty feet high, from 
which the enemy poured a plunging 
re and rolled down huge stones. 
Here the line retired and fortified on 
the extreme right. For the second and 
more important attack, portions of the 
division'} of Newton and Davis were 
selected. When the signal was given, 
the troopa charged up the slope of the 
mountain in face of a murderous fire 
from a battery on the summit, pene- 
trated two lines of abatis, carried a line 
of rifle-pits beyond, and reached the 
works ; but a destnictive fire of mus- 
ketry and artillery from the enemy soon 
made it necessary to recall the men. 
General Newton's troops returned to 
their original line, while the biigade of 
Davis threw up brea.st-works between 
those they had carried and the main 
line of the enemy. The entire contest 
lasted little more than an hour ; but it 
cost General Sherman 3000 men in killed 
and wounded, while the enemy, fighting 
behind breast-works, suffered little. 

During the day there had lieen some 
sharp skirmishing with the enemy's 
left wing; and General Cox's divi- 
sion pushed fonvai'd to a point nine 
miles south of Marietta and not more 
han three fi-om the Chattahoochee. 
From his elevated position on Kenesaw 
Mountain, General Johnston had been 
able to watch SheiTuan's movements 
and to judge correctly at what point 
the main attack would fall, and had 
'leen ready to receive it with his main 



force. Though Sherman admitted that 
this attempt was a complete and costly 
failure, he yet took upon himself the 
entire responsibility, claiming tha'^, it 
was not altogether without good fniits, 
inasmuch as it satisfied Johnston that 
he would assault, and that boldly, when 
an assault appeared to be the surest 
means of success. 

General Sherman could not rest long 
under the imputation of defeat ui 
failure. He almost inunediately com- 
menced preparations to turn the enemy's 
left. On the 1st of July, Generals j^w 
Hooker and Schofield advanced 1. 
about two miles to the right, and 
McPherson was ordered to shift rapidly 
his whole force from the extreme left 
to the extreme right of the National 
lines and push on to Nickajack Creek, 
which falls into the Chattahoochee foui 
miles below the railroad bridge. Gen 
eral Garrard with his cavalry was sent 
to occupy McPherson's place in front 
of Kenesaw, while General Stoneman 
moved on his flanks to strike the river 
near Turner's Ferry, two and a half 
miles below the railroad bridge. Mc- 
Pherson commenced his movement on 
the night of the 2d. The effect waa 
instantaneous. The object of the move- 
ment was at once detected by General 
Johnston, who withoiit further delay 
prepared to evacuate Kenesaw Mo\intain 
and fall back to the Chattahoochee. 
Simultaneously with McPherson's move- 
ment, Johnston's rear-guard abandoned 
the works which for three weeks had 
been so resolutely defended; and before 
dawn on the morning of the 3d j^jy 
the National pickets occupied th* J** 



THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



717 



'irest of Kenesaw. General Thomas' 
whole line was then moved forward to 
the railroad and thence southward to 
the Chattahoochee; and General Sher- 
man entered Marietta at half -past eight 
in the morning, just as the enemy's 
cavalry left the town. General Logan's 
coqjs, which had not moved far, was 
ordered back to Marietta by the main 
road ; and McPherson and Schofield 
were instructed to cross Nickajack 
Creek, attack the enemy in flank 
and rear, and, if possible, harass him 
while crossing the Chattahoochee. 
Johnston was too good a general to 
be thus caught ; and he had covered his 
movement well. He had constructed a 
strong tete-dni-pont at the Chattahoochee 
with an advanced intrenched line across 
the road at Smyrna camp-rceeting 
ground, five miles from Marietta where 
General Thomas found him, his flanks 
protected by Nickajack and Rotten- 
wood Creeks. In his retreat, Johnston 
left behind about 2000 mtn, principally 
stragglers, who were made prisoners. 

General Johnston was obliged to 
leave his new position by another flank 
movement ; and on the night of the 4th 
he fell back to the Chattahoochee, which 
he I -ossed with the main body of his 
army, leaving Hardee's corps on the 
light bank. General Sherman left a 
l^urrison in Marietta and moved up to 
the Chattahoochee. On the evening 
of the 5th, the troops of Thomas and 
McPherso'v occupied a line extending 
from a short distance above the lailroad 
bridge to the mouth of Nickajack Creek, 
while those of Schofield were posted in 
the rear of Smyrna as a resei-ve. The 



enemy lay behind a line of unusual 
strength, covering his pontoon bridges 
and the railroad, and beyond the river. 
Heavy skirmishing during the 5th along 
the entire front demonstrated the 
strength of the enemy's position, w^hich 
it became appai-ent could be turned only 
by crossing the river, a deep and rapid 
stream, passable only by means ol 
bridges, except at one or two difficult 
fords. 

General Sherman judged that it 
would be easier to cross the river at 
once, before the enemy had time to 
make a more thorough preparation and 
regain confidence. Accordingly, Scho- 
field was ordered to move eastward 
from his position near Smyrna, to cross 
near the mouth of Soap's Creek, eight 
miles north of the railroad bridge, and 
effecl a lodgment on the east banlc 
This was most successfully and skilfiilly 
accomplished on the 7th of July, j^iy 
General Schofield completely 7. 
surprising the guard and cajjturing a 
gun, and immediately afterwards lapug 
pontoon and trestle bridges, and taking 
up a strong position on high and com- 
manding groimd from which good roads 
led eastward. At the same time Gen- 
eral Garrard moved rapidly on Rosewell 
a town near the Chattahoochee, neailj 
due north of Atlanta, and about seven 
miles above the point where Schofield 
crossed, and destroyed there some 
woollen and cotton mills, from which 
the Confederate amiies had been long 
supplied. Gan-ard was then orderoc' 
to secure the ford at Rosewell and hold 
it till relieved by infantry. As General 
Shei-mau intended transferrinif tlic army 



718 



ATLANTA. 



of tke Tennessee from the extreme right 
to the left, he ordered Thomas to send 
his nearest division of infantry to 
Rosewell to hold the ford till MvPher- 
son could send up a corps from the 
neighborhood of Nickajack Creek. 
General Newton's division was sent, 
and held the ford till the arrival of 
Dodge's corps, which was soon followed 
by McPherson's whole army. On the 
9th a crossing was effected at Rosewell 
and a good bridge constructed, while 
the enemy ^^a- amused by feints, 
extending from Powers Ferry, four 
miles above the railroad bridge, to 
Turner's Ferry, three miles below it. 
Under cover of the same demonstrations 
General Howard also built a bridge at 
Power's Feny. Thus duiing the 9th 
three good points of crossing were 
secured above the position of the enemy, 
with good roads leading to Atlanta. 
General Johnston then took the alarm; 
and on the night of the 9th withdrew 
Hardee's corps to the left bank, aban- 
doned his Ute-du'-pont, burnt his bridges, 
and left Sherman, on the morning of 
July *^^ lOtli of July, master of all 
10. the country north and west of 
the Chattahoochee. The Confederate 
army then fell back to the outer fortified 
lines around Atlanta, abandoning the 
whole line of the river, except the left 
ving, which remained a short time in 
the neighborhood of Turner's Ferry, 
expecting an attack in that quarter. 
General Sherman, however, rapidly and 
quietly moved the remainder of the 
army of the Tennessee to its old position 
on the extreme left. 

One of the objects of General Sher- 



man's campaign, the advancement oi 
the National lines from the Tennessee 
to the Ch,attahoochee, had now been 
attained ; and Atlanta was only eight 
miles distant. The main armies remained 
quiet in their camps on the Chattahoo 
chee from the 10th of July to the 16th 
In the mean time stores were collected 
at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining'e 
Station ; the railroad guards and garri- 
sons were strengthened, and the bridges 
and roads leading across the river were 
improved. The railroad was in com 
plete order ; and stores had been brought 
by it as early as the 8th within a mile 
of the bridge. A sufficient force waa 
detailed to go to the left bank of the 
river to occupy the works of the enemy. 
These were found to be of the most 
formidable character, extei) ling more 
than five miles along the river, with 
almost impenetrable lines of abatis. 

In anticipation of the present position 
of affairs,General Sherman had collected 
a well-appointed cavalry force, about 
2000 strong, at Decatur, Ala., with 
orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, 
to push rapidly southward, cross the 
Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten 
Islands, and to push on thence by the 
most direct route to Opelika, with the 
object of destroying effectually the 
railroad running westward from that 
place, and thus cutting off from John 
ston's army an important source of 
supplies and reinforcement. The com 
mand of this expedition was given to 
General Rousseau, commanding the 
district of Tennessee. As soon as 
Johnston was well across the Chattar 
hoochee, and Sherman had commenced 



JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 



71« 



aianoeuvrmg on Atlanta, the requisite 
lotice was given; and, on the 10th of 
July, General Rousseau commenced his 
march. He passed through Talladega, 
reached the railroad on the 16th about 
twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and 
broke it up all the way back to that 
place, as well as several miles of the 
branch railroads leading towards West 
Point and Columbus. Then turning 
northward he arrived at Marietta on the 
2 2d, his loss not having exceeded 30 
men. 

The sudden abandonment of his 
formidable line of defenses on the left 
bank of the river, by General Johnston, 
occasioned the utmost dissatisfaction 
ir?th his conduct of the campaign, 
'»«Decially in Atlanta, where it was 
expected he would make a stand on the 
Chattahoochee, which it was argued he 
30uld easily do, being in the immediate 
Qeighborhood of his supplies. His 
retreat from the Chattahoochee wa*f the 
crovTning ofEence with the enemies of 
this able general, whose inferiority of 
force had made it impossible to avoid 
Sherman's outflanking movements, but 
who had nevertheless kept his army in 
a compact body, wath insignificant 
losses of guns or material of war. His 
removal was loudly demanded ; and on 
the 17th, in accordance with orders 
from the Confederate War Department, 
he turned over his command to General 
flood. With this change in commanders 
commenced a change in the character 
of the campaign in accordance with the 
difference in the genius of the two gen- 
erals, which it was hoped would have 
an important influence on the viorak of 



the troops, discoviraged by a long 
succession of retreats from fortified 
positions. 

The whole of General Sherman's 
army crossed the Chattahoochee j^y 
on the 17th, with the exception 17. 
of Davis' division of the FouT-teentL 
corps, left to watch the railroad bridge 
and protect the rear, and preparations 
were made to move upon Atlanta. The 
army of the Cumberland, now occupying 
the right and right centre, rested on the 
river just above the raih'oad bridge. 
The left centre was occupied by the 
army of the Ohio, the left by the army 
of the Tennessee. The line thus formed 
made a grand right-wheel march, of 
which the army of the Cumberland waa 
the pivot ; and on the evening of the 
l7th came into a position along the Old 
Peach Tree road, about northeast of the 
railroad bridge. On the 18th, the left 
vping, swinging round rapidly, struck 
the Georgia Railroad about two miles 
west of Stone Mountain, a huge mass 
of granite fifteen miles northeast of 
Atlanta. General McPherson, with the 
aid of Gan-ard's cavaby, which moved 
on his flank, broke up about four miles 
of this road, while General Scliofield 
occupied Decatur, six miles east of 
Atlanta, and General Thomas moved 
his troops up towards Peach Tree Creek, 
a small stream flo^\ing southwestward 
to the Chattahoochee, a little above the 
railroad bridge. The Confederates 
believing that their left was the real 
point of attack, and that Sherman would 
approach Atlanta from the southwest, 
and oj>po8e these movements wth an 
inadequate force of infantry and a few 



nb 



AtLAi4tA. 



cavalry. Thus McPherson and Schofield 
were able on the 19th to pass eastward 
of Decatur within the naturally strong 
defensive lines of Nance's and Peach 
IVee Creeks ; and on the same day 
Thomas, moving more directly from the 
north, though meeting with more oppo- 
sition, succeeded in crossing Peach Tree 
Creek in fi'ont of the enemy's intrenched 
lines. The National armies then lay in 
a curved line north and northeast of 
Atlanta, extending from the railroad 
which nms between Atlanta and the 
river to the Georgia Railroad and some 
distance south of it. 

On the 20th, the National lines 
moved still nearer Atlanta ; but as a 
trap existed between the lines of Scho- 
field and Thomas, two divisions of 
Howard's corps of Thomas' army were 
moved to the left to connect with 
Schofield. By this movement Newton's 
division of Howard's corps was left 
alone to hold an important position on 
the road leading fi'om Atlanta to Buck- 
head. General Hood soon detected the 
weak point, and was not slow in taking 
advantage of the opportunity thus 
afforded him. He was soon, therefore, 
in a position in which he was ready to 
strike a blow which might go far towards 
retrieving many disasters. General 
Sherman had, however, sent orders to 
Newton and the rest of the ai-my of the 
Cumberland to close up rapidly towards 
the left. Newton accordingly moved 
to a prominent ridge, where his troops 
stacked arms and made a temporary 
halt, but, beyond throwing up piles of 
logs and rails, made no defensive 
preparations, no attack being appre- 



hended, prisoners just brought in having 
reported that there was no considerable 
force of the enemy within a mile and a 
half. Hood had in the mean time 
been massing his forces in the woods 
immediately in front of the position of 
General Newton and of General Hook- 
er's force, which was approaching from 
the right, hoping to fall upon his adver- 
saries while in motion and cut the 
National army in two. At four ],j|y 
o'clock in the afternoon he ad- 20. 
vanced suddenly from the woods, with- 
out skirmishers, directly on the position 
of Newton. His appearance was alto- 
gether unexpected ; nevertheless >^he 
National troops instantly sprang to 
anns. and from behind theii' log and 
rail breast-works poured a deadly fire 
into the dense masses of the enemy 
Well-served batteries also, which New 
ton had posted on his banks, aided tc 
keep the Confederates in check. 

General Hooker's whole corps was 
uncovered ; and it had to fight on compa 
ratively open ground. Geary's division 
was thrown back in some confusion. 
Rallying quickly it recovered its ground 
and kept the enemy in check till Ward's 
division came up. Ward met the 
enemy's charge by a counter-charge, 
and after a brief but fierce sti-uggle 
drove him back. The division of 
Williams, further to the right and next 
to that of Geary, though desperately 
attacked, repulsed every onset with 
heavy loss. The battle had lasted four 
hours, when Hood drew his forces 
rapidly back to their intrenchments, 
leaving on the field 600 dead, and 1000 
severely wounded, a number of piisonerSf 



oENEiiAL Mcpherson. 



n: 



and seven regimental flags— his total 
loss being estimated by General 
Sherman at not less than 5000. The 
National loss was 1900, sustained 
principally by the corps of General 
Hooker, upon which fell the brunt of 
the battle. General Johnston's division 
of Palmer's corps had also been engaged, 
)ut being well defendev. its loss was 
comparatively light. 

The Confederates kept within their 
mtrenched position during the 21st, 
',heir right beyond the Georgia Railroad 
*ud their left extended towards Turner's 
Feny, at a general distance of four 
miles from Atlanta, In the course of 
the day a strongly fortified hill in front 
of the exti'eme National left, which 
completely commanded Atlanta and the 
two principal roads leading north and 
south from the city, was earned by 
General Leggett's division of the Seven- 
teenth corps, though with a loss of 750 
men. Two desperate but unsuccessful 
attempts to regain this position were 
made by the Confederates, who when 
they finally retired left their dead and 
wounded on the slope of the hill. 

On the morning of the 2 2d, the whole 
of the advanced line of the enemy was 
found abandoned, which led Sherman to 
suppose that Hood was about to give 
up Atlanta without further contest. 
lie was, however, only preparing to 
repeat on a larger scale the experiment 
cf the 20th. Pretending to be falling 
Dack upon the city, he hoped to decoy 
General Sherman into a rapid advance, 
and then suddenly, with all his force, 
strike the National army while in 
motion, at such weak points aa should 



offer. Unsuspectingly Sherman pushed 
his troops beyond the abandoned works 
He found the enemy occupying a linp 
of finished redoubts completely covering 
the approaches to the city, and actively 
engaged in connecting these redoubts 
with curtains, strengthened by rifle- 
trenches, abatis and chevaux-de-frisf^ 
Satisfied that Hood meant to fight, 
Sherman immediately resimied the dis- 
positions for pressing towards the city 
on its east and northeast fronts. The 
National line by these movements be 
came so contracted, that the Sixteenth 
corps, under General Dodge, which 
fonned the right of the army of the 
Tennessee, was crowded out of its posi- 
tion, and was directed to march to the 
extreme left of the line, to aid in the 
defense of the hill which had been car- 
ried by the Seventeenth corps the day 
before, and which was stiD held by 
Leggett's division. 

At ten in the morning, and about 
the time the movement was j^jy 
commenced. General Sherman, 5:2. 
in company with General Schofield, was 
examining the enemy's lines, whe:i he 
was joined by General McPherson, who 
described the condition of things en his 
flank and the disposition of his tj^ops. 
Sherman explained to him that if seri- 
ous resistance were met in Atlanta, as 
seemed probable, he should extend to 
the right, and did not want much dis 
tance gained on the left. McPhersou 
then described the hill occupied by 
Leggett's division as essential to the 
occupation of any ground to the east 
and south of the Augusta Railroad. 
Sherman therefore ratified McPhei-son'e 



722 



atlania: 



disposition of bis troops, and modified 
a previous order sent him in writing to 
employ Dodge's corps in breaking up 
the railroad, and sanctioned its going, 
as already ordered by McPherson, to 
his left, to hold and fortify the position 
there. McPherson remained with Gen- 
eral Sherman till noon, when reports 
arrived indicating a movement of the 
enemy towards the left flank. He then 
mounted his horse and rode away with 
his staff. 

General Sherman had the day before 
sent Garrard's cavalry to Covington, on 
the Augusta Railroad, forty-two miles 
east of Atlanta, with instructions to 
send out detachments from that point 
to destroy the two bridges across the 
Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, trib- 
utaries of the Ocmulgee. McPherson 
had also left his wagon train at Decatur, 
under a guard of three regiments com- 
manded by Colonel Sprague. 

Soon after the departure of McPher- 
son, sounds of musketry to the left and 
rear rapidly gromng into volume and 
accompanied by the roar of artillery^ 
were heard, and about the same time 
the reports of guns in the direction of 
Decatur. There could be no doubt 
now as to what the enemy was about. 
Hood was throwing a superior force on 
the National left flank while he held 
the National forces with his forts in 
front, the only question being as to the 
amoimt of force at his disposal. Orders 
were immediately sent to all parts of 
the right and left centre to give fxill 
employment to the enemy along the 
vvhole line, and for Schofield to hold as 
large a force as possible in reserve 



awaiting developments. Not more 
than half an hour had elapsed aftei 
McPherson had parted from Sherman, 
when his adjutant-general. Colonel 
Clarke, rode up and reported him killed 
or a prisoner. He had ridden to 
General Dodge's colunm, moving as 
before described, and had sent off nearly 
all his staff and ordei'lies on various 
errands, and taken a narrow road that 
led through the woods to the left and 
rear of General Giles A. Smith's divi- 
sion, which was on General Blair's 
extreme left. A few minutes after he 
had entered the woods a shai-p volley 
was heard from the direction in 
which he had gone, and his horse had 
come out riderless, with two wounds. 
Sheiinan immediately despatched a staff 
officer to General Logan, commanding 
the Fifteenth Corps, dii'ecting him to 
assume command of the army of thfc 
Tennesee and hold the ground already 
chosen, especially the hill occupied by 
General Leggett's division. 

Already the whole line was engaged 
in battle. McPherson upon reaching 
the left had found the Sixteenth corps 
going into position to prolong the flank, 
and at that time facing to the left in a 
direction perpendicular to the main 
line. Between the right of the Six 
teenth corps and the left of the Seven 
teenth was a wooded space of about 
half a mile. Shortly after twelve jQ]y 
o'clock the enemy emerged from 22. 
the woods in front of these corps m 
three columns, and attacked tne Six 
teenth corjis. Three desperate assaults 
were repulsed by Dodge, in the last of 
which the enemy suffered severely from 



AilAOiS. UiN U^VAVVK. 



rta 



the National batteries. It was during 
the ] ull in the battle which now occmred 
that McPherson had attempted to ride 
through the woods to G. A. Smith's 
division on the left of the Seventeenth 
corps, it having been reported that the 
nemy was about attempting to push 
a force through the gap above mentioned 
between the two corps. After sending 
the only remaining member of his staff 
with orders to obtain a brigade from 
Logan's command and throw it across 
the gap, with a single orderly he struck 
into the road before mentioned. The 
enemy's skirmish line, however, had 
already advanced close up to the road, 
and before he was aware he was within 
fifty feet of it. A volley brought him 
to the ground, mortally wounded. 

Wangelin's brigade, the one ordered 
ap from Logan's command, arrived 
in time to partially check the Confed- 
erates, but not soon enough to prevent 
a portion of their force getting in the 
rear of the Seventeenth corps, while 
other masses of troops were pushed 
tgainst the hill held by Leggett, whose 
division, as well as that of G. A. Smith, 
was attacked in front and rear, and 
obliged to fire alternately from behind 
their own breast-works and an aban- 
doned parapet of the enemy. Leggett's 
troops held firmly a fortified angle at 
the top of the hill, against which the 
Confederates threw their columns with 
desperate but fruitless energy. In the 
mean time Smith, who had been com- 
pelled to draw back his more exposed 
lines, and in doing so to abandon two 
guns, took up a new line, whose right 
connected with the division of Leggett, 



his left diawn back and facing south- 
east. The Confederates could make 
no impression on this new formation of 
the corps, whose deadly fire compelled 
them to recoil again and again, mowing 
down whole ranks at a time and cover 
ing the ground and ditches with dead 
and wounded men. A portion of the 
force that had penetrated the gap before 
mentioned, renewed the attack on the 
right flank of the Sixteenth corps, and 
captured on its first advance a 6-gun 
batteiy which was moving unsupported 
along a narrow road through the woods. 
They were soon checked, however, by 
the divisions of Sweeney and Fuller, 
and diiven back with the loss of many 
prisoners. Several of Sweeney's regi- 
ments had expen-led their ammunition, 
but charged with the bayonet, when the 
enemy broke and fled. At about half 
past three the Confederates desisted 
from their attack on the left flank, 
having sustained very heavy loss zind 
gained no ground. 

In the mean time two divisions of 
Wheeler's cavalry, with a section of 
artillery, had taken a wide cu-cuit to the 
eastward and fallen upon Decatur im- 
opposed — Sherman having sent Gar 
rard's cavalry to Covington, as before 
stated — and attempted to capture the 
wagon trains ; but Colonel Sprague cov 
ered them with great skill and success, 
sending them to the rear of Schofield 
and Thomas, and not withdrawing 
from Decatxir till every wagon wa 
safe, except three which the teamsterB 
had abandoned. 

A pause in the battle occurred about 
four o'clock. Hood was ma.ssing troopK 



784 



ATLiAJNTA. 



For an attack on the Fifteenth corps, 
now commanded by General M. L. 
Smith, which, immediately adjoining the 
Seventeenth coi-ps, held the right of the 
army of the Tennessee, behind strong 
breast-works. At half-past four, while 
the attention of the extreme left was 
occupied by a pretended attack, a heavy 
force of the enemy, two lines deep, 
marched directly on the left of the 
Fifteenth corps, driving in two regi- 
ments of skirmishers and capturing two 
guns. Lightbum's brigade, which held 
this part of the line protected by breast- 
works, kept the enemy at bay by well- 
directed discharges of 20 pounder Par- 
rott guns. Presently a second strong 
column of the enemy appeared, and 
rapidly and steadily approached, heed- 
less of the fearful furrows made in its 
ranks by well-directed artillery. The 
attack had now become sufficiently for- 
midable ; but when a thu-d column of 
the Confederates was seen pouring in on 
the rear through a deep cut in the 
Georgia Railroad, Lightbum's troops, to 
avoid certain capture, retired in confu- 
sion to the second line of breast-works 
500 yards fi'om the main line; and the 
abandoned works with two batteries 
fell into the hands of the enemy. The 
position lost was one of the utmost 
importance, and Sherman sent orders to 
Schofield — which, however, he had an- 
ticipated — to make the Fifteenth corps 
regain its ground at any cost. To aid 
he movement, batteries from Schofield's 
corps were so posted that by means of 
them the enemy and his works beyond 
might be shelled, and the approach of 
rflinfoi-cements prevented. The Con- 



federates were on the point of turning 
the captured PaiTott guns upon the 
inner National line, when the Fifteenth 
corps, supported by some of Schofield's 
troops, advanced with loud cheers to 
the attack. After a fierce struggle, in 
which the fight was sometimes hand to 
hand across the narrow parapet, the ene- 
my was driven out of the works and the 
guns retaken. Repeated discharges of 
grajae and canister into the retreating 
masses caused fearful carnage. Thus 
ended the battle, by far the bloodiest 
that had yet been fought in Georgia. 
The Confederates were defeated at all 
points. Their dead left in front of the 
National lines numbered 2200 from 
actual count, of which 800 weie deliv- 
ered to them under flag of trace. Theii 
total loss in killed was computed by 
General Logan at 3240 ; in addition to 
which they lost 3000 prisoners, includ 
ing 1000 wounded and many commis- 
sioned officers. Owing to the closeness 
and desperation of the conflict, the pro- 
portion of killed was unusually large. 
Hood could til afford these heavy losses, 
as his force was originally smaller 
than Sherman's. The total National 
loss was 3722, the greater part being 
killed and wounded. Sherman's amiy, 
however, had sustained an irrepara 
ble loss in the death of General Mc- 
Pherson " He was " said Sherman : 
" a noble youth, of striking personal 
appearance, of the highest professional 
capacity, and with a heart abounding 
in kindness that drew to him the affec- 
tions of all men." His body was recov 
ered and carried in the heat of battle 
to General Shennan. who sent it. in 



CAVALKY EXPEDITIONS. 



rsrs 



({barge tu his personal staflF, back to 
Marietta, on its way to his Northern 
home.* 

Garrard, with his cavalry, returned 
July from Covington on the 24th, 
21. having thoroughly accomplished 
his mission to destroy the bridges over 
the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, 
besides burning a train of cars, 2000 
bales of cotton, and the depots at Cov- 
ington and Conger's Station. He also 
broke up the railroad between those 
two places for seven miles, and brought 
in 200 prisoners and some good horees, 
having lost in the expedition only two 

• QBiraaaAi, Jaices Birdsktk McPherson was born 
in Sandusky Co., Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1828, 
and entered the Military Academy at ^Vast Point in 
1849. He graduated at the head of his class on the 
30th of June, 1853, and was then appointed brevet 
second lieutenant of engineers and assistant instructor 
of practical engineering at the Academy. He remained 
in this position till 1854, when he was appointed 
assistant engineer on the defenses of New Tork harbor. 
In 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort 
Delaware, and subsequently of the fortifications on 
Alcatras Island, in San Francisco Bay. In 1861 he 
was placed in charge of the fortifications in Boston 
harbor. In the same year he was made captain, and 
in November became aide-de-camp to neieral Halleck 
in the Western Department, with the rank of lieuten- 
ant colonel. He was chief engineer of tlie army of 
the Tennessee in the expeditions against Forts Henry 
and Donelson, and he was also at the siege of Corinth. 
In May, 1862, he was appointed brigadier-general of 
volunteers, and in the following month general super- 
intendent of military roads in West Tennessee. In 
September of the same year he was on the staff of 
General Grant, with the rank of major-general of 
volunteers. Subsequently, he was appointed brigadier- 
general of the regular army, his rank dating from 
August, 1st, 1863. Two months later he led a column 
into Mississippi, and defeated the enemy at Canton, 
m Sherman's expedition to Meridian he was second in 
command, and in the Atlanta campaign commanded 
the army of the Tennessee. McPherson was distin- 
guished for bravery. Industry, and indefatigable 
energy. In the language of General Grant, he was 
"one of the ablest engineers and most skilful gener- 
als " 

98* 



men. The Georgia Railroad being now 
unavailable to the enemy, Sherman 
turned his attention to the railroad 
connecting Atlanta with Macon, the 
only avenue left by which supplies could 
be brought to the enemy. For this 
purpose he organized his cavalry into 
two large bodies, to move in concert 
from each wing of the army, while the 
army of the Tennessee was to be shifted 
at the same time by the right to East 
Point, a station six miles southwest of 
Atlanta, at the junction of the Maoon 
and West Point roads. Stoneman was 
transferred to the left flank, and Gar- 
rard's cavalry added to his own, making 
an effective force of 5000 men. On the 
right flank McCook, to whose command 
was added the cavalry brought by Gen- 
eral Rousseau, had an aggregate forcf 
of 4000 men. These two well-appoin 
ted bodies of cavalry, which Shermac 
considered more than a match foi 
Wheeler, were directed to move in won 
cert, Stoneman's by the left around 
McDonough, McCook's by the right on 
Fayetteville. On the night of the 28tb 
they were to meet on the Macon Railroat 
near Lovejoy's, thirty miles south of 
Atlanta, and break up the track thor- 
oughly. The enemy's communications 
would then be all destroyed, and it was 
hoped the speedy evacuation of Atlanta 
would follow. 

Just before starting on the expedition 
Stoneman requested permission to p?-<> 
ceed, after accomplishing the proposeo 
destruction of the railroad, to Macon and 
Andersonville, and release the Union 
prisoners there. To thi.H, as thfte was 
a possibility of success, and, to use 



/26 



ATLANTA. 



Sherma'^'s words, "something captiva- 
ting in tiie idea," consent was given by 
General Sherman, on the condition, 
however, that Wheeler's cavalry should 
first be defeated, and that Stoneman 
ehoiild make the attempt with his own 
cavalry only, that of Garrard to return 
immediately to his own flank of the 
National army. 

Thp two expeu.cioiLc get out on the 
July 27th, Stoneman marching as pro- 
27. posed towards McDonough, and 
sending Garrard to Flat Rock to cover 
his movement. McCook moved down 
the west bank of the Chattahoochee. 
But Stoneman, instead of proceeding to 
Lovejoy's, turned off almost immedi'«tely 
towards the Georgia Railroad, following 
it as far as Covington. He then struck 
due south to the east of the Ocmulgee, 
for Macon, sixty miles distant, and ar- 

ived in the vicinity of that place on the 
30th. A detachment was sent eastward 
to Gordon, on the Georgia Central Rail- 
road, where 11 locomotives and several 
trains loaded with stores were destroyed, 
and several bridges between that place 
and Macon. But having learned that 
on the previous day the prisoners in 
Macon had been sent away to Charles- 
ton, Stoneman decided to return at once, 
without attempting to reach either 
Macon or Andersonville. He accord- 
ingly turaed northward in the evening 

^ly but on the following morning, 
when about twenty miles from 
Macon^ encountered a heavy force. 
Dismoimting a portion of his command, 
as the country was imfavorabie for cav- 
alry operations, he threw them foiward 
Hs gkirmifihei'b. He sioon h<)wever, 



31 



found himself surrounded by a superior 
force. He then gave directions to the 
greater part of his troops to cut their 
way as well as they could through the 
enemy's lines, while he with several 
hundred men and a section of artillery 
occupied their attention. He was finally 
compelled to surrender. One of his 
three brigades was captured with him; 
one, under Colonel Capron, was sur- 
prised and scattered on its way back 
and the third, under Colonel Adams, 
arrived almost intact within the Nation 
al lines. Garrard remained at Flat 
Rock till the 29th, awaiting orders 
from Stoneman, when he marched to- 
wards Covington; but learning thure 
that he had gone southward, returned 
to his position on the left flank of the 
army. 

McCook, who marched along the west 
side of the Chattahoochee, on amving 
at Rivertown, crossed on pontoons and 
marched to Palmetto Station, on the 
West Point Railroad, twenty-five miles 
south of Atlanta, and destroyed the 
track there. He then moved eastward 
upon Fayetteville, and biimt 500 ai-my 
wagons, killed 800 mules, and made 
prisoners of several hundred quarter- 
masters' men. He reached the appoint- 
ed rendezvous at Lovejoy's on the night 
of the 28th, burnt the depot and tore 
up a section of the raih'oad ; but hi^' 
work of destruction being interfered 
with by an accumulating force ot tb^ 
enemy, and hearing nothing of Stone 
man, he turned off towards the soutii 
west and marched to Newman, a statiori 
on the West Point Railroad. Here he 
encountered an infautjy force of tli*^^ 



MAGNIFICENT ADVANCE REPULSED, 



W 



enemy on its way from Mississippi to 
Atlanta, which had been delayed by the 
break he had effected on the road at 
Palmetto. This force, with the pursu- 

ng cavalry, hemmed him in, and he was 
compelled to drop his prisoners and cut 

is way out, in doing which he lost 

ome 500 officers and men. The total 
losses of Stoneman's and McCook's 
commands amounted to not less than 
1500 men. Owing to Stoneman's failure 
to co-operate with McCook at Lovejoy's, 
the damage done to the Macon Railroad 
was not effectual, and the communica- 
tions of Hood in the direction of Macon 
were soon restored. Atlanta ob**-ined 
a respite of at least a month. 

While these raids against the South- 
em railroad communications of Atlanta 
had been going on, the army of the 
Tennessee, now under the command of 
Major-General Howard — appointed by 

he president to succeed General Mc- 
Pherson — had, in accordance with the 
plans of Sherman, been drawn out of 
i;S intrenchments on the left flank, and 
moved during the 27th, behind the rest 
of the army, to a position on the extreme 
right, the right flank being held by the 
corps of General Logan. The line of 
the army was thus prolonged southward 
beyond Proctor's Creek, and facing 
eastward. About ten in the morning 
all the army was in position, and the 
men were busily engaged in throwing 
ap the usual defense of logs and rails. 
Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps 
had been ordered by Sherman, on the 
day before, to move down to Turner's 
Ferry, and thence towards Whitehall or 
East Point, and if possible to reach the 



flank of Howard's new line, so that in 
case Hood should attempt to repeat the 
experiment of the 2 2d, and attack any 
part of the army while in motion, his 
force might be taken in flank at an on 
expected moment 

Hood was not long in finding cm 
that the army of Sherman was swinging 
round towards the Macon Railroad, and 
massed troops in the same direction tc 
oppose the movement. At noon jq], 
on the 28th, the Confederates 28. 
moved out of Atlanta by the Bell's Feriy 
road, formed in the open fields behind 
a rising ground, and advanced in paral- 
lel lines directly against the Fifteenth 
corps, expecting to find it detached and 
unsupported. Fortunately Logan's 
troops had thrown up breast-works, and 
though the advance of the Confederate 
columns was " magnificent," as Sherman, 
who witnessed it, said, it was only to 
be followed by a recoU before steady 
volleys of musketry and incessant dis- 
charges of grape and canister. In spite 
of the efforts of their officers the men 
broke and fled, and though rallied again 
and again, at some p^irts of the line as 
often as six times, they were, about 
four o'clock in the afternoon, compblled 
to retire, with a loss of not less than 
5000. Logan's loss was reported at less 
than 600. Had Davis' division come 
up at any time before four o'clock, this 
complete repulse of the enemy might 
have been made a disastrous lont 
Owing to the difficult nature of th 
country through which his march lay 
and the absence of ropds, Davis was un- 
fortunately delayed. This was the last 
attempt of the ener\7 to check the 



728 



ATLANTA. 



extension of Sherman's lines by the 
flank ; and though the extensions south- 
svard were met by well consti-ucted forts 
and rifle-pits between the National army 
and the railroad to and below East Point, 
the defensive was strictly adhered to. 
The National line was prolonged on the 
1st of August still further southward be- 
yond East Point, by transferring Scho. 
Seld's army and Palmer's corps to the 
right. 

About this time several changes in 
important commands took place. Hook- 
^T, offended because of the appointment 
>f General Howard as the successor of 
WcPherson, resigned his command of 
the Twentieth coips, and General Slo- 
'nim was appointed in his place. Slocum 
was at Vicksburg, and until he arrived 
the command devolved on General S. 
H. Williams. Palmer at the same time 
resigned his command of the Fouiteenth 
C01-J1S, and was succeeded by General 
Jefferson C. Davis. The command of 
the Fourth corps, vacated by the pro- 
motion of General Howard, was given 
to General D. S. Stanley. 

From the 2d to the 15tl^. of August, 
«he National line was extended still 
further to the right, in the hope of 
flanking Hood in that direction. The 
Twenty-Third corps, supported by the 
Fourteenth, was transferred from the 
left to a position below Utoy Creek — 
a small stream flowing westward to 
the Chattahoochee — where it joined on 
Logan's right and formed the right 
flank. Reilley's brigade of Cox's divi- 
kng. ^^^° made an attempt on the 5th 
6. to break through the enemy's line 
about a mile below Utoy Creek, but 



failed, losing about 400 men. On the 
next day, however, the j.o8ition waa 
turned by General Hascall, and Genera] 
Schofield advanced his whole line close 
up to and facing the enemy below Utoy 
Creek. Still he could get no foothold 
on either the West Point or Macon 
Railroad. The enemy's line, in which 
was now a large body of Georgia militia, 
at this time was about fifteen miles long, 
extending from near Decatur to East 
Point and beyond, and his positions 
were so masked by the hills and woods 
that the weak parts of the line could 
not be discovered. 

Along the west side of the raili'oad 
from Atlanta to East Point, a distance 
of six miles, the enemy had an admira- 
bly constnicted line of defenses, wdthin 
which was a second line, consisting of 
a series of redoubts of great thickness 
of parapet connected throughout by a 
continuous infantry })arapefc, covered by 
abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and other im- 
pediments. The inner line ot works 
completely suiTounded the city, and 
extended southwe8t^vard as far as and 
ai'oimd East Point, thus coveiing the 
point of Junction of the West Point 
and Macon Railroads. The National 
army had been so shifted by successive 
movements from its first position, in 
which it had threatened the city on the 
north and northeast, that now, while 
the northern approaches were covered 
by its extreme left, the extreme right 
lay" southwest of Atlanta, and in a line 
parallel with the railroad, at an aveiage 
distance of two and a haK miles, the 
intervening space being a naiTOW belt 
of rough wooded country, the scene of 



THE GRAND MOVEMENT POSTPONED. 



,'ih 



constant skirmishing. Hood's position 
seemed to be impregnable ; and although 
his nxmibers were inferior to those of 
• Sherman — yet his advantage in holding 
the interior lines made up in a great 
measure for his want of men, and the 
contest seemed likely to be indefinitely 
protracted. Sherman became satisfied 
that the enemy's lines could be canied 
by assault only at a fearful sacrifice of 
life, and determined to adopt another 
plan of operations. His object now 
was to get possession of the Macon 
Raili'oad, the only line left by which 
Hood's army could be reinforced, and 
on which it was wholly dependent for 
supplies. This effected, Hood might be 
compelled to evacuate the city or sur- 
render. To gain this end Sherman 
determined to move his entire army. 
But before moving, he had a battery of 
foiu" 4i-inch rifled guns put in position, 
and a steady fii'e opened upon the city 
— the object being to impress the enemy 
with the conviction that regular siege 
operations were commenced. Several 
extensive fii-es were also thus caused in 
the city, and the ru nnin g of trains on the 
Macon Raih-oad was inteiTupted; but 
the enemy resolutely held the forts, 
willing, apparently to see the city laid in 
lUihes rather than abandon them. Sher- 
man therefore commenced his new move- 
ment, which amounted to nothing less 
than raising the siege of Atlanta and 
taking the field with his main force, and 
asing it against the communications of 
Atlanta instead of against its intrench- 
(uents. 

By the 16th of August, Sherman had 
''ompleted his plans, according to which 



the Twentieth corps, under Wil- Aug. 
liams, was to be moved back to the ^^' 
intrenched position at the Chattahoo- 
chee Bridge, and the main army was to 
march to the West Point RaUroad, neai 
Fau'bom, and aftei-wards to the Macon 
road at Jonesboro, the wagons loaded 
with provisions for fifteen days. But 
befoi'e putting these plans in execution 
Shei-man learned that WTieeler, wth a 
force of cavalry, vaiiously estimated 
at from 6000 to 10,000 men, had 
passed ai-ound by the east and north. 
Making his appearance on the Nation- 
al lines of communication, he captured 
900 head of cattle, and made a break 
on the railroad near Calhoun. Shei 
man, therefore, thinking that in th« 
absence of Wheeler's cavalry, the tasL 
he had marked out for the whole ai'mj 
might be accomplished by a strong 
mounted force, suspended his ordei-s foi 
the grand movement by the right flank, 
and dispatched Kilpatrick — who had 
now recovered fiom the wound he re 
ceived at Resaca — with a force of 500C 
well-appointed cavaliy to tear up the 
railroads. Kilpatrick left his camp 
near Sandtowu on the 18 th and struck 
the West Point Railroad at Fairboni, 
the Macon Railroad at Love joy's; but 
being much harrassed by a body of in- 
fantry and by Ross's cavalry, was not 
able to effect any permanent damage on 
the roads — not enough to internipt their 
use for more than ten days. He (hei 
returned northward and eastward, anu 
reached Decatur on the 2 2d. 

It now became appai-ent to Sherman 
that his original plan must be earned 
out. All the army commanders were 



/30 



ATLANTA. 



at once notified to send their surplus 
wagons, the sick and wounded, and in- 
cumbrances of all kinds, back to the 
intrenched position at the Chattahoochee 
Railroad Bridge, and that the movement 
must commence on the night of the 25th. 
Th(? Twentieth corps marched back to 
the bridge. The Fourth corps, under 
General Stanley, was drawn out of its 
line on the extreme left, and marched 
to a position below Proctor's Creek. 
The movement was continued on the 
night of the 26th, the army of the 
Tennessee being drawn out and moved 
rapidly by a circuit towards Sandtown 
and across Camp Creek ; the army of 
the Cumberland south of Utoy Creek. 
The army of the Ohio remained m its 
position. A third movement placed 
the army of the Tennessee on the West 
Point Railroad above Fairbom, the 
army of the Cumberland above Red 
Oak, and the army of the Ohio near 
Diggs and Mims. The whole front of 
the city was thus uncovered, much to 
the astonishment of the Confederates, 
who, for a short time, not being able in 
any other way to account for these 
strange operations, supposed that Sher. 
man had begun a retreat. 

The 28th of Augiist was devoted by 
Ane. Sherman to the destruction of the 
'i8. West Point Railroad, between 
Fairbom and Red Oak, and for some 
distance above. The work was tnor- 
oiighly done. The road was destroyed 
for twelve and a half miles, the ties 
being burnt, and the rails twisted. Sev- 
eral cuts were made across the road and 
filled up with logs, tnmks of trees, 
fragments of rock, and earth, among 



which were placed shells prepared as 
torpedoes, to explode in case of an 
attempt to clear them out. Sherman, 
after having personally inspected this 
work, and seen that the destruction was 
so complete that it would be very 
difficult to restore the road to working 
condition, ordered the whole army to 
move next day eastward by several 
roads — Howard, on the right, towards 
Jonesboro ; Thomas, in the centre, by 
Shoal Creek Church to Couch's, on the 
Decatur and Fayetteville road ; and 
Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's 
Mills. 

Hood now began to understand the 
object of these movements ; but still 
unaware that Sherman's whole army 
was marching on his communications, 
he contented himself with sending only a 
part of his force, the corps of Hardee 
and S. D. Lee, to Jonesboro, remaining 
himself in Atlanta with Stewart's coi-pa 
and the Georgia militia. 

The several columns of Sherman's 
army were again in motion in a south- 
easterly direction on the 30th. Ang. 
Thomas, in the centre, encounter- 30 . 
ing little opposition, attained his posi- 
tion at Couch's early in the afternoon ; 
Schofield being near the enemy, moved 
cautiously on a circle around East Point, 
and came into position towards Rough 
and Ready ; Howard, who had the 
outer circle, and therefore a greatej 
distance to move, met with some opposi 
tion, which, however, he easily overcame, 
passed Renfrew, the point indicated for 
him in the orders of the day, and 
at night halted within half a rrule of 
Jonesboro. Next morning, findi-xg 



MOVEMENT ON JONESBOBO. 



rsi 



himself in the presence of the heavy- 
force under Generals Hardee and Lee, 
Howard deployed the Fifteenth corps, 
and disposed the Sixteenth and Seven- 
teenth on its flank. 

Sherman had in the meantime, as 
soon as he learned that Howard had 
passed Renfrew, directed Thomas to 
send to that place a division of Davis' 
corps, also to move Stanley's corps in 
connection with Schofield's force,to wards 
Rough and Ready, and then to send 
forward a strong detachment to feel for 
the railroad. Schofield was also ordered 
to move boldly forward and strike the 
tailroad near Rough and Ready. These 
^Qg_ movements were progressing on 
31. the Slst, when the Confederates 
moved out of their works at Jonesboro, 
and attacked the position of Howard, 
but were steadily and repeatedly re- 
pulsed. After a contest of two hours' 
duration, they withdrew, losing in killed, 
wounded, and captured, 3000 men, 
besides general officers, including Major- 
General Anderson, mortally wounded. 
Howard's loss was slight, as his men 
fought behind breast- works. It whs 
observed on this occasion that the Con- 
federate troops had begun to lOse the 
enthusiasm and dash which b^•.d hitherto 
characterized their attacks. 

Hearing the sounds of battle about 
noon, Sherman renewed his orders to push 
the other movements on the left and 
centre, and about four o'clock received 
reports that Howard had thoroughly 
repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro ; that 
Schofield had reached the railroad a 
mile below Rough and Ready and was 
busy breaking it up ; that Stanley was 



on the road below Schofield, and was 
also breaking it up, and that General 
Davis' corps had struck the road within 
four miles of Jonesboro. Orders were 
then given for the whole army to mov 
on Jonesboro ; Thomas from the north 
with Schofield on his left. Howaro 
was to hold the Confederates in their 
fortifications till the rest of the army 
could close in upon them. The troops 
were also ordered to continue the des 
truction of the railroad as they moved 
along it. Garrard was charged to 
watch the roads northward, and Kil- 
patrick was sent southward along the 
west bank of the Flint River, to threaten 
or attack the railroad below Jonesboro. 
It was expected that the whole army 
would be able to close in on Jonesboro 
by noun on the 1st of September; bul 
the corps of Davis alone, having a com 
paratively short distance to travel, wa 
up in time, and was deployed fa«in 
southward, its right in connection with 
the corps of Howard, its left on tho 
railroad. Stanley and Schofield wero 
moving along the Rough and Readj' 
road, breaking it up at the same time 
and Sherman fearing that night would 
come on before their arrival, and that 
the enemy woiild then be able to escajx 
him without a fight, ordered the corpa 
of Davis to assault the enemy's works 
at once. The troops advanced to the 
attack across open fields under a wither 
ing artillery and musketry fire. After 
a desperate fight, which lasted two 
hoiirs, they drove the Confederates from 
their works, capturing two 4-gun batter- 
ies — one of them Loomis', lost at Chick 
amauga — some battle-flags, and a large 



m 



ATLANTA. 



number of prisoners, including the 
greater part of Govan's brigade, with 
its commander, which had f o med part 
of the celebrated "fighting division" of 
Cleburne. Repeated orders were sent, 
urging the rapid advance of Stanley 
and Schofield, but the want of roads and 
the difficiJt natui-e of the countiy pre- 
vented their coming up and getting into 
position for attack before fm-ther oper- 
ations were rendered impracticable by 
the approach of night. Had they 
been able to close in upon Hardee a few 
hours earlier, his entire force woidd in 
all probability have been captured. As 
it was, Hardee had to evacuate the place 
during the night and fall back seven 
miles to Lovejoy's, where he intrenched 
in a naturally strong position. About 
two o'clock in the morning the \\'atchei's 
in Sherman's camp heard in the direction 
of Atlanta, about twenty miles distant, 
the sounds of heavy explosions, followed 
by a succession of minor reports re- 
sembling the rapid firing of cannon and 
musketry. About four o cJock: similar 
sounds were heard, indicating a night 
attack on the city by Slocum, or that 
Hood was blowing up his magazines 
and preparing to evacuate. Never- 
theless, when the approach of day made 
it clear that Hardee had abandoned his 
works at Jonesboro, Sherman moved 
his army in pursuit. Hardee was found 
Ji his intrenched position at Lovejoy's, 
his flanks protected by a branch of 
iValnut Creek to the right and a small 
onfluent of the Flint River to his left. 
In the mean time, in Atlanta the 
utmost consternation and excitement 
had arisen when it became known that 



the main army of Sherman had gol 
between Hardee's force and the city. 
Hood immediately gave orders for the 
evacuation of his works and the remov- 
al of as much of the ammunition and 
stores as was possible with his limited 
means of transportation, and for thf 
destruction of the rest. Large quanti 
ties of pro\'isions in the public store 
houses were distributed to the inhabi 
tants and to the troops. The rolling 
stock of the railroads, consisting of 
about 100 cars and 6 locomotives, were 
gathered together near the rolling-mill 
in the evening, by which time all th(j 
troops except the rear-guard had got 
away. The care were then laden mth 
the surplus ammunition, and, together 
with the depots, storehouses, and all 
that could be of use to the National 
army, set on fire about midnight. This 
occasioned the series of explosioiis thai 
had been heard in Sherman's camp. 
Slocum, at the Chattahoochee Bridge, 
also hearing these sounds, sent out early 
in the morning of the 2d of Sep- gept. 
tember a strong reconnoitring 2. 
column, which pushing forward with 
out meeting any opposition, arrived 
at Atlanta about nine o'clock, when th*. 
mayor made a formal surrender of tht 
city, only requesting the security of 
private property and protection for non 
combatants, which were readily guaran 
teed. Ward's division then marched 
into the city with drums beating and 
colors flying, and the National bannei 
was raised over the court-house amid 
hearty cheers from the troops. Eleven 
heavy guns were found in the fortific» 
tions, and a number which had been 



REMOVAL OF CIVILIANS. 



733 



buried were subsequently dug up. 
There were also found 3 locomotives 
uninjured, 3000 muskets in good order, 
and a quantity of tobacco and other 
stores. Of the valuable machinery in 
the Confederate Government work- 
shops, part had been removed to Augus- 
ta and Macon, and part destroyed. 

The object of Sherman's movement 
against the Macon Railroad having been 
attained, by ihe surrender of Atlanta, 
he gave up tb * pursuit of Hardee's force. 
To follow it through a country covered 
with forest'i, would have been useless. 
He therefcrf; issued orders on the 4th for 
the return of the anny by slow marches 
towards Atlantrt,. On the 5th it was 
back at Jonesbr-o ; on the 7th it moved 
to Rough and Ready, and on the 8th 
camps were sel icted — for the ai my of 
the Cumberlat d around Atlanta, for 
^he army of tl'8 Tennessee about East 
Point, and foi the army of the Ohio 
at D(catur. 

Sherman's final success in compelling 
the evacuation of Atlanta was owing in 
a great degree to the mistake made by 
Hood in sending off his cavalry under 
Wheeler to operate against the National 
communications far beyond the reach 
of recall, thus enabling Shei-man's cav- 
alry, followed quickly by his main army, 
^o fall upon the railroads south of At- 
lanta. Up to the time of Wheeler's 
raid, Sherman's railroad communications 
between Atlanta and Chattanooga had, 
owing to his skilful dispositions, been 
scarcely interrupted. In Chattanooga 
had been accumulated a sufficient quan- 
tity of stores to render the array indepen- 
dent of Nashville ; and when Sherman 



heard of Wheeler's departure, which 
took place soon after the unfortunate 
raid of Stoneman, he felt no uneasiness, 
as it left him supeiior in cavalry to his 
adversary. Wheeler struck the rail roa 1 1 
at Adairsville, midway between Atlaut 
and Chattanooga, and captured thero 
900 head of beef cattle ; proceeding 
then northward, he did some damage at 
Calhoun. On the 14th he made his 
appearance at Dalton, and demanded, 
in order "to prevent the effusicu of 
blood," an immediate and unconditional 
surrender. Colonel Siebold, who was 
in command of the garrison of 500 or 
600 men, replied in the negative ; and 
sending word to General Steedman, 
commanding at Chattanooga, he held 
out against the Confederates till the 
following day, when reinforcements 
arrived. Wheeler then went to East 
Tennessee; and the railroad between 
Atlanta and Chattanooga was immedi- 
ately restored to running order. Sub 
sequently he desti'oyed a large part oi 
the raili-oad between Chattanooga and 
Knoxville ; and diu-ing the latter part of 
August and the first week in Sept/;mbei 
he endeavored to break up the laili'oad 
and interrupt telegraphic con munica- 
tions between Chattanooga and Nash- 
ville. He was, however, comjielled t(j 
retire southward pursued by (reueraltj 
Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger, to 
wards Florence, in northern Alabama 
Having determined to remove all 
ci\alians from Atlanta and to retain tin 
town for military purposes exclusively 
Sherman issued an order dated ggpt. 
5th September ordering all fami- t. 
lies living in Atlanta whose male 



?b4 



ATLANTA. 



representatives were in the Confederate 
sei-vice, or had gone south, to leave the 
city within five days. All northern 
citizens not connected vnth the army, 
unless they obtained from him or from 
xeneral Thomas permission to remain, 
were also to leave the city in five days or 
to be liable to imprisonment. To facil- 
itate the removal of the inhabitants, 
the number of whom had greatly 
diminished during the progress of the 
siege, Sherman proposed to Hood, still 
remaining at Lovejoy's, a truce of ten 
days. Hood agreed to the proposal, 
although he protested against the 
measure as one of unnecessary cruelty. 
Sherman replied in a characteristic let- 
ter to H od, showing that the conduct 
of Johnston and other Confederate 
commanders afforded sufficient prece- 
dent for his action. The inhabitants 
who still remained in Atlanta were very 
unwilling to be sent away, and the 
mayor, James M. Calhoun, addressed a 
letter to Sherman, asking a reconsider- 
ation of the order to which the latter re- 
plief*., showing in clear and forcible 



language the propriety of the measure he 
had determined on, at the same time dem- 
onstrating that the hardships of war so 
much complained of had been brought 
upon the Southern people by their own 
action. The truce agreed upon extended 
from the 12th of September to the 22ci 
and was subsequently prolonged. The 
National Government furnished trans- 
portation as far as Rough and Rea<^y, 
for such of the inhabitants as wished 
to move southward, and for those desir- 
ing to move liorthward, as far as Chat 
tanooga^ They were permitted to take 
^\ath thom their movable property, for 
which also transportation was furnished. 
Negroes who chose to do so were allowed 
to go with their masters. Of those who 
remained, the men were put in govern- 
ment employ, and the women and 
childi-en were sent outside the lines. 
During the truce there were removed 
to Rough and Ready 446 families, com 
prising 705 adults, 860 children, and 
470 servants. The amoimt of house- 
hold goods removed was an average oi 
1,661 pounds to each family 



PETERSBURG. 



786 



CHAPTER XXXVI. 



Tfc» Army of the Potomac. — Description of Petersburg. — Movement on Petersburg under GUImora and 
Kautz. — The Eighteenth Corps at Bermuda Hundred.— The Outer Defenses of Petersburg taken. — 
Movement of Terry against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad. — Army of the Potomac before 
Petersburg. — Four Days of Unsuccessful Assaulting. — The Confederate Troops reoccnpy their Lines in 
Front of Butler's Position. — Attack on Sheridan's Wagon Train at White House. — Movement against the 
Weldon Railroad. — Skirmish at Davis' Farm.— Fire directed against the Appomattox Bridges. — Deep 
Bottom occupied by Foster. — The Movement against the Weldon Railroad resumed. — The National Line 
broken through.— Disastrous Consequences. — Heavy Losses in Prisoners. — Advance of Wright towards the 
Weldon Railroad. — The Vermont Brigade driven back.— Attack on the Tenth Corps.— Sheridan's Cavalry 
attacked while on the March from White House. — Friendly intercourse between Pickets. — Petersburg 
Bombarded. — March of the Sixth Corps to the Relief of Wilson's Cavalry. — Raid of Wilson and Kantz 
against the Weldon and Danville Railroads. — The Weldon Railroad cut — Railroad Destruction at Burkee- 
ville and on the Danville Road. — Battle at Staunton Bridge. — Fight at Stony Creek and Reams' Station.— 
Disastrous Rout of Wilson's Column. — Escape of Kautz's Command. — Long Route taken by Wilson. — 
The Weldon Railroad cut by the Sixth Corps. — A Demonstration frustrated. — Confederate Assault on a 
National Earthwork. — The Fourth of July in the Lines before Petersburg. — A sudden Attack repulsed. 
— A Dead Lock. — Effect of incessant hard Fighting. — Grant retains Butler in his Command. — Change in 
Corps Commanders. — Occupation of Strawberry Plains. — The Mine at Petersburg. — The Feint at Deep 
Bottom. — Demonstrations towards Richmond. — Lee hurries large numbers of Troops to the North Side of 
the James. — Explosion of the Mine. — Advance of the Storming Column. — Delay. — The Repulse. — Root 
of Ferrero's Colored Division. — The Fort recaptured by the Confederates. — Delay in burying the Dead.-- 
Causes of FaUure. — Explosion of a Confederate Mine. — Deserters. — Terrific Explosion at City Point.- 
Perseverance of Grant.— Gradual Exhaustion of the Southern Fighting Element. — The Dutch Gap CanaL 
— Movements North of the James. — Fight at Strawberry Plains. — Demonstrations at Deep Bottoit.— 
Battle of Deep Run. — Ludlow's Movement from Dutch Gap. — Operations against the Weldon Railroad.— 
Battle at Davis' Farm. —Battles for the Weldon Railroad. — Destruction of the Track.— Battle of Reams' 
Station. — Pickett attacks Butler's Position.— Heavy Bombardment of Petersburg. — Gregg's Recconnois- 
sanc* towards Stony Creek.— A tacit Truce broken.— Redoubt captured by De Trobriand.— Extension ol 
the City Point Railroad.- General Hampton's great Cattle Raid,— Movement from Deep Bottom towards 
Richmond.— Battle of Chapin's Farm. — Capture of Battery Harrison. — Capture of New Market Heights. 
— Repulse at Fort GUmer. — Beconnoissance by Kautz and Terry towards Richmond. — Attack on Battery 
Harrison repulsed.— Movement towards the South Side Railroad.— Capture of Fort McRae.— Repulse of 
Potter's Division.— Kautz's Cavalry surprised and routed. — Repulse of the Enemy by Terry.— Beconnois- 
aances.— Simultaneous Movements North of the James towards Hatcher's Run— Battle of Hatcher's Run. 
Gregg's Raid to Stony Creek Station.— Warren's Operations on the Weldon RaUroad towards Hicksford. 



Without the loss of a wagon or a 
single piece of artillery, the army 
'of the Potomac had been trans- 
*ened from the north bank of the 
Chickahominy to the south side of the 
James. The Confederates were aware 
that some such movement was intended ; 
but they had not counted on its being 
executed with so much celerity. As the 



wearied soldiers marched along the dusty 
roads, they met with little annoyance 
save from the heated atmosphere and 
the burning sun. The column which 
moved from Long Bridge to Wilcox 'a 
Wharf, it is true, had a sharp engage- 
ment with the enemy near White Oak 
Bridge, on the borders of the swamps ; 
but Wilson's cavalry and Crawford's 



/36 



PETERSBURG. 



advanced division of the Fifth corps, 
with a loss of not more than 200 men, 
ibove them back. Making allowance 
for stragglei-s, and for a skirmishiag 
line cut off at Cold Harbor, the entire 
loss attendinfc the movement did not 
exceed 400 men. It had been Grant's 
fij-st intention to fall upon Lee's ai-my 
again and again from the B,apidan to 
the Chickahominy, and by a succession 
of heavy blows to break it up, or so 
wt dken it, that when it should at last fall 
back upon Richmond, that city would 
prove an easy conquest for his victor- 
ious legions. His scheme failed. The 
numerical strength of the enemy proved 
greater than had been supposed ; and 
General Lee A\as careful '"'^ his retro- 
grade movements never to tight except 
in impregnable positions. 

Petersburg was now the immediate 
object of Grant's attention. In any 
attempt to approach Richmond from 
the south, the occupation of Petersburg 
must be an important prelimiaary step. 
The holding of that city would Sever 
the enemy's communications southward, 
and afford many material advantages 
in the investment of Richmond. Grant 
had wished to gain possession of it in 
the outset; and in his grand plan of 
campaign he had arranged that it 
should be taken and held by the army of 
the James, which, however, had proved 
inadequate to the task. Situated on 
the right or south bank of the Appo- 
oiattox, at a distance of 22 miles south 
if Richmond, and 10 miles southwest 
if the James at City Point, and having 
ft population at the beginning of the 
war of over 18,000. Petersburg ranked 



as the third town in Virgiriia. It was 
the focus of convergence of five rail- 
roads: the Richmond road ninning north 
the Weldon road running south to the 
Carolinas ; the South Side road i-unniag 
west to Lynchbiirg ; the Norfolk road 
running southeast and the short road 
ninning northeast to City Point The 
town was defended by a series of skil 
fully constimcted earth- works, consisting 
not only of square redoubts, but 
also of well-established rifle-trenches, 
extending around it in a semicircle, 
both ends resting on the river, the north- 
em extremity being strengthened by 
batteries on the opposite side of tl e 
stream. 

General Butler, it will be remembered, 
had already made a demonstration against 
Petersburg. Having been frequently 
infoiTued by deserters that the ganison 
was much weakened by the withdrawal 
of troops to reinforce Lee, he, early in 
the month of June, made preparations 
for sending a force in that direction. 
A pontoon bndge ^vas constructed, to be 
throAvn across the Appomattox, and 
gun-boats were sent up the nver to 
reconnoitre. The expedition was placed 
under the charge of General Gillmore, 
who led the infantry column, about 
3500 men, consisting of Hawley's brig 
ade of the Tenth corps, and a brigade 
of colored troops under General Hinks. 
The cavaliy 1400 strong, was com 
manded by Kautz. It was arranged 
that Gillmore, having crossed to the 
east bank of the Appomattox by the 
pontoon bridge, should proceed by the 
turnpike road towards the town, and 
attack it from that direction, while 



THE OUTEH DEFENSES. 



731 



Kautz, also crossing the river, should 
fetch a wide circuit and make his attack 
on the south or southwest side of the 
town ; the movements of the two bodies 
of troops to be so timed that they should 
-nter the place simultaneously at differ- 
ent points. It was hoped that the town 
might thus be captured, and that if not 
held, at least all its suppKes and stores 
of ammunition might be destroyed, 
Butler was to make a demonstration 
in the mean time against Fort Clifton. 

On the 8th of June, shortly after 
dusk, the pontoon bridge was laid down 
near Point of Rocks, and about mid- 
night Kautz's cavalry crossed by it, 
quickly followed by Hawley's brigade, 
which was soon afterwards joined by 
the colored brigade of Hinks. Before 
ei^ht o'clock in the morning;. Follett's 
battery was brought up in front of the 
woods near Point of Rocks, and began 
to shell the Confederate lines near Fort 
Clifton. The gun-boats Commodore 
Perry and General Putnam also opened 
fire on the same position. A brisk fire 
was kept up thus till noon. A battery 
which the enemy brought down, and 
which threw 30-pounder shells at Gen- 
oral Weitzel's signal station, was soon 
silenced. In the mean time Gillmore 
Jnno *^<i Kautz had pressed on, mak- 
9. ine a detour so as to avoid the 
lin? of Fort Clifton, and were rapidly ap- 
proaching Petersburg. The infantry 
met with no serioiis opposition till 
vvithin about two miles of the town, 
?\'hen the Confederate skirmish lines 
were encountered, but quickly driven 
back. Arrived in front of the town, 
ind sufficiently near to be able to 



examine the fortifications critically. 
Gillmore came to the conclusion that 
they were too strong to be attempted 
by the force imder his command, rie, 
therefore, withdrew his troops about 
noon, and got back to camp the same 
evening. In the mean time Kautz on 
his side had forced the intrenchment« 
and actually engaged the enemy in the 
streets. But the Confederates concen- 
trated against him what force they 
had; and he was compelled to retire, 
although he earned off with him 40 
prisoners. His loss was only about 20 
killed and wounded. 

At one o'clock on the morning of the 
15th, the Eighteenth corps which j^q^ 
had anived at Bermuda Hundred 16 . 
on the previous evening, in transports, 
by way of Fortress Monroe, set out for 
Petersburg. Kautz's cavalry in the 
advance crossed the Appomattox b 
the pontoon bridge near Point of Rocks 
Brooks' and Martindale's di\nsions fol 
lowed together with Hinks' two brigades 
of colored troops. The route taken was 
the same as that pursued a week pre- 
vious by Gillmore and Kautz. Soon 
after daylight Kautz, advancing along 
the City Point road, encoimtered skir- 
mishers, and drove them out of a small 
earth-work. The troops of Hinks and 
Brooks followed rapidly, and soon after- 
wards, near Harrison's Creek, a line of 
rifle-trenches with two 12-pounder8 was 
discovered, from which solid shot flew 
over the head of the column. Hinka 
deployed skirmishers, scattered the ene- 
my through some neighboring woods 
and finally secured a position near 
Baylor's Faim. fn.m which the Fifth 



738 



PETEKSBuRG. 



and Twentj Kfth colored regiments car- 
ried the enemy's works, capturing one 
of the gims and turning it on the 
retreating Confederates. The division 
of Brooks now moved up, with Bum- 
ham's brigade in the advance and 
ntered a strip of woods which con- 
cealed the main outer line of the defenses 
of Petersburg, about two miles from 
the town. Hinks then moved his divi- 
sion towards the left, on the Jourdan 
Point road, while Mai-tindale, with 
Stannard in the advance, moved on by 
the river road. A line was thus formed 
in front of the Petersburg intrench - 
ments, in which Martindale held the 
right, Brooks the centre, and Hinks the 
left. Active skirmishing went on while 
these positions were being taken, and 
the fire of the sharpshooters told severely 
on the troops. Just before sunset, the 
order was given to carry the enemy's 
kvorks by assault ; and the whole line 
lushed forward, swept the entire range 
uf rifle-pits in spite of a heavy artillery 
fire, and drove the enemy from the 
intrenchments. Sixteen guns, a battle- 
flag, and 300 prisoners were taken. 
Had an adequate supporting force been 
at hand, the second line of works might 
have been taken with comparative ease. 
The National loss was about 500 men. 
The Second coi-ps began to arrive in 
the evening, and before morning the 
whole of it had reached the scene of 
action During the night Bimey's 
division held the captured earth-works, 
against which the enemy knowing theii' 
value, made demonstrations, but in vain. 
\Vhile the infantry were thus operating 
I i awards Petersburg from the northeast. 



Kautz, on the extreme left, -mth Spear's 
brigade in the advance, moved against 
the enemy's works near the Norfolk 
Railroad and on the Baxter road. After 
a brisk cannonade on the position, 
which was well fortified with artillery 
a charge was made by Kautz's mep 
armed with carbines ; but the work 
proved too strong to be carried, and 
Kautz was compelled to retire So far 
Petersburg had been defended by its 
local garrison, but the Confederate 
troops in the neighborhood were rapidly 
concentrating to its aid. 

On the morning of the 16th, treneral 
Butler having learned that a |)or- j,|^jp 
tion of the Confederate forces in 16. 
front of his intrenchments at Benuuda 
Hundred had been hurried oft' to Petei"s- 
burg, sent out General Terry with a 
part of the Tenth corps to reconnoitre. 
The Confederates gave way before 
them ; and the reserves coming up, their 
line was broker, through, and finally 
the raiLroad was reached near VValthal 
Junction. While a working party tore 
lip the track and puiied down the tele- 
graph for about two miles, the main 
body of General Terry's force moved 
along the road by which it was sup- 
posed Lee's advance was approaching. 
But the Confederates at length came 
dowTi upon them in force and compelled 
a retreat. The result of the movement 
was, that travel by the railroad was 
interrupted for about a day. 

In the mean time the National tiuo{)8 
wei-e gathering ai'ound Peters bui'g. 
Eai'ly on the morning of the- 16th, Bii'- 
ney sent Colonel Egan's brigade against 
a redoubt on his left, which was carried 



CONFEDERATE POSITION CARRIED. 



739 



«nd held, with the loss of about 100 
men. An attempt wag made to push 
forward the picket lines, when skii"- 
mishing and artilleiy filing ensued. But 
reinforcements for the Confederates 
were now rapidly arriving from various 
quarters, and in such numbers that it 
was thought advisable not to push the 
troops forward till the arrival of Bum- 
side's corps. Kautz, however, had 
moved out with his cavalry to the left 
across the Norfolk Railroad, to occupy 
^ound for the Ninth and Fifth corps. 
In the afternoon Bum&ide, having 
irossed the James by the pontoon bridge, 
came up with the Ninth corps, after 
a severe forced march from Charles 
City Court House. Line of battle was 
then fomied, with the Second corj^ts in 
the centre, the Eighteenth corps on the 
right, and the Ninth corps on the left. 
Bimey's division held the right of the 
Second coi-ps, General Barlow's the left. 
To tht, left of Barlow was General Pot- 
ter's division of the Ninth corps. The 
ground between the opposing lines, 
though broken and rugged, was rather 
open, with here and there fields of grain. 
At six o'clock the attack was commenced 
and kept up for three hours. Bimey's 
division earned the crest in its front, 
and held it. Barlow's advanced brig- 
ade found more difliiculty, the enemy 
being somewhat concentrated in its 
front. At length Miles' brigade of 
Barlow's division and Giifiin's of Pot- 
ter's division, charging in face of a de- 
sti-uctive artillery fire, succeeded in 
gaining a foothold in the rifle-pits out- 
side of the stronger works. The troops 
b*»ing here annoyed by the enemy's fire, 



Barlow determined to make an assault 
on his main works; and Bumside 
prepared a column to make the attempt 
in connection with him. But the enemy 
having opened a severe fire upon Bum 
side's troops, cutting off a skinnish line 
of 300 men in Barlow's front; the 
assault was deferred till morning, 
Bimey's loss during the three hours' 
fighting was about 500 men. Potter's 
division in its charge on t^e rifle-pits 
lost about the same number. The right 
had not taken an important part in the 
contest and had suffered but little. 
The total National loss since the begin- 
ning of the action was between 1500 
and 2000, while that of the Confederates 
owing to their advantage of position, 
was comparatively small. 

On the morning of the 17th, at four 
o'clock, BiuTiside ordered Potter's jnu«i 
division to take the works in its 17. 
front ; and Griffin's brigade, supported 
by Curtin's, canied it with a i-uah, cap- 
turing 6 guns, 16 oflicers, 400 men, and 
a stand of colors. A pause then oc- 
curred in the assault; but sharp skir 
mishing was canied on by the picket 
lines, and the artillery on both sides 
kept up a steady fire. In the afternoon 
Potter's division w2j3 relieved by the 
divisions of Wilcox and Ledlie. An 
advance by Ledlie's division was then 
ordered ; and the charge was gallantlj 
made, covered by a brisk artillery fire 
The intrenchments were reached ; aftei 
a short but bloody contest over th 
breas1>work8, the Confederates wen- 
driven out of them and the position 
was carried; and although several at- 
tempts were made by the enemy to 



740 



PETERSBURG. 



recover the lost ground, it was firmly 
held. Bumside, now so near was 
actually able to throw shot into the 
town. The other portions of the line 
had, auriug the day, been engaged in 
skirmishing, but without attempting 

ny decisive assault. The enemy's 
position, opposite the Second corps — 
temjiorarily commanded by Bimey, in 
the absence of Hancock, who was suf- 
fering fnom an old wound — was deemed 
too strong to be attacked with any hope 
of success. Barlow's division, on the 
left of the Second corps, had taken part 
in Bumside's charge in the morning, 
and rendered efficient service. On the 
right, the greater part of the Eighteenth 
corps, under General Smith, was relieved 
from the position it had carried ; and 
recrossing the pontoon bridge over the 
Appomattox at night, it regained the 
intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred in 
the morning. The divisions of Hinks 
and Martindale, on the extreme right, 
remained, as they could not be with- 
drawn to advantage. The Fifth corps, 
under Warren, came up on the left, and 
was massed there in the rear of Bum- 
side. About nine o'clock at night the 
enemy appeared in force on Bimey's 
front, but was driven back. Somewhat 
later, under cover of a vigorous shelling 
fi-om the Confederate batteries, the 
enemy suddenly reappeared in two 
columns, one in front, the other in flank, 
and made a desperate and finally suc- 
cessful effort to recover the works taken 
by Bumside during the afternoon. 
Leaping the defenses in the dark, the 
Confederates succeeded in driving out 
the National troops. 



On the same day, early in the mom 
ing, a body of the enemy, consisting of 
parts of the divisions of Pickett and 
Fields, attacked the National lines neaj 
the James. Foster's division of the 
Tenth corps, which held a line extend 
ing from near Ware Bottom Church 
towards the Appomattox, was pushed 
back some little distance. 

It was now the morning of the 18th. 
The National line in front of j^^g 
Petersburg was disposed as fol- 18. 
lows, from right to left : two divisions 
of the Eighteenth corps, under Martin- 
dale and Hinks ; the Sixth under Wright ' 
the Second under Bimey; the Ninth 
under Bumside, and the Fifth undei 
Warren. It had been intended to make 
another assault at four o'clock in the 
morning ; but skirmishers having been 
sent out, it was foimd that the enemy 
had abandoned the works immediately 
in front for an inner series of defenses 
New combinations, therefore, became 
necessary. Skirmishing and artilleiy 
firing went on while the enemy's new 
defensive line was being reconnoitred. 
A general advance of the three corps on 
the left was ordered at noon. Giblxn's 
division of the Second corps was 
pushed forward, while the rest of the 
coi-ps threw out double lines of skir- 
mishers to divert the enemy's attentiop.. 
Gibbon's troops moved promptly up 
towards the works, which were neai- t!ie 
railroad to City Point ; but when they 
got out from under cover they were 
suddenly struck by a murderous enfilad- 
ing fii-e on the left. For a time the 
men pressed vigorously forward ; but 
their ranks were so sw^ept by incessant 



•ITJE WELDON RAILROAD. 



74] 



■ volleys, that at last even the veterans 
recoiled. The breast-vrorks were not 
even reached when the men began to 
retire, leaving their dead and wounded 
on the field. At four o'clock in the 
afternoon another storming party was 
organized. It consisted of Mott's divi- 
fdon, with detachments from the two 
other divisions, all of the Second corps. 
Shortly before five in the afternoon, 
Mott moved out his force in two col- 
umns, and the two leading brigades 
burst upon the enemy in gallant style ; 
but in spite of an exhibition of the most 
resolute bravery, they were forced back 
with terrible loss, by a concentrated 
artillery and musketry fixe. The Sixth 
and Ninth corps were little more suc- 
cessful than the Second ; Martindale's 
division of the Eighteenth corps, al- 
though at first attended with some suc- 
cess, shared the same experience as the 
others. The fighting was continued 
into the night, but gradually died away 
in picket firing. The losses during the 
day had been very heavy, especiaDy on 
the part of the Second corps. During 
the whole operations from the 16 th to 
the 18th of Jime, the estimated loss in 
killed, wounded and missing was not 
under 9000 men. The four days' 
assaults had had no other result than 
the decimation of the storming columns. 
During the 19th, arrangements were 
made under a flag of truce for burying 
the dead, and carrying off the wounded 
between the Lines. The Sixth corps, 
which had been on the north side of 
the Appomattox, near Port Walthal, 
svas relieved by the Eighteenth corps, 
md Jdoved into line on the right. 



General Ferrero's division of the Ninth 
corps, also anived, and was posted in 
the fi'ont. Three Gou federate rams 
descended the James, nearly as far as 
Dutch Gap, but were soon driven back 
by the fleet. The Confederates contin 
ued to intrench on the west side of th 
Appomattox as industrioiisly as the 
National troops did on the east side ; 
and having no apprehensions of imme- 
diately losing Petersbiu'g, they made 
some movements in other directions. 
Beauregard in his hurry to reinforce 
Petersburg had hastily deserted his old 
lines in front ^;f Bermuda Hundred 
and the Tenth corps, as has been stated 
made use of the opportunity to cut the 
Petersbui'g and Richmond Railroad ; 
but when they were driven back, the 
Confederates reoccupied their works, 
and from these lines made a alight 
demonstration in front and some ididing 
movements in the neighborhood of th 
James. On the night of the 19th, they 
succeeded in destroying the wharves at 
Wilcox's and Westover Landings, and 
sent small bodies of troops along the 
river to do whatever other mischief they 
couli They also threw up earth- works 
near Turkey Bend ; but they were easily 
shelled out of them by the gun-boats. 

On the 21st, active movements were 
again commenced by the main jm|g 
army, and once more by the left 21. 
flank, with the object of severing the 
communications to the south of Peters- 
burg by the Weldon RailroatL On the 
previous night the Second corps had 
been moved from its position in the 
right centre of the line to the left, the 
gap thus formW being closed up by the 



«•• 



)43 



PETERSBURG. 



extension of the Ninth corps and part 
of the Eighteenth. It then struck across 
the Norfolk Railroad, and marched 
rapidly southward, though under an 
intensely hot eun and through clouds 
of stifling and blinding dust, with the 
ateadiness which had so often charac- 
terized it during flank marches in pres- 
ence of the enemy. Griffin's division of 
the Fifth corps was detached to follow ; 
the Sixth corps was also moved out in 
support. Before noon the main cdlumn 
halted ; but in the afternoon Barlow's 
division of the Second corps, with sharp- 
shooters skirmishing in advance, was sent 
forward, and struck the enemy's lines 
in the neighborhood of the Jerusalem 
road which runs southward from Peters- 
burg, about midway between the Nor- 
folk and Weldon railroads. The di^nsion 
was then halted and put into position, 
ind skirmishers were advanced. These 
met a stout resistance from dismounted 
cavalry pickets; and almost immedi- 
ately, infantry were discovered in force 
with artillery planted in earth-works. 
It was evident that the enemy under- 
stood the value of the Weldon Railroad, 
and was prepared as well as determined 
to defend it. After a severe skirmish 
Baiiow's advanced line withdrew and 
rejoined the main column. Gibbon had 
in the mean time reconnoitred towards 
Petersburg, but without result. On the 
extreme left the enemy's movements 
were so threatening that a squadron 
of cavaliy was sent round to protect 
that flank. The Second corps was then 
retired to form in position for the night, 
with Bai'low's division on the left, Mott's 
in the centre, and Gibbon's on the right 



Beyond Gibbon's division was Griffin's 
of the Fifth corps. The Sixth corps 
was intended to be posted between the 
Second corps and the Weldon Railroad. 
Ricketts' division came up and took a 
position on Barlow's left, and the othei 
division followed. There was a littl 
cavalry skirmishing on the extreme left, 
and the Confederate scouts made a 
slight dash in the evening towards the 
National position ; but the day closed 
without any more important movement. 
The fight in the afternoon took place 
on what was known as Davis' Farm, 
about 3 miles from the city and within 
a mile of the railroad. 

The day was comparatively quiet is 
the lines east of Petersburg. The Con- 
federates early in the morning opened 
fire towards the headcjuarters of the 
Sixth corps, which had not at that time 
moved out ; and there was more or less 
firing during the day, especially towards 
the right. The bridges over the Appo- 
mattox connecting Petei-sburg and 
Pocahontas now underwent a daily 
shelling from the National batteries. 
The fire directed on the railroad bridge 
caused great annoyance to the enemy, 
as it tended materially to obstruct the 
passage of cars. 

Some important movements took place 
during the day, to the north of Peters 
burg. Early in the morning Foster's 
division of the Tenth corps, crossed to 
the north side of the James River by a 
pontoon bridge laid by General Weitzel 
on the previous evening, to a point 
between Aiken's Landing and Fom 
Mile Creek- Foster advanced towaitis 
the Kingsland road, drove in the enemy's 



FOSTEK AT DEEl' BOTTOM. 



M3 



piekets and intrenched at Deep Bottom, 
about 1 miles from Richmond. On the 
opposite side of the river was the bat- 
tery of the enemy known as Howlett's. 
Near this point a fight between the moni- 
tors and Confederate rams took place ; 
but though the latter were aided by 
the battery, they were driven back to 
their usual position on the weit side 
of Dutch Gap. The heavy Dahlgren 
guns soon silenced the battery; and in 
the evening they were opened on the 
enemy manoeuvring in front of Foster. 
Foster was thus enabled to hold his 
own for some time without molestation. 
Meanwhile the Eighteenth corps again 
left its camp near Bermuda Hundred, 
once more crossed the pontoon bridge, 
marched to the lines in front of Peters- 
Ixurg, and took the position vacated 
by the Sixth corps. The result of the 
various aiTay movements on the 21st 
was, that at night the different com- 
mands lay as follows : Foster's division 
was north of the James at Deep Bottom ; 
the remainder of the Tenth corps being 
with Butler at Bermuda Hundred. In 
the intrenchments east of Petersburg, 
the right was held by Smith, the centre 
by Bumside, the left by Warren. Three 
or four miles to the south, threatening 
the Weldon Railroad, were the corps of 
Hancock and Wright, with Grifl^'s 
division of Warren. 

The movement against the Weldon 
Railroad was resumed early on the 2 2d. 
Now that the capture of Petersburg had 
lune come to be considered out of the 
22, question for the present, the sev- 
erance of the Weldon Railroad became 
a primary object. The Sixth corps, the 



whole of which had come up duiin^ the 
night, prepared to move, in conjunction 
with the Second corps, directly against 
the railroad. The position of the 
Second corps was near the Jerusalem 
road, Gibbon's right resting on the left 
of the road, with GriflSn's division o 
the Fifth on the further side. Gibbon's 
troops were already well up to the 
enemy's works and needed only to go 
into position and intrench, as any furthei 
advance on their part might bring on a 
general engagement before the line was 
properly established. The left of the 
line, therefore, consisting of the Sixth 
corps with the diAnsions of Barlow and 
Mott of the Second was ordered to ad- 
vance, the movement to commence at 
daybreak. By some misunderstanding 
the march was delayed. At last the 
two corps began to move, at the same 
time, though independently of each 
other, each commander having been 
cautioned to protect his flank well in 
case connection were not made with the 
other corps. The line had been deploy- 
ed in rather an open style, and covered 
a wide extent of ground, which being 
difficult and intricate, and the movemeni 
made in presence of the enemy, il 
was thought desirahlu to mass more 
closely. Accordingly Barlow, who held 
Hancock's left, pressed well in to 
the right and threw two brigades into 
reserve, the remainder of his troopg 
forming the advance line. But on 
entering the woods a gap began to foiTO 
between his left and the right of the 
Sixth corps, and he placed some regi 
ments to guard his flank. Meanwhile, 
Mott had, without difficulty, obtained 



744 



PETERSBURG. 



the position indicated for him and had. 
b^un to intrench ; Gibbon was already 
in position ; and Barlow having moved 
forward sufficiently was also about to 
intrench, when the startling sound of 
musketry was heard on his flank, and 
soon afterwards in his rear. With a 
new of checking the movement against 
the railroad, the Confederate force under 
Hill was approaching in several col- 
umns, preceded by a dense cloud of 
skirmishers. The Sixth corps was far 
distant on the left and rear. A wide 
gap was thus left in the National line ; 
but it was happily filled up in time to 
prevent fatal results. Quick to take 
advantage of the mistake committed. 
Hill pushed on an entire division, with 
Mahone's brigade in the advance, into 
the intervening space. The attack was 
made with tremendous energy. Barlow 
was the first to feel the weight of the 
onset. His division bending under the 
blow was quickly rolled up, thus ex- 
posing Mott's left flank. Mott in turn 
was struck heavily and fell back, leaving 
exposed the left of Gibbon. Gibbon 
shared the fate of Mott and Barlow. 
The intrenchments of each of the three 
divisions were captured. Such was the 
suddenness and impetuosity of the 
attack, and so great was the confusion 
resulting from it, that several whole 
regiments were swept off and captured 
dmost without a fight. McKnight's 
battery, which had been ably handled, 
was surrounded and captured entire. 
The career of the enemy, however, was 
now checked by the firmness of the 
Twentieth Massachusetts under Captain 
Patten, who executed a change of front 



vrith remarkable coolness, courage and 
skill. The broken corps was at length 
rallied. Miles' reserve brigade of Bar- 
low's division was brought up ; Clark's 
New Jersey battery on the right of the 
Jerusalem road wathstood successfully 
the concentrated fire of the enemy; 
Gibbon's division, or rather what was left 
of it, was also rallied, and the beginning 
of a new line was auon formed. 

It was now towards evening. After 
an unsuccessful effort made by Gibbon 
to capture the lost batteiy, Meade 
came to the front. Observing that 
the enemy's troops were not in 
sufficient number to cope with his 
own if well handled, Meade again 
sent forwaixi the Second and Sixth 
corps. The- Sixth met vdth little oppo- 
sition, and attained the position aimed 
at earlier in the day. The Second corps 
went through the woods in strong 
skirmishing lines, and succeeded, though 
not without some effort, in regaining a 
part of the gi-ound from which it had 
been driven. It then went into intrench- 
ments, and passed the night in throwing 
up works and placing batteries for the 
protection of the line. The division of 
Giiffin also came up and covered the 
right. The loss sustained in this un- 
fortunate and unskilfiilly managed 
affair was principally in prisoners, some 
2000 having been taken by the enemy, 
including 50 or 60 officers ; the numbei 
of kUled and wounded was only about 
500. Four guns also were lost and 
several colors. Picket firing was kepi 
up all night, as the last advance had 
placed the opposing lines in close prox- 
imity. A reconnoissance and advance 



SKIRMISHING A^ND CANNONADING. 



745 



made at daylight, disclosed the fact that 
the Confederates were strongly in- 
trenched along the east side of the 
Weldon Railroad. To the east of Pe- 
tersburg a sharp artillery and musketry 
fire was kept up all night; but on 

either side was an advance attempted. 

On the 23d, Wright moving out to 

the extreme left, found that the enemy's 

lines did not extend far in that direction. 

June -^^ ^^^^ * reconnoitring force to 

23. the railroad, which was reached 
svithout opposition, and the telegraph 
wires were cut. The Vermont brigade, 
consisting of three regiments, was at 
once pushed forward with instructions 
to hold the road ; but the troops had 
hardly reached their destination when a 
division of the enemy under Anderson 
came down upon their flank and drove 
them back, capturing several hundred 

risoners, and then, flushed vrith success, 

fter pushing back the Vermont brigade 
to the main body, commenced a general 
attack. The result was that Wright 
withdrew his line towards evening to 
the cover of breast-worb Little else 
of importance occurred during the day. 
On the 24th the enemy opened a 
furious artillery fire in front of the 
Eighteenth corps. At its close, a charge 
June ^^ made by Hoke's brigade 

34. on Stannard's division of the 
Tenth corps. The attack fell chiefly on 
the brigade of Colonel Henry^ who, ob- 
serviug that the attacking force was not 
large, drew in his skirmishers; and 
>vhen the enemy commenced to run 
over his rifle-pits, he caused the For- 
tieth Massachusetts, armed \vith the 
Spencer repeating-rifle, to open fire 



upon them. This, with artillery in flank, 
easily separated the enemy's skirmishing 
line from his reserve; and about 150 
prisoners fell into Hemy's hands. On 
the evening of the same day, Sheridan's 
cavalry was attacked while on the marcl 
from White House to rejoin the main 
army. A brigade of infantry was sent 
to his relief; but the affair was very 
bloody, and the rear-guard sufiV^red 
severely. The enemy was beaten off 
at length ; and the wagon train, several 
miles in length, was saved, but not 
before a loss of 500 or 600 had been sus 
tained. Sheridan's force crossed the 
James in safety on the 25th, four or five 
miles above Fort Powhatan, at a point 
where the pontoon bridges could be 
guarded by gun-boats. 

During the 25th the enemy was busily 
engaged in repairing the Weldon Rail 
road, and the National forces in strength 
ening their positions. All along the 
line, owing to the proximity of the 
opposing pickets, there was skirmishing 
with occasional artillery firing, but no 
serious fighting. About ten o'clock at 
night a sharp attack was made on the 
right of the Fifth corps and on the left 
of the Ninth. It was commenced by 8 
heavy artillery fire, which lasted about 
an hour, followed by the advance of a 
strong skirmish line up to the National 
breast- works ; but the enemy was easily 
repulsed, and the loss was not great or 
either side. 

From the 26th to the 29th, corapara 
tive quiet prevailed in the camps, broken 
occasionally by picket firing, skirmishing 
near the working parties, and desultory 
cannonading. From the front of Smith's 



IM 



PETERSBURG. 



•jorps a 30-pounder Parrott shell was 
^itrown into the city every five minutes, 
ind with such regularity that it came 
o be called the " Petersburg express." 
rhe earth-works along the National 
lines underwent constant improvement 
antil they became almost impregnable. 
A.bout eleven o'clock on the morning of 
the 27th, the Confederates, much 
annoyed by the regular fire of the 30- 
pounder Parrott on the city, opened 
from their heavy guns on the west side 
of the Appomattox. The batteries in 
Smith's front, where many guns were 
now in position, opened in reply, and 
shelled the city, as well as the enemy's 
batteries beyond the river, till noon. 
The opposing pickets along some parts 
of the line entered into an agreement 
not to fire upon each other, and the 
result was an unusual degree of quiet 
for a little while ; but Bimey found it 
necessary to prohibit the more intimate 
intercourse which this state of things 
had a tendency to bring about. By 
the Second corps on the left, some move- 
fiients were made with the view of 
guarding against hostile demonstrations 
on the flank. Hancock, now convales- 
cent, resumed command of this corps in 
the evening. At one o'clock in the 
'noming of the 28th there was a false 
alarm ; and the Eighteenth corps got 
onder aims. About this time some very 
heavy siege guns were got into position, 
ind a bombardment of the ci+y was com- 
menced by bursting a shell over it every 
quarter of an hour during the night. 
This fire was continued for some time ; 
and on the night of the 30th it caused a 
(•onflagration in th e town The weather. 



which for many days and nights had beet 
intensely hot, causing great suffering to 
the men, whether on the march or in 
camp, now grew a little cooler. The 
excessive heat had been severely trying 
to the wounded. The agents of the 
Sabitary and Christian Commissions 
availed themselves of the opportunity 
afforded by these days of comparative 
quiet to distribute vegetables and luxu- 
ries among the troops, and in other 
ways to contribute to their comfort. 

In the movement against the Weldon 
Railroad, it had been arranged that 
Wilson and Kautz should co-operate 
with a strong cavalry force. About two 
o'clock in the morning of the 2 2d of 
June, Wilson and Kautz set out from 
Blackwater Creek, a little south of Prince 
George Court House. Wilson was in 
command. The united force numbered 
6000 to 8000 men, with 3 batteries of foui 
guns each, half rifled ordinance, and half 
light 12-pounder8, besides a battery of 
four small mountain howitzers. The col- 
umn struck the Weldon Railroad at 
Reams' Station, tore up and burnt the 
track for several hundred yards, and de- 
stroyed the water tank, depot and public 
buildings, as well as a saw-mill at Dutch 
Cross Roads. Moving westward as far 
as Dinwiddie Coiirt House, the command 
proceeded northward to the Petersburg 
and Lynchburg Railroad, striking it at 
Sutherland Station, and marching thence 
westward to Ford's Station, about 22 
miles from Petersburg, the brigade of 
Kautz being in the advance. At this 
point, which was reached before even 
ing, several miles of the track "^ere 
destroyed as well as 2 locomotives and 



THE BRIDGE AT STAtTNTOif RIVER. 



747 



1 6 care ; the depot and some stores were 
also burnt. All this was accomplished 
before midnight, when the command 
bivouacked. In the morning, about two 
o'clock, Kautz again set out in advance, 
and by rapid mai'ching soon left a wide 
gap between his portion of the column 
and that under Wilson. His course lay 
along the railroad in the direction of 
Burkesville, the point of intei-section of 
the Lynchburg and Danville railroads. 
He reached Wilson's Station about four 
o'clock, Black and White about seven 
o'clock, and Ncttaway at noon, whence 
he hurried on to Burkesville. At this 
place the depots, cars, and similar prop- 
erty were destroyed, as well as sev- 
eral miles of the track eastward and 
westward. The railroad here was con- 
structed of strap rails laid on longitu- 
dinal stringere of dry yellow pine. 
While the the rear was engaged in 
burning and otherwise destroying the 
depots and other buildings along the 
road, advanced parties collected iry 
rails, piled them up against the stringere 
and set the whole on fire. This was 
done with so much method and celerity 
that miles of the railroad were burning 
at once. 

The main part of the column, some 
miles in the rear, near Nottaway Court 
House, encountered about three o'clock 
in the afternoon a Confederate force on 
its right flank, consisting of two regi- 
ments under Colonel Barringer and 
General Bearing. The Second brigade, 
under Colonel Chapman, was formed in 
Jen© ^i"® ; ^^^ * sharp fight ensued, 
23 . which lasted till nightfall, when 
the enemy withdrew, carrying off 84 



prisonera. The loss on each side was 
about 60. Wilson's troops bivouacked 
at Nottaway ; Kautz bivouacked not 
far from Burkesville. Both commands 
marched towards Meheirin in the mora 
ing — Wilson's across the countiy. 
Kautz's along the railroad — fonned a 
Junction there, and moved on to Keys- 
ville, where the column bivouacked for 
the night, Kautz's men having worked 
hard all day on the railroad, of which 
they destroyed 18 miles of the track 
besides other railroad property. The 
march and the work of destniction were 
resumed early on the 25th ; and the 
whole column pressed rapidly forward 
till about three o'clock in the afternoon, 
when the advance came up to the cov- 
ered bridge over the Staunton Kiver. 
From Burkesville to this bridge, a dis- 
tance of about 35 miles, the railroad 
track had been thoroughly destroyed. 
Eastward of Burkesville the track had 
also been torn up, making an aggre- 
gate of 50 miles of railroad put out of 
running order. It was very desir- 
able that the bridge also should be 
destroyed, as it would consume much 
time to replace it. But the Confederates 
were well aware of its value ; and while 
Wilson and Kautz had been destroying 
the track, they had collected in the 
neighborhood of the bridge a consider- 
able force of Virginia and North 
Carolina militia, some of whom had 
been brought up from Danville. They 
had also made such good use of their 
time as to throw up intrenchments in 
front of the bridge, and construct earth- 
works, in which they had placed some 
artillery. They had besides, placed it 



748 



PETERSBURG. 



piece of ordnance on an armored car, 
which could be moved on the railroad. 
On the approach of the National troops 
June the enemy opened fire %Yith gi-ape 
'^'** and canister. Kautz's four regi- 
nents at once deployed on the right and 
eft of the main road. Sharp skirmish- 
mg, with considerable loss on the side 
of Kautz, was kept up for some time ; 
but it soon became evident that under 
the circumstances the National troops 
could accomplish nothing without suf- 
fering disastrously ; and they were 
compelled to withdraw, after having 
burnt the railroad depot. The chief 
object of the raid had, however, been 
now accomplished ; and at night the 
column moved eastward reaching 
^Veylsburg, about daylight on the 
26th. After an hom-'s halt the line of 
mai'ch was again taken up, the route 
'hosen for the return lying through 
Christianville and across Meherrin 
Creek, and thence to Double Bridges 
on the Nottaway. The enemy's cavalry 
brigade again appeared, this time on 
the left ilank, and some unimportant 
skirmishu'.g followed. The Nottaway 
River was reached about noon on the 
28th at Double Bridges ; and the pickets 
stationed there were easily driven across 
the bridge by Mcintosh's second bri- 
gade, which was in the advance. It 
had been intended to cross the Weldon 
Ka'lroad at Jarrett's Station ; but infor- 
mation having been received that a 
large furce composed of militia and reg- 
ulars from Weldon had been collected 
there, the route was changed to Stony 
Creek, about midway between Jarrett's 
and Reams' stations. Mcintosh's br 



gade with the Second Ohio and Third 
Indiana, dashing across the bridge, met 
at once a spirited resistance. Never 
theless the men all got over, and Mc 
Intosh foixned line of battle ; but 
a considerable Confedeiate force was 
found lying on the road to the station. 
After some skii-mishing, the National 
troops foimd it necessaiy to act on the 
defensive ; and they got together as 
rapidly as possible a breast-work of 
rails, logs, and earth, in the usual 
manner. It was not long before they 
had to repel several charges. 

Wilson, now fearing that if he 
remained long in that vicinity the ene- 
my might gather about him a force 
from which he could not escape, deter- 
mined to withdraw ; an*' about eleven 
at night he sent off the command of 
Kautz with the wagons and ammunition 
trains, and between 1000 and 200( 
negroes, collected on the march, towards 
Reams' Station. Wilson himseK fol- 
lowed before daylight with the remain- 
der of his force, with the exception of 
3 regiments left in the intrenchments 
to do what they could towards detain- 
ing the enemy. Kautz, on approaching 
Reams' Station, found the Confederal-es 
posted in great strength, and was a1 
once pressed in front and rear by both 
cavalry and artiUeiy. ^Vhen j^^g 
Wilson came up with the bulk of 29. 
his force, he attempted to fonii line of 
battle ; but he was very soon attacked 
and defeated, and his entii'e force thrown 
into confusion. Of couree the detach- 
ment left at Stony Point could not long 
hold out ; it was flanked and partly cut 
off. The situation of Wilson's colun \ 



KETUEN OF WILSON'S CAVALEr. 



74S 



Qow became extremely critical ; it was 
almost eutirely surrounded by a greatly 
auperior force; and it soon became a 
question, not whether the National cav- 
alry could hold their ground, but 
whether thoy could not be captured in 
a body. The plan finally adopted, per- 
haps the best under the circumstances, 
was for each regiment or squadron to 
make its escape separately as it best 
could. Kautz turned off nearly due 
south with his command. Detachments 
moved in various directions; and a 
general stampede was made for the lines 
near Petersbirrg, over ditches and fences, 
through swamps and woods, and along 
concealed by-paths, to escape the fiercely 
pui'suing foe, who chased the fugitives 
clo8« up to the National lines. On the 
night of the 28th, the main part of 
Kautz's command reached the picket 
reserve in a state of terrible exhaustion 
and excitement, and remained there 
through the night. They did not reach 
their old camp till the evening of the 
30tL Squads and solitary horsemen 
continued to straggle back within the 
lines for two or three days. Badly as 
Kautz's troops had fared, they might 
have had much worse fortune had it 
not been for their commander's intimate 
knowledge of the country, which en- 
abled him to get his men through rapid- 
ly. But they were aL thoroughly used 
up, some of the men coming in asleep 
U their saddles. 

Wilson was so long without being 
iieard from, that it was feared he had 
been captured with all his men. The 
main part of his force did not ride in 
till the 1st of July. He had retreated 



in the night by the road leading south 
eastward towards Suffolk, a&d making a 
wide circuit, secured safety at the ex- 
pense of a long route. He crossed the 
Nottaway about 30 miles from Peters- 
burg, and the Blackwater at the County 
Road bridge; turning then northward 
he made his way to Cabin Point, and 
rode thence into the Union lines about 
5 miles from Fort Powhatan. His 
entire force was in wretched plight when 
it retui-ned. Both men and horses were 
worn out and jaded to the last degree. 
Their clothing and accoutrementp were 
torn and spoiled, and their horses hai'dly 
able to walk. They had lost their alL 
The enemy had got possession of the 
entire wagon train — 16 guns, nearly all 
their caissons, and many horses. The 
total loss in men was about 1500. Of 
the large number of negroes collected, 
the greater part were recaptured. The 
ambulances, filled with sick and woimd- 
ed, had been left on the field at Reams' 
Station, under a hospital flag. Notwith- 
standing the unfortunate termination of 
the expedition. Grant expressed himself 
satisfied with the result, inasmuch as 
the Danville .Railroad had received 
so much damage that considerable 
time must elapse before it could be 
restored to working crdei The 
Sixth corps, which had set oat for 
Reams' Station in the hope of relieving 
General Wilson's force, dJd not anive 
until all was over. The Confederates 
had disappeared from that point; and 
the troops took advantage of then 
absence to destroy the railroa<l and 
telegraph for soUiC miles. Man) 
fugitive negroes, who aad IvUowed 



750 



PETERSBUEG. 



Wilson's cavalry, took refuge with 
the Sixth corps. 

It was now the 1st of July. Little 
of moment occurred during the day in 
the lines before Petersburg. About ten 
July o'clock, however, a heavy musket- 
1. ry fire from the Confederates 
broke out in front of the Ninth corps, 
followed presently by a charge upon 
an earth-work which General Ledlie 
had foT some days been engaged in 
throwing up. After a sharp but short 
conflict the Confederates were driven 
back with considerable loss, as the posi- 
tion was well defended by flanking 
batteries. The firing continued at in- 
tervals through the night. About three 
o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d of 
July a sharp artillery fire was opened 
by the enemy on the line of the Eight- 
eenth corps, and was warmly responded 
to by the National batteries. This con- 
tinued for about two hours, without 
any important result. On the evening 
of the 3d there was some firing on the 
right centre. 

The Fourth of July was celebrated 
in the lines before Petersburg by a 
national salute of 34 shots from a 30- 
pounder Parrott in front of Smith's 
position, followed by a general play of 
artillery on the steeples of Petersburg. 
The military bands also played national 
\irs all along tlie line. 

Comparative quiet reigned until the 
7th, when a battery of heavy guns in 
front of the Fifth corps opened fire 
upon a body of Confederates who were 
observed to be throwing up a new work. 
Ageneral cannonading and afireof sharp- 
shooters followed. In the morning 



and early part of the 8th there j^|j 
was little firing. About four 8. 
o'clock in the afternoon however, th« 
Confederates springing suddenly to 
their feet, with their accustomed battle- 
yell, poured a volley of musketry into 
the intrenchments in front of Turner' 
division, on the left of the Eighteenth 
corps. They then quickly deployed a 
skirmishing line, and moved rapidly on 
the works along the front of Martindale 
and Stannard. The entire space be- 
tween the opposing lines was soon cov- 
ered with a dense cloud of mingled 
smoke and dust ; and the musketry fir- 
ing was very sharp for a time ; but the 
enemy was driven back without having 
reached the breast- works. In the mean 
time the batteries aU along the front of 
the three corps on the right were open- 
ed; and shot and shell were thrown 
not only into the space which the Con- 
federates had attempted to cross, but 
into the city and over the Appomattox. 
The superior weight of metal of the 
National batteries soon overpowered 
those of the enemy. The loss in this 
affair was not very great on either side, 
although the Confederates got the worst 
of it, as they were uncovered in their 
unsuccessful charge, while their oppo- 
nents were well protected. The cannon- 
ading was all over at dusk. 

After this, there was again foi 
some days a pause in the fight. It 
was not until the 18th, that hostilitiee 
took again any very active shape. On 
that day, a 13-inch mortar, which aftei 
some difficulty had been got into posi- 
tion in front of the Eighteenth corps, 
began to throw its huge shells into th« 



THE MINK. 



nt 



enemy's works. On the following day 
tbero was steady artilleiy firing in front 
of tlie Ninth and Eighteenth corjis as 
well as from the batteries of the Fifth. 
A heavy rain, the fii-st of any account 
lince the army left Spottsylvania Court 
House, began to fall early in the morn- 
ing, and continued all day and into the 
night. Its cheering influence on the 
army was of great value. There was 
enough of it to lay and thoroughly 
penetrate the dust, which owing to the 
long-continued drought and the ceaseless 
tread of many feet, had become several 
inches deep in the camps. 

On the same day General Grant 
rescinded an order of the War Depart- 
ment by which General Butler was 
relieved of his command. Grant not 
only restored Butler, but in addition to 
the Tenth and Eighteenth coqis, he 
gave him command of the Nineteenth 
corps, just arrived at Fortress Monroe 
from the South, and of which General 
Emory's division had gone ti- aid in the 
defense of Washington. N<ii .ung after 
thiSjGeneral Smith was relieved of the 
command of the Eighteenth corps, and 
was succeeded temporarily by General 
Martindale, and then permanently by 
General Ord. General Gillmore also, 
who had been relieved of the command 
of the Tenth corps, was succeeded 
temporarily by Generals Brooks and 
ferry, and permanently by General 
Bimey, formerly of the Second coi-ps. 

About ten o'clock in the forenoon of 
the 20th the fire of the 13-inch mortar 
vvas directed across the river. This was 
responded to by a concentrated artillery 
lire from the enemy, which in its turn 



was replied to by the National 30- 
pounders and 8-inch mortars, together 
with the light batteries. This lasted 
four hours without any important 
result. The Confederates had estab 
lished a battery of Whitworth guns afc 
Strawberry PlainSj about a mile fi'om 
the pontoon bridge over the James, from 
which they were able to deliver aa 
enfilading fire on the gun-boats, and had 
disabled the Mendota. A Maine regi- 
ment was moved out to occupy the 
position, which it succeeded in doing 
on the 2l8t, but was driven out of it 
again at night. With the help of the 
gun-boats, the Nationals quickly recov- 
ered the position. Cannonading was 
kept up for the next four or five days , 
but there was no general engagement. 

At this date there was completed an 
important work which had been j^j- 
commenced by Bumside just a 26. 
month before, and when the conviction 
had been forced upon the National 
commanders by the disastrous repulse 
of several storaiing columns, that the 
defenses aroimd Petersburg were im- 
pregnable against diiect assault. This 
was nothing less than a great mine 
which had been constmcted under one 
of the most important of the enemy's 
works. The idea of this mine originated 
vrith Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of 
the Forty-Eighth Pennsylvania, who, as 
well as many men of his regiment, had 
been familiar with mining operations 
before the war. To the men of this 
regiment the consti-uction of the mine 
was intrusted and by them completed. 
The work of excavation was begun on 
the 25th of June, vrith the utmost 



•i 



r52 



PETERSBURG. 



[•recautions as to secrecy, in the side 
of a ra\nne surmoiinted by an earth- 
work in front of the position of the 
Ninth corj)S, and was perseveringly 
pushed on towards the doomed fort, 
lituated about 2000 yards from the city. 
he distance to be mined was about 
00 feet. The mine was constructed 
in the usual manner, the surface 
having been first carefully measured 
by triangulation. As the excavation 
went on, the earth was orought out 
and thrown on works, oo as not to give 
rise to inquiries by being allowed to 
accumulate in great heaps. The gallery 
was made in the usual shape, about 4 
feet wide at the bottom and sloping 
upwards so as to be narrower at the top. 
The height was about 4i feet. The 
groimd rose towards the fort, and the 
tunnel was so cut as to slope in an up- 
ward direction. Difficulties in the shape 
i)f water and quicksands were encounter- 
ed and overcome, though the mine remain- 
ed very damp. When the locality of the 
fort was reached, there was only about 
20 feet of the earth intervening; and the 
sound could be distinctly heard overhead 
of the nailing of planks and timbers, 
indicating that the occupants of the fort 
were making a floor for their artillery. 
Wings were then extended to the right 
and left, in which 8 magazines were 
formed, 4 in each gallery, carefully 
' tamped " or separated by packings of 
eand-bags and wood. Wooden pipes 
were laid along the tunnel to within 
100 feet of the magazines. The ventila- 
tion of the mine was effected by sinking, 
just within the exterior line of works 
to the side of the tunnel, a shaft, at tb;^ 



bottom of which a fireplace was buill 
with a grating opening into the gallery, 
and by means of a fii-e kept burning at 
this point a cun-ent of air was caused. 
The smoke issuing from the top of the 
shaft of course could not be concealed, 
but attention was diverted from it by 
keeping fires at various places along the 
line. Finally, when all was complete, 
the chambers were charged with about 
four tons of gunpowder. To keep the 
enemy from obtaining a knowledge of 
what was going on, intercoui'se between 
the opposing picket lines was strictly 
prohibited; and an incessant skimiishing 
and artillery fire was kept up in front 
of the Ninth corps, even while all along 
the rest of the line there was compara 
tive inaction. The plan of assault was 
to explode the mine and immediately 
afterwards open a cannonade from all 
the guns along the Mne, niunbering 
nearly 100. Then, before the enemy 
could recover from the confusion and 
dismay which would be naturally created 
by the explosion and sudden burst of 
a tremendous artillery fire, a strong 
storming party was to rush through the 
gap which it was supposed would be 
made in the line of the enemy's works, 
and endeavor to carry the position 
beyond — a very strongly fortified crest, 
called Cemetery Hill, completely com- 
manding the city, and the key of the 
enemy's position. The National linea 
had for a long time been gradually 
pushed foiTvard till they were now 
not more than 150 yards distant from 
those of the enemy, the nearest point 
being: the undermined fort. The inter 
vening space was swept by tho eneJiiy's 



THE FEINT AT DEEP BOTTOM. 



753 



artillery; and near the fort itself abatis 
and vanous other entanglements had 
been placed. 

To add to the probability of success, 
Grant detennined, before exploding the 
mine and commencing the assault, to 
induce Lee to draw off a large propor- 
tion of his troops fi'om Petersburg by 
making a feint in another direction. 
With this end in view he began a series 
of movements which indicated a design 
to transfer operations to the neighbor- 
hood of Richmond. Grant's line at 
this time was not less than 20 miles 
long. On its extreme right, across the 
James at Deep Bottom, Just above Four 
Mile Creek, Foster, with his division of 
the Tenth coi-jis, had bet- u for a long 
time in possession of an intrenched 
camp — a position of considerable im- 
portance, since, so long as it was held, 
the enemy could neither make a demon- 
stration on the National right flank 
from Malvern Hills, which they still 
occupied, nor any successful attempt to 
obtain on the James a position from 
which it would be possible to blockade 
the river. It also constituted an excel- 
lent base for an advance on Richmond 
from the southeast, by three parallel 
roads, and thus served admirably for the 
feint now about to be made in that di- 
rection. A pontoon bridge, thoroughly 
p'otected by gunboats, lay across the 
James in the rear of Foster's position ; 
but in his front was a large force of the 
enemy, effectually barring any advance 
on his part. About a mile and a half 
below the position of Foster, at Straw- 
berry Plains, also held by a small 
National force, a second pontoon bridge 



was thrown across the river on the 21st 
of July, and on the following day a bri- 
gade of the Nineteenth corps crossed 
by it and secured the bridge head. 
The Confederates made a large addition 
to their force in front of Foster's pos: 
tion ; and on the 26th there was in that 
direction ra[iid and heavy artilleiy and 
muskotiy fuing, in which the gun-boats 
took part. Skirmishing also was con- 
tinued through the day by Foster's 
infantiy, with a loss of about 50 men. 
In the the mean time, at four o'clock in 
the afternoon of the 26th, the Second 
cordis quietly began to march from its 
position on the extreme left of the line 
before Petersburg, soon followed by 
Sheridan's cavalry, which had been 
lying in camps around its flank and rear 
The column moved very rapidly with 
out straggling — Barlow's division first, 
Mott's and Gibbon's next, to Point o 
Rocks on the Appomattox — and crossed 
the river early in the evening. The 
march was then continued to the James, 
which was reached by midnight at 
Jones' Neck, and before daylight the 
crossing began by the pontoon bridge, 
which had beenjsovered with grass and 
hay, to prevent noise. The cavalry 
followed soon after daybreak, and 
passed the infantry on the New ]\Iarkel 
road. A line of battle was then fonue<l, 
in which the cavalry of Sheridan and 
Kautz held the right. The Second 
corps lay at Strawberiy Plains, the 
brigade of the Nineteenth coi-jis on its 
left, with Foster in his old position at 
Deep Bottom on the extreme left. 

Ill front of the Second corps lay a 
body of the enemy under General 



7M 



PETERSBURG. 



Kei-shaw, along a road skirting a pine 
forest, and in rifle-pits, with a battery of 
four 20-pounder Parrott guns. Up to 
this position from near the bridge ran a 
road, by which the Second corps, about 
July seven o'clock, began to advance, 

27. the skirmishers spreading out 
across the open space in front of the 
enemy, while the gun-boat Mendota in 
the stream opened fire with her 100- 
poimder Parrotts. A rapid fire was 
opened at the same time from the en- 
emy's battery. In the mean time, how- 
ever, Miles with his brigade of Barlow's 
division, having made a rapid movement 
under cover, got on the flank of the 
enemy's position and made a brisk 
charge. Kershaw immediately retreat- 
ed, abandoning his battery, which proved 
to be one taken from Butler at Drurj^'s 
Bluff two months before. 

On the 28th, the tro< 'ps north of the 
James continued to make demonstra- 
tions; and the gun-boats occasionally 
shelled the woods. At nine o'clock in 
the morning a general advance of the 
cavalry was ordered ; and after a march 
of three miles, Sheridan came upon a 
strong infantry force. His command 
then quickly dismounted and foimed 
jujy in a belt of woods, Greggs' divi- 

28. sion on the right, Torbert's on 
the left. Torbert's division on being 
attacked fell back into the woods, but 
was soon rallied ; and the brigades of 
Merritt and Davies making a charge, 

he enemy broke and left the field, after 

osing about 150 men in killed, wounded, 

nd prisoners, besides the colors of two 

North Carolina regiments. Gregg's 

division, losing a gun and many men. 



was steadily forced back until about five 
o'clock in the afternoon, when it was 
relieved by the an-ival of (xibbou's di- 
vision of the Second corps. The demon 
stiations were continued on the 29th; 
and a train of about 400 empty wagons 
was sent over one of the pontoon bridges 
to the north side of the James, as if an 
advance in great force towai'ds Malvern 
Hills were intended. Nearly 20,000 men 
and 20 cannon had now actually been 
sent over; and the suspicious of the 
enemy were aroused at last to such an 
extent as to produce the effect desired 
by Grant. Lee hunied off from Petere- 
burg a large force to the Richmond side 
of the James ; and as early as the even- 
ing of the 28th, Mott's division of the 
Second corps was secretly moved back 
to Petersburg. After dark the remain- 
der of tlat corps and all tho cavalry 
recrossed the river, and marching all 
night arrived before daybreak in the 
lines before Petersburg. 

The time for the explosion of the 
min'-* aad now come. Soon after mid- 
night of the 29th all the troops were 
got into position. The Ninth corps, 
which was to head the assault, was 
drawn up in front of the mine, Ledlie's 
division in the advance, Willcox's and 
Pottei"'s next, in support, and Ferrero'e 
consisting of colored troops, in the rear. 
The Eighteenth corps, had been with- 
drawn from its position on the right of 
the Ninth corps and posted in its rear. 
Mott's division of the Second corps, just 
returned from the north side of the 
James, was moved into the po8iti:)n 
vacated by the Eighteenth corps; and 
the other divisions of the Second corps 



INSIDE THE CKATER. 



75t 



as they arrived were placed in adjoin- 
ing positions. The whole force was 
closely massed, only the necessary gar- 
risons being left in the more distant 
intrenchments. Thus the assaulting 
force consisted of the Ninth corps sup- 
ported by the Eighteenth, with the 
Second corps in reserve on the right 
and the Fifth on the left. The cavalry 
were to operate on the left if opportun- 
ity should offer. The time for lighting 
the fuse was fixed at half-past three in 
the morning of the 30th ; and the troops 
at that hour were in entire readiness, 
impatiently awaiting orders. 

At the appointed moment the fuse 
was lit; but the mine did not explode. 
The fuse was imperfect. It had been 
spliced in two places ; and at one of the 
splices, the fire had stopped. Two brave 
men who had faith in the mine, and 
who had toiled at it night and day 
under Pleasants, volunteered to go in 
and apply the match afresh. Grant 
and Meade were at the front. It is now 
ten minutes to five o'clock. The earth 
in the neighborhood trembles ; and then 
with a tremendous explosion, what seems 
a conical mountain rises in the air, 
streaked and serried with lightning. 
For a moment, it hangs poised; and 
then the beholder sees in mid air, tim- 
ber, stone, earth, bodies and limbs of 
men, and some of the heavy guns of the 
''^ork. Two hundred men, many of 
them still asleep, had been blown into 
fragments. It waa a horrible, shocking 
affair. So soon as the mass fell to earth, 
100 guns opened fire upon that living 
Golgotha. 

T^et us now see what advantage was 



gained by the desperate but not wholly 
unjustifiable experiment. Success de- 
pended entirely upon rapidity of action. 
A huge gateway had been opened to 
Cemetery Ridge, and thence jito Peters- 
burg. But where is the stonning col- 
umn ? Ledlie's division which had been 
selected by lot was slow to move. 
When it did move, it halted in the centre 
for at least an hour. Fen-ero who with 
his colored troops was to follow Ledlie, 
could not advance, as the crater was 
choked. Bumside was ordered to move 
forward all his troops ; but still there 
was delay. Ord, now in command of the 
Eighteenth corps, was peremptorily ord- 
ered by Meade to press into the gap ; but 
he declared it to be impracticable ; and 
no doubt, he spoke the truth. There 
was no other way by which the troop 
could advance, except by the crater, and 
that was now crowded, literally blocked. 
The scene inside the crater when 
first entered by the Nationals, is not to 
be described. It was a Pandemonium 
of horror. In the huge chasm, some 
200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet 
deep, were scattered the debrU of the 
work, with the "torn and tattered frag- 
ments of human beings. Some of the 
more fortunate victims were half-buried 
and piteously calling for help. Not a 
few were calling for water ; and the cry 
was general "Yanks, for God's sake, 
take me out ; I'll do as much for you 
some time." In such a scene of chao 
and agony, it is not to be wondered at 
if the National soldiers, left for the 
most part without competent leaders, 
should have halted, and pelded to the 
cliiiina of humanity. The halting 



66 



P JTERSBURG. 



however, was ruinous ; for it gave the 
Confederates time to recover from the 
alarm and stupor occasioned by the explo- 
sion ; and the well directed fire of the 
£funs on Ceriietery Ridge falling upon the 
aow unfortunate Nationals aggravated 
the horrore of that scene of agony and 
death. It was impossible to advance ; 
it was impossible to retire ; and the 
officera who were present had no longer 
any control. The carnage was frightful. 
It was not a valley of the Shadow of 
Death. It was a valley of Death itself. 

As early as nine o'clock, Bumside 
was directed to withdraw his troops at 
pleasure. It was two o'clock before the 
order was carried out and not until 
General Bju-tlett who led the attack, 
had been captured with the greater 
portion of his staff. The mine had 
proved a great and sorrowful faUure. 
Although no new thing in war, it was 

barbarous conception ; and success 
through such a channel would hardly 
have been glory. 

The National loss was about 5000, 
while that of the Confederates, includ- 
ing 200 prisoners, did not much exceed 
July 1000. On Sunday, the Slst, a 
31. flag of truce was sent to the ene- 
my with a request for permission to 
hnry the dead and care for the wounded ; 
but owing to an informality this wag 
aot obtained till Monday, when an 
UTTustice took place in the morning 
from five till nine. In the mean time 
many of the severely wounded died 
from exposure, in great suffering, much 
aggravated by the extremely hot 
weather ; and the bodies of the slain 
had become so discolored anr^ ■'woUen 



from lying in the sun, that the remains 
of the white men could scarcely bf 
distinguished from those of the negroes 

The failure of the mine was a great 
disappointment. It was expected by 
many that Petereburg was about to fall 
Grant, himself, shared the disappoint 
ment ; but he was not discouraged. 
As soon as the truce was concluded, 
the filing was resumed. On the 4th 
of August, Grant left for Washington. 
On this day also a short engage- j^„g^ 
ment took place on the James i- 
between the gun-boats and a battery on 
the north bank. For five days previous, 
intercourse between pickets had been 
prohibited by the enemy. This circum 
stance, and the report of deserters that 
mining was going on, led to suspicions 
that an attack might be expected. 
These suspicions proved to be well- 
foimded. About five o'clock on the 
evening of the 5th, a mine was Aug. 
fired by the enemy in fi'ont of the 6 . 
Eighteenth corps, and followed up by 
rapid and continuous musketry firing. 
But the mine failed, having becm 
exploded several rods outside of the 
head of a sap it was intended to reach. 
A considerable mass of earth was thro^vn 
into the air; but the dust and smoke 
had hardly subsided when the National 
troops were busily engaged pouring 
volleys into the enemy's works, from 
which no charge was made. There was 
considerable artillery firing for a time 
but the loss was not heavy on either 
side. 

On the 9th, about noon, a ten-ific 
accidental explosion took place at City 
Point. An ordnance boat lying at the 



DUTCH GAP CANAL. 



767 



?rliarf suddenly blew up with a contin- 
uous roar that was heard in all direc- 
log. tions for many miles. The cause 
9. of the explosion is imknown, but 
•t is supposed to have been the dropping 
of a case of fixed ammunition. Its 
effect was most disastrous, in the loss of 
life, in the number of persons frightfully 
mutilated, and in the destruction of 
property. The boat and another near 
it were blown to fragments. The bluff 
close by was penetrated by a vast quan- 
tity of shells, balls, bullets, and frag- 
ments of various ammunition, and a 
number of buildings were thrown down. 
Parts of vessels and houses mingled 
with limbs and pieces of himian bodies 
were scattered around in all directions; 
and even the boats on the river did not 
escape. Between 60 and 70 pereons 
were killed and about 130 were wound- 
ed. The majority of the sufferers were 
laborers, many of them colored. 

The repulse of the National forces in 
the attack on Cemetery Hill, led +o the 
belief that operations at Petersburg 
would cease for some time. Grant, 
ho^vever, was not a man to be so easily 
discouraged. The Confederates had, 
it is true, constructed near the side of 
the fort destroyed by means of the mine, 
a new work, from which they opened 
fire on the National lines on the 1 2th of 
August ; and the defenses of Petersburg 
were apparently as strong and as perti- 
na<nously defended as they had been 
t\vo months before. But the war was 
sustained on the part of the Confederacy 
inly by the most strenuous efforts; and 
its aiTnies were kept up to a point at 
'A'hich the defensive could be success- 



fully maintained only by a conscription 
of the most ruthless character. The 
best part of the Southern fighting ele- 
ment had long been consumed ; and old 
men and boys now constituted almost 
the only recruits that could be obtained. 
None knew this better than General 
Grant; and upon this fact he seems to 
have placed much reliance, and drawr 
from it encouragement to persevere. He 
knew that, although the soldiers of the 
Confederates had no superiors, every 
battle and skinnish diminished theii 
numbers. He knew also that, although 
the Confederate government controlled 
almost the entire resom-ces of the South, 
they were rapidly wasting away, and 
that finally the States in rebellion must 
succumb from sheer exhaustion. 

A work, which it was supposed would 
prove of great value, was commenced 
by Butler about the middle of August 
This was the construction of a canal at 
Dutch Gap, on the James, where a 
bend in the river, 11 miles south-south 
east of Richmond in a direct line, forms 
a peninsula called Farrar's Island, con- 
nected with the north bank by a neck 
of land about 175 yards wide. A navi- 
gable channel cut across this neck would 
save a circuit of not less than 6 miles 
around the bend. The preliminary 
survey was made on the 7th of August, 
and a large niunber of workmen com- 
menced digging soon afterwards. 1 1 
was Butler's expectation that this canal 
when completed, would prove of im- 
mense service to the National army. It 
would, he conceived, be deep enough to 
allow the passage of large war vessels ; 
and he felt confident that the iron-clada 



758 



PETERSBURG. 



vvould then be able to ascend to the 
upper part of the river, without 
[laasing by the circuitous channel around 
the peninsula, which was full of torjie- 
does, and other obstructions, besides 
being gtiarded by Confederate gun -boats, 
whose usual station was at Dutch Gap. 
\yhen completed and occupied it would 
.ilso flank the enemy's strong and impor- 
tant position at Howlett's, opposite the 
southwestern extremity of Farrar's 
Island, from which the river was swept 
at this point with heavy batteries. It 
would be a long step in the approach 
to Fort Darling, and would •> ake 
necessary on the part of the enen } a 
new and more extended line of defense, 
and thus find occupation for h large 
Auff. number of their troops. On the 
10. 1 0th of August a force was thrown 
across the river at this point ; and the 
work wa.s prosecuted with impunity un- 
til the 12th, when, soon after daybreak, 
the enemy collected in the vicinity in 
such force that the National gun-boats 
opened fire upon him and kept it up 
several hours. On the following morn- 
ing two Confederate rams appeared, 
and taking a position under the lee of 
Farrar's Island, where they were shel- 
tered fi'om the fire of the National gun- 
boats, began to shell the negro troops 
engaged -n digging the canal. The 
battery at Howlett's also opened fire, 
and was replied to by the National 
battery at Crow's Nest, near Dutch Gap. 
The river being full of obstructions at 
the extremity of Farrar's Island, the 
National gun-boats could not get near 
enough to take part in the engagement. 
The troops on the isthmus had already 



thrown up intrenchments along a 
portion of the line of the proposed canal ; 
and, though exposed to a fire from 
Howlett's battery on the west, and from 
2 gun-boats on the north, which contin- 
ued till noon, they were able to remain 
at work. A gun at Howlett's battery 
was disabled by a shot fi'om that at 
Crow's Nest. The enemy showed signs 
of a deteiTnination to dispute energet- 
ically the National advance in this di 
rection. On the 13th, operations on the 
canal were covered by another move 
ment on the part of Grant, to the north 
of the James, made in the hope of again 
inducing Lee to send away a portion of 
his forces from Petersburg to favor a 
new movement against the Weldon 
Railroad. 

The Second corps, which had been 
moved up from Petersburg, was put on 
board of a fleet of transports at City 
Point; and on the 13th the ves-^Ang. 
sels went down the river, with ^** 
the bands playing, as if bound for For- 
tress Monroe. The movement was pur- 
posely made in an ostentatious manner, 
in order that it might be noted by the 
enemy, and cause him to believe that 
Grant was sending a poition of his 
forces to Washington. When night 
fell, the transports were headed up the 
river, and ascending at full speed soon 
reached Deep Bottom, where the troops 
were all put on shore by noon on the 
following day. On the same night 
two divisions of the Tenth corps crossed 
the James by the pontoon bridge to the 
same point, as did also Gregg's cavalry 
division, and joined Foster in his old 
position thei'e Early on the raorniiifi 



STRAWBERRY PLAINS. 



of the 14th, Foster's brigade was moved 
out towards Strawberry Plains, where 
the enemy was found strongly posted 
in intrenchments situated on command- 
ing ridges covering the Kingsland road, 
,vith a line of rifle-pits in front. As the 
dvance pressed forward, considerable 
kinnishing took place ; but the enemy 
gradually fell back to the rifle-pits, 
which at length were charged and easily 
taken by the Tenth Connecticut and 
Twenty - Fourth Massachusetts, with 
about 100 prisoners. The enemy was 
in the mean time hurrying troops over 
from his right to the region of Malvern 
Hills ; and it became essential that the 
National force should form in order of 
battle, and push forward as rapidly as 
possible. Accordingly, Gregg's cavalry 
swept out to the National right, clearing 
the roads of the enemy's pickets, and 
opening the way for the Second corps. 
Aug. ^ost of the day was consumed in 
14. getting the troops into position. 
When the line was formed, the cavalry 
covered the right flank of the Second 
corjis, which stretched towards the left 
as far as Four MUe Creek On the 
other side was the Tenth corps, its right 
resting on the creek, its left on the 
intrenched bluff at Deep Bottom. The 
gun-boats in the river took such posi- 
tions that they were able to shell the 
Confederate works occasionally. An 
attempt was made to push the whole 
line forward in the evening. The Tenth 
corps charging the enemy's outer works 
in a line of woods about a mile from the 
pontoon bridge, after a sharp engage- 
ment succeeded in carrying them, at the 
same time capturing four 8-inch brass 



howitzers and a number of priso am 
In the centre of the line, Gibbon'n and 
Barlow's divisions of the Second corjie 
moved out towards the Confederate 
works, and succeeded in establishing 
themselves some distance in advance oi 
the position which they had earned in 
the feint made two weeks before. The 
assault was now made by Gibbon's divi 
sion, Colonel Macy's brigade in the 
advance. Crossing a com field and going 
over a hill, they descended into a ravine, 
where a stream, flowing through swampy 
land and thick brush, formed an impene- 
trable barrier The charge was made 
under a severe artillery fire of the 
enemy, which also raked the ravine. 
Natural obstacles rendering any further 
progress ur'ixvsaiWe, the men availed 
themselves of what shelter they could 
find, and after a short time were with- 
drawn. The entire loss sustained by 
the Tenth and Second corps was about 
1000 men. 

Skirmishing was kept up all day on 
the 15th, the object being to extend the 
line to the right and secure a strongei 
position. The Tenth corps was moved 
across Four Mile Creek and placed j^Qg_ 
on the right of the Second, the 16. 
cavalry in the mean time covering the 
right flank and skirmishing. Holding 
a position on the Charles City Road, 
they confronted there detachments of 
the enemy's cavalry, which with othei 
reinforcements had been hunied ovei 
from Petersburg during the preceding 
day and night. Supposing that Grant 
was threatening Malvern HUls, the 
enemy's infantry was pushed as rapidly 
as possible in that direction, while his 



rso 



PETEKSBURQ. 



cavalry was kept on the roads le d- 
ing northwestward towards Richmond, 
There was constant manceuvring and 
heavy skirmishing during the day, in 
the course of which about .^00 men 
were killed or wounded on the part of 
the Nationals, without any important 
nd vantage having been gained. The 
intense and debilitating heat during 
this and the preceding day not only had 
a very depressing effect on the troops, 
but caused some loss by sunstroke and 
exhaustion. 

More decided efforts were made to 
Aug. advance on the Itith. Gregg's 
16. cavalry stretching out on the 
Charles City Road, on the extreme right, 
covered that flank. On his left was 
Cktlonel Craig's brigade of Mott's divi- 
sion of the Second corps ; then came the 
Tenth corps and the remainder of the 
Second. The extreme left at Deep Run 
\vas held by colored troops. The region 
n which the movements were about to 
take place was covered with dense 
forest and undergrowth, with only here 
and there a small cleared space. To the 
difficulties thus presented to the man- 
oeuvres of troops was added the intense 
heat of the day, which was one of the 
most sultry and oppressive of the season. 
The eai'liest movement was made by the 
cavalry of Gregg, along the Charles 
City Road as far as Deep Bottom Creek 
or Deep Run, where he was joined by 

brigade of Barlow's division under 
Miles. Further progress was disputed 
by a brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, 
which, however, was quickly driven 
back vpith the loss of its commander, 
<vho was killed while attempting to 



rally his men. The column then pushed 
forward on the siime road ueai- to 
Wliite's Tavern, not more than 7 milee 
from Richmond, where the enemy was 
found intrenched in a position too strong 
to justify attack. Miles then vsdthdi-ew 
his brigade towards the right of the 
main line under Birney, marching back 
by the route which he had taken in 
advancing. On seeing this, the enemy, 
collecting from various quarters a con- 
siderable force at White's Tavern, 
moved rapidly dovm upon Gregg's 
command in the afternoon, and drove 
it back to Deep Run, where Gregg made 
a stand, and easily maintained himself 
for some time. Meanwhile there had 
been some very sharp fighting on the 
centre of the line. Terry's division of 
the Tenth corps pushed forwax'd into 
the wooded region between the Central 
and Charles City roads, Foster's brigade 
in front. Pond's and Hawley's in support, 
with Craig's brigade of the Second corps 
on the light. Aiter a toilsome march 
under a burning sun, over ground much 
broken with ravine and jungle, the en- 
emy's picket line was at last found and 
driven in. Artillery firing followed, 
and some slight works and a few piis- 
oners were captured- The main Avorks 
were then charged upon by Pond's 
brigade, supported by Hawley's and 
some colored troops ; and after an hour g 
hard and close fighting at short range 
in the dense woods, in which the loss 
on both sides was severe, the intrench- 
ments were carried, 200 prisoners being 
taken and some colors. The National 
troops then occupied the intrenchments 
and prepared to hold them against the 



DEEP BOTTOM. 



761 



Confederates should they return in 
force. About this time Colonel Craig 
wath his brigade was despatched to the 
assistance of Gregg's cavalry, which the 
enemy, having received reinforcements, 
was driving back rapidly. In the en- 
gagement which followed, Craig was 
killed; and his brigade, partly in con- 
sequence of this, being thrown into con- 
fusion, fell back, losing many prisoners. 
The cavalry and infantry on the right 
having now given way, the Confederates 
concentrated their efforts against the 
infantry in the centre, upon which they 
made a series of desperate assaults, and 
at length got possession of the works 
which had been won from them with 
such hard fighting ; and notwithstanding 
that Bimey, about six o'clock, made an 
effort to regain them, they held the 
position. Having succeeded in forcing 
back the right, the enemy was now able 
to direct an enfilading fire on the centre ; 
and the whole National line was with- 
drawn at dark, having sustained during 
the day a loss of some 1500 men, that 
of the enemy being nearly as great. 
The line at night was substantially the 
same as it had been in the morning. 

While these events were taking place 
on the right, Major Ludlow, at Dutch 
Gap, moved out about 1000 men on trans- 
ports to Aiken's Landing, and marched 
thence to Cox's Ferry, two or three 
miles above Dutch Gap, where he in- 
trenched. On the afternoon of the 
following day, Howlett's battery and a 
Confederate ram opened fire on the 
men engi^ed in digging the canal, 
which was replied to by the battery at 
Crow's Nest and by the monitors. 



After dark, Ludlow seeing that he 
would not be able to maintain himself 
in his advanced position at Cox's Ferry, 
withdrew his troops and returned to 
his old position at Dutch Gap. 

On the 17th, there was little or no 
fighting on the right. Between four and 
six in the afternoon, the killed of the 
day before were buried under a flag of 
truce, each party taking charge of its 
own dead. The 18th also was quiet in 
the immediate neighborhood of Deep 
Bottom ; but at night a fierce assault was 
made on the intrenchments of the Tenth 
corps, by a division of the enemy, who 
charged in column on a portion of the 
line held by Terry's division and ^ng, 
W Bimey's colored brigade. 18. 
The firmg was very close and verj 
heavy for an hour, but the Confederates 
were repulsed with a loss of not less 
than 1000 men. On the 19th, there 
was some skirmishing, but no general 
engagement. The aggregate National 
loss in this second demonstration, at 
Deep Bottom, was estimated at not less 
than 5000 • that of the enemy at 3000. 
But the movement had answered its 
purpose ; and the troops were rapidly 
marched back to tte lines before Peters 
burg, a division of the Second corps 
arriving there by the morning of the 
20th. 

Little of importance occurred at 
Petersburg while the bloody struggle 
was going on in the neighborkood of 
Deep Bottom. Artillery and picket 
firing went on till the evening of the 
15th, when it was suspended for a shoii 
time by an extraordinary rain storm, 
which swept away many tents and 



res 



PETEKSBUKG. 



Butiers'booths and flooded the trenches. 
On the morning of the 18th, at one 
o'clock, the enemy opened a tremendous 
fire all along the line, and continued it 
for two hours ; but no assault followed, 
^bout an hour after the cannonading 
eased, operations against the Weldon 
Railroad were commenced by the move- 
ment of the Fifth corps ia that direction. 
Leaving camp with four day's rations, 
the march was directed towards Reams' 
Station; and between seven and eight, 
the advance arrived at Six Mile Station, 
near which a mile of the track was torn 
up, and the rails destroyed Little 
opposition was experienced during this 
movement, which wae ^ lite unexpected 
by the enemy; and while the first divi- 
sion under Griffin was engaged in 
destroying the railroad track, the other 
divisiors advanced two or three miles 
towards Petersburg, driving in the skir- 
mishers. At Yellow Tavern, about ten 
o'clock, the column encountered a bri- 
gade of cavalry, which was driven back 
as far as Davis' Farm, two and a haK 
miles from Petersburg. But at this 
point a force of the enemy, consisting 
of two divisions of Hill's corps under 
Heth and Mahone, came hurrying down 
the railroad. The National line was 
immediately formed in the open field, 
the Third division under Crawford on 
the right of the railroad, and the Second 
4ng under Ayres on the left. About 
18. two o'clock the enemy emerged 
from the woods in front and made an 
impetuous charge. For a time the two 
divisions under Crawford and Ayres 
got the worst of it, and were driven 
half a mile d ^wn the railroad ; but the 



Fourth division under Cutler and some 
other troops coming up, the Nationals 
were enabled to stretch out around and 
were successful in flanking the enemy's 
left. This turned the tide of battle ; and 
the Confederates were finally repulsed 
The contest was over before dark ; and 
the National troops immediately went 
to work throwing up breast-worka 
Although heavy rain fell at night, and 
the enemy, fearing another attack, threw 
shells into the lines from midnight till 
daybreak, the National troops were 
found strongly intrenched ©n the rail- 
road 2i miles south of Petersbiirg. The 
loss on the part of the Nationals, inclu- 
ding 160 prisoners, was somewhat over 
1000; that of the Confederates, in- 
cluding 30 prisoners, was, by their own 
account, only about 500. 

The Fifth corps had thus secured an 
intrenched position on the Weldon Rail 
road. It was not likely, however, that 
the Confederates would allow it to be 
quietly retained. If left isolated, the 
troops would very soon be driven off or 
surrounded and captured. It was thus 
of the utmost importance, that this new 
position on the extreme left should be 
connected with the main line before 
Petersburg; and reinforcements were 
accordingly set in motion. The enemy 
having withdrawn nearer to the city 
during the night, leaving only a picket 
line in front, the National skirmishers 
were pushed forward early, on the morn- 
ing of the 19th. The whole line fol 
lowed, throwing up breast- works as they 
proceeded, and planting batteries to 
strengthen the advanced position. This 
went on without opposition till about 



THE WJKLDOiV RAILKOAb. 



763 



ten o'clock, when a short skirmish 
occurred in front of the picket lines on 
the right, at which point the enemy was 
reconnoitring. The troops had all got 
into line about noon ; but a portion of 
the gap betvveen the right of the Fifth 
corps and the old line of intrenchments 
near the Jerusalem road still remained 
unoccupied. The new line when ar- 
ranged stood as follows : WUlcox's divis- 
ion of the Ninth corps having just amved 
held the extreme right; then came a 
brigade of Cutler of the Kfth corps; 
then Cravrford; then Ayres; then on 
the extreme left Griffin b Jivi-'\ n and 
the remainder of Cutler's. The railroad 
ran between the divisions of A^Tes and 
Aug. Cravrford. About four o'clock, 
19. heavy rain falling at the time. 
General A. P. Hill broke suddenly upon 
the line, with both divisions of his corps, 
under Mahone and Heth. Mahone, 
having with him the brigades of Cling- 
man and Colquitt as well as his own, 
attacked the right with great fury, first 
striking the picket line, which consisted 
of Bragg's brigade. The advanced regi- 
ment was quickly driven back from the 
cornfield where it had been posted, to 
the National breast-works, losing many 
men. The enemy had discovered the 
gap at this part <>f the line, and rushed 
through it like a torrent, thus getting 
•/etween the divisions of WUlcox and 
>awford. Desperate artUlery and 
nusketry fighting ensued. But WUl- 
cox's brigades were kept closely massed, 
Hartranft on the right, Humphrey on 
the left; and they remained unbroken. 
Hill then, while keeping Willcox and 
Cravrford occxipied in front with Cling- 



man's and Mahone's brigades, des- 
patched part of Colquitt's brigade to 
drive in that under Bragg. After des- 
perate fighting this was accomplished, 
and the right of Crawford's division, 
where Lyle was posted, was completely 
flanked. Colquitt, Joined by other 
forces, succeeded in getting a front, 
flank, and rear fire on a part of Craw- 
ford's division, the consequence of which 
was that more than 1500 men, compris- 
ing nearly the whole of Hartshorn's bri 
gade and part of Lyle's and Wheelock's, 
were cut off and captured. 

While this was occurring on the right 
of the railroad, the divisions on the left 
under Ayres, Griffin, and Cutler were 
attacked by the troops under Heth. 
The advance of the Confederates was 
made with great impetuosity the Na- 
tional picket line was driven in, and the 
advanced intrenchments were soon taken; 
but at the second and main line the 
Confederates received a bloody repulse, 
not, however, before Hayes' brigade of 
regulars, who had held their post with 
great firmness, were badly cut up. The 
line on their right and left having been 
forced back; they became exposed to an 
enfilading fire, and sustained a heavy 
loss in killed and wounded, besides 500 
or 600 captured. Among the captured 
and wounded was General Hayes. 

Very ojTijiortunately, just at the time 
when the right centre had become 
broken and the centre was giving way, 
the First and Second divisions of the 
Ninth corps under Potter and Wliite 
came up. Although they had made a 
long and toilsome forced march over 
roads now reduced to mud by the latf 



7G4 



PETERSBURG. 



heavy raiiis, they were immediately 
formed and sent in on the charge ; and 
the enemy was overlapped and turned. 
In the meantime the battle had become 
so confused on Crawford's right that 
the combatants could not be distin- 
guished ; and the artillery now directed 
on that point, swept down friend and 
foe alike. The result was, that the 
contest, was decided against the Confed- 
erates ; and the disordered lines of the 
National troops were soon raUied. 
Night, however, had fallen before the 
battle was entirely over. The National 
loss in killed and wounded was esti- 
mated at 1 500. The Confederates had 
lost about the same number. In pris- 
oners they lost not more than 250, while 
they captured, mostly from the divisions 
of Ayres and Crawford, not less than 
2700, including 9 field officers and 60 or 
70 line officei-s. On the following day, 
the 20th, there was some cannonading, 
but no general fighting. 

On the 21st the enemy made another 



Aug. 



effort to recover the Weldon Rail- 



21. road. The National line lay sub- 
ntantially as it did on the 19th, the first 
three divisions of the Ninth corps 
holding the right and the Fifth corps 
the left. Cutler's division lay across 
the railroad, Cra-vvford's being on its 
light, Griffin's and Ayres' on its left. 
At four o'clock in the morning the 
Confederates opened a heavy artillery 
fire along the whole line, from the left 
to the Appomattox, and about seven 
o'clock made a feint towards the Ninth 
I'orpa At nine the attack commenced 
in earnest, with a terrific fire of both 
Holid shot and shell from all their bat- 



teries, \vhich was replied to with at 
least equal power. Shortly afterwards 
the enemy's column emerged from the 
woods and dashed in fine style across 
the open space in front of the National 
breast-works. It was intended that the 
attack should be made in two columns, 
one in front, the other in flank ; but the 
flanking column on the left of the rail- 
road, instead of striking the extreme 
left, under Griffin, fell upon the right 
of Ayres' division and the left of Cutler's. 
The National skirmishers were soon 
driven in, and their pits taken ; but on 
approaching the works, the Confederates 
were received with a steady fire of 
musketry, and although they again and 
again advanced to the charge, they 
were always repulsed. On the right, 
they did not succeed in reaching th 
main works, and suffered much fron« 
both artillery and musketry. On th 
left, a colmnn which approached by the 
Vaughan road was caught with a cross 
fire; large niimbers threw down their 
arms and surrendered, and the remain- 
der exposed to a hot fire, hastily with- 
drew. An effort to flank the extreme 
left also failed. The main force of the 
attack, however, fell on the divisions of 
Ayres and Cutler. The battle was brief 
— lasting only two hours. It was 
nevertheless one "f the most desperate 
contests of the campaign. In the 
stmggle the Confederate generals 
Saunders and Lamar were killei 

On the morning of the 22d it wa* 
discovered that the enemy, had retired 
and intienched himself about 3 miles 
from Petersburg. Skirmishers were 
then thrown out, and both armies went 



REAMS' STATION. 



76t 



ro work industriously witli the spade. 
The picket lines were busily engaged in 
skirmishing all day ; but there was no 
general engagement. During the pre- 
vious week, one division of the Second 
corjis had been withdravpTi from Deep 
Bottom and hurried back to Petersburg. 
It tooK possession of the intrenchments 
vacated by the Fifth corps when it 
marched for the Weldon Railroad. The 
other two divisions, with Gregg's caval- 
ry and the Tenth corps, also left Deep 
Bottom on the night of the 20th, where 
Foster's briarade remained alone. March- 
ing rapidly all night, the two divisions 
of the Second corps reached the lines 
of the Ninth on the morning of the 21st, 
and on the 2 2d Barlow's division, tem- 
porarily commanded by Miles, was set 
to tearing up the track of the Weldon 
Railroad in the rear of the Fifth corps 
towards Reams' Station, in which it was 
joined by Gibbon's division on the fol- 
lovnng day The Fifth corps a_30 tore 
up a portion of the track towards Peters- 
burg, so that by the night of the 24th 
the railroad was thoroughly destroyed 
from a point four miles below Petere- 
burg down to two miles below Reams' 
Station. The cavalry under Gregg 
covered the work of the infantry during 
these operations, and had several skirm- 
ishes vdth the enemy. 

On the morning of the 25th, Gibbon's 
division of the Second corps moved 



Aug. 



down the railroad below Reams' 



26. to continue the work of destruc- 
tion ; but when about a mile below the 
station, its advance, consisting of caval- 
ry, was suddenly checked and driven 
back by the enemy's picket line. 



Smythe's brigade of infantiy was at 
once pushed forward and deployed as 
skirmishers, the cavalry retiring behind 
them. Smythe drove back the enemy's 
skirmish line some distance, but pres- 
ently meeting a stronger force, was 
himself compelled to fall back to the 
main body of the division, which was 
now in line of battle, the Third brigade 
on the right of the track, the First on 
the left, the other troops in suppoi-t 
Before noon the enemy had appeared 
in some force on Gibbon's left, making 
towards his real" but this movement 
was checked by a party of Gregg's cav- 
alry, and the Confederates were driven 
off. A little later some cavalry of the 
enemy appeared in front, in the direction 
of Dinwiddie Conrt House, but were 
checked by Chapman's cavalry brigade 
While this desultory fighting was going 
on m the neighborhood of Gibbon'6 
division. General Hill was making pre 
parations to attack that under Miles at 
Reams' Station. It occupied the old 
intrenchments constructed by the Sirth 
coi-ps, which in a semicircular form par 
tially surrounded the station, and cov 
ered the railroad both above and below 
that point. The enemy appeared in 
front of Miles soon after twelve o'clock, 
and Hancock immediately ordered Gib- 
bon to fall back and form a junction with 
the left of Miles. The cavaby followed 
and was disposed so as to cover the 
left flank and rear. Gibbon an-anged 
his line so that it faced the south and 
southeast, looking down the railroad. 
About two o'clock the enemy's skirmish 
line advanced and swept forward with 
the accustomed battle yell ; but it soon 



766 



PETERSBURG. 



fell back in confusion under a sharp 
fire from infantry and artUleiy, suffering 
severely. Skirmishing followed till 
about half-past three, when the enemy's 
column emerged from the woods in close 
ine of battle, and with bayonets fixed 
rushed towards the National works. At 
the distance of twenty paces it was met 
oy a murderous fire of musketry and of 
artillery from 4 batteries, when it re- 
coiled, broke, and hastened back under 
cover, having suffered frightful loss. 
Another assault, made an hour later, 
had a similar lesult. 

The Confederates now began to fell 
trees for the purpose of planting batter- 
ies; and notwithstanding shells were 
thrown among them, they succeeded at 
length in getting a very heavy concen- 
tric fire upon the National lines, into 
.vhich they poured shell and shot with- 
out an instant's cessation for twenty 
minutes, and with a most desti-uctive 
eflEect. The result was that the Nation- 
aI troops became to a certain extent 
demoralized ; and when at last the 
shelling ceased and the enemy's storm- 
mg column again advanced with renewed 
fury, the fire with which it was received 
was less vigorous than before. The 
(eft and centre of Miles' division, upon 
which the blow fell, allowed the enemy 
to gain the breast-works, and after a 
bloody hftndto-hand contest, the Nation- 
si lines were broken through, and a 
genera) rout followed, although some 
regiments and companies remained 
fighting with heroic determination. Of 
the 12 gims which had been used with 
tmch destructive effect during the day, 
\f were lost. At this crisis a part of 



Gibbon's division was hurried acroae 
the rear from the left, under a heavy 
fire, to the support of Miles, a distance 
of more than half a mile, and arrived 
in time to drive back the enemy in that 
quarter, though at a fearful cost in 
killed and woimded. Thus aided. Miles 
was enabled to rally his division and 
partially restore his lines. But while 
a portion of Gibbon's troops were thus 
employed, a fierce attack was being 
made on the left by a large force of the 
enemy, consisting of Heth's division of 
infantry and Hampton's divi«.ion of cav- 
alry, equalling in impetus that which 
had been made on the centre. Gibbon's 
troops, already exhausted by their exer- 
tions, were hurried back to the left, 
where the enemy was in great force. 
Although desperately resisted by some 
brave regiments, who allowed them 
selves to be cut to pieces rather than 
give way, the Confederates overpowered 
all opposition ; and Hancock was finally 
compelled to withdraw his corps from 
Reams' Station and retire towards the 
lines of the Fifth corps. Gregg had in 
the mean time brought his dismounted 
cavalry to the assistance of the infantry 
and the enemy, who had suffered veiy 
severely, did not pursue. Thus ended 
the battle of Reams' Station — one of 
the most obstinately contested battles of 
the war. The National loss was votj 
heavy, amounting to not less than 30()!! 
of which 2000 were prisoners. Seven 
stands of colors and 9 cannon were also 
lost. The enemy's loss in killed and 
wounded was about 1 500. The Nation 
al forces continued to hold the Weldon 
Railroad at Yellow Tavern. 



FEIENDLY FEELING. 



767 



On the 25th the Eighteenth corps, 
on the right of the National line before 
Petersburg, and the Tenth corps at 
Deep Bottom and Bermuda Hundred, 
had begim exchanging positions. These 
movements produced a demonstration 
jn the part of General Pickett in front 
of Butler's position. Opening fire from 
the long silent artillery, the enemy 
reinforced his skirmish line and ad- 
vanced it against that of General Butler. 
A sharp flght ensued ; but the enemy 
soon withdrew, losing 60 prisoners. 
The killed and wounded wo-.a few on 
either side. The movement of the 
troops was then continued, and was 
completed during the night of the 26th. 

The shelling of Petersburg was re- 
sumed with great vigor on the 29th, 
and was continued for some time all 
along the line with a fury unparalleled 
for many weeks, but the casualties re- 
sulting from it were few. There was 
at the same time considerable artil- 
lery firing between batteries and gun- 
boats on the James in the vicinity of 
the Dutch Gap Canal, the work on 
which, was being vigorously prosecuted 

Since the destruction of a portion of 
the Weldon Railroad the enemy had 
had recourse to wagons, to convey their 
supplies from Stoney Creek, eight miles 
south of Reams' Station, around by the 
Boydton plank road to Petersburg; 
Sept. and on the 2d of September, 

2. Gregg made an important recon- 
iioissance in that direction. At daylight 
his cavalry, supported by Crawford's 
livision of the Fifth corps, moved out 
some distance; and Smith's brigade 
marched up the Vaughan road towards 



the plank road and in the direction of 
Petersburg. The plank road was dis- 
covered to be well fortified Retumiag, 
Smith was attacked by some of the 
enemy's cavalry, but escaped withou 
much loss. The whole force then re 
turned to camp. 

As usual during periods of compara- 
tive inaction, friendly intercourse be- 
tween pickets and the exchange of 
newspapers began to take place along 
a part of the lines. When such a tacit 
truce existed, the men were accustomed 
to walk about at their ease in front of 
the works, trusting fully in the honor 
of their antagonists. But, on the 1st 
of September, while a large numbei 
were thus promenading outside the 
trenches, the National batteries com 
menced playing on the town, and a 
voDey of musketry was fired in reply 
from the Confederate works, on the 
exposed troops, of whom some 200 
were killed or woimded. This put an 
end to amicable relations for some time. 
On the night of the 4th, about eleven 
o'clock, news of the fall of Atlanta 
having arrived in camp, a S8 ate was 
ordered of 100 shotted gims .U along 
the line from the extreme rig • t to the 
extreme left. To the roar of tne artil 
lery the troops added their enthusiastic 
cheers, and the enemy, apprehending a 
general attack, replied briskly, but the 
firing was discontinued about one 
o'clock. 

For several days along Grant's now 
extended lines, little of importance 
occurred beyond the usual desultory 
cannonading at intervals. On the left, 
near the Jerusalem plant road, the 



768 



PETERSBURG. 



National and Confederate lines Had 
been for some time in such close prox- 
imity, that at one point the opposing 
pickets could converse without diffi- 
culty. Hancock determined to drive 
the enemy out of this advanced posi- 
tion, as being too commanding and 
dangerous, and gave orders to Mott, 
whose division lay opposite to the point 
in question, to direct a movement 
against it. Accordingly, at one o'clock 
Sept. on the morning of the 10th, the 
10. Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania and 
the Twentieth Indiana were sent under 
General De Trobriand to carry the 
work. The approach was made silently, 
the enemy's picket line was surj^rised, 
and the position was flanked and taken, 
with very little firing. The affair was 
a perfect success. The enemy opened 
an artillery fire, and, somewhat later, 
made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort 
to recover the lost ground. Ninety 
prisoners were taken, while the Nation- 
al loss was less than 20. 

On the 14th the long continued de- 
sultoiy firing was followed by a fierce 
cannonade directed on Petersburg, shells 
being thrown into the city for two 
hours at the rate of 20 a minute. This 
the enemy replied to, by bombarding 
the single towers which had been 
erected on the Appomattox, and by 
shelling the working party on the Dutch 
Gap Ganal. Very early on the morn- 
mg of the 15th, movements of the ene- 
my's cavalry on the left having been 
reported, a brigade of the Fifteenth 
corps, preceded by several regiments of 
cavalry, was sent out towards the 
Vaughan road. The enemy's lines at 



Poplar Spring Church were broken 
through, and reconnoissances made 
in various directions ; but although 
Bearing's cavalry was encountered and 
a little skirmishing took place, the 
troops finally returned to camp without 
having discovered the character of the 
enemy's movement, which proved to be 
the most daring and successful raid of 
the campaign. Setting out from Reams' 
Station on the morning of the 15th, 
Hampton, with a body of cavalry, con- 
sisting of 4 brigades, and 2 batteries, 
marched rapidly around the National 
left, and appeared suddenly on the 
morning of the 16th, in the rear of the 
centre. His object was to seize a herd 
of 2500 cattle at Sycamore Chm-ch 
about a mile south of Coggin's Point 
on the James, and nine miles northeast 
of Prince George Coiirt House. Spear's 
cavalry brigade was picketed arounc? 
the point to be attacked ; but the eiie 
my rushed in so unexpectedly, ggpj 
that it was taken completely by 16. 
surprise. The* pickets were quickly 
driven in ; and two regiments, the 
Thirteenth Pennsylvania and the First 
District of Columbia, were entirely 
broken and stampeded, the latter being 
captured entire with all its horses, arms, 
equipments, wagons, and camp. The 
enemy, by making a wide detour around 
the National left, had succeeded com- 
pletely in concealing his movements. 
As soon as the cattle were secured, thej 
were driven off. Hampton's troopers 
then set out on their return, pursued 
by the divisions of Gregg and Kautz, 
aa far as Belcher's Mill on the Jerusfr 
lem plank road. At this point the 



CHAPIN'S FAEM. 



7«& 



Confederates under Rosser and Dealing 
made a stand and repulsed an attack 
made on them by the brigades of Smith 
and Stednian. The other portions of 
Hampton's column moved ofi with the 
cattle at their leisui-e. By this daring 
and skilful operation, Hampton se- 
cured an abundant supply of meat 
for Lee's army. Besides the cattle, he 
canied ofE 300 prisonei-s, 200 mules, 
and 32 wagons. Among the captures 
was also a telegraphic construction 
corps of 40 men, with their train and 
20 miles of wire. The entire loss of 
the enemy did not exceed 50. While 
Hampton's raid was in progress, the 
entire skiniiish line of the Fifth corps 
was driven into the intrenchments, with 
the loss of 90 men made prisoners. 
From the 16th to the 23d, sharp picket 
filing was kept up along the Ime re- 
sulting in many casualties. 

On the night of the 28th, the army 
Sept. ^^ *^^ James, xinder Butler, con- 

28. sisting of the Tenth corps under 
Bimey, holding the right of the main 
line before Petersburg ; the Eighteenth 
corps, under Ord, at Bermuda Hun- 
dred, and Kautz's division of cavalry, 
were quietly but rapidly moved from 
their positions, in light marching order, 
to the James, over which they crossed, 
on muffled pontoon bridges, the Tenth 
c<^)rps to Deep Bottom, and the Eight- 
eenth to Aiken's Landing, about mid- 
way between Deep Bottom and Dutch 
Gap. At daylight on the morning of 
the 29th, the Eighteenth corps advanced 
by the Varina road, which runs in a 

northwesterly direction to the New 
Market road. Having proceeded about 



a mile the enemyu pickets were met, 
and skirmishing began, Stannai'd's di- 
vision in the advance. Two or three 
miles from Aiken's Landing, a long line 
of iatrenchments was found running 
westward from the road to the James 
and ending there in a well-constmcted 
fort. The region traversed by these 
intrenchments is in the neighborhood 
of Chapin's and Ball's blnffs, and was 
known as Chapin's Fann. In front of 
the fortifications was an open plain. 
Line of battle was formed in the woods 
on the edge of this plain, Stannard's 
division on the left near the live?', 
Heckmn.'s on the right. The third 
division under Paine was operating ^vith 
the Tenth corps on a different road. 
In front of Stannard were sti'ong con- 
nected forts, including the works kno\vn 
as Battery Harrison. The latter was 
well provided with artillery and sur- 
rounded by a wide and deep ditch. In 
front of Heckman was a line of lifle- 
pits defended by infantiy. The troops 
having been formed under cover of the 
woods, dashed across the plain under a 
heavy fire from the forts and rifle-jiita 
and from the gun-boats in the river, 
and carried the entire line of works, 
including Battery Hanison, capturing 
16 pieces of artillery and 200 prisoners. 
The attack was, in fact, a surprise. 
Fortunately there were but few troops 
in the works, and these mostly inex- 
perienced, or the affair would have 
been much more bloody. As it wa.«, 
the success was purchased at a hi^avj 
cost, the National loss being about 800 
The fighting was all over by ten o'clock 
and the men were set to work throwing 



770 



PETERSBUKG. 



up breast- works and strengthening their 
position. The Confederate gun-boats 
and batteries on the other side of the 
James, however, kept up such an annoy- 
ing fire that it was found impossible to 
hold the portion of the works on the 
left near the river. They were there- 
fore abandoned. 

The Tenth corps had in the mean 
time marched from Deep Bottom 
towards New Market, crossing Four 
Mile Creek. The enemy was found at 
the junction of that road with the New 
Market road, where strong breast- works 
had been constructed in a commanding 
position called New Market Heights, a 
marshy tract of ground in front, covered 
with stunted trees and a dense \mder- 
gi-owth besides being obstructed by an 
abatis. Over this piece of difficult 
groimd Paine's colored troops were 
directed to charge. In spite of the 
formidable obstacles in their path, and 
under a very destructive musketry fire, 
they rushed to the works and carried 
them at the point of the bayonet with- 
out firing a shot. This position being 
the key-point of the line of defenses, 
was stoutly defended by the Confeder- 
ates ; but nothing could withstand the 
impetuous onset of the colored troops. 
Terry's division of the Tenth coi-ps 
pushed in on the right and flanked the 
enemy, who fell back from the heights 
and Terry immediately occupied them. 
The National loss was about 1500, sus- 
tained chiefly by the colored division; 
that of the enemy was much less. Bir- 
ney then pushed on in the direction of 
Richmond, along the New Market road, 
to the point where the Mill road enters 



it, three miles west of New Market 
After carrying some feebly defended 
earth-works here, the advance drove the 
enemy as far as the junction of the 
Varina and New Market roads, six 
miles southeast of Richmond Here, 
on Laurel Hill, was found a substantial 
fortification called Fort Gilmer, consist- 
ing of a semicircular main work ^th 
other works on each side, a wide and 
deep ditch extending in front of the 
intrenchments. The advance was im- 
mediately deployed on the right, »nd 
W. Bimey's colored brigade on the 
left. About two o'clock an assault 
was ordered, and several charges werr 
made ; but each time the troops wen 
compelled to retire with great loss, 
a severe artillery and musketry fir* 
from both flank and front completelj 
sweeping the open space over whicl 
the storming parties had to move. Th< 
colored troops on the left succeeded ii) 
reaching the ditch ; but the few men 
who mounted the parapet never return 
ed. It soon became evident that the 
position was too strong to be taken, and 
before dusk the troops were called off. 
The enemy was left in secure possession 
of Laurel Hill, having suffered but '■ ttle 
loss, while that of the Nationalb was 
not less than 500. 

Kautz having early in the icioming 
reconnoitred the roads before the ad 
vance of the infantry columns, tiirned 
off about nine o'clock to the right and 
moved up the Central road toward? 
Richmond, in which direction he mel 
no opposition till within two or thret 
miles of the city, when a fort ne*r tht 
tollgate opened upon him. Terry aJeo 



BATTERY HARRISON. 



771 



whose division had been sent to the 
support of Kautz, marched across from 
the New Market to the Central road, 
and pressing on rapidly came within 
sight of the spires of Richmond. But 
both withdrew about sundown. The 
country had been found full of fortifi- 
cations, and the enemy everywhere 
showed a disposition to resist. The line 
of the army at night was formed with 
the Tenth corps in the centre, the cav- 
alry on the right, and the Eighteenth 
corps on the left. 

About two in the afternoon of the 
30th, the Confederates, having been 
largely reinforced from Petersburg 
during the night and morning, appeared 
in great force in front of Battery Har- 
rison and the line of captured works 
now held by the Eighteenth corps. 
Their plan of attack was, to break 
through these and separate the Eight- 
en th and Tenth corps. The blow fell, 
therefore, on the right of the Eighteenth 
and the left of the Tenth. The action 
was commenced by a cannonade from 
Sept. *^^ enemy of fifteen or twenty 
30. minutes' duration, followed by a 
charge on Paine's colored division, now 
getting position on the right of the 
Eighteenth corps, and on W. Bimey's 
colored brigade, on the left of the Tenth. 
But Paine and Bimey held their ground 
well, delivering a witheiing fire of 
musketry, while the batteries made 
great devastation in the charging col- 
lunn. The weight of the attack fell, 
however, on Stannard's division. Form- 
uig in three strong lines on the edge of 
the woods, the Confederates charged 
npon it with great fury under cover of 



a hot shelling from their gun-boats and 
an enfilading fire from the batteries on 
the other side of the river. Stannard's 
men had been instructed to lower theii 
pieces ; and theu* fire was incessant and 
murderous. Three times the Confed- 
erates charged ; but each tims, although 
they got near the works, they were 
driven back with great slaughter to 
their cover in the woods. They lost 
in this affair, including 200 prisoners, 
of whom 20 were officers, nearly 800 
men. The National loss did not exceed 
200. At night heavy rain fell, continu 
ing through the following day and 
night; and the surface of the country 
was soon covered with deep mud, ren 
dering the movement of artillery and 
wagons, and even the march of troops, 
exceedingly difficult. 

These movements on the north side 
of the James having, as was intet ied, 
induced Lee to send off a great pi-'.t of 
his forces in that direction. Gran* who 
had for several days been making.; pre- 
parations for the movement, despatched 
on the 30th a column from the left flank. 
The National force remaining near 
Petersburg while the army of the James 
was operating towards Richmond, con 
sisted of three corj5s and the second 
division of cavalry. Of these the 
Second corps and parts of the Fifth and 
Ninth were now left to hold the long 
line of the Weldon Railroad and Peters- 
burg intrenchments, while two divisions 
of the Ninth corps with two division 
and a brigade of the Fifth were consti 
tuted a column of advance undei 
Warren. On the 29th, a reconnoissance 
had been made by Gregg's cavalrv 



rr2 



PETEESBURG. 



supported by two biigades of infantry, 
towards the Poplar Spring Church 
road beyond the Vaughan turnpike. 
On leaching the Weldon Railroad 
Gregg struck off to the south of Yellow 
Tavern, but after sending the different 
origades in various directions fell back 
again. About five o'clock the enemy, 
who had followed Gregg on his return, 
attacked him with two pieces of artillery; 
and skirmishing, resulting in little loss 
to either side, continued till dark, when 
'Ti-egg retmned to his former lines. 

On the following morning the column 
under Wan-en set out from Four Mile 
Station on the Weldon Railroad, the 
headquarters of the Fifth corjjs, the 
cavalry under Gregg on the extreme left, 
while the divisions of Griffin and Ayres, 
with Hoffman's brigade of the Fifth 
corps, followed by the divisions of 
Willcox and Potter and several ltf»+tei- 
ies, moved out in the direction of Poplar 
Grove, on the South Side Railroad, 15 
miles west of Four Mile Station. The 
march was made in a northwesterly 
du-ection ; and soon after twelve o'clock, 
haviag struck the Squirrel Level road, 
Peebles' Faiin was reached, about three 
miles from the railroad and four or five 
southwest of Petersburg. Here was 
discovered a redoubt, called Fort 
McRae, in which were several small 
rifled guns, and connected with it a 
strong line of intrenchments on com- 
manding ridges. In front was an open 
space of ground swept by the guns of 
the redoubt. The task of charging 
uver this and capturing the crest was 
assigned to Grifiin's division, which 
advanced in three lines one behind 



another, and earned the works, driving 
the enemy out at every point and taking 
about 50 prisoners and one gun. The 
National loss was about 150. The 
column then re-foi-med ; and the march 
being resumed the enemy was found 
occupying a strong work on a hill half 
a mile further on. At five o'clock 
Potter's division, attempting to press 
up the acclivity on which the Confed- 
erates were posted, sustained a severe 
repulse, and being in its turn charged, 
was thrown into confusion. A flanking 
column of the enemy now appeared in 
gi-eat force, broke in between the divis 
ions of the Fifth and Ninth corps, and 
swept off more than 1500 prisoners 
chiefly from Potter's division. The 
further progress of the enemy, however, 
was checked by the rapid approacii &i 
Griffin's division. The National loss 
was over 2500, of which 1600 belonged 
to Potter's division. The Confederate 
loss did not exceed 500. 

Od the 1st of October the enemy 
made two attacks on the division Q^^ 
under Ayres, but both were easily 1 . 
repulsed. Another was made, in the 
pouring rain, by Hampton's cavalry 
division, upon Gregg, who covered the 
left flank beyond the Vaughan road. 
Hampton succeeded in driving him 
back from one line of intrenchments to 
another, but finally retired taking with 
him 100 prisoners. The National force 
continued to hold intrenchments four 
miles fi'om the South Side RaUroad, 
connecting on the right with the old 
line of works at Petersburg ; but the 
enemy retained and used the railroad. 
On the 2d, General Mott moved out 



ATTACK ON THE NATIONAL RIGHT. 



773 



towards the Boydton plank-road, over 
which supplies were now conveyed in 
wagons to Petersburg ; but the enemy 
was found strongly intrenched in 'front 
of the road, and Mott was compelled to 

f^tire, with a loss of 100 men. 

Meanwhile, there had been some 
activity on the north side of the James. 
On ihe morning of the 1st of October, 
General Terry, preceded by Kautz's 
cavalry, made a reconnoissance towards 
Richmond on the Central or Darbytown 
and Charles City roads. When within 
3 miles of the city the Confederate skir- 
mishers were encotmtered and driven in, 
and Terry continued to advance until 
he approached the main line of defenses, 
which ran across both roads ; but fur- 
ther progress was prevented by vigor- 
ous shelling on the part of the enemy. 
After reconnoitring carefully, TeiTy 
and Kautz returned at night, having 
suffered but little loss. The rain and 
mud caused a suspension of operations, 
beyond reconnoitring and intrenching. 
Nothing of importance occurred till the 
7th, when the enemy made a sudden 
and partially successful attempt to turn 
the right flank of the army of the James. 
This flank lay in a line running to the 
northeast of Battery Harrison, where 
the Eighteenth corps was firmly in- 
trenched, about 7 miles south of Rich- 
mond. To the right of the Eighteenth 
corps lay the Tenth, across the New 
Market and Central roads ; and on the 
extreme right was the cavalry of 

teneral Kautz, consisting of only two 
Brigades vmder Spear and West, with 
two batteries, each of four 3-inch rifled 
guns, resting on the Charles City road, 



at a distance of 5 miles southeast of 
Richmond. At an early hour in the 
morning a large force of the enemy 
under General Anderson, consist- qcj 
ing of two full divisions of in- 7. 
fantry and a brigade of cavalry, aj)- 
proached by the Darbytown and Charles 
City roads, and fell unexpectedly upon 
Kautz's cavalry. Taken completely b} 
surprise Kautz's troops broke into t 
perfect rout and scattered over the 
country in the rear, followed by the 
batteries, which being left without sup- 
port could not remain in safety. They 
were soon imbedded in mud, and cap 
tured with all the caissons and most ol 
the horses. Kautz lost 300 of his men 
in captured, killed and wounded. The 
Confederates having now stampeded the 
National cavalry and got possession of 
the Central road, advanced towards the 
Tenth corps, which lay in a strongly 
intrenched line, its right held by Terry 
who with the first division covered the 
New Market road, — the troops being 
disposed in rifle-pits in the thick woods. 
On the left of the line of the Tenth 
corps the ground was open ; and on this 
side was posted the artillery, consisting 
of four 6-gun batteries, so planted as 
not only to sweep the ground in front, 
but to some extent that over which the 
right must be approached by the enemy 
Of Terry's division, upon which the 
attack fell, Pond's brigade held the left, 
Abbott's the centre, and Plaisted's the 
right. Curtis' brigade of Foster's divis- 
ion was also brought up and placed in 
line with these. When the Confeder- 
ates approached, between nine and ten 
o'clock, they found themselves under a 



«*o 



774 



PETERS BITRG. 



cross fire of artillery from the National 
left. An attempt was made to reply 
by two batteries; but these were soon 
overpowered. In the meantime Field's 
infantry division dashed over the open 
Bpace at the double-quick, and in spite 
of the felled trees, succeeded in gaining 
the woods on the National right. The 
National troops in the woods remained, 
quiet tin the enemy got very close, in 
front of the centre under Abbott, when 
the four brigades above mentioned rose 
from their places of concealment and 
poured into the advancing column a 
most destructive fire — that of Abbott's 
brigade, which was pai-tially armed with 
the Spencer repeating rifle, proving very 
deadly, as the fighting took place within 
short range. The Confederates, how- 
ever, continued the struggle for some 
time. At length, after a vain though 
iesperate rush on Pond's brigade, they 
were compelled to withdraw. Terry's 
division was then put in motion to 
follow and, if possible, to flank the 
enemy, causing him to fall back to the 
Charles City road, leaving the Central 
road to the National troops. While the 
struggle was proceeding on the right of 
the army of the James, a demonstration 
was made by the enemy on the left, at 
Battery Harrison, but without result. 
The National loss during the day did 
not exceed 500. 

There was anothw breathing spell, 
which lasted for several days. The 
Nationals continued to intrench busily 
along the lines they held. The enemy's 
iron-clads near Cox's Ferry annoyed to 
some extent the picket line on the left 
flank of the Eighteenth corps with an 



enfilading fire; but comparatively few 
casualties occurred. The work on th« 
Dutch Gap Canal was prosecuted indus- 
triously, subject to an artillery fire from 
Howlett's battery, which, however, the 
National gun-boats and batteries suc- 
ceeded in temporarily silencing on the 
11th. On the 13th, General Butler put 
87 prisonei-s at labor under the enemy's 
fire at the canal, in retaliation for Con- 
federate ill-treatment of National color- 
ed soldiers at Fort Gilmer. 

On the 12th, General Terry, tempora 
rily commanding the Tenth corps, made 
a reconnoissance in force towards q^^^ 
the right, taking with him the first 12. 
division under Ames, the colored divis- 
ion under W. Birney, and a part of 
Kautz's cavalry division. The colmnn 
set out in the evening, but halted during 
the night. In the morning it moved 
again, and struck the Central road neai 
the point from which Kautz's command 
was driven on the 7tli. The cavalry 
then stretched out to the Charles City 
road, dismounted and deployed as skir- , 
mishers, thus covering the extreme right 
between that road and the Central road ; 
whUe W. Birney deployed on the left of 
the Central road, and Ames on the right 
towards the left of the cavalry. About 
seven o'clock the Confederate videttet 
were encountered on the Charles Cit] 
road, and driven back over a mile 
towards a series of intrenchments whicl- 
blocked the way. There they halted 
and as soon as the Nationals wer 
within easy range, they opened a sharp 
and merciless fire. This was quickly 
returned ; but Terry's object being to 
discover the length and strength of thie 



(JHAKLES CITY KOAD. 



77B 



new line of the enemy, he kept his 
troops as much as possible under the 
shelter of a strip of woods in front of 
the works. Continuing to push out 
brigades in reconnoitring charges, at 
various points, he soon felt the whole 
series of intrenchments ; but made no 
serious demonstrations, except on the 
enemy's extreme left, which, it was sup- 
posed, was overiapped by the National 
right, and whicii Pond's brigade was 
ordered to turn. The works at this 
point were, however, found to be re- 
fused ; and as the National troops 
rushed forward they were caught by an 
enfilading fire and suffered severely. 
This encouraged the Confederates to 
sally from their breast- works on other 
parts of the line, and charge with all 
their available force. It was not, how- 
ever, attended with much success ; and 
soon after four in the afternoon the 
National troops were withdrawn un- 
broken. Before darkness fell, they were 
back within their own intrenchments. 
The losses were unimportant. 

On the left, to the west of the Wei- 
don Railroad, a reconnoissance was 
made on the 8th, somewhat similar to 
that made by Terry and Kautz. It was 
\ general advance of the Fifth and Ninth 
corps, the object being to feel the ene- 
my's position, to push forward the lines, 
and to occupy if possible aU the series 
of works connected with Fort McRae 
which had been taken. The Fifth corjis, 
temporarily under Crawford, moved out 
on the West Halifax, Vaughan, and 
Squirrel Level roads ; and of the Ninth 
corps, temporarily under Parke, Pot- 
ter's division pushed out near the Pe- 



gram House, and Willcox's took the 
Church road, Ferrero's division being 
left in reserve. WUlcox got as far as 
the Boydton plank road, but foimd it 
strongly defended by lines of intrench 
ments. After a day spent in skirmish 
ing and hard marching, both corps re- 
turned to camp. 

In front of the Second corps at Pe 
tersburg a great deal of skirmishing 
and mortar firing occurred from time 
to tinae, especially at the redoubt where 
the picket lines were closest — a work 
which had been captured by De Trob- 
riand about a month before, and since 
named Fort Sedgwick. The soldiers 
gave it the name of " Fort Hell" On 
the 8th this firing was very severe, and 
on the 11th the enemy's cannonading 
was so vigorous and prolonged that it 
was thought a general attack on tht 
National lines was intended. 

There was comparative quiet again 
untU the 26th. In the meantime, Grant 
had been completing his plans for an 
other movement against the stubborn 
defenses of Richmond. He proposed 
to make a strong feint on the right 
by the army of the James, which was 
to move as if aiming to get round the 
left flank of the enemy, and at ite same 
time to execute a series of operations of 
a more determined character by the 
army of the Potomac, with the object 
of turning the enemy's right flank neai 
the South Side Railroad. On the even 
ing of the 26th the whole army wa 
ordered to be in readiness to mo re at 
daybreak, on the following morning. 
Up to this time the proposed movement 
had been kept, as was supposed, pr 



776 



PETERSBURG. 



foundly secret; and nothing was done 
whicli could give rise to a suspicion, on 
the part of the enemy, that an advance 
would be made for some days. On this 
evening, however, all disguise was aban- 
loned; and such arrangements were 
snade that if the contemplated move- 
ment proved successful, it would be 
possible without inconvenience perma- 
nently to leave the old camp. The sick, 
the baggage, the commissary stores, 
5amp equipage, and other property, 
were sent to City Point ; the sutlers 
also took their goods thither. Rations 
for three days were issued to the cav- 
alry, and for four days to the infantry. 
The intrenchments at Petersburg were 
to be held by the artillery, with only 
yuch infantry support as was absolutely 
Qecessary. 

The great movement of the army of 
fbe Potomac commenced on the 27th. 
Before dawn the entire anny, with the 
exception of the detachments from each 
Oct. corps left in the trenches, was on 
-7. the march — Gregg's cavalry on 
the extreme left moving towards Reams' 
Station and then in a westerly direc- 
tion ; next on the right Egan's second 
and Mott's third division of the Second 
corps, with three batteries under Major 
Hazard, moving southwesterly down the 
Vaughan road ; then Warren's Fifth 
corps on the Squirrel Level road ; and 
laflt of all, on the extreme right, the 
Xinth corps under Parke, moving as 
did all the columns in a southwesterly 

direction towards Hatcher's Run 

a small stream rising near Sutherland 
Station on the South Side Railroad, and 
Sowing in a southeasterly direction to 



Rowanty Creek, a tributary of the Not- 
taway. It was intended that the two 
divisions of the Second corps and 
Gregg's cavalry should march as se- 
cretly and as rapidly as possible by a 
wide detour around the enemy's right 
flank, and should then seize the line of 
defenses on Hatcher's Run at the point 
where the Boydton road crosses it, from 
which to the South Side Railroad it was 
supposed little opposition would be met. 
The Fifth and Ninth corps were at the 
same time to demonstrate against the 
works at Hatcher's Run, directly in 
front ; and the Fifth was to form con- 
nection with the Second corps there, 
the Ninth remaining on the right of the 
Fifth. Hancock and Gregg reached 
Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road at 
half-past seven. The road, at this point, 
was found much obstructed with felled 
trees ; and the banks of the stream, par- 
tially cleared so as to give range from a 
line of rifle-pits on the opposite bank, . 
were held by a small force of dismounted 
cavalry. Egan's division rapidly de- 
deployed; and Smyth's brigade, form, 
ing the first line, quickly forded the 
stream, carried the slight defenses, took 
about 20 prisoners, and dispersed the 
remainder of the small force. About 
noon Hancock and Gregg reached th€ 
Boydton road. The enemy was found 
fully on the alert ; and Gregg's troops 
covering the left, were opened upon 
from artillery and the carbines ol 
Young's dismounted cavalry. Grnnt 
and Meade were both on the ground it 
this time; and although it was evid nt 
that the enemy had received info? i& 
tion of the movement in time to le 



BOTUTON BOAD. 



771 



prive it of the character of a surprise, 
it was thought that an advance might 
yet be attended with success. Accord- 
ingly Egan's division was deployed on 
the right of the Boydton plank road, 
acing towards the bridge over Hatch- 
r's Run, Mott's division on the left of 
^e road, De Trobriand's brigade con- 
necting with Gregg on the extreme left ; 
while McAllister's brigade of Mott's 
division was placed in the rear to watch 
the enemy, who had a battery at some 
distance down the plank road. The 
bridge was then seized by a skirmish 
line in the advance of Egan's division 
and the stream crossed. The next thing 
to be done was to cairy the enemy's 
works beyond ; and in order to prepare 
for this, Egan's division was, about one 
o'clock, disposed with Price's brigade in 
he centre, Rugg's on the left, and 
Smyth's on the right, Beck's battery 
co-operating on the latter flank. McAl- 
lister's biigade was withdrawn from 
watching the enemy in the rear and de- 
ployed in support of Egan. The Fifth 
corjis being now heard firing rapidly on 
the right, the attack on the works was 
delayed till it should approach and co- 
operate. Owing however, to the difficult 
nature of the thickly wooded country 
in which the operations were being 
conducted, and the intricacy of the 
roads, the Fifth corps f aUed to connect ; 
and after waiting until four o'clock, 
Hancock prepared to make the assault. 
The enemy, in the mean time, having 
discovered that while the left flank 
of Hancock's force was covered by 
Gregg's cavalry, his right was entirely 
anprotected, took the offensive. Mar 



hone's strong division of Hill's corps 
burst suddenly upon Hancock's right 
and partially turned it, sweeping off at 
the same time a section of Beck's bat 
tery ; then getting across the plank 
road, it bore down upon Egan in the 
rear. Egan promptly changed front 
with his own and McAllister's brig- 
ades; and with the aid of three bat- 
teries, after a severe and prolonged 
fight, he succeeded in repulsing Ma- 
hone. Egan was now in turn able to 
attack the Confederates in flank, com- 
pelling them to abandon the guns they 
had captured, as well as three of theii 
own flags, besides taking nearly 1000 
prisoners and one gun. The loss of the 
Second corps in this affair was esti 
mated at 1000 in killed, wounded and 
prisoners. 

After this attack by Mahone had 
been repulsed, and just before dark, the 
enemy, with a force of five brigades, 
made a vigorous demonstration on the 
left against Gregg's cavalry. Gregg, at 
first, fell back; but, soon rallying, he 
drove back the enemy and re-established 
his lines. 

Rain had fallen in the afternoon, 
tending to make manoeuvres difficult* 
the ammunition was nearly exhausted 
and so far the Confederates had shown 
themselves not only vigUant but strong. 
and had inflicted a loss about as great 
as they had sustained. There was neeJ 
for great caution ; and as there wae 
reason to believe that the enemy would 
soon gather in greater force, it wat 
deemed imprudent to prosecute the 
movement by the left flank Soon after 
dusk, therefore, the retrograde march 



778 



PETERSBURG. 



was commenced by the route taken in 
the morning. It occupied the entire 
night and part of the next day. The 
old camps were regained by the Second 
corps with comparatively little loss. 
Many of the wounded, however, had 
been left on the field, the column not 
being provided with the means of trans- 
portation. 

The task of the Fifth and Ninth 
corps had been to demonstrate against 
the enemy's works at Hatcher's Run in 
front, so as to cover the movement of 
the Second corps by the left and finally 
to co-operate with it ; but this they 
had only partially succeeded in accom- 
plishing. Having only a short distance 
to march, they had indeed soon made 
^heir appearance in front of the works 
and got into position, the Ninth on the 
right, the Fifth on the left. Skirmishing 
was earned on during the greater part 
of the day by the infantry ; but the use 
of artillery was made extremely diflBcult 
in that region by the almost impenetra- 
ble woods, which rendered military mar 
noeuvres almost impossible. The enemy 
being familiar with every inch of the 
ground had in this respect greatly the 
advantage. Although the commands 
of Hancock and Warren were during a 
great part of the day not very far apart, 
a junction was rendered altogether im- 
practicable by the natural obstacles 
presented in the shape of dark, dense 
svoods and swampy ground. The ob- 
scurity of the few miserable roads was 
such that troops got into the opposing 
lines, and staff officers lost their way in 
the forest gloom. The two corps found 
the enemy's defenses in front, too strong 



to be pierced, and had to content them 
selves with maintaining their position, 
which they retained all day and through 
the night until orders arrived from 
Grant to fall back. The loss thus sus- 
tained in manoeuvring and skirmishing 
was about 500. The aggi-egate losses 
attending the entire movement by the 
left flank were not much short of 1500 
men. The enemy suffered less in killed 
and wounded, but lost many more in 
prisoners. Thus ended what is known 
as the battle of Boydton Road. 

The demonstrations made by Butler 
and his Tenth corps were comparatively 
barren of any good results. On the 
Williamsburg road he was attacked and 
defeated. On the York River Railroad 
he captured a fort which he afterwards 
abandoned. His loss was about 1500 
men. The Confederates lost about 200. 

At dusk in the evening of the 27th, 
General Miles, who had been left in the 
Petersbiirg lines with the first division 
of the Second corps, under cover of a 
terrific cannonade, sent a small storming 
party, consisting of 100 volunteers, un- 
der Captain Price, against a fort which 
was situated near the spot where the 
mine had been exploded in Jidy. This 
small party, having moved quickly, and 
as sdently as possible across the inter 
vening space, clambered over the para 
pet ; and although Price who led the 
assault was Idlled, they actually drove 
the enemy out of the worka Had the 
attack been made by a larger force it 
might have resulted disastrously for the 
enemy ; but as it was impossible for so 
small a body of men to hold an impor- 
tant fort against the overwhelming 



ATTEMPTED SURPBISEB. 



779 



force which was immediately thrown 
upon them from right and left, they 
promptly retreated, losing 10 of their 
number, but carrying off 30 prisoners, 
among whom were several officers. 

About ten o'clock on the night of 
the 30th, the Confederates having ob- 
tained information as to the strength 
and position of a portion of the Na- 
tional picket lines in front of Fort 
Davis, undertook, and successfully car- 
ried out, one of those little surprises 
which, as practised against themselves, 
they had had frequent and painful 
Oct. experience. A body of Confed- 
'^^' erates getting in the rear of the 
National pickets caUed to them to " fall 
in." These troops, being mostly raw 
recruits, and believing themselves to be 
among friends, promptly obeyed the 
call, and the entire line, consisting of 
380 men, was captured. The immedi- 
ate result of this surprise was to uncover 
the National intrenchments at the point 
of junction of the corps of Warren and 
Hancock. On this unprotected point, 
the enemy advanced. Fortunately, the 
National officers had been put on their 
guard by a sentinel who had escaped 
his captors ; and when the Confederates 
came within range they found them- 
selves under a heavy musketry fire, to 
which was soon added that of artillery. 
After about an hour's fighting, in which 
the loss did not exceed 100 on either 
side, the enemy withdrew. 

On the 4th of November there was 
harp skirmishing in the neighborhood 
>i Fort Sedgwick ; and, on the night of 
the 5th the enemy succeeded, by a sud- 
den attack, in getting poesession of a 



considerable portion of the NationaJ 
picket line in that vicinity, and immedi- 
ately began to reverse the works Not. 
and to intrench. At the same time *• 
another body of the Confederates car 
ried the picket Une opposite the crater 
The skirmishing was attended with 
little loss on either side. It was nec- 
essary, however, that the enemy should 
be promptly dislodged ; and a furious 
cannonade having been opened upon 
them from the forts and batteries to 
the right and left, the whole line 
was aroused. At daybreak, after some 
desperate fighting, the captured works 
were recovered ; and the line was re 
established from Fort Sedgwick to the 
crater. On the 6th, a similar attack 
was made by the enemy on the left, 
but was quickly repulsed. This desul 
tory %hting, with little result beyond 
its tendency to wear out both the com 
batants, had become constant, and is 
fact, almost monotonous. The men 
about this time began to build log- 
huts, the weather having become uncom 
fortably cold 

On the 1st of December a raid wa* 
undertaken by Gregg's cavalry against 
the Weldon Railroad, at Stony Creek 
Station, 18 miles south of Petersburg. 
At half-past three in the morning Dee 
Giegg broke camp and set out in * 
a southerly direction, his second brig- 
ade in the advance, the first brigade 
next, the third in the rear. The enemy's 
pickets were met before daybreak ; but 
no serious opposition was encountered 
until the column arrived at Rowanty 
Creek, where a cavalry force dis- 
puted the advaDoe, but was qaickly 



T«0 



PETERSBURG 



dispersed. The third, brigade was then 
jeft to cover the rear; and the column 
passed on to Duvall's Station, where 
the first brigade also was dropped, to 
destroy certain maniifacturing establish- 

nents and to protect the flanks. The 
^econd brigade then went on to Stony 
Ci-eek Station, two miles further on. 
There they found a well-built fort, 
which they captured and destroyed, 
spiking the guns and carrying oflE'the 
greater portion of the garrison as pris- 
oners. While this work of destruction 
was going on, a brigade of Hampton's 
cavalry came upon the scene. Gregg 
deemed it convenient to retreat. The 
Confederates followed, harassing his 
rear as far as Rowanty Creek. At that 
point the pursuit was discontinued. 
The entire loss sustained by Gregg was 
not over 40, all of whom he managed 
to cany off, together %vith 175 prisoners 
and about 100 negroes. 

A few days af tenvards another move- 
ment, on a much larger scale, was made 
against the Weldon Railroad, which it 
was of the utmost importance that the 
enemy should not be allowed to re- 
cover. On the 6th of December a 
heavy column, consisting of the Fifth 
corps, Mott's division of the Second 
corps, and Gregg's division of cavalry, 
Dec. in all about 20,000 men, with 22 

®* pieces of artillery, under General 
Warren, was massed on both sides of 
the AV^eJdon Railroad between the Hali- 
fax and Jerusalem roads. There the 
troops bivouacked for the night. Heavy 
rain extinguished the camp-fires ; but 
before daybreak the troops were on the 
inarch, the cavalry starting at four 



o'clock. The column took the Jerusalem 
road, and struck the Nottaway at the 
point where Freeman's Bridge had for 
merly been, about 18 miles south-south 
east of Petersburg. The cavalry crossed 
the river, which was about three feet 
deep, by fording ; the infantry ciossed 
by a pontoon bridge ; and the whole 
coliunn was on the south side of the 
stream before daylight on the morning 
of the 8th. The cavalry bivouacked at 
Sussex Court House ; the infantry be- 
tween that place and the river. At 
three o'clock the cavalry set off in a 
southwesterly direction towards Jar- 
rett's, a station on the raih'oad about 30 
miles south of Petersburg, the infantry 
following rapidly. About twelve o'clock 
the cavalry advance reached the point 
where the railroad crosses the Notta- 
way, seized and burned the bridge, and 
then began to tear up the track. Th 
infantry arrived soon after and com 
pleted the work of destruction by burn- 
ing the sleepers and twisting the rails. 
This work was continued for 5 miles, 
as far as Jaixett's Station, where the 
depot and water tank were destroyed. 
The following day the column, stiU 
moving southward, destroyed the track 
as fai" as Bellfield, on the Meher- 
rin, 37 miles south of Petersburg. At 
Three Creek, 3 miles north of Bellfield 
the enemy burned the bridge and iis 
puted the passage of the cavahy; bu 
Dennison's battery having opened upoi 
them, and the Tenth New York having 
forded the stream on the National left, 
and flanked the position, the Confeder 
ates fell back to Bellfield Hicksford, 
opposite Bellfield, was found protec*«d 



RETURN OF WARREN. 



781 



on both sides of the river by strong 
intrenchments, within which were some 
of Hampton's cavalry and a body of 
militia ; and when the National troops 
got within range, a hot fire was dii-ected 
on them. Several charges were made on 
the enemy's works ; but Warren finally 
drew the troops off, and most of the cav- 
alry bivouacked that night noi^th of 
Three Creek. Up to this time during the 
march a cold rain had poured down, mak- 
ing the roads almost impassable ; but 
now the increasing cold was accompanied 
with a stoi-m of hail and snow, and the 
situation of the troops became one of 
extreme discomfort. It was determined, 
therefore, not to prosecute operations 
against Hicksford, the strategic value of 
which was not sufiSciently great to 

A^ this period in the History of the War the rail- 
road had become not only a useful but a most potent 
military factor. It had been, as we have seen, of 
rignal service at Chattanooga. It had rendered poasi 
ble Sherman's movement on Atlanta, and had greatly 
facUitated his March to the Sea. Without the railroad, 
Thomas would have found it impossible not only to 
resist the fierce onsets of Hood, but even to maintain 
himself, in Tennessee ; and the advantages which it 
secured for the army in front of Petersburg and Rich- 
mond were many and invaluable. To the end of the 
war it continued to be an agent of first-class utility 
and power ; nor is it any disparagement to the rank 
and file to say that but for the railroad and the admir- 
able uses to which it was put, the war would have 
assumed a different character and been attended prob- 
ebly by a different result. The eitablishment of this 
oranch of the service was due to the active brain and 
far-reaching vision of Secretary Stanton : its suc- 
Mssfol management is to be credited to the skill, 
ljsp*r"enj»(, activity and untiring energy -of General 
D. V. McCallum. On the 11th of February, 1862, 
McCteiium was appointed military direcuir and 
superintendent of railroads, in the United States, with 
authority controllable only by the War Department ; 
and commanding officers everywhere were directed, 
on pain of dismissal from the serv-ice, not to in- 
terfere with the working of the new Department. 
The respunBibilities of the head of the Bailroad 
:£01 



\vaiTant any heavy sacrifice of life. 

On the morning of the 10th WaiTe& 
commenced his march back towards the 
National lines, the enemy follovsdng and 
attempting to hai-ass his rear. Uis 
troops got back to camp on the 12th 
much exhausted, but without having 
sustained any great loss. 

With the exception of two reconnois 
sances which were made with a view to 
direct attention from Warren, this was 
the last operation of importance in the 
year. The holiday season came on. 
The men were allowed some rest, 
numbers of them obtained furloughs. 
The festivities proper to the season were 
not overlooked; and the Christmas of 
1864 spent in the lines before Peters- 
burg will not soon be forgotten. 

Department were scarcely second to those of the 
eneral-in-chief . One of the greatest feats accom- 
plished by McCallum was when he transferred Hooker 
with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, over 23,000 
strong, with artillery, trains, baggage and animalo 
from the Rapidan in Virgiiiia, to Stevenson, Alabama, 
a distance of 1192 miles, within the brief space of 
seven days. But for the railroad, Hooker could not 
have been present at Chattanooga ; and few will deny 
that the success on Lookout Mountain contributed to 
the final victory at .Missionary Ridge. The work done 
between Chaltauooga and Atlanta la repairing 138 
miles of railroad, was scarcely less wonderful. 
In his report, Gener^ McCallum gives it as his 
opinion that but for the railroad, Slierman'i' 
campaign, in jjlace of being a success, "would ha\e 
resulted in disaster and defeat." An idea of the De- 
partment and of the magnitude of its work may be 
obtained from the following figures. At one time, 
such was the pressure brought to bear on this branch 
of the service, McC'allum had under him as many as 
24,964 men. During the war he operated in all 2106 
miles, and made use of 419 engines and 6330 cara Of 
bridges he buUt over 26 miles, and of track he laid 
or relaid 641 mUes. The expenses of the Department 
amounted to $42,462,145.55. The property when 
sold realized $12,636,965.83. General .McCallum had 
several able assistants, among whom were General 
Anderson, General Devereui and Col. \V. VV. Wrifcht 



t8» 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 



rhc Valley of the Shenandoah — Memoiy of Jackson — Banks and McDowell — Fremont and Shields — The Co- 
operative Movement — Sigel and Hanter — Ljiichburg — Meadow Bridge — Burbridge^Pound Gap — Th« 
ESect of Morgan's Retreat — Washington Exposed — The Shenandoah Valley Unguarded — Early's Invasion 
— Sigel's Betreat — A Panic — Lincoln calls for Militia — General Lewis Wallace at Baltimore — He hastens 
to the Monocacy — At Frederick — Wallace joined by Ricketts — Preparations to relieve Washington — 
Wright and Emory — Battle of the Monocacy — A Fierce and Protracted Struggle — The Stone Bridge — 
Ricketts Outflanked — The Confederate Force — Wallace orders a Betreat — Wallace by his heroic resisunce 
saves the Capital — Great Excitement in Baltimore and Washington — Approach of Early towards Wash- 
ington — Near Forts Stevens and De Russey — Augur's Beconnoisance^Early's Retreat — Wright in Pursuit 
— Snicker's Ferry — Island Ford — Kemstown — Banker Hill Road — Death of Colonel Mulligan — McCans- 
land at Chambersburg — Burning of Chambersbnrg — McCaasland's Retreat — Pursued by Averill — Panic in 
Maryland and Pennsylvania — Consolidation — The Middle Military Division — Hunter Believed — Sheridan 
in Command— Force and Composition of Sheridan's and Early's Armies — Advance of Sheridan up the 
Shenandoah Valley to Cedar Creek — Mosby attacks Sheridan's Wagon Train — Retreat of Sheridan from 
Cedar Creek — Destruction of Stock, Grain, etc. — Penrose's Brigade — Massacre near Snicker's Gap — Panic 
in Maryland — Sheridan at Bolivar Heights — Sheridan at Berryville — Offensive Movements resumed — 
Battle of Winchester — Advance to Cedar Creek — Battle of Fisher's Hill — Advance to Staunton — Early at 
Browns Gap — Murder of Lieutenant Meigs — Betreat of Sheridan towards Cedar Creek — Devastation of the 
Shenandoah Valley — Rosser's Cavalry Stampeded — Position of the Army at Cedar Creek — Early's Noctur- 
nal Flank Movement — A Daring and Successful Attack — A complete Surprise — Wright compelled to Retreat 
—At Middletown — Wright again Driven Back — Order Restored — Sheridan stUl Absent — Sheridan's Ridt 
from Winchester — The Tide of Battle Turned— A complete Victory — End of the Battle at CedAr Creek- 
Honors to Sheridan. 



1864. 



On more than one occasion already, 
it has been our duty to linger 
with the reader in the valley of 
the Shenandoah. Almost from the 
commencement of the war, the tide of 
battle surged in . or around this now 
famous valley. It was already memora- 
ble as the scene of Jackson's first great 
campaign — the scene of the humiliation, 
if not defeat, of Banks and McDowell, 
of Fremont and Shields. In connection 
with the investment of Petersburg and 
the approach to Richmond, it has again 
Decome the scene of important opera- 
tions. In a previous chapter, and in 
their proper place, some of these opera- 
tions have been described in detail 



At the commencement of the Wilder- 
ness campaign. General Grant entrusted 
certj»ln co-operative movements which 
were to be conducted in the Shenan- 
doah and Kanawha Valleys, to the care 
of General Sigel. It will be remem- 
bered that Sigel was singularly unfor- 
tunate in a series of encounters which 
he had with Breckenridge ; and about 
the middle of May he was superseded 
by General Hunter. Hunter, it will 
also be remembered, although he won 
a battle and inflicted heavy loss on the 
enemy, found it necessary to fall back 
from Lynchburg, which he was inveat- 
rng; and, much to the annoyance and 
disappointment of General Grant, he 



£;AKLY'S INVASION. 



788 



oaade an unfortunate, even disastrous 
retreat by way of Meadow Bridge to- 
wards the Kanawha. 

It had been arranged that General 
Burbridge, who was commanding in 
Kentucky, should co-operate with Hun- 
ter in the movement against Lynch- 
burg. While Hunter, with the com- 
bined forces of Crook and Averill, was 
to move direct on Lynchburg, Bur- 
bridge was to enter Virginia on the 
extreme southwest, with the view of 
engaging the attention of the enemy, 
and preventing any movement on 
Hunter's rear. It was not doubted at 
the time that this two-fold movement 
would be attended with complete suc- 
cess ; for, as General Breckenridge, 
with his command, had been with- 
drawn to the assistance of General Lee, 
there was no Confederate force of any 
miportance to the immediate west of 
the Blue Ridge. We have already 
seen that Hunter failed in carrying out 
his part of the programme. It remains 
to be seen that Burbridge, in all that 
regarded the general plan, was equally 
unsuccessful. The object of Burbridge's 
movement was discovered by the Con- 
federates ; and as they could not hope 
to defeat it by a direct attack in front, 
they resolved to thwart it by detaining 
the general and his command in Ken- 
tucky. With this end in view, the 
ever-vigilant and the ever-ready Morgan 
made a dash into that State. Dividing 
his troops, he sent them out in different 
iirections. Encountering almost no 
»pt)08ition, they moved through Pound 
Gap, and struck successively PaintvUle, 
Hazel Green, Owingsville, Flemmgs- 



biirg, Maysville, and other places, seiz 
ing property, breaking up railroads, 
burning bridges, and capturing a body 
of National troops under General Hob- 
son, some 1600 strong. On the 12th 
of June, in the vicinity of Cynthiana, 
Burbridge, who had i etumed from jnn^ 
south-western Vi/jjiiia and also 12. 
had been wo''Vli)g his way back with 
great rapidity, fell upon Morgan with 
his whole force, routing him utterly, 
with a loss of 300 killed and wounded 
and as many prisoners. Of Hobson's 
command 1000 horaes and 100 men 
were recaptxired. Burbridge's lo8«} was 
150. Morgan's men, utterly demoral 
alized and flinging down their isrms, 
fled in all directions ; but they had, 
nevertheless, accomplished their pur 
pose. They had brought Burbridge 
back to Kentucky, where -his wearied 
troops remained until they were re 
quired by Sherman. 

The faUiire of this conjoint move- 
ment, coupled as it was with the retreat 
of Himter across the mountains, left 
Washington exposed and the Shenan 
doah Valley practically unguarded. 
Lee, quick to seize his opportunity 
resolved to make a demonstration in 
the direction of Harper's Ferry. His 
object seems to have been three-fold — 
to induce Grant to withdraw some of 
the troops from before Petersburg, 
to procure supplies, and to make 
an attempt on the National Capital 
Early, who, during the disability of 
Ewell, was in command of the upper 
part of the valley, having been rein, 
forced by a body of Breckenridge'a 
troops, was quickly in motion at the 



7R4 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



Lead of soDie 20,000 or 25,000 men, 
lu spite of the hot weather, he marched 
at the rate of about 20 miles a day. 

As soon as Grant became aware of 
this new movement of the enemy, he 
ordered Hunter, who was then on the 
Kanawha in Western Virginia, to trans- 
port his troops, with all possible haste, 
Dy river and rail, to Harper's Ferry. 
Insuperable obstacles, however, lay in 
Hunter's way. The river was low, and 
the railroad was broken in several 
places. As Hunter was not able to be 
foi-ward in time, other arrangements 
had to be made to meet the emergency. 
The Sixth corps was taken from its 
lines in front of Petersburg, and sent 
to cover Washington. The Nineteenth 
coi-ps, under General W. H. Emory, 
which had just arrived in Hampton 
Roads from the Gulf Department, was, 
without being allowed to disembark, 
pushed after the Sixth. 

Meanwhile, Early was advancing. 
On the 3d of July he was at Martins- 
burg, where Sigel was in command. 
July Sigel, unable to offer any effec- 
3. tive resistance, retired across the 
river, and took possession of Maryland 
Heights, leaving to the enemy the roll- 
ing stock, heavy trains laden -nath sup- 
plies for General Hunter, and other 
valuable stores. A panic seized the 
entire surrounding country. It recalled 
the memory of the two former inva- 
sions, that which preceded Antietam 
and that which preceded Gettysburg. 
Preparations were everywhere made to 
'eave the menaced region. At Fred- 
erick, on the 5th, the railroad trains 
were loaded with government stores ; 



and arrangements were made for the 
evacuation of the city. On the same day 
Hageratovra was occupied by the cav 
aby of the enemy ; the stores were jqj, 
plundered, and a requisition was 6. 
made on the inhabitants for $20,000. 
The money was paid, and the raideiB 
left. President Lincoln, yielding to the 
excitement, and realizing the presence 
of danger, at the same time issued 
a call for militia — 12,000 fi'om New 
York, 12,000 from Pennsylvania, and 
6000 from Massachusetts. The caL 
was promptly responded to by each of 
the different States. 

General Lewis Wallace was at that 
time in command of the Middle De 
partment, having his head-quarters at 
Baltimore. WaDace had heard some 
vague rumore regarding the disasters 
which had befallen Sigel. More posi- 
tive information soon reached him ; and 
he became aware that the enemy having 
crossed the Potomac was alreading in 
Couch's Department. Convinced that 
a movement was intended against Balti- 
more and Washington, Wallace vrith 
all haste possible, adopted measures for 
checking the progress of the invadei-s. 
On the 5th of July, with the few ava'l- 
able troops at his command, he took a 
strong position on the Monocacy River. 
There he concentrated his forces ; and 
the groimd chosen was such as enabled 
him to cover the Baltimore and Ohio 
crossing, and the principal roads leading 
to the cities now supposed to be in 
danger. On the 6th all the men, who 
could be spared from watching the 
railroads, were gathered together at the 
appointed rendezvous. There was sora* 



THE MONOCAOY. 



rss 



skirmiflhiiig on the 7th with varying 
success. On the «vening of that day, 
however, the Confederates who had 
assembled in some force in front of 
Frederick were charged by Colonel 
Charles Gilpin at the head of his regi- 
ment, and driven back to the woods. 
The situation was now becoming serious 
not only for Wallace but for Baltimore 
and Washington. Happily, however, 
relief was at hand. Ricketts' division, 
the advance of the Sixth coi-ps, reached 
Washington late on the night of the 
6th of July. Ricketts with his division 
was sent to Baltimore the same night, 
with orders to push on towards the 
Monocacy as quickly as possible. On 
the 8th Wallace was joined by Rick- 
etts, and made aware that Wright with 
the remainder of the corps, and Emory 
with the Nineteenth corps, were on 
their way to Washington. Becoming 
more and more satisfied that the Con- 
federates were bent on marching to the 
Capital, he withdrew what troops he 
had sent for the defense of Frederick to 
his chosen position on the Monocacy. 
There on the morning of the 9th he 
made dispositions for battle. His right 
July ^^'^ under E. B. Tyler, and cov. 
9. ered the railroad at the Baltimore 
pike. His left was under Ricketts and 
held the Washington pike. On the 
left wing the main attack was exjiected. 
Each wing had 3 guns — Colonel Brown, 
with his o\vn command and a body of 
mounted infantry guarded a stone bridge 
on Tyler's extreme right ; and the lower 
foi-ds were protected by a body of cav- 
alry under Clendennin. Near the rail- 
road at a block-house, was a rude earth- 



work, mounted with a 24-pouader 
howitzer. Of Ricketts' division, three 
regiments were yet behind. It was 
expected, however, that they would 
arrive by rail at one o'clock. Wallace's 
entire force was about 8000. Early 
was already in his front with 16 
Napoleon guns, a strong body of cav- 
alry, and some 16,000 infantry. 

It was near nine o'clock when }'Iarly 
opened the fight. The attach was 
made with tremendous fmy. The 
shock was felt almost instantan ously 
on both wings of the National »rmy. 
Brown soon found it difficult t< main- 
tain his position on the Nationa' right. 
At the same time, a bold anc , as it 
proved, successful movement v as exe- 
cuted against the National !» ft. A 
large body of Confederates having 
moved by their own light, si cceeded 
in crossing the Monocacy out - f range 
of Ricketts' guns. Ricketts, finding 
himself outflanked, wheeled ar. and so 
as to face the foe; but in his n' v posi- 
tion he found himseK exposed to an 
overwhelming force in his fi'ont, as well 
as to an enfilading fij-e ttom i'arly's 
guns across the stream. The buttle 
lasted for many weary hours, the Na- 
tionals offering a stout and stubtH'i-n 
resistance to the repeated onsets of 
vastly superior numbers. Tyler wLUe 
holding his own position, sent all the 
assis^^^ance he could to Ricketts. It 
w:as confidently expected that Ricketts' 
thi-ee regiments would be fonvard by 
one o'clock. It was now, however, far 
in the afternoon ; and as yet thei-e were 
no signs of coming relief. Towai-d' 
four o'clock, Wallace, despairing of as 



786 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



distance and seeing the Confederates 
issuing from the woods in two strong 
columns to deliver a crushing and per- 
haps final blow, ordered Ricketts to 
retreat by the Baltimore road. Brown 
still held the stone bridge. Fighting 
desperately he continued to hold it 
until Ricketts' column was safe. At 
five o'clock Brown was compelled to give 
way. He fell back by the Baltimore 
pike. Tyler, with his remaining force, 
had no choice but follow. It was only 
by the narrowest chance that he and 
his staff, cut off from the rest of the 
troops, contrived to make good their 
escape. At New Market, the fugitives 
were joined by the three absent regi- 
ments of Ricketts' division; and the 
retreat towards Ellicott's Mills was 
covered. The wearied troops bi- 
vouacked some 12 miles from the field 
of strife. The battle of the Monocacy 
was a defeat to the small body of Na- 
tional troops engaged ; but it was a 
gain to the National cause. Wallace 
had lost nearly 2000 men, of whom 
over 1200 were missing; but he had 
given Wright ind Emory time to reach 
Washington. He had, in truth, saved 
the Capital. It was not denied that 
Early, if he had advanced immediately 
after the battle, might have captured 
Washington. His troops, however, had 
been severely tried ; and they needed 
rest. He halted for a day. That 
pause made the Capital secure. Wright 
and Emory were forward in force ; and 
the former at Grant's urgent request 
was placed in command of all the troops 
which could be made available for the 
defense of Washinjgfton. 



For some days the wildest excitement 
prevailed ; and it was feared that both 
Baltimore and Washington were in 
danger. Johnson, with his cavalry 
moved towards Baltimore; but finding 
all the approaches to the city so well 
guarded that success was not to be 
expected from any attack which he 
could hope to make, he contented mm 
self with a general destmction of the 
railroads. He burned the bridges and 
tore up the tracks ; and in the work of 
vandalism he was exceeded by his lieu- 
tenant the notorious Gilmore, who 
stopped the trains, plundered the pas- 
sengers and the mails, and burned the 
cars. Early moved on Washington, 
advancing with great caution. On the 
12tb he was within 4 miles of the j^iy 
city, on the north side, and in 12. 
front of Forts Stevens and de Russey 
His skinnishers and shai-pshooters be- 
gan to be a source of some annoyance ; 
and with the view of developing his 
strength General Augur sent out from 
Fort Stevens a brigade of veterans. 
These had not advanced far before they 
felt the foe in very considerable force. 
A severe struggle ensued, each party 
losing about 300 men. Made aware 
of the concentration of troops in Wash- 
ington, and deeming success impossible, 
if not trembling for his own safety, 
Early now beat a hasty retreat. On 
the night of the 12 th he crossed the 
Potomac at Edward's Ferry, carrying 
with him a large amount of booty, in 
eluding some 2000 head of cattle and 
some 5000 horses. 

On the 13th Wiight commenced the 
pursuit, taking with him the two divi 



AVERILL DEFEATS EARLY. 



787 



sions of the Sixth corps, and the Nine- 
teenth corps under Emory. Moving 
northwestward from Washington to 
Poolesville, he crossed the Potomac just 
below Edward's Ferry, and marched to 
Leesburg, where he was joined by 
Ricketts. On the l7th Duffie's cavalry, 
of Crook's command, had overtaken 
and captured a portion of the enemy's 
train at Snicker's Gap, near the She- 
nandoah, and Crook himself coming up 
soon afterwards, the Confederates were 
driven through the gap after a sharp 
fight. They held the ferry, however, 
on the west side of the river, where 
they planted two guns and put a stop 
to the pursuit for a while. On the 18th 
the whole of Wright's and Crook's 
forces had passed through Snicker's 
Grap, except Duffie's cavalry, sent north- 
ward to Ashby's Gap to guard against 
an attempt of the enemy to flank the 
National right. Shortly after mid-day 
the infantry crossed at Island Ford, 
two and a haK miles below Snicker's 
Ferry, the Thirty-Foiirth Massachusetts 
in the advance and driving the enemy. 
Crook's force also was soon over the 
river; and line of battle was formed, 
Colonel WeUswith the Thirty-Fourth 
Massachusetts being on the left and 
Colonel Thorbum's brigade on the 
right. A sharp engagement ensued. 
The Sixth corps also had commenced 
crossing, when the enemy, under Breck- 
eoridge, finding the rear attacked, re- 
turned quickly, and charged and drove 
back Colonel Thorbum's brigade, com- 
pelling it to recross the river. Colonel 
Wells then withdrew his force in good 
■Mxler; and the enemy retained posses- 



sion of the west bank. Duffie had nu 
better fortime at Ashby's Gap. He 
had driven Imboden through the gap 
and across the river; but the enemy 
having returned in force, he was him 
self compelled to retreat. A loss of 
about 500 was sustained in these two 
fights ; and some of the wounded were 
left in the hands of the enemy, who was 
then allowed to pursue his way leisurely 
towards Winchester and Strasburg 
The column under Wright crossed the 
river. It soon, however, returned and 
marched back to Leesburg, where it 
was divided. Crook with his portion of 
the force going to Harper's Ferry, and 
Wright with the Sixth corps to Wash- 
ington. 

On the 19th, Averill, moving up the 
Shenandoah Valley from Martinsburg, 
encountered and drove back a body of 
cavalry at Darksville. Next morning 
he continued his march in the same 
direction. As he approached Win- 
chester, General Early came out of his 
old intrenchments to meet him. The 
battle which ensued lasted three hours, 
when the Confederates, after losing 
about 400 men in killed and wounded, 
retired to their intrenchments, leaving 
Averill master of the field, with 4 can- 
non, several hundred small arms, and 
about 200 prisoners. Averill's loss was 
about 250. 

Soon afterwards General Averill wae 
rejoined by General Crook with his in 
fantry, just returned from the unfor 
tunate affair at Island Ford. Tiie force 
under Crook was now about 10,00( 
men, consisting of Averill's and Duffie's 
cavalry and two divisions of infantry 



fSS 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



On the 23d, after some sTrirmishing at 
Kemstown, foui miles south of Win- 
cliester, the National cavalry was forced 
back, by the enemy, on the main body ; 
and on the following day they were 

Iriven through Winchester in confu- 
sion towards Bunker Hill, thus com- 
pletely uncovering the flanks of the 
infantry. General Crook had drawn 
up his force in line of battle ; but when 
his cavalry broke he was compelled to 
beat a retreat. The Confederates, 
who had received reinforcements, and 
nho were in much superior force, were 
able completely to outflank Crook's 
.ine. The retreat continued on the 
Bunker Hill road till night. The Na- 
tional loss was under 1200, including 
pnsonera. Among the killed was Col- 
onel Mulligan, whose brigade covered 

he retreat. 

On the 25th, Crook halted at Mar- 
tinsburg, to gain time for getting off 
his trains ; but after a shai-p artillery 
engagement he again fell back, and on 
the following day crossed the Potomac 
into Maryland, leaving the Confeder- 
ates in possession of the west bank of 
the river from WUliamsport to Shep- 
herdstown. Another panic seized the 
people of Maryland and Southern 
Pennsylvania. On the 28th, General 
Kelley crossed the Potomac and ro- 
occupied Martinsburg, which the Con- 
federates had already evacuated. On 
the morning of the 30th a force of 200 
or 300 cavalry, under McCausland, 
crossed the Potomac and marched to- 
wards Chambersbiu'g. McCausland, on 
his arrival, offered to spare the place 
for the sum of $600,000 ; but as this I 



was not forthcoming, he set fire to the 
town ; and two-thirds of it were laid 
in ashes. McCausland withdi'ew about 
eleven o'clock ; and immediately after 
wards Averill, who, with his cavalry, 
had just arrived at Chambersburg, set 
out in pursuit. Averill followed Mc- 
Causland as far as Hancock, at which 
place the raiders, who were well 
mounted, succeeded in crossing the Po- 
tomac. 

At the beginning of August, great 
excitement was produced in the border 
regions of Maryland and Pennsylvania 
by the reported reappearance of the 
Confederate raiders. Mosby had crossed 
the Potomac at Cheat's FeiTy, with a 
small body of cavalry ; but he quickly 
retired, carrying with him considerable 
plxmder. Early, it was rumored, had 
entered Pennsylvania, at the head o 
40,000 men ; but General Wright, with 
the Sixth and a portion of the Nine- 
teenth corps, scoured the country and 
failed to find him or any trace of his 
presence. Pennsylvania, however, was 
now thoroughly aroused. It was known 
that the Confederate general, Johnson, 
was raiding and working Jesti-uction 
in Maryland. On the 7th of August, 
Averill fell upon this force on ^ng, 
the Romney road, as they were 7. 
retiring towards Moorefield, and routed 
them, cjipturing all their artilleiy, with 
many wagons and small-aims, and 500 
prisoners. 

These successive raids had convinced 
General Grant that a powerful force, 
under a competent leader, was now 
needed in the valley of the Shenan 
doah. Without delay he consolidated 



BERRYVILLE. 



789 



the WasMngton, Middle, Susquehanna, 
and Southwest Virginia Departments 
into what he called the Middle Military 
Division, and placed it under the com- 
mand of General Hunter. Grant visited 
Hunter, who was concentrated on the 
Monocacy, and gave him his instruc- 
tions. These raids must be ended ; 
and to prevent their repetition every- 
thing which can not be consumed 
must be destroyed- Hunter expressed 
a willingness to be reKeved ; and on 
the 7th of August, the command was 
given to .Sheridan, who promptly en- 
tertui upon his duties. 

The force under the command of 
Sheridan consisted of the Sixth corps 
under Wright, and the Nineteenth under 
Emory, the old army of Western Vir- 
ginia, comprising the Eighth corps, un- 
der Crook; the entire first division of 
Potomac cavalry ; Averill's division ; 
Lowell's brigade, which had been usu- 
ally kept near Washington, and Kel- 
ley's command ; to which was soon after- 
wards added Wilson's second division 
— in all about 40,000 men, of which 
10,000 were cavalry, with about twenty 
6-gim batteries. The force under Early, 
including the two infantry corps of 
Rodes and Breckenridge, consisted of 
about 30,000 men, of which 10,000 
were cavalry, with fourteen 6-gun bat- 
teries, and at this time was at Winches- 
ter, 27 miles west-southwest of Harper's 
Ferry. 

At sunrise on the rooming of the 
10th of August, Sheridan began the 
movement of his forces from Halltown, 
about 4 miles west of Harper's Ferry. 
Marching at first westward, he reached 



Charlestown in two hours, from which 
point the Nineteenth corps, preceded 
by the cavalry brigades of Custer ^^g, 
and Gibbs, struck off to the left ^0. 
for Berryville, 15 miles southwest. 
Further to the left marched the com- 
mand of Crook, while on the right the 
Sixth corps, preceded by the brigades 
of Devin and Lowell, moved along the 
Winchester road, turning off a few 
miles towards Berryville to join the 
Nineteenth. The weather during the 
march was oppressively hot; and the 
roads, in rainy seasons almost impassa- 
ble from deep mud, were now covered 
with a thick layer of dust, which the 
rapid tread of many thousand feet, with 
horses, artillery and wagon trains raised 
in stifling clouds. About noon the 
several cavalry brigades of Custer, De- 
vin, Gibbs, and Lowell formed a junc- 
tion at Berryville. Four miles west of 
this place, on the road to Winchester, 
a body of the enemy's skirmishers was 
found and driven off. The infantry 
bivouacked in the neighborhood of 
Berryville, on the different roads by 
which they had approached, the Sixth 
corps on the right, the Nineteenth in 
the centra, the Eighth on the left. 
The cavalry, posted in the advance, 
held the roads leading to Winchester 
and Millwood, the latter place being 
occupied by Colonel Cesnola's regi- 
ment. On the 11th the army took the 
road leading to Winchester, the cavalry 
in the advance. Custer's brigade, on 
Arriving at Sulphur Springs Bridge, 
about 4 miles east of Winchester, en 
countered a body of the enemy. A 
sharji skirmish took place, lasting two 



790 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



hours, Cnster being flanked and driven 
back. Meanwhile Devin's brigade, fol- 
lowed by Gibbs', had moved towards 
White Post, aiming to arrive by a cir- 
cuitous route at Newtown, with the 
design of flanking the enemy, who, it 
was now ascertained, had begun to 
withdraw southward, along the road 
leading to Strasburg. This object, 
however, was not attained. The ad- 
vance under Cesnola encountered the 
enemy's skirmishers near White Post, 
and drove them back on the road lead- 
ing to Newtown. On arriving at the 
road leading south to Front Royal, a 
brigade of Confederate infantry was 
discovered, with three field pieces, in a 
very strong position. The advance 
waited till the remainder of Devin's 
brigade arrived, wbfn a severe fight 
ensued, lasting from eleven o'clock till 
twelve, but without any decisive result. 
At four o'clock Crook came up with 
his infantry and relieved Devin. The 
latter then marched on to the assistance 
of Gibbs, who had got nearly to New- 
town and engaged the enemy, and was 
aow falling back. Devin arrived just 
in time to check the Confederates, who 
then retreated to the woods, unpur- 
sued, the National troops also retiring 
about a mile and bivouacking with a 
strong picket guard in front. The Con- 
federates by hard fighting succeeded in 
olding Newtown, and in covering their 
trains, which passed down safely towards 
Strasburg. The total National loss 
was about 300, chiefly in cavalry. The 
iafantry, although not much engaged, 
suffered severely in marching, and lost 
uiany men from sunstroke. 



On the morning of the 12th, it hav- 
ing been ascertained that the enemy 
had retreated, Sheridan's army ^ng^ 
moved forward again. The cav- 12. 
aby advanced, skirmishing most of the 
way, to Cedar Creek. About noon 
they found a force of the enemy on a 
hill in front of Strasburg. The Con- 
federates shelled and drove back the 
cavalry skirmishers, till they were re- 
lieved by the Eighth corps, which had 
now arrived. The remainder of the 
army in passing through Newtown and 
Middletown met with no opposition, 
and on arriving at Cedar Creek bivou- 
acked on the east bank, on the west 
side of which the enemy held a position 
in some old breast-works. There was 
active skirmishing during the remainder 
of the day, and in the evening some 
shelling across the creek, but no gen- 
eral engagement On the following 
day, the enemy having fallen back in 
the night, the National skirmishers got 
into Strasburg, but were compelled to 
retire again. On the evening of the 
14th the heights in front of the town 
were captured ; and on the following 
morning the small force of the enemy 
which had held Strasburg for two days 
withdrew. The works on Fisher's HUl, 
however, still commanded the place. 

News, however, had now arrived 
which caused Sheridan with his whole 
army to conmience a rapid retreat to- 
wards Harper's Ferry. On the 13th, 
while the National army was lying in 
front of Strasburg, Mosby with a few 
light troops dashed through Snicker'R 
Gap, crossed the Shenandoah, and fell 
suddenly on the rear of Sheridan's 



CKOOKED RUN. 



791 



supply train near Benyville on its way 
to Winchester, about 4 miles from the 
gap. The guard, consisting of Kenly's 
brigade of himdred days' men, became 
panic-stricken when Mosby made his 
charge. A few brave men fought well 
or a while, but the rest made ofi as 
ra})idly as possible. Mosby captured 
and destroyed 75 wagons, chiefly laden 
with cavalry baggage, besides securing 
200 prisoners, 600 horses and mules, 
and 200 head of cattle. He then re- 
tired, having lost only two men killed 
and 3 wounded. The National loss 
was not much greater. But this dis- 
aster in the rear, though not fatal in 
itself, caused it to be reported that 
Longstreet with his entire corps was 
getting into a position across Sheridan's 
Lhti of communications, and was cutting 
ofl his whole army. The consequence 
^as that on the 15th Sheridan got his 
ine. ^ corps and the various cavalry 
16. brigades in readiness to retreat. 
The movement commenced about 
eleven at night, the Nineteenth corps 
taking the lead towards Winchester, 
followed the next day by Crook's com- 
mand, the Sixth corps bringing up the 
rear To prevent flanking operations 
on the paii; of the enemy from the 
gaps in the Blue Ridge, and to cover 
the retreat in that direction, Devin's 
cavalry brigade had been sent a few 
miles to the southeast towards Front 
RoyaL In the meantime a body of the 
enemy, forming a part of Kershaw's 
division, which had taken part in the 
recent actions near Malvern Hill s, had 
come by railroad to Mitchell Station, 
and marched thence to Front Royal ; 



and on the morning of the 16th Cus- 
ter's brigade, followed not long after 
wards by that under Gibbs, was sent 
to the 8upjx)rt of Devin. Custer 
arrived soon after noon and took posi- 
tion on the left of Devin. The line 
had not been long formed, however, 
before the enemy suddenly appeared 
marching in two columns, one of infan 
try, the other of cavalry, along the 
road leading northward from Front 
Royal to the Shenandoah. A brisk 
artUlery fight then took place, the Con 
federates using 8 pieces, thoixgh with 
out much effect. Their cavaliy having 
crossed by the bridge and their infantry 
by the ford, they advanced to carry 
the National batteries, but were re- 
pulsed on the right by a charge from 
two regiments of Devin's brigade, each 
of which captured a flag. The Confed 
erates were thus again driven over the 
river. Meanwhile, having secured a 
good position for their artUlery, they 
attempted to turn the National left. At 
this time a brigade of Kershaw's divi- 
sion crossed the river, when a series of 
charges and counter-charges took place 
with the brigade of Custer. The fight- 
ing continued till after dark ; and when 
the Confederates fell- back to recross 
the river 150 of them were made pris- 
oners at the ford. The killed and 
wounded did not exceed 100 on either 
side. This affair took place near 
Crooked Run, a small tributary of the 
Shenandoah, a little below the conflu 
ence of the north and south forks 
Early the next morning Custers and 
Devin's brigades fell back on the road 
I leading northward to Winchester to 



7dS 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



follow the infantry column, carrying 
out as they went orders which had 
been given for the capture or destruc- 
tion of all the stock, grain, hay, 
and everything else which could con- 

ribute to the sustenance of man or 
oeast. Fields and gardens were rav- 
aged and swept clean. 

The enemy followed closely upon the 
heels of Sheridan. The Sixth corps, 
which brought up the rear of the in- 
fantry column, had left Winchester on 
the morning of the 17th, Colonel Pen- 
rose's brigade, consisting of only about 
500 men, having been left behind as a 
lupport to Torbert's cavalry. About 
Lng. ^^** o'clock the advance of the 

17. enemy, approaching by the New- 
town and Winchester turnpike, attacked 
Penrose, who had deployed his small 
brigade in skirmishing order, with the 
savalry on his flank, about a mile out 
of the town on the road leading to 
Kemstown. The cavalry, however, 
gave way, leaving Penrose to make the 
best fight he could behind fences, trees, 
and walls. Just before dark, the 
enemy having received large acces- 
sions of numbers, was able to flank 
Penrose's little force; and it was soon 
broken, losing 300 prisoners, the re- 
fTAinder, with Penrose and a few officers, 
making their way through Winchester, 
escaped towai-ds Clifton and Martins- 
burg. That night the enemy occupied 
Winchester. The National cavalry 
oivouacked at Berryville, next day 
lAking up the line of retreat towards 
Harper's Ferry, being much harassed 
on their flanks and rear by the Confed- 
erate cavalry. 



On the 18th, some men in citizens 
dress, killed a corporal and two laen 
belonging to an advanced post of the 
Fifth Michigan Cavalry, picketing at 
Snicker's Gap, and hastily made off. 
Several other similar occurrences took 
place ; and on the 19th, General Custer 
ordered some houses of disloyal citizens 
to be destroyed in retaliation. WhUe 
a squad of men from the Fifth Michi- 
gan were engaged in carrying out this 
order, they were set upon by Mosby's 
men and compelled to fly in confusion: 
18 of them were overtaken ; and of 
these 15 were killed. This affaif which 
took place near Snicker's Gap turnpike, 
was followed by another retaliatory 
order for the destruction of more houses 
of disloyal citizens. 

During the retreat of Sheridan's 
army, Averill, who commanded at Mar- 
tinsburg, continued to hold the place; 
but the alarm had become so great 
on the 18th, that he abandoned it with 
his main force, leaving only one com- 
pany, which was driven out on the fol- 
lowing day. Another panic then aiose 
in that neighborhood and spread into 
Maryland. In Hagerstown, merchants 
packed their goods and sent them north- 
ward ; the quartermasters' stores were 
loaded on railroad trains in readiness 
to be rapidly transported to Frederick 
the sick and wounded were sent to 
Harrisburg. In the mean while Averill 
took possession of the fords of the 
Potomac from Shepherdstown to WU- 
liamsport. Once more prepai'ationa 
were made to resist an attempt on the 
part of the enemy to ci'oss over to Mary- 
land ; and on the 19th Sheridan's wagon 



BOLIVAR HEIGHTS. 



tn 



train was reported to be " safe " back 
at Hagerstown. The panic soon died 
out; and the enemy, a few of whose 
advanced cavalry had actually got near 
the Potomac, began to retire. On the 
20th some of the National cavalry again 
entered Martiosburg. 

On the 2l8t, Sheridan had disposed 
his aiTuy advantageously about two 
miles out from Charlestovni towards 
Summit Point. It extended in a line 
from the Smithsfield to the Berryville 
road, the Sixth corps on the right, the 
Eighth in the centre, and the Nine- 
iug. teenth on the left. About eight in 
21. the morning Early came up, and 
with a part of his force attacked the 
advanced cavalry skirmishers on the 
right and left, easily driving them in. 
The main body of his army moved off 
across the National right ; but with a 
small force he drove back Wilson's 
ili vision of cavalry from a good position 
on Summit Point with severe loss. He 
then threw a few brigades against the 
Sixth corps and the right of the Eighth ; 
and fighting ensued, which lasted from 
ten o'clock till the close of the day, in 
the course of which the Sixth corps 
steadily advanced till it came upon the 
enemy's line of battle ; but it sustained 
heavy losses in the continuous heavy 
skirmishing, and retired to its original 
position at dark Cannonading was 
kept up for some time ; but the resiilt 
of the battle was, that Sheridan's army 
again fell back and took a position on 
Bolivar Heights, his right resting on 
the Potomac, his left on the Shenan- 
doah, his headquarters at Halltown. 
The position of the army here was ex- 



ceedingly strong, far outnumbering the 
enemy ; and reinforcements with sup- 
plies were being sent to it daily. In the 
mean time the enemy's cavalry ranged 
the country in all directions at will 
On the 24th, a reconnoitring force of 3 
brigades sent out towards Charlestown 
discovered that Early was there in force, 
with his pickets out towards Bunker 
Hill. On the 25th, Torbert's cavalry 
was sent to reconnoitie in full force in 
the direction of Leetown, Wilson's 
division moving out from Halltown 
and uniting with Merritt's at Kearneys- 
ville, from which point the enemy's 
skirmishers retired. The National 
troops had the advantage for a little 
while ; but the face of affairs soon 
changed, and the Confederates drove 
back the divisions of WUson and Mei 
ritt, which were very badly handled, 
and compelled to abandon Keameys- 
ville, and make the best of their way 
towards Harper's Ferry. A running 
fight ensued, lasting from eleven in the 
forenoon till dark, by which time Mer- 
ritt's division was safe in camp at 
Bolivar Heights ; but Custer's brigade, 
which had the rear in the retreat, did 
not fare so well At Shepherdstown 
Custer found himself cut off from the 
Halltown road, by which he intended 
to march, and was finally compelled to 
seek safety by crossing the Potomac. 
The enemy did not venture to follow, 
but held the river fi-om Shepherdstown 
to Williamsport, and on the following 
day made demonstrations as if designing 
to cross at the fords. In the afternoon 
Thorburn's division of Crook's corps 
and Lowell's cavalry pushed ou* or « 



794 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



reconnoissance towards Halltown. The 
infantry soon encountered the Con- 
federates, and after a contest, which 
lasted only twenty minutes, drove them 
to the cover of their artillery. Lowell 
with his cavalry then dashed in on the 
flank and cut oflE 69 prisoners, including 
6 ojBScers. The result of this reconnois- 
sance was that the enemy was found 
to have left Sheridan's front ; and about 
seven o'clock in the morning of the 
28th he was again on the march in the 
direction of Charlestown, his cavalry in 
the advance carefully reconnoitring in 
various directions. By ten o'clock the 
Nineteenth corps reached Charlestown ; 
and the entire army pushed on to the 
old line of battle held during the en- 
gagement a week before, about 2 miles 
beyond the town, the Sixth corps hold- 
ing the right, the Nineteenth the cen- 
tre, and the Eighth the left. Then 
having formed line of battle, the army 
awaited the result of the cavalry ad- 
vance. On the morning of the 29th 
Ang. ^^® Confederates were found near 
29. Smilhsfield ; and General Merritt 
making a vigorous attack upon their 
cavalry drove it back through the town 
and over Oj'equan Creek. A reconnois- 
sance was then made beyond the creek 
by General Custer's cavalry with Ran- 
som's baUery; but encountering the 
Confederate skirmishing line he retired 
igain across the stream in the direction 
of Smithsfield, followed by the enemy's 
infantry, which, however, on the ad- 
vance of General Ricketts' division fell 
back again rapidly. Sheridan's army 
then again retired upon Charlestown, 
and remained quiet till the morning of 



the 3d of September, when it was again 
put in motion in a southwesterly di- 
rection. Crook's command occupying 
the left, the Nineteenth corps the cen- 
tre, and the Sixth the right. Between 
ten and eleven the second oAvalry ggpj 
division on the extreme right was o. 
attacked by Lomax's cavalry about 7 
nules south of Martinsburg. Lomax's 
troops, however, were driven from tnc 
field. About noon Crook's command 
reached the vicinity of Berryville, 
where it was attacked by a large Con- 
federate force, approaching from the 
direction of Winchester. Crook hastUy 
formed his men ; and a battle ensued, 
which lasted tUl dark, when the enemy 
retired, having suffered severely. The 
remainder of the army then coming up, 
got into position in the neighborhood of 
Berryville, and threw up substantial 
breast- worka Here Sheridan remained 
about two weeks, content to hold his 
own in the valley, without attempting 
any venturesome expedition, but keep- 
ing his force weU in hand, so as to 
check any movement on the part of 
Early. During this time frequent re- 
connoissances were made both by the 
Confederate and the National cavalry. 
Sheridan had now been considerably 
over a month in the valley, with an 
army decidedly superior to that of 
Early; and his marches and counter- 
marches had been a source of much 
perplexity and some dissatisfaction with 
the Northern public. His campaign so 
far had been one of manoeuvres, in 
which decisive fighting was avoided. 
The enemy, however, had been kept 
constantly occupied ; and a force which 



WINCHESTER 



796 



Lee could ill spare had been kept away 
from Petersburg, or from reinforcing 
Hood at Atlanta. When Atlanta fell, 
it ceased to be a part of Grant's policy 
to keep Early with a large force idle in 
ihe valley; and about the middle of 
September he paid a hasty visit to the 
apper Potomac, had an interview with 
Sheridan, and gave him permission to 
change the character of the campaign 
by commencing a series of offensive 
operations. 

A reconnoissance made on the 13th 
by the first cavalry division supported 
by Getty's division of the Sixth corps, 
to Lock's Ford on the Opequan, showed 
that the Confederates were on the west 
bank in some force. Three days later 
it was discovered that they had disap- 
peared entirely from the neighborhood 
of the left wing of the National army 
on the Winchester and Berryville turn- 
pike, and that they had but a weak 
Une on the right. On the 18th the 
Confederate general, Gordon, with his 
division of infantry, occupied Martins- 
burg, but was speedily driven out of it 
again by AverilL Sheridan now hav- 
ing become satisfied that the main body 
of the Confederates had moved to the 
vicinity of Bunker Hill and Stephen- 
son's Depot, resolved by a rapid move- 
ment westward towards Winchester, to 
get into their rear. On the afternoon 
of the 1 8th, therefore, the troops were 
placed under arms and held in readi- 
ness to march at a moment's notice. 
At three o'clock on the morning of the 
Sept. l^th the Sixth and Nineteenth 
lS« corj)s were set in motion, the 
Sixth being directed to march in par- 



allel columns on each side of the Win- 
chester and Berryville turnpike with 
the artillery, ammunition, and supply 
trains between them on the road, the 
Nineteenth corps following by th«» 
same road in similar order. Croo 
with the Eighth corps was ordered to 
move at five o'clock from his position 
in the vicinity of Summit Point, across 
the country in a southwesterly direc- 
tion, and form a junction with the 
Sixth and Nineteenth corps at the 
point where the Winchester and Berry- 
ville turnpike crosses the Opequan, 5 
miles east of Winchester. Torbert and 
Averill, with their large cavalry force, 
were directed to occupy the enemy's 
attention by demonstrating on his left. 
Shortly after daylight Wilson's division 
of cavalry crossed the Opequan and 
skimiished with the enemy, who were 
discovered to be in force on the west 
bank. The march of the Nineteenth 
corps was by some means so delayed 
that it did not cross the Opequan till 
about noon, and thus Early had time 
to draw in his left from its advanced 
position near Bunker HUl. Such was 
the resistance offered that the first and 
second lines were thrown into some 
confusion, and forced to retii-e behind 
the third ; but as soon as Sheridan got 
his batteries into a position fi'om which 
they were able to silence the enemy's 
guns, order was restored, and they 
again advanced, retaking the position 
from which they had been driven, and 
holding it until reinforced by Crook, 
whose troops had been kept in reserve 
on the east side of the creek Then 
followed one of the most fiercely con 



796 



THE SHENAlUx^oAH. 



tested battles of the war, the opposing 
lines being at some points not more 
than 200 yards apart. About three in 
the afternoon Crook's first division got 
into position on the right and his 
second in the rear, supporting a divi- 
sion of the Nineteenth corps. About 
this time, also, Torbert, with Averill's 
and Merritt's cavalry divisions, arrived 
on the extreme right. Sheridan then 
ordered an advance along the entire 
line. The Confederates stubbornly 
maintained their ground against the 
National infantry, but gave way finally 
before a most brilliant and successful 
charge of the cavalry, made at a critical 
moment. The battle lasted till five in 
the evening. The victory, however, 
was of the most decisive character. 
Early's troops were driven from the 
field in confusion ; and, according to a 
despatch of Sheridan's, they were sent 
" whirling through Winchester," whence 
they retreated rapidly to Fisher's Hill, 
3 miles south of Strasburg. Night 
prevented Sheridan from continuing 
the pursuit. Such was the battle of 
Winchester. Sheridan captured 2500 
prisoners, on the field and in the pur- 
suit In the hospitals at Winchester 
he found nearly 3000 wounded. The 
Confederates left behind them, also, 5 
guns and 9 battle flags. Early's entire 
loss must have amounted to 6000. 
Sheridan's entire loss could hardly have 
been much under 5000. On both sides 
several prominent oflicers were killed, 
mong them General David Russell 
and the Confederate general, Rodes. 

The position of Early at Fisher's 
Rill was one of ertrnordinary natival 



strength. His iim extended in a west 
erly direction across the Strasbm-g val 
ley, the i-ight resting on the North 
Fork of the Shenandoah, the left or 
Little North Mountain. From this 
position Sheridan soon made prepara 
tions to drive him ; and after a good 
deal of manoeuvring, his army about 
noon on the 2 2d lay as follows: Sept. 
Crook's corps on the right, the 22. 
Sixth in the centre, and the Nineteenth 
on the left. While Wright and Emorj 
made demonstrations on the left and 
centre, and Averill drove in the ene- 
my's skirmishers. Crook moved out to 
the extreme right. After a long and 
arduous march, he got round and 
flanked Early's left between four and 
five in the afternoon, and made a furi- 
ous attack, sweeping down behind th« 
enemy's breast-works, and driving the 
Confederates out of them in the greates 
confusion. While Crook was thus 
carrying everything before him on the 
enemy's left, Wright attacked the Con- 
federate centre, separating the two 
wings. The enemy broke and fled 
towards Woodstock, leaving behind 
him 16 guns and 1100 prisoners. The 
victory at Fisher's Hill was the more 
easily won from the fact that Early 
dreaded an attack from Torbert, who, 
it was known, was coming through the 
Luray Valley with his cavalry. Tor- 
bert, however, had been effectively heLl 
in check by an inferior force near Mel 
ford. 

Sheridan marched, the night aftei 
the battle, to Woodstock, but halted 
there in the morning to give his troop 
rest and to await the arrival of jation* 



DEVASTATION OF THE VALLEY. 



7»7 



Averill pushed on in advance, drove the 
Confederates to Mount Jackson, where 
they made a stand and resisted his 
further progress. Sheridan soon after- 
wards advanced to Mount Jackson and 
hence to New Market ; and on the 
25th his headquarters were at Harri- 
sonburg, his cavalry moving towards 
Staunton. On the 24th, Torbert had 
a sharp engagement near Luray with 
the enemy's cavalry, who were trying 
to operate in Sheridan's rear; but he 
succeeded in driving them up the 
valley; and on the 26th he rejoined 
the main army. Early retreated to 
Port Republic, and thence to Brown's 
Grap, a depression in the Blue Ridge 
15 miles southeast of Harrisonburg, 
which he held in force, and retained, 
in spite of several attempts to drive 
him from it. Torbert, with Wilson's 
di^nision of cavalry and a brigade of 
Merritt's, entered Staunton on the 
moi-ning of the 26th and destroyed a 
quantity of the enemy's property ; then 
marching along the railroad to Waynes- 
boro, he tore up the track for the entire 
(.llstanee, as well as the bridges over 
Christian's Creek and the South River, 
finally retiring to Harrisonburg by way 
of Staunton, destroying or carrying off 
large supplies of forage and grain. 

Several reconnoissances made to- 
wards Early's position at Brown's Gap 
showed that he enjoyed unusual facili- 
ties for defense. He had thrown up 
intrenchments and prepared to make a 
determined stand. An advance on 
Lynchburg on the part of Sheridan, 
with Early in his rear now receiving 
reinforcements, would have been ex- 



tremely hazardous. His communication? 
would have been at once interrupted. 
As it was, numeroiis guerrilla bands, 
under the lead of Mosby, White, and 
other partisan chieftains, kept up ar. 
annoying warfare between Strasbur 
and the Potomac ; and ever since th 
army left Harper's Ferry, every small 
party and every straggler had been 
" bushwhacked " by the people of the 
valley, many of whom had obtained 
protection passes from earlier com- 
manders. Lieutenant John Meigs, of 
the engineer corps, was overtaken and 
murdered in a uanow wooded road 
between Harrisonburg and Dayton ; 
but in retaliy.ion for this, all the 
houses within five miles were burned 
by order of SI eridan. Nothing was to 
be gained by staying any longer in the 
neighborhood of Port Republic and 
Cross Keys; and it remained only to 
fall back down the valley to some 
point which could be easily and firmly 
held, and to which the winter supplies 
for the army might be conducted in 
safety. On the 6th of October, oct. 
therefore, Sheridan withdrew his <>. 
forces from the various advance points 
which they had occupied, and marched 
northward, destroying on his way, in 
accordance with ordei*s from Govern 
ment, all the hay, gi'ain, and forage to 
be found, beyond what was necessary 
for the use of his own army. In a des- 
patch dated October 7th, Sheridan says 

" The whole country from the Blue Kidge 
to the North Mountain haa been made unten- 
able for a rebel army. I have deatroyed oyei 
2000 bama filled with wheat, hay, and farming 
implements, over 70 mills filled with wheat 
and flour Four herds of cattle have been 



79« 



THE SHENANDOAH. 



Jriven before the army, and not less than 3000 
iiliitp have been killed and issued to the 
troops. This destruction embraces the Luray 
fiud Ijittle Fork yalleys as well as the main 
valley." 

As Sheridan returned down the 
valley towM-ds Cedar Creek, he was 
closely followed by the Confederate 
cavalry under Rosser, supported by the 
main body of Early's army. On the 
Qct. 9th, the head of Sheridan's in- 
9. fantry column having entered 
Strasburg by the east road, while the 
rear was still some miles further south 
the enemy following the cavalry on the 
»rest road had advanced so far as to 
yet on the left flank of the infantry 
column, Custer and Merritt then 
turned and attacked with their cavalry, 
A^hen a report having spread among 
Rosser's men that the National infantry 
were at the same time flanking them, 
they immediately gave way and broke 
into a stampede. The pursuit was 
continued 7 miles. The loss of the 
enemy was not great, being only about 
300 men, including prisoners; but he 
abandoned 11 guns, 4 caissons, and an 
ammunition train. Things remained 
quiet for several days after this affair ; 
but on the 12th the Confederates 
again appeared in the neighborhood 
3f Strasburg and opened an artillery 
fire on Emory's and Crook's corps. 
These troops were then partially with- 
tlrawn and Crook pushed out a recon- 
noissance, which brought on a smart 
engagement of three hours' duration. 
Night, however, closed upon the 
scene without any advantage and with 
little loss to either side. 

On the 16th, Sheridan went to 



"Washington on important businese^ 
leaving the army under the command 
of General Wright, whose corj^s ogt_ 
was, in the meantime, intrusted to 15. 
General Ricketts. Fisher's Hill had 
been abandoned as not affording any 
good defensible line on its southern 
slope, on which side Early would be 
likely to approach ; and the army had 
now lain for several days in front of 
Strasburg, behind breast-works thrown 
up on rising and rolling ground, mostly 
along the east side of Cedar Creek — 
Crook with the Eighth corps on the left, 
the Nineteenth corps in the centre, the 
Sixth on the right. On the right of 
the Sixth, a little in the rear and in 
reserve, were the two cavalry divisions 
of Custer and Men-itt. The line was 
4 or 5 miles long, and following the 
course of the creek, nearly north and 
south. Crook's corps rested its left 
flank on the North Fork of the Shenan 
doah and its right on the Winchester 
and Strasburg turnpike, the principal 
highway in that region. Behind Crook's 
left and at right angles to it, with a 
view to guard against any turning 
movement on that flank, lay a force 
about equivalent to a brigade, known as 
Etching's provisional division. North 
of the turnpike came the Nineteenth 
corps, Grover's division holding its left 
and resting on the turnpike, where it 
joined Thorbum's division of Crook's 
command. The Sixth corps on the 
right, and the second cavalry division, 
were not strongly protected with works, 
as was all the rest of the line, but were 
well posted on high ridges, and held 
firmly the Middle road, or that which 



EARLY'S NOCTURNAL FLANK MOVEMENT. 



799 



rans next north of the txtmpike. A 
Hmall stream called Meadow Run flows 
into the creek between the two roads 
mentioned. In fi-ont the National po- 
sition was considered impregnable, ex- 
cept by surprise, and to turn it would 
be, it was believed, an undertaking of 
extreme temerity. To guard against 
surprise on the left, the North Fork 
was picketed by Powell's cavalry divi- 
sion from Cedar Creek all the way to 
Front Royal. Weir's battery com- 
manded the fords, supported by cavalry, 
which were so posted as to prevent 
surprise from the direction of the 
Luray Valley. Artillery was posted in 
front of the positions of Crook and 
Emory, so as to command the ford and 
the bridge over Cedar Creek, as well as 
the rising ground on the west side. 
The wagon trains and reserve artillery 
lay in the rear on the turnpike. On 
the 17th the cavalry on the right under 
Cluster was attacked by Confederate 
cavalry and infantry ; and a severe 
skirmish ensued, restilting in the re- 
pulse of the enemy. Next day a care- 
ful reconnoissance was made from the 
left towards Strasburg and Fisher's 
Hill ; but no sign of movement on the 
part of the enemy was discovered. 
Despatches, however, were captured ; 
and it was thus ascertained that re- 
inforcements had been sent to Early, 
for the purpose of enabling him to 
attack and defeat Sheridan. 

Early, in fact, had just received a 
reinforcement of some 12,000 men. His 
actual strength was thus increased to 
27,000. His army was still smaller 
than that of Sheridan. Enoouratred, 



however, by so large an accession of 
strength, Early prepared to put m exe- 
cution one of the most audacious 
movements of the war. Before break 
of day on the 19th, he arranged his 
troops at Fisher's Hill and began to 
move against Sheridan's lines. His cav 
airy and light artillery were directed to 
advance against the National right, so 
as to occupy the attention of Torbert 
and the Sixth coi-ps. His infantry 
marched in five columns, of which Gor- 
don's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's were 
ordered to place themselves by o^t, 
daybreak on the left rear of the 1^- 
whole National position, while Ker- 
shaw's and Wharton's were to endeavor 
to get, about the same time, close 
under the intrenched rising groimd on 
which lay Crook's command. To turn 
the National left, it was necessary that 
Early's columns should descend into 
the fforore at the base of the Massanut 
ten Mountain, ford the North Fork of 
the Shenandoah, and skirt Crook's en- 
campment for some distance, in some 
places within 400 yards of his pickets. 
It was a hazardous as well as audacious 
experiment ; but it was executed with 
wonderful skill and, as the result 
proved, with complete success. The 
movement was conducted quietly, and 
with great caution. The result was 
that before daybreak the Confederate 
infantry, formed and ready for battle, 
lay ^\^thin 600 yards of the National 
cam J 13. Gordon's column was diagon- 
ally in the rear of the Nineteenth 
corps; on the left of Crook, facing 
Kitching's provisional division, was 
Hamseur supported by Pegram ; in 



oOO 



THJfl SHENAJiDOAH. 



front of Crook was Kershaw supported 
by Wharton. Under cover of the 
morning mist, Kershaw's column moved 
rapidly through Crook's picket line, 
and with tremendous fury rushed upon 
the intrenchments. The onslaught was 
feai-fuL The surprise was complete. 

In a quartei of an hour Crook's 
gallant army of Western Virginia be- 
came a disorganized mass of fugitives 
in rapid rout towards the position of 
the Nineteenth corps. Crook lost sev- 
eral batteries, some 700 men made 
prisoners, and about 100 in killed and 
wounded. The Sixth corps was at the 
same time menaced ; and its attention 
occupied by the enemy's cavalry and 
light artillery. It fell to the lot of the 
Nuieteenth corps to resist unaided the 
shock of Gordon's colimin, now advanc- 
ing solidly massed up the slope of a 
broad bare hQl which commanded Em- 
ory's camp. The Confederate force, 
including the divisions of Ramseur and 
Pegram, was as strong as Emory's, and 
v\a8 supported by another column com- 
ing up through the woods on the left, 
aud along the turnpike in fi-ont. The 
Xiueteenth corps was thus not only 
taken in the rear, but outnumbered. 
Still it held out for about an hour; 
and then its left gave way, leaving a 
[>art of the artillery in the enemy's 
hands. The left and centre of the 
National army had now fallen into 
complete confusion ; and all the trains 
that could be got away were sent off 
in haste along the turnpike towards 
Winchester. The sun was now high 
in the heavens; and the extent of the 
disaster was rendered visible. The 



Confederates had succeeded in rolling 
up the left of the line, and in severing 
Powell's cavalry division on the ex 
treme left from the rest of the ai-my , 
and they were now forcing back the 
entire centre, and occupying the in 
trenchments of the Nuieteenth corps 
as they had those of Crook's command 
They had also captured 18 pieces ol 
artillery, thus not only lessening the 
National power for defense, but in- 
creasing their own power for attack. 
The captured cannon were turned with 
ten-ible effect on theii' late possessors. 
The Sixth corps was now ordered over 
from the right ; and these troops, exe- 
cuting quickly a change of front which 
brought them at right angles to their 
former line, were soon engaged in des- 
perate battle. The resistance made by 
the Sixth coips in covering the retreat 
afforded opportunity for re-forming the 
fugitives to some extent; but the Con- 
federates increased their artillery and 
musketry fire to the utmost, and stiLl 
pressed the National left flank, with 
the view, apparently, of getting full 
possession of the turnpike, that they 
might seize the trains and get between 
the National army and Winchester. 
The enemy pressed the left much mort 
vigorously than the right. Merritt's and 
Custer's cavalry were transferred from 
the right to the left ; and a severe con 
test took place in the thickly wooded 
country near Middletown, in which the 
left had been placed by its rapid re- 
treat. About nine o'clock Sheridan's 
army had got into line of battle again, 
and made desperate efforts to check 
the enemy. Both sides used artillerj' ; 



SHERIDAN'S FAMOUS RIDE. 



801 



bat the Confederates had greatly the 
advantage in this arm, having not only 
their own batteries, but the captured 
guns of their antagonists besidea The 
Sixth corps held its ground well ; but 
Orook's corps on the left was forced 
back, and the whole line gradually 
gave way, the enemy again getting 
past the National left flank, and finally 
gaining the village of Middletown, 
about 3 miles northeast of the posi- 
tion from which Sheridan's army had 
been driven. The principal aim of the 
National commanders now was to cover 
the trains and draw off the army with 
as little loss as possible to Newton, 
where they hoped to be able to re-form 
and offer an effective resistance. The 
battle had been completely lost. Camps, 
earth-works, some 24 guns and 1800 
prisoners — all were left in the hands of 
the enemy. The routed Nationals were 
.flying in all directions, large numbers 
of them making their way to Win- 
chester. 

The National army fell back, as we 
have seen, first towards Middletown, 
and afterwards in the direction of 
Newton. About a mile or so in the 
rear of Middletown, Wright succeeded 
in restoring something like order. 
Sheridan was still absent. He had 
been, as we have mentioned, on a visit 
to Washington. On his return, he 
dpent the night at Winchester. It was 
Qot until his army had been defeated 
that he was made aware of Early's 
attack. He Wfus in his saddle in a 
minute. He had scarcely left Win- 
chester when he beheld sad evidences 
of the disaster wliich had befallen his 



army. The road was covered with 
wagon trains and crowds of weary 
fugitives. As he rode along on his 
splendid charger, the air was rent with 
cheers. The fugitives felt abashed and 
halted ; and the wounded by the way- 
side feebly waved a joyful salute. He 
did not slacken his pace to rebuke oi 
encourage. Waving his hat to the 
cheering crowds, his horse still at full 
gallop, he shouted, "Face the other 
way, boys ! Face the other way ! We 
are going back to our camps. We are 
going to lick them out of their boots." 
The words were electric. The tide of 
fugitives began to turn. As he neared 
the main body, the enthusiasm became 
unboimded. Officers and men tossed 
their hats and cheered to the echo. He 
repeated his fiery words, " Boys, if I 
had been here this would never hav 
happened. We are going back. Well 
have all these camps and cannon baci 
again." What Sheridan said, he meant ; 
and the men believed him. He was in 
the field shortly after ten o'clock. 

There was a lull in the fight, which 
lasted several hours. Wright, as has 
been mentionM, had already restored 
order, and made dispositions, if not for 
attack, at least for effective resistance. 
Sheridan approved of the arrange- 
ments ; and amid the most enthusiastic 
cheers, he rode along the lines, study- 
ing the ground and encouraging th 
men. About one o'clock Early mad 
a charge, which was vigorously repulsed 
by Emory. About three o'clock Sheri 
dan gave the order, "The entire line 
will advance. Tlie Nineteentli corj)8 
will move in coimection ^^'it^1 the SixtL 



902 



THE SHEKANDOAH. 



The right of the Nineteenth will swing 
to the left, 80 as to drive the enemy upon 
the pike." The order was promptly 
obeyed. The entire line moved forward 
— Getty's division leading the charge. 
IVIerritt's cavalry covered the left flank ; 
nc" Custer's cavalry was thrown out on 
the right. As the Nationals advanced 
they were checked for a moment by a 
tremendous fire of artillery and mus- 
ketry. The check, however, was but 
momentary ; for Emory swung around 
upon the foe and by two gallant charges 
greatly disordered his lines. Almost 
at the same moment, the National cav- 
alry fell upon Early's flank. The tide 
of battl had already turned. The 
Confedera es fought with bravery and 
determination ; but Sheridan's boys 
now fighting in the presence of their 
favorite chief ere not to be resisted. 
The battle, in fa t, was already won ; 
and what was so recently a retreat, was 
now changed into a pursuit. It was a 
perfect rout. On his arrival, Sheridan 
said " we'll have all those camps and 
cannon back again." His word was 
made good. That night, the National 
mfantry halted within their old camps ; 
but the cavalry pursued, hanging upon 
the flanks and rear of the retreating foe, 
until he was beyond St asburg, and 
night fell upon the scene. Early halted 
for the night at Eisher i Hill, and m the. 



morning resumed his retreat southward. 
In the pursuit, aU the captured guns 
were recovered. The Nataonak cap 
tured not only their own guns, but 23 
of those of the enemy, together with 
1500 prisoners, and any quantity of 
horses, mules, ambulances, wagons and 
stores of various kinds. 

Such was the Battle of Cedar Creek : 
and such was the end of the gre&l 
campaign in the Shenandoah Valley 
It was one of the most brilliant cam 
paigns of the war. It was chai-acter 
ized by vigor and skill ; and it wa> 
crowned with success. Sheridan had 
captured during the campaign 13,000 
prisoners and killed and woimded 
10,000 men. His own loss, however, 
was great — reaching the high figure of 
16,000 men. He had now taken his 
place among the great captains of the 
age. His praise was in every mouth. 
His famous ride from Winchester has 
been immortalized by the combined 
influences of poetry and song. It was 
a proud honor which was conf eiTed upon 
him when some three weeks afterwards 
on the occasion of the resignation of 
General McClellan, he was promoted to 
the rank of Major-Greneral in the regu 
lar army ; but it was an honor to which 
he had entitled himself by daring, by 
energy, by unwearied activity and by 
success. 



THE MARCH TO THE SKA. 



80o 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

Vih^rm»B at Atlanta — How the Men were Occupied — Position of the National Forces — Hood Ralllea mi 
JoneeIx>ro — Speech of JefEereon Davis at Macon — New Confederate Policy — Thomas sent to Nashville — 
Movements of Hood — AUatoona Pass — Arrival of General Corse — General French demands its Surrender 
— Corse's Reply — Ready for the "Useless Elffusion of Blood" — The Assault — Corse Wounded — Sherman 
at Kenesaw Mountain — The Confederates Retreat towards Dallas — Sherman at Kingston — Sherman at 
Rome — Hood Before Resaea — Demands its Surrender — Colonel Weaver's Reply — The National Post at 
Dalton Captured — Sherman at Resaea — Communications with Rome Re-opened — Affairs at Snake Creek 
Gap and Ship's Gap — Rapid Retreat of Hood to Gadsden — Beauregard Assumes Command — Sherman at 
Gaylesville — New Plan of Campaign — Sherman's Proposal to Grant — The March to the Sea Suggested — 
Grant Consents — Sherman Prepares for the March — He Sends some of his Troops to Thomas — Sherman's 
Army Re-organized — Atlanta in Flames — The Railroad Routes to the Sea — Order of March — Troope to 
Live on the Country — " Uncle BUly " and the Troops — The Men in Fine Spirits — Feint on Macon — Battle 
of Grlswoldville — Occupation of Milledgeville — Flight of the Legislators — Howard Crosses the Oconee — 
Occupation of SandersvUle — Sherman at Tennllle Station — KUpatrick Defeats Wheeler — Crossing the 
Ogeechee — Approach to Savannah — The Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers — Captain Duncan and two Scouts 
Reach the Fleet — Rejoicing in the North— Foster's Co-operative Movement— Fort McAllister— Preparing 
to Assault — The Fort Reduced — Arrival of Foster and Dahlgren — Sherman on board the Nemaha — The 
Surrender of Savannah Demanded — Hardee Refuses — Kilpatrick Cuts the Gulf Railroad .Savannah 
Invested — Uiaor Causeway — Corduroy Road — Vigorous Preparations for the Assault — Hardee's Fo«ition 
Desperate— After Destroying all the Confederate Property, he Retreats during the Night — Sherman Enters 
the City— His Christmas Present to President Lincoln— Halleck and Grant's Congratulations- -A Compli 
ment from Grant — A Successful Campaign— The Inherent Weakness of the Confederacy Demonstrated— 
Fearful Destruction of Property— General Geary Appointed Military Governor of Savannah— Resolution 
of Snbmissior to the Laws of the United States— Sherman Perfecting his Plan for the March through the 
Carolinas. 



1864. 



AiTER the fall of Atlan+a, there was 
a lull in the campaign. The 
wearied armies on both sides 
were permitted to enjoy a brief period 
of repose. They were not, however, 
allowed to be wholly idle. Hood col- 
lected and recruited his forces at Love- 
joy's Station. Sherman's head-quarters 
were at Atlanta. Some of his men 
obtained leave of absence. Those who 
remained were employed in the con- 
struction of huts and barracks, in 
strengthening the defenses of the city, 
and in repairing the railroads. Supplies 
md recruits were hurried forward from 



Chattanooga. It seemed as if Sherman 
intended to hold Atlanta \vith a strong 
garrison, and to make it the base foi 
further operations towards the South. 
Before the end of September the place 
was so strengthened and filled with 
supplies that, with a small ganison, it 
woiild have been able to resist the 
attacks of vastly superior numbers. 

The city was held by the army of 
the Cumberland under Thomas. Th 
army of the Tennessee, under Howard, 
was gro-uped about East Point, and the 
army of the Ohio, under Schofield, held 
Decatur The cavalry consisted of two 



804 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 



iivisions : one stationed at Decatur, 
jnder Garrard; the other, under Kil- 
patrick, was posted near Sandtown, 
with a pontoon bridge over the Chattar 
hoochee, from which position any 
movement of the enemy towards the 
west could be watched- Niimerous 
changes occurred in the composition of 
the armies. The term of service of 
many of the regiments had expired, 
and the temporary suspension of active 
operations afforded an opportunity to 
consolidate and reorganize, to reclothe 
and equip the men, and to make prep- 
arations for another campaign. The 
garrisons in the rear also, and at points 
along the railroad, were strengthened 
to make the communications more se- 
ciire. Wagner's division of the Fourth 
corps and Morgan's division of the 
'^'ourteenth corps were sent back to 
Chattanooga. 

General Hood, recovering with sur- 
prising elasticity from the stunning 
blow which he received in the loss of 
Atlanta, rallied and reorganized his 
forces at Jonesboro, receiving his sup- 
plies by the Macon Railroad. His 
army numbered about 40,000 men, ex- 
clusive of the Georgia militia, which, 
as if to give the impression that no 
immediate offensive movement was con- 
templated, were withdrawn by Gov- 
ernor Brown soon after the evacuation 
of Atlanta. The governor expressed a 
hope, however, that he should be able 
to return the militia force to Hood's 
command in greater numbers and with 
equal efficiency when the interests of 
the public service should require it. 

It was not the intention of the Con- 



federate authorities, however, to allow 
their principal Southern army to remain 
inactive. Whatever declarations they 
might make to the public in the hope 
to belittle Sherman's successes, they 
were well aware that the capture of 
Atlanta was a blow at the heart of the 
Confederacy, and that it would be so 
considered by the Southern people. It 
was evident that if Georgia and the 
Gulf States were to be saved to the 
Confederacy, something must be done, 
and that without delay, to arrest the 
victorious progress of the National 
army. While affairs were in this posi- 
tion, Jefferson Davis set out on a tour 
of inspection through the South ; and 
at Macon, on the 23d of Septem- gept. 
ber, he delivered an address on 2o 
the crisis, maiked by so many indiscreet 
admissions that some of the Confederate 
journals refused to believe the reports 
to be genuine. In this address he 
spoke with undisguised vexation of the 
depletion of Hood's ranks by desertion 
and absenteeism ; and he promised that 
if all the men away without leave would 
return to their duty, Sherman's army 
should meet the fate that befell that of 
the French empire in its retreat from 
Moscow. 

The new policy to be inaugurated in 
the South by the Confederates was in 
a measure foreshadowed by the speech 
of Davis at Macon. It was boiTowed 
from that which Sherman had himself 
so successfully carried out in his cap 
ture of Atlanta, and had the merit o 
boldness if not of originality and far 
sightedness. In accordance with this 
new plan of the Confederates, Hood's 



HOOD Al DALLAS. 



806 



whole army was to move rapidly in a 
compact body to the north of Atlanta, 
and after breaking up the railroad 
between the Chattahoochee and Chat- 
tanooga, push on to Bridgeport and 
there destroy the great railroad bridge 
over the Tennessee River. Atlanta 
would then be cut off from Chat- 
tanooga and the latter from Nashville. 
Sherman thus separated from his prim- 
ary and secondary bases, would find 
Atlanta but a barren conquest It 
would, indeed, have been difficult for 
him to hold it ; for he would soon have 
foimd himself in perplexity from the 
want of provisions and supplies, which 
would be intercepted in all directions 
by the Georgia militia. Forrest, un- 
doubtedly the best of the Confederate 
cavalry officers, was already operating 
in southern Tennessee, where the Na- 
tional force was barely adequate to the 
task of protecting the communications 
between Nashville and Chattanooga. 
It was anticipated, also that the re- 
sumption of offensive movements on 
the part of Hood would restore the 
morale of his army, which had become 
dispirited by its long series of retreats 
and reverses ; and that the opposite 
effect would be produced on the army 
of Sherman if compelled to abandon 
conquests effected at the cost of so 
many severe battles and painful 
marches. Such was the plan devised 
by the Confederate authorities — a plan 
which if vigorously carried out, and 
against a less able general than Sher- 
man, might have been productive of 
the most disastrous consequences to the 
National arms. It will be seen that 



Sherman was fully equal to the emer 
gency, and that the prophecies of tht. 
Southern press, that the " great flanker" 
was about to be "out flanked," were 



not to be fulfilled. On the 28th 



Sept. 



of September, as soon as he be- !J8. 
came convinced that the enemy intend 
ed to assume the offensive, Sherman 
sent Thomas, his second in command, 
to Nashville, to organize the new troop? 
expected to arrive there, to make pre 
liminary preparations, and to look after 
Forrest. 

In spite of strenuous opposition, 
Hood was retained at the head of the 
Confederate army, with Cheatham, 
S. D. Lee, and Stewart, commanding 
his three corps. Wheeler remained in 
coBomand of the cavalry, which had 
been largely reinforced. Hood soon 
moved westward towards the Chatta- 
hoochee, taking a position facing Sher- 
man and covering the West Poin 
Railroad about Palmetto Station. He 
also threw a pontoon bridge over the 
Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry de- 
tachments beyond it in the direction of 
Carrollton and Powder Sj)rings. About 
the 2d of October his whole Qct. 
army was over the Chattahoochee, 2 . 
and on the march towards Dallas, 
where his three corps were directed to 
concentrate. At this point he was aide 
to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well 
as the fortified places on the railroad 
to Chattanooga, while there remained 
open to him in case of defeat, a lit.9 
of retreat eouthwestward into Alabama. 
Advancing eastward from Dallas to 
the railroad, he captured Big Shanty 
and Ackworth Stations, broke the tele 



806 



THE MAKOH TO THE SKA. 



graph wires, and destroyed the railroad 
between those places. He also sent 
an infantry division under General 
French against the National post at 
Allatoona Pass through which lay the 
lailroad and Sherman's line of commun- 
ications. Here were stored more than 
1, 000,000 rations for the National 
aimy, the capture of which would 
prove an important acquisition to Hood's 
impoverished commissariat. The natural 
stiength of the position at Allatoona 
Pass was such, that 1000 men could 
hold it against ten times their number so 
long as supplies held out. Its redoubts 
were at this time garrisoned by only 
three small regiments under Colonel 
Tourtellotte. In the possession of the 
Confederates it would have effectually 
interrupted the National communica- 
tions between Chattanooga and Atlanta, 
and might have necessitated the evacua- 
tion of the latter city. It will be seen, 
therefore, that Hood had excellent rea- 
sons for striking suddenly and with a 
large force at this point. 

Well aware that his seat at Atlanta 
was insecure while his long line of com- 
munications lay exposed to interrup- 
tion, Sherman, on hearing that Hood 
had crossed the Chattahoochee, des- 
patched General Corse vsdth a division 
of the Fifteenth corps to Rome. Slocimi 
was ordered to hold Atlanta and the 
railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee 
with the Twentieth corps. A freshet of 
the river having carried away the 
bridges, three pontoons were laid on 
the 4th of October, and the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, Fourth, Fourteenth, and 
Twenty-Third corps were put in motion 



towards Smyrna camp-ground. The 
following day they were moved to the 
strong position about Kenesaw Moun- 
tain. Anticipating the enemy's move- 
ment against Allatoona Pass, Sherman 
had already signalled and telegraphed 
to Corse to reinforce that post from 
Rome, and hold it until the main body 
of the National army could come to his 
assistance. On receiving the message, 
Corse immediately placed a brigade of 
900 men on the cars and reached Alla- 
toona on the night of the 4th, just in 
time to be ready to meet the attack of 
French's division. With this addition 
the garrison nimibered loOO men, with 
6 guns. 

Early on the morning of the 5th, 
French with 6000 men, and sup- q^.^^ 
ported by two other divisions, 6. 
approached Allatoona, and sent a letter 
to Corse demanding an uumediate siu'- 
render, in order to avoid "a useless 
effusion of blood," giving only five 
minutes for an answer. Coree was 
ready within the time specified. His re- 
ply was that he and his command were 
ready for the " useless effusion of blood " 
as soon as it was agreeable to Fren ;h. 
This was immediately followed bj a 
Confederate attack which comment ed 
at eight o'clock and continued till two 
in the afternoon. Driven by the des 
perate assaults of overwhelming num 
bers, Corse's troops contested the ground 
foot by foot, from their intrenchments 
to the hill, and from the hill to the • 
fort Corse, although bleeding and at 
times insensible, having been wounded 
early in the action, still fought on with 
an obstinacy and desperation worthy of 



SHERMAK AT ROME. 



Sol 



the great stake for which he contended. 
During the heat of the contest, about 
ten o'clock, Sherman reached the Kene- 
saw Mountain, 18 miles distant from 
Allatoona, and from its summit saw 
the smoke of battle and heard faintly 
the sounds of artillery. The distance 
being too great to send troops to take 
part in the battle, Sherman directed 
General Cox with the Twenty-Third 
corps to move rapidly westward from 
the base of Kenesaw, strike the road 
from Allatoona to Dallas, and threaten 
the rear of the attacking force. He 
also succeeded in getting a signal 
message to Corse notifying him of his 
presence. Sherman had great confi- 
dence in that general and in the result 
of the battle, and said while reviewing 
it from his remote stand-point : " I know 
Corse ; so long as he lives, the Alla- 
toona Pass is safe." The assaulting 
columns of the enemy, thrown back 
again and again, were finally compelled 
to retire towards Dallas. Their retreat 
was hastened by apprehensions .'>f the 
co-operating movement of Cox towards 
the only road by which they could 
escape. Unfortimate delays, arising 
from rain and mud, prevented Cox 
from intercepting the Confederates on 
the road back to Dallas ; but they left 
800 killed, wounded, and prisoners, in 
the hands of Corse. The garrison lost 
nearly haK its number, in killed and 
wounded. The little town of Alla- 
toona was reduced to a mere wreck by 
the severe fire of the Confederates. All 
the artillery and cavalry horses were 
killed. The valuable stores, however, 
were saved, and the fort and pass were 



held. This battle was the decisive 
event in the pursuit of Hood. Corse 
notwithstanding his severe wounds, 
was able to return the same night to 
Rome with the remainder of his com- 
mand. The only important injury done 
by the Confederates in this vicinity 
was the destruction of 6 or 7 miles of 
railroad between Big Shanty and Allar 
toona, which was immediately put in 
course of restoration. Sherman re- 
mained several days in the vicinity of 
Allatoona, watching the movements of 
Hood, suspecting he would march for 
Rome, and thence towards Bridgeport, 
or else to Kingston. 

On the 6th and 7th, Sherman pushed 
out his cavalry towards Burnt q^.^^ 
Hickory and Dallas, and disco v- 6. 
ered that the enemy had moved west- 
ward. Inferring from this that Hood 
would attempt to break the railroad 
again in the neighborhood of Kingston, 
he put his army in motion on the 
morning of the 8th through Allatoona 
Pass and arrived at Kingston on the 
10th. There he learned that Hood 
had threatened but passed by Rome, 
and that he was crossing the Coosa by 
a pontoon bridge 11 miles below. He 
therefore, on the 11th, moved his q^j^ 
army to Rome, and sent Gar- 11 • 
rard's cavalry and the Twenty-Third 
corps under Cox across the Oostanaula 
to threaten the flanks of the enemy as 
he passed northward. Gaixard drove 
a Confederate cavalry brigade beyond 
the Narrows leading into the valley oi 
the Chattooga, and captured 2 field 
pieces. 

Hood, however, moved with g^e^t 



808 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 



rapidity on his northward march, and 
on the 12 th appeared with Stewart's 
Oct. coi-ps in front of Resaca, and de- 
12. nianded its immediate and un- 
-^onditional surrender. He promised 
hat all the white officers and soldiers 
hould be parolled in a few days, but 
he threatened that if the place should 
be captured by assault, no prisoners 
would be taken. To this demand 
Colonel Weaver, who held the defenses 
of the place with 600 men and 3 pieces 
-)t artillery, replied : " If you want it, 
come and take it." The garrison 
mauned the rifle-pits surrounding the 
works, and kept the enemy's skrr- 
mishers at bay. During the day masses 
of Confederate troops continued to 
pass the fort ; but no serious attack 
was made on them, the enemy being 
more intent on destroying the railroad 
towards Dalton. Sherman had at first 
intended to move his army into the 
Chattooga Valley, to interpose between 
the enemy and his line of retreat down 
!the Coosa, but fearing that Hood 
woTild then move eastward by Spring 
Place and down the i'ederal road, he 
determined to move against him at 
Resaca. Although repulsed at that 
place by Colonel Weaver, Hood h^ad 
succeeded in breaking up the railroad 
fi'om Tilton to Dalton. At Tilton, 
during the night of the 12th, he cap- 
liu-ed a blockhouse garrisoned by a 
part of the Seventeenth Iowa, after a 
gallant defense. At Dalton, owing to 
the negligence of the National scouts, 
the Confederates were able to surround 
the foi-t garrisoned by the Forty -Fourth 
aolored regunent, under Colonel John- 



ston, before adequate preparations for 
defense could be made. A summons 
to surrender, signed by Hood, similar 
to that sent Colonel Weaver being sent 
in, Colonel Johnston, finding that Buz- 
zard Roost and other important points 
commanding his position were already 
in the enemy's hands, complied with 
the demand. During the 14th and 
15th the enemy was occupied in com- 
pleting the destraction of the railroad 
as far as Tunnel Hill. The rolling 
stock had been mostly removed ; and of 
this kind of property only a few box 
cars were destroyed. 

With the main body of his army, 
Sherman arrived at Resaca on the 14 th, 
where he encamped for the night. 
Determining to strike Hood in flank or 
force him to battle, he directed the 
army of the Tennessee, under Howard, 
to move to Snake Creek Gap, where 
a portion of the enemy's forces held the 
old National lines, and General Stanley 
with the Fourth and Fourteenth corps 
to march by way of Tilton across the 
mountains to the rear of the gap in the 
neighborhood of Villanow Howai"d 
skirmished with the Confederates diir 
ing the forenoon of the 15th^ q^j 
with the view of detaining them lo- 
till Stanley should have time to get m 
their rear ; but they gave way about 
noon, and though followed through tht 
gap, escaped before Stanley had oeei 
able to reach the further end of the 
pass. 

The approach of the National columns 
now warned Hood to move off west 
ward; and the 16th of October found 
him in full retreat for I^afayette 



vlAYLBSVILLE. 



808 



Towards that place also Sherman 
moved his army, with the view of cut- 
ting off Hood's retreat. At Ship's 
Gap, Ho'.»d left some troops intrenched, 
to detain his pursuers; but Wood's 
li vision of the Fifteenth corps rapidly 
arried the advanced posts held by two 
■ompanies of a South Carolina regi- 
ment, making the men prisoners. The 
remainder of the regiment escaped to 
the main body near Lafayette. Next 
morning Sherman's force passed over 
into the valley of the Chattooga, the 
army of the Tennessee moving in pur- 
suit, by way of Lafayette and Alpine, 
towards Blue Pond ; the army of the 
Cumberland by Summerville and Mel- 
ville Post Office to Gaylesville, and the 
army of the Ohio and Gaixard's cavalry 
from Villanow, Dirt-town, and Goover's 
Gap to Gaylesville. Hood, however, 
vas little encumbered with trains ; and 
8 he marched with great rapidity in 
a southwesterly direction, through a 
broken and mountainous country, he 
succeeded m getting into the naiTow 
gorge formed by the Lookout range 
abutting against the Coosa River in the 
neighborhood of Gadsden. 

During this retreat of Hood into 
northern Alabama, he had frequent 
opportunities to join battle with his 
pursuers. Of these, however, he de- 
clined to take advantage. He remained 
at Gadsden till near the end of October, 
receiving a few reinforcements brought 
Oct. ^P ^y Beauregard, who on the 
17. 17th assumed command of the 
confederate Military Division of the 
West, Hood still retaining his special 
command; though subject to the super- 



vision or direction of Beaureijard. The 
latter published an address appealing 
to his countrymen of all classes and 
sections for their support and confi 
dence, and urging soldiers absent with- 
out leave to return to the army. The 
address seems to have had little effect. 
On the 19th the National armies la} 
grouped about Gaylesville. 'n the q^i 
rich valley of the Chattooga, a 19. 
region abounding in com and cattle. 
Here Sherman resolved to let his mei> 
live on the country for a whUe, conten- 
for the present to watch hie enemj 
without wearing out his troupy in a use 
less pursuit. Hoping that Hood would 
turn towards Huntersville and Bridge 
port, he posted the ai-my of the Ten 
nessee near Little River, with orders tc 
keep within supporting distance of th« 
cavalry, which was directed to watcl 
Hood in the neighborhood of Hill's 
Valley, and give the earliest notice pos- 
sible of his turning northward. ITie 
army of, the Ohio was posted at Cedar 
Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon 
bridge across the Coosa and reconnoitre 
towards Center and in the direction of 
Blue Mountain. The army of the 
Cumberland was kept in reserve at 
Gayles\'ille. In the mean time com- 
munications were opened to Rome, and 
a large force was engaged in repairing 
the railroads. The injuries done to 
these were confined to two sections, one 
7 miles long between Big Shanty ami 
Allatoona, and the other 21 miles long 
between Resaca and Tunnel HilL By 
the 20th the road was in running ordei 
again from Resaca to Atlanta. On the 
28th, trains left Chattanooga for the 



SIO 



THE MARCH TO THK SEA. 



latter place. Atlanta was abimdantly 
supplied with provisions ; but forage was 
scarce; and Slocum was instructed to 
send strong detachments m the direc- 
tion of South River, for the purpose of 
iollectinc' com and fodder. He was 
also to put his wagon trains in good 
condition for further service. 

Hood had not succeeded in interrupt- 
ing the National communications to 
such a degree as would compel the 
evacuation of Atlanta Having failed 
permanently to disable the railroad, he 
had been driven into nothem Alabama, 
where he was now separated from that 
admirable railroad system by means of 
which his army had been so well and so 
long supplied. Georgia and the whole 
southeast was left exposed to the inva- 
ders; but on the other hand there 
seemed open to Hood the opportunity 
of carrying the war into Middle Ten- 
Qessee and Kentucky, where the richly 
stored cities and farms afforded tempting 
chances foi plunder. His ej^perience 
during the retreat had been such as to 
satisfy him that he was able, with the 
army at his command, to endanger at 
any moment, Sherman's communicationa 
It was his conviction that Sherman 
would not be able to follow him, and 
that even then, he would have but 
little ehance of overtaking his army. 
Sherman, however, had resolved upon 
a bolder course, and one promising 
greater and more important results. 
He had previously submitted to General 
Grant the outlines of a plan for the de- 
struction of Atlanta and the raUroad 
back to Chattanooga, to be followed by 
a march through the heart of Georgia 



to one of the Atlantic seaports. This 
proposition he now renesved from 
Gaylesville, and it received the sanction 
of the commander-in-chief. On the 2d 
of November, Grant wrote to Sherman 
"with the force you have left with 
General Thomas he must be able to take 
care of General Hood, and destroy him. 
I do not see that you can withdraw 
from where you are to follow Hood, 
without giving up all we have gained 
in territory. I say then, go on as you 
propose." On the 8th, in a letter dated 
the 7th, came Grant's adieu. "Great, 
good fortune attend you." 

The original plan of the campaign had 
been, after capturing Atlanta, to hold 
it, and, using that city as a secondary 
base, to move an army eastwai'd through 
Georgia, leaving garrisons at points 
along the railroads across the State, 
and thus cut the Confederacy in two 
from west to east, as had been done 
from north to south by the opening of 
the Mississippi. The execution of this 
plan would have requii-ed large details 
of troops, and it was willingly abau 
doned. Sherman's plan, which was 
substituted for this, effectually secured 
the same advantages. When Hood 
crossed the Chattahoochee on his flank- 
ing march upon the National communi- 
cations, he was moving in the very 
direction in which Sherman wished him 
to go ; and it was with feelings not 
unmixed with anxiety that the National 
commander watched the movements of 
his antagonist xmtil, instead of returning 
to Jonesboro, he moved off from Gads 
den to the neighborhood of Decatur. 
The ill-advised strategy of Hood gave 



PREPAKATIONS FOR THE MARCH. 



811 



Sherman the very opportunity he de- 
Mred ; and he prepared at once to avail 
himself of it. 

On the 26th of October, considering 
his army unnecessarily large for his 
)ct. purp*^^®' ^^^ having a8cert;ained 
26. that Hood had moved westward 
across Sand Mountain, Sherman de- 
tached the Fourth corps under General 
Stanley, with orders to proceed to 
Chattanooga and report to General 
Thomas at Nashville. On the 30th, 
the Twenty-Third corps, commanded 
by Schofield, was also sent to Thomas, 
to whom Sherman delegated full power 
over all the troops subject to his com- 
mand, except the four corps with which 
he designed to move into Georgia, 
This gave to General Thomas the Fourth 
and Twenty-Third corps, the two divi- 
sions under General A. J. Smith — then 
en route for Tennessee from Missoxui — 
all the garrisons in Tennessee, as well 
as all the cavalry of Sherman's Military 
Division, except one division under Kil- 
patrick, which was ordered to rendez- 
vous at Marietta. General Wilson, who 
had arrived from the army of the Poto- 
mac to take command of the cavalry of 
Sherman's army, was sent back to 
NashvQle, with all dismounted detach- 
ments, and with directions to collect as 
papidly as possible the cavalry serving 
in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, 
organize, and equip them, and report to 
Thomas for duty. These forces it was 
hoped would enable Thomas to defend 
the railroad from Chattanooga to Nash- 
ville, and, at the same time, leave him 
an army which would be a match for 
that of Hood, should he cross the Ten- 



nessee and move northward. Thomag 
was also fully informed of Sherman's 
plans, and at the same time assured 
that until he felt fully confident of 
being able to cope with Hood, the east 
ward movement on the part of Sherman 
would not be commenced. 

By the Ist of November Hood had 
moved his army from Gadsden and 
appeared in the neighborhood of j^^^ 
Decatur. Sherman then began !• 
preparations for his march througl' 
Georgia. The army of the Tennessee 
returned by slow and easy marches tr 
the neighborhood of Smyrna camp 
ground. The Fourteenth corps was 
moved to Kingston, from which point 
a"] surplus artillery, all baggage not 
needed for the contemplated laovement, 
and all the sick and wounded, and the 
refugees, were directed to be sent back 
to Chattanooga. The troops were at 
the same time put in the most efficient 
condition for a long and difficult march 
From the 2d to the 11th of November 
every locomotive and car on the Chat 
tanooga and Atlanta Railroad was put 
in requisition. The vast supplies o' 
provisions, forage, stores, and machinery, 
which had been acciunulated at Atlanta, 
Rome and other points, and eveiything 
likely to impede the movements of the 
army, were sent safely to Chattanooga. 
On the night of the 11th the last train 
left Atlanta for the north. Everything 
being now ready Corse, who still re- 
mained in Rome, was ordered to destroy 
the bridges there, as well as all the 
foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or 
other property that could be useful to 
the enemy, and move on Kingston At 



hi3 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 



the same time the railroad near Atlanta 
aad between the Etowah and the Chat> 
tahoochee was directed to be effectually 
destroyed. The garrisons north of 
Kingston were ordered to withdraw 1> 

'hattanooga, taking with them all pub- 

.c property and railroad stock, and to 
take up the rails north of Resaca and 
preserve them for future use. The 
railroad between the Etowah and the 
Oostanaula was left imtouched, as it 
might be necessary to reoccupy the 
country as far as the line of the Etowah. 
On the 12th of November the message 
f^QY^ " All is well " was telegraphed 

!'-• to Thomas ; the wire was then 
cut, and Sherman's army stood alone, 
without any communication in the rear. 
By the 14th, all the troops had arrived 
at or near Atlanta, and by orders of 
Sherman was grouped into two wings ; 
the right and left, commanded resp wt- 
ively by Generals O. O. Howard and 
H. W. Slocum. The right wing was 
composed of the Fifteenth corps, Gen- 
P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth 
corps, General Frank P. Blai- com- 
manding. The left wing was com- 
posed of the Fourteenth corps, --Teneral 
Jeff. C. Davis and the Twentieth coi-pa. 
General Slocum. The Fifteenth coq>s 
had four divisions, those of Woods, 
Hazen, Smith and Corse. The Seven- 
teenth had three divisions, those of 
Mower, Leggett and Smith. The 
Fourteenth corps had three divisions, 
those of Carlin, Morgan and Baird. 
The Twentieth corps had also three 
di\nsious, those of Jackson, Geary and 

Ward. The cavalry division was held ■ 
separate, and was subject to orders from 



Sherman only. It was commanded 
by Judson KUpatrick, and was c->m 
posed of two brigades, commanded re 
spectively by Colonels Eli H. Murray 
of Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins of 
Illinois. The total strength of tb< 
army was about 60,000 : — infantry 
about 64,000, cavalry nearly 5000, 
artillery nearly 2000. General Barry, 
in fitting out the artillery, which was 
reduced to the minimum, withdrew 
every doubtful or suspicious horse. 
Each artUlery carnage had eight horses, 
and each battery a reserve of twelve 
Sherman issued orders to regulate the 
conduct of the troops on the march. 
The whole force moved rapidly south 
ward, and on the 14th of November 
lay agaui around Atlanta. 

On the 16th all the buildings in the 
city, except the dwelling-houses jjq^. 
and churches, were destroyed 16. 
under the direction of Captain Poe, the 
chief of engineers. The several corps 
having been supplied with clothing 
and such equipments as were necessary, 
from the depots, and everything valu- 
able to the Government removed, the 
torch was applied in the evening t<j the 
various buUdings, the most substantial 
of which had been previously mined 
For many hours the heavens were 
lighted up by the flames of this va^,' 
conflagration, which was rendered more 
awful by the explosion of shells and 
magazines. By the dawn of the 16th 
all that was valuable of the city lay in 
ashes. The property destroyed in- 
cluded all the buildings connected with 
the railroads, the passenger depots, 
freight bouses, a number of locomotivee 



SHERMAN LEAVES ATLANTA. 



813 



cars, and every description of rolling 
stock ; the machine shops, mills, arse- 
nals ; the laboratory, the armory, many 
business houses, the institutions of 
learning, and all the hotels except the 
Grate City ; in all about 1800 buildings, 
exclusive of woodsheds and outhouses, 
the whole valued at about $2,000,000. 
As far as possible private property was 
spared, the object being merely to 
render the city useless to the enemy 
when he should reoccupy it. 

Connecting Atlanta with the sea- 
board are two great lines of railroad, 
nearly parallel and having a general 
southeasterly direction, one terminating 
at Charleston, 308 miles distant, the 
other at Savannah, 293 miles distant 
The former line is composed of the 
Georgia Railroad, 171 miles long, ex- 
tending from Atlanta to Augusta, and 
of the South Carolina Railroad, 137 
miles long, extending from Augusta to 
Charleston; the latter consists of the 
Western and Macon road, 103 miles 
long, connecting Atlanta and Macon, 
and of the Georgia Central Railroad, 
190 miles long, connecting Macon with 
Savannah. From Augusta there runs 
a cross railroad due south to Millen, on 
the Georgia Central Railroad, 53 miles 
long, affording a second route to Savan- 
nah from Atlanta, 10 miles longer than 
that through Macon. The belt of 
country between the twr main lines of 
railroad, as far east as Augusta and 
Millen, is of an average breadth of 40 
miles ; east of these points the country 
between the roads gradually expands 
to a width of nearly 100 miles. The 
Georgia joad, after the capture of 



Atlanta, had lost much of its import 
ance. All the others, however, includ- 
ing that between Augusta and Millen, 
were important links in the chain of 
communications between the northern 
and southern portions of the Confeder- 
acy. The feeling was prevalent, there- 
fore, that the destruction of these links 
would be a severe blow to the enemy. 
The region included within these rail 
roads was probably the richest and 
most populous of Georgia, containing 
Milledgeville, the capital of the State, 
and other important towns. It was 
reported to be rich in all kinds of agri- 
cultui-al produce and abundantly able 
to supply the wants of a large invading 
army. 

While Atlanta was yet v flames, 
SheiTuan's army began its march east 
ward in four colimms. The two consti- 
tuting the left wing under Slocum, 
followed the railroad towds Augusta, 
while the two composmg the righ^ 
wing under Howard, accompanied bj 
Kilpatrick's cavalry, marched in the 
direction of Jonesboro and McDonough, 
with orders to make a strong feint on 
Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about 
Planter's Mills, and rendezvous in the 
neighborhood of Gordon in seven days. 
Slocum moved by way of Decatur and 
Stone Mountain, with orders to tear u} 
the railroad from Social Circle to Mad 
ison, to bum the important railroad 
bridge across the Oconee, east of Madi- 
son, and then to turn southward and 
rendezvous at Milledgeville on tht> 
seventh day. Sherman himself left 
Atlanta on the 16th in company with 
the Fourteenth corps, which marched 



81i 



THE MAKCH TO THE SEA 



by way of Lithonia, Covington, and 
Shady Dale, also towards Milledgeville. 
AH the corps were provided with good 
wagon trains, in which the supplies of 
ammunition were abundant, but with 
only twenty days' bread, forty days' 
sugar and coffee, beef cattle equal to 
forty days' supplies, and a double 
allowance of salt. Three days' forage 
in grain was also taken. The instructions 
were that the army should live, during 
the march, chiefly if not altogether on 
the country, which abounded in com, 
sweet potatoes, and cattle. It was not 
at first known to the men whither they 
were marching. The opinion prevailed 
that they were off for Richmond. 
The day was unusually fine ; and a 
feeling of exhilaration seemed to per- 
vade all minds. As he moved about, 
Sherman was frequently greeted with 
the words " Uncle Billy, I guess Grant 
is waiting for you at Richmond.'' 

At what point, on the seaboa'*'?. Sher- 
man would come out coma not be 
definitely fixed. It was not impossible, 
as he would be obliged to subsist at 
least partially on the country, that a 
force inferior to his own might compel 
him to abandon his plans and seek a 
point different from that intended. 
The blindness of the Confederate au- 
thorities, however, allowed them to send 
Hood's arc y — the only considerable 
force they had between Richmond and 
the Mississippi — northward on an offen- 
sive campaign, thus leaving the whole 
southeast open, with little opposition 
to be dreaded by the National forces 
on any route they might take. Sher- 
man's first object was to place his army 



in the heart of Georgia, interposing it 
between Macon and, Augusta, and thus 
obliging the Confederates to scatter 
their forces in order to defend not only 
those points, but Millen, Savannah, 
and Charleston. It was his opinion 
that by means of pretended demonstra 
tions on places widely separated, leav- 
ing it doubtful whether the immediate 
objective was Augusta or Macon, or 
both, he would be able to perjilex the 
enemy and insure a speedy and unin 
terrupted march to the coast. 

Howard's command, of which the 
Fifteenth corps formed the right fol- 
lowing the railroad southward as far 
as Jonesboro, encountered the mounted 
troops of Iverson ; but these were 
"luickly dispersed by Kilpatrick's cav- 
alry. The column then moved east- 
ward through McDonough and Jackson 
to the Ocmulgee, crossed it at Planter's 
Mills and passing southward through 
Monticello and Hillsboro, and between 
Milledgeville and Clinton, struck the 
Georgia Central Railroad on the 22d, 
the left at Gordon, 20 miles east j^^y^ 
of Macon, the right extending 22. 
westward towards Griswoldville. In 
conjxmction with the operations of 
Howard's column, the greater part of 
the National cavalry under Kilpatrick 
made a circuit by the right, through 
Griffin and Foi-syth, towards Macon. 
At first the Confederates supposed this 
to be only a raid on a grand scale ; but 
on the approach of Howard's column — 
and still remaining ignorant of Slocxira'a 
movement in the direction of Augusta 
— they began to think that Sherman 
was aiming at the capture of Macon 



GBISWOLDVILLE. 



m 



They, therefore, concentrated at that 
place all their available force, consisting 
of some cavalry under Wheeler, a small 
body of veterans, and several brigades 
of militia. On the 20th, 800 of Kil- 
{tatrick's cavalry with 4 cannon, made 
a pretended attack on East Macon, two 
miles east of the city, and drove the 
enemy within his intrenchments. Lit- 
tle loss was sustained on either side ; 
but the movement very effectually ac- 
complished its purpose of confirming 
the Confederates in the belief that 
Macon was Sheiman's objective. The 
National cavalry then, after destroying 
several miles of railroad east of Wal- 
nut Creek, withdrew to Griswoldville. 
The Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps 
having struck the Georgia Central 
Railroad on the 2 2d, as already stated, 
immediately commenced to destroy the 
track and the road-bed between Gordon 
and Griswoldville. 

While this work was gomg on, onf> 
of the severest battles of the campaign 
took place. Walcott's brigade of in- 
fantry, with a section of artillery and 
some cavalry, forming the extreme 
right of the Ilfteenth corps, had been 
thrown forward to Griswoldville to 
cover that flank, and also to continue 
the demonstration on Macon commenc- 
ed by Kilpatrick. At the same time 
Howard s trains were closing up, and 
his men were destroying the raiboads. 
Walcott, after burning the principal 
buildings in Griswoldville, posted his 
troops in a wood protected in fi-ont by 
an open morass, and threw up a raU 
breast-work. About two in the after- 
loon a force of the enemy, about 500C 



strong, moved out of Macon and ap 
proached the National position. Fall 
ing back slowly, the National cavalry 
placed themselves in connection with 
the infantry so as to protect them in 
flank and rear, and leave the enemy no 
alternative but to make a direct front 
attack. The Confederate force, ccn^ 
sisting of a part of Hardee's old com 
mand brought up from Savannah and 
several brigades of militia, advanced 
boldly ; and, being mostly inexperienced 
troops, and ignorant of the strength of 
the National position, they attempted to 
carry it by storm. They made six 
desperate assaults, which Walcott's vet 
erans, well protected by theii- breast- 
works, repelled with ease, and with 
little loss, while the Confederates mov- 
ing with difficulty through the morass, 
were exposed to a steady fire from men 
conscious of security, and suffered se- 
verelj- When they retired, they left 
300 dead upon the field. The Confeder- 
ate loss, according to their own account, 
was 614, including General Anderson 
severely wounded. It was probably 
nearer 2000. After this battle, Macon 
might easily have been taken by 
Howard, but now that the raili'oad 
connections were destroyed, its posses- 
sion was no longer an important object. 
In the mean time, the left wing of 
Sherman's army continued its march 
along the Augusta and Macon Railroad 
in two })arallel columns, the Twentieth 
corps on the left, the Foiu-teenth, accom- 
panied by Sherman, on the light. The 
latter corps having thoroughly de- 
stroyed the railroad as fai' as Covington, 
turned south, on the 19th. towaixh 



816 



THE MABCH TO THE SEA. 



Milledgeville ; while the Twentieth 
corps, which had previoiisly marched 
on the north side of the railroad, con- 
tinued the work of destroying the track 
and the bridges as far as Madison 30 
miles north of Milledgeville and 90 
niles west of Augusta. To strengthen 
the conviction that this movement was 
intended to threaten Augusta, the cav- 
alry, moving on the left wing, was sent 
as far east as Union Point, 7*^ miles 
west of that city. From Mad-^ot the 
Twentieth corps turned off nearly due 
south, and passing through Eatonton, 
^Qy^ its advance arrived at Milledge- 
21. ville on the 21st, followed, next 
day, by the Fourteen) th corps, which 
passed through Shady Dale and Eaton- 
ton, neither coips having encountered 
any opposition during its marcL 

When Sherman's army set out from 
Atlanta, the Georgia legislature was in 
session at Milledgeville, but the ap- 
proach of Kalpatrick's cavalry caused 
no alarm there, as the movement was 
supposed to be only a raid, and that its 
object was Macon. When, however, on 
the ] 8th, it was discovered that How- 
ard with the right wing was moving 
through McDonough in a southeasterly 
direction, and that Slocum was also 
approaching from the north, a panic 
seized the whole body of legislators, 
who fled with all possible haste to 
Augusta. After this exodus several 
days of quiet passed, when on a bright 
sunshiny morning an advanced regi- 
ment of the Twentieth corps entered 
the capital of Georgia, with the band 
playing the national airs. 

Only a few of the National troops 



entered Milledgeville. Two or three 
regiments were detailed under the 
orders of engineers to destroy govern- 
ment and certain other property. The 
magazines, arsenals, depot buildings, 
factories of various kinds, with store- 
houses cntaining large amounts of 
government property, and about 1700 
bales of cotton, were burned. Privatt 
houses, even those of noted Confeder 
ates, were left xminjured, as well as 
the Capitol ; and the inhabitants were 
protected as far as possible from pil- 
lage or insult from the soldiery. The 
hospital surgeons, the principal of the 
Insane Asylum, and others, expressed 
their thankfulness for the excellent 
order preserved duiing the National 
occupation. Some stores and about 
2500 small-arms fell into the possession 
of the National troops ; and a number 
of Union prisoners were liberated from 
the penitentiary. 

While Sherman's left wing was en- 
joying a temporary rest at Milledge- 
ville, the right, under Howard, moved 
eastward along the Georgia Central 
Railroad, with orders to destroy it 
thoroughly as they went, as far as Ten- 
nille Station. The Confederates now 
became aware that Macon was not to be 
serioiisly attacked ; and Wheeler, march- 
ing with all speed, got across the 
Oconee near the railroad bridge, and, 
aided by a body of militia under Gen 
eral Wayne, prepared to dispute the 
passage. When Howard airived on 
the 23d, he found the guard there so 
strong that a crossing coidd be effected 
only at considerable loss. After skir- 
mishing near the rivei a day or two to 



WAYNESBOKO. 



817 



occupy the enemy's attention, the Fif- 
teenth corps was moved to a ford 8 
miles below, and a pontoon bridge was 
laid without much difficulty. The 
Confederates then retreated ; and by 
e 26th the whole risrht winof had 
ossed the river, and moving eastward 
as engaged in destroying the railroad. 
The left wing crossed the Oconee near 
Milledgeville on the 24th, and moved 
by two roads in a southeasterly direc- 
tion towaj'ds Sandereville, a small town 
38 miles from Milledgeville, and a little 
north of the railroad. The Fouiteenth 
corps now took position on the left of 
Slocum's column, and Shennan accom- 
panied th« Twentieth corps towards 
Sandersville. On approaching this 
Nov. pl'^^e on the 25th, the bridges 
25. across Buffalo Creek were found 
to have been burned. Next day the 
two coi-ps, marching by jiarallel roads, 
entered the town almost at the same 
moment, skirmishing with and driving 
out Wheeler's cavalry, which had at- 
tempted to impede their progress. On 
the 27th and 28th both wings lay 
encamped between Sandersville and 
Irwin's Cross-Roads, a few miles south 
of the railroad. About this time also 
Sherman shifted his quarters from the 
left vring to the Seventeenth corps, 
then at Tennille Station, opposite San- 
dei'sville. 

Kilpatrick, after the demonstration 
at Macon which ended ^vith the action 
at Griswoldville, shifted his cavalry 
force to the left wing, and remaining 
a 1 1,1) at Milledgeville to recruit, was 
directed to move rapidly eastward and 
break the railroad bet^veen Millen and 



Augusta, thus threatening Augusta 
and covering the passage of the maiL 
body of the army across the Ogeechee, 
the next great river on Sherman's route 
east of the Oconee. After breaking 
the railroad, Kilpatrick was ordered to 
turn southward and move rapidly upon 
Millen, to rescue the National prisoner? 
supposed to be confined there. On th«- 
27th, a few hundred of his cav- jy^^y 
airy, under Captains Hays and 21. 
Estes, dashed into Waynesboro, on the 
railroad, 30 miles south of Augusta, 
where they did some damage ; but it 
having been ascertained that the prison- 
ers had for several weeks previous been 
in the coui-sc of removal from Millen to 
some less exposed point in southern 
Georgia, no demonstration was made on 
that town. The advanced cavalry 
detachment now fell back to its main 
body, which lay east of the Ogeechee 
near Louisville. Kilpatrick had re- 
tired thence to meet the infantry, with 
instructions from Sherman not to risk 
a battle unless circumstances should 
greatly give him the advantage. But 
the appearance of the cavalry on the 
left flank of the National army, led 
the Confederates to suppose that Au 
gusta was the real objective of the 
campaign. Shennan, therefore, ordered 
Kilpatrick to leave all his wagons and 
other incumbrances with the It ft wing 
and to move towards A\Tieeler's cav- 
alr}% which was hovering around in th. 
direction of Augusta ; and if Wheeler 
desired fighting to give him all he 
wanted. Accordingly, Kilpatrick, svy 
poi-ted by Baird's division of infantr) 
of the Fourteenth corps, again moved 



«18 



THE MAECH TO THE SEA. 



in the direction of Waynesboro. En- 
countering AVlieeler in the neighbor- 
Qgg^ hood of Thomas' Station, on the 
i- 3d of December, Kilpatrick at- 
tack ihI Lim in position, diiving him 
from three successive lines of barri- 
cade«, through Waynesboro and across 
Brier Creek, the biidges over which 
he burned. Marching rapidly south- 
vvai-d from Waynesboro, he rejoined 
the left wnng at Jacksonboro, 20 miles 
•iast of Millen, on the 5th. 

On the 28th of November the Four- 
teenth corps stinick the Ogeechee at 
Fenn's bridge, 15 miles north of Sand- 
ersville. The river was crossed by pon- 
toons; and marching along its north 
bank, the corps anived at Louisville on 
the 29th. Upon reaching Buckhead 
Creek, it then turned eastwaid to Lump- 
kin's Station, on the Augusta and Millen 
Railroad, 10 miles south of Waynes- 
boro. On the 3d and 4th of December 
it destroyed a considerable portioj of 
the track, and then marched in a south- 
easterly direction for Jacksonboro. At 
the same time the Twentieth corps 
moved along the railroad, which from 
Davisboro Station runs parallel with 
the Ogeechee for about 20 miles. The 
Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps moved 
along the south side of the railroad, 
the Fifteenth, mth which was General 
Howard in person, keeping on the right 
flank and about a day's march ahead, so 
»s to be ready to turn against the flank 
oi any force of the enemy that should 
attempt to oppose the progress of 
the main body. The Twentieth and 
Seventeenth corps had been some d»ys 
ffligaged in destropng the railroad be- 



tween Tennille Station and the Ogee 
chee. This river, being here about 
sixty yards wide, and naturally a strong 
defensive line to the enemy, might 
have been rendered a serious obstacle. 
On the 30th, however, a crossing \\ as 
effected vdth little difiiculty, the fio\. 
Twentieth at the railroad bridge 30. 
and the Seventeenth near Bai-ton Sta 
tion, a few miles further east. These 
two coi-ps advanced steadily along the 
railroad, and on the 2d of Decembei 
the Seventeenth reached Millen ; the 
Twentieth, passing a little north of 
that town through Birdsville, moved iu 
a southeasterly direction, while the 
Fifteenth in two columns, stUl a day's 
march m advance of the main body 
kept along the west bank of the 
Ogeechee. The whole army then turn 
ing slowly round frorr. its easterly 
course, moved directly southward in 
parallel columns, all except the Fif- 
teenth corps — which was directed to 
cross to the east bank on arriving at 
Eden Station — between the Ogeechee 
and Savannah Rivers, the Seventeenth 
corps following the railroad and tear- 
ing it up while advancing, the Four- 
teenth keeping along the Savannah 
River road, and the Twentieth march- 
ing down the middle road by way of 
Springfield. Kilpatrick covered the 
rear, and kept at bay such scattered 
bodies of the enemy's cavalry as 
attempted to harass the columns while 
in motion. 

The advantage of the feint which 
had been made towards Augusta now 
became apparent. A considerable 
number of Confederate troops had 



1 



THE GULF KAILKOAD CUT. 



81S 



been concentrated at that place. Had 
Sherman's true object been known, 
these might have been used to obstruct 
his march to Savannah, towards which 
he was now moving. The weather 
which had been for the most part 
favorable during the first half of the 
campaign, became rainy after the col- 
umns passed Millen. As the army 
approached Savannah, the coimtry was 
found more marshy and difficult. Great 
obstructions were met in tin- shape of 
felled trees where the roads crossed the 
creek swamps or narrow causeways ; 
but these the well -'organized pioneer 
companies rapidly removed. No im- 
portant opposition was encountered till 
the heads of the columns were wthiu 
about 15 miles of Savannah. Here all 
the roads leading to the city were again 
found obstructed -with felled timber ; 
but the imperfect defenses thus formed 
were easily turned and the enemy 
driven away. 

By the 10th of December the Con- 
Dec, federates had retired within their 
10. lines at Savannah. These follow- 
ed a swampy creek which falls into the 
Savannah River about 3 miles above 
the city and extended thence to the 
head of a corresponding creek which 
falls into the Little Ogeechee. These 
streams formed excellent cover for the 
enemy, flowing through marshes and 
rice fields, which could be flooded either 
by the tide-water or from inland ponds, 
the gates of which were covered by 
heavy artillery. 

To prevent an attack on the Gulf 
Railroad, at that time employed to its 
utmost capacity in bringing supplies 



and reinforcements to the city, the Con. 
federates sent a force across the Ogee- 
chee, which they supposed woujd be 
able to check the advance of the Fif- 
teenth corps. The greater part of this 
corps had, however, passed over to the 
east bank of the river on the 7th neai 
Eden Station ; and the next day Corse's 
division was pushed forward between 
the Little and Great Ogeechee, in ad- 
vance of the main column, to the canal 
connecting the Ogeechee with the 
Savannah. A position was taken up 
on the south side of the canal and in- 
trenched ; the Confederates abandoning 
the portion of their advanced line there 
and retiring within the fortifications oi 
Savannah. Reinforcements fi'om the 
Fifteenth corps were sent to Corse; 
and on the 9th a detachment moved 
forward to the Gulf Railroad, tore up 
the track for several miles, and cap 
tured a train of 18 cars with many 
prisoners, thus cutting off communica- 
tions between Savannah and the south 
No supplies could reach the city bj 
the accustomed channels ; while the 
investing forces had large herds ol 
cattle, brought * with the s . ray oi 
gathered from the country on the 
march ; and although stUl without 
communication with the f.»^,et, thej 
had yet remaining in the ?-rjiy wagons 
a considerable supply oi breadstuffe 
and other necessaries. The fine rice 
crops, along the Savannah and Ogee- 
chee rivers, aftorded abundance Oj 
fodder for the cattle, as well as food for 
the men. The country south f/ the 
Ogeechee was also open »j fcr^i^iny 
ground. 



320 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 



The only approaches to Savannah 
were the two railroads, and the Au- 
gusta, Louisville and Ogeechee dirt 
roads, all narrow causeways and com- 
manded by heavy ordnance, against 
which it would have been useless to 
oppose the light field gims with which 
Sherman's army was provided. The 
strength of the enemy at that time was 
also unknown to the National com- 
mander, and he determined not to us- 
sault immediately, trusting that the 
operation of time would bring about 
the desired result. Sherman, therefore, 
instructed his army commanders to 
invest the city as closely as possible 
from the north and west, and to re- 
connoitre the ground well in their front. 
The 11th and 12th of December were 
passed in putting the troops in position, 
erecting breast-works, and establishing 
batteries. The army lay in a semicir- 
Dgp^ cular line about ten miles long — 
12. the left resting on the Savannah 
River at a point 3 miles distant from 
the city, the right on the Gulf Railroad 
at a distance of 11 miles — everywhere 
confronted by the enemy's strong line 
of earth-works, which constituted the 
exterior fortifications of the city. 

In the mean time, in order to facili- 
tate communications with the fleet. 
Captain Duncan, with two scouts, was 
sent down the Ogeechee is a small 
skiff, on the night of the 9th. Con- 
cealing themselves in the rice swamps 
during the following day, they resumed 
the perilous voyage at night, and suc- 
ceeded in getting past Fort McAllister 
and the Confederate picket-boats dur- 
ing a rain-storm. They then made their 



way into Ossabaw Sound, where on the 
morning of the 11th they were picked 
up by the National gun-boat Flag, and 
immediately conveyed to Hilton Head. 
General Foster was at that time operat- 
intr asrainst the Charleston and Savan 
nah Railroad with the view of destroy 
ins: the communications of Savannah 
with the north. He was immediately 
sent for, and received Howard's dis 
patch of the 9th : " We have had per- 
fect success, and the army is in fine 
spirits." This was the first direct 
intelligence from Sherman's army since 
its departure from Atlanta, and its 
reception caused universal rejoicing in 
the North. 

The co-operative movement of Foster 
against the Charleston and Savannah 
E^ilroad, the object of which was to 
effect a lodgment at Pocotaligo or a 
Grahamville, had only partially suc- 
ceeded. The o^^edition dispatched 
for this purpose, consisting of 5500 
men under General Hatch, together 
with a naval brigade under Commander 
Preble, and gvm-boats from Admiral 
Dahlgren's squadron, arrived soon after 
daylight at Boyd's Point, where the 
troops were landed. They advanced 
skirmishing some miles ; but not being 
acquainted with the country did not 
succeed in reaching the railroad, and at 
night were compelled to withdraw. 
Next day, however, the march was 
resumed ; and the troops were pushed 
on towards the enemy's position near 
Grahamville. Str^vug works, cot sist- 
ing of a fort and baitery, with rifle-j.its, 
were found at Honey Hiil, 3 Piiles fr'>ui 
Grahamville. The ganiflon hiwev^r 



FORT McALHSTEK, 



821 



* ts slim, there being only 1500 men un- 
ci, r Genera] G. W. Smith, with 7 pieces 
ot artillery. The position was imme- 
diately attacked An engagement en- 
sue \, lasting six hours, and the National 
trocps were on the point of carrying 
he yorks, when reinforcements arrived 
or the enemy. These consisted of a 
regi; aent of infantry and some cavalry, 
andt r General Robertson, who brought 
also another battery. It being found 
impojsible now to contend against the 
increi::aed force of the enemy, protected 
aa they were by their defenses, the 
National force was withdrawn to a 
good position on the Savannah road, 
having sustained a loss of 740 men. 
The operations on the part of Foster, in 
which there was a good deal of desul- 
tory fighting, were continued for several 
days; and, although he did no* succeed 
in getting possession of the raihoad, in 
guarding which the Confederates dis- 
pKyed. gieat tenacity, his troops under 
Hatjh secured a position on the peniu- 
aula or neck between the Coosawatchie 
and Tullafinney Creek, about three- 
quaiters of a mile from the railroad. 
From this point, the intervening woods 
having been cut down for the purpose, 
they could clirect the fire of their artil- 
lery on the jassing trains. 

As the gr€ &ter part of the fleet was 
already in o/ at the entrance of the 
Savannah River, nothing remained to 
be done but to send a few vessels to 
Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds to open 
ommunicatioES with the army. The 
atter sound, the estuary of the Ogee- 
chee, affording the most practicable 
mode of accomplishing this object, 



Sherman took meastires to reduce Fort 
McAllister, a strong redoubt on the 
right bank of the river, which its guns 
commanded. This fort, situated 6 miles 
from the sound and about 18 miles 
southwest of Savannah, was highly im- 
portant to the seciuity of the city in 
the rear. It was one of the strongest 
of its class in the South ; and it had suc- 
cessfully resisted the attacks of a small 
fleet of iron-clads in the early part oi 
the year 1863. It mounted 23 guns 
en barbette and one mortar, including 
several 8-inch anl 10-inch pieces. 
Every line of approach to the fort was 
commanded by howitzers and field 
pieces placef u the bastions. A deep 
ditch 40 feco ivide, into the bottom of 
which were driven palisades, extended 
along its front ; and a formidable line of 
abatis ran along the outer edge of the 
ditch, beyond which the approaches 
were thickly planted with torpedoes. 
Fortunately the garrison was not strong, 
consisting of only two companies oi 
artillery and three of infantry, in al. 
about 200 men, in command of Major 
Anderson. It would doubtless have 
been reinforced in a few days. On the 
evening of the 12th, Hazen's division 
of the Fifteenth corps was marched 
from its position on the Gulf Railroad 
to the Ogeechee, just below the mouth 
of the Canoochie, where the bridge, 
known as King's Bridge, having been 
destroyed was rapidly reconstructed in 
a substantial manner. At daybreak o\ 
the 1 3th Hazen crossed to the west Dec, 
bank and pushed on towards Fort 13. 
McAllister, his orders being to carrj, 
it by assault Hazen reached thf 



999 



83a 



THE MABOH TO THE HhA. 



vicinity of the fort about one o'clock, 
and deployed his division in such a 
manner that both flanks rested on the 
river. His skirmishers were posted 
behind the trunks of trees whose 
branches had been used by the enemy 
n constructing the abatis. About 
five o'clock the assault was made, with 
9 regiments, at three points. In a very 
short time, the intervening space of 600 
yards was crossed, the abatis sur- 
mounted, and the ditch reached. A 
few minutes sufficed to tear down 
enough of the palisades to permit the 
passage of the troops, who with loud 
cheers and great enthusiasm rushed in 
swarms over the parapet and planted 
their colors on the rampart. In twenty 
minutes from the time the assault was 
commenced the fort was won. The 
struggle was brief. The losses were 
not great on either side. The victory, 
however, was complete. Shermaa him- 
self, was an eye-witness of the Dera- 
tions from a rice-mill on the opposite 
bank of the river. 

No communication had yet been 
effected with the fleet. From a signal 
station at the rice-mill, Sherman's offi- 
cers had been for two days gazing 
anxiously over the rice fields and salt 
marsh, in the direction of Ossabaw 
Sound, but no vessel came in sight. 
\Vhile the preparations for assaulting 
Fort McAllister had been going on, 
the smoke-stack of a small steamer evi- 
dently approaching became visible on 
the horizon. Just before the assault 
was made, the steamer was signalled. 
Answer was given ; and, as soon as 
be saw the colors fairly planted on the 



fort, Sherman, in company with How 
ard, proceeded in a small boat to meet 
Hazen ; but finding that he had not 
yet been able to communicate with 
the steamer, which was hid from him 
by some intervening woods, he tooi 
another small boat with a crew, and 
pulled down the river to it. It proved 
to be the tug Dandelion, Captain Wil 
liamson, who announced that Admiral 
Dahlarren and General Foster were on 
their way and might be hourly expected 
in the soimd. Sherman, after writing 
a despatch to the War Department, 
his fii^t since leaving Atlanta, returned 
immediately to Fort McAllister. Be- 
fore daylight on the 14th he received 
intelligence that Foster had actu- oec. 
ally arrived in the steamer No 14. 
maha and was anxious for an inteniew. 
Sherman immediately went on board 
the Nemaha, and after a consultation 
proceeded in that steamer to meet 
Dahlgren, whose flag-ship, the Harvest 
Moon, was in Warsaw Sound. Meas- 
ures were at once concerted for opening 
pennanent communication between the 
army and the fleet; and Dahlgren, 
having agreed to engage the attention 
of the forts at Wilmington and Rose 
dew, Sherman returned to Fort Mc 
Allister the follomng day, confident of 
being able to carry the defenses of 
Savannah as soon as his heavy ordnance 
from Hilton Head should anive. Or 
the 17th a number of 33-pounder 0^^ 
Parrott guns were landed from 17. 
transports, at King's bridge, on the 
Ogeechee, where the new base was 
established, the obstructions in the 
river below having been removed : and 



HARDEE RETIRES FROM SAVANNAH. 



«n3 



Sherman despatched from Slocum's 
headquarters, by flag of truce, a formal 
demand for the surrender of the city. 
This was refused by General Hardee, 
who was in command there with about 
15,000 men. Hardee expressed a de- 
ermination to hold the city to the last, 
saying that his communications were 
yet open, that he was fully supplied 
with subsistence stores, and was able 
t<» withstand a long siege. On the 
same day, a large body of cavalry under 
Kilpatrick, with infantry sapports, were 
sent down the Gulf Railroad as far as 
the Altamaha River, for the purpose of 
destroying the track. This work was 
thoroughly accomplished for the entire 
distance, including 4 miles of trestle- 
work immediately adjoining the river. 

The city was now invested on every 
side except along the Savannah River. 
That river, which was filled with ob- 
structions and commanded by the guns 
of Forts Jackson, Lee, and Lawton. was 
in possession of the enemy nearly as 
far towards the sea as Fort I'jlaskL 
Opposite the city is Hutchinson's 
Island, several miles long, the west 
end of which was in possession of Slo- 
cum's troops; but the lower end still 
remained in the hands of the enemy. 
A little below the island, on the South 
Carolina side, the Union Causeway 
which runs north through the swamps 
intervening between Savannah and 
Charleston, afforded a way of escape to 
Hardee. 

Reconnoissances from the left flank 
had shown that it was impracticable to 
push a considerable force across the 
Savannah River vnth a view to occupy 



the causeway, as the enemy holding 
the river opposite the city with iron 
clad gun-boats, would be able to destroy 
any pontoons laid down between Hut- 
chinson's Island and the South Carolina 
shore. Sherman, therefore, ordered Slo 
cum to get his siege guns into po.nitiou, 
and prepare for an assault; while he 
himself, proceeded to Port Royal and 
made anangements to have the Union 
Causeway occupied from the north by 
the troops of Foster. In the meantime 
a substantial corduroy road had been 
constructed across the swamps and rice 
fields from the Ogeechee, at King's 
Bridge, to the vicinity of the city 
Along this road the heavy siege gun." 
were transported to their position, a? 
well as supplies for the armj. 

Hardee seeing this, and well aware 
that the avenue of escape northward 
w^ould not be allowed long to remain 
open to him, immediately made prepar 
ations for evacuating the city. On the 
afternoon of the 20th he caused Dgc^ 
his troops to destroy the navy 20. 
yard and the Confederate Government 
property; while the two iron-clads 
Georgia and Savannah moved up the 
river, and, supported by several bat- 
teries, opened on the National left 
a furious fire, which was continued all 
night, with a view to cover the retreat 
The Confederate troops were conveyed 
across the river, during the night, ii 
steamboats and row-boats and on rafts 
and on the morning of the 21st, tavinj; 
blown up the iron-clads and the forts 
below the city, they were well on theii 
way towards Charleston. 

Hardee's retirement was discovered 



iu 



THE MAR H 10 THE SKA. 



by the National pickets at dawn on the 
2l8fc; and several regiments were sent 
forward to occupy the deserted intrench- 
ments. A few nuurs later Sherman, 
who had just returned from Hilton 
Dg^^ Head, entered the city at the head 
'il. of his body-guard and received 
the formal surrender from the muni- 
cipal authorities. On the same day 
Foster communicated with the city by 
steamers, taking up what torpedoes 
could be found and passing safely over 
others. Measures were also taken for 
clearing the channel of all obstructions. 
The captures included 800 prisoners, 
150 guns, 13 locomotives in good order, 
190 cars, a large supply of ammunition 
and material of war, 4 steamboats, be- 
sides the iron-clads and transports blown 
up by the enemy, and 33,000 bales of 
cotton safely stored. 

Writing to President Lincoln on the 
2 2d of December, Sherman said : " I beg 
to present you, as a Christmas gift, the 
^ity of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns 
and plenty of ammunition, and also 
about 25,000 bales of cotton." Lincoln 
replied, thanking Sherman for his gift. 
Elalleck and Grant both wrote letters 
af congratulation to the victorious gen- 
eral. " I never " wrote Grant " had a 
doubt of the result. When Appre- 
hensions for your safety were expressed 
by the President, I assured him that 
with the army you had, and with you 
in command of it, there was no danger 
but that you would reach salt water in 
some place. But I should not have 
felt the same security — in fact 1 would 
not have entrusted the expedition to 
any other living conunander " 



Thus ended the great march to the 
sea — a march which, while it command- 
ed the attention of the world, and estab 
lished on soKd foundations the militarj- 
reputation of General Sherman, dem- 
onstrated, in the most striking man- 
ner, the inherent weakness of the 
Confederacy. The campaign had lasted 
over five weeks ; and, during that 
time, an army 65,000 strong, with 
10,000 horses, over a tract varying from 
20 to 60 miles in width, traversed a 
distance of 300 miles, Sherman had 
lost only 567 men, of whom 63 were 
killed, 245 wounded, the remainder 
missing. A track of desolation marked 
the progress of the army. Over 20,000 
bales of cotton had been destroyed, 
and probably over 25,000 bales cap- 
tured. There were captured besides 
some 10,000,000 poimds of corn, and 
an equal amount of fodder ; neai'ly 
1,500,000 rations of meat ; about 1,000, 
000 rations of bread ; 483,000 rationr 
of coffee, 581,000 of sugar, about 1,150, 
000 of soap, and 137,000 of salt. This, 
however, was not alL Over 320 miles 
of raiiroad were destroyed ; and so 
complete waa the work of destruction 
that conununications between the Con- 
federate armies in Virginia and those 
in the west were finally and effectually 
severed. Sherman had. during his 
march, forced into his service some 5000 
horses and 4000 mules, and captured 
1328 prisoners, with 167 guns. His 
army entered Savannah, accompanied 
by more than 10,000 negroes, who 
everywhere haUed the National troops 
as deliverers. According to Sherman's 
own estimate, damage was done to the 



SAVANNAH StTBMISSIVE. 



896 



State of Georgia to the extent of 
$100,000,000, of whicli $20,000,000 
t least inured to the advantage of the 
National government. 

General Geary was appointed mili- 
tary commander of Savannah, immedi- 
ately after the surrender. On the 26th 
from his head-quarters in the field, 
General Sherman issued special orders, 
giving instructions as to the course of 
conduct to be pursued by the military 
authorities towards the inhabitants of 
the captured city. The orders were 
strict ; but they were not unjust, nor 
could they even be called severe. The 
property of the peaceful citizens was 
to be respected. Industry of all kinds 
was to be encouraged. Assistance was to 
be tendered to all deserving families or 
individuals who, from whatever cause 
were in necessitous circumstances. The 
Mayor was instructed to give public 
notice that the time had come when all 
must choose their course, and decide 
whether they were willing to remain 
within the National lines, and conduct 
themselves as good citizens, or depart 
in peace. Those who prefen'ed to 
leave were to report their names to 
the Chief-Quarterraaster ; and measures 
would be taken to secure them safe 
transport beyond the lines. Sherman 
deemed it his duty to lay hib hand 
somewhat hfeavily on the press. Only 
tw* newspapers were to be published 
in the city ; and their editors and pro- 



prietors were to be held to the strictest 
accountability. 

In the grave emergency in which 
they now found themselves, the inhab- 
itants of Savannah conducted them- 
selves with the utmost propriety. 
Their behavior, indeed, was in striking 
contrast with that of the inhabitants of 
other Confederate citiea No iU feeling 
was manifested towards their captors 
by word or deed. On the contrary 
there was evidence that the occupation 
of the city by the Nationals, was felt 
to be a deliverance. A latent Union 
sentiment soon began to reveal itself ; 
and as early as the 28th of December, 
a meeting of influential citizens was 
held at the call and under the presi 
dency of Mayor Arnold, and resolu 
tions -vere passed — acknowledging thf 
duty of submission to the laws of the 
United States, and asking protection 
accordingly, respectfully requesting 
his Excellency, the Governor of Georgia, 
to call a convention of the people of 
that State, and thus afford an oppor- 
tunity of voting upon the question 
whether the war between the two sec- 
tions of the country should continue, 
and finally tendering thanks to the 
military commander for his " urbanity ' 
and his " uniform kindness." 

The year 1864 was all but ended 
Before the close, however, Shrrm&L 
had perfected his plans for the ) <>}•« 
ted march through the Can>b"njM 



^a« 



HOOD ANT) THOMAS IK TEKNESSEE. 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 



fhomaa at Nashville — Shennan's Instmctions — Sherman Divides his Army — Troops sent to Thomas — What 
the Confederates thoaght of Sherman's Movements — Grant's Opinion of Hood's Conduct — Hood playing 
into the hands of his Antagonist — Appearance of Forrest in Tennessee — At Waterloo — ^Forreet Attacks 
Athens — Campbell Compelled to Surrender — Forrest Advances to Pulaski — Held in Check by Bousseau— 
Forrest Divides his Command^Bniord at Huntsville — Pursued by Granger's Cavalry — Forrest destroys 
the Railroad between Carter's Creek and Spring Hill — Buford and Forrest Pursued by Rousseau, Wash 
borne and Morgan — The Confederates Escape to the South Side of the Tennessee— Thomas Re-arranging 
and Re-distributing his Troops — The Confederates Attack the Garrison at Decatur — Granger makes a 
Stubborn Resistance — The Confederates Compelled to Retire— The Confederates at Cypress Creek — Held 
In Check by General Croxton — Hood's Purpose — Thomas Divines his Plans — Rosecranz in Missouri — The 
Condition in which he Found the State — The Confederates Encouraged by the Failure of the Red River 
Expedition— General Sterling Price — "Knights of the Golden Circle"—" Sons of Liberty "—Threatened 
Rising in Missouri — Rosecranz Communicates with the Government at Washington — Arrest of the Belgian 
Consul — The Government Incredulous — Rosecranz Resolute — Shelby at Batesville — Rosecranz joined by 
A. J. Smith — Shelby at Bloomfield — Pilot Knob— General Evring at RoUa — Price before Jefferson City— 
Compelled to Move oS in a Westerly Direction — Price already a Disappointed Man— Danville and High 
Hill — Price Retreats followed by Pleasonton--Fagan at Independence — Routed by Pleasontoi -At the 
Big Bine— Curtis at Westport — Severe Engagement — The Confederates Routed — At Marais des Cygnes- 
Prlce Surprised — Falls Back to Little Osage Crossing— Marmaduke and Cabell Captured — The Confederate 
Retreat into Arkansas— Pleasonton Resting his Men at Fort Scott— Price at Newtonia — Engagement a 
Fayotxeville — The Confederates driven off with Heavy Loss— Price's Invasion a Failure — Grant DispU-ased 
with Rosecranz — Minor Operations in Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee — Morgan's Last Raid- 
Oeath of the Guerrilla Chief — Generals Qillem and Burbridge — Breckenridge to Command in East Tennessee 
— Stoneman's Raid — Strawberry Plains — Saltville — Bean Station — Burbridge at Bristol — At Abingdon — 
Marion- Hood and Thomas Confronting each other— Preparing for the Conflict— Re-appearance of Forrest 
—Thomas Waiting for Reinforcements— Schofield at Columbia — At Franklin — Schofield Forms his Line 
»l Battle — The Battle Ground— The West Bank of the Harpeth River— Hood Resolves to Attack Schofield's 
Centre — The Battle Begun— The Confederates Attack with Great Fierceness — The National Line Penetrated 
—Almost a Confederate Victory — Stanley to the Rescue — Opdyke's brave 'First Brigade" — The Tide of 
Oatiie Turned- The National Line Restored — Repeated Onsets — Midnight — Sounds of Battle Hushed- A 
National Victory — Opdyke Complimented — Losses on both sides Heavy — Position of Thomas' Troops 
Before Nashville — Montgomery Hill — Murfreesboro — Overall's Creek — Fort Rosecranz — Thomas' Delay 
Misunderstood at Washington — Grant Dissatisfied — Hurries from City Point — Explanations — Intense Cold 
— The Ground Impassable — The Weather Moderates — Immense Activity in Both Camps — Thomas' Plan of 
Battle— Montgomery Hill Carried— The Confederates Forced Back at aU Points — Nolensville Turnpike— 
The Night of the 15th of December — Preparing to Resume the Conflict — Second Day of the Battle— 
Overton's HiU— Tremendous Firing— The Confederates Routed — Vigorous Pursuit— Rutherford's Creek- 
Waiting for the Pontoon Train— Duck River— Severe Weather— Thomas Resolves to Continue the Pur- 
suit- Wilson's Cavalry— Lamb's Ferry— The Confederates Across the Tennessee River — Thomas Order* 
the Main Army to Discontinue the Pursuit — Cavalry Skirmishing — " Thomas has Done Magnificently "- 
Hood's Army Ruined beyond Recovery — Estimate of Hood — Osband's Expedition — Davidson's Eipedition- 
Qrierson'p Exredition — Great Destruction of Property. 



In the 



adapter immediately preced- 
we have seen that General 
'Sherman about the end of Sep- 
tember, and while hip headquarters 



S64 



were still at Atlanta, sent General 
Thomas, his second in command, to 
Nashville, with insti'uctions to organize 
such troops as might be placed at his 



SHERMAN DIVIDES HIS ARMY. 



M7 



disposal, and to keep a watchful eye 
on the movements of the great Confed- 
erate raider, General Forrest. Later, 
towards the end of October, and while 
the main body of the National anny 
»vas halting at Gaylesville, Sherman, 
who had now obtained Gi-ant's consent 
to advance to the coast, divided his 
army into two parts. Under his own 
pereonal command, and for the purpose 
of pushing his way through Georgia, 
te retained four corps. The other two 
corps — the Fourth, imder General Stan- 
ley, and the Twenty-Third, under Gen- 
eral Schofield — he sent to Thomas. 
General Wilson, who had quite recently 
arrived from the army of the Potomac 
and taken command of Sherman's cav- 
alry, was also sent to Nashville to 
report to Thomas for duty. He took 
with him some dismounted detach- 
ments, and had instructions to collect, 
mount, organize, and equip all the cav- 
alry serving in Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee. It was Sherman's conviction 
that thus reinforced, Thomas would be 
quite able to cope with any forces 
which Hood might succeed in bringing 
against him. 

It is now generally understood that 
the Confederate authorities were com- 
pletely taken by surprise at Sherman's 
audacious movement. His lines of 
defense were of enormous extent. The 
distance from Atlanta to Louisville is 
474 miles- from Atlanta to Nashville, 
289. The railroads connecting the 
army with these lines, it was necessary 
to protect. It was the belief of Davis 
and his associates that, as soon as the 
National lines were seriously threat- 



ened, Sherman would abandon Georgia. 
They had no conception that he would 
of his own accord sunder his communi 
catioDS and boldly march to the sea 
When Sherman did march, one read. 
with surprise that Hood did not follow 
him. " Hood," says General Grant io 
his report, " instead of following Sher- 
man, continued his move northward, 
which seemed to me to be leading to 
his certain doom. At all events, had I 
the power to command both armies, I 
should not have changed the orders, 
under which he seemed to be acting." 
Sherman, before his departure, made 
Thomas fully acquainted with his plans, 
delegated to him the command of all 
troops and garrisons, not absolutely in 
the presence of the commander-in- chief, 
and instructed him to pursue Hood, 
if he should attempt to follow the 
main army, but, by all means, to keep 
a firm hold on Tennessee. 

Long before Sherman divided his 
anny, attempts were made by the Con- 
federates, to destroy the conmiunica- 
tions of Nashville with the southeast. 
On the 23d of September, Forrest Sept. 
at the head of 7000 cavalry, after 2:{. 
having crossed the Tennessee, near 
Waterloo, made his appearance before 
Athens, a small town on the railroad 
from Decatur, and about 90 miles south 
of Nashville. The place was held by 
Colonel Campbell, with 3 colored regi- 
ments and about 150 men from the 
Third Tennessee cavalry. Campbell, 
on the approach of Forrest, retired to 
the fort. On the morning of the 24th 
the town was completely invested ; anrl 
a vigorous fire was opened u]Hra llit- 



d28 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



garrison from a 12-pounder battery. 
The guns of the fort replied. Camp- 
bell, however, was unequally matched ; 
and after an artillery contest of two 
hours' duration, he \"elded to the 
lemands of his antagonist and surrend- 
ered. Had he held out about half an 
hour longer, he might have been rein- 
forced by the Nineteenth Michigan, and 
the One Hundred and Second Ohio 
regiments. As it was, these regiments 
were overpowered and captured. For- 
rest then advanced to Pulaski. That 
place, however, had been well cared 
for by General Rousseau ; and the 
Confederate general moved eastward, 
cutting the railroads as he advanced. 
Meanwhile, it began to be seen that 
Forrest was bent on serious work ; and 
National troops were pushed forward 
from all directions to resist his pro- 
gress. Rousseau at the head of a body 
of troops moved by rail to Tullahoma. 
Steedman advanced from the Etowah 
district to the north side of Tennessee. 
Newton's division of the Fourth coi-ps 
arrived from Atlanta on the 28th and 
replaced Steedman's command at Chat- 
tanooga. Morgan's division of the 
Fourteenth corps, also from Atlanta, 
and accompanied by General Thomas, 
arrived at Nashville on the 3d of 
October. 

Forrest had by this time divide 
his forces. One column consisting of 
4000 men, under Buford, he sent south ^ 
towards Huntsville. The other col- 
umn, consisting of 3000 men, he led, 
himself, in the direction of Columbia. 
Buford, as early as the 30th of Sep- 
tember appeared before Huntsville, 



and in vain summoned the garrison to 
surrender. Moving off, he appeare<l 
before Athens on the afternoon q^j^ 
of the 2d of October. That 2.' 
place had, in the meantime been re 
gamsoned by the Seventy-Third Indi 
ana, Lieutenant-Colonel Slade. Aftei 
a useless attack made almost immedv 
ately after his arrival, and another 
equally useless attack on the following 
morning, Buford, pursued by some of 
Granger's cavalry, was compelled to 
retreat towards the Elk River. For- 
rest had little better success than his 
lieutenant. He did not venture to 
make an attack on Columbia ; but on 
the 3d he destroyed about 5 miles of 
railroad between Carter's Creek and 
Spiing Hill. He then parolled his 
prisoners and moved off in the direc- 
tion of Mount Pleasant Hill. It novv 
became apparent that both Buford an, 
Forrest were aiming to make good 
theii" escape to the south side of the 
Tennessee ; and the various National 
commands, particularly those unci or 
Rousseau, Washbume and Mor^'in 
closed in upon them, with a view to 
prevent their crossing the river, and if 
possible to effect their capture. 1 he 
Confederates, however, knew every ii ch 
of the ground ; and in spite of » most 
vigorous pursuit, both accompushed 
their purpose, Buford crossing the 
Tennessee on the 3d and Forrest on 
the 6th. The ferry-boats and othei 
means of crossing were destroyed ; bu 
the pursuit was not rx>ntinued, 

Thomas now spent some time in 
re-an-anging and re-distributing hife 
troops. His great object was to guard 



KOSECRANZ IN MISSOURI. 



well all the avenues of approach, and 
yet to have his ti-oops so in hand that 
he could concentrate with ease and 
rapidity in the event of the enemy 
attacking him in force. It was not 
Qct^ imtU the 26th that Hood made 
26. any further demonstrations. On 
that day, a large force of Confederate 
infantry appeared before Decatur, and 
attacked the garrison, but without 
effect. Granger held the plap« ; and 
on the 27th reinforcements were sent 
him with instructions to hold out to 
the bitter end It seemed as if the 
enemy was bent on serious business ; 
for he proceeded at once to establish a 
line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the 
town. On the 29th, however, after 
having had on the previous day some 
bitter experience of the daring and 
energy of Granger's men, who made 
two separate and successful sorties, the 
Confederates retired in the direction of 
Courtland. On the same day, it was 
reported to Thomas that a body of the 
enemy was crossing the river, near the 
mouth of Cypress Creek, about 2 miles 
below Florence. General Croxton was 
in command at that point ; and on re- 
ceipt of the intelligence, Thomas imme- 
diately sent to his aid a division of 
cavalry under General Hatch, with m- 
stnictions to guard the passage /f the 
river imtil the arrival of the Fourth 
corps, now on its way from Georgia. 

It now became evident that Hood 
mtended to invade Middle Tennessee ; 
and Thomas hurried forward prepara- 
tions accordingly. Before, however, 
we enter upon a detailed account of 
the events which led to the great 

i«9T 



battles of Franklin and Nashville, and 
the subsequent pursuit and destriKJtion 
of Hood's army, it is fitting to refer to 
certain events which were taking place 
or were about to take place, in Mis 
souri and Eastern Tennessee. 

After the battle of Chickamauga 
Rosecranz, who was superseded by 
Thomas, was assigned to the command 
of the Department of the Missouri. 
He reached St. Louis m the beginning 
of January, when he found the State 
of Missouri in a very troubled condi- 
tion. It was menaced by foes without, 
and by hidden but not less dangerous 
foes within. The failure of the Red 
River expedition, and the expulsion of 
Steele from the country below the 
Arkansas River, had a most disastrous 
effect upon the National cause, to the 
west of the Mississippi. At least two- 
thirds of the State of Arkansas was 
left in undisturbed possession of the 
Confederates. It was well known that 
General Sterling Price, the great guer- 
rilla chief in that region, was making 
active preparations for an^^ther raid 
into Missouri Missouri was still under 
the authority of the National Govern- 
ment ; but the inhabitants of the State 
were largely in sympathy vrith the 
Confederacy. The loyal people of the 
State were over-awed and compelled to 
conceal their sentiments. Secret asso 
ciations — such as the " Knights of the 
Golden Circle," the * Order of Ameri 
can Knights," and the " Sons of Lib- 
erty " — abounded ; and it was reported 
to Rosecranz that when Price should in- 
vade Missouri, the members of these 
societies would join him in number* tc 



SSO 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



the extent of at least 23,000 men. 
Rosecranz had good reason to believe 
that the reports regarding these secret 
societies and their purposes were not 
without foundation. He accordingly 
>ommunicated his information to the 
government, and asked for reinforce- 
ments. The government was at first 
mcredulous, believing the danger to be 
more imaginary than real, and was 
encouraged in this belief by the report 
©f General Hunt, who had been sent to 
make a tour of observation throughout 
the State. On being informed that 
arrangements had been made to initiate 
the revolution in St. Loms by murder- 
ing the Provost-Marshal, and seizing the 
State government, Rosecranz arrested 
the Belgian consul, who was the State 
commander, with his deputy, secretary, 
lecturer, and about 40 members. The 
government, still incredulous, ordered 
their release ; but Rosecranz was reso- 
lute ; and the government, on receiving 
fuller information, justified his course, 
and countermanded the order. There 
can now be no doubt that the prompti- 
tude and vigilance of Rosecranz at this 
crisis did much to prevent tLe threat- 
ened rising. The arrest of the State 
commander struck terror into the 
hearts of the conspirators. 

Price and his friends, meanwhile, 
were preparing to carry out their part 
©f the programme. It was now the first 
week in September. Rosecranz received 
information from Washbume who kept 
a keen eye on the movements of the 
Confederates in Arkansas, that Shelby 
was at BatesviUe, in Northern Ar- 
'cansas, and that, as soon as he was 



joined by Price, the invasion would be 
commenced. Rosecranz communicated 
the intelligence to Washington ; and 
Halleck without a moment's delay 
telegraphed to Cairo, directing A. J. 
Smith, who was then on his way, with 
6000 troops to join Sherman in North- 
em Georgia, to halt and proceed to 
St. Louis, where he was to report to 
Rosecranz. 

On the 23d of September, the ad- 
vance of Price's force, under Shelby, 
occupied Bloomfield, in Stoddard Coun- 
ty, which had been evacuated by the 
National troops on the night of the 21st. 
On the 26th the Confederates gept. 
moved on Pilot Knob, which 26. 
fortimately had been occupied the day 
before by General Hugh S. Ewing 
with a brigade of A. J. Smith's com- 
mand. With this force, and the garri- 
son of PUot Klnob and some outlying 
posts, Ewing undertook to make a 
stand against the Confederates, who 
without delay made preparations to 
carry the place by assault. The fort 
occupied by the National forces was a 
strong one, mounting four 24-pounder8, 
four 3 2 -pounders, and four 6-pounder 
Parrotts, besides two 6-pounder Par- 
rotts moimted outside. The enemy 
advanced against it on the 27th, in full 
confidence of being able to carry it by 
assault ; but he was driven back with 
a loss of about 1000 men, by a well- 
directed artillery and musketry fire 
The fort, however, was commanded by 
a neighboring height called Shepherd 
Mountain, and the enemy having occu- 
pied this position Ewing determined to 
abandon the work. He had previously 



PILOT KNOB. 



831 



«nt away his stores to St. Louis. 
Blowing up his magazine, he fell back, 
keeping up a running fight with the 
enemy as far as Harrison Station, on 
'he Southwest Branch Railroad. Here 
he prepared to make another stand, 
behind breast-works left by a party of 
militia who had previously occupied 
the place. Ewing in his defense of 
Pilot Knob rendered important service 
by detaining the entire force of Price, 
and affording time to put St. Louis in 
a state of defense, then covered only 
by a portion of A. J. Smith's infantry 
and some regiments of cavalry thrown 
out as far as practicable towards the 
enemy. The Confederates followed 
him up closely, and cut the railroad on 
both sides of him, thus severing his 
communications with both Rolla and 
St. Louis. He was only saved from 
another assault by the opportune arrival 
of Colonel Beveridge, of the Seven- 
teenth Illinois cavalry, with 500 men. 
The enemy taking these to be only the 
advance of large reinforcements, de- 
layed the intended attack • and Bever- 
idge, in the night, with the main body 
of the troops, succeeded in reaching 
RoUa. 

In the mean time, Springfield being 
considered secure, General Sanborn 
moved with all his available cavalry to 
reinforce Rolla, where General McNeil 
was in command and preparing to pro- 
tect the depots and great supply trains. 

A. J. Smith's infantry, aided by the 
militia and the citizens, the whole 
under the command of General Pleason- 
ton, made St. Louis secm-e. General 

B. Gratz Brown was placed by Rose 



cranz in charge of the militia Brown 
concentrated at Jefferson City, the 
troops of the Central District ; and 
being reinforced by General Fisk with 
aU the available troops north of the 
Missouri, as well aa aided by the- 
enthusiastic exertions of the citizens, 
he made thorough preparations to drive 
back the invaders from the State capi- 
tal. Towards ib'^a pjint Prioe, who 
had remained a day or two at Rich- 
wood's, threatening St. Louis, was rap- 
idly marching. On the 7th of October 
he had crossed the Osage not far from 
the city. But McNeil and Sanborn, 
moAring with all their available cavalry 
succeeded by forced marches in reach- 
ing the city first ; and having united 
their commands with those of Fisk and 
Brown, they so increased the defensive 
force within the city, that Price deem- 
ing it prudent not to attack, moved off 
in a westerly direction. Pleasonton 
arrived at Jefferson City on the q^j^ 
morning of the 8th, and assumed 8. 
chief command. Sanborn with all his 
mounted troops, about 4000, was or 
dered to follow and harass the enemy, 
but not to attack until the remaining 
cavalry and infantry supports could 
come up. 

On the afternoon of the 9th, the Con- 
federates entered California, 25 mUes 
west of Jeffereon City, on the Pacific 
Railroad, and burnt the depots and a 
train of cars. From California, after 
tearing up the railroad track some 
distance on each side of the town, they 
moved on to Booneville, in Cooper 
County. Price was already a sorely 
disappointed man. He had. it is true. 



632 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



obtained a few recruits ; but the " Sons 
of Liberty," the " Knights of the Gold- 

m Circle," had sadly failed him at the 
•ritical moment, when at least a tem- 

wrary success was possible. 

On the 13th the Confederate chief 
vnthdrew from Booneville, and, contin- 
uing his march westward, occupied 
Lexington, in Lafayette County, on the 
Qct^ 17th. For the purpose of forag- 

17. ing and obtaining recruits and 
conscripts, detached bodies of his force 
were sen* in various directions, some 
as far as the borders of Kansas, some 
as far east as Danville and High Hill, 
Montgomery County. Wherever they 
made their appearance they worked 
terrible destruction. The militia wei-e 
driven out of Sedalia, in Pettis County, 
with severe loss ; and at Glasgow, in 
Howard County, 6 companies of the 

Foi-ty-Third Missouri were compelled 
to surrender. 

The National troops did not pursue 
actively imtU Pleasonton came up, when 
they advanced towards Booneville and 
harassed Price's rear. Most of the 
National cavalry were concentrated at 
the Black Water, awaiting the arrival 
of Colonel Winslow from Washburne's 
command. He came up, on the 19th, 
bringing with him 1500 troopers with 
whom he had followed the enemy from 
Arkansas. Pleasonton, having now f^t 
east 6500 mounted men, exclusive ^x 
38cort guards, moved from Sedalia in 
pursuit of Price. At Independence, on 
the 2 2d, he came up with and routed 
the Confederate general, Fagan, cap- 
turing 2 guns. 

On the morning of the 23d, Pleason- 



ton approached the Big Blue At We«jt 
port where General Curti*. then in 
charge of the Department of q^^^ 
Kansas, had been vigorously but 23. 
unsuccessfully attacked, the day before 
he found the main body of the Confed 
erates. Pleasonton fell upon them witl 
tremendous energy at the early hour ol 
seven. The battle raged with great 
fury, until about one in the aftemoou, 
when the Confederates gave way and 
fled towards Little Santa Fk Pleason 
ton ivnd Curtis who had now united 
thei« lorces lollowed in close pursuit 
At Marais des Cyernes, at four o'clocl 
on the Ui'^ming of the 25th, the 
National troops came up with the 
fugitives, when Pleasonton snrprised 
and aroused the camp by a heavy fire 
of artillery. Price arose and flei 
leaving behind him his camp equipage, 
one cannon, several hundred head of 
cattle, and 20 wagons full of plunder 
The Confederates, keeping up a runaing 
fight, fell back to Little Osage Cross- 
ing, where two advanced brigades 
under Benteen and Phillips charged 
upon and broke their lines, capturing 
Generals Marmaduke and Cabell, 4 
field officers, about 1000 prisoners, 8 
pieces of artillerj'', and some 1500 stand 
of arms. The pursuit was continued, 
Sanborn's brigade again leading the 
way. The Confederates were over- 
taken ; and after a brief but stubborn 
resistance, they crossed the Marmiton, 
and fled under cover of the night, into 
Arkansas. In six days 204 miles had 
been traversed. Price was falling back 
at panic speed. The line of his retreat 
was strewn with the wrecks of wagon? 



DISSATISFACTION WITH EOSEORANZ. 



Hid 



had other necessaries and accompani- 
ments of the battle-field. Pleasonton 
had retired to Fort Scott to rest his 
^aded men and horses. Sanborn, how- 
ever, was still in close pursuit. At 
Newtonia, Price made another and a 
final stand ; and but for the timely 
arrival of Sanborn, he would have won 
a decided victory over the National 
troops under Blunt. As it was, Price 
made his escape into Western Arkansas 
followed by Ourtis. The last struggle 
in connection with this Missouri inva- 
sion was at Fayetteville. The place 
was held by Colonel La Rue, with the 
First Arkansas cavalrj' — a -/'Jy of 
men who, amid gx'eat trial and hard- 
ship, remained true to the Union. 
Colonel Brooks had surrounded Fay- 
etteville with some 2000 Confederates. 
He had been joined by Fagan's division 
of Price's flying army. La Rue might 
have held out against Brooks ; but it 
would be a hopeless struggle against 
the combined forces of Bi'ooks and 
Fagan. At the critical moment Curtis 
came up ; the Confederates were driven 
off with heavy loss, and La Rue was 
saved- Such was the end of the inva- 
sion ; and no airther attempt was made 
on Missonri. Sterling Price's name had 
long been a tower of strengtl to the 
Confederate cause in the West. His 
prestige was gone forever. Missouri 
vvas no longer — and, indeed, had no 
reason to be — in sympathy with seces- 
sion. The State, which had suffered 
much,. now began to enjoy some degree 
of tranquility. 

Price had accomplished little by his 
raid, beyond the destraction of about 



$5,000,000 of property, and laying 
waste the country through which he 
passed. He obtained 5000 or 6000 
recruits or conscripts, took 1500 stand 
of arms, one cannon, many horses, and 
large herds of cattle, vrith a rast 
amount of plunder, in the shape of 
clothing, forage, and provisions ; but 
of this he lost nearly all in his precipi- 
tate retreat, besides 10 guns and 1958 
prisoners. In his flight from Newtonia, 
he abandoned ordi^stroyed most of bin 
wagon- trains ; and his men and horses 
suffered severely. Large numbers of 
his followers left him ; and when he 
recrossed the Arkansas, his force had 
been reduced by desertion and losses 
to xcss than 50uO men, only partially 
armed and mounted. His artillery had 
dwindled down to 3 Parrott guns and 
one 12-pounder mountain howitzer; and 
of his train, Avhich originally consisted 
of 200 wagons, but 53 remained. The 
entire National loss, according to the 
official report of General Rosecranz, 
was, in killed, wounded and missing, 
only 346 officers and men. 

General Grant was ill-satisfied with 
the whole affair. In his judgment, the 
invasion ought fo have been nipped in 
the bud. In his report he says : " the 
impunity with which Price was enabled 
to roam over the State of Missouri foi 
a long time, shows to how little pur 
pose a superior force may be used ' 
There is no reason why General Ros« 
cranz should not have concentrated hi 
forces and beaten and driven Price 
before the latter reached l*ilot Knob." 
Rosecranz could hardly, in truth, have 
made a moi-e \\Tetched use than he did 



834 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



>f a large portion of his troops. He 
was slow to act ; and when he did act, 
he did not act with wisdom During 
the entire pursuit, the troops of A. J. 
Smith were practically neutralized. If 
tistead of ordering him to follow Pleas- 
nton in the direct pursuit of Price, he 
ad ordered him to continue his move- 
ment westward, Price ought to have 
been captured. Af It was, Price ob- 
tained time, and when pressed, he had 
to deal with Pleasonton and the cavalry 
alone. It was the 2X\ of October when 
Smith arrived at Independence ; but it 
was too late, for Pleasonton was already 
engaged with the enemy and the loud 
thunders of artillery were heard in the 
direction of the Big Blue River. His 
troops were weary and footsore ; and 
believing that his services were no 
onger needed, he marched them to Har- 
isonville, where they enjoyed a brief 
nterval of rest. The fame of Rosecranz 
was clouded at Chickamauga. It was 
permanently injured by his conduct of 
iffairs in Missouri. 

Less immmediately connected with 
che Geoigia and Tennessee campaigns, 
but still having a most important bear- 
ing on the general issue, were some 
minor operations which took place in 
Southwestern Virginia and East Ten- 
nessee in the fall of the year. It had 
been a favorite theory with some experi- 
enced military men that in the event 
of Lee sustaining any great disaster in 
the East, he would retire with his army 
to Southwestern Virginia, and passing 
thence into East and Middle Tennessee, 
there concentrate the remaining forces 
■>i the Confederacy. He would then 



be in a position to threaten Naji dl*. 
Chattanooga, or Louisville ; and it wat 
predicted that the decisive battle of the 
war would be fought somewhere in the , 
Southwest. For this reason, a consid 4 
erable National force was retained ii 
East Tennessee. Knoxville was well 
fortified ; and outlying bodies of in 
fantry and cavaliy were pushed w*^ll 
up the railroad and the Holston River 
Valley towards the Virginia line. But 
after the commencement of the great 
Atlanta and Richmond campaigns, in 
May, affaire in East Tennessee lost 
^nuch of their interest, the forces on 
00th sides being concentrated, as much 
as possible, on the more important 
scenes of operatiors. The presence of 
scattered bodies of irregular Confeder- 
ate cavalry in Southwestern Virginia 
proved a source of constant alarm in 
Eastern Kentucky. These rough riders, 
dashing through the gaps of the Cum 
berland Mountains, would fall upon iso- 
lated posts, capture their garrisons, and 
after plundering in the adjacent country ' 
would get back again to their mountain 
retreats before they could be overtaken^ 
It was on one o"' these plundering ex- 
peditions that Morgan, in the month of 
June, and after the burning of Cynthi- 
ana, as has already been mentioned, 
was overtaken and badly defeated bj 
General Burbridge. For some time 
afterwards, Morgan did not venture to 
take the offensive. He was of too rest 
less a nature, however, to remain long 
inactive ; and by the beginning of Sep- 
tember he had again set his band of 
guerrillas in motion. He occupied 
GreenvUle, East Tennessee on the 3d 



QILLEM DEFEATED. 



835 



but his comiLAnd was surpriaed the 
game night by General Gillem, who 
ggp^^ had made a forced march from 

9. ' Bull's Gap. The Confederate 
chief with a portion of his staff was in 
the house of a Mrs. Williams. The 
house was surrounded ; and Morgan 
while attempting to escape was shot 
dead. The death of Morgan was fol- 
lowed by another short season of com- 
parative inaction, both parties being 
content to remain on the watch, await- 
ing the development of events around 
Atlanta. 

About the begmning of Octobe", Gen- 
eral Burbridge with 2500 men set out 
on an expedition from Kentucky against 
the salt-works in Southwestern Virginia, 
which were of great importance to the 
enemy. After heavy skirmishing he 
succeeded in driving the Confederates 
from Clinch Mountain and Laurel Gap. 
Qpt^ Coming up with them again on 
2. the 2d of October, about 4 miles 
from Saltville, he drove them back 
within their defenses in tbt immediate 
neighborhood of the salt-works. Here, 
however, they bade defiance to the 
National troops; and Burbridge, his 
ammunition being exhausted, found it 
necessary to retire. He had sustained 
a loss of 350 men. 

General Gillem having fallen back 
after General Burbridge's withdrawal 
into Kentucky, from Greenville to 
Bull's Gap, and thence to Mon-istown, 
42 miles from Knoxville, was followed 
Dy a Confederate force, under Vaughan. 
J)n the 26th of October, Vaughan ven- 
tured to attack Gillem but was repulsed 
Two days afterwards Vaughan attacked 



again, but, receiving a stiU more severe 
repulse, retreated, pursued by Gillem 
as far as Limestone, 98 miles east of 
Knoxville. After remaining in that 
advanced position until the 7th of 
November, Gillem, whose force was 
only 1500 men, consisting of 3 regi 
ments of Tennessee cavalry, retired to 
Bull's Gap, where Breckenridge, now 
at the head of the Confederate forces in 
East Tennessee, some 3000 strong, at 
tacked him on the 11th. He too was 
repulsed. On the 12th, Gillem with- 
drew his forces from Bull's Gap, and 
began to retreat in the direction of 
Knoxville. In the evening Brecken- 
ridge got his force on Gillem's flank 
and rear by moving through Laurel 
Gap. His cavalry, under Vaughan and 
Duke were in front. Soon after mid- 
night Breckenridge attacked Gil- j^^y 
lem's retreating col umn near Mor- 13. 
ristown, charging upon both flanks and 
at the same time breaking his centre. 
The National force was routed, one 
regiment after another giving way till 
men and horses became mixed up 
together in inextricable confusion. A 
panic ensued. Owing to the darkness 
few casualties occurred ; but the men 
threw away their arms and sought 
safety in flight. All the artillery and 
the baggage were left in the hands of 
the enemy. The Confederate general 
claimed to have captured 70 wagons, 
six 11 -pounder Parrott guns with theii 
horses and ammunition, 18 stand o 
colors, 316 prisoners, and about 200 
horees and mules. The remainder of 
Gillem's command, about 1000 in nunj 
ber, escaped to Strawberry Plains and 



§36 



flOOD AND THOMAS IN TENN ESSEE. 



thence to Knoxville. Breckenridge 
assumed the air of a conqueror in East 
lennessee, and issued a proclamation 
(tromising protection to all who should 
lay down their arms and become peace- 
able citizens. He continued to advance, 
by way of Strawbeiry Plains, in the 
jfoy, direction of Knoxville. On the 
18. 18th he withdrew as rapidly as 
he had advanced; and on that day 
General Amraen, reinforced by 1500 
troops from Chattanooga, reoccupied 
Strawberry Plains. On the 23d of 
November the main torce of the enemy 
wm reported to be at New Market, 8 
m'Jes to the north. 

About this time General Stoneman 
was ordered from the West to take 
general directior of affairs in East 
Tennessee. As soon as he arrived he 
instructed Burbridge to march, with all 
his available force in Kentucky, by 
way of Cumberland Gap, to the relief 
of Gillem. Stoneman was directed by 
Thomas to concentrate as large a force 
as he could, and move against Brecken- 
ridge, with the object of either destroy- 
ing his force or driving it into Virginia- 
He was also directed to destroy, if 
possible, the salt-works at Saltville, and 
the East Tennessee and Virginia Rail- 
road from the Tennessee line as far 
into Virginia as he could go without 
endangering his command. Learning 
>n the 6th of December that Brecken- 
ridge was falling back towards Vir- 
ginia, Stoneman made preparations to 
foHow him ; and having concentrated 
Q the commands of Burbridge and 
12. Gillem at Bean's Station, he set 
nit on the 12th for Bristol The ad- 



vance under Gillem reached -Jonesborc 
the same day, and drove the rear-guard 
of Vaughan's cavalry through the 
town. Gillem then turned northward 
to Kingsport, on the North Fork of 
the Holston, crossed the river, scaled 
the bluff, on which Duke was posted 
defeated him, and killed, captured, oi 
dispersed the whole command. The 
Confederates left in his possession 
8 wagons and the entire camp equi- 
page. Burbridge moved upon Bristol, 
where lie struck Vaughan, and skir 
mished with him until Gillem's column 
came up. Vaughan was also com 
pletely defeated, with the loss of some 
300 prisoners and much property. 
Burbridge then pushed on to Abing 
don, cut the railroad between Saltville 
and Wytheville, to prevent reinforce- 
ments coming from Lynchburg to tht 
force defending the salt-works. Gillem 
also reached Abingdon on the 15th. 
The enemy under Vaughan had in the 
mean time reached Marion, havijig 
marched liy & road parallel with that 
by which Stoneman's fore, had ad 
vanced, and had begun to intrench 
But Gillem pushed on after Vaughan, 
and after a hard march of 29 miles he 
came up with him, early on the 16th. 
He attacked him instantly, and d^^^ 
after completely routing him, 16. 
drove him to Wytheville, 30 miles 
further, captuiing the place, with 200 
prisoners, 7 pieces of artillery, and a 
large wagon train. All the enemy's 
stores and supplies were destroyed, aa 
well as the extensive lead-works neai 
the tovtTQ, and the railroad bridges ovei 
Reedy Creek. Stoneman now turned 



FORREST AT JOHNSONVILLE. 



9&1 



ha attention towards Saltville. His 
troops entered that place on the 20th, 
Dec, capturing 8 pieces of artillery and 
20. a large quantity of anununition 
of all kinds. They also destroyed the 
buildings belonging to the Confederate 
government, as well as nearly all the 
machinery, kettles, vats, engines, and 
boilers of the salt-works, said to be 
among the most extensive in the world, 
and an immense quantity of salt. 

In this great raid, besides the dam- 
age done to the salt-works and lead- 
mines, there were captured 20 pieces 
of artillery, 900 prisoners, 200 negroes, 
8000 hogs, many cattle, and 200 mules. 
Eleven foundries, 90 flour and saw 
mills, 30 bridges, and the depots at 
Glade Spring, Marion, and Wytheville, 
were destroyed, as well as 13 locomo- 
tives, about 100 cars, and many miles 
of railroad track. It was estimated 
that the loss to the Confederates in 
stores alone amounted to $2,000,000. 
Th^ rapidity, with which Stoneman 
mo ed, enabled him to take the entire 
region he traversed by surprise, so that 
the citizens had not time to run off 
their stock After these disasters, 
Rreckenridge made no further attempts 
fo threaten East Tennessee. Stoneman 
returned to Knoxville, accompanied by 
GUlem's command ; Burbridge marched 
back to Kentucky by way of Cumber- 
land Gap. 

We now return to Hood and Thomas. 
Ilood, we have already said, had made 
such movements as left Thomas in no 
doubt that he intended to invade Mid- 
dle Tennessee. He had been for some 
time repairing the Mobile and Ohio 



Railroad for the purpose of supplying 
his army; and trains were running as 
far north as Corinth and thence east- 
ward to Cherokee Station, transporting 
supplies from Selma and Montgomery. 
Wood's division of the Fourth corp 
reached Athens on the 3l8t of q^j 
October,and the other two divis- 81 . 
ions rapidly foUowed. The Twenty- 
Third corps under Schofield, awaiting 
at Resaca the orders of Thomas, as 
soon as it was known that Hood had 
appeared in force along the south side 
of the Tennessee River, was directed to 
concentrate at Pulaski, and was now 
also on its way in the rear of the 
Fourth corps. The Confederates hav 
ing on the 31st effected a lodgment for 
their infantry on the north side of th* 
Tennessee River about 3 mUes above 
Florence, and driven Croxton above 
Shoal Creek, General Stanley was di- 
rected also to concentrate the Fourth 
corps at Pulaski. 

In the mean time Forrest, with 17 
regiments of cavalry and 9 pieces of 
artillery, had commenced moving north- 
ward from Corinth, and from Paris, 
Tennessee. On the 28th of October 
he appeared before Fort Heiman, an 
earth- work on tlie west bank of the 
Tennessee about T5 miles from Paducah, 
where he captured a gun-boat and 3 
transports, having previously burned 
the steamer Express. On the 2d of 
November he had succeeded in planting 
batteries both above and below Jack- 
sonville, an important base of supplies, 
and the terminus of the Northwestern 
Railroad. He thus completely block 
aded the river and prevented the 



nit 



83S 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



escape in either direction of 8 gun-boats, 
8 transports, and about a dozen barges. 
The garrison consisted of about 1000 
men under the command of Colonel 
Thompson. The naval forces under 
Lieutenant King attacked the enemy's 
batteries below Johnsonville. They 
were repulsed, however, after a severe 
contest, but not until they had recap- 
tured a transport, with two 20-pounder 
Parrotts and a quantity of ammunition 
and stores on board, and compelled the 
enemy to destroy one of the captured 
Not. gun-boats. On the 4th the Con- 
4. federates opened fire on the town, 
as well as on the gun-boats and trans- 
ports, from batteries on the west bank. 
In the artillery contest which ensued 
the gun-boats were soon disabled ; and, 
to prevent their falling into the hands 
of the enemy they were set on fire, 
mth the transports. Unfortiinately 
the flames spread to the buildings of 
the commissary £.:■. I quartermaster's de- 
partments, which togetisr witi ?, Wge 
amount of stores on the levee, were 
totally destroyed, involving a loss to 
the Government of about $1,500,000. 

On the 5th, after directing upon the 
garrison a furious cannonade of an 
hour's duration, the enemy withdrew, 
crossed to the east bank above the 
town, and marched off in the direction 
of Clifton. On the same dav Schofield, 
with the advance of the Tweuty-Third 
coi'ps, arrived at Nashville; and being 
sent immediately by railroad to John- 
eonATlle, he arrived there at night, 
only to find that the enemy had disap- 
peared. Schofield was directed to 
leave a body of troops at Johnsonville 



sufficiently numerous for its defena*- 
With the rest of his force he wat 
ordered to join the Fourth coq)s at 
Pulaski, assume command of all the 
troops in that vicinity, and, watching 
the movements of Hood, retard his 
advance into Tennessee as much as 
possible. He was not, however, to risk 
a general engagement till A. J. Smith 
should anive from Missouri, and until 
Wilson had remounted the cavalry 
regiments whose horses had been taken 
for the use of Kilpatrick's division in 
Georgia. 

General Thomas, now found himself 
confronted by that anny of veterai 
troops which, under General Johnston 
had made such persistent opposition to 
the advance of Sherman's largely super 
ior force from Dalton to the Chatta 
hoochee, reinforced by 12,000 well 
equipped cavalry under Forrest — pej 
haps the boldest and ablest, as well a* 
the most unscrupulous of the Contni- 
erate cavalry officers. Hood's an ay 
n.^-R- cons? ted of a^out 45,000 infan.ry 
and from 12,000 to lo,000 cavalry. 7 he 
available force of Thomas at this t, tne 
was less than half that of Hood, c )m 
prising only about 12,000 men lu dei 
Stanley, 10,000 under Schofield, al out 
4000 cavalry under Hatch, Crox>on'^ 
brigade of 2500 men, and Caproj 's oi 
1200, in all about 30,000 men. The 
remainder of his force was 8ta1ione<i 
along the railroad to keep open com 
mimications at Chattanooga, Decatui 
Huntsville, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Mur 
freesboro, and intermediate posts. It 
was necessary that all these pointe 
should be well guarded. 



HOOb55 iJjiiiAl. 



83S 



Hood remained inactive in the neigh- 
borhood of Florence from the Ist to 
the 17 th of November, influenced 
doubtless by his uncertainty respecting 
the movements of Sherman. He had 
laid a { ontoon bridge over the Tennes- 
see Ri rer in place of the destroyed 
railroa-l bridge, and had sent over to 
the north side S. D. Lee's infantry 
corps and two cavalry divisions, which 
skirmished continually with the com- 
mands of Hatch and Croxton along the 
line of Shoal Creek. His other two 
corps re/aained on the south side of the 
^Qj^ T.'Tinessee till the 17th of Novem- 
1 7 . ber, when Cheatham's corps also 
crossed t > the north side, and Stewart's 
preparvd to foUow. On the same day 
a portj m of Lee's corps moved up the 
Lawrouceburg road to Bough's Mill on 
Shoal Creek, skirmishing a little with 

atch's cavalry, and then retiring to 
Bome neighboring bluffs, went into 
?^\mp. 

Thiri delay, on the part of Hood was 
a ei eat gain to the National command- 
er. Thomas was anxiously awaiting 
the ftrrival of promised reinforcements. 
In a few days or weeks at most, the 
term of service of a large number of 
his t^)ops would have expired ; but 20 
one year regiments were on their way 
to take their place. A. J. Smith, with 
two veteran divisions, already well 
advanced on his joirmey, was approach- 
ing from Missouri. Wilson, having all 
but completed his arrangements, would 
soon Join him with 12,000 effective 
cavalry. In addition to these which 
could be confidently counted upon, 
there had been collected at Chattanooga, 



some 7000 convalescents which, if not 
available for marching, would at least 
be serviceable for garrison duty. These 
forces, when all concentrated, would 
increase Thomas' available force to 
an army almost as large as that of the 
enemy. Had Hood delayed his advance 
one week or ten days longer, Thomas 
would have been able to meet him at 
some point south of the Duck j^q. 
River. Hood, however, began 19. 
his advance on the 19th, moving bj 
parallel roads from Florence toward? 
Waynesboro, and driving Hatch's cav 
airy out of Lawrenceburg, on the 2 2d 
It then became the policy of Thomas 
to retire in the direction in which his 
reinforcements were approaching, and 
at the same time to delay the enemy 
as much as possible. Schofield began 
to remove the public property from 
Pulaski preparatory to falling back 
towards Columbia — two divisions of 
Stanley's corps having been sent to 
Lynnville, 15 miles north, to protect 
the railroad and secure the passage of 
the wagon -trains. Capron's brigade of 
cavalry was stationed at Mount Pleas 
ant to cover the approaches from the 
southwest to Columbia, where was held 
in position, a brigade of Ruger's divi 
sion of the Twenty-Third corps. O* 
the other two divisions of that corps, 
one was directed to move to Columbi*, 
and the other by way of Waverly to 
Centerville, to occupy the crossings of 
the Duck River, near Columbia, Wii 
liamsport, and Gordon's Ferry. On 
the 23d Granger withdrew by rail, 
without any opposition, on the part of 
the en "my, the garrisons at Athens, 



i 



y*0 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



Decatur, and Huntaville to Stevenson, 
i«ending 5 new regiments from that 
place to Murfreesboro, and retaining 
the original troops of his command. 
On the same night, Schofield evacu- 

ted Pulaski and retired towards 
Columbia, where he arrived on the 
24th. The officer, commanding at 
Johnsonville, was ordered to remove all 
public property and retire to Fort 
Donelson and thence to Clarksville. 

On the 24th and 25th some dismount- 
ed cavalry of the Confederates skir- 
mished with Schofield's troops at Col- 
umbia; and, during the 26th and 27th, 
the infantry having come up, they 
made more decided demonstrations, but 
did not assault. Their movements, how- 
ever, indicated an intention to cross the 
Duck River, above or below the town. 
Schofield, therefore, withdrew to the 
north bank on the night of the 27th, 
and took up a new position, in which 
he remained undisturbed during the 
28th. In front of the town, two divi- 
sions of the Twenty-Third corps were 
placed in line, holding all the neigh- 
boring crossings, while Stanley's corps, 
posted in reserve on the Franklin turn- 
pike, was held in readiness to repel 
any attempt, on the part of the enemy, 
to force a passage. General Wilson, 
with a body of cavalry, held the cross- 
ings above those guarded by the in- 
jjoy^ fantry ; but, about two o'clock 

29. on the morning of the 29th, the 
Confederates drove him back and 
pushed over the river at the Lewisburg 
turnpike, and, a lit^Je later, a body of 
their infantry crossed at Huoy's Mills 
6 miles above Columbia. .Schofield 



now finding his communication with 
the cavalry interrupted, and his line of 
retreat towards Franklin threatened, 
prepared again to fall back. Stanley, 
with a division of infantry, was sent tc 
Spnng Hill to protect the passage of 
the trains, and keep open the road for 
the retreat of the main force in that 
direction. He arrived just in time to 
drive off the enemy's cavalry, and to 
save the trains. Soon aftei"wards, he 
was attacked by both infantry and 
cavalry, and had considerable difficulty 
in maintaining his position till dai-k. 
Schofield, though not attacked at Huey'e 
Mills, was actively engaged all day 
resisting the enemy who attempted a 
crossing at Columbia. Late in the 
afternoon, and, after giving direction 
for the retreat of all the troops north 
ward at dark, he took with him Ruger' 
division and hastened to the relief of 
General Stanley, at Spring Hill. Leav- 
ing a brigade to hold the turnpike, a< 
this point, he pushed on to the cross- 
roads, near Thompson's Station, whence 
a body of the enemy's cavalry hastily 
made off at his approach, leaving their 
camp-fires burning. The main body ot 
Schofield's command withdrew safely 
from Columbia after dark, on the 29th, 
passed Spring Hill without molestation, 
at midnight, the cavalry moving on the 
Lewisburg turnpike, on the right of the 
infantry line of march. The whole 
command got into position, at j^q^^ 
Franklin, 18 miles south of Nash- 30. 
ville, early on the morning of the 30th. 
Line of battle was formed at once on 
the south side of the town in expecta 
tion of the enemy's immediate approack 



frane:lin. 



84] 



The battle-ground was well chosen. 

Franklin is situated on the west bank 
of the Harpeth River, a bend of which 
incloses more than half of the town on 
the east and north, leaving only a part 

f the west and south sides exposed. 

rhe National troops were disposed in 
a line running southeast, both flanks 
resting on the river — the Fourth corps 
on the right, the Twenty-Third on the 
'eft. The cavalry were posted on both 
sides of the town on the north bank, 
where also was a fort on the hill com- 
manding the town and the railroad, 
besides earth- works and some artillery. 
From the outset the troops worked 
enei'getically in the erection of breast- 
works of logs and earth, while the 
skiiToishers in front endeavored to 
check the enemy's advance. Between 
the lines of the two armies extended a 
broa?. plain, broken by slight undula- 
tions and little hills, interspersed by 
clumps of bushes and groves of trees. 

The object of Schofield in making a 
stand at Franklin was to detain Hood 
until the trains could be got off safely 
over the Harpeth Bridge and well on 
theii- way to Nashville. To refuse 
battle would have been to expose his 
command to certain attack from superior 
forces while on the march, the result of 
which would, doubtless, have been the 
destiiiction of the wagon-trains and 
the greater part of the artillery. Such 
a calamity might have been followed 
Dy the fall of Nashville, and the aban- 
donment of a large part of Tennessee. 
Hood's object was to overwhelm Scho- 
field at once, or at least compel him to 
sacrifice his artiUery and stores. He 



therefore hurried up his troops and 
massed them behind a screen of thick 
woods, in a line parallel with that oi 
Schofield, Stewart's corps being on the 
right, Cheatham's on the left, and Lee'h 
in reserve in the rear. These move 
ments were made with such celeritj- 
that Hood very nearly took Schofield 
by surprise. The Confederate chief 
rode along his front, telling his men 
that the National lines were weak, and 
that when these were once broken 
Thomas would be compelled to leave 
Tennessee His own army was in 
excellent condition. With his usual 
boldness and confidence of success, 
Hood determined to attack the centre 
of Schofield's line, hoping to pierce it, 
and then to push in through the town 
to the bridges, when he would capture 
the trains, and at the same time cut the 
opposing anny in two. At four o'clock 
in the afternoon he advanced to the 
attack. The National skirmishers 
slowly retreated to their works, ex 
changing a sharp fire with those of the 
enemy; and then a tremendous can- 
nonade was opened from the ai-tillery 
along Schofield's line. The cloud of 
hostile skirmishers was quickly fol 
lowed by the long and massive lines 
foiu" deep, of Cheatham and Stewart 
As the Confederates approached, the^ 
were received by a tremendous mus 
ketry, as well as, artillery fixe. On 
they came, however, with fierce energy 
A terrific struggle ensued. At length 
one of Cheatham's divisions gained the 
outworks held by Wagner, and forced 
him back on the stronger lines held hy 
Cox and Rugor. The Confederatoe 



84« 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



then re-fonning their lines, again rushed 
on, and after a most desperate and 
bloody contest, penetrated the second 
line of defenses, and captured two guns. 
The situation had already become 
critical in the last degree. It seemed 
as if Hood had already victory in his 
grasp. At this supreme moment, Stan- 
ley rode forward to the head of 
Opdyke's brigade, of Warren's division, 
which was posted behind the works, 
and ordered it forward with Conrad's 
brigade in support. Opdyke's voice 
was immediately heard ringing loud 
and clear above the tumult. " First 
brigade, forward to the works," he 
cried, himself leading the way. His 
brave men promptly responded to the 
call. On they went with firm and 
steady step. With crushing weight 
they fell upon the exultant columns of 
the foe. The Confederates, at the very 
moment when victory seemed secure, 
were not only checked in their trium- 
phant career; they we^e driven back 
with fearful slaughter. The gap was 
closed — the National line restored. By 
this gallant charge the works and guns 
were recovered ; and 300 prisoners 
with 10 battle-flags were captured. 
Hood, however, was unwilling to give 
up the contest. Again and again, in 
four successive assaults, he flung his 
men, as if with the energy of despair, 
on the now compact National lines ; but 
it was all in vain. After dark the' 
Confederates, moving to their own left, 
aiade a vigorous attack on the National 
right ; but this too was repulsed by 
Hanley's first division, under Kimball, 
(t was midnight when the sounds of 



musketry and artillery ceased. Hood, 
bitterly mortified at the result of the 
contest, had withdrawn his men. Such 
was the battle of Franklin — a battle 
which did honor to the genius of Scho- 
field, but which, according to the con- 
current testimony of Wood, Stanley 
and Thomas himself, was won by Op 
dyke and his gallant brigade. It was 
the voluntary testimony of each of 
thesf generals, that but for Opdyke 
and his men, their skill, promptitude 
and gallantry, " disaster instead of vic- 
tory would have befallen the National 
arms at Franklin." Opdyke had al- 
ready figured at Shiloh, where he waa 
twice wounded, at Chickamauga, at 
Missionary Ridge, at Rocky Face, and 
at Peach Tree Creek. He was spared 
at Franklin to perform equally noble 
deeds at Nashville. 

On both sides the losses were severe. 
Hood's loss was about 6000, some of 
his best generals had perished ; and 
many of them were severely wounded. 
Schofield's loss was not so heavy — 2326 
in all, of whom 189 were killed, 1033 
wounded, and 1104 missing. Among 
the wounded were Generals Stanlev 
and Bradley. 

It would be difficult to over-estimate 
the importance of the victory at Frank 
lin. It checked Hood's advance ; it 
gave Schofield time to remove his 
troops and his property to Nashville ; 
and what was of equal value, from a 
National point of view, it greatly dis- 
couraged and bowed down the spirits 
of the Confederate rank and file. 

After the battle, Schofield in com- 
pliance with orders from Thomas, fell 



OVERALL'S (JKEEK. 



843 



back to Nashville, in front of which, 
by noon on the Ist of December, a 
Ogj^ line of battle was formed. The 

1. army of Thomas was now about 
^6,000 strong. Steedman had come up 

rem Chattanooga with 5000 men. 
A- J. Smith with his command had 
mived from Missouri on the 30th. 
Other reinforcements were rapidly ar- 
riving. Thomas had taken every care 
to strengthen his position. Forts 
Nogley, Morton, Confiscation, Houston 
tnd Gillem, situated on commanding 
.Heights, guarded the approaches from 
the south. Behind these, and in front 
of NashvUle, lay Thomas' army ; A. J. 
Smith on the right, resting on the 
river ; the Fourth corps commanded by 
Wood in the absence of the wounded 
Stanlf 7, in the centre ; and the Twenty- 
Third corps, under Schofield on the 
left. Wilson with the cavalry, was 
stationed, to secure the interval be- 
tween Schofield and the Cumberland 
above the city. Steedman arrived in 
the evening, and took up a position 
about a mUe in advance of the left 
centre of the main line and on the left 
of the Nolensville turnpike. This 
positio 1, however, was considered to be 
too mnch exposed, and the cavalry 
were d'j-ected to take post on the north 
side of the river at Edgefield, Steed- 
man's troops taking their place in the 
line between Schofield and the river. 
On the afternoon of the 2d of Decem- 
ber small parties of the enemy's cavalry 
engaged the National skirmishers ; but 
their infantry did not appear in force 
till the latter part of the following day, 
when Hood began to establish his main 



line. Early on the 4th he occupied 
the high ground on the southeast side 
of Brown's Creek, extending j^g^^ 
fi-om the Nolensville turnpike 4. 
— his extreme right in a westerly direc- 
tion across the Franklin and Granny 
White turnpikes to the hUls south and 
southwest of Richland Creek, and along 
that stream to the HUlsboro turnpike. 
Both flanks were covered by the cav- 
alry. The enemy's salient was jn 
Montgomery HUl, within 600 yards of 
the National centre. An artillery fire 
was opened on his lines from several 
points, but brought no reply. In this 
position Hood's army remained till the 
15th of December. 

Dming this interval, there occurred 
some operations of a minor character. 
Murfreesboro was then held by General 
Rousseau. The garrison at Murfrees- 
boro had been considerably strength 
ened by the arrival of a body of troops 
under General Milroy, who had been 
ordered up from Tullahoma. Thomas 
was particularly anxious that nothing 
should be allowed to disturb his 
communication with Chattanooga. He 
kept, therefore, a watchful eye on the 
railroad. Hood was not ignorant of 
the importance of this line of commu 
nication ; and on the same day on 
which the latter took position in front 
of Thomas, Bates' division of Cheat- 
ham's corps appeared at Overalls 
Creek, and made an attack on the 
block-house at the railroad crossing 
The little garrison made a stout re- 
sistance ; and on the arrival of Milroy 
who was sent with 3 regiments fioin 
Fort Rosecranz, Bates was com pel hid 



844 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



o retire. During the tliree following 
lays, Bates was largely reinforced \\'ith 
X)th cavalry and infantry ; and it 
seemed as if he were bent on making an 
Msault on the fort. On the 8th, Buford 
\^, at the head of a body of cavalry 
8. dashed into Murfreesboro. At- 
tacked by a regiment of National in- 
fantry, Buford found it necessary t(^ 
retire from the town. Determined that 
kifl day's labor should not be altogether 
fruitless, he swept around by way of 
Lebanon, and along the Cumberland, 
with the evident intention of cutting 
Thomas' communication with Louis- 
ville; but the gun-boats on the river 
made it impossible for him to carry out 
his designs. On the same day, Milroy 
encoimtered the Confederates in some 
force on the Wilkeson turnpike, and 
after a severe struggle, routed them, 
inflicting a loss of 30 killed, and 175 
wounded, and capturing over 200 pris- 
oners and 2 guns. Milroy's loss was 
about 205 men killed and wounded. 

Thomas' protracted delay was misun- 
derstood and misinterpreted at Wash- 
ington. Grant, himself, who had great 
faith in Thomas, was dissatisfied. Hood, 
<t was thought, was having matters too 
much his own way. Grant, resolved to 
have the mystery of the delay ex- 
plained, hurried from City Point for 
Nashville. He had only proceeded as 
far as Washington, when he received 
from the West, telegraphic messages 
fully explaining the situation, and con- 
vincing him that he had not mistrusted 
his man, and that all was well in Ten- 
nessee. Grant did not pursue his 
journey Thomas was really making 



the best possible use of his time. Hie 
numbers were superior to those of 
Hood, but he was deficient in cavaliy. 
Time was of the utmost importance to 
Wilson, who was organizing with all 
the rapidity possible in the circum- 
stances. The weather, besides, had 
been unfavorable. On the morning of 
the 9th, there was a heavy sleet-storm, 
which covered the ground with ice. 
For a week the ground was such, that 
it was impossible to move ; and the 
cold was most intense. 

On the 14th, the weather moderated 
considerably. In both camps the ut- 
most activity prevailed. It was evident 
that both armies were fully prepared 
for a great test struggle. Thomas con 
vened his corps-commanders ; and a 
plan of battle was discussed and agreed 
upon. The left flank of the enemj 
was his weak point. It was the gen 
eral conviction that the point was vul 
nerable — that it could be turned. It 
was resolved, therefore, to make a 
feigned attack against Hood's right, 
and to follow it by an eifective blow 
against the left. The morning of the 
15th was gloomy. A dense fog j)gp 
overhung the entire country 16. 
around. It was not until the morning 
was fai- advanced, that it was possible 
to move the troops to their assigned 
positions. Steedman had received in 
stmctions, the night before, to advanc 
against the enemy's right, east of the 
Nolensville turnpike. As soon as th 
light peiTuitted, he proceeded to cany 
out his instructions. 

Immediately after the completion 
of Steedman's movement, Smith and 



JiiASHVILLE. 



U6 



tVilson pushed out along the Harding 
turnpike, .and, wheeling to the left, ad- 
vanced against Hood's position, across 
the Harding and Hillsboro turnpikes. 
A.t the same time, Johnson's division of 
'Avalry was sent to operate against a 
oaltery of the enemy at Ball's Landing, 
on the Cumberland, 8 miles below 
Nashville ; and, late in the afternoon, in 
conjimction with some gun-boats, he en- 
gaged it, continuing the firing till dark, 
and with such effect that the Confed- 
erates disappeared from that vicinity 
during the night. The remainder of 
Wilson's cavalry, moving on the right 
flank of A. J. Smith's troops, Hatch's 
division leading and Knipe's in reserve, 
struck the enemy at Richland Creek, 
near Harding's House, drove him back 
rapidly, capturing a number of prison- 
ers and wagons. Continuing to ad- 
vance, and still swininnsr a little towards 
he left, they came upon a redoubt 
containing 4 guns. The redoubt was 
carried by assault ; and the captured 
guns were turned upon the enemy. 
The same troops then advanced against 
another and stronger 4-gun redoubt, 
capturing it with 300 prisoners. At 
this stage it was discovered that Smith 
had not advanced sufficiently to the 
right. Schofield, therefore, with the 
Twenty-Third corps, was directed to 
leave his position in reserve, and ad- 
vance to Smith's right. This move- 
ment Schofield rapidly accomplished ; 
and the cavalry were thus enabled to 
operate more freely on the enemy's 
rear. The Fourth corps, under Wood, 
formed on the left of Smith's command, 
«.nd as soon as the latter had struck 



the enemy's flank, assaulted Mont- 
gomery Hill. This position, the most 
advanced in Hood's line, was carried, 
at one o'clock, by a brigade of thf- 
second division. The Fourth corj)8, 
still connecting with Smith's left, con- 
tinued to advance, carrying by assault 
all that portion of Hood's line in its- 
immediate front, and capturing severai 
pieces of artillery, with 500 prisoners 
and some colors. The Confederates 
were driven out of their original line 
of works, and forced back to a position 
along the biase of the Harpeth Hills, 
still holding their line of retreat by the 
Fi-anklin and Granny WTiite turnpikes. 

The National line was readjusted at 
nghtfall so as to run along the east 
[ide of the Hillsboro turnpike — Scho- 
field on the right, Smith in the centre, 
and Wood on the left, with the cavalr} 
on the riojht of Schofield. Steed man 
continued to hold the position he had 
gained in the morning, east of the 
Nolens\alle turnpike. The day's oper- 
ations resulted in the forcing back oi 
the enemy at all points, with a loss of 
16 pieces of artillery, 1200 prisoners, 
several hundred stand of arms, and 4C 
wagons. The National loss was slight 
The original plan of battle had been 
strictly adhered to, and, with but few 
alterations, fully carried out. The 
entire army bivouacked in the line of 
battle formed at dark ; and prepare 
tions were made to renew the contest 
on the foDowing day at an early hour 

On the 16th, at six in the mom- pgg^ 
ing, the struggle was resumed. 16. 
Wood pressed back the Confederate 
skirmishers across the Franklin tuno 



B46 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



pike ; and then swinging a little to the 
right he advanced in a southerly direc- 
tion, driving the Confederates before 
him until he came upon their new main 
line of works, at Overton's Hill, about 
miles south of the city, and on the 
east side of the Franklin turnpike. 
Steedman moved out from Nashville by 
the Nolensville turnpike, and formed 
his command on the left of Wood, 
whose left flank he thus effectually 
secured. Smith moved on the right of 
Wood's corps and established con- 
nection with it, thus completing a new 
line of battle. Schofield's corps re- 
mained in the position taken up at 
dark on the 15th, in which his troops 
faced eastward and towards the enemy's 
left flank, while those of Smith and 
Wood faced towards the south. Wil- 
son's cavalry was dismounted and 
formed on the right of Schofield. 
These dispositions having been com- 
pleted, it was determined to continue 
the movement against the enemy's left 
flank ; and the entire National line 
moved to within 600 yards of that of 
the enemy at all points. About three 
in the afternoon an assault on Overton's 
Hill was ordered to be made by two 
brigades of Wood's corps, aided by a 
colored brigade from Steedman's com- 
mand. But as the ground on which, 
the assaulting columns were formed 
was open and exposed to the view of 
the Confederates, they anticipated the 
movement, and drew reinforcements 
from their left and centre to strengthen 
the menaced position ; and, when the 
assault was made, they directed a tre- 
mendous fire of grape, canister, and 



musketry upon the National troops 
Wood's men, however, moved steadily 
onward up the hill until near its crest, 
when the reserves of the enemy rose 
suddenly and opened upon their assail- 
ants a most destructive fire, which 
caused them to waver and ultimately 
to fall back, leaving their dead and 
wounded lying among the felled trees. 
The troops were immediately re-formed 
in their old position by Wood, in readi- 
ness for a renewal of the assault. 

Smith and Schofield then moved 
against the works in their respective 
fronts, and carried all before them, 
breaking the enemy's lines in a dozen 
places, captming all his artillery with 
thousands of prisoners, including four 
general officers. Wilson's cavalry dis- 
mounted, attacked the enemy at the 
same moment, gained firm possession 
of the Granny White turnpike, and 
thus closed one of the routes which 
had remained open to the Confederates 
for retreat in the direction of Franklin. 
Wood's and Steedman's troops, now 
hearing the shouts of their victorious 
comrades on the right, again rushed 
impetuously forward to renew the as- 
sault on Overton's Hill. Although 
received with a very heavy fire, their 
onset proved irresistible. The Confed 
erates broke, and, leaving their artillery 
and a large number of prisoners, fled ij 
confusion to the Brentwood pass 
through which runs the Franklin turn 
pike, closely followed tiU dark by th 
Fourth corps. Wilson, at the sami 
time, hastily mounted Knipe's and 
Hatch's divisions of his command, and 
sent them in pursuit along the Granny 



THE PUnsUll. 



847 



Wliite turnpike, with directions to 
reach Franklin, if possible, in advance 
of the enemy. After proceeding about 
a mile they came upon a body of Con- 
federate cavalry under Chalmers, behind 
barricades constructed across the road. 
The position was charged, at once, by 
the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, under 
Colonel Spalding, when the Confeder- 
ates broke and scattered in all direc- 
tions, leaving a number of piisoners, 
among whom was General E,ucker. 
Such was the battle of Nashville. 

During the two day's operations 
4462 prisoners were taken, including 
287 officers, from the grade of major- 
general downwai'd, besides 53 pieces 
of artillery and thousands of small-amis. 
The Confederates left 3000 of their 
dead and wounded on the field of bat- 
le. The total National loss did not 
exceed 3000, and of this number very 
few were killed. 

Next morning, the pursuit was con- 
Dgg^ tinned, the Fourth corps pushing 
17. towards Franklin by the direct 
turnpike, and the cavalry by the Granny 
White turnpike to its intersection with 
that road, beyond which point they 
moved in advance of the infantry. 
Johnson's cavalry division was sent by 
Wilson direct to the Harpeth River by 
the Hillsboro turnpike, Avith instruc- 
tions to cross and move rapidly towards 
Franklin. The main cavalry column, 
Knijie's division in the advance, over- 
took the enemy's rear-guard 4 miles 
north of Franklin, at Hollow Tree Gap, 
and carried the position by simultane- 
ous charges in both front and flank, 
OApturing 413 prisoners and 3 stand of 



colors. The Confederates then fel] 
back rapidly to Franklin, and endeav 
ored to defend the crossings of the 
Harpeth ; but, Johnson's division com 
ing up from below on the south side 
of the stream, they were compelled to 
retire. The National forces took {>o8 
session of the town, in which were the 
enemy's hospitals, containing over 2000 
wounded, of whom about 200 were 
Union soldiers. Wilson continued the 
pursuit towards Columbia, the Confed- 
erate rear-guard slowly retiring before 
him to about 5 miles south of Franklia, 
where it halted in some open fields on 
the north side of the West Harpeth 
River, apparently disposed to make a 
stand. Wilson at once deployed Knipe's 
division as skirmishers, with Hatch's 
division in support, and ordered his body- 
guard, the Fourth United States caval- 
ry commanded by Lieutenant Hedges, 
to attack the Confederates. Form- 
ing on the turnpike in column of fours, 
the gallant little band charged with 
di'awTi sabres, and succeeded in break 
ing their centre, while Knipe's and 
Hatch's men drove back their flanks, 
scattering the entire command and cap- 
turing their artillery. Night came on; 
and the fugitives escaped. The Fourth 
coqis had followed, in the rear of the 
cavalry, as far as the Harj)eth River. 
There, however, their progr-ess was 
stayed. The bridges were destroyed, 
and there was too much water in the 
stream to penuit the crossing of infantry. 
The construction of a trestle bridge was 
commenced ; but it was not comj»leted 
hefi'iv tiiglit-fall. Steedman's command 
followeti the Fourth corps and encamped 



^48 



HOOD AND THOMA.S IN TENNESSEE 



near it on the banks of the Harpeth. 
Smith and Schofield, with their corps, 
also joined in the pursuit, marching 
along the Grann)^ White turnpike to 
its intersection with the direct road to 
Franklin. At that point they encamped 
for the night. 

The pursuit was resumed by the 
cavalry, and pushed the next day as far 
Dec, as Rutherford's Creek, 3 miles 

18. from Columbia. The Fourth 
corps crossed to the south side of the 
Harpeth and closed up with the cavalry, 
the enemy offering no opposition during 
the day. Heavy rains having succeeded 
to the cold which had delayed Thomas' 
o})eration8 at Nashville, not only made 
the roads almost impassable, but swelled 
the streams and rivers to such an extent 
that the pursuit became extremely diffi- 
ciilt. Rutherford's Creek had swollen so 
rapidly, that it was found to be unford- 
able soon after the enemy had crossed. 
The splendid pontoon train with its 
experienced pontoniers, belonging to 
the army of Thomas, had been taken 
by Sherman for his Georgia campaign. 
A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed 
at Nashville, was on its way ; but the 
wretched state of the roads retarded 
Dgg^ its arrival. During the 19th, 

19. efforts were made by the ad- 
vanced troojis to get across Rutherford's 
Creek. They were only partially suc- 
cessful, only a few skirmishers effecting 
a lodgment on the south bank. Smith's 
and Schofield's commands crossed to 
the south side of the Harpeth, the form- 
er advancing to Spring Hill, the latter 
to Franklin. On the morning of the 
20th, Hatch having succeeded in throw- , 



ing a floating bridge over Rutheriord'ft 
Creek, got his entire division over, an(i 
pushed on for Columbia; but on reach 
ing Duck River he found that the Con 
federates had got everything across tb« 
night before by a pontoon bridge, whicL- 
they had carried off, and that the rivei 
was impassable. In the course of tli 
day Wood constructed a foot bridge 
over Rutherford's Creek; and by night- 
fall having crossed all his infantry, as 
well as one or two of his batteriess. he 
pushed on to Duck River. 

The pontoon train came up about 
noon, on the 2l8t; and, in spite of the 
severe cold which had now set in, the 
bridge was completed before night f al 1 
and Smith's command pushed across 
Materials for the construction of anothei 
bridge were hurried forward to Duck 
River. This bridge was finished in 
time to permit Wood's coromand to 
cross to the south side, late in th 
afternoon of the 2 2d, and to get into 
position on the Pulaski road, about 
two miles south of Columbia. 

Notmthstanding the severity of the 
weather and the vexatious delays which 
he had experienced, Thomas resolved 
to continue the pursuit. This duty he 
assigned to Wilson's cavalry and the 
Fourth corps. The infantry was to move 
along the turnpike — the cavalry was 
to march on its flanks, across the fields. 
Smith's and Schofield's corps were to 
follow more leisurely, and to be used 
as occasion demanded. Hood had now 
formed a powerful rear-guard, composed 
of Forrest's cavalry and about 4000 
infantry under General Walthall, made 
up of detachments from all his organized 



DEFEAT OF HOOD. 



649 



force. This rear- guard, undaunted 
and firm, did its duty to the last. All 
the rest of Hood's once noble army 
became a disheartened rabble of ragged, 
barefooted, and half -armed men, whose 
privations and discouragement led them 
to take every opportunity of escape 
*rom the Confederate sei-vice. 

Wilson crossed the Duck River on 
the 23d ; and on the foDowing day, 
supported by Wood, he came up with 
the enemy at Lynnville and at Buford's 
Station. A stand was made at both 
these places ; but the Confederates were 
quickly dislodged with considerable 
loss, and followed up so rapidly that 
they had not time to destroy the bridges 
9ver Richland Creek. On the morning 
oi the 25th they evacuated Pulaski, 
Qgg^ and were pursued in the direction 
86. of Lamb's Feny, over an almost 
impracticable road and through a coun- 
try devoid of sustenance for men or 
horsea During the afternoon Colonel 
Harrison's brigade found them strongly 
mtrenched, at the head of a deep and 
heavily wooded ravine, through which 
the road ran. Their skirmishers were 
driven in ; but the attack was delayed 
until the remainder of the cavalry 
should come up. The enemy then, 
recovering some of its old audacity, 
took the opportunity to sally from his 
breast-works, driving back Harrison's 
skirmishers, and capturing one gun. 
The Confederates were ultimately 
driven back, with a loss of some 50 
prisoners ; but the gun was not recov- 
ered. The cavalry, in piirsuit, moved 
90 rapidly that their supply trains were 
left far in the rear ; and both men and 



animals suffered much in consequence 
Wood's corps following the cavaby on 
the night of the 26th encamped 6 miles 
out from Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry 
road, and reached Lexington, Alabama, 
30 miles from Pulaski, on the 28th. 
The Confederates, by this time, d^^, 
had made good their escape 28. 
across the Tennessee River at Bain 
bridge ; and Thomas ordered the pur- 
suit to cease. At Pulaski 200 of the 
enemy's wounded and sick were found 
in the hospital ; and 4 guns were taken 
out of Richland Creek. The road, all 
the way from NashviUe to Bainbridge, 
was strewn with wagons, limbers, 
small-arms, and blankets, affording con- 
clusive evidence that the retreat of 
Hood's troops had been of the most 
disorderly character. 

Although the pursuit of Hood, by 
the main army, had been discontinued, 
a force of 600 cavalry under Colonel 
Palmer, made up from various regiments, 
set out from Decatur, in the direction 
of Hood's line of retreat. Palmer as 
certained at Leighton that Hood had 
passed through that place on the 28th, 
and marched in the direction of Colum- 
bus, Mississippi. Avoiding the cavalry 
of the Confederates, and moving rapidly 
by way of LaGrange, Russell ville and the 
Cotton-Gin road. Palmer overtook their 
pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons 
and 78 pontoon boats, about 10 miles 
from Russellville, the whole of which 
he destroyed. Then, having ascertained 
that a large supply train was on its 
way to Tuscaloosa, he set out on the 
Ist of January towards Aberdeen, Mis 
sissippi, and succeeded in surprising i1 



850 



HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 



about ten o'clock the same night, just 
beyond the Mississippi boundary line. 
This train, consisted of over 100 wagons 
and 500 mules. The wagons he burned ; 
the mules he sabred or shot. After 
encountering and pressing back Roddy's 
cavalry, near Leighton, Alabama, and 
capturing and destroying Hood's pon- 
toon train, about 10 miles from Russell- 
ville he pushed on for Moulton. Meet- 
ing a body of Confederates at Thorn 
Hill, he attacked and routed them. He 
arrived safe at Decatur on the 6th of 
January. 

While Hood was before Nashville, 
he sent into Kentucky a force of about 
800 cavalry with 2 guns, under General 
Lyon, with instructions to operate 
against the railroad communications 
with Louisville. To protect these, 
McCook's division of cavalry was on 
the 14 th of December sent to Bowling 
Green and Franklin. Lyon captured 
Hopkinsville, but was soon afterwards 
met and routed by Lagrange's brigade 
near Greenburg. Then, making a wide 
detour by way of Elizabethtown and 
Glasgow, he succeeded in getting to 
the Cumberland River, at Burkville, 
where he crossed. Proceeding thence, 
byway of McMinnville and Winchester, 
to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Mem 
phis and Charleston Railroad, he at 
tacked the little garrison, at Scottsboro 
on the lOlh of January, but was again 
repulsed. This time, however, his com- 
mand scattered and was pursued to the 
Tennessee River, beyond which he 
managed to escape with about 200 
men, the rest of his force dispersing in 
squads ainons' the mountains Palmer 



with 150 men crossed the Tennesset 
River and went in pursuit of Lyon 
and on the 1 4th of January, he surprised 
him in camp at Red Hill, on the road 
from Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, cap 
turing Lyon with 100 of his men, anc 
his one remaining piece of artillery 
Lyon, however, shooting a sentinel, 
eflFected his escape. 

The total National losses in the vari 
ous operations of the campaign in Ten 
nessee, including killed, wounded, and 
missing, did not exceed 10,000 men; 
while that of the enemy in prisoners 
alone was 13,189, including nearly 1000 
officers of all ranks, 72 serviceable pieces 
of artillery, and a large number of 
battle-flags. More than 2000 deserters 
also came within the National lines and 
took the oath of allegiance. 

The success which attended General 
Thomas, in this campaign, was in some 
respects without parallel in the entire 
history of the war. In many of the 
campaigns larger numbers were en 
gaged, and the fighting was more severe ; 
but in none of the campaigns was an 
opposing army so thoroughly demol- 
ished. It was the first time that a 
Confederate army had been annihilated. 
Thomas had reason to be proud of hie 
victory. With an army hastily made 
up of fragments of three separate com 
mands, numerically weaker, and greatly 
inferior in dicipline to that to which he 
was opposed, he not only held his own, 
not only repelled successive attacks, 
but won a signal, even a crowning 
victory. It has already been mentioned 
that Grant was impatient of what he 
called Thomas' " unnecessaiy delay 



CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS. 



86 



oefore the battle of Nashville. Al- 
thougn not abandoning the opinion 
that the delay was perilous and to a 
certain extent unnecessary, the Lieu- 
tenant- General afterwards declared that 
Thomas' success would be accepted as 

vindication of that distinguished 
officer's judgment. In his letter to 
Sherman on the 18th of December, 
Grant says "Thomas has done magnifi- 
cently." Thomas was slow but he was 
sure. He was already renovpned as the 
"Rock of Chickamauga." As the con- 
queror of Hood, the hero of the great 
Tennessee campaign, he was henceforth 
to take a foremost place, vdth Grant 
and Sherman and Meade and Sheridan. 
The government evinced its appreciation 
of his gieat services by appointing him 
major-general in the regular army, his 
rank to date from the 15th of Decem- 
ber — the day on which he won his 
crov?Tiing victory at Nashville. 

On the 30th of December, Thomas 
proclaimed the campaign at an end, 
and gave orders for the distribution of 
his troops in winter-quarters, at East- 
port, in Northern Mississippi, at Athens 
and Huntsville, in Alabama, and at 
Dalton, in Georgia. This arrangement, 
however, was not satisfactory to Gen- 
eral Grant and the War Department. 
The Secession cause must now be 
crushed — such was the determination 
of General Grant; and in this deter- 
mination he was fully supported by the 
government. Until this result should 
be achieved, there was to be no rest for 
the National armies. Thomas was, 
therefore, instructed to countermand 
vhe orders given, and to make a new 



disposition of his troops. Wood vdth 
the Fourth corps was to go to Hunts 
ville. Smith, Schofield and Wilson 
were to concentrate at Eastport, and to 
hold themselves in readiness for furthei 
orders. 

Hood with a shattered fragment of 
his army had made his way to Tupelo 
Mississippi. There, on the 23d of Janu 
ary, he was relieved of his command, at 
his own request ; but it would be use- 
less to deny that his resignation had 
become a necessity. A capable and 
dashing officer, he was Longstreet's 
tower of strength at Gettysburg, where 
he lost an arm. He fought with equal 
energy and daring at Chickamauga, 
where he lost a leg. He held him- 
self responsible for the conception of 
the Tennessee campaign ; and he strove 
hard, he tells us, to do his duty in 
its execution ; but his plan and mode 
of battle would have been more per 
feet, if he had awaited, not made, the 
assaults. As it was, he acted precisely 
as his antagonist wished him to act. 
Hood added another name to that list 
of capable men, who had figured on 
both sides — men who as corps or divis- 
ion commanders were equal to any 
emergency ; but who, being unequal to 
the responsibilities of uncontrolled 
authority, were found wanting, when 
entrusted with supreme command. 

Simultaneous with these operations 
in Tennessee, and having for their 
object the occupation of the Confeder 
ate forces to the west of both Shermai 
and Thomas, there were some minoj 
and co-operative movements of which it 
is necessary to give a brief account 



?52 



HOOD AND IHOMAS LN TENxNESSEE. 



One of these was sent out from Vicks- 
burg, in the latter part of November, 
against Hood's communications with 
Mobile. The force employed, consisting 
of about 2000 cavalry, with 8 pieces of 
itillery, under Colonel Osband, after 
well executed flank movement on 
Jackson on the 24th, started northward 
for the Mississippi Central Railroad 
Bridge over the Big Black. The bridge 
ifQj^ was reached on the 27th, captured 
27. after a sharp fight and destroyed. 
The wagon-road bridge and 30 miles of 
railroad track were also destroyed, with 
all the intermediate depots and build- 
ings, besides 2600 bales of cotton, sev- 
eral locomotives and cars, and a large 
amount of stores at Vaughan Station. 
Hood's army was thus cut off from 
the supplies accumulated for its use 
at Jackson; and the railroad was 
rendered unavailable for months. 
The expedition, although considerably 
harassed on its return by bodies of the 
enemy, got back to Vicksburgon the 4th 
of December, without having suffered 
any material losses. 

Another expedition, under General 
Davidson, set out from Baton Rouge, 
with a similar object, on the 27th of 
November, comprising a force of 4200 
men in two divisions, commanded by 
•reneral BaUy and Colonel Davis, with 
96 wagons and 8 guns, and reached 
Tangipaha, on the Jackson Railroad, on 
the 1st of December. Five miles of 
the track were torn up and the railroad 
buildings and bridges burned. Unfor- 
timately, some dwelling houses caught 
<ire ; and a part of the town was con- 
sumed The column then proceeded to 



Friiuklin\nlle ; and there, also, the traci 
was torn up. Columbia and Augusta 
were also visited. The enemy's cavalry 
under Scott, now made its appearance 
and a shaif) skirmish occurred, on th 
Yazoo City and Vicksburg road on the 
2d. After a weary march, over j)^, 
roads rendered almost impassable 2. 
by heavy rains, the command airived 
at West Pascagoula, on the 12th. On 
the 16th, the Mobile and Great North- 
em Railroad was cut at Pollard's, 72 
miles northeast of Mobile, by a column 
of iufantiy and cavalry, under Colonel 
Robinson. A few miles of the track 
were torn up, and the depot, 8 cars, and 
a large amount of stores, including 2000 
stand of arms, were destroyed. 

Another co-operative movement, from 
Memphis, had greater success. On the 
21st of December, General Dana q^^^ 
sent General Gnerson, with some 21 . 
3000 cavalry, to cut the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad. The column moved 
directly eastward, threatening Corinth. 
Detachments, sent for the piu^ose, cut 
the telegraph vvire between Grand 
Junction and Corinth, as well as that 
between Booneville and Gumtown, oc 
the Mobile and Ohio road. On the 
latter road they also destroyed 4 bridges 
between the same points. The main 
column, moving rapidly on Tupelo, 
surprised and captured or disj^ei-sed 
Forrest's camp of dismounted men at 
Verona. At this place, were destroyed 
32 cars, loaded with new wagons, pon- 
toons, and supplies, 300 army wagons, 
most of which had been captured from 
General Sturgis at Gumtown, 4000 new 
English-made carbines intended for th© 



GRIEESON'S EXPEDITION. 



853 



use of Forrest's troops, also large 
amounts of ordnance stores, quarter- 
masters' and commissary stores for 
Hood's army. On leaving Verona the 
column moved southward along the 
line of railroad, which was thoroughly 
destroyed, to a point between Egypt 
and Prairie Stations. Telegrams were 
taken from the wires at Okalona from 
Generals Taylor and Gardner, ordering 
Egypt to be held at aU hazards, and 
promising reinforcements from Mobile 
and elsewhere. Eygpt was held by a 
garrison of about 1200 infantry and 
cavalry, with 4 guns on platform cars. 
f)ec. Grrierson attacked the place on 
28. the 28tk While the attack was 
going on, two trains loaded with 
infantry, under Gardner, came in sight. 
Grierson sent a force to meet them 
and to hinder their approa^L The 
expected aid not coming up, the garri- 
son, after a fight of about two hours, 
was dispersed with a loss of 500 pris- 
oners and General Gholson killed. At 
Egypt the Nationals destroyed a train 
of 14 cars and 1000 stand of arms. 
T^ farther prosecution of the raid was 



now given up, the hostile force in front 
and the great number of prisoners and 
captured animals making rapid move- 
ment impossible. The column, accord- 
ingly, turned to the southwest, and 
marching through Houston and Belle, 
fontaine, struck the Mississippi Central 
Railroad at Winona. A detachment, 
sent to Bankston, destroyed the large 
and valuable factories which supplied 
the Confederate army with clothing and 
shoes, as well as large quantities oi 
wool, cloth, and leather. Another de- 
tachment destroyed the new machine- 
shops and all the Confederate govern- 
ment property at Granada. A brigade, 
sent southward from this place, tore up 
the railroad track and pulled down the 
telegraph wire for 35 miles, and meet- 
ing a brigade of Confederate troope 
imder Wirt Adams at Franklin, chained 
and drove it from the field with a lose 
of 25 killed. The column, after destroy- 
ing an immense amount of property, 
arrived safely at Yicksburg, on the 
5th of January, bringing in 550 pris- 
oners, 1000 negroes i*nd 800 korses and 
mulea. 



H64 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PEIVATBERS. 



CHAPTER XL. 



]• Steaernxj of the Bloeka4e — The Blockade Bnnners — The Temptation — The Efforta of the GoTernmant-' 
Gfiowing Strength of the N»t«1 Serrice— GUlmore's Expedition to Florida — Seymour Placed in Immediate 
rommand — On St. John's Biver — At Jacksonville — At Baldwin — Gillmore Returns to Hilton Head — 
Seymour's Blunder — Suwannee Eiver — Barber's Station — Olnstee Station — Battle of Olustee — Bravery of 
the Negroes — Seymour Falls Back on Jacksonville — Destruction of I*roperty — The Expedition a Failure — 
North Carolina — New Berne— Plymouth — Washington — Pickett's Unsuccessful Attempt on New Berne — 
Confederate Attack on Plymouth — Forts Warren, Wessels and Comfort — The Albemarle — Capture of 
Plymouth — Hoke Demands the Surrender of New Berne — Melancthon's Blockading Squadron — Th« 
Sassacus Buts the Albemarle — The Albemarle Retires — Hoke Abandons the Siege of New Berne — Quiet 
in Albemarle Sound and along the Coast of North Carolina — Bumside's Conquests in 1863 for the most 
part recovered by the Confederatee — Cuahing and the Albemarle — Cuahing's Bravery — Destruction of the 
Albemarle — Plymouth Recaptured — Wilmington the one Open Port — Its Defenses — Arrangements Made 
to Reduce it — A Joint Expedition — Porter and Butler — Grant's Instructions to Butler — The Troops on 
board Transports — A Formidable Fleet — A Storm at Sea — Cape Fear — The Transports Seek Shelter a* 
Beaufort — Fort Fisher — The Powder Ship — The Experiment a FaUure— The First Attack on Fort Fishe; 
— A Magnificent Bombardment — The Second Day — The Troopa Landed — " Yankee Doodle" — Bravery o> 
Curtis — Difference of Opinion — The Troops Re-embarked — The Assault a FaUure — A National Disap 
pointment — Grant Ofiended — Preparations for Another Assault — Grant Sends an Increased Land Force — 
Terry in Command — The Combined Forces at New Inlet — The Strengfth of Fort Fisher — The Armamenl 
of the Fleet — A Terrific Bombardment — Terry Rebolves to Assault — Porter Concurs — The Signal Given— 
The Marines Driven Back — The Palisades— Curtis' Brigade — A Terrible Struggle — Curtis Joined by 
Pennybacker and Bell — Hand-to-hand Rghting — Fighting over the Traverses — Arrival of Blackman and 
Abbott — Fort Fisher Captured — Hoke's Attack on the National Line — His Retreat— 'The Struggle at Fort 
Fisher one of the most gallant in the War — A Brave Assault — A Heroic Defense — A Fearful Explosion — 
The Confe<lerate8 Blow Up Fort CasweU— All the other Works Deserted— The Blockade of Wilmington 
Sectired — A Pause — General Schofield Ordered to the Coast of North Carolina — His Arrival at Fort Fiahei 
— The Department of North Carolina — Schofield in Command — Ordered to Co-operate with Sherman — 
Capture of Fort Anderson — Wilmington Abandoned by the Confederates — Occupied by the Nationals — 
A Severe Blow to the Confederates — Mobile — A Co-operative Movement — Canby, Wilson and Thatcher— 
MobOe a place of Great Strength — Canby and Thatcher Move Against It — On the East Side — Spanish Port 
—The Siege — The Assault — The Work Abandoned — Occupied by the Nationals — Tort Blakely — A place 
of Great Strength — Canby Resolves to Assault — A Rush into the Jaws of Death — A Desperate Struggle — 
" Remember Port Pillow " — A National Victory — Surrender of Mobile — Wilson's Co-operative Movement 
— At Elyton — At Montevallo — Ebonezer Church — Selma Captured — Great Destruction of Property — At 
Montgomery — The Place Surrrendered — At Macon — A Most Successful and Most Destructive Raid — The 
Privateers— The Savannah— The Petrel— The Juda— The Nashville— The Sumter— The Later Privateers— 
The Florida — Her Depredations — Captured at Bahia — Sunk in Hampton Roads — The Tallahassee and 
Chickamauga — Destroyed at Wilmington — The Georgia — Captured near Lisbon — The Olustee — Th« 
Shenandoah — Surrendered to the British Government — The Stonewall — Surrendered to the Spaniards a 
Havana — The Alabama — Her Mission of Destruction — Captain Semmee — At Cherbourg — The Kearsarg 
and the Alabama — The Great Battle — Captain Winalow — The Deerhound — The Courronne — Winslow' 
Skilful Fighting — The Kearsarge Victorious — The Alabama Sunk— Her Record. 



Naval and coast operations have 
already, at dififerent times, occu- 
pied OUT attention, in the course 
of this work. These operations had for 



1864. 



their primary object, the establishmen 
and maintenance of an effective block 
ade of all the ports on the coasi, 
through which the Confederacy m %h.i 



JSXFEDITION TO FLOEIDA. 



856 



obtain succor or supplies. It can well 
be understood that the maintenance of 
such a blockade was a severe strain on 
the energies of the North. It implied 
the presence of armed vessels, all along 
he extended seaboard, gun-boats in the 
'vers and bayous, and large bodies of 
(irmed men at suitable points, and at 
convenient distances all along the coast. 
Blockade-running, which offered pecu- 
liar temptations to the foreign trader, 
was at first beset with little difficulty. 
The reward was great; and the risk 
was small Time, however, and the 
progress of the war worked a great 
change. The Navy grew ia strength ; 
and the perils and risks of the blockade- 
runner multiplied. At the close of 
1863, there were of iron-clad steamers 
75 ; of side-wheels 203 ; of screws 198; 
of sailing vessels 112 — in all 588. The 
umber of guns was 4443, and the 
ggregate tonnage 467,967. On the 
1st of July in that year, there were 
34,000 seamen ; and during the year 
enlistments for the naval service aver- 
aged over 2000 per montk In 1864 
the number of vessels had increased to 
671 ; the number of guns to 4610 ; and 
the tonnage to 510,396. At the begin- 
ning of the war, there were in the ser- 
vice 7600 men ; at its close the figures 
were 51,500. 

In the spring of 1864, the naval 
forces were divided into four separate 
squadrons, of which one was stationed 
in the James River, one in the Sounds 
of North Carolina, the other two lying 
off Cape Fear and the adjacent inlets. 
Each of these squadrons was placed 
under a competent officer ; and the 



head-quarters were established at Beau 
fort, North Carolina. Port after por* 
had gradually been wrested from th 
Confederacy, until in almost every har 
bor and along the banks of the Missis- 
sippi, the National flag floated supreme 
After the destruction of the forts in 
Charleston Harbor, and in Mobile Bay 
Wilmington was the only port of first 
class importance, which continued t< 
invite the enterprise and to tempt the 
the cupidity of the blockade-runners. 
As we have already brought down the 
story of the naval and coast engage- 
ments to the year 1864, and as separate 
chapters have been devoted to Charles- 
ton Harbor and to Mobile Bay, we pro- 
pose to make this chapter exhaustive 
of all the remaining naval and coast 
operations, for whatever purpose, cov- 
ering, of course, those connected with 
the blockade and the privateeiing inter 
ests of the SoutL 

Although not in any direct way con- 
nected with the blockade, yet having 
all the essential characteristics of a 
coast operation, place must be found at 
the outset here for a brief record of the 
ill-starred expedition which was sent to 
Florida, in the early months of 1864. 
Towards the close of 1863, report? 
w^re freely circulated, to the effect, that 
Florida, tired of the war, was sighing 
for amnesty and restoration to the 
Union. Gillmore, since the demolition 
of Fort Sumter, his troops compara 
tively unemployed, had remained a 
Hilton Head. It was the opinion oi 
that officer, that such being the state oi 
feeling in Florida, his men might be 
used to some advantage in an expediticr 



at 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATBERS. 



to that State. In January, Lincoln 
gave his consent to the proposed exped- 
ition — at the same time commissioning 
as major, Mx. John Hay, one of his 
private secretaries, and sending him to 
Hilton Head, to join Gillmore and pro- 
ceed with him as the representative of 
the Executive. Gillmore hurried for- 
ward the necessary preparations ; and 
the expedition, under the immediate 
command of General Truman Seymour, 
consisting of 4500 infantry and 400 
cavalry, on board 20 steamers and 8 
Feb. schooners, left Hilton Head, on 

6. the 6th of February. On the 
following day, they entered the St. 
John's River, and proceeding upwards, 
landed at and occupied Jacksonville, in 
the afternoon. Jacksonville was found 
to be in ruins, and, with the exception 
of a few women and children, aban- 
doned by the inhabitants. On the 8th, 
the army in three columns — commanded 
respectively by C. C. Barton, Forty- 
Eighth New York, J. R Hawley, 
Seventh Connecticut, and Guy V. 
Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts, set out 
from Jacksonville in the direction of 
Baldwin. Henry, who commanded the 
cavalry, led the advance. On the way, 
Henry found the Confederates in some 
force, at Camp Vinegar. Passing the 
camp, he surprised and captured, some- 
what in the rear of the Confederates, 4 
guns, and a large amount of commis- 
sary stores. Baldwin was reached 

bout sunrise, on the morning of the 
9 th, when another gun was captured, 
together with 3 cars, a large quantity 
of cotton, and stores of all kinds, to the 
value of about $500,000 Henry 



pushed forward in the direction ol 
Lake City ; but discovering that the 
Confederate general, Finnegan, vrf£ in 
the neighborhood, and not knowing the 
exact strength of his command, he fell 
back about 4 miles, and telegraphed to 
Seymour for orders and supplies. 

Gillmore had accompanied the ex 
pedition as far as Baldwin. It was not 
his intention to penetrate further into 
the interior. Giving Seymour instruc- 
tions to that effect, he returned to Hil- 
ton Head, which he reached, on the 
15th. Seymour, however, having been 
informed that Finnegan had fallen back 
from Lake City, gave way to his own 
strong impulses and assumed the respon- 
sibility of pushing forward his troops, 
bare almost of supplies, in the direc- 
tion of the Suwannee River. Thence 
he telegraphed to Gillmore, notifying 
him of the fact and asking him to make 
a demonstration against Savannah, with 
one of the iron-clads, so as to present 
reinforcements being sent to Finnegan. 
Gillmore was astounded. He saw, at a 
glance, the peril to which Seymour was 
exposing himself and his 6000 troops. 
There was no reason why Finnegan 
should not receive reinforcements from 
both Georgia and Alabama. In such 
a case, Seymour's force would be over- 
whelmed and probably destroyed. Gill 
more, without a moment's delay, sent 
a message to his lieutenant remonstra 
ting against the folly of such conduct. 

It was too late, Seymour was already 
caught in a trap. On the mom- Yeh. 
ing of the 20th, he had pressed 20. 
forward, from Barber's Station, along the 
road which runs parallel with the rail 



OLtlSTEE, 



867 



road. He was within three miles of 
Olufltee Station. At this point there 
was a swamp and a heavy pine forest. 
Under cover of these, Finnegan had 
disposed his men. It was now near two 
o'clock in the afternoon. The head 
of Seymour's column had no sooner 
come up, than the woods blazed with 
the fire of musketry and artillery. 
Henry's cavalry with Stevens' battalion 
and Hawley's Seventh Connecticut were 
the first to suffer. Hawley hui-ried 
forward the Seventh New Hampshire, 
Colonel Abbott, with the batteries of 
Hamilton, Elder, and Langdon. The 
National artilleiy suffered terribly. 
In the brief space of twenty minutes 40 
out of 50 horses were killed, and 45 
out of 82 men. What remained of the 
artillery force fell back, leaving behind 
two guns. 

The battle, however, continued to 
rage with great fury. Seymour almost 
atoned for the blunder he had commit- 
ted, by his activity and daring. He 
was everywhere present, and the bullets 
of the enemy whistled around him in 
vain. Hawley's brigade having suffered 
terribly, the Eighth United States, a 
negro regiment from Montgomery's bri- 
gade, was sent to its support. This 
regiment, which had never before been 
under fire, behaved with the utmost 
gallantry. For two houi-s it held an 
exposed position in front ; and its losses 
■ — including its brave commander and 
amounting in all to 350 men — attested 
the severity of the fighting. Barton's 
brigade, composed of the Forty-Eighth, 
Forty-Ninth, and One Hundred and Fif- 
teenth New York, was brought up in 



turn. On the part of this brigade 
nothing was wanting in the matter of 
bravery ; but it proved of no avail It 
advanced only to repeat the experience 
and to share the fate of that which had 
gone before. For a while the struggle 
was prolonged. Barton's men, already 
severely punished, were showing signs 
of weakness. The Confederates seemed 
to think that their opportunity had 
come for a final and crushing charge. 
Gathering up their strength, and as if 
resolved to make short, sharp work with 
their antagonists, they came rolling for- 
ward in overwhelming numbers and 
with resistless energy. It was a critica. 
moment. Montgomery, with his tw« 
remaining negro regiments, the Fifty- 
Fourth Massachusetts and the First 
North Carolina, rushed forward to the 
rescue, and received the full weight of 
the Confederate onset. This was the 
turning point in the fight. The negroes 
fought with the energy of despair, and 
although their comrades were fallins' on 
«very side, they firmly held their ground. 
Although ultimately overpowered and 
driven back, it was not untQ Seymour 
had found time to rally and re-adjust hia 
lines and get his guns in position. Four 
vollies of grapeshot from the National 
batteries compelled the Confederates to 
halt. It was now about four o'clock. 
Seymour ordered a retreat. The Con 
federates attempted to pursue ; but the 
National guns, handled with skill and 
fired with great rapidity, made such 
havoc in their lines that they were com- 
pelled to desist. Seymour fell back 
with the wreck of his command to 
Jacksonville; and finally the whole 



8S8 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 



command returned to Hilton Head. 
The estimated loss of the Nationals in 
this campaign was nearly 2,000 men. 
At Jacksonville, Seymour destroyed 
stores valued at $1,000,000. The Con- 
federate loss was under 1000 men. 
Such was the battle of Olustee, and 
such was the result of the test applied 
to the loyal sentiment of Florida. 

From the date of Seymour's unsuc- 
cessful experiment, Florida no longer 
commanded attention imtil the close of 
the war. Early in the year 1864, how- 
ever, the east coast of North Carolina 
became the theatre of some important 
operations. Since 1862, when they 
werf captured by General Bumside, 
New Berne, Plymouth, and Washing- 
ion had been held by National garri- 
jons. In February 1864, an unsuccess- 
ful attempt was made by a body of 
Confederates, under General Pickett, to 
recapture New Berne. After setting 
on fire the gun-boat Underwriter, 
Pickett claimed a victory and retired. 
It was, however, a barren victory ; for 
he had left the defenses of New Berne 
untouched. 

About the middle of April, a more 
daring as well as more successful effort 
was made against Plymouth, at the 
head of Albemarle Sound, and at the 
mouth of the Roanoke River. The 
place was well fortified, and was held 
by General Wessels, with a force of 
«'.)me 2400 men, consisting of the Eighty- 
Fifth New York, One Hundred and 
First and One Hundred and Third 
Pennsylvania, Sixteenth Connecticut, 
and 6 companies from other regiments. 
[n the river, in front of the town, were 



the gun-boats Southfield, Miami, and 
Bombshell. In the immediate neigh- 
borhood, and guarding the approaches 
to the town were four forts — Fort Wai 
ren, Fort Williams, Fort Wessels, and 
Fort Comfort. On the 17th of j^^^\ 
April, General Hoke, with about 17. 
7000 Confederates, appeai-ed in the 
vicinity of Plymouth ; and, on the same 
day, he made an attack on Fort War- 
ren, which was about a mile above the 
town. On the morning of the 18th, the 
attack was resumed with greater energy ; 
and powerful assistance was rendered 
by the Confederate ram Albemarle 
which came down the Roanoke River. 
The National gun-boat Bombshell came 
to the aid of the garrison, but ^vas soon 
disabled and captured. Hoke then fell 
upon Fort Wessels, a mile nearer the 
town ; and, although a vigorous resist- 
ance was offered, the fort was at length 
captured. Plymouth was now closeh 
invested. Hoke pressed the siege with 
great energy ; he brought his batteries 
closer upon the town; and the Albe- 
marle, having run past Fort Warren, 
fell upon the unarmed gun-boats. The 
Southfield was first struck. The blow 
was fatal ; for she speedily went down 
The Miami was next attacked ; and 
although she managed to escape down 
the river, it was not until her command- 
er was killed, and many of her guns 
were disabled. The Albemarle then 
turned her guns upon the town, pour 
ing upon it a perfect storm of shot and 
shell. On the following day, Hoke, 
having pushed his batteries within 
1100 yards of the town, opened upon 
it a tremendous fire. He then made a 



DESTEUCTION Or rmfi ALBEMARLE. 



859 



general assault. Wessels made an ob- 
atinate defense ; but lie was ultimately 
compelled to surrender tlie place with 
1600 prisoners, 25 guns, and 2000 
small arms. The fall of Plymouth 
'•endered necessary the evacuation of 
Washington, a little town at the mouth 
of the Tar River, some 32 miles north 
of New Berne. 

Pursuing his victorious career, Hoke 
then pushed towards New Berne. Ar- 
rived in front of the place he demanded 
its surrender, which was refused. He 
then commenced a siege. Captain 
Cooke of the Albemarle somewhat 
over-elated by his success at Plymouth, 
and feeling confident that a similar 
success would attend him in the broader 
waters further down, pushed on again 
to the assistance of Hoke. He was 
ignorant of the fate which awaited him. 
Captain Melancthon, with his blockad- 
ing squadron, was then guarding the 
waters of Albemarle Sound. His prin- 
cipal vessels were the Mattahesset, the 
Miami, the Wyalusing, the Whitehead, 



May 



and the Sassacus. It was now 



6. the 5th of May. The Albemarle 
was accompanied by the captured boat 
Bombshell The Sassacus gave the 
Bombshell a broadside which compelled 
her to strike her flag. She then butted 
the Albemarle, forcing her hull under 
the water. The Sassacus, however, 
was severely punished for her temerity, 
a 100-pound Brooks bolt passing 
through one of her boilers, Mlling 3 
men, and wounding 6, and filling the 
vessel with scalding steam. When the 
cloud of steam passed away, the Albe- 
marle was seen moving off in the direc- 



tion of Plymouth, firing as she fled. 
The Bombshell was left behind. Hoke 
was compelled to abandon the siege of 
New Berne. It was a National victoiy. 
For some months there was quiet in 
Albemarle Sound, and all along th 
coast of North Carolina. The conquests 
made by Bumside, in 1862, had for the 
most part been recovered by the Con- 
federates ; but Roanoke Island and New 
Berne remained in the hands of the 
Nationals. The Albemarle continued 
to be a source of annoyance and even 
terror to the blockading vessels. To- 
wards the end of October, Lieutenant 
W. B. Cushing, one of the bravest of 
the young ofiicers in the naval service, 
undertook to destroy the monster. It 
was lying at the time in the harbor of 
Plymouth, behind a raft of logs, some 
30 feet in width. A small steam launch, 
fitted up as a torpedo boat, was placed 
in Cushing's charge. On the night of 
the 27th of October, with a crew Oct. 
of 13 oflicers and men, he moved 27. 
up the Roanoke, and arrived, before he 
was perceived by the enemy, within 
twenty yards of the Albemarle. The 
torpedo was und6r the ram and explod- 
ed before the enemy had time to fire a 
shot. Cushing's own account best tells 
the story: "The torpedo," he says 
"was erploded at the same time that 
the Albemarle's gun was fired. A shot 
seemed to go crashing through my boat 
and a dense mass of water rushed in 
from the torpedo, filling and completely 
disabling her. The enemy then con- 
tinued to fire at fifteen feet range, and 
demanded our surrender, which I twice 
refused." Cushing escaped into the 



800 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PEIVATEJSaS. 



water, and, in spite of the bullets of the 
enemy, managed to reach the shore. 
Most of his crew were captured or 
drowned- In the morning, he learned 
that his work had been effectually ac- 
complished. The Confederate ram was 
completely destroyed. A few days 
later, Plymouth was recaptured by 
CJommodore Macomb, and the National 
flag was unfurled over the simken 
Albemarle. 

It has already been stated in this 
chapter that Wilmington, North Caro- 
lina, was the one seaport remaining to 
the Confederacy through which foreign 
supplies could be obtained. Charleston 
had not yet fallen; and Mobile was 
still a stronghold of the Confederates ; 
but the blockade of both harbors was 
complete, and there were few who 
deemed it possible to run the gauntlet 
of either the one or the other. Of all 
the Confederate ports WUmington was 
th*' most difficult to close against the 
blockade-runners. It was peculiarly 
and favorably situated, some thirty 
miles up Cape Fear River. It could not 
be approached without passing certain 
formidable works which, at the mouth 
of the river and on the borders of the 
sea, the Confederates had erected for 
purposes of defense There are two 
channels admitting to Cape Fear River 
The southwest or main channel is about 
^i miles wide, with a depth of from 10 
to 14 feet of water on the bar. It was 
protected by Fort Caswell on Oak 
1 Island, and by the Light-house battery 
on Smith's Island. The northwest 
channel, called New Inlet, less than 2 
miles wide and the water less deep than 



in the other, was protected by Fort 
Fisher — a first-class casemated earth- 
work, on the mainland, near Federal 
Point. The interior of the peninsula 
which lies between Cape Fear River 
and the Atlantic Ocean is for the most 
part sandy and low, in few places rising 
higher than 15 feet above high tide. 
To reach Wilmington it was necessary 
to pass through one or other of these 
inlets. So long as the Confederates 
held the works, ingress was easy to a 
friend, perilous to a foe. 

As early as the beginning of 1864, 
the government at Washington, had 
made arrangements for the capture of 
Wilmington. General Bumside, who 
was intrusted with the expedition, was 
collecting troops for the pui-pose, at 
Annapolis, when he was summoned by 
General Grant to join the army of the 
Potomac. Later, in the summer of the 
same year and simultaneously with th 
preparations for the attacks on the 
forts in Mobile Bay, arrangements were 
made for reducing the works at the 
mouth of Cape Fear River. With ihis 
end in view, gun-boats armored and 
unarmored were assembled in Hampton 
Roads ; and in October, Admiral Por- 
ter, charged with the execution of the 
naval portion of the task, found him- 
self at the head of a fleet of 50 war 
vessels, including the New Ironsides 
and several monitors. The plan which 
had been first suggested to Bumside by 
Mr. Kidder, a Boston gentleman, and 
which had been approved of by the 
government was again accepted ; and 
Grant agreed to send the bulk of Sher 
idan's force to co-operate 'vith Porter 



FORT FISHER. 



in the intended movement Sheridan's 
men, however, it was soon found, could 
not be spared from the Shenandoah 
Valley ; and the expedition against 
Wilmington once more fell through. 
It was now resolved to make a direct 

ttack on Fort Fisher and its depend- 
encies. Preparations were hurried for- 
ward ; and a reconnoissance of Fort 
Fisher was made, with the help of the 
blockading squadron, by Generals God- 
frey Weitzel and Charles K. Graham. 
Rumors of the projected movement 
against Wilmington reached the ears of 
the Confederates. General W. H. C. 
Whiting, an accomplished and skilful 
engineer was then in charge of that 
region. Under his direction, new works 
were thrown up to strengthen Fort 
Fisher ; and the garrison was increased. 
Another delay took place ; and it was 
not until December that the expedition 
actually set out. Grant having de- 
tached 6500 troops from the forces 
under Butler, placed them under the 
immediate command of Weitzel. The 
object of the expedition, as stated in 
Grant's instructions to Butler, was, 
first, the closing of the port of Wil- 
mington, and, second, the capture of 
that city. It was not intended that 
Butler should accompany the expedi- 
tion. 

On the 8th of December, the troops 
j)gg^ destined to take part in the pro- 

8. posed movement — Ames' division 
of the Twenty-Fourth corps, and 
Paine's division of the Twenty-Fifth 
(colored) corps — left Bermuda Hun- 
dred in transports. On the foDowing 
day they were at Fortress Monroe ; and 

401 



Butler notified Porter that his troops 
were ready to proceed. On the 14th, 
at noon, when off Cape Henry, Butler 
joined the transports in his flag-ship, 
the Ben Deford. The transport fleet 
then put to sea. Porter's formidable 
fleet had preceded it by 36 hours. On 
the evening of the 15th the ti'ansports 
with the troops on board, arrived at 
the appointed rendezvous, about 25 
miles east of Fort Fisher. The weather 
had been beautiful, since the 13th. 
For three days more, while the army 
waited for the navy, the ocean was 
perfectly calm. It was not until the 
evening of Sunday, that the fleet made 
its appearance. Then, however, the 
weather which had been so propitious 
had become gloomy and threatening. 
A strong wind was coming up from 
the southeast ; and the sea was covered 
with white-caps. The wind increased 
in violence until, on the 20th, it blew 
a perfect hurricane. It was one of 
those storms which are common on that 
coast, and which have given its name 
to Cape Fear. By advice of Porter, the 
transports returned to Beaufort, some 
TO miles up the coast. There they 
foimd shelter and took in coal and 
water. The storm lasted for 3 days, 
and was one of the severest experi 
enced in 30 years. Porter's fleet, while 
it lasted, rode at anchor. On Dgc, 
Friday the 23d, Butler, who had 23. 
accompanied the expedition, and, con 
trary to Grant's expectation, had taken 
personal command, sent Captain Clarke, 
one of his aids, in the anued tug Cham- 
berlain to inform Porter that the fleet 
would be at the rendezvous by sunset 



■■(52 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 



next day. Clarke returned to Butler 
on Saturday at suniise, with the report 
tliat Porter could not wait the arrival 
of the troops, and that his purpose was 
to fire the powder-ship at one o'clock 
Jiat morning. Butler was indignant, 
l)ecause he considered the presence of 
the troops essential to the success of 
the experiment. The powder-ship was 
exploded as Porter declared it would 
be ; but the experiment was fruitless. 

What was the experiment ? It ap- 
pears that on the first of October 1864, 
an accidental explosion of 150,000 
pounds of gunpowder took place at 
Erith, in England; and such was the 
force of the concussion that 100 yards 
of embankment was blown away, and 
a large number of houses destroyed. 
Butler taking a hint fi'om this fact, 
conceived the idea that a similajr ex- 
plosion in the near neighborhood of 
Fort Fisher woiild have a similar result. 
It was his expectation that it would 
shake down, at least, a portion of the 
walls and demoralize the garrison. He 
had grievously miscalculated. The 
experiment was fairly made. Two hun- 
dred and fifteen tons of gunpowder 
were exploded, without any apprecia- 
ble result. 

Porter, not discouraged by the failure 
of the gunpowder experiment, resolved 
to proceed without delay to the attack. 
The squadron selected for that purpose 
poDLsisted of 33 vessels, carrying over 
400 guns, with a reserve of 17 small 
gun boats, carrying about 100 guns. 
The first line was composed of the New 
Ironsides, the Monadnock, Canonicus 
and Mahopac — all iron- clads. The sec- 



ond line was composed of the heavy in 
gates Minnesota, Colorado, Wabash and 
other vessels of similar weight and con 
struction. There was yet another line 
in rear of the second ; and two divisions 
took side positions, to the north and 
east, and to the south and southeast, so 
as to be able to direct an enfilading fire 
on the works. The bombard- J)qc. 
ment was "magnificent for its 24. 
power and accuracy." Clouds of dust 
arose fi'om the fort, and concealed 
everything from view. It was impossi- 
ble for the garrison to make any show 
of resistance. The gunners retired 
behind their bomb-proofs ; and in less 
than an hour and a quarter the fort 
was silenced. For five hours, the 
bombardment continued ; and at sun- 
set when Butler arrived in his flag-ship 
with some of the transports, Porter sig- 
nalled his fleet to retire for the night. 

Arrangements were made, early on 
the morning of the 25th, for a joint 
attack by the troops and the fleet. It 
was agreed between Porter and Weitzel 
that, as soon as the transports arrived, 
the troops should attempt to effect a 
landing under cover of the fire from 
the ships, and proceed to take the place 
by storm. It was an hour past Dqc. 
noon before the transports were 26. 
fully forward. The fleet had already 
for some hours been firing upon the 
works. Without delay, and by the 
help of launches, a landing was effected 
about 3 miles above Fort Fisher. Gen- 
eral Curtis with about 550 men, wag 
the first to reach the shore. The Na 
tional flag was quickly planted on a 
deserted battery A» soon as it wae 



FAILURE OF THE FIEtJT ATTACK. 



863 



Seen, the air was rent by cheers from 
the men still on board the transports ; 
and the bands struck up " Yankee 
Doodle." Curtis pushed along the 
<jhore, until his skirmish line was within 
50 yards of Fort Fisher. It was Por- 
ter's belief that there was " not a rebel 
within five miles of the fort." Weitzel 
had a very different opinion. He had 
landed with Curtis, and advanced to 
within 800 yards of the work. It 
would be " butchery " he thought, to 
make an assault under the cii'cumstances ; 
and returning to Butler on board the 
gun-boat Chamberlain, he so reported, 
Butler after some consideration came 
to the same conclusion ; and about five 
o'clock in the afternoon, when about 
one-half of his troops were landed, he 
ordered them to re-embark. In the 
meantime Curtis, still pressing forward, 
had captured the half-moon battery 
with 220 men. He had notified Gen- 
eral Ames of the fact, calling for assist- 
ance, and declaring his belief that he 
could take the fort. Ames, ignorant 
of the order which had been given to 
re-embark, sent Colonel Bell's brigade 
to the support of Curtis. It was now 
after sunset ; and before Curtis could 
make a further advance, the firing of 
the fleet ceased, and night closed in 
upon the scene. As soon as Ames 
t)ecame aware of the order to withdraw 
bis troops, he put them on board the 
launches and retiuned to the transports. 
The attack on Fort Fisher from which 
so much was expected, thus resulted in 
total failure. On the following day, 
the transports, with the troops on board, 
left for Hampton Eoads. 



The result of the experiment on Fort 
Fisher was a source of deep and gen 
eral disappointment. No one was 
more disappointed than General Grant 
himself. He was greatly displeased. 
It was his opinion, as it was that o 
Admiral Porter, that the place might 
have been taken, if the land forces had 
acted with sufficient detenniuation, and 
if the advance had been adequately 
sustained. Several of the officei-s vol- 
untarily reported to Grant that, ^vheu 
recalled, they had nearly reached the 
fort, and that, in their judgment, it 
could have been taken without much 
loss. Which was right in this instance, 
General Weitzel, who landed and in- 
spected the works, or Admiral Porter, 
who saw them only from his flag-ship, 
will possibly always be a divided ques- 
tion. It does not seem fair, however 
to blame General Butler for acting o 
the advice of Weitzel who, according to 
Porter's own confession, was a thorough 
soldier and an able engineer, whose busi- 
ness it was to know more about assault- 
ing than he did. Whatever may have 
been the fact, in the circumstances, it 
was Grant's determination that the fort 
should be taken and the blockade of 
Wilmington reduced. While therefore 
the South was rejoicing over what they 
claimed to be a \Tictory, the Lieutenant- 
General was making arrangements for 
dealing a more effective, and, as it 
proved to be, a decisive blow. 

For some days after the departure of 
the transports. Porter, with his 
fleet, was still off New Inlet, in 
the neighborhood of Fort Fisher. Here 
he received instructions from Grant, 



8M 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PKIVATEERS. 



ordering him to remain, and promising 
to send h\m an effective land force, 
Ypith a proper leader. It was still liis 
belief that the fort could be taken. In 
addition to the troops which had gone 
back in the transports to Hampton 
Roads, he sent a brigade of 1500 men, 
and a small siege train. General Terry 
was to command. The new expedition 
Jan. ^^^ Hampton Roads on the 6th 
6. of January, and on the 8th ren- 
dezvoused off Beaufort, where Porter 
was taking in coal, ammunition and 
other needed supplies. The weather 
was boisterous ; and it was not until 
late on the night of the 12th that the 
combined forces arrived off New Inlet. 
It had been arranged that the troops 
should be landed some distance above 
the fort, and that they should then in- 
trench across the point to Cape Fear 
River, so as to prevent reinforcements 
being sent from Wilmington. The land- 
ing effected, and the position secured, 
the assault was to be made simultane- 
ously by the troops and by the fleet. 
Fort Fisher, as we have seen already, 
was a place of wonderful strengtL 
Admiral Porter, who was at Sebastopol 
during the siege, pronounced it much 
stronger than the famous Malakoff. 
With the immediately connected works, 
it mounted 75 gims. The armament 
of the whole works guarding the ap- 
proaches to Wilmington was about 160 
guns, among which were some 150- 
pounder Armstrongs. The attacking 
squadron carried 500 guns, some of 
them the largest in the world. It was 
a concentration of destructive machin- 
ery unparalleled in the world's history. 



On the morning of the 13th, at an 
early hour, the landing of the troops 
commenced. Some 200 boats jg^^ 
and a large number of steam- tugs 13. 
were employed in the operation. Th( 
fleet, divided into 3 columns, covered 
and protected the boats and the land 
ing ; and as early as three o'clock in the 
afternoon 8000 troops were on shorw 
Each man carried with him 3 days' 
rations and 40 rounds of ammunition. 
There was put on shore also an abun- 
dant supply of intrt^ching tools. Dur- 
ing the entire process of landing, the 
fleet was pouring shot and shell into 
the fort. The bombardment had been 
teirific. It was calculated that, while 
it lasted, four shots were fired from the 
fleet every second, and that during tht 
course of the day, the ipon-clads alone — 
the New Ironsides, Sangus, Mahopac 
and Canonicus — fired upwards of 2000 
shells. It is not wonderful that undei 
such a fii-e, the Confederates should 
have been compelled to take sheltei 
imder their bomb-proofs. At dark, 
about an hour after the landing of the 
troops had been effected, t?»e wooden 
vessels were drawn off for the night. 
The iron-clads remained at their an 
chorage, firing slowly at internals, dur 
ing the darkness. 

As soon as the troops were landed, 
they were set to work, throwing up 
intrenchments ; and as early as eight 
o'clock on the morning of the 14th, 
they had constructed a good j^^, 
breast- work stretching from the 14. 
river to the sea, and partially cf^s^sred 
by abatis. During the course of the 
day, a reconnoissance was made to 



SECOND ATIAUK ON FOBT FISHES. 



865 



mthiii 500 yards of the fort The 
principal result of this reconnoissance 
was that General Terry, in view of the 
difficulty of conducting a regular siege 
on the narrow and exposed peninsula, 
came to the conclusion that the wiser 
course would be to make an immediate 
assault In this Admiral Porter con- 
curred ; and it was decided that the 
assault should be made at three o'clock, 
:)n the afternoon of the 1 6th. Arrange- 
nents were made for the army to as- 
sault the western half of the land face, 
while a co-operating force of sailors and 
marines should attack the northeast 
bastion. The troops were kept busy 
strengthening the line of breast- works, 
and getting the guns into position as 
soon as they were landed ; and, all day 
long and all night through, a slow and 
deliberate fire was maintained by the 
fleet Fort Fisher, before the sun went 
down on the 14th, was badly pounded. 
Most of the guns were injured ; not a 
few of them were silenced ; and what 
with the slow but continuous fire of 
shot and shell during the night, suffi- 
cient openings were made to warrant 
an assault, in the morning. 

On the morning of the 15th, every- 
lan. thing was ready for the attack. 
16. The ships were in position ; and 
the soldiers and marines were prepared 
to move at the word of command. At 
eleven o'clock, the fleet opened a fire 
which was unparalleled in the history 
of naval warfare. Under its cover 
1000 sailors and 400 marines, com- 
manded by Fleet-Captain K K. Breese, 
were landed on the beach; and by 
digging rifle-trenches, they worked their 



way to a point within 200 yards of the 
sea-front of the fort, where they lay 
awaiting the final signal for attack. 
The troops selected for the attack were 
the brigades of Curtis, Pennybacker 
and Bell, of Ames' Division. Paine' 
division of colored troops and Abbott's 
brigade were left in charge of the in- 
trenchments facing Wilmington. It 
was now three o'clock. All this time 
the fleet continued to thunder against 
the fort, working terrible destruction. 
At half-past three o'clock the signal 
was given. All the steam whistles 
screamed and roared. The ships di- 
rected their fire to the upper bat- 
teries. The sailors, led by Captain 
Breese, eager to win the laurels of the 
day, rushed forward, with reckless 
energy, towards the parapet of the fort, 
already swarming with Confederate 
soldiers and blazing with the fire of 
musketry. It was intended that the 
marines should cover the assaulting par 
ty ; but for some unknown reason they 
failed to fire upon the Confederates 
who exposed themselves on the parapet. 
It was Porter's opinion that if the 
marines had made a proper use of their 
guns, the first assault would have been 
a complete success. " I saw " he says 
"how recklessly the rebels exposed 
themselves, and what an advantage 
they gave our sharpshooters whose guns 
were scarcely fired, or fired with no 
precision." In spite, however, of tli< 
murderous fire to which they were e.\ 
posed, the sailors pressed forward, some 
of them actually reaching the parapet. 
The advance was swept away like chafl 
before a mighty rushing wind. Tha 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEEES. 



men in the rear seeing the slaughter in 
front, were seized with a panic and fell 
back in some confusion. The attack on 
this part of the fort was a failure, 
except in so far as it diverted attention 
"rom the action of the troops. 

Before the signal for assault was 
given, the soldiers had, under cover of 
hastily constructed breast-works, ap- 
proached within a few hundred yards 
of the fort. At the word of command, 
they sprang forward and went bounding 
towards the palisades. These, already 
much damaged by the fixe from the 
fleet, soon yielded to the vigorous 
blows of the axemen. Curtis' brigade, 
which led the attacking force, pushed 
on in the face of a severe enfilading 
fire A lodgment was quickly effected 
on the west end of the land front. 
Here a terrible hand-to-hand struggle 
commenced. The cannoniers rushed 
to their guns ; and the parapet bristled 
with bayonets. Curtis, one of the 
bravest of the brave, was sore beset. 
He was soon, however, joined by Penny- 
backer, who took position on his 
right, and by BeU, who occupied the 
space between the fort and the river. 
" Hand-to-hand fighting " says General 
Terry, " of the most desperate charac- 
ter ensued, the huge traverses of the 
land face being used successively by the 
enemy as breast- works, over the tops of 
which the contending parties fired in 
each other's faces." Niae of these 
traverses were carried one after the 
other by the National troops. It was 
now about five o'clock. The battle had 
lasted a full hour and a half. It be- 
came apparent that more troops were 



needed to support the assaulting col 
umn. Terry, therefore, ordered up 
Abbott's brigade from the line of in- 
trenchments facing Wilmington. Breeae 
being, at the same time, ordered to oc 
cupy that position with his sailors and 
marines. Paine, also, being ordered tc 
send down one of his best regiments 
forwarded the Twenty-Seventh, a negi'c 
regiment, under Brigadier-Greneral A. 
M. Blackman. Meanwhile, the combat 
waxed fiercer and fiercer. There was 
no lull — no interruption. Amid the 
ruins of barracks and storehouses, in 
the deep sand-hollows, and over the 
bodies of dead and dying comrades, the 
terrible struggle was prolonged. While 
this desperate fight was going on, inside 
the work, the fleet was not idle ; and 
by means of signals, which were ex- 
changed with great accuracy, such of 
the ships as were in position were 
enabled to pour upon the fort a well- 
directed and most destructive fire, with 
out in any way interfering with the 
action of the troops. Some of the 
ships, from the moment the action com- 
menced, continued to sweep the groimd 
more to the south, so as to make it 
impossible for any reinforcements to 
reach the fort from that direction. 

The battle commenced at haK past 
three o'clock. It was now dusk. Nine 
of the traverses which had been used 
as breast-works, one after the other 
had been carried. It was about this 
time that Blackman reported to Ames, 
and that Abbott, with his little band, 
entered the work. The arrival of these 
reinforcements gave intensity to the 
struggle. Blackman's troops, aftei 



FORT CASWELL BLOWN UP. 



S61 



having been under the heavy fire for a 
little while, were withdrawn. It was 
aow near nine o'clock. The fighting 
still continued for the possession of the 
traverses. At length two more of them 
were canied ; and the Confederates fell 
back, Abbott pi'essing them with great 
vigor, and finally diiving them from 
their last stronghold. The entire work 
was now in the hands of the Nationals. 
Some of the gamaon had fled down the 
Point to Battery Buchanan. Thither 
they were hotly pursued by Abbott 
and by Blackman ; and about midnight, 
Colonel Lamb, the conunandant of the 
fort, and Major-General Whiting, and 
such of the garrison as were not in the 
hands of General Terry, were made 
prisoners. Hemmed in between the 
water and their antagonists, they had 
no choice but to surrender. 

About four o'clock in the afternoon, 
eneral Hoke approached the line of 
mtrenchments which had been thrown 
up across the peninsula, so as to guard 
against any surprise from the north ; 
and it seemed for a time as if he meant 
to make a vigorous attack. Paine was 
in readiness to receive him. Hoke, 
however, after a slight sMrmish vnth 
the National pickets, retired. His de- 
parture was a relief to General Terry. 
A vigorous and well-sustained attack 
m that direction, might have changed 
the fortunes of the day. 

Such, then, was the great struggle 
for the possession of Fort Fisher ; and 
Buch was the result. No more gallant 
assault was ever made. No more glori- 
ous resistance was ever oflFered. To 
both North and South. Fort Fisher 



will ever be a source of common pride 
On both sides were revealed the intelli- 
gent purjiose and indomitable spirit of 
the American soldier. 

The garrison originally numbered 
over 2300 men, of whom 1971 with 
112 officers were captured. General 
Whitney and Colonel Lamb were both 
severely wounded. The National loss 
in killed, woimded and missing was 
about 690. Ames' brigade command- 
ers, Curtis, Pennybacker and Bell, were 
each of them woimded, the two former 
severely, Bell mortally. On the part 
of the fleet, there was a loss of about 
250 or 300 men ; and two 15-inch guns 
were exploded on board the monitors. 
On the morning of the 16th a fearful 
accident occurred. From some un- 
knovra cause, the principal maga- j^n, 
zine of the fort exploded, scatter- 16. 
ing death and ruin all around. Some 
200 men were killed; and about 100 
were wounded. 

On the 16th and 17th the Confeder- 
ates blew up Fort Caswell on the right 
bank of the river. They abandoned 
also Battery Holmes, on Smith's Island, 
together with all the works at Smith»- 
ville and Reeve's Point. The Nationals 
were thus left in entire and absolute 
control of all the works which com- 
manded the mouth of Cape Fear River. 
Li the different works were found 169 
pieces of artUlery, most of them of 
heavy calibre and some of them of the 
best English make ; over 2000 stand o 
small arms, with stores and ammunition 
in large quantities. The blockade of 
Wilmington was thus effectually se 
cured ; and Wilmington itself was uyw 



868 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PBIVATEEB» 



to command the attention of General 
Terry and Admiral Porter. 

Some weeks were allowed to elapse 
before active operations were resumed, 
In the direction of Wilmington. It 
was not deemed advisable to make an 
dvance, until the land troops were 
considerably reinforced. It was known 
that Hoke, with a strong force of Con- 
federates, was occupying an intrenched 
line which extended across the penin- 
9ida, from the sea, at Masonboro Inlet 
to Sugar Loaf Battery, on the east 
bank of Cape Fear River, and almost 
to Fort Anderson, a strong work which 
stood on the west bank of the river. 
General Terry having supplied the 
requisite niimber of men to guard the 
different works, strengthened his line 
of intrenchments, which, as we have 
een, extended across the peninsula, 
ome two or three miles to the north of 
Fort Fisher. Meanwhile, Admiral Por- 
ter had pushed some of his lighter 
vessels through New Inlet into Cape 
Fear River ; and Cushing, in obedience 
to the orders of the Admiral, had 
raised the National flag over Fort Cas- 
well, and the works at SmithsviUe. 

General Grant had not been unmind- 
ful of the 'afficulties, aa \^ ell as oppor- 
tnnities, «vhich might follow upon the 
capture of Fort Fisher. Occupied as 
he was, with the work immediately 
before Petersburg and Jiichmond, his 
mental eye continued io survey the 
whole vast field of -war operations. 
Sherman was already, with the consent 
of the Lieutenant-Generjil, .making pre- 
parations for his return march through 
the CaroHnas. Thomas' success had 



been such that he was left almost 
without a rival in Tennessee. He had 
about him more men than he could use , 
and he had already ordered Schofield 
with the Twenty-Third corps, to go 
into winter-quarters at Eastport, Missis 
sippi. Grant, however, had work foi 
Schofield and his men. It was his 
determination to hasten matters to a 
close; and with this end in view, he 
had resolved to concentrate the armies 
of the republic. When about to carry 
out the orders of Thomas and retire to 
Eastport, Schofield received instruc- 
tions, from Grant, to proceed to the coast 
of North Carolina. The instructions of 
the Lieutenant-General were promptly 
obeyed. Proceeding by steamers down 
the Tennessee and up the Ohio to Cin- 
cinnati, and thence by rail, he reached 
Washington and Alexandria on the 
23d of January. His troops were again 
embarked ; and on the 9th of feh. 
February, Schofield, with Cox's 9. 
division arrived at Fort Fisher. The 
remainder of the troops followed, some 
of them going to New Berne. After 
the capture of Fort Fisher, Butler had 
been superseded by Ord, in the com- 
mand of the Department of Virginia 
and North Carolina. A separate De- 
partment was now made of North 
Carolina, and intrusted to Schofield. 
Schofield, however, was to act under 
orders from General Sherman and to 
co-operate vrith him. Sherman was 
expected to be in the neighborhood of 
Goldsboro, between the 2 2d and the 
28th of February ; and Schofield, march 
ing from Wilmington or New Berne 
was to join him at that place. There 



MOVEMENT AGAINST MOBILE. 



869 



were now in the immediate neighbor- 
hood of Fort Fisher some 20,000 men. 

No time was now lost in moving 
towards Wilmington. Two days after 
the arrival of Schofield, Terry advanced 
against Hoke. Driving in the pickets, 
he threw up a fresh line of intrench- 
ments close to those of his antagonist. 
An unsuccessful attempt was made to 
turn Hoke's left. The attempt to turn 
his right was more successful ; and 
Fort Anderson was speedily enveloped 
by the divisions of Ames and Cox. It 
Pgl,^ was the 18th of February. On 
18. the same evening, the garrison, 
convinced of their danger, abandoned 
the fort, taking with them 6 guns and 
some valuable property, but leaving 
behind them 10 heavy guns and a large 
q^uantity of ammunition. The work 
was occupied next morning ; and over 
t waved the National flag. After the 
mpture of Fort Anderson, Ames crossed 
to the east side of Cape Fear River to 
assist Terry. Hoke abandoned his in- 
trenchmeuts and fell back towards 
Wilmington. The National troops 
pressed forward on both sides of the 
river. Fort Strong and Fort St. Philip 
were successively deserted by the Con- 
federates. On the 21st, Cox was on 
Eagle Island and flinging shells into 
Wilmington. Feeling his situation to 
be desperate, Hoke ordered a general 
destruction of property. Several steam- 
ships, including the Chickamauga and 
Tallahassee were destroyed by fire, 
Feb. together with large quantities of 
22. military and naval stores. On 
the morning of the 2 2d, it was discovered 
that the Confederates had abandoned 



the town ; and Schofield and his vie 
torious troops entered unopposed. The 
fall of WUmington was a serious blow 
to the Confederate cause. It had long 
been a fruitful source of supplies ; and 
it could ill be dispensed with. Lee, i 
was known, had manifested mucL 
anxiety regarding Wilmington ; and 
after the capture of Fort Bisher, there 
was found in the work a letter, in 
which he informed the officer command 
ing that if WUmington should be taken, 
Richmond could not much longer hold 
out. Grant's plans were working ad- 
mirably ; and the end, day after day 
was more visibly drawing nigL 

In a separate chapter, we have 
al?eady given a detailed account of the 
operations in Mobile Bay — operations 
which, in August, 1864, resulted in the 
capture of the forts which commanded 
the entrance. In the upper portions 
of the bay, the waters are shallow. It 
was found impossible, in consequence, 
to move the fleet sufficiently near the 
town to make bombardment possible ; 
and as the land force was too small to 
attack without the aid of the fleet, 
operations were suspended until the 
spring of 1865. 

Mobile, however, still conmianded 
Grant's attention ; and when Sherman 
had completed his triumphal march 
through Georgia to the sea, and Thomas 
had cut to pieces Hood's army in Mid 
die Tennessee, fresh arrangements were 
made for the reduction of this Confed- 
erate stronghold. The conduct of the 
movement against Mobile was intrusted 
to General Canby, then commanding 
the West Mississippi army with head- 



soy 



870 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 



quarters at New Orleans. A co-opera- 
tive movement was placed in charge of 
the famous cavalry leader, General J. H. 
Wilson, who was to act under or- 
ders from General Thomas. Admiral 
Thatcher, then in command of the West 
Gulf S<juadron, was also ordered to 
proceed to New Orleans and confer 
with General Canby. It was believed 
that by using vessels of light draught, 
the fleet would be able to co-operate 
with the army. Canby proceeded at 
once to collect his forces ; and he soon 
had around him, or acting under his 
orders, and towards a common end, an 
army of about 45,000 men. It consisted 
of Granger's newly organized corps, the 
Thirteenth, 13,200 strong; A, J. Smith's 
corps, the Sixteenth, 16,000 strong ; 
Steele's column, which came up from 
Pensacola, 13,200 strong ; with artillery, 
cavalry and engineers to the number of 
3000. The Confederate forces in the 
Department, were under the command 
of General Richard Taylor, who was at 
Meridian, General D. H. Maury, with 
9000 men was immediately in charge 
of Mobile, and its defenses. 

About the middle of March, every- 
thing was in readiness for the forward 
movement. Wilson, who as we have 
seen, was to co-operate with his cavalry, 
was also ready to swoop from the north, 
down through Alabama. During the 
course of the three years of the war, 
Mobile had been made a place of great 
strength. On the western side particu- 
larly, it was considered impregnable. 
A direct attack on that side was deemed 
too hazardous. It was, therefore, de- 
tiMTnined to make a flank movement, 



up the eastern shore, and, in concert 
with the fleet, which Thatcher had con 
trived to bring up, to seize the fortificar 
tions on the islands and the mainland 
at the head of the bay. On the j[^j. 
24th of March, the Thirteenth 24. 
corps, having mai'ched along the penin 
sula from Fort Morgan, reached Dan 
ley's, on Fish River. The Sixteenth 
corps which had crossed the bay in 
transports, and had landed under cover 
of the fleet, was already at the appoint- 
ed rendezvoiia On the 25th, the Thir- 
teenth and Sixteenth corps advanced 
from Fish River, up the east side of the 
bay, along the Belle Rose and Blakely 
Roads. The roads were strewn with 
tor].')edoes, some of which exploded, 
killing men and horses. On the 26th, 
having encountered only a few skir 
mishera by the way, the National ad 
vance was in the neighborhood of Span 
ish Fort, some 7 miles east from Mobile 
The reduction of this fort was deemed 
a preliminary necessity ; and, on the 
following day, it was completely in 
vested on the land side, Smith being on 
the right, and Granger on the left. 
This fort was of great strength, the 
works extending about two miles. It 
was garrisoned by nearly 3000 men, 
under General R. Gibson. 

The siege of Spanish Fort lasted for 
two weeks On the 27th, as the day 
advanced, and all during the night, the 
firing was on a scale of unusual mag 
nificence. Besiegers and besieged viec 
with each other, the bombardment and 
the response being equally terrific; an (a 
spectacle unique in its character, as 
grand and imposing as it was fitted to 



BLAKBLT. 



871 



alarm, was fumislied to the citizens of 
Mobila Canby, day after day, drew 
his lines closer and closer, the fire tell- 
ing more and more effectually on the 
works. Excellent work was done 
by the vessels of the fleet. They 
not only neutralized the vessels of the 
enemy, but succeeded, from time to 
time, in throwing 100-pound shells into 

April *^^ ^°^- ^^ *^^ ^^^ ^^ April 
8. an assault was made by Colonel 
Bell's Eighth Iowa regiment, of Gedde's 
brigade of Carr's division. The garri- 
son was composed mainly of Texans, 
who fought with tremendous energy. 
The Texans received the advancing 
column with a tremendous musketry 
fire. Bell, however, pushed his men 
forward in greater force, cheering them 
by his words and sustaining them by 
his example. The Iowa men charged 
over the works in the most gallant 
manner ; and after a desperate hand-to- 
hand struggle, they foimd themselves 
in possession of about 300 yards of the 
intrenchments, with several colors, and 
about 360 prisoners. Gibson, convinced 
that the position was no longer tenable, 
proceeded to withdraw his troops. 
About midnight, the firing from the 
fort ceased ; and, shortly after two 
o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Ber- 
tram's brigade entered and took posses- 
sion of the place, without encoimtering 
any opposition. The immediate fruits 
of victory were 600 prisoners, the en- 
tire works, with 30 heavy guns, and 
military stores in abundance. 

C)n the night of the 11th, Forts Hu- 
gei and Tracy, which commanded the 
mouth of the Blakely River, were also 



abandoned ; and the key tr> Mobile was 
now in the hands of the Nationals 
The fleet moved up the Tensas ±nrU 
River towards Mobile, picking ll. 
up, as it advanced, some 35 tor 
pedoes, and coming to anchor within 
shelling distance of the city. In cross- 
ing Blakely Bar, two of the vessels 
were sunk. The army moved along the 
east bank of the river towards Blakely, 
where the Confederates had constructed 
a strong line of works, about three 
miles in length, both extremities resting 
on high ground, and extending to the 
river. These works comprised nine 
redoubts, or lunettes, and were armed 
with forty guns. The garrison, which 
was under the command of General St. 
John Lidell, was composed of veterans 
from Hood's army, and was about 3500 
strong. Lidell had for his immediate 
subordinates, Generals Thomas and 
CockerelL 

Blakely had been closely invested bj 
Hawkins' negroes since their arrival from 
Pensacola. On the afternoon of Sunday, 
the 9th of April, Canby arrived at ji^prf] 
Blakely with the troops, which had 9. 
been engaged in the capture of Spanish 
Fort. Immediately after his an-ival, he 
decided upon an assault. It was, he 
knew, a perilous undertaking ; but much 
precious time would necessarily be 
wasted in a siege. He resolved to run 
the risk. The ground to be traversed 
was covered with chevaucc-de-fi-ise, abat/i 
and torpedoes ; in the immediate ti-on 
of the works was a broad, deep ditch 
and forty gims, with their angry mouths, 
threatened every avenue of approa^ih. 
Canby drew up his divisions in line of 



87a 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEEKS. 



battle. Hawkins, with his negroes, was 
on the right ; Veatch and Andrews of 
the Thirteenth corps, were in the centre ; 
and Garrard's division of the Sixteenth 
corps was on the left. The remainder 
of the Sixteenth corps was held in 
reserve. Half past five o'clock was the 
hour fixed for the assault. The ap- 
pointed moment had all but arrived ; 
and the men were waiting impatiently 
for the signal. The sky was overspread 
with gloom ; and low growling sounds 
of distant thunder came rolling from 
the west. These sounds were soon 
rendered inaudible by the nearer and 
more alarming thunders of rival artil- 
lery. WhUe the National guns thun- 
dered over the intervening space, the 
advance was made almost simultaneous- 
ly, along the whole line. Never did 
troops behave more nobly. Never was 
attack made in cii'cumstances of greater 
difficulty. It was a rush into the very 
jaws of death. Torpedoes were ex- 
ploding, at every step ; the abatis and 
other obstructions made progress next 
to impossible ; while the terrific fire 
from the enemy's guns, swift and uner- 
ring, ploughed long lanes in the advanc- 
ing columns. Nothing daunted, how- 
ever, the brave fellows pressed forward. 
Here, as at Port Hudson, the negro 
troops were on the right ; and here, as 
there, they rivalled their white compan- 
lons-in-arms, by feats of valor. They 
were the first to advance — the first en- 
gaged in deadly conflict with the enemy. 
Garrard, on the left, when the signal 
was given pushed forward only a por- 
tion of his men, his object being to 
discover a suitable avenue to advance in 



force. No such avenue being discovered 
he gave the word " Forward ; " and his 
brave fellows, heedless of the withering 
fire from the Confederate breastworks, 
went bounding forward. The centre 
also was quickly at work. From the 
extreme right to the extreme left, the 
whole line, extending about three miles, 
was engaged in the assault. At all 
points the experience was very much 
the same. The great difficulty was 
to reach the works. For more than 
half an hour, the entire Hne, struggling 
with the obstacles which lay in the way, 
and thrown into disorder from time to 
time by exploding torpedoes, was ex- 
posed to the g\ms of the enem}'. At 
length, as the day was waning, victory 
dawned on the National left Garrard's 
men, cheered by the example of their 
chief, had worked their way through the 
obstructions. Harris' brigade swept 
over the ditch, and clambered up the 
face of the works ; while those of Gil- 
bert and Rinaker, having turned the 
right of the fort, rushed in, and cap- 
tured General Thomas, with 1000 of his 
men. The struggle was more protract- 
ed, in the centre and on the left. Veatch 
and Andrews met with a most stubborn 
resistance, and suffered terriblv from the 
enemy's fire, as weU as from the ex- 
ploding torpedoes. The presence of 
the negroes seemed to rouse the wrath 
of the Confederates ; and the struggle 
on the left raged, for a time, with 
tremendous fury. At length the cry 
was raised "Remember Fort Pillow. " 
"Remember Fort Pillow" rang along 
the line. The words were electric ; 
and Hawkins' dusky brigades, as if 



WILSON'S GREAT KAID. 



873 



yielding to a new and overwhelming 
impulse, and filled with superhuman 
energy, with wild cries, went rushing 
over the embankments, and swept the 
enemy before them, like chaff before 
he wind. The battle of Blakely was 
nded. It was only one hour and a half 
since the Nationals advanced to the 
assault; and already they were in pos- 
session of all the works, with 40 pieces 
of artillery, 4000 small arms, 16 battle 
flags, and a large quantity of ammuni- 
tion. They had captured over 3000 
men, with several officers of high rank, 
including Generals Lidell, Cockerell 
and Thomas. The Confederate loss was 
estimated at 500 in killed and wound- 
ed. The National loss was much 
more severe — probably not much under 
1000. 

With the fall of Fort Blakely per- 
ished the last hopes of the Confederates 
in Mobile. On the 11th, Maury retired 
from the place, and, with 9000 men in 
gun-boats and transports made his way 
up the Alabama River. Before his 
departure, he caused to be sunk the two 
powerful rams, Huntsville and Tusca- 
Aprll loosa. On the evening of the 
12. 12th the place was suiTendered 
On the following day, Veatch's division 
entered the town; and the National 
banner was hoisted on the public build- 
ings. Thtis ended another successful 
campaign. 

The story of the capture of Mobile 
would be incomplete without a brief 
reference to the co-operative movement 
which was conducted under the imme- 
diate direction of General Wilson. 
After the expulsion of Hood from East 



Tennessee, Thomas, as has been stated 
already, had a large unemployed force 
on hand. We have already seen what 
use was made of Schofield and his com 
mand. It remains for us to follow 
Wilson on his famous cavalry raid 
through Alabama. Wilson had been, 
for a brief space, with the cavalry of 
the Military Division of the Mississippi, 
on the north side of the Tennessee 
River, in Lauderdale County, Alabama. 
On the 23d of February, he was visited 
by General Thomas who gave him in- 
structions regarding the intended move 
ment. It was designed to be co-opera- 
tive with that of Canby; and it was 
expected that while he would be giving 
the Confederates sufficient occupation, 
and 80 preventing them from sending 
reinforcements against Canby, he 
would be able to destroy Selma, Tusca 
loosa, and the other great iron centres of 
the State. The cavalry were in excel 
lent condition ; and the necessary ar 
rangements being quickly completed, 
they set out on the 2 2d of March, ^(lt. 
The entire force under Wilson, 22. 
numbered about 13,000, all mounted 
except some 1500 who were detached 
to guard the numerous supply and 
baggage trains. The troops were ar- 
ranged in three divisions, and were 
commanded respectively by Long, Up- 
ton, and McCook. They were accom 
panied by 6 batteries. There were 250 
wagon trains, together with a light pon 
toon train of 30 boats, borne by some 
56 mule wagons. Each trooper cairied 
with him five days' rations, 24 pounds 
of grain, an extra pair of horse-shoes, 
and 100 rounds of ammunition. The 



874 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PBIVATEERS. 



expedition, it was expected, would not 
last over 60 days. As but little opposi- 
tion was encountered, it is unnecessary 
to dwell minutely on the details of this 
raid- Wilson was at Elyton on the 
30th. Thence he despatched Croxton's 
brigade, of McCook's division, to Tusca- 
loosa, with instructions to destroy the 
foundries and factories, and other 
pubKc property. Wilson, himself push- 
ed forward to Montevallo, which he 
reached on the afternoon of the 31st. 
There, he destroyed a large niunber of 
ironworks, rolling-mills and collieries. 
There, too, he encountered and defeated 
a body of Confederate cavalry, captm*- 
ing 3 guns and several hundred prison- 
ers. At Ebenezer Church, near Boyle's 
Creek, he was confronted by Forrest, 
with 5000 men. Forrest was routed 
and driven in confusion towards Selma, 
leaving behind him 2 gims and 200 
April prisoners. At f cm- o'clock, in the 
2. afternoon of April 2d, Wilson's 
troopers were in sight of Selma. Prep- 
arations were made for an immediate 
assault The place was well fortified ; 
and Forrest was there at the head of 
7000 men. Forrest had manifested an 
unwillingness to attempt a defense 
with so small a force ; but Taylor, who 
made good his own escape, ordered him 
to hold it at all hazards. The attack 
was made without any delay. It was 
made at two separate points, and with 
tremendous energy, Long and Upton 
Doth distinguishing themselves by their 
bravery. It was not yet dark when 
the Confederates were fleeing from the 
place in wild confusion. Fori-est, 
Roddy and Armstrong contrived to 



escape by the Bumsville road. Selma 
with 32 guns, 2700 prisoners, of whom 
150 were officers, was now in the hands 
of the Nationals. Twenty-five thous- 
and bales of cotton were found blazing. 
Wilson fired 10,000 more, together with 
the foundries, arsenals, machine-shops 
and other public property. 

On the 12th of April, WUson was a1 
Montgomery, the original seat Aprii 
of the Confederate government. 12. 
The place had been in chai'ge of Wirt 
Adams. Adams, however, had already 
fled, having set on fire before he left, 
some 90,000 bales of cotton. Mont- 
gomery was formally surrendered by 
the city authorities. Wilson remained 
in the place two days, during which he 
destroyed 5 steamboats, several locomo 
tives, one armory, and several foundries, 
and then entered Georgia, On the 16th. 
he captured Columbus, taking 52 guns 
and 1200 prisoners. He caused to bo 
destroyed a large quantity of property — 
about 115,000 bales of cotton, 200 cars, 
15 locomotives, with the navy yard, 
arsenal, and factories of various kinds, 
and a vast quantity of stores. Among 
the property destroyed was the Con- 
federate ram Jackson, which mounted 
six 7-inch guns. On the 2l8t, WUson, 
pushing on, had reached Macon, which 
was surrendered under protest. Here 
he heard for the first time of the arm- 
istice between Sherman and Johnston. 
Here also he was joined by Croxton, 
who, it will be remembered was sent 
to Tuscaloosa. He captured that plac 
on the 3d of April, and proceeded 
thence through Jasper, Talladega and 
Newman, thus completing a march of 



THE SUMTEH. 



87B 



fiftO miles in 30 days. During this raid, 
which was in the last degree disastrous 
to the Confederate cause, Wilson cap- 
tured 5 fortified cities, 288 pieces of 
ai-tillery, 23 stand of colors and 6820 

)risoner8. The property he destroyed 
j?as enormous. His own loss did not 

iiuch exccied 700, of whom 90 were 
killed. 

From an early period, in the history 
of the war, the North suffered severely, 
while the South equally benefitted, by 
the blockade-i-unners, and also by priv- 
ateers on the high seas. By closing the 
ports of Charleston, WUmington and 
Mobile, the business of the blockade- 
runners was effectually ended. To- 
wards the end of 1864, the privateers 
had been for the most part swept from 
the seas ; but it was not until after the 
fall of the Confederacy, that the depre- 
dations of these vessels wholly ceased. 
A brief account of the origin, doings, 
and fate of what were caUed the Con- 
federate cruisers, will, it is thought, 
form a not inapt conclusion to the 
present chapter. 

Scarcely had the war broken out, 
when certain vessels specially built or 
reconstructed for the purpose, heavUy 
armed and floating the Confederate 
flag, began to prey on the commerce of 
the North. One of the first of these 
vessels was the Savannah, a schooner 
of 50 tons, and carrying an 18-poimd 
swivel Early in June, 1861, she suc- 
ceeded in eluding the blockading- 
stpiadron off Charleston, and captured 
a Maine brig, laden with sugar and 
bound for Philadelphia. Soon after- 

ivards, however she came in the way 



of the United States brig-of-war Perry 
and was obliged to surrender. Another 
of these vessels was the Petrel. She, 
too, successfully ran through the block- 
ade of Charleston, and was about to 
commence her work of destruction 
when she was pursued, and blown to 
pieces by the United States frigate, 
St. Lawrence. The Juda, another 
privateer, was burned on the 14th of 
September, 1861, in the harbor of Pen- 
sacola. The Nashville was another of 
the vessels of the privateer class. She 
destroyed a valuable merchant ship 
called the Harvey Birch, near the 
English coast. She then proceeded to 
Southampton ; but the Tuscarora being 
there, she returned, and escaping from 
the National ship, made her way back 
safely to Southern watei-s. The Nash 
ville, as has been narrated elsewhere, 
was finally destroyed on the 22d of 
Febi-uary, 1863, on the Ogeechee River 
near Fort McAllister. Of all the orig 
inal privateers, the most destructive 
was the Sumter. During her brief 
career, under the guidance of Captain 
Semmes, she played terrible havoc 
among American 'merchant ships She 
was finally forced to take refuge in the 
waters of Gibraltar, where she wae 
blockaded by the Tuscarora. Finding 
that he was not likely ever to be able 
to take his vessel out, Semmes sold the 
Sumter, and, afterwards, with hie 
officers, proceeded to Liverpool, wherf 
he awaited the completion of the 
Alabama. 

The privateers of a later date were 
of a more formidable character. They 
were constructed, for the moat part, in 



876 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PBIVATEERS. 



British ship-yards. The first of these 
vessels was the Oreto, built at Birken- 
head. She was finished in the fall of 
1862, and immediately left England, 
flying the British colors, for Nassau, 
New Providence. Thence, her colors 
unchanged, she sailed for Mobile, 
which in spite of the blockade, she 
reached on the 4th of September. 
About the end of December, she moved 
out from Mobile, ran the blockade, and 
commenced her work of destimction. 
She was now named the Florida, and 
was fully armed. In the space of three 
months, during which she remained 
mostly in American waters, now cruis- 
ing among the West India Islands, and 
now sweeping along the coasts of the 
United States, she captured 15 vessels, 
2 of which were afterwards converted 
into cruisers, the rest destroyed. In 
August 1863, she crossed the Atlantic, 
reaching Brest on the 4th of September. 
At Brest she was for a brief period 
forcibly detained. Set at liberty, she 
again crossed the Atlantic ; and, run- 
ning along the coast of Brazil, she de- 
stroyed the bark Mandamon, off the 
port of Bahia, and then ran into that 
harbor. There, contrary to law, she 
was captured by the U. S. steamer, 
Wachusett, and conveyed to Hampton 
Roads, where not long afterwards, she 
was sunk. The Florida was first com- 
nanded by Maffit, later by Morris. 

Besides the Florida and the Alabama, 
of which latter we shall have something 
to say presently, there were other ves- 
sels, most of them British-built, all of 
them powerful, and every one of them 
dwitruc'^ve, according to opportunity 



The Tallahassee, in a cruise of ten dayp 
destroyed 33 vessels. The Chicka 
mauga, during her career, destroyed 
property at sea, to the amount of 
$500,000. Those vessels were x'Jti- 
mately compelled to take shelter in the 
inland waters at Wilmington, where 
as has been mentioned in a previous 
chapter, they were both destroyed by 
the Confederates. The Georgia, orig- 
inally called the Japan, and built at 
Glasgow, was, after she had accom- 
plished a vast amount of destruction, 
captured by the National fiigate, Niag 
ara, about 20 miles off Lisbon. The 
Olustee, a powerful vessel of 1100 tons, 
schooner-rigged, with two propellers, 
appeared in 1864, and, in November of 
that year, captured many vessels bound 
for New York. The Shenandoah, built 
at Glasgow, under the name of the Sea 
Kang, in 1863, was purchased by the 
Confederates in 1864, and taken to 
Madeira, where she took in her arijus, 
stores and crew. Thence she sailed for 
Australia, and the North Pacific. Dur- 
ing her marauding career, which lasted 
for some time after the war was over 
she destroyed some 25 ships. She was 
eventually taken back to Europe, and 
surrendered to the British government 
Another of those vessels, named the 
Stonewall, was built in France for the 
Danish government. She became Con 
federate property by right of purchabe 
At the close of the war, she was sur 
rendered to the Spanish oflScials a 
Havana, and given up by them to the 
United States. 

The great naval event on the high 
seas, dming the course of the war wae 



THE ALABAMA AND THE KEAKSAKGE. 



877 



fclie fight between the Alabama and the 
Kearsarge. The Alabama was built 
at Birkenhead, by Laird, and was first 
named the " 290." When completed 
in July, 1862, she was taken to Ter- 
ceira, one of the Western Islands, under 
the command of a British captain. 
There she was joined by another Brit- 
ish vessel from which she received her 
armament. On the day following, the 
British screw steamer Bahama arrived, 
bringing with her Captain Semmes and 
the other officers, formerly of the Sum- 
ter, and 20 more of her crew. On 
Sunday, August 26th, she steamed out 
of port. When out in the open sea. 
Captain Semmes appeared on deck, in 
full uniform, mustered the crew, read 
his commission, as post-captain, in the 
Confederate navy, and announced that 
the " 290 " was henceforth to be known 
as the Confederate sloop-of-war, Ala- 
bama. The British flag was hauled 
down ; and the Confederate ensign and 
pennant were hoisted and saluted. On 
the 29th of August, she went forth on 
her mission, which was to " sink, bum, 
and destroy everything which flew the 
ensign of the so-called United States of 
America." For well nigh two years, 
she continued faithful in the perform- 
ance of this terrible work. By the end 
of October, she had made 27 prizea 
Most of the vessels attacked, being 
unarmed, fell an easy prey. In Janu- 
ary, 1863, she encountered the Hat- 
teras, one of the blockading ships off 
Galveston. The Hatteras was lightly 
armed ; and in one-quarter of an hour, 
she went down imder the heaAry fire of 
her antagonist. After cruising for a 



time in the West Indies, and then along 
the coast of BrazU, Semmes crossed the 
Atlantic to Cape Town, where he re- 
mained for some time. Thence he pro 
ceeded to the Malay Archipelago, which 
he reached in November ; and after an 
unproductive cruise of three months 
he returned homewards. On the 11th 
of Jime, 1864, he went into the French 
harbor of Cherbourg. In her pro- 
tracted wanderings, the Alabama had 
captured 47 vessels, of which 45 were 
destroyed. 

At that time the U. S. steamer 
Kearsarge, Captain John A. Winslow, 
was lying in the Dutch port of Flush- 
ing. Of the presence of the 
Alabama at Cherboui'g, Winslow 
was immediately made aware, thi-ough 
the American Consul at that port. On 
the 14th, the Kearsarge appeared off 
Cherbourg. On the day following, 
Winslow received a note from Semmes, 
in which the latter requested j^^g 
him not to depart, as it was his 16. 
intention to take the opportunity offer ■ 
ed for testing the merits of the two 
ships. Winslow, perfectly willing to 
oblige, remained. In proportion and 
armaments, the vessels were about 
equal. The Alabama was about 220 
feet, and 1150 tons; she carried one 
7-inch Blakely rifle, one 8-inch smooth 
bore 68-pounder, and six 32-pounders. 
The Kearsarge was 214i feet long, and 
1030 tons; and carried two llinc 
Dahlgren guns, one 30-pounder nfle 
and four 32-pounders. The Alabam 
had about 140 officers and men. Th 
Keai-sarge had 22 officers and 14C men. 
Winslow. for the sake of pro*<H;tfo-s 



878 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE PlilVAiEEKS. 



hung his anchor cable over the midship 
section of his vessel on either side ; 
and in order to make the addition less 
unsightly, he caused the chains to be 
boxed over with inch deal boards, 
rhe same experiment had been made by 
Farragut, when moving up the Missis- 
ippi, in 1862. 

On Sunday morning, the 19th of 
joQg June, about twenty minutes past 
19. ten, the Alabama was seen steam- 
ing out of Cherbourg, accompanied by 
the Frrnch iron-clad Courronne, and fol- 
lowed by the steam yacht Deerhound, 
owned by an Englishman, of the name 
of Lancaster. Winslow, on seeing the 
Alabama approach, steamed out to 
sea, in order that no questions should 
be raised as to the line of jurisdiction. 
When about 7 miles out from the 
breakwater at Cherbourg, the Alabama 
being about a mile behind, Winslow 
wheeled round and made direct for his 
antagonist The Alabama opened fire 
at once ; and loading with wonderful 
rapidity, she fired a second and a third 
broadside, without receiving any re- 
sponse. The Kearsarge had received 
no harm as yet, except in the rigging ; 
but Winslow, being now within 900 
jards of his antagonist, and fearing the 
effects of another broadside, sheered 
liis vessel and opened fire. The two 
ships were soon broadside to broadside. 
iSemmes, however, fought shy. It was 
evident that he did not seek close 
action ; and Winslow, fearing that in 
the event of his antagonist being sorely 
pressed he might make for the French 
shore, attempted to run under the stem 
of the Alabama. The effect of this 



movement, on the part of the Kear 
sarge, was to force the Alabama, with 
a full head of steam, into a circular 
track. The Kearsarge followed. For 
an houi' the two vessels kept moving 
in a series of circles, starboard bearing 
upon starboard, both firing heavily and 
drifting with the tide further fiom the 
shore. It was now about noon. The 
combat had lasted an hour. The ves- 
sels had described seven circles. They 
were thus about 4 miles further from 
the French coast, than they were at 
the commencement of the action. The 
Alabama was already at the mercy of 
her adversary. The filing fi'om the 
Confederate from the fii-st had been 
rapid and wild. The filing from the 
Kearsarge was slow, steady and deliber- 
ate. The result was that while the Kea- 
sarge was comparatively uninjured, tht 
Alabama was sorely damaged. She 
had received several 11-inch sheila. 
Of these, one had disabled a gun, kill 
ing or wounding some 18 men; and 
another had penetrated the coal bunker, 
where it exploded, and blocked up the 
engine room. Her sides were shattered, 
and pierced -with holes. On her seventh 
rotation in the circular track, the Ala- 
bama winded, setting fore try-saU and 
two jibs, with head in shore. Her port 
broadside with only two guns, was now 
presented to the Kearsarge ; and she 
was moving slowly. Winslow was now 
in a position to use grapeshot with 
effect. A few more guns were fired ; 
and the flag of the Alabama disap 
peared. A white flag was then dis- 
played over her stern ; and Win- 
slow, respecting the signal of distresa 



THE ALABAMA SUNK. 



8'r9 



iiscontinued firing. Within two min- 
utes, the Alabama again opened fire from 
her two guns on the port side. The 
Kearsarge quickly responded ; and then 
fiteaming ahead, Winslow placed his 
V essel right across the bow of the Ala- 
oama, and was about to open a raking 
fire. The white flag, however, was 
still floating ; and Winslow again re- 
served his fire. Almost immediately 
.afterwards, the boats of the Alabama 
were lowered ; and in one of them 
came an officer who informed Winslow 
that the Confederate vessel had sur- 
rendered, and that she was fast sinking. 
Twenty minutes after the surrender, 
the Alabama went down in the deep 
waters of the English Channel. She 
went down stem foremost, her bow 
rising high in the air, and her main- 
mast breaking oif, as she disappeared. 
Semmes flung his sword into the sea. 
He and his officers, and some of the 
crew, were picked up by the Deerhound, 



and carried to England. Some 65 or 
70 men, a number of them wounded, 
were rescued by the boats of the Kear- 
sarge. Several others were got on 
board by two French pilot boats, and 
taken to France. Although the Ala- 
bama had fii'ed some 370 shot and 
shell, the Kearsarge was but little 
injured ; and the casualties on board 
amounted to only 3 wounded. This 
great naval duel, the greatest perhaps 
in the century, was witnessed by thous- 
ands of people on the French shore. 
Such was the end of the Alabama — a 
privateer which, during her career, had 
captured and for the most part burned 
65 vessels, which had destroyed pro- 
perty estimated at $10,000,000, and 
which, more than any ship of her class, 
had driven American commerce from 
the sea. On sea, as well as on land, 
the National cause was now gaining 
the ascendency. Time was working 
steadily in favor of the right 



no 



THE MAEOH THROUGH THE CAilOLINAS. 



CHAPTER XLI. 



barman stUl »t Sftvumah — Ordered to Tmnoport hi« Troops to the James — Sherman Presses dta Mare 
Orerland — Correspondenee with Grant — Earnest Entreaties — Orant Consents to the Overland March — 
Preparations — Foster left in Command of Savannah — Howard's Troops Embarked for Beaafort — Slocmn 
Ordered to the Coosawhatchie — Sherman at Hilton Head — The Floods — The Troops Detained — Slocum at 
the Salkahatchie — Blair at Orangeburg Bridge — Sherman Sets Ont for Colombia — Little Congaree Brid/st 
— Shells Flong into Columbia — The Army before Colombia — Surrender of Columbia — The City in Flames— 
Wade Hampton's Orders — Charleston — The City Threatened — General Hardee in Command — The Place 
Elracuated — Formal Surrender of Charleston and all the Harbor Defeases — Qillmore Takes Possession- - 
A Grand Demonstration — A Distinguished Assemblage — General Anderson Restores the Old Flag to 
Fort Sumter — Address by Henry Ward Beecher — Great Rejoicing — Slocum at Rocky Mount — Kilpatrick 
at Lancaster — The Catawba Greatly Swollen — On to Cheraw — Kilpatrick Surprised — Almost a Defeat — 
The Confederates Concentrating — Sherman Sets Ont from Fayetteville — Pushing on to Goldsboro — Hardee 
Attempts to Hinder the Advance — Pretence of Moving on Raleigh — Sherman Resolves to Dislodge Hardee 
— A Strong Position — Severe Fighting — A Dismal Night — A Confederate Retreat — The Battle of 
Ave(ry8boro — A National Victory — The Goldsboro Road — Howard at Lee's Store — Sherman Starts for 
Goldsboro — Overtaken by the Way — Bad News — Compelled to Return — Slocum in Danger — The Con- 
federates in Force under Johnston — In a Strong Position — The Confederate Attack — The Battle of 
Bentonville — Fearing's Brave Brigade — The Confederates Surprised — Terrible Fighting — The Confederates 
Driven Back — The Day Saved — Morgan's Division Covered with Glory — A National Victory — Arrival of 
Howard and the Right Wing — Result of the Three Day's Fighting — A Great National Gain — Sherman's 
Purpoce — In Communication with Schofield and Terry — Schofield's Advance on Goldsboro— The Country 
Flooded — The Confederates in Force under Bragg — The March to Kinston — The Importance of the Rail 
road — Jackson's MUls — Severe Encounter on the Trent and Upper Trent Roads — Bragg Compelled to R«tir 
aeross the Neuse — Schofield at Kinston — The Three Armies United — The Object of the Campaign Practi 
eally Accomplished — The Railroads Repaired — Sherman at City Point — He Meets Lincoln, Grant and Porter 
— Lincoln's Conversation — " Stop this Blood-shed " — The Grand Result of the Campaign — Stoneman's Raid 
—His Instructions — Collecting his Troops — A Demonstration in the direction of Bristol — Movement Across 
Stone Mountain — Stoneman at Boone — At Wilkesboro — Crossing the Yadkin River — On Cranberry Plain 
— At Jacksonville— General Destruction of the Railroads — No Rest for the Troopers — Stoneman on the North 
Carolina Railroad, between Danville and Greensboro^Burning the Factories at Salem — On the Road to 
Salisbury — Encounter with Pemberton — The Confederates Defeated — Fearful destruction of Property — 
Motherwell on the Catawba Biver — Burning of the Railroad Bridge — The End of a most Destructive Raid. 



From the moment that General Sher- 
man had demonstrated the hol- 
* lownesa of the Confederacy, by 
his almost unopposed march to the 
eea, General Grant, impatient of 
delay and determined to force matters 
to a final issue, was anxious that his 
lieutenant should return northward, 
and bring his army into conjunction 
with the army of the Potomac and the 
army of tne James, then confronting 



General Lee at Petersburg and Rich- 
mond. 

The question was, how was this 
transfer of so large an army to be ac- 
complished? There were two modes 
which at once suggested themselves 
The army could be transferred by sea 
It could also be transferred by a land 
march through the Carolinas. Both 
modes of transfer would be attended 
with difficulty. It was mid-wint,er 



THE MARCH COMMENCED. 



881 



I h- re were many and serious objections 
to conveying so many thousands of 
men, with all the appurtenances of war, 
on board transports, along such a coast, 
.t such a season There were also 
Qany and serious objections to the 
narch overland. Of the two modes, 
Sherman very wisely concluded in favor 
of the transfer by land. Grant, how- 
ever, had ordered that the army should 
be carried to Virginia by sea. Sher- 
man prepared to obey. It was ^vith 
the utmost reluctance, however, that 
he was taking such a course. " I have 
now completed my first step " he writes 
to Grant. " I should like to go to you 
by way of Columbia and Raleigh, but 
will prepare to embark as soon as ves- 
sels come. You know well how much 
better troops arrive by a land march 
thai when carried by transports." Still 
latei, when the movement had actually 
commenced, and when he was about to 
embark his troops, he wrote from Poc- 
otaligo to Grant. "I know," he says, 
"that this march is necessary to the 
war. It must be made sooner or later, 
and I am in the proper position for it. 
I ask no reinforcements, but simply 
wish the utmost activity at all other 
points, so that the enemy may not 
concentrate too powerfully against me. 
I expect Davis vrill move heaven and 
earth to resist me, for the success of my 
army is fatal to his dream of empire. 
Richmond is not more vital to his 
cause than is Columbia. " Grant 
jaelded. " I am gratified," writes 
Shennan in reply, "that you have 
modified your former ordei-s, as I 
feared the transportation by sea would 



very much diatui-b the unity and mor- 
ale of my army, now so perfect." 

In refitting the army, which was 
about 60,000 strong, in regulating the 
local government, and in making th 
proper disposition of the captured cot 
ton and other property, Shemian con 
sumed nearly a month. During that 
time he had a visit from Secietary 
Stanton. Grant sent Grover's diviaidc 
of the Nineteenth cor]i8 to garrison tht- 
forts; and on the 18th of Janii- jjjj 
ary Sherman transferred thene IS. 
and the city itself to General Foster. 
Foster was, at the same time, instructed 
to follow the movements of the army 
inland by occupying, in succession, the 
city of Charleston and such other 
points northward along the coast as 
were of any strategic value. Sherman 
had already made up his mind to make 
Goldsboro the point from which he 
would re -open communications with 
the seaboard; and he had given orders 
to Colonel Wright, superintendent of 
military railroads, to proceed in ad- 
vance to New Berne, and extend the 
railroad from that point to Goldsboro— 
a distance of about 45 miles — by the 
16th of March. Schofield, as has been 
mentioned in a previous chapter, was 
directed to move with the Twenty- 
Third corps, from New Berne and 
Wilmington upon Goldsboro, so as to 
be there if possible on the arrival lA 
Sherman. 

Before commencing the marcn, ilow- 
ard was directed to embark his com 
mand and proceed by sea to Beaufort 
South Carolina, and from that poin 
to send a force to make a lodgment f^ 



8S2 



THE MARCH THKOtTGH THE OAROLINAS. 



I he Charleston Railroad at or near 
I'ocotaligo. Tkis was effected on the 
15th of January by the Seventeenth 
corps under Blair; and a depot of sup- 
plies was established near the mouth 
of Pocotaligo Creek, having easy water 
communication with Hilton Head. 
Slociun with the left wing of the 
army, and Kilpatiick with the cavalry, 
were ordered to rendezvous about the 
same time near Robertsville and Coos- 
awhatchie, in South Carolina, with a 
depot of supplies at Pureysburg or 
State's FeiTy on the Savannah River. 
Slocimi, accordingly, had a pontoon 
bridge laid over the river opposite 
Savannah. He also repaired and cor- 
duroyed the Union Causeway, which 
traverses the rice-fields northward from 
the city. Heavy rains, however, 

welled the river and overflowed all 
Jie adjacent low groimds, covering the 
causeway with water 4 feet deep and 
breaking the pontoon bridge. Com- 
pelled to seek a crossing higher up 
the river, he moved to Sister's Ferry; 
but as the bottom-lands were over- 
flowed there also, he was again de- 
tained. 

On the 2 2d of January, Sherman 
went to Hilton Head, where he had a 
conference with Admiral Dahlgren 
and General Foster. He then pro- 
ceeded to Beaufort, and on the 24th to 
to Pocotaligo, where the Seventeenth 
corps, under Blair, was encamped. 

rhe Fifteenth corps had not yet con- 
centrated. Wood's and Hazen'a divis- 
ions only being at Beaufort. J. E, 
Smith's division was marching from 
Savannah to join them by the coast 



road; and that of Corse was detain*, 
by storms and the floods. On tht 
following day, and in order to j^^j 
strengthen the conviction on the 26. 
part of the enemy that Charleston wa 
to be the objective of Sherman's move 
ments, a demonstration was madx 
against the Combahee Ferry and tht 
railroad bridge across the Salkahatchie 
Feigned movements were made, as il 
it was intended to cross. No real 
movement, however, was made until 
the waters abated. 

By the 29th, the floods had retired 
from the roads west of Savannah sulfi 
ciently to permit Slocum to put the 
left wing in motion, at Sister's FeiTj. 
A gun-boat, sent thither by Dahlgi-en, 
covered the troops while crossing. 
Three divisions of the Fifteenth corps 
also had closed up at Pocotaligo ; and 
the right wing being ready to start, 
Howard was directed to move the 
Seventeenth corps along the Salkahat- 
chie as far as River's Bridge, and the 
Fifteenth by Hickory HUl, Loper's 
Cross-Roads, Anglesey Post Ofiice, and 
Beaufort's Bridge. Hatch's division 
was directed to continue the feints at 
the railroad bridge and the ferry, till 
Sherman's movement should turn the 
enemy's position and compel him to 
fall back behind the Edisto. The 
march of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth 
corps began on the 1st of Febru- j-gj,^ 
ary; and though all the roads !• 
leading north were obstructed by felled 
trees, the pioneer battalions cleared the 
path of the army so rapidly, that, on 
the 2d, the Fifteenth corps reached 
Loper's Cross-Roads, and the Seveii 



ORANGEBURG. 



883 



teenth, River's Bridge. Slocum was 
still hindered by the floods at Sister's 
Ferry ; but he had managed to push to 
the east bank two divisions of the 
Twentieth corps under Williams, with 
Kilpatrick's cavalry. Kilpatrick was 

rdered to Blackville by way of Barn- 
well. Williams was ordered to Beau- 
fort's Bridge. Slocum was dii-ected to 
get the remainder of his command over 
Hs rapidly as possible, and join the 
right wing, on the South Carolina 
Railroad. The right wing was ordered 
to cross the Salkahatchie — which was 
still held by the enemy in force, with 
infantry and artillery intrenched at 
River's and Beaufort's Bridges — and to 
push on to the South Carolina Rail- 
Feb. ^^^^ ^^ '^^ T^^^ Midway. River's 

3. Bridge was carried, on the 3d of 
February, by two divisions of the 
Seventeenth corps, those of Mower and 
G. A. Smith. Mower and Smith led 
their troops in person, wading the 
swamp, which was nearly 3 miles wide. 
A lodgment was effected below the 
bridge ; and the brigade which guarded 
it was driven towards Branchville. 

The line across the Salkahatchie was 
thus broken ; the enemy retreated at 
once beyond the Edisto at Branchville. 
Sherman's army moved rapidly to the 
South Carolina Railroad, at Midway, 
Bamberg, and Graham's Station. The 
track of the railroad was then torn up 
all the way from the Edisto as far 
west as Blackville. To this point 
Kilpatrick had, in the mean time, 
brought up his cavalry. Ordered to 
proceed towards Aiken and threaten 
Augusta, he skirmished heavilv with 



Wheeler's cavalry at Blackville, Willis- 
ton, and Aiken. The destruction of 
the railroad was continued aa far as 
Windsor, 20 miles east of Augusta. 
By the 11th, the entire army was oa 
the railroad from Midway to Johnson's 
Station, thus dividing the enemy's 
forces, which lay westward at Aiken 
and Augusta and eastward, at Branch 
ville and Charleston. A movement on 
Orangeburg was commenced, the Seven- 
teenth corps crossing the South Fork 
of the Edisto at Binnaker's Bridge, and 
moving straight on that place, the 
Fifteenth crossing at Holman's Bridge 
and moving to Poplar Springs, in sup- 
port. On the 12th, the Seventeenth 
corps finding the Confederates in- 
trenched in front of the Orangeburg 
Bridge, carried their position at a dash, 
compelling them to retire, beyond the 
bridge, to the protection of a battery 
which was covered by a rampart oi 
cotton and earth. Blair keeping G. A 
Smith's division near the bridge, sen! 
the other two divisions to a point, two 
miles below, where Force's division 
crossing by a pontoon bridge, and mov- 
ing rapidly up to the position held by 
the Confederates, compelled them to 
retreat. Smith iomiediately pushed 
over the bridge and took possession of 
the enemy's abandoned battery. The 
bridge, which had been partially burned, 
was then repaired ; and the whole 
corps was in Orangeburg by four p^j, _ 
o'clock in the aftenioon, and, at 1-. 
work, tearing up the railroad. By the 
14th, Blair had destroyed the track, as 
far northward as Lewnsville, and drivei 
the Confederates across the Congai-e*- 



BU 



THE MAKOB. THKOUQH THE 0AR0LINA8. 



As they retired, they burned the bridges 
in their rear. 

Sherman, without making demon- 
strations on Branchville or Charleston, 
which his movements had already made 
untenable, set all his columns in march 
for Columbia, the Seventeenth corps 
following the State road ; the Fifteenth 
crossing the North Edisto from Pop- 
lar Springs, at Schilling's Bridge, and 
taking a coxmtry road which enters 
the State road at Zeigler's. On the 
1 5th, this corps found the enemy 
strongly posted at the Little Congaree 
Bridge, having a tete-de-pont on the 
south side, and on the north side a well- 
constructed fort, the artillery of which 
commanded the bridge. The ground 
in front was level and open. It was 
covered with a fresh deposit of mud, 
from which the water of a freshet had 
only just retired. General Wood, how- 
ever, by sending a brigade through a 
cypress swamp to the left, succeeded in 
turning the flank of the tete-de-pont; and, 
promptly following up his advantage, 
he got possession also of the bridge and 
fort. Some delay was occasioned in 
repairing the bridge, which had been 
partially burnt, so that the column did 
not arrive at the Congaree, opposite 
Columbia, tUl the following morning. 
By that time the enemy had burnt the 
fine bridge at that point. 

The inhabitants could now be easily 
Been running about the streets ; and 
small bodies of cavalry occasionally 
showed themselves. Against these was 
directed, for some time, the fire of one 
gun ; but, subsequently, it was turned 
by oixier of Sherman against the walls 



of the unfinished State House. A few 
shells were also thrown at the railroad 
depot to scatter the crowds who were 
carrying oflE sacks of com and meal. 
Of course no white flag was visible, or 
any sign of a disposition to surrender. 
Slocum came up with the left wing 
within an hour after the arrival of 
Howard's column; and the latter was 
directed to cross the Saluda River 
about 3 miles above the city, to pro 
ceed thence across the Broad River 
and to approach the city from the 
north. Slocum was directed to cross 
the Saluda at Zion Church, to proceed 
thence northward towards Winnsboro 
and to break up the railroad and 
bridges in the vicinity of Alston. On 
the night of the 16th, Howard had 
thrown a flying bridge across the Broad 
River about 3 miles above the city. By 
this means he got one brigade over. 
In the morning a pontoon bridge 
was laid, and preparations were made 
for an advance upon the city. 

Meanwhile the mayor had appeared 
and made a formal surrender to Yei\i, 
Colonel Stone, of the Twenty- 17. 
Fifth Iowa, at the Saluda Bridge. A 
small party, from the Seventeenth corps, 
had also crossed the Congaree, in a 
skiff, and entered the city, from the 
west. Stone's brigade was then posted 
in the streets of the city ; and, for some 
time, good order prevailed. Subse 
quently, however, half drunken sol- 
diers and released prisoners, enter- 
ed stores and private dwellings and 
helped themselves to any valuable? 
they could find, robbing ladies and 
gentlemen of their watches and jewelry 



FALL OF CHARLESTON. 



885 



m the streets, and committing vari- 
ous other crimes when not immedi- 
ately under the eyes of their oflScers. 
Orders were given for the destruction 
>f all arsenals and such other public 
property as could not be made use of 
by the army, as well as all railroads, 
depots, and machinery that might be 
subsequently made available to the 
enemy. They were to spare private 
dwellings, as well as schools, colleges, 
and such institutions. The Fifteenth 
corps passed through the city in the 
course of the day, marching out by 
the Camden road. The Seventeenth 
corps did not enter the city at all ; and 
the left wing halted about 2 miles 
distant. 

General Wade Hampton, who was 
in command of the Confederate rear- 
guard of cavalry, had, before leaving 
the city, ordered that all cotton, 
whether belonging to the Confederate 
government or to individuals, should 
be collected in the streets and burned. 
The bales were cut open ; and the loose 
cotton, scattered and blown about by 
a high wind, which prevailed at the 
time, lodged in trees, on the roofs of 
houses, and on piazzas and verandahs, 
thus offering great temptation to the 
floating fire which filled the air. Some 
of the great heaps of cotton were still 
burning when the National troops took 
possession. The flames, however, were 
soon extinguished by the exertions of 
the soldiers. Sherman's instructions 
had not yet been put in execution, 
when the smouldering heaps of cotton, 
fanned by the wind, broke out again 
into flames, which were communicated 



to some of the adjacent buildings 
About dark, the conflagration spread to 
such an extent, as to be altogether be- 
yond the control of the single brigade 
stationed in the city ; and Wood's 
whole division was ordered in, to 
check the progress of the flames. By 
midnight, the fire became quite unman- 
ageable. Drunken soldiers had cut the 
hose ; and, in some instances, they went 
round with torches, deliberately setting 
fire to buildings which would otherwise 
have escaped. In spite of the exertions 
of Sherman, who was up nearly all 
night, and of Generals Howard, Logan, 
and Wood, the fire was not got under 
control until about four o'clock in the 
morning, by which time the whole of 
the business portion of the city was in 
rains. The arsenals, railroad depots, 
machine shops, and other public prop- 
erty, were destroyed on the 18th and 
19th, as well as the raUroad track as 
far as Kingsville and the Wateree 
Bridge, and also towards Wrcinsboro. 

Columbia, the political capital of 
South Carolina, feU on the 17th of 
February. On the following day feli 
Charleston, the commercial capital. The 
destruction of the inland routes of 
travel and supply, by the army of Gen 
eral Sherman on its march through the 
Carolinas, made the whole sea-coast 
northward, from Savannah to New 
Berne absolutely worthless and even 
untenable. The National fleet occu 
pied the entrance to Charleston harbor. 
Morris Island was also held ; an ar 
tUlery fire was, at intervals, directed 
against Fort Sumter and the city itself; 
but the capture of either had proved 



886 



THE MABCfl THROUGH THE OAKOLINAS. 



to be a task of extreme difficulty, and 
in fact impossible by the navy, without 
the aid of a large co-operating land 
force. The strategic value of Charles- 
ton was not, however, so great as to 
warrant the sending against it an expe- 
lition of the magnitude which would 
have been necessary for its reduction. 
The closing of the harbor, by a block- 
ading fleet, effected nearly all that 
would have been accomplished by the 
actual occupation of the city. This 
had been secured by the presence of 
Admiral Dahlgren's fleet of iron-clads. 
Some thought was entertained, early 
in the summer of 1864, of attacking 
Fort Sumter and attempting the pas- 
sage with monitors ; but the idea was 
finally abandoned. It was not until 
l«gl,_ the 8th of February, 1865, when 
8. GUlmore succeeded Foster in 
ommand of the Department of the 
South, that active measures were taken 
to reduce the city. 

General Hardee was at that time in 
command, in Charleston, with a force 
of about 15,000 men, comprising the 
regular garrison and troops with which 
he had retreated from Savannah. On 
the 10th, operations were commenced 
by the construction of a bridge across 
the creek separating Folly and Cole's 
islands from James Island ; and a force 
under General Schimmelpfenig, 3000 
trong, effected a lodgment on the 
latter about 3 miles southwest of 
Charleston. Skirmishers, who were 
thrown forward, encountered the en- 
emy at Grimball's, on Stono River. A 
mortar schooner and two tin-clads also 
nioved up the Stono Ri^^er and shelled 



the enemy, and at the same time cov 
ered the flank of the National troops 
About half -past four, General Haitweli 
moved his whole biigade forward in 
columns, doubled on the centre, and 
carried the enemy's rifle-pits at the 
double-quick. The contest was brief, 
as the Confederates retreated rapidly to 
their main works, abandoning then 
dead and wounded, and losing about 
20 prisoners. The National loss was 
about 80. As this movement was only 
a feint, the troops of General Schim 
melpfenig were soon afterwards with- 
drawn. On the 12th and 13th, demon- 
strations were made, by a force under 
General Potter, along the approaches 
from Bull's Bay towai'ds Mount Pleas- 
ant, with the view of threatening 
Charleston from the north. General 
Hatch's column, moving northward 
from Pocotaligo, threatened Charleston 
from the south. Hardee soon became 
aware that his hold on the city was very 
precarious. His railroad communica- 
tion with Branchville, as well as with 
Savannah, was destroyed. The rail- 
road running northward to Florence, 
the only remaining one, was in dariger. 
A prolonged defense of the ci^.y could 
only end in his being encircled by 
National forces, and compelled to sur- 
render his whole army. If he could 
effect a junction with Johnston, he 
might yet render important service to 
the Confederacy. About midnight of 
the 17th, therefore, as the last of Yeh. 
the Confederate troops were leav- 17. 
ing, they fired the upper part of the 
city, where were the railroad Ijuildings 
containing several thousand bales of 



THE OLD FLAG ON FORT SUMTER. 



887 



ftotton. In these buildings were stored, 
in addition to the cotton, a large quan- 
tity of rice, and 200 kegs of gunpowder. 
About half-past three in the morning 
a terrific explosion took place, killing 
about 150 people, and mutilating about 
200, among whom were women and 
children, who wei'e caiTying off the rice. 
At daylight, several rams ia the inner 
harbor, near the city, were blown up. 
The mayor, soon aftei-ward, sent a note 
to GUlmore, stating that the Confeder- 
ate military authorities had withdrawn ; 
and at nine o'clock on the morning of 
Ye\), the 18th, the city of Charleston, 
18. with Forts Sumter and Moultrie, 
Castle Pinckney, and all the defensive 
works, were formally surrendered, 
(iillmore's troops were promptly moved 
ap to the city ; and the National flag 
was restored to the parapet of Fort 
umter amid the deafening cheers of 
vhe troops. 

The soldiers were, immediately, set 
to work to check the progress of the 
flames, in the upper part of the city. 
The fire, however, had already got such 
headway that the cotton warehouses, 
arsenals, quarter - masters' stores, the 
railroad bridges, some vessels in the 
Hhip -yards, and a large number of 
dwellings were destroyed before this 
could be effected. The lower part of 
the city, within range of the fii-e of the 
(leet, had suffered much from shot and 
shell, in the course of the protracted 
eiege, and had long been in a ruinous 
-.endition. The wealthy residents had 
deserted the city ; and the population, 
now reduced to about 10,000, mostly 
negroes and poor whites, had no means 



of escape. " Any one," said Sherman, 
" who is not satisfied with war should 
go and see Charleston, and he will 
pray, louder and deeper than ever, 
that the country may in the long 
future be spared any more war." Sev- 
eral hundred desei-tei-s from Hardee's 
army, who had concealed themselves in 
houses, whUe the evacuation was going 
on, surrendered when Gillmore's troops 
entered the city. Among the captures 
were 450 cannon, found in the forta 
and other defenses, 8 locomotives, and 
a large number of passenger and plat- 
foi-m cai"s, all in good condition. 

The memorable siege of Charleston 
commenced actually, on the lOtk of July 
1863, when GUlmore landed on Morris 
Island, The city had been under fire 
542 days ; and the suiTender took place 
on the fourth anniversary of the inaug- 
uration of Jefferson Da%as, as president 
of the Southern Confederacy. The 
moral effect of the fall of Charleston 
was very great, not only in the North 
and in the South, but in Europe also. 

The circiunstances of the surrende 
of Fort Sumter, by General Ajiderson 
had produced an impression on tht 
public mind too deep to be readily 
erased ; and President Lincoln, desirous 
to commemorate its restoration, made 
arrangements for a celebration worthy 
of the occasion. The old flag was 
restored, with great pomp and solem- 
nity, on the 14th of April. A large 
number of citizens, on board the 
steamer Oceanicus, arrived from New 
York to take part in the ceremonies. 
Colonel S. L. Woodford took gen 
eral charge of the day's proceedings 



888 



THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 



Gathered around the flag-staff, the entire 
company, led by W. B. Bradbury, sang 
his song, " Victory at Last." This was 
followed by "RaUy round the Flag." 
Prayer was offered by the Rev. Mat- 
thew Harris, chaplain of the United 
States Army. Selections fi'om the 
Book of Psalms were read by Dr. R. 
S. Storrs, of Brooklyn. General To^vn- 
send. Assistant Adjutant-General, read 
Major Anderson's despatch of April 
I8th, 1861. This done, Anderson's 
faithful servant. Sergeant Hart, ap- 
peared with a new mail-bag containing 
the identical flas: which had been taken 
down on the day of surrender, four 
years before. The precious relic, now 
a memorial of victory as well as of 
defeat, was attached to the halyards. 
Anderson then delivered a brief but 
touching address, after which, he 
boisted the old banner to the peak of 
the flag -staff, amid heaven - rending 
cheers, the whole multitude then 
breaking forth into singing "The Star- 
Spangled Banner." As soon as the 
singing was over, deafening peals were 
thundered forth from four guns on the 
fort. These were responded to by all 
the batteries which had taken part in 
the bombardment, in 1861. The pro- 
ceedings were concluded by an address 
from the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, 
an address which, for power, pathos, 
grandeur of thought and all the other 
elements of fij-st-class oratory, has sel- 
dom been equalled, rarely surpassed. 
Feb. On the 23d of February, 
23. Georgetown, on the South Caro- 
lina coast, about 50 miles northeast 
of Charleston, was evacuated by the 



Confederate forces. On the 26th, 
Admiral Dahlgren entered and took 
possession. 

In the mean time. General Slocum, 
with the left wing and the cavalry, had 
crossed the Saluda and Broad rivers, 
breaking up the railroad near Alston, 
and as far as the bridge over the Broad 
River, on the Spartanburg road. The 
main body moved towards Winnsboro, 
where it arrived on the 21st of Feb 
ruary. Destroying the railroad, as far 
as Blackstakes Depot, Slocum then 
turned towards Rocky Mount, on the 
Catawba. He arrived there, with the 
Twentieth corps, on the 22d, and having 
laid a pontoon bridge, crossed the next 
day. Kilpatrick's cavalry crossed over, 
the same night, during a heavy rain, and 
pushed on to Lancaster, whither jSeam-e- 
gard had retired with the Confederate 
cavalry. Heavy rains prevailed fi'om 
the 20th to the 26th, making the roads 
almost impassable and swelling the 
rivers. The Catawba became so swol" en 
that the pontoon bridge gave way be- 
fore the Fourteenth corps had effected 
a crossing ; and much difficulty was ex- 
perienced in the work of reconstruc- 
tion. When General Davis got his 
command over, the whole left wing was 
put in motion for Cheraw. 

The right wing had crossed the, 
Catawba before the heavy rains set in, 
and pushed on for Cheraw. Detach 
ments were sent, from the Fifteenth 
corps to Camden, to bum the bridge 
over the Wateree, as well as the railroad 
depot and public storea At Lynch's 
Creek the right wing was delayed by 
the badness of the roads, just as the 



FAYETTEVILLE. 



^ 



left wing had been at the Catawba. 
The leading division of the Twentieth 
corps entered Chesterfield on the 2d of 
March, skirmishing with Butler's cav- 
^g^. ^^ ; *°^ about noon, on the 3d, 

8. the Seventeenth corps entered 
Cheraw, the Confederates falling back 
across the Pedee and burning the bridge 
after them. A large amount of ammu- 
nition and numerous pieces of artillery 
were destroyed at Cheraw, aa were also 
the railroad bridges and trestles, as far 
as Darlington. Without delay, the col- 
umns were put in motion in the direction 
of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the 
right wing crossing the Pedee at 
Cheraw, the left wing and the cavalry 
at Sneedsboro, Kilpatrick's cavalry, 
keeping well on the left flank. In 
spite of the unfavorable weather and 
the wretched roads, the Fourteenth and 
Seventeenth corps, on the 11th of 
March, reached Fayetteville, on the 
Cape Fear River. There they had a 
sharp skirmish with Wade Hampton's 
cavalry, the rear-guard of Hardee's re- 
treating army, which, after crossing the 
river, biimt the bridge. On the morn- 
Mar. ^S o^ ^^® ^^^^ ^^ March, at day- 

10. light, Kilpatrick, who was on the 
left, and exposed, was suddenly at- 
tacked by Hampton and his cavalry. 
Hampton gained possession of the 
camp of Spencer's brigade, and the 
house in which Kilpatrick and Spencer 
had their quarters. Kilpatrick, who 
was asleep at the time, escaped, with 
only pantaloons and slippers ; but suc- 
ceeding in rallying his men, on foot, in 
a neighboring swamp, he attacked the 
enemy so vigorously, that he regained 



his camp, horses, and artillery. The 
Confederates rapidly made off, taking 
with them a few prisoners, but aban- 
doning their dead. The army remained 
during the 12th, 13th, and 14th a< 
Fayetteville. The buildings of wha 
was called the Arsenal of Construction 
which covered 50 acres of ground 
and which contained a vast amount ol 
machinery, brought from Harper's 
Ferry, were destroyed. All the build 
ings were burnt, and the machinery 
destroyed, under the sujiervision ol 
Colonel Poe, the chief engineer of the 
army. 

Up to this time, Sherman had suc- 
ceeded in keeping his army between 
the diirided and scattered portions of 
the enemy's forces. The latter, how 
ever, were now concentrating on Sher 
man's left flank. The troops, with 
which Beaxu-egard left Columbia, had 
been reinforced by Cheatham's corps 
from Hood's broken army, and by the 
garrison of Augusta. Hardee also had 
got across the Cape Fear River; and 
he would soon be able to join the 
other armies. These various bodies of 
the enemy, wheh united, would consti- 
tute a formidable force, superior, in 
fact, to Sherman's in cavalrj', and but 
little inferior in infantry and artillery. 
Commanded as they were, by the skilful 
and experienced Johnston, Sherman 
had need to move with caution. Before 
arriving at Fayetteville, he had sent tw: 
trusty scouts to Wilmington, with Lntei 
ligence respecting his position. The 
scouts made their way safely ; and oe 
the morning of the 12th of March, a 
small steamer arrived at Fayetteville 



890 



THE MARCH IHROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 



from Wilmington. It returned, tte 
same day, with despatches for General 
Terry, and for General Schofield, at 
New Berne, informing them that the 
army would move on the 15th, for 
ioldsboro, and directing them to move 
iheir forces on the same point. 

Aa delay would be highly dangerous, 
in face of the probable combination of 
the enemy's forces, Sherman moved out 
of Fayetteville, on the 15th. The 
weather was still unfavorable ; and the 
roads had to be corduroyed to allow 
the passage of wagons and artillery. 
Kilpatrick was directed to move by the 
plank road, as far as Averysboro and 
beyond. He was to be followed by 
four divisions of the left wing, ^vith as 
few wagons as possible. The remainder 
of the train, under the escort of the 
other two divisions of the left wing, 
were ordered to take a shorter and 
more direct road to Goldsboro. How- 
ard, with the right wing, was ordered 
to send his trains well to the right, 
towaids Faisoo's Depot and Goldsboro, 
holding four divisions in readiness to 
aid the left wing, if it should be at- 
tacked while in motion. 

General Sherman accompanied the 
left wing, ^\ath Kilpatrick's cavalry in 
advance, as far as Kyle's Landing. At 
Taylor's Hole Creek, Kilpatiick en- 
countered the rear-guard of the enemy's 
cavalry ; and a brigade of infantry was 
sent at his request to hold a line of 
j[gp_ barricades. On the morning of 
.16. the 15th, the column, advancing 
in the same order, found a large force 
of the enemy under Hardee, in an 
intrenched position, in the vicinity of 



Averysboro, where the road branches 
off towards Goldsboro. Hardee's 
intention was, evidently, to detain 
Sherman, so as to give Johnston time 
to concentrate his forces. It was neces- 
sary, therefore, to get possession of the 
Goldsboro road without delay ; and 
at the same time desirable to keep up, 
as long as possible, a pretence of mov- 
ing on Raleigh. 

Sherman, immediately, made pi-epara- 
tions to dislodge Hardee's force. Slo- 
cum was ordered to push forward and 
carry the position. The Twentieth 
corps, imder Williams, led the attack ; 
and Ward's division, which was in the 
advance, found a brigade of heavy 
artillery, armed as infantry, posted 
across the road behind a light parapet, 
with a battery which commanded the 
open ground in front. A brigade, sent 
round by the left, turned this line, and 
then made a quick charge. The Con 
federate brigade broke, and fell rapidly 
to a second and stronger line. In doing 
so, it suffered severely, from the fire of 
a well-posted battery under Major Rey- 
nolds. Ward's division advanced over 
this ground, capturing 217 men and 3 
guns. On approaching the enemy's 
second line, Jackson's uivision was de- 
ployed on the right of Ward's ; and 
two divisions of the Fourteenth corps 
were deployed on the left, well towards 
the Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick, who 
was acting in concert with Williams, 
got a brigade on the road ; but it waa 
furiously attacked by a Confederate 
division under McLaws, and compelled 
to fall back to the flank of the infantiy. 
Late, in the afternoon, the whole line 



BENTONVILLE. 



891 



advanced, and drove the Confederates 
within their intrenchments. During the 
dismal and stormy night which followed, 
they retreated over a wretched road in 
the direction of Smitkfield. Such was 
the battle of Averysboro. The Na- 
tional loss was 7? killed and 477 
wounded. The enemy left 108 of their 
dead on the field. 

Ward's division kept up a show of 
pursuit for some distance. The re- 
mainder of Slocum's command, turning 
to the right, crossed the South River 
and took the Goldsboro road. Kil- 
patrick crossed more to the north, with 
orders to move eastward and guard the 
flank in that direction. The wagon- 
trains, with their escorts, and Howard's 
column, were, in the mean time, slowly 
toiling along the miry roads towards 
Bentonville and Goldsboro. 

Sherman remained with Slocum and 
the left wing, on the night of the 18th, 
on the Goldsboro road, about 5 miles 
from Bentonville. Howard was at 
Lee's Store, some 2 miles to the south. 
The pickets of both columns were well 
thrust forward- There was no sign to 
indicate that the enemy intended to 
ofEer further opposition to the march. 
Har^ Sherman, therefore, on the mom- 
19. ing of the 19th, ordered Howard 
to move, with the right wing, by the 
Goldsboro road. A little later, he rode 
on hiniseK in the same direction. His 
object was to advance with the column, 
and open communications with Scho- 
field and Terry, who were knowTi to be 
moving up from New Berne and Wil- 
mington. He was only about 6 miles 
on his journey, when he heard cannon- 



ading on the northwest, and when he 
was overtaken by some staff officers, 
who informed him that Slocum had 
encountered the entire Confederate 
army under General Johnston. Slocum 
was ordered to call up the two divis 
ions which were guarding the wagon 
trains, as also, Hazen's division of th 
Fifteenth corps, which was near Lee's 
Store. Sherman promised to hurry up 
■with Blair's corps, and the three re- 
maining divisions of the Fifteenth, and 
fall upon Johnston's left rear. Slocum 
felt the foe, at a very early hour on the 
19th, and just when he had advanced 
from his camp. By ten o'clock, the 
Confederates, cavalry and artillery, were 
present in great force. At noon, the 
fighting had become stubborn and se- 
vere. It was now discovered that the 
whole of Johnston's army, augmented 
by the commands of Hoke and Hardee 
was in a fortified position, in front o 
the left wing of the National army 
prepared to attack, and already hopeful 
of victory. It was, indeed, a surprise. 
Preparations were made in all haste to 
resist the thre.atened attack. Barri 
cades were hurriedly thrown up ; orders 
were sent for the two divisions of the 
Twentieth corps, who were guarding 
the wagon-trains, also for Hazen's Ji 
vision of the Fifteenth. Morgan and 
Carlin, with their respective diWsiona, 
were on the extreme National left^ 
Carlin to the left of Morgan. It wa 
now half-past two o'clock. With tre- 
mendous fuiy, the Confederates came 
rushing out of the woods, and sent 
Carlin's division into the air. Morgan's 
division stood firm. Tli^- biigadt!*' 



89* 



THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS 



of Mitchell and Vandevere were in 
line ; and Fearing's brigade was in 
reserve. General Davis, then in com- 
mand of the Fourteenth corps, which 
was thus savagely attacked, realizing 
the danger, with which the whole army 
was threatened, rode to the front, faced 
Fearing's brigade to the left, and hurled 
',t upon the Confederate's flank. " Push 
right in the direction of that heaviest 
firing," shouted Davis to Fearing, " we'll 
whip them yet." " Well whip them 
yet," echoed the boys; and on they 
went, over the swampy ground, and 
fell like a thunderbolt on the unsus- 
pecting foe. The Confederates reeled 
and staggered and fell back; and such 
was the confusion into which they 
were thrown, that it was an hour, 
before they were able to resume the 
attack. The day was saved ; for Sher- 
man was thus afforded time to re-form 
Davis' left and centre. In that gal- 
lant charge, young Fearing was dis- 
abled by a bullet, and himdreds of his 
brave men were either killed or wound- 
ed. Davis' line was drawn back and 
formed, in open fields, half a mile to rear 
of the old line ; and the artillery were 
massed on a commanding knoll, so as 
to sweep the whole space between the 
new line and the enemy. Morgan's 
troops, on that day, won for themselves 
imperishable renown. Again and again, 
did the Confederates come up to the 
attack. Again and again were they 
repulsed, with heavy loss. "If Mor- 
gan's troops can stand this," said Davis, 
"all is right. If not, the day is 
lost." In the midst of the hottest of 
the fight, Coggswell's brigade, of the 



Twentieth corps, came up and moved 
into the gap between Custer and Mor- 
gan. This position it gallantly held, 
until the end of the struggle. The 
National forces, said Sherman, received 
" six distinct assaults, by the combine 
forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, 
under the immediate command of Gen- 
eral Johnston himself, without giving 
an inch of ground, and doing good exe- 
cution on the enemy's ranks." The 
Confederates suffered terribly from the 
National artillery, they themselves be- 
ing weak in that arm. During the 
night of the 19th, Slocum's wagon- 
train, with its guard of two divisions, 
and Hazen's division, came up, as 
ordered, and, taking position, rendered 
the left wing almost impregnable. 

The right wing, moving to the relief 
of the left, experienced at first but lit 
tie opposition. It soon, however, en 
countered a body of cavalry, posted 
behind a barricade, at the fork of the 
road, near Bentonville. The cavalry 
were quickly dislodged, and the forks 
of the roads secured It was now dis- 
covered that the left flank of the enemy 
was thrown back, and that he had con- 
structed, in his front, a line of parapet, 
in the form of a bastion. The salient 
of this line was on the main road to 
Goldsboro, between Slocum on the 
west, and Howard on the east. The 
flanks rested on Mill Creek, and cov 
ered the road back to Smithfield. By 
four o'clock, on the afternoon of th 
20th, Howard had established a strong 
connection on his left with Slocum, 
Line of battle was formed, in front of 
the enemy's intrenched position, and 



AT KINSTON. 



898 



Johnston was put on the defensive, 
with Mill Creek, and only a single 
bridge in his rear. Sherman, however, 
having little to gain by a battle, was 
in no haste to strike. Skirmishing was 
kept up all day ; and there was some 
heavy artillery firing. 

On the 21st, skimiishuig and artillery 
firing were kept up. Some bold and 
]|Iar^ dashing efforts were made to dis- 
21. cover a weak point in the ene- 
my's linea On one occasion. General 
Mower, with his division of the Seven- 
teenth corps, pushed his way around 
the Confederate flank, almost to the 
bridge at Mill Creek He was glad, 
however, to return to the defenses of 
his own lines. During the night, John- 
ston retreated on Smithfield, leaving 
his pickets behind him, his dead un- 
buried, and his wounded va field hos- 
pitals. He was pursued some 2 miles 
beyond Mill Creek. 

Such was the battle of BentonvUle. 
It cannot be called one of the greatest ; 
but it was certainly one of the most 
important battles of the war. If Sher- 
man's army had been defeated at Ben- 
tonville, and Johnston thus set free to 
join Lee at Petersburg and Richmond, 
the result might have been disastrous 
in the extreme. As it was, the country 
was brought one stage nearer the de- 
sired end. In the three days' fighting, 
the Nationals lost 1646. The Confed- 
erate loss was probably not under 3000. 

Sherman had now accomplished his 
purpose. He had already, to all in- 
tents and purposes, effected a junction 
with Schofield and Terry. Schofield 
had entered Goldsboro on the 2l8t. 



Terry was in possession of the Neuse 
River at Cox's Bridge. 

As soon as Wilmington fell into his 
hands, Schofield took measures to 
carry out Grant's orders, with regard to 
the movement on Goldsboro. General 
Palmer, then commanding the New 
Berne district, was sent from Wilming- 
ton, with instructions to march from 
New Berne, with 5000 men, to occupy 
Kinston — a small town on the Neuse 
River and on the railroad to Golds- 
boro, about 22 miles from that place 
and 32 from New Berne. Ruger's divi- 
sion, of the Twenty-Third corps, was 
sent from Fort Fisher to reinforce him. 
The immediate object of this move- 
ment was to get possession of and 
hold the railroad, in order to establish 
a depot of supplies at Kinston, and so 
facilitate the subsequent movement 
upon Goldsboro, when Sherman should 
arrive. Palmer was not able to com- 
plete his preparations for an advance so 
soon as was expected ; and, on the 6th 
of March, General Cox arrived at jjar. 
New Berne, assumed command, 6' 
and commenced the forward move- 
ment. The Confederates, after being 
driven out of Wilmington, had re- 
treated northward to Goldsboro; and 
ha\ang determined to defend that 
place, they decided to make their first 
stand at Kinston, at which point about 
1200 troops were concentrated unde 
General Bragg. The march to Kinston 
was one of extreme difficulty. The 
morasses were impassable; and the 
Neuse River was too shallow to admit 
the heavy gim-boats. It became, there- 
fore, a matter of the last importance, that 



994 



THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 



the line of railioad to Kinston should 
come under the control of the National 
army. 

The 6th, was spent in clearing the 
roads and in building bridges. On the 
norning of the 7th, the enemy was 
found in some force, at the point where 
the Dover and Jackson roads meet the 
Trent road. Classou drove him back 
to Jackson's Mills, 4i miles from Kins- 
ton. On the 8 th, there was some sharp 
fighting, the Confederates, in course of 
the day, rushing from their works at 
Jackson's Mills, falling upon Curtis' 
division with great force, and over- 
whelming the Twenty-Seventh Massa- 
chusetts and the Fifteenth Connecticut. 
The Nationals were compelled to fall 
back, and foim a new line of battle. 

During the whole of the 9th, there 
was lively skirmishing, but without any 
]j[j^y^ decisive result. On the 10th, ho w- 
10. ever, the enemy, who had received 
large reinforcements, attacked in a bold 
and determined manner, hoping to 
defeat Schofield, before Couch, who was 
now on his way from Wilmington, 
could come up. The National forces 
were well intrenched at the junction of 
the Trent and Upper Trent roads. 
Schofield and Cox were both on the field, 
as were also Bragg, Hill, and Hoke on 
the side of the Confederates. The 
enemy made two fierce attacks — one 
falling on Carter's division on the left, 
the other on Ruger's division in the 
centre. Both assaults were decisively 
repulsed, with heavy loss to the enemy. 
Bragg withdrew his troops, leaving 
behind him his dead and wounded with 
•several hundred j^risoners. His total 



loss was about 1500 in killed, wounded, 
and missing. Couch came up from 
Wilmington, on the morning of the 
11th; and Bragg fell back across the 
Neuse to Kinston, where he burnt the 
biidge and, for a short time, held the 
north bank of the river, 

Schofield, having no pontoon train, 
could not cross the Neuse until the 
14th. On that day, Bragg abandoned 
Kinston, and set out to join Johnston, 
who was then concentrating for the 
piu-pose of attacking Sherman's left at 
Benton ville. Immediately after getting 
possession of Kinston, Schofield set a 
large force at work in the reconstruction 
of the railroad, under the direction of 
Colonel Wright. He, also, re-built the 
wagon-bridge over the Neuse, brought 
forward supplies, and prepared for a 
fiu-ther advance. On the morning of 
the 20th, he left Kinston ; and on ji^j 
the evening of the 21st, he took "H- 
possession of Goldsboro with little op 
position. TeiTy left Wilmington on th« 
15th, and moving steadily northward 
reached Faison's Depot on the 20th; 
and, in obedience to Sherman's orders, 
he advanced thence to Cox's Bridge, 10 
miles above Goldsboro, and secured a 
crossing of the Neuse, on the 22d 
The three annies were united ; and the 
object of the campaign was accom 
plished. The railroads from Goldsborc 
to Wilmington and New Berne were 
quickly repaired ; and supplies in abun 
dance were moved forward to Kinston 

On the 23d, the different commands 
had camps assigned to them, in the 
vicinity of Goldsboro. On the 25th, 
the railroad from New Berne was agair 



THE RESULT OF TUE MAKCH. 



89.S 



in working order ; and the fii'st train 
of cars came in. The troops were soon 
supplied with abundance of food and 
clothing. In harmony with an arrange- 
ment already made, Shei-man, leaving 
fhe army in charge of Schofield, pro- 
ceeded by rail to Morehead City, and 
*^i\ ^nce by steamer to Cit-y Point. There, 
in the upper saloon of llie River Queen, 
j[j^j^ on the eferSth.g of the 27 th of 

27 . March, he ii^et President Lincoln, 
General G-:ar.t, and Admiral Porter ; 
and then occurred that famous con- 
sultation, which is one of the memor- 
able incidents of the war. Lincoln 
looked care-worn and anxious. Grant 
eat silent and imperturbable, smoking 
his cigar. Pleased with the promising 
aspect of things, and convinced that 
the hour of victory was at hand, Lin- 

oln was yet most desirous to put an 
end to further bloodshed. " As long 
a; the rebels lay down their ai-ms, I 
don't care how it is done." " Stop this 
bloodshed ; " he added, " stop this hor- 
rible war; I know I can manage all 
the rest. What signify the terms, 
so long as we get peace ! " On hearing 
Sherman's account of his own position, 
he expressed the fear that Johnston 
might escape southward by the rail- 
I'oad, and thus render necessary further 
pursuit. " He cannot move southward," 
said Sherman, " vnthout breaking up 
his army, which, once disbanded, can 
never again be re-united ; and I have 

lestroyed the railroads, so that they 

■an not b^, used for a long time." 
At this point, Grant, who had not 
taken any pai-t in the conversation, 
interjected the fjnestion, " What is to 



prevent them laying the rails again ? ' 
" Why " answered Sherman, " my bum 
mers hav'nt done things by halves. 
All the rails have been twisted ; and 
they are as crooked as rams' horns. 
They can never be used again." The 
conversation turning upon the terms 
of surrender which should be allowed 
Johnston, Shennan said : " I can com- 
mand my own terms ; Johnston will 
have to yield." Lincoln said : " Get 
his surrender on any terms." Sherman 
never saw Lincoln again. It was the 
opinion of Grant and Sherman that one 
or the other would have to fight one 
more bloody battle, but that it would 
be the last. Sherman returned to New 
Berne by the steamer Bat. 

In the march across the Carolinas, aa 
in that from Atlanta to Savannah, the 
army of Sherman wasted a wide belt 
of country, of an average breadth o 
not less than 40 miles, consuming al 
the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, 
and corn meal. Hundreds of miles of 
railroad were destroyed and thousands 
of bales of cotton burned. There were 
captured 85 canncto, 4000 prisoners and 
25,000 animals. Many thousand negroes 
also were set free. 

These results were uo doubt import- 
ant; but the grand lesult which Sher- 
man had achieved, and one of the 
grandest results of the war, was that no 
Confederate force could now hinder the 
junction, if necessary, of his own iorci^n 
with those of Grant. 

Simultaneously with these converg- 
ing movtMiierits of the .so\eral armies, 
Stoneman made his last great raid. It 
was part of General Grant's plan that 



896 



THE MARCH THROUGH THE UAROLII^AS. 



Stoneman should aid Sherman's move- 
ments by a cavalry raid into South 
Carolina. Before Stoneman was ready 
to move, Sherman had advanced so far 
on his march backward from the sea, 
that the co-operative movement of the 
tavaJry was not necessary. Stoneman 
was, therefore ordered to march east- 
ward, and destroy the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad, in the direction of 
Lynchburg. On the 20th of March, he 
collected the cavalry brigades of Palm- 
er, Miller and Brown, of Gillem's 
division, at Mossy Creek. His whole 
force was about 6000 strong. Having 
moved eastward, to Bull's Gap, he 
divided his troops, sending Miller to 
make a demonstration in the direction 
of Bristol, himself proceeding with tLe 
rest to Jonesboro, where he crossed 
over Stone Mountain to Boone, in North 
Mar. Carolina. At Boone, on the 28th, 
28. he skirmished with the enemy, 
and captured 200 Home Guards. The 
day after, he was at Wilkesboro, where 
he captured stores and some prisoners. 
Continuing his march, he crossed the 
Yadkin River, at Jonesville ; and then, 
facing to the north, he advanced to 
Cranberry Plain, Carroll County, Vir- 
ginia. Thence, having sent Miller to 
Wytheville to destroy the railroad, he 
himself, with the main body, moved on 
Jacksonville. From Jacksonville he 
sent out raiding parties in all directions. 
One of these, under Major Wagner, 
having advanced on Salem, swept along 
the railroad to the east, destroying it 
from New River Bridge to within 4 
miles of Lynchburg. Another, and a 
larger party, under Stoneman himself, 



advanced on Christiansburg, and de- 
stroyed about 90 miles of rail Stone- 
man's prescribed task being thus accom- 
plished, he collected his forces, and 
returned to Jacksonville. 

There was still, however, work to be 
done ; and Stoneman was not disposed 
to rest his troopers imtil that work was 
accomplished. On the 9th of ^prf] 
April, his face now turned to the 9. 
south, we find him on the North Caro- 
lina railroad, between Danville and 
Greensboro, his whole command at 
work tearing up rails and demolishing 
bridges. Palmer destroyed the railroad 
between Greensboro and Salisbury, 
burned the factories at Salem, and 
captured some 400 men. Stoneman, 
with the main body, moved on Salis- 
bury, which was a provision depot, and 
known to be guarded by a Confederate 
force, some 3000 strong, under General 
W. M. Gardiner. The Confederates 
were found at Grant's Creek, 10 miles to 
the east of Salisbury, well posted, with 
18 guns. The entire foroe was under 
the command of Pemberton, Grant's 
old opponent, still faithfully serv- 
ing the Confederates, although reduced 
to the rank of ColoneL The Nationals 
charged the Confederate position. The 
struggle was brief. The Confederates 
broke and fled, leaving behind them 
some 1200 men, who were made pris 
oners, all their guns, 3000 small arms, 
and a vast quantity of stores. Salisbury 
was occupied without further resistance 
The work of destruction was repeated 
Ammunition, provisions, clothing, medi 
cine, 10,000 small arms, 4 cotton fac 
tories, 7000 ba^es of cotton, all were 



BRIL»aE OVER THE OATAWBA BURNED 



897 



lelivered up to the flames. The prison 
pens, from which the Union prisoners 
had already been moved, were fired ; and 
the rails for miles on both sides of the 
town were torn up and destroyed. 
Stoneman now set out for East Teimes- 
see, taking with him the prisoners and 
the captured clothing, and followed by 
thousands of negroes. 

On the 18th, General Palmer, whose 
command was at Lincolntown, sent 
Major E. C. Motherwell, with a body 
of some 250 mounted men, belonging 
to the Twelfth Ohio cavalry, towards 
the point where the Charlotte and 
South Carolina Railroad crosses the 
Catawba River His instructions were 
to destroy the railroad bridge. By 
this time, Richmond had fallen; and 
Davis, the Confederate president, was 
at Charlotte with a considerable force. 
Vaughan and Duke, who had come 
down L'om the borders of Virginia, it 
was ascertained were also in the neigh- 
borhood. Motherwell, in consequence, 
found it necessary to move with great 
caution. At Dallas he encountered the 
cavalry leaders. He cunningly, how- 
ever, evaded battle. On the following 



morning, the 19th, at day-break, the 
National troops were well formed. Aq 
vancing to the bridge, they captured the 
picket and surprised the guard, ^prfj 
The torch was soon applied ; and 19. 
in about thirty minutes the splendir" 
structure, some 1150 feet in length, and 
about 50 feet above the water /as com 
pletely destroyed. After skirmishing 
with some Confederate cavalry, under 
Ferguson, MotherweP's men began to 
move backwards in the direction of Dal- 
las. Early on tne 20th, having marched 
all nigh^, they rejoined the main body of 
t^ brigade, with 325 prisoners, 200 
horses, and two pieces of artillery. 

This last raid of Stoneman was one 
of the most destructive during the war. 
He captured from fii-st to last some 6C-00 
men, about 56 pieces of artillery, small 
arms in great abundance, "^ ith othei 
property of imtold value. If the fat. 
of the Confederacy had not been al 
ready sealed, it must have hastened the 
end. As it was, it helped to complete 
the punishment of the South, and, by 
throwing some darker lines upon the 
canva.: made more horrible the picture 
of civil war. 



THE FALL OF PETEKSBDRa AND EICHMOND, 



CHAPTER XLII 



.~«nt holding on to the Weldon Railroad — Sheridan master of the Shenandoah Valley— Dutch Gap Canai- 
The Explosion — James River Flooded — Confederate Fleet in the James — Fort Brady — Battery Parsons- 
Preparing for Attack along the Whole Lane — Rovanty Creek — Hatcher's Run — Smyth at Armstrong's Mill- 
The Boydton Plank-Road — Dabney's Mills — -The Second Battle of Hatcher's Run — Movement fnim the 
Shenandoah — Hancock in Command of the Middle Military Division — Sheridan at Kernstown — At Stras 
burg — At Woodstock — At Staunton — Custer at Waynesboro — Sheridan's Troops at ScottsWlle and New 
Market — Hardwicksville — Amherst Court House — Sheridan at Ashland Station — Terrible Destruction of 
Property — Richmond in Consternation — Lee Preparing to Penetrate the National Lines — Grant on his 
Guard — Lee's Attack on the Ninth Corps at Fort Steadman — Fort Steadman Captured by the Confed- 
erates — A Terrific Struggle — Fort Steadman Re-captured by the Nationals — General Advance of th< 
National Left — Wright and the Sixth Corps Heavily Engaged — The Advanced Position held by the 
Nationals — Grant's Plan of Attack— His Old Tactics — White Oak Road and Five Forks — The National 
Line — Its Vast Extent^Disposition of the Troops — General Directions — The Night of the 29th of March— 
The National Troops in Motion — Warren and Humphreys on the White Oak Road — In Front of the 
Enemy's Right Flank — Sheridan at Dinwiddle Court House — Grant's Instructions to Sheridan — The 
Position of Lee's Army — Lee's Extended Line — His Difficulty — His Plan of Battle— Longstreet left in front 
of the National Right — The Morning of the 30th — Bad Road — Grant in no Haste to Strike — The Delay a 
Gain to L oo The Confederate General Preparing to Acton the Offensive — Warren on the Boydton Plank 
Road — Ayres, Crawford and Griffin— Warren's Disposition of his Troops — His Advance — The Battl< 
Begun — Fierce Sortie by Lee — Ayres and Crawford Driven Back — (Jriffin Stands Firm — Chamberlain's 
Brigade — The Confederates Driven Back — Warren Attacks the Works at Hatcnor a Run — Lee's Sortie a 
failure — He Attacks Sheridan at Five Forks — The National Cavalry Driven in Confusion — Dinwiddle 
Court House — Devin and Da vies Isolated from the Main Body — Sheridan in Great Straits, but Equal tr 
the Situation — The National Cavalry Recruited — Severe Fighting — Sheridan Dismounts his Men — The 
Clonfederates Pressed — Night and Keiief — Sheridan Praised by Grant — An Anxious Night — Alarming 
Rumors — Warren Ordered to Sheridan's Relief — Gravelly Run — Lee Falls Back from Dinwiddie — He 
Takes Position at Five Forks — A Junction Effected by the National Infantry and Cavalry — Sheridan 
Assumes Command of the Entire Force — Saturday, April 1st — The Key-Point of the Position — A Morning 
Struggle — Sheridan Preparing to Attack — His Plan of Battle — He Blames Warren for Delay — Four 
o'clock— Assault on the Confederate Position at Five Forks — Warren's Advance — A Warm Reception— 
Ayres and Crawford Badly Punished — Griffin Again to the Rescue— The Rally — The Battle Raging -Ad vane* 
of the Cavalry — The Confederates Routed — A Brave Remnant — A Complete Victory — Difference Betweei 
Sheridan and Warren — Sheridan's Charges not Sustained by Facts — The Disaster at Five Forks a Sar 
Blow to Lee — His Right Flank was Turned — Grant and Meade Quick to Act- The Thunder of th. 
National Guns — A Hideous Night — The General Assault — Parke and Wright Carry all Before Them- 
Ord at Hatcher's Run — He Unites with Wright — The Clayborne Road — Sutherland's Station — The SimiL 
Side Railroad Lost to the Confederates— Forts Gregg and Alexander— Gibbon's Heroic Attack — Capture ol 
the Forts — The Investing Line Drawn Close — Lee's Inner Line — Bold and Aggressive to the Last — Ai 
OfEensive Sally— Heath's Division of A. P. Hill— Death of Hill— The End at Hand— " Richmond Must B» 
Evacuated " — Scene in St. Paul's Church — A Sad Sunday — A Night of Horrors — Richmond and Peters 
burg Ev»cvi»ted — Entrance of the National Troops — The Old Flag Restored — Joy and Gratitude. 



Wk return now to the neighborhood 
of Petersburg and Richmond, 
where after the battle of Hatch- 
•jrs Run and at the conclusion of 



1866. 



Warren's expedition, as before de 
scribed, the army of the Potomac and 
the army of the James went into win 
ter quarters. With the left -^f thu 



DBSTRXJCTION OF THE DREWRY. 



army of the Potomac, Grant maintained 
a firm hold on the Weldon Railroad. 
His right, which consisted of the army 
of the James and which was stationed 
on the north side of the river of that 
name, extended to within a few miles 
of Richmond. Sheridan, now undis- 
puted master of the Shenandoah Valley 
from Harper's Ferry to Staunton, had 
his headquarters at Kemstown, near 
Winchester. 

It was not until near the end of 
March, that Grant was ready for a 
general movement upon the Confeder- 
ate Knes. The opening months of the 
year, however, were not spent wholly 
in idleness. Several events of minor 
importance served to disturb the mo- 
notony of winter quarters. On New 
Jan. Year's day, the bulkhead of the 
!• Dutch Gap Canal was partially 
blown out by the explosion of mines. 
The earth was thrown up to a consid- 
erable height ; but, instead of being cast 
forward, as was desired, it fell back 
into its foiTner position. Connection 
mth the river \va8 not established ; and 
oi course the canal remained useless 
for the pui-poses for which it was in- 
tended. 

Heavy rains, about the middle of 
January, swelled the James River to 
several feet above its ordinarj' level, 
flooding the low grounds along its 
banks, and tearing away the pontoon 
bridges at Aiken's Landing and Dutch 
Bottom ; and the enemy, taking advan- 
tage of the high water, dui-ing the 
absence of Porter's fleet, prepai-ed his 
iron-clads in the James for a descent on 
City Point. A fleet composed of 3 



iron-clads, the Virginia, Richmond and 
Fredericksburg, each carrying 4 guns; 
the wooden vessels Drewiy, Nanse 
mond and Hampton, each of 2 guns; 
the Bedford, one gim ; the steamer 
Torpedo, and 3 torjiedo boats, at a very 
early hour on the morning of the 2-4th, 
dropped down from their anchor- Jj^q 
age above the Howlett batteries. 24. 
Moving silently under cover of the 
darkness, they had all but passed Fnrt 
Brady, when the guns of the fort 
opened upon them a tremendous fire. 
The vessels made a vigorous response, 
and moving onward were soon beyond 
the range of the guns. In the brief 
struggle one of the guns of the fort, a 
100-pounder Parrott, was dismounted. 
On reaching the obstructions at Dutch 
Gap, the Fredei-icksburg pushed 
through under a full head of steam. 
The Richmond, the Vh'ginia and the 
Drewry gi-ounded in att^npting t. 
follow; and the Fredericksburg was 
compelled to retura to their assistance. 
The Drewry could not be got ofl:; and 
as daylight was approaching, and the 
fleet was now within range of Battery 
Pai'sons, she was abandoned. A shell 
firom the battery, subsequently falling 
into her magazine, she blew up and 
was totally demolished. The remain 
der of the fleet retired up the river. 
The loss in killed and wounded did 
not exceed 20 on either side. 

About this time some futile attempts 
were made to renew negotiations fo 
peace. After the entire breaking up 
of Hood's army by Thomas, and the 
march of Sherman, almost unopposed, 
from Atlanta to Savannah, a conviction 



900 



rHE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 



began to prevail very generally in the 
South as well as in the North, that the 
strength of the rebellion was broken. 
Without Sherman's command, the Na- 
tional forces in the field were anffi- 
ciently numerous to ensure final success. 
The North had, therefore, one great 
army to spare, while the Confederacy, 
in men, in resources of every kind, and 
In the spirit with which the contest was 
carried on, was known to be failing 
rapidly. A belief came to be generally 
entertained in the North, that a large 
portion of the Southern leaders were 
not indisposed to accept peace, even on 
condition of entire submission to the 
National authority. Some of the best 
and more sagacious of the Confederate 
le«A<5rj had long seen that success was 
ho^^eless; and they were only solicitous 
f bringing the war to a close in some 
way which should not wound too 
Keenly the pride and self-respect of the 
Southern people. A large class in the 
North were also desirous that efforts 
should be made to put a stop to the 
war as soon as it could be done without 
materially sacrificing the national inter- 
ests. Into the details of these peace 
efforts we shall not enter. They were 
all failures, and they had no appreci- 
able effect on the war. 

It was now the Slst of January. 
There were signs of imusual activity 
all along the National lines. Grant, 
resolved to put in execution a long 
projected movement towards the ene- 
my's right had issued marching orders 
to the entire army in front of Peters- 
burg — the Second, Fifth, Sixth and 
Niath corps. The hospitals were 



cleared, and the sick sent back to City 
Point; the quartermasters' and com- 
missary stores also were sent out of 
harm's way. The cars were kept run- 
ning constantly to City Point until the 
afternoon of Saturday the 4th of Feb- 
ruary, when Gregg's division of cavalry 
received orders to march at three on 
the following morning. The Fifth 
corps was to follow at five, and the 
Second at six. The object of the move 
ment was to get possession of the 
South Side Railroad, which, it was 
hoped, would cause the evacuation of 
Petersburg. Gregg's division started 
at the hour appointed ; and, mov- Yeh. 
ing along the Jerusalem plank- 6. 
road, the advance reached Reams' Sta 
tion soon after daybreak. The Fifth 
corps moved along the Halifax road — 
Ayres' division in the advance. Griffin's 
next, and Crawford's in the rear. These 
troops formed the expeditionary oi 
flanking column. Along the Vaughan 
road marched Smyth's and Mott's di- 
visions of the Second corps. These 
troops had the duty assigned them of 
moving directly on the enemy's works 
at Hatcher's Run, while the Fifth corps 
and Gregg's cavalry marched around 
their right. The weather and the roads 
were good ; and the troops, carrying 
four days' rations, were in excellent 
spirits. Gregg's cavalry column, ad 
vancing from Reams' Station towards 
Dinwiddle Court House, encountered, 
at Rowanty Creek, a body of Wade 
Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and in 
trenched. After a sharp skirmish, the 
bridge across the creek, and the works 
were carried; and 22 of the garrison 



HATCHER'S BUN. 



»01 



were made prisoners. The Nationals 
lost 20 men. The stream was, at this 
time, about 20 feet vsdde. As it was 
too deep for fording, it was necessary 
to construct bridges to enable the 
Fifth corps to get over with its ord- 
nance, supply trains, and ambulances. 
This caused a delay of several hours. 
The cavalry, however, moved on rap- 
idly to Dinwiddle Court House, where 
they captured an empty wagon train, 
and sent out scouting parties in vari- 
ous directions. At nightfall Gregg 
retuj-ned to Rowanty Creek, and en- 
camped. 

General Humphreys, with the second 
and third divisions of his corps, moved 
down the Vaughan road to Hatcher's 
Run — Mott with the third division in 
tie advance, De Trobriand's brigade 
leading. De Trobriand deployed his 
brigade ia line of battle ; and, sending 
the Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania over in 
skirmishing order, he carried the works 
and secured the ford. The Cuoieder- 
ates were compelled to take refuge in 
the woods. The brigade then taking 
position on a hill beyond the ford, 
threw up intrenchments. But the cav- 
alry battalion, which had crossed a 
little to the south of the Vaughan 
road, while pursuing the enemy and 
reconnoitring on the left, met a small 
force in ambush, from which it received 
a sharp volley, and lost a number of 
'oen and horses. 

General Smy+h, in the mean time, 
before the run was crossed and while 
his division was yet half a mile from 
the stream, turned off to the right, 

ng a by-path, leading northeastward 



towards Armstrong's Mill and Ford 
After an advance of about a mile, a 
heavy force of the enemy, under Gordon, 
was found in a strong position, with 
pickets thrown out in front. The Con 
federates having retired within their 
breastworks, Smyth formed his men in 
line of battle, his left connecting with 
Mott's right. Earth-works were also 
thrown up and other preparations made 
to resist an attack. Skirmishing went 
on tUl about two o'clock, when a fui-i 
ous artillery fire was begun by the 
enemy. About half-past four, the ene- 
my fell with great weight on Smyth's 
right flank, striking principallj McAl- 
lister's and Murphy's brigades. With 
their accustomed yell, the Confederates 
pressed through a diflScult swamp upon 
which Smyth's right partly rested , 
but the troops, standing firm behind 
their breast-works, received them with 
such a musketry fire that they fell back 
again to the woods. This attempt to 
cany the works on the right flank, and 
thus turn the National position, was 
repeated a second and a third time, but 
with the same result. It was not until 
darkness fell that the fighting was dis- 
continued. Smyth's lines remained 
intact. When morning dawned, it was 
found that the Confederates had aban- 
doned their ground in front of the 
Second corps. During the night the 
lines were re-formed so that the fgi, 
Fifth and Second corps were •• 
brought into connection, the SeconJ 
on the right, the Fifth on the left^ 
the latter covered by Gregg's cavalry. 
The Sixth and Ninth corps were also 
BO disposed as to be able to rendei 



902 



THE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND, 



assistance to the Fifth and Second, if 
necessary. The lines, as usual in the 
presence of the enemy, were covered 
vrith rude breast-works. Early in the 
forenoon, De Trobriand and McAllister 
oioved out their brigades and recon- 
noitred in the dii-ection of Petersburg. 
About noon, Crawford's division of the 
Fifth corps was sent towards Dabney's 
Mills with the \new of getting to the 
Boydton plank-road. The entire region, 
to be traversed in this direction, was ill 
adapted for marching or manoeuvring. 
It was covered with thick woods, and 
broken up in all directions with swamps 
and ravines. There was but one road ; 
and it was so narrow that two wagons 
could not pass each other. The troops, 
advancing in skinnishing order on the 
right and left of the road, were more 
unfortunate than those moving along 
it, as the ground was softer, covered 
with thick underbrush, and swai-ming 
with Confederate sharp-shooteiu T'^e 
men lost their shoes in the mud ; and 
their muskets and ammunition were 
made useless by water. About two 
miles above the Vaughan road, Craw- 
ford's skirmishers met those of the 
enemy under Pegram, and drove them 
back. Pegram sent for assistance, and 
was quiikly reinforced by Evans' di- 
vision. The persevering advance of 
Crawford was at length checked, but 
not before the enemy had been driven 
Deyond Dabney's Mills. 

Gregg with the cavalry, on the left 

f the Vaughan road, had been fighting 

or some time, the enemy's cavaliy 

having commenced the day by pressing 

his rear so that Davies' brigade, and 



subsequently the entire division, became 
engaged. During a lull in the fighting, 
the cavalry threw up breast-works, 
which proved of immense advantage. 
Towards evening the enemy attacked 
again in force, driving in the picket 
and forcing the troops to take refuge 
behind their intrenchments. Heavy 
firing followed, the Nationals, some oi 
whom were armed mth the Spencei 
rifle, inflicting considerable loss upon 
the enemy. The battle became very 
severe; and Gregg, who was finally 
driven out of his breast-works, was 
forced back to Hatcher's Rim. 

While the cavalry had thus been 
desperately engaged on the left, the 
infantry on the right of the Vaughan 
road had to withstand repeated shocks. 
Soon after five o'clock, the enemy came 
down upon the Fifth corps. As it was 
apprehended that Crawford's division, 
entangled in the woods, might be cut 
off, Ayres' division was sent to its sup- 
port ; but while moving in column it 
was attacked and diiven back. Wheat- 
on's division of the Sixth corps, which 
arrived about five o'clock, was also 
ordered up to the support of Crawford, 
and part of it was, for a time, hotly 
engaged. This division, however, shan,d 
in the general reverse, and soon joined 
the Fifth corps and Gregg's cavaliy, 
both of which Avere falling back in 
confusion. The force of the enemy 
consisted of Pegram's and Evans' divis 
ions of Gordon's corps, and Mahcne' 
division of A, P, Hill's corps. In th 
presence of these veteran troops, and 
in a broken and swampy countiy, in 
which the enemy had ^eatly the 



SHEKIDAN'S GREAT EAID. 



908 



advantage, in being well acquainted vvith 
the ground, a retreat could not be con- 
ducted with anything like a regular 
formation. The scattered troops fought 
as they fell back, every irian for him- 
self, firing from behind trees and such 
shelter as they could find ; nor was it 
until the Vaughan road and Hatcher's 
Run were reached and the intrench- 
ments regained, that the routed col- 
umns could be rallied. Flushed with 
success, the Confederates dashed out of 
the woods into the open space in fi'ont 
of the works. Received with a sharp 
fire they fell back quickly to their 
cover, without attempting to carry the 
defenses. Thus ended the second bat- 
tle of Hatcher's Run. The Confeder- 
ate loss was about 1000 in killed and 
wounded. Among the former was 
General Pegram. The Nationals sus- 
tained a loss of nearly 2000 men. 
General Crawford's division suffered 
severely. 

' The National troops busied them- 
selves all night, and during the morning 
Feb. ^^ *^^ '^*^' ^^ strengthening their 

7 . defenses, believing that the Con- 
federates would attack again ; but, as 
they showed no disposition to do so, 
Crawford's division was sent out to 
reconnoitre. The enemy was found in 
a strong position higher up the stream, 
between Armstrong's and Burgess' 
Mills. A sharp musketry fire was kept 
up for some time ; but as Crawford was 
not strong enough to force the enemy's 
lines, he fell back again towards the 
intrenchments. There was also con- 
^derable artillery firing during the day. 
On the 8th there was no fighting. The 



troops, however, were kept busy during 
the entire day throwing up iutiench- 
ments and defensive works. The result 
of the entire movement was the pro- 
longation of the National line in the 
direction of the South Side Railroad, aa 
far as Hatcher's Run, to which the 
City Point Railroad was continued 

Before commencing a general moy^e- 
ment of the armies operating against 
Richmond and Petersburg, it was of 
the utmost importance that all the 
enemy's communications, north of the 
James, should l-e cut oii. To accom- 
plish this object, and with a view also 
if possible, to reinforce Sherman, who 
was inferior to his opponents in ca\^alry, 
Grant determined to set in motion an 
expedition from the Shenandoah Val- 
ley. Placing General Hancock tempo 
rarily in charge of the Middle MUitarj 
Division, with his headquarters at Win 
Chester, Grant directed Sheridan to pro 
ceed with an adequate cavaliy force to 
Lynchburg, and after thoroughly break 
ing up the railroad and canal, to pus> 
southward and join Sherm.in. Accord 
ingly, Sheridan, on the 27th of Febru- 
ary, left his camp at Winchester with 
about 10,000 cavalry, comprising Mer- 
ritt's first division, Custer's third divis 
ion, and a brigade under Colonel Cape 
hart, Avith 4 gims. For some days 
before the march commenced, heavy 
rains had prevailed. The roads there 
fore, were very bad ; and the streams 
and rivers were greatly swollen. The 
troops, however, marched along the 
turnpike, Avhich, being macadamized; 
was in comparatively good condition, 
and passed successively through Kem& 



I 



904 



THE FALL OF PETEKSBURG AND RICHMOND. 



town, Middletown, and Strasburg, reach- 
ing Woodstock, vpithout encountering 
opposition. At Woodstock the column 
bivouacked, having marched 30 miles 
»n the first day. Thence the march 
was continued, on the 28th, through 
Edenburg and Hawkinsburg to the 
North Fork of the Shenandoah, which 
was crossed by a pontoon bridge be- 
tween Mount Jackson and New Market. 
After a march of 27 miles, the troops 
bivouacked at Lincoln's Mills, between 
Harrisonburg and New Market. On 
the 1st of March, the column moved 
26 miles, passing through Harrisonburg, 
Mount Crawford, and Mount Sydney, 
and, crossing Middle River, encamped 
about 4 miles from Staunton. At this 
place, it was known, Early had his 
head-quarters. The Confederate chief, 
dowever, had anticipated Sheridan's 
approach, and warned the inhabitants, 
who removed from the town much of 
their money and valuables. 

The only skirmishing, so far, had 
been at the North River, near Mount 
Crawford, where Capehart's brigade 
had a sharp contest vrith some cavalry 
of Rosser's division, who were trying to 
bum the bridge. The bridge, however, 
was saved; and 37 prisoners and 21 
wagons were captured, with a loss of only 
6 men. The weather had been good, 
permitting 83 miles of the march to be 
easily accomplished. During the night 
of the 1st of March, the rain began to 
fall About nine o'clock, while the troops 
were encamped outside of Staunton, 
Devin's brigade moved up to the town, 
drove out the pickets, and occupied 
it without op|»osition. Turning then 



towards the left, the brigade marched 7 
miles along the road leading to Rock 
fish Gap, and destroyed the trestle 
bridge of the Virginia Central Raili'oad 
at Christian's Creek. 

On the 2d of March, Sheridan's 
column, heedless of the rain, jjgj^ 
wflich stUl continued to fall in 2. 
torrents, moved through Staunton ; and 
the march was continued towards 
Waynesboro, on the South River, 13 
miles southeast, whither Early had 
retreated with the forces under his 
command At Fisherville, Custer's 
division, in the advance, encountered 
the enemy's videttes and drove them 
back towards Waynesboro. On arriv- 
ing near the latter place, the Confed- 
erates were found in an intrenched 
position, with 5 guns. Custer then, 
placing Colonel Pennington's brigade 
on the right, and Colonel Welles' on 
the left, with Capehart's in reserve, de- 
ployed two regiments of the advanced 
brigades as skirmishers, who moved to 
the attack firing briskly. Much to the 
surprise of their assailants, the Confed- 
erates, after filing a single volley, broke 
and attempted to retreat ; but Custer's 
troops, rushing in and surrounding 
them, captured some 1600 men, about 
two-thirds of Early's whole command 
Among the captures were 11 gims, 17 
battle-flags, over 100 horses and mules, 
and about 200 wagons loaded with sub- 
sistence stores. Early's personal bag 
gage was taken, but he himself escaped 
to Charlottesville. This was the end 
of Early as a military leader. 

Custer's division and Capehart's 
brivjade crossed the South River and 



SHERIDAN MOVING TO W^ITE HOUSE. 



906 



moved on rapidly in pursuit as far as 
Greenwood Station, destroying the de- 
pot and a train, in which were 6 pieces 
of artillery with commissary and ord- 
nance supplies, which Early had in- 
tended to send away. The prisoners 
were sent to Winchester under an 
escort of 1500 men. On the 6th, the 
escort was attacked, while crossing the 
North Fork of the Shenandoah, by a 
small force under Rosser. Rosser, 
however, was beaten off, and the num- 
ber of prisoners was increased. The 
detachment arrived at Winchester, with 
its charge, safe. Sheridan's entire col- 
umn having come up to Waynesboro, 
the march was resumed, on the morning 
of the 3d, in the direction of Char- 
lottesville, 18 miles to the east. The 
rain was still falling ; and the roads were 
wretched. The troops, destroying the 
ailroad and bridges, as they moved 
long, arrived at Charlottesville on the 
day of starting ; but they were de- 
tained there two days, awaiting the 
arrival of the wagon trains, which were 
delayed by the wretched condition of 
the roads. In the mean time bodies of 
troops sent out, destroyed the railroad 
in the direction of both Lynchburg and 
Richmond, as well as the large iron 
bridges over the North and South forks 
of the Rivanna River. 

The delay, occasioned by the detention 
of his trains, finally caused Sheridan to 
abandon the idea of capturing Lynch- 
H[ar. ^^^g ', aiid, on the morning of the 
6. 6th, dividing his force into two 
.olumns, he sent one southward to 
Scottsville, whence it marched up the 
James River Canal to New Market, 



destroying every lock between thos« 
towns, and working destruction gener- 
ally. From New Market a detachment 
was sent on to Duguidsville, to secure 
the bridge at that point. It was found, 
when the front was reached, that the 
bridge was already destroyed, as was 
that also over the James at Hard wicks- 
ville. The other column, which moved 
in a southwesterly direction, succeeded 
in destroying the railroad as far as Am- 
herst Court House, 16 miles north of 
Lynchburg. Thence it moved across 
the country to New Market, where the 
two columns effected a junction. The 
Jame-a River was now so much swollen, 
that the pontoons were foimd to be 
useless. The Confederates had also 
destroyed the bridges by which Sheridan 
had hoped to get to the South Side 
Railroad. He had, therefore, only two 
alternatives, either to return to Winches- 
ter or to march as rapidly as possible to 
White House. Choosing the latter 
course, he followed the James River 
Canal towards Richmond, and destroyed 
every lock, besides cutting through the 
banks wherever that was pi-acticable, as 
far east as Goochland. On the 10th, at 
Columbia, at the confluence of the Riv- 
anna with the James, he concentrated his 
whole force Remaining there one day. 
he sent scouts to Grant, with information 
as to his position and intentions with 
a request that supplies be sent to meet 
him at White House. His scouts Ug^. 
arrived at head-quarters, on the !*-• 
night of the 12th ; and an infantry force 
was -mmediately sent by Grant to take 
possession of White House, whither 
abimdant supplies w»re forwarded 



d06 



THE FALL OF PEl'ERSBCrRG AJSID RICHMOND. 



Sheridan, then moving as if he intended 
to threaten Richmond, arrived at the 
Central Railroad, near Ashland station. 
He then crossed the South Anna and 
the North Anna ; and having destroyed 
all the bridges and many miles of rail- 
road, he proceeded down the north 
bank of the Pamunkey to White House, 
where he anived on the 19th, his men 
and horses in great need of rest and 
supplies. 

The amount of property destroyed, in 
this great raid, was enormous. It was 
estimated that the property destroyed 
by Custer alone amounted to $2,000,- 
000. Not a bridge was left standing 
over the James between Richmond and 
Lynchburg. Every railroad bridge was 
destroyed between Staunton and Char- 
lottesville, as well as between the lat- 
ter place and Buffalo. The aqueduct 
at Columbia was badly damaged. No 
kind of property m as spared. It was 
a general and complete destrac^'ion. 
Richmond was filled with consterna- 
tion. The Confederate government 
was paralyzed. On the 24th, Sheridan 
moved from White House, crossed the 
James River at Jones' Landing, and on 
the 27th, formed a junction vdth the 
army of the Potomac, in front of Pet- 
ersbiirg, taking position in Gregg's old 
camp on the left and rear of the army. 

The course of events in North Caro- 
lina had now made it the most prudent 
policy for Lee and Johnston to unite 
their forces ; and Grant's great source of 
anxiety at this time was the probability 
that the Confederates would leave their 
strong lines about Petersburg and Rich- 
mond for the purpose of accomplishing 



this union of the two great Confederate 
armies. " I had spent days of anxiety," 
says General Grant in his report, " lest 
each morning should bring the report 
that the enemy had retreated the night 
before. I was firmly convinced that 
Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would 
be the signal for Lee to leave. With 
Johnston and him combined, a long, 
tedious, and expensive campaign, con 
suming most of the summer, might be- 
come necessary." From the reports ol 
deserters and from other sources. Grant 
had become fully convinced that some 
such movement was intended, and that 
Pet»^rsburg was about to be abandoned. 
L' *:, in truth, had already resolved to 
penetrate the National lines, and, what- 
ever the risk, to attempt to force his 
way from the Appomattox to the 
Roanoke. 

To prevent such a movement, and 
with a view to force a final issue. Grant 
had made arrangements, as early as the 
24th of March, for a general attack on 
the 29th. Lee, however, was also bent 
on carrying out his perilous purjiose; 
and, on the morning of the 25th, jfg,.^ 
he fell with crushing weight on 26. 
the lines of the Ninth corps in front ol 
Fort Stead man — a square work on 
Hare's Hill, about a mile from the 
Appomattox. It was the second regu- 
lar fort in the right of the National 
lines. The first was Fort McGOvery, 
close by the river. The thii'd, to the 
south, was Fort Haskell. Fort Stead- 
man mounted 9 guns, and was sup 
ported by mortar batteries on the right 
and left. The National line, at this 
point, was guarded by McLaughlin's 



ADVANCE OF THE NATIONAL LEFT. 



907 



brigade of Willcox's division, the Four- 
teenth New York Heavy Artillery being 
inside the fort. Gordon's corps con- 
sisting of three divisions, was massed 
against it at daylight. The rest of 

iee's army was, at the same time, held 
in readiness, should the proposed at- 
tempt prove successful, to make an 
attack on the National left. The dis- 
tance between the opposing lines, at 
Fort Steadman, was only 150 yards. 
At daybreak, Gordon's troops, having 
got through the obstructions in their 
own immediate front, rushed over the 
interval, charged up the acclivity to the 
fort, and worked their way rapidly 
through the abatis. The assatilt was 
executed in so bold and skilful a man- 
ner that the National officers were sur- 
prised. Gordon's troops carried the fort 
almost without any opposition. Turn- 
ing the guns of the fort towards the 
right and left, they compelled the aban- 
donment of the mortar batteries, which 
they immediately occupied. Over 500 
men were made prisoners, including 18 
commissioned officers. 

Resolved to extend their conquest, 
the victors moved upon Fort Haskell, 
then commanded by Major Woermer. 
The situation had become extremely 
critical ; and, if Gordon had been well 
supported, a serious disaster might have 
befallen the National army. From 
■lome cause or other, Lee lost his oppor- 
tunity. It was his last. Willcox's 
men were rallied ; Hartranft, with his 
division, came to the rescue ; and all 
the neighboring batteries concentrated 
their fire on Fort Steadman, and the 
Confederate advance. The enemy made 



good and effective use of the captured 
guns. It soon became manifest, how 
ever, that he was engaged in a hopeless 
struggle. The concentrated fire of the 
different batteries was working terrible 
destruction Hartranft's men pressed 
towards the captured fort, with ai 
energy and a detennination seMon 
equalled in war. For a time the battl. 
raged fiercely. Finally, however, tb. 
Confederates, recently so elated with 
victory, were forced back into, and out 
of Fort Steadman. Some of them 
made the rash attempt to regain theu 
own lines ; but such was the enfilading 
fire from the National artillery, which 
swept the intervening ground, that 
they were literally cut to pieces. About 
1900 surre-ndered, rather than make 
the perilous attempt. Fort Steadman 
and the 'x^f works were of couree 
recovered. The entire Confederate loss 
was about 2500. The National losb 
was estimated at 68 kUled, 337 wound 
ed, and 506 missing. The contest was 
over by ten o'clock. At Gordon's 
request, a brief trace was agreed upon ; 
and the dead were "buried. 

A general advance of the National 
left was ordered a little later in the 
forenoon. The Sixth corj>s which lay 
on the left of the Ninth, and the Second 
which was on the left of the Si.xth, 
moved out against the Confederate 
picket line, which was far in advance u\ 
the main line of works. The picket lino 
was captured, without much difficulty; 
and many prisoners were taken. It was 
not to be supposed, however, that tlio 
Confederates would allow the adv;iiictd 
position to remain in the possession 



90S 



THE FALL OF PETERSBUKQ AND RICHMOND. 



of their antagonists, without making 
a bold effort to reclaim it. Accord- 
ingly, about half-past two in the after- 
noon, a vigorous assault was made upon 
the Sixth corps. A little later, about 
half -past four, a similar assault was made 
on the Second corps. The fighting 
was protracted and severe ; but the 
Confedorates were ultimately driven 
back, and, at night, the advanced posi- 
tion was held by the Nationals. 

Grant's original purpose, which was 
to open the campaign by a general 
movement by the left flank, on the 
2yth, was not in any way affected by 
the events of the 25th. Adhering to 
his {>lan, he pushed forward prepara- 
tions for the grand movement. It will 
be observed that the movement, con- 
templated by Grant, was, in its main 
features, a repetition of those tactics, 
with which we were made familiar, 
during the Wilderness campaign. It 
was his pui'pose to mass on his own 
left, and, using his right as a pivot, to 
fall with overwhelming force on Lee's 
right and vulnerable flank. With the 
exception of the Ninth corps, which 
was to form the National right and to 
be the pivot of the movement, the turn- 
ing column was to embrace th^ entire 
army of the Potomac, Sheridan's cav- 
alry force, and nearly the whole army 
">f the James. The right of Le^'s 
ntrenched line, running southwestward 
from Petersburg, crossed Hatcher's Run 
at the Boydton plank road. Thence 
it extended some distance westward, 
parallel with Hatcher's Run and along 
the White Oak roai This line cov- 
ered Lee's main communication by the 



South Side Railroad. About 4 miles 
further to the west of the termination 
of this intrenched front, there was a 
detached line, running also along the 
Wliite Oak road, and covering an im- 
portant strategic point, known as Five 
Forks. Such was the position which 
Grant proposed to turn. 

On the 27th, General Ord, then in 
comm\ud of the army of the James, 
moved over with the greater portion of 
his troops, from the Richmond front to 
the lines before Petersburg. The force, 
thus transferred, consisted of two di- 
visions of the Twenty-Fourth corps, 
under General Gibbon ; one division of 
the Twenty-Fifth corps, under General 
Bimey ; and a small division of cavalry, 
under General McKenzie. They took 
position on the extreme left of the 
National line, on the ground occupied 
on the 25th, by the Second and Fifth 
corps. The Ninth corps, under General 
Parke, and the remainder of Ord's com- 
mand, under General Weitzel, were 
left to guard the extended line of. 
intrenchments. 

On the 29th, at an early hour, the 
Fifth and Second corps, commanded 
respectively by Warren and Hum- Mar. 
phreys, led the general advance. ^9. 
The distance to be traversed was not 
great ; but the roads were in a wretched 
condition, and progress was necessarily 
slow. Warren, marching well to the 
left, crossed Rowanty Creek, and then, 
tiiming to the right, moved northward 
along the Quaker road. Humphreys 
advancing by the Vaughan road, cross- 
ed to Hatcher's Run, some 4 miles 
above Rowanty Creek, and then, like 



jEE's oeitiu'Al, position. 



909 



Warren, turned his face to the north. 
The two corps, on roads nearly parallel, 
were thus marching towards the flank 
of the Confederate intrenchments. War- 
ren had advanced to within 2 miles of 
the Confederate works, before he en- 
countered anything like serious opposi- 
tion. The enemy was then felt in 
Bome strength. A sharp contest en- 
sued, the weight of the resistance being 
chi y bome by Chamberlain's advance 
brigade, of Griffin's division. Griffin 
not only held his own — he repulsed the 
Confederates, who left behind them 
100 men as prisoners, with a consider- 
able number of dead and wounded. 
The National loss, in the encounter, did 
not exceed 370 men. Warren pressed 
on, and drew fire from the Confederate 
works on the White Oak road. Hum- 
phreys, whose pathway was mure diffi- 
cult than that of Warren, had neared, 
)ut not reached the Confederate works, 
when night compelled him to discon- 
tinue his advance. Sheridan, mean- 
while, having moved by a more cir- 
cuitous and more adventurous route, 
had reached Dinwiddle Court House, 
about 6 miles southwest of the position 
occupied by the right of the National 
advance. 

Such was the situation on the night 
of the 29th. The National line was 
practically unbroken from Dinwiddle 
Court House, to the Appomattox, and 
was in the following order : Parke, 
Wright, Ord, Humphreys, Warren, 
Sheridan. It had been Grant's inten- 
tion — and instructions had been given 
accordingly — that Sheridan should cut 
loose from the rest of the army, and 



set out on an expedition against the 
South Side and Danville RaUroads. 
The Lieutenant-General, in the brief 
interval, had changed his mind with 
regard to the disposition of the cavalry ; 
and on the 29th, he so informed Sheri- 
dan. " I now feel " wrote Grant, " like 
ending the matter, if it is possible to 
do so, before going back. I do not 
want you, therefore, to cut loose, and 
go after the enemy's roads at present. 
In the morning, push around the ene- 
my, and get on his right rear. We 
will act all together as one army here, 
until it is seen what can be done with 
the enemy." 

The position of Lee had now become 
extremely critical. To a man of weaker 
nerve, and less fruitful of resource, it 
would certainly have seemed desperate. 
He knew that Grant was massing his 
troops on his own left, and that a vig- 
orous attack was contemplated in the 
direction of the Confederate right. As 
yet, however, he was ignorant of the 
actual condition of the National right. 
He did n<^t know that Grant had so 
concentrated on his own left, that he 
was incapable of making any offensive 
movement with his light. It Avas allim 
portant that effective resistance should 
be offered to the threatened movement, 
on his right ; for if success should at- 
tend his antagonist in that direction, 
his only remaining lines of communica- 
tion with the rest of the Confederacy 
would be effectually severed. It was 
also of the utmost importance, as he 
conceived, that his long intrenched 
line — some 35 miles in length — which 
covered Petersburg and Richmop i 



910 



THE FALL OF PETEKSBURG AND RICHMOND. 



sliould be preserved intact ; for if the 
line sliould be penetrated, at any one 
point, the struggle would be rendered 
hopeless. To oppose the threatened 
movement, and to protect his intended 
ine, he had only 37,000 muskets, and 
BmaU body of broken-down horse. 
[n the emergency, the Confederate com- 
mander was not found wanting. Of 
the two evils which stared him in the 
face, and from one or other of which 
escape was impossible, he chose the 
less. He sti-ij^ped his intrenched lines, 
as far as was possible, and concentrated 
his strength on his th-eatened right 
flank. It was unfoi+nnate for Lee that 
he was ignorant of tne strength of the 
Nationals, in front of his owti left. 
Two divisions of Longstreet's corps, 
some 8000 strong, guarded the lines of 
Richmond ; and Mahone's division of 
Hill's corps protected those in front of 
Bermuda Hundred. On the Petersburg 
side were the divasions of Wilcox, 
Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, and the rem- 
nant of Ewell's corps, now under Gor- 
don. Lonajstreet was ordered to remain 
where he was for the present ; he was 
to move to the Petersburg side, as soon 
as he discovered any weakening of the 
lines in his front. From the troops on 
the Petersburg side he drew two divis- 
ions and three brigades — a force of 
about 15,000 men; and to these he 
added what remained of Fitz-Lee's cav- 
alry. Leaving only some 6000 or 7000 
men in the Petersburg intrenchments, 
he hastened, during the stormy night of 
the 29th and 30th, and placed the troops 
thus collected in front of the position 
in which Warren and Humphreys were 



arrested by the darkness. 

On the morning of the 30th, the Na- 
tional troops were in position and ready 
to strike. The storm had ceased ; ijij^f^ 
but the ground was soaked with 30. 
rain, and the roads were wretched. It 
was found next to impossible to move 
the heavy trains. Such in fact, was the 
condition of the entire surrounding 
country, that Grant was in no haste to 
force a decisive issue. Humphreys and 
Warren were pushed forward, and 
placed close in front of the Confederate 
line on the White Oak road and Hat- 
cher's Run. Sheridan despatched a 
body of cavalry under Devin, support- 
ed by Davies" brigade of Crook's divis- 
ion, in the direcdon of Five Forks. 
The Confederates, however, were found 
there in great force ; and the cavalry 
returned to Dinwiddie Court Hoiise. 
During the coxu"se of the day. Grant 
became convinced, from reconnoissances 
made by his subordinates, that the Con 
federate lines were weak, and that they 
might be penetrated without great 
difficulty. He resolved, therefore, to 
reinforce Sheridan rather than extend 
his line, and while leaving it to that 
officer to execute the flanking move- 
ments, to assault the enemy's lines with 
the other corps. 

It was now Friday, the Slst. The 
ground was still unfavorable for moving 
large masses of men with all the jja^^ 
imjjedimenta of war. Grant, be- 31. 
lieving his position secure, ani influ 
enced by the weather and the impassa 
ble character of the ground, was still 
unwilling to make too much haste 
Lee, however, had decided differently 



A DASHING CONFEDEBATE CHARGE. 



9U 



Grant's delay in striking what was 
meant to be a decisive blow, had been 
a great gain to Lee. lie was, indeed, 
but ill prepared to resist an attack on 
the morning of the 30th. His troops, 
however, were now well forward ; antl 
he had got them into position. The 
weather had given him time. His pos- 
ition, however, was pregnant with peiil. 
Further delay would be no gain to him ; 
it might be his ruin. Brave and full 
of resource to the last, he resolved to 
repeat the experiment which had been 
so successful in the past, and by reason 
of which he had foiled so many turning 
movements. Warren held position, on 
the Boydton plank-road, with the divis- 
ions of Grif&n and Crawford. The 
division of Ayres was thro^vn forward 
to the west of that road. Early on tLe 
morning of the 31st, Griffin was relieved 
by Miles' division of the Second corps, 
and was thus enabled to develop more 
fully towards the left. Warren^ in fact, 
moved his entire corps to the westward 
of the Boydton road, and pressed for- 
ward, in the direction of the extreme 
right of the Confederate line. Ayres' 
division was in advance ; Crawford's was 
in the rear, and somewhat to the ri^ht 
of Ayres' ; Griffin's was in the rear and 
to the right of Crawford's. Sheridan 
was so far to the left that several miles 
intervened between the National caval- 
ry and Warren's left flank. Warren 
has been found fault with for this dis- 
position of his troops ; but, in the cir- 
cumstances, it is difficult to see how he 
could have arranged them differently, 
without acting in opposition to the 
first principles of military science. He 



could not know at what point the 
enemy would strike; and so, in place 
of extending a thin weak line from 
Himiphreys' left, he disposed his troops 
in masses en echelon, so as to be ready 
to resist attack from whatever direct 
ion it might come, with reinforcements 
close at hand. Warren was desirous 
to obtain possession of the White Oak 
road, beyond the extreme left of the 
Confederate line of intrenchments ; and 
after he had received instructions to 
suspend operations for the day, he ob- 
tained permission from General Meade 
to reconnoitre and take possession of 
the position, if he found it possibln 
to do so. 

It was this movement which precipi 
tated the conflict. It was now half- 
past ten o'clock. Ayres' division, with 
Winthrop's brigade in advance, had 
been pushed forward in the directior 
indicated. The reconnoissance wa 
scarcely begun, when the enemy was 
felt; and Lee, with the swiftness of 
lightning and with the weight of an 
avalanche, fell upon Warren's advance. 
Ayres was stunned by the blow, and 
forced back upon CraAvford. Cravsrford 
in his turn, pressed by the foe, and dis- 
organized by the- fugitives, broke and 
fell back upon Grifiin. The wisdom of 
the echelon arrangement was now made 
visible. Griffin stood firm and immov- 
able ; and, in the more open ground in 
which his division was posted, the othei 
two divisions were quickly rallied. 
The Confederates, elated with wha 
promised to be a complete victory, 
were effectually held in check, and 
Warren, as soon as his lines were re 



912 



THE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 



stored, made a vigorous counter-charge. 
Humphreys pushed Miles' division for- 
ward to Warren's right ; and, while the 
Fifth corps attacked the Confederates 
in front, Miles fell heavily on their left 
iank- For a time the fighting was 
'vely and spirited in the extreme. 
Chamberlain's brigade of the Fifth 
corps, particularly, covering itself with 
glory. The Confederates were soon 
compelled to fall back behind their in- 
trenchments. Humphreys pressed for- 
ward with great energy, and made 
hold attacks on the works at the inter- 
section of the Boydton and White Oak 
roads, and on the west side of Hatcher's 
Rim. The works, however, were too 
strong and too well guarded to be 
assailed with success. 

Lee had failed in his attack on War- 
In regaining his intrenchments. 



ren 



owever, he had sustained but little 
OSS. He was quickly ready for another 
Dold and determined effort, which he 
confidently hoped wovdd be attended 
with better, perhaps enduring success. 
Sheridan, as we have seen, had failed 
in the attempt which he made on Five 
Forks, on the 30th. Impressed, how- 
ever, with the strategic value of the 
position, and imdismayed by the exper- 
ience of the day before, Sheridan made 
another attempt on the morning of the 
Slst. Devin's division, supported by 
Davies' brigade of Crook's division, was 
pushed forward again in the direction 
of Five Forka Crook, with his other 
two brigades, those of Smith and 
Gregg, encountered and held in check 
a hostile cavalry force at Chamberlain's 
Creek. While the Confederate cavalry 



were thus occupied with Crook, an , 
the Confederate infantry were engaged 
with Warren, Five Forks was left com 
paratively unprotected ; and the place 
was Beizad without difficulty by Devin 
and Davies. His infantry safe behind 
their works and Warren's progress 
effectually checked, Lee resolved that J 
live Forks should not be left in the ' 
hands of his antagonist. Detaching 
porL 2JS of the two divisions of infantry 
under Pickett and Bushrod Johnson 
he sent them to regain the lost position. 
Advancing by the White Oak road, 
they soon reached Five Forks. The 
National cavalry were driven from the 
place and forced back in confusion on 
Dinwiddle Court House. Pursuing 
vigorously, with cavalry and infantry, 
the Confederates reached Chamberlain's 
Creek, which they attempted to cross ; 
but, being stoutly resisted by Smith's 
brigade, they were compelled to seek a 
crossing further up the creek. Falling 
upon Davies' brigade, ^nth great weight, 
they forced it back against the left 
flank of Devin's division. Both com- 
mands were thus isolated from the 
main body, which was at Dinwiddle 
Court Housa Devin and Davies were 
thus compelled to make a long detour, 
by the Boydton plank-road, in order 
to rejoin their chief and the main body 
Deceived by this movement, and be 
lieving it to be a forced retreat, tho 
Confederates made a left wheel, and 
were about to make a vigorous pursuit 
Sheridan, quick and ready, always, in 
truth, equal to the situation, realized at 
once his new difficulty, and the oppor- 
tunity which was so promptly and 



GEAVELLY ETJN. 



913 



unexpectedly presented. With the bri- 
gades of Gregg and Gibbs he charged 
upon the now exposed flank and rear 
of the Confederates, and compelled 
thenc to face about and so give up the 
[)ursnil Devin and Davies soon re- 
joined the main body, upon which the 
Confederates now f eU with tremendous 
fury, and ^th the combined strength 
of the cavalry and infantiy then at 
hand. The numbers were not unequal ; 
but the fire-arms of their infantry gave 
the Confederates an advantage. Plucky 
as he had always shown himself, on 
every battle-field on which he had been 
actively engaged, and determined to 
bear his own burden and do his own 
work, Sheridan dismounted his troopers, 
and, placing them behind light breast- 
works, he opened upon the Confeder- 
ates, a musketry fire, so swift and so 
deadly, that they were compelled to 
fall back The National cavalry, al- 
though successful in repelling the attack 
of the enemy, had been somewhat se- 
verely handled ; and a renewed assault 
might have been attended with some 
danger. Happily, darkness intervened, 
and, for the night, made a fresh assault 
impossible. 

Grant was greatly pleased with Sheri- 
dan's conduct. He displayed, he said, 
^eat generalship. He did not retreat 
on the main army, " to tell the story of 
superior forces encountered." On the 
contrary, " he deployed his cavalry on 
foot," and, by compelling the enemy to 
do the same, " made his progress slow." 
This was high praise from the Lieu- 
tenant-General ; but it was justified by 
the fact. Sheridan had undoubtedly. 



done weU — all indeed he could do ; but 
no one knew better than himself that 
the shades of evening had fallen like a 
blessing. 

The night of the 31st of March, waa 
an anxious night, at the head-quarters 
of the National army. It was known 
that the cavalry had been attacked and 
driven from Five Forks, and that they 
had been attacked again, in force, at 
Dinwiddle Court House. It was the 
general conviction, that Sheridan could b 
not hold his own, unless strongly rein- 
forced. Warren, accordingly, was or- 
dered to his relief vnih the Fifth corps. 
Warren promptly obeyed, and hurried 
off Ayres, with hia division. Unfor- 
tunately, however, the bridge at Gravel- 
ly Run, over which it was intended 
that Ayres' troops should pass, was 
^o^ud to be destroyed. The construc- 
tion of a bridge, sufficient to pass in 
fantry, necessarily occasioned some de 
lay. It was near twQ o'clock on the 
morning of April 1st, when the division 
was crossed and on its way to Dinwid- 
dle. When made aware of the condi- 
tion of the crossing at Gravelly Run, 
Meade suggested to Warren the pro- 
priety of sending troops both by the 
Boydton road, and by the Quaker road, 
considerably further to the east. It 
was a distance of about 10 miles to 
Dinwiddle by the Quaker road; and 
Warren not unjustly judged that the 
wiser course was to abide the issue of 
the movements already commenced, 
retaining the divisions of Griffin and 
Cravpford where they were, until he 
should hear that Ayres had reached 
Dinwiddle. The result proved that h«i 



914 



THE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND KICHMOND 



acted not unwisely. While this anxiety 
prevailed at head-quarters, Sheridan, 
himself, had ceased to have any fear 
regarding his position. Before mid- 
night, indeed, he became aware that 
Lee had mthdrawn the greater part of 
is troops from his immediate front. 
Fearing for the welfare of the isolated 
l^orce in the immediate front of AVarren, 
[liee, as early as ten o'clock, on the night 
of the 31st, had recalled his troops from 
Dinwiddle, and taken position at Five 
Forks. In such a position, in the event 
of any attack being made by Warren, 
he would be better able to render the 
needed assistance. At earliest dawn 
April o'^ *^® morning of April Ist, and 
1 . shortly after he had been joined 
by Ayres, Sheridan put his whole force 
in motion, in the direction of Five 
Forks. Warren, meanwhile, had march- 
ed across the country, with his two 
3ther divisions ; and, by seven o'clock, 
he formed a junction witn the cavalry, 
midway between Dinwiddle and Five 
Forks. Sheridan, who ranked Warren, 
assumed command of the entire force. 
He had now under his immediate con- 
trol, four divisions of cavalry, and three 
of infantry — an aggregate force, a; least 
25,000 strong. It would be difficult, 
if not impossible, for Lee to oppose 
him at Five Forks with more than half 
of that number. 

Such was the condition of affairs on 
Saturday, April Ist. Lee's line, as we 
have seen, all the way between Hatch- 
er's Run and the Appomattox, was 
thinly guarded. There was hardly 
more than one man to five yards of 
front. Confi'onting this line, ae has 



also been mentioned, were the corps o* 
Parke, Wright, Ord and Humphreys. 
At any one point that line might have 
been easily penetrated. The original 
plan of battle, however, was strictly 
adhered to. Grant remained resolut 
in his determination to turn the Cou 
federate right flank ; and to this end 
he was bending all his energies. The 
key-point of the entire situation was 
Five Forks. For the defense of this 
position, Lee had accumulated aU his 
available force. Towards this point 
Sheridan was now marching with both 
cavalry and infantry. As early as four 
o'clock, on the morning of the 1st, an 
attack was made by the Confederates, 
on Foster's division of the Twenty- 
Fourth corps. The blow, which was 
unexpected, was swiftly and skilfully 
delivered, and was attended with mo- 
mentary success. Foster's men yielded 
to the pressure ; and the Confederate 
flag was raised on the deserted parapet. 
The Nationals quickly rallied ; and the 
enemy, glad to escape to his lines, left 
behind him some 50 prisoners. For a 
time the artillery thundered ; and there 
were demonstrations made by the Na- 
tionals along the whole line. This 
morning affair, however, was only an 
episode ; it was not the great feature of 
the day. During the morning and 
forenoon, Sheridan kept pressing for- 
ward, in the direction of Five Forks. 
By two o'clock, he had forced the Con- 
federates inside their works. Merritt 
with his cavalry, while he was to hold 
the enemy firmly in his front, was in 
structed to make a vigorous demonstra 
tion. as if his real object was to turn 



FIVE FORKS. 



915 



tu3 opponent's right flank. Warren, 
svith the Fifth corps, was ordered to 
move, so that, at the proper time, his 
whole weight would fall on the Con- 
federate left. In order the more com- 
pletely to enclose his antagonist, in his 
toils, Sheridan directed McKenzie, with 
his brigade, to move along the White 
Oak road, and take place on Warren's 
right, thus guarding against any hostile 
movement, which might be made from 
the diiection of Petersburg. It was a 
well arranged plan ; and there was 
every leason to believe that, if prompt- 
ly executed, it would be attended with 
complete success. McKenzie, when ad- 
vancing to take the position assigned 
him, encountered and routed a body of 
the enemy's cavalry, driving them to- 
wards Petersburg. He had returned 
and joined the main body, on the 
White Oak road, just as Warren ad- 
vanced to the attack 

It was now foirr o'clock. Sheridan 
had expected to make the attack, at an 
earlier hour. He had, himself, as we 
have seen, reached the ground about 
two o'clock. He blamed Warren for 
the delay. That general, before resum- 
ing his march to the point assigned 
him, deemed it mse to form his whole 
corps in battle order. This, of course, 
consumed a certain amount of time ; 
and Warren informed his chief that he 
could not be ready for an assault before 
four. At the hoiir named, he was 
ready. Ayres was on the left ; Craw- 
ford was on the right ; and Griffin was 
behind Crawford in reserve. Each of 
the two advanced divisions had two bri- 
gades in front ; and each brigade was 



in two lines of battle. The third bri 
gade of each was also aiTanged in tw<' 
lines of battle, behind the centre of the 
two former lines. Giiffin's division 
which, as we have said, was in the rear 
of the right, was arranged in column of 
battalions in mass. The lines, as they 
advanced, were to keep closed to the 
left; and they were to pi'eserve their 
direction, in the woods, by keeping the 
sun over their left shoulders. The point, 
immediately aimed at, was on the 
White Oak road, and a little beyond 
the enemy's left flank. That point 
reached, they were to swng around 
pivoting on the left ; and then, having 
foi-med perpendicular to the White 
Oak road, they were to advance and 
fall on the Confederate left. 

The entire distance, between Warren 
and the White Oak road, was only 
about 1000 yards A few minutes was 
sufficient to enable the Fifth corps te 
accomplish the intended movement 
The enemy had, in the meantime, re- 
fused his left in a crotchet, about 100 
yards in length, and turned northward 
to the main line. This refused line was 
covered by a strong breastwork, and 
by a dense undergrowth of pines 
Ayres' division which, as we have said, 
was to be the pi^ot on which the other 
two divisions were to wheel, as soon as 
it effected its ctiange of front, encoun- 
tered the enemy's skirmishers in front 
of the crotchet. Crawford's division, ir 
taking position, was exposed to a heav; 
fire on its left — a fire which was, at the 
same time, working some mischief ol 
Ayres' right. Crawford, in order to 
obtain the shelter of woods and a ridge 



916 



TUE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 



obliqued somewhat to the right, and 
thus produced a gap between his own 
division and that of Ayres. Ayres' 
right, in fact, was for a time, so to 
apeak, "in air;" and so terrific was the 
fire on that exposed flank, that the 
troops became unsteady, large numbers 
of them breaking and falling back to 
the rear. This, however, was but a 
short-lived difficulty; for Griffin flung 
his division into the gap, and Ayres, 
his men quickly rallying, rushed upon 
the intrenched crotchet, and by an im- 
petuous charge, carried it, capturing 
about 1000 men, with several battle 
flags, Griffin fell upon the works, in 
his front, and captured them, taking 
1 500 prisoners. Crawford, moving more 
to the right, reached the Ford road ; 
and then, wheeling round, his face now 
to the south, he fell upon the enemy's 
rear, and captured 4 guns. The sound 
of the guns on the right, was the signal 
for the cavalry to attack. Merritt led 
his troopers forward with great gallan- 
try, Devin and Custer, his immediate 
subordinates, rivalling each other in 
deeds of daring and of skill. The cav- 
alry, however, were Avarmly received ; 
and, in a few seconds, numbers of ^der- 
less horses were seen galloping over the 
clain, wildly screaming and sniffing the 
air with terror — sad evidences of the 
deadly precision of the musketry fire of 
the enemy. The Confederates, pressed 
in front flank and rear, in great num- 
bers, threw down their arms. A smaU 
but determined body, however, contin- 
ued to parry the thrusts of the cavalry 
in the front, and the hostile movements 
of Warren, who had again concentrated 



his forces at right angles with the 
White Oak road. Warren experienced 
a most stubborn resistance. At this 
stage, the personal courage of that gen- 
eral was conspicuously revealed. His 
troops, somewhat disorganized, halted 
without orders, in their forward move 
ment. Wairen sprang to the front, ana 
called on his men to follow him. ITie 
action was electric. The call was irre- 
sistible. There was one ■nald rush ; 
the works were carried ; and all that 
remained of the enemy was captured. 
In this final *^ffort, Warren had his 
horse shot undtc' hira ; and, but for the 
timely interfeience of Colonel Rich- 
ardson, who was severely wounded in 
shielding his loved commander, he 
himself might have penshed. Pickett 
and Johnson had done their best ; but 
their best had failed. Those of the 
Confederates, who were not captured, 
were now retreating in wild confusion, 
in a western direction, hotly pursued 
by the mounted divisions of Merritt 
and McKenzie. The trophies of the 
day were several guns and colors, with 
more than 5000 prisoners. Of these 
last, 3244 were taken by the Fifth 
corps. The National loss was compar- 
atively trifling, not exceeding 1000 in 
all, of which 634 belonged to the in- 
fantry. 

Such was the battle of Five Forks, 
Of all the battles of the war, few wer« 
more brilliant or more decisive. It 
redounded to the honor and increased 
the already great reputation of General 
Sheridan. It was equally a credit to 
General Warren. It was his Fifth 
corps which, under his direction, fought 



A TERRIFIC CA5JN0NADB. 



gn 



md won the battle. The plan was 
Sheridan's. The execution of the plan, 
which was perfect, was mainly done by 
Warren. For some cause, not satisfac- 
torily explained, although both generals 
have written and published on the sub- 
ject, Sheridan, after the battle, relieved 
Warren from duty ; and General Griffin 
was assigned to the command of the 
Fifth corps. An unpleasantness seems 
to have existed from the moment that 
the Fifth corps was ordered to co-oper- 
ate with, and act under instractions, 
from Sheridan. It is not so clear on 
whom the blame for the existence of 
such a feeling' should rest. Sheridan 
was dissatisfied with Warren at Din- 
widdle Court House. His conduct, he 
thought, was dilatory The cause of 
the delay has already been explained 
The bridge at Gravelly Run, by the 
Boydton plank-road, had been destroy- 
ed ; and before the run could be crossed, 
a new bridge had to be constructed. 
Successful, though he was. General 
Warren faUed to please Sheridan, at 
Five Forks. In preparing for battle, 
he thought, he was slow. He seemed 
to be lukewarm, or, as Sheridan him- 
self put it, " his manner gave me the 
impression that he wished the sun to 
go down before dispositions for the 
attack could be completed." This, 
however, was not all. He blamed him 
because some of his troops gave way, 
at the commencement of the contest ; 
and he charged him, with not exerting 
himself sufficiently to inspire them 
with confidence. Such charges, the 
reader will perceive, are not sustained 
Dy our narrative. They are not justi- 



fied by the actual facts of the battle. 
It is difficult, indeed, to acquit Sheri- 
dan of something like rashness or in- 
considerate haste in his treatment of 
Warren. The Lieutenant -General, of 
course, was made aware of the diffi- 
cidty between the two commanders • 
and it is only just to General Grant to 
say, that his sturdy common sense was 
never more strikingly displayed, than 
when, refusing to take any part in the 
quarrel, he appointed Warren to the 
chief command in the Department of 
the Mississippi, then in need of a first 
class man.* 

The news of the disaster, at Five 
Forks, was soon known to General Lee. 
It was a terrible blow. He knew its 
full meaning. His right flank was 
turned. The enemy was in his rear. 
A general assatilt was certain ; and all 
he could do now was to hold on, an 
provide for a retreat. The news, o 
course, was as quickly known to Meade 
and Grant. Nor were they slow to 
act. Instantaneously, from their multi- 
tudinous throats, the National guns, all 
along the line before Petersburg, opened 
their murderous fire; and night was 
made hideous by the roar of artillery 
and the hissing and bursting of shells. 
The cannonade continued the entire 
night. Wrisrht, Parke and Ord were 
ordered to attack m the early morning ; 
and Miles' division of Humphreys' 
corps was ordered to the support of 
Sheridan. 



• Coppee's Grant and Bit Oampaignt, p. 43*. Sain- 
ton's Campaign* of the Army of tJu Potomac, p. GOl. 
BebeOion Record, toL H, pp. M6, 64fl. Ixj^in^g 
Oimi War, vol. UI, (noU) MZ 



«•« 



i;18 



THE FALL OP PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 



The 2d was Sunday. At earliest 
dawn, the assault was opened from 
April *^^ Appomattox to Hatcher's 

2. Run, Parke, with the Ninth 
corps, was on the right. Wright, with 
he Sixth corps, was on the left of Parke. 
J)rd was on the left of Wright. Parke 
quickly carried the outer line of in- 
trenchments ; but he was compelled to 
halt before an inner cordon of works, 
on which he could make no impression. 
Wright, carrying everything before 
him, and attaining the Boydton plank- 
road, swept to the left, down the Con- 
federate intrenchments, and captured 
many guns and several thousands of 
prisoners. Ord forced the lines at 
Hatcher'^ Run, and formed a connec- 
tion with Wright. Their combined 
forces then swung to the right, and 
advanced by the Boydtot road, in the 
direction of Petersburg. Hiimphreys, 
who was still more to the left, when 
he heard of these successes, advanced 
with two divisions of the Second 
corps — the divisions of Mott and 
Hays — storming and carrying a re 
doubt in his front, and making a con 
nection with the Sixth corps. Miles 
with the remaining division of Hum 
phreys' corps, had, in the meantime, 
joined Sheridan, and, imder his orders, 
attacked the remains of the Confeder- 
ates who had gathered together, west 
f Hatcher's Run, at the intersection of 
ahe Claybome road, and driven them 
lo Sutherland's Station, on the South 
Side Railroad. Sheridan, at the same 
time, was hotly pursuing the enemy 
with the divisions of Bartlett and 
Crawford of th*. Fifth corps At 



Sutherland's Station, Humphreys re 
claimed Miles' division ; and Sheridan, 
returning to the Five Forks, moved 
across the South Side Railroad, at 
Ford's and WUson's stations, with the 
view of striking the Confederates all 
Sutherland's, in the rear. Miles, mean 
while, had attacked and routed the foe, 
at that point, capturing 2 guns and 600 
men. The South Side Railroad, theii 
most important line of communication, 
was thus lost to the Confederates. 
While these events were taking place. 
Gibbon's ilivision of Ord's command, 
had pushed its way to Forts Gregg 
and Alexander, two strong, enclosed 
redoubts, the most salient and com 
manding to the south of Petersburg 
Fort Gregg was strongly raannti by 
Harris' Mississippi brigade ; and, for a 
time. Gibbon's men dashed themselves 
against it, in vain. Ultirnatf-ly, h^.w 
ever, and at the early hour of se/en, 
the fort was carried. It had been a 
terrific and most determined struggle. 
Gibbon had lost 500 men ; and of the 
250 defenders of t>e work, only 3C 
remained. Fort Alexander, which was 
but imperfectly p/otected, was more 
easUy taken. The investing line was 
now drawn tight and close around Pe- 
tersburg. 

In this inner line, which was well 
protected, and which admitted of 
greater concen ration, Lee was still 
strong. It was now about ten o'clock. 
Longstreet, ha ing at length discovered 
that the force which confronted him, 
on the north of the James, was a mf re 
mask, and having withdrawn several o^ 
his brigades, had just joined Lee • 



DEATH OF A. P. HILL. 



919 



Petersburg, with Banning's brigade of 
Field's division. Thus strengthened, 
Lee, having made the best arrange- 
ments possible for the defense of the 
city, resolved to make an offensive 
sally, in the direction of the National 
right, and vnth the view of regaining 
some works which had been captured 
by the Ninth corps. Heth's division 
of A. P. Hill's corps was pushed for- 
ward to the attack ; and such was the 
vigor of the onset that the Ninth corps 
was able with difficulty to maintain its 
ground. The National troops, then 
holding City Point, were ordered to its 
support ; and Heth, after a bold and 
most determined effort, was repulsed. 
In this final struggle, A. P. Hill, one of 
Lee's best generals, and one who during 
the four years of strife, had taken a con- 
spicuous part in the defense of Rich- 
mond, was killed. He had oeen convers- 
ing with Lee and Mahone. The sounds 
of battle were coming nearer and nearer. 
"How is this, General?'' said Lee to 
Hill, " youi- men are giving way." Fling- 
ing over his uniform a rough coat, Hill, 
accompanied by a single orderly, rode 
forward to reconnoitre. Li a wooded 
ravine, he came upon half-a-dozen sol- 
diers, in blue. They raised their rifles 
and fired. Hill fell dead on the spot.* 



• AxBBOSE Powell Hill, who came to his on timely 
end doling the final assault on the lines before Peters- 
Durg, was bom in Culpepper County, Virginia, in 
1824. He was thus at the time of his death, only 41 
years of age. In the county, which gave him birth 
his father was a 'leading merchant, and a prominent 
politician. Young Hill entered the military academy 
n 1843, and graduated in 1847, in the same class with 
leneral Bumaide. He became lieutenant in Beptem- 
Der, 1861 ; and in 1855 he was promoted to the rank of 
eaptain. Later, in the same year, he was appointed an 
Mslatknt in the Coast Survey. This position he held 



The end was now close at hand. 
The grand drama, so full of strange 
scenes, and tragic incident, and bo 
fraught with the destiny of a great 
nation and people, had reached its last 
act. Lee was now fully convinced that 
he could no longer maintain his posi' 
tion. He decided to hold on until night, 
and then to retreat by the Danville 
road, in the hope of effecting a junction 
with Johnston. About half past ten 
o'clock, and immediately after the re- 
pulse of Heth, he telegraphed to Jef- 
ferson Davis, saying, "My lines are 
broken in three places ; Richmond 
must be evacuated this evening. " 
When the message was handed him by 
Colonel Taylorwood, Davis was in his 

until March, 1861. When VLrginia seceded, he joined 
the volunteers of that State, becoming colonel of th« 
Thirteenth regiment. He took part in the battle of 
Bull Run. He fought at Williamsburg, where he 
held the rank of brigadier-general. For his bravery 
in that fight, he was made major general; and on the 
25th of June, 1863, he formed one of the council of 
war, held at Richmond. He was present at Mechan- 
icsville, and took part in all the subsequent battles of 
the " Seven Days." He fought against Pope, through- 
out the Virginia campaign. He was present at An . 
tietam, at Fredericksburg, at Chancellorsville. When 
" Stonewall" Jackson received his death wound, the 
command devolved upon Hill, who was himself se- 
verely wounded, almost immediately afterwards. For 
his gaUant conduct at ChanceUorsvilie he was made a 
lieutenant-general, and put in command of one of 
three great corps into which the army of Virginia was 
divided. He took par* 'n the three days' fighting at 
Gettysburg. He was more fortunate on the first day, 
than he was on the second and third. From that dat« 
onto the end, including the manoeuvring in the neigh 
borhood of Mine Run, the battles In the Wilderness 
at Spottsylvtinia, at Cold Harbor, before Petersburg 
and Richmond, he was a prominent actor in the army 
of Virginia. He lived to see almost the bitter end- 
but he was spared the humili&te>io which rested so 
heavily on some of his associates Whatever may b« 
the opinion entertained regarding the cause, in which 
and for which he fought, to Ambrose Powell Hill 
most be accorded a high place among the great hoI- 
diers begotten, on either side, by the Olvl) W»r. 



MO 



THE FALL OF PETERSBUEG AND RICHMOND. 



aeat, in hifl customary place of worship, 
the Episcopal Church of St. Paul. A 
livid pallor passed over the face of the 
ruined president; and he quietly left 
the church. It was evident to the 
assembled congregation that something 
dreadful had happened. The deepest 
silence prevailed, and the religious ser- 
vices were closed. In dismissing the 
congregation, the rector. Dr. Minne- 
gerode, gave notice that General Ewell, 
the commander in Richmond, desired 
the local forces to assemble at three 
o'clock, in the afternoon. The news 
passed from lip to lip, and from church 
to church ; and the sorrowful utterance 
came from many a pulpit that the 
same congregation might never meet 
Again. 

It was, indeed, a sad Sunday in 
Richmond. The government would 
give the citizens no positive informa- 
tion. As the afternoon advanced, how- 
ever, there was no longer any doubt 
that the city was about to be aban- 
doned. At all the Departments, the 
utmost activity prevailed ; and wagons 
laden with trunks and boxes were be- 
ing hurried thence to the station of the 
Danville Railroad. Davis left the city, 
about eight o'clock. The members of 
the Confederate Congress and of the 
Virginia Legislature had all departed, 
by nine o'clock. At midnight, all that 
remained of the Confederate govern- 
ment was the War Department; and 
t was represented by Major Melton, 
J one. 

The tumult had already become great 
duiiug the afternoon. It became more 
^oleiit, when darkness set in. The 



City Council, dreading the consequences 
which might result from a drunken sol- 
diery and an intoxicated rabble, ordered 
the destruction of all liquors. By mid- 
night, wine, spirits, beer, and other in 
toxicating liquids ran down the sti'eets 
in streams ; and the authorities soon 
became aware, from the number of 
drunken and disorderly stragglers, that 
they had committed a grave blunder, 
and unwittingly created the very evU, 
they wished to prevent. As no one 
could leave the city without a pass 
from the Secretary of War, and as no 
one could find :;hat functionary. Rich 
mond, during tne .veary night hours, 
became a very Pandemonium. Noth- 
ing was sacred. Nothing was safe. 
The horrors of the situation were ag- 
gravated when, at three o'clock in the 
morning, Ewell, in obedience to oi-ders 
from Major Melton, set fire to the 
warehouses. The conflagration was 
soon beyond control. One thousand 
houses, covering thirty squares — one- 
third of the city — were on fire. The 
War Department, the Treasury, many 
churches and public buildings, were 
consirmed. In the midst of the confu- 
sii^n, the howling mob liberated the 
prisoners from the State Penitentiary, 
and then fired the place. Towards 
morning, when the tumult was at its 
height, a magazine near the alms-house 
exploded, with a concussion which 
shook the city to its foundations 
Another explosion soon followed. I 
was the blowing up of the Confederat 
ram Virginia. A little later, the Fred 
ericksburg and Richmond, also iron 
clads, were blown up ; and the receiy 



JOY ANL» QBATITUDE. 



ing ship Patrick Henry was scuttled 
and sunk. In the early morning, 
El well, wrapt in a faded cloak and a 
plouched hat, rode away on an iron- 
gray horse. 

As soon as it \\:i.s liglit on Monday 
pril mo ing, General Weitzel, who 

S. was holding the National lines 
north of the James, crossed the aban- 
doned defenses ; and, at six o'clock, he 
and his staif, with the second brigade 
of the third division of the Twenty- 
Fourth corps, commanded by Geneial 
Ripley, were in the suburbs of the 
city. At that time the fire was raging 
fiercely ; and shells, exploding in the 
burning arsenal, were ocreaming over 
the doomed city. At eight o'clock, 
Weitzel and his stafi entered Rich- 
mond ; and Lieutenant De Peyster, hav- 
ing ascended to the roof of the Virginia 
State House, hoisted over it the old 
flag of the Republic. The city was 
>laced under military rule. General 
Shepley, the same who was put in 
command of New Orleans, wheu it 
was captured, was put in conunand 
of Richmond. Lieutenant - Colonel 



Manning was made provost -marshal 
The flames were soon got under; and 
order was restored. With Richmond 
were captured 1000 prisoners, 5000 sick 
and wounded in the hospitals, 500 
cannon, 30 locomotives and 300 cars. 
Petersburg was taken possession of 
simultaneously with Richmond. 

The fall of Petersburg and Rich- 
mond naturally enough filled the North 
with joy and satisfaction. With the 
speed of lightning, the glad intelligence 
was carried broad and wide over the 
land ; and before nightfall, on that 
memorable day, the sentiments of the 
people had found expression in the 
most enthusia^'tic demonstrations of 
delight. In tUe larger centres of pop 
ulation, business was suspended, the 
public places were crowded; patriot- 
ic speeches were delivered ; cannon 
boomed and church bells chimed ; 
while, in most cases, the assembled 
multitudes, controlled by a common 
sentiment, recognized the hand of the 
God of Battles who had given them 
the victory, by spontaneous outboTBta 
of gi-ateful song 



922 



THE LAST DAYS OP THE WAR. 



CHAPTER XLIII. 

He End at Hand — The Confederate Retreat — Chesterfield Court House — Amelia Court House — ^The Pursuit- 
Sheridan at JettersvUle — Paine's Cross Roads — A Severe Encounter — Lee pushes on towards Deatonsville 
— Conduct of the Pursuit — Collision at Farmville — Death of General Read — Sailor's Creek — Capture of 
Ewell — Lee crosses the Appomattox — The Horrors of the Retreat — Lee in a Strong Position — Attacked by 
Humphreys — Death of General Smith — Prince Edward Court House — Correspondence between Grant and 
Lee — Appomattox Station — Sheridan Strikes and Drives Back Lee's Vanguard — Lee's Retreat Cut Off — 
Grordon's Vain Attempt to Cut Through Sheridan's Lines — Lee goes to meet Grant — The Interview — The 
Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia — The Terms of Surrender — The Magnanimity of the 
Conqueror — Lee's Farewell to hia Troops — A Touching Scene — The Keystone of the Confederacy Gone — 
National Rejoicing — Clouded Joy — Grant in Washington— The Cabinet Meeting — Ford's Theatre — 
Assassination of Lincoln — John Wilkes Booth — A Real Tragedy — The Nation in Grief — Attempt on the 
Life of Secretary Seward — A Fonl Conspiracy — Lincoln's Funeral — The Fate of the Conspirators — 
Sherman at Goldsboro — Reconstruction of his Army — Johnston Retreats — The Pursuit — A Letter from 
Johnston — Sherman's Reply — Durham's Station — Meeting of the two Generals — The Second Meeting — 
The Memorandum — Sherman's Mistake — The Memorandum disapproved of — Grant at Sherma^i's Head- 
quarters — The Surrender of Johnston — Wade Hampton Unfaithful — Surrender of Taylor — Surrender of 
Farrand — The Confederate Cabinet — Flight of Davis — Faithful Reagan — Mrs. Davis in Danger — Davis r.t 
Irwinsville — Capture of Davis — Capture of Stephens— Surrender of Jeff. Thompson — Kirby Smith stiJl 
holds out — Hopes of Foreign Help — Collision of the Rival I'orce? on the Rio Grande — Brazos Santiago — 
Barrett and Slaughter — Palmetto Ranche — Colored Troops — The trave Sixty-Second — The Thirty-Fourth 
Indiana — The Last Battle of the War — Kirby Smith Asking Terms of General Canby — Deserting his 
Post— General Buckner— The War Ended— The Cost— A Fearful Sacrifice— The Sacrifice not in Vain— 
The End Foreseen and Provided For — The Grand Review at Washington — One Conspicuous Figure Missed 
— ^The Disbandment of the Troops — A Difficult Problem Satisfactorily Solved — Sherman's Farewell to hi« 
Command — Grant's Last Order — A Kindly "Adieu " — Our Task Completed. 



The bloody and protracted tragedy 
which was commenced on the 
^^^' 12th of April, 1861, when the 
first Confederate shot was fired against 
Fort Sumter, was now drawing rapidly 
to a close. The fall of Richmond and 
Petersburg was the true beginning of 
the end. The backbone of the Confed- 
eracy was broken. At an earlier stage 
of the contest, these places might have 
been abandoned without radically in- 
juring the Secession cause. Lee, how- 
ever, had been pleased to stake his all 
on the defence of those famous lines; 
and now that they were broken, it was 



all but impossible for him again to 
rally his forces in any position, in 
which he could hope to offer an effect' 
ive or protracted resistance. 

Richmond and Petersburg were, as 
we have seen, occupied by the National 
troops on Monday the 3d of April. April 
The Confederate chief, mean- 3. 
while, had concentrated his forces at 
Chesterfield Court House, a point mid- 
way between Richmond and Petersburg, 
and then pushed out in a westerly direc- 
tion. The evacuation and retreat were 
conducted with wonderful skill. It was 
Lee's intention to push on as quickly 



SHERIDAN AT JETTERSVILLB. 



U23 



as possible to Biu'kesville, a station 
about 52 miles west of Petersburg, and 
where the South Side and Danvnie 
Railroads cross each other. If he could 
reach that point and destroy the bridges, 
ji his rear, he might succeed, by 
pushing his way towards Danville, not 
only in putting distance between him- 
self and his pursuera, but in effecting a 
Junction with Johnston. In that case, 
as he not iinreasonably concluded, he 
might, at least, be able to exact more 
favorable terms from the conqueror. 
His past experience encoui*aged him to 
hope for the best. He had already 
successfully conducted two famous 
retreats — one after Antietam and 
another after Gettysbuj-g. On the 
morning of the 3d, he had already 
succeeded in putting 16 miles between 
his army and Petersburg. Lee was in 
excellent spirits. On Tuesday the 4th, 
April ^^ reached Amelia Court House, 
4. and struck the Danville Railroad. 
He had made arrangements to receive 
here 250,000 rations which were to 
be sent from Danville. His stores were 
already exhausted ; for he had started 
on the march, with provisions only for 
a single day. At Amelia Court House, 
however, there were no supplies. They 
had, it appeared, been promptly sent. 
The loaded trains had reached their 
destination on the afternoon of Sunday. 
Immediately on his arrival, however, 
the officer in charge received an order 
from the Richmond authorities to bring 
on the train to Richmond, and take on 
board the personnel and effects of the 
Confederate government. The officer 
obeyed, and proceeded to Richmond 



without unloading the CKTb. The 
sui-prise, sorrow and indignation of the 
Confederate commander, when the sad 
fact was disclosed to him, may well be 
imagined. His men were already fam 
ishing. It was impossible to proceet. 
until they collected what supplies could 
be obtained from the surrounding 
country. The delay, thus occasioned, 
not only robbed Lee of all the advan- 
tages of the start ; it proved the ruin of 
all his plans and prospects. 

The National army, meanwhile, was 
not permitted to remain idle. Grant 
had taken possession of both Richmond 
and Petersburg. With the exception 
of the troops under Weitzel, all the 
rest of his forces were south or south- 
west of Petersburg. We have already 
said that Lee's objective was Burkesville. 
Towards the same point, and advancing 
in two lines, the Nationals were now 
converging. It was Grant's great object 
to reach Burkesville, before Lee should 
be able to attain that point. The troo})8 
of the army of the James, under Ord, 
were moving by the South Side or 
Lynchburg RaUroad. Sheridan, vnth 
the cavalry and the Fifth corps, follow- 
ed by the Second and Sixth corps, was 
moving in a line, more to the north, and 
nearer the Appomattox. On the after 
noon of the 4 th, at the head of the 
cavalry, he struck the Danville Railroad, 
at Jettersville, some 7 miles southwest 
of Amelia Court House. The Fifth 
corps was following close in the rear of 
the cavalry. Lee, who, as we have seen, 
had reached Amelia Court House, on 
the morning of the same day, was com 
pelled to halt at that place, in order tc 



9S4 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



obtain provisions, hia supplies having 
been carried on to Richmond. On 
reaching Jettersville, Sheridan soon 
learned of the whereabouts of Lee, and 
was naturally overjoyed at the thought 
that he had been able to fling himself 
across his antagonist's line of retreat. 
To Meade, who was some 16 miles in the 
rear, sick and encamped for the nigVt, 
Sheridam sent a message urging him to 
push forward the Second and Sixth 
corps, with all possible haste. "Do I 
understand" said Meade "that General 
Sheridan believes that Lee's army will 
be destroyed or captured, if my troops 
reach the Danville Railroad by mom- 
ning ? " " Yes sir " was the prompt reply. 
Without a moment's delay, the worn-out 
men were again in motion. To Grant, 
Sheridan at the same time wrote, saying 
" I wish you were here, yourself. I feel 
confident of capturing the army of 
Northern Virginia. I see no escape for 
General Lee." On the afternoon of the 
April ^*'^' Meade had come up with 
o. the Second and Sixth corps, and 
joined Sheridan at Jettersville. Grant, 
meanwhile, was pressing forward, with 
Ord and the army of the Jamea On 
the evening of the 4th, he had encamped 
vrith the main body of that army at 
Wilson's Station. At half past six on 
the following day, close by Nottoway, 
about 9 mUes southeast of Buxkesville, 
and some 12 miles south of Jettersv/ile, 
and when about to encamp for the 
night, Grant received Sheridan's letter. 
With all possible speed, he hurried 
forward two divisions of the Twenty- 
Fourth corps to Burkesville, leaving 
Bimey with the remainder of the col- 



umn at Blacks and Whites. At eleven 
o'clock, the advance had reached Burkea- 
Anile Junction ; and about the same hour 
Grant joined Sheridan at Jettersville 
When the Lieutenant-General arrived at 
the unpretentious little building, which 
Sheridan had made his head-quarters, 
the latter was in bed and asleep. In a 
few seconds, however, he was in the pres- 
ence of his chief and sketching on the 
back of a letter, the relative positions of 
his own troops and the columns of Gen 
eral Lee. Grant took in the situation at 
a glance. " Lee is caught " he said. " It 
will be hard work for him to get away." 
Lee's position had already become 
sufficiently desperate. He was not only 
cut off from his main line of retreat ; 
he was overtaken by the vastly superior 
numbers of the enemy. The two days' 
delay had indeed been fatal. On the 
night of the 4th, and during the earliei 
portion of the 5th, he had a choice of 
two possible courses. He might have 
fallen upon Sheridan's isolated com- 
mand, and attempted to cut his way 
through, and so make himself master 
of the Danville route ; or, by doubling 
on his track, and striking out in a west- 
erly direction, he might have endeav- 
ored to push his way to Lynchburg 
and the moimtains beyond. The former 
of these courses was no longer open to 
him, on the evening of the 5th ; for 
Meade, as we have seen, had already 
arrived with the Second and Sixth 
corps of the army of the Potomac. 
Sheridan has since given it as his op n- 
ion, that Lee might, during the earlier 
portion of the 5th, have attacked him 
with success, and pursued his way to 



FARMVILLE. 



Bnrkesville Junction. In this opinion 
we do not concur. Sheridan had with 
him an excellent force, about 18,000 
strong, including infantiy and cavalry ; 
and he had already found time to throw 
ap ia his front a powerful line of breast- 

orks. Lee's entire force, weary, dis- 
pirited and hungry, did not exceed 
20,000 ; and on the 5th, as on the 4th, 
it was broken up into foraging parties. 
At all events, no such experiment was 
made ; and now it was questionable 
whether the other alternative could 
be adopted with any prospect of suc- 
cess. On the afternoon of the 5th, 
Brigadier-General Davies, whom Sheri- 
dan had sent out early in the day, with 
a mounted force, to operate to the left 
and in front of Jettersville, struck a 
tiain of 180 wagons, escorted by a body 
of Confederate cavalry at Paine's Cross- 
Koads. Davies fell heavily upon the 
cavalry and routed them, capturing 5 
pieces of artillery and a number of 
prisoners. The wagons, he destroyed. 
Almost immediately afterwards, Davies 
was beset with a considerable body of 
Confederate infantry ; and it might 
have gone hard with him and his men, 
had he not, at the opportune mouient, 
been reinforced by the brigaaes of 
Gregg and Smith, of the Second cavalry 
division. As it was, the fighting was 
severe ; but the National troops found 
their way back to Jettersville. 

On the morning of the 6th, the entire 
«rmy of the Potomac, which, the night 
previous, had concentrated at Jetters- 
ville, moved northward, in the direc- 
tion of Amelia Court House. Meade 
had resumed control of the Fifth corps ; 



and Sheridan thenceforward operated 
with the cavalry alone. It was soon 
discovered that Lee, who had, at night- 
fall, on the previous day moved on 
from Amelia Court House, had slipped 
past the left flank of the National army 
and that, with all his forces, he was now 
moving rapidly westward, in the direc- 
tion of Deatonsville. The order of 
march was immediately changed. The 
Sixth cordis was moved from the right 
to the left. The Second corps was then 
ordered to push forward by the Dea 
tonsvillr route ; the Fifth corps was to 
move by a parallel route on the right 
and the Sixth coi'ps was to move by 
another parallel route to the left 
There were thus three pursuing col 
umns — one close on the enemy's rear, 
one on a parallel line to the north, and 
another on a parallel line to the south. 
Sheridan, with the cavalry, led the van 
of the left or southern column. 

While the army of the Potomac was 
thus pressing hard upon the retreating 
foe, the army of the James, imder the 
skilful direction of General Ord, was 
pushing its way rapidly from BurkeS' 
ville Junction, in the direction of Farm 
ville. Ord, as we have seen, had reach 
ed Bui-kesville, with the advance of the 
army of the James, on the night of the 
5th. On the morning of the 6th, his 
troops being well forward, he set out, 
at an early hour for Farm ville, as above 
mentioned, his object being to antici 
pate the arrival of the van of the 
Confederate army, and to destroy the 
bridges which at that place cross the 
Appomattox. Eager to accomplish hit? 
purpose, Ord pushed forward a light 



9X6 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



column, consisting of two regiments of 
infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, 
u ader the command of Brigadier-General 
Thomas Read. On the way, and when 
iuflt approaching Farmville, Read en- 
countered the van of Lee's army. There 
was an immediate collision. The Con- 
federates, who were greatly superior in 
numbers, fought with the energy of 
men who knew that their last hopes, 
if not gone, were at least trembling in 
the balance. Read, however, presented 
a bold and determined front. Fighting 
at the head of his men, he held the 
Confederates at bay, until Ord had 
time to come up with the main body. 
It was a noble service, nobiy done. 
In the struggle Read* wav shot and 
killed, in a hand-to-hand contest with 
General Bearing ; and his command 
waa overwhelmed. The Confederates 
had saved the bridges ; and when Ord 
arrived they intrenched themselves. 

Meanwhile the three columns of the 
army of the Potomac were pressing 
forward with all possible haste. Sher- 
idan with his cavalry, as we have seen, 
moved at the head, and in advance of 
the left column. He was already close 
upon Deatonsville, when he espied the 
whole Confederate army struggling to- 
wards the west. It was evident, at a 
glance, that Lee's men were greatly 

•Brioadikb-Genkbax S. T. Bras, was a native 
of Massachusetts. He entered the Service in January, 
1862, as captain of unattached cavalry from his native 
State. At Gettysburg, where he distinguished him- 
self, and wafl severely wounded, he held a staS ap- 
pointment. He held command under Qrant from the 
Rapidan to the James, and before Bichmr>nd and 
Petersburg. When Ord was appointed to the cow* 
ooand of the army of the James, he made Bead his 
itaff o6Soer 



exhausted. In this terrible march the 
splendid training and high morale of 
the army of Northern Virginia were 
conspicuously revealed. Never was 
army in so severe a plight. It wan 
marvellous, indeed, that, in the circum- 
stances, the troops could be held to- 
gether. They knew that the entire 
army of the Potomac was pressing close 
upon their heels ; and it was scarcely h 
surprise when the van was struck by 
the army of the James. Escape was 
hardly to be hoped for ; but strong 
nerve and high purpose amply supply 
the place of hope. Sheridan was not 
slow to see his opportunity; nor was 
he dilatory in turning it to account. 
He made his arrangements with admir- 
able skill. Right in front of him was 
a Confederate wagon-train escorted by 
a powerful force of infantry and cav 
airy. Crook was ordered to attack the 
train. C-Lister was ordered at the same 
time to press forward and attack a 
point further in advance. If Crook 
should not succeed in his attack, he 
was to move on again, ahead of Cus- 
ter ; and this mode of action was to be 
kept up, until finally a weak point 
should be discovered. The experiment 
was attended with almost immediate 
success. Crook, unable to make any 
impression in his front, was compelled 
to fall back. Custer, however was 
more successful. Gaining the road at 
Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the 
Appomattox, he immediately engaged 
the enemy. Crook and Devin with 
their respective divisions, having hur 
x'led to his aid, the Confederate line 
was pierced ; and there were captured 



SAILOR'S OEEBK. 



Wi 



400 was^ons, 16 p'-'cea of artillery, with 
a large number of prisoners. 

One of the most immediate as well 
as most important effects, produced by 
this onslaught, was the cutting off from 
the main body of Lee's army, the entire 
corps of General Ewell, with a portion 
of Pickett's division. It was all-im- 
portant that this force should not be 
allojved to escape. With the view of 
detaining them, until Wright, with the 
Sixth corps, should have time to come 
up, Sheridan ordered a mounted charge, 
which wan made in a most spirited 
manner by Colonel Stagg, and his brave 
brigade. It was not long until the 
advance division of the Sixth corps, 
under General Seymour, made its ap- 
pearance. Seymour was ordered to 
carry the road on which the Confeder- 
tes were posted. Pushing his men 
orward with great energy, Seymour 
compelled the Confederates to fall back. 
This, however, they did slowly, con- 
testing every inch of the ground, and 
turning and striking heavily at almost 
every step. So vigorous, in truth, be- 
came the resistance, that Seymour found 
it necessary to halt his men and await 
the arrival of Wheaton's division, also 
of the Sixth corps. Wheaton was 
speedily on the ground, and in position 
on Seymour's left. The advance was 
then renewed. The Confederates, no 
longer able to resist the tremendous 
pressure on their front, fell back, until 
the lines of the Sixth corps had reached 
Sailor's Creek. Sheridan's cavalry could 
Qow be seen on the high ground to the 
south of the creek ; and the long lines 
of smoke, arising from the bum^ingr 



wagons, gave sad evidence of the de 
stnictive work which had been going 
on. It would be difficult to imagine a 
situation more critical than that in 
which Ewell and his brave followei 
now found themselves. Encompassed on 
every side, and barred from every pos 
sibility of escape, they still gave blow 
for blow ; and, almost at the last mo 
mr-nt, they poured so deadly a volley 
into the ranks of their assailants, that 
a portion of Wright's veteran line bent 
and g8"e way. It was impossible, 
however, to maintain the struggle 
against +he vastly superior numbers of 
tho Nationals. Pressed in front by the 
Sixth corps, and charged in flank and 
rear by Sheridan's cavalry, Ewell's vet- 
erans threw down their arms ia token of 
siirrender. Over 6000 men were made 
prisoners ; and among the captured were 
General Ewell himself, and four othei 
general officers. The National loss in 
this encoimter at Sailor's Creek, was 
about 1000, in killed and wounded. 

The National victory at Sailor's 
Creek, might have been less easily 
won — it would certainly have been less 
decisive — if the movements of the 
Second corps had been conducted with 
less energy. Following, as we have seen, 
right in the rear of the retreating Con- 
federates, Humphreys never gave them 
a moment's rest, until, at evening, he 
crowded them together, at Sailor's Creek. 
In the confusion which prevailed, when 
the Confederates thus found them- 
selves pressed on aU sides, Humphreys' 
men captured a large train, and many 
hundreds of prisoners, together with 
1 8 flags and several pieces of artillery. 



938 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAS, 



During the night of the 6th, and the 
morning of the 7th, Lee with the shat- 
tered remains of his once magnificent 
^p,.jj army, crossed the Appomattox, 

7 . by the bridges, a few miles east of 
Farmville. Resolved, if possible, to 
make the Appomattox an impassable 
bjirrier between himself and his pur- 
suers, he ordered the bridges to be 
destroyed. Humphreys, however, with 
the Second corps, was close upon his 
heels. The second span of the railroad 
bridge was already burning ; it was left 
to the mercy of the flames. The wagon- 
road bridge was just fired ; it was saved. 
Humphreys' troops were pushed across 
without much difficulty, Barton's divis- 
ion leading. The Confederates, who 
seemed to be posted in considerable 
force, on the heights on the opposite 
"de, disappeared as the Nationals ap- 
proached, leaving behind them several 
pieces of artillery. Ten guns had also 
been left on the south of the river. 
Signs were already abundant that Lee. 
and his whole army, brave and indoro ■. | 
able as they all were, could not miich 
longer hold out. Men and horses were 
sinking by the wayside from pure ex- 
haustion ; and thousands had let fall 
their muskets from sheer inability to 
carry them. Without food and sleep, 
more could not be expected from man 
or beast ; but neither food nor sl'^ep 
was to be granted them until the bii-ter 
end. The horrors of that march have 
not, perhaps, been equalled since the 
famous Moscow retreat. 

The impossibility of continuing the 
march westward began to be apparent 
to alL On the night of the 6th, when 



the army of Northern Virginia was 
well across the Appomattox, several of 
the chief officers of that army met 
around the bivouac fire, and consulted 
as to what it was best to do, in the cir 
cumstances. General Lee was not 
present. Three lines of conduct were 
suggested : — to disband, allowing the 
troops to make their way, as best they 
might, to some fixed rallying point ; to 
abandon the trains and cu* their way 
through the opposing lines ; or to sur- 
render. After a short consultation, it 
was agreed that two of the suggested 
lines of conduct were impracticable ; 
and the voice of the council was in 
favor of suiTender. General Pendleton 
was commissioned to communicate the 
result of theii deliberations to General 
Lee. The probability is that Lee's 
private opinion did not differ from that 
of his officers ; but, refusing to regard 
the situation as so desperate, he lent 
an apparently unvnlling ear to their 
advice. It would be time enough, he 
thought, to surrender when he had abso- 
lutely no other choice. He was not yet 
reduced to that extremity. Pendleton 
was still with his chief, when the con- 
versation was broken short by the loud 
thunders of artillery — sounds which too 
plainly told that the relentless and un- 
tiring pursuer was again upon the 
track. In his determination not to 
surrender, Lee was, no doubt, encour- 
aged by the fact that Davis and his 
colleagues were at Danville, and mak- 
ing strenuous efforts to reorganize the 
government. Lee was still aware thai 
the Confederate authorities — if such 
authorities could be said now to exist — 



PEINCE EDWARD GOUET HOUSE. 



929 



had no intention as yet of giving up 
the contest ; and he was hardly to be 
blamed — especially when we remember 
that he was the most trusted and hon- 
ored man in the Confederacy — if he was 
unwilling to incur the odium of aban- 
doning the sinking vessel, while a sin- 
gle ray of hope remained. 

The army of Northern Virginia, or 
rather what remained of that once mag- 
nificent organization, was now concen- 
trated, in a strong position, some four 
or five miles north of Farmville, and 
covering both the stage and plank 
roads. The ground in front, which was 
open, and gently sloping downwards in 
the direction of Appomattox, was cov- 
ered with intrenchments and batteries. 
Humphreys, as soon as he had crossed 
the river with the Second corps, re- 
newed the pursuit. Barlow, with the 
first division, moved in the direction 
of Farmville, which the Confederates, 
on his approach, abandoned, after firing 
the bridges, and destroying 130 wagons. 
Humphreys, himself, with the divisions 
of Miles and De Trobriand, making a 
more direct pursuit, soon found nimself 
confronted by Lee's army in its in- 
trenched position. He saw at a glance 
how vain it would be to make any at- 
iempt in front. Having sent instruc- 
tions to Barlow to come up without 
delay, he proceeded to execute a flank 
movement, in the hope of dislodging his 
antagonist. He soon discovered that 
bis own lines were outflanked by those 
of the Confederates, both on the right 
and on the left ; nor was he any longer 
a doubt that he had in front of him 
all that remained of the army of North- 



ern Virginia. Extending his right the 
length of one division, Humphreys 
ordered Miles to make an attack with 
three regiments. Miles made a bold 
and vigorous attempt ; but he was com 
pelled to fall back, with a loss of over 
600 men in killed and wounded. Among 
the former were General Smyth* and 
Major Mills. Among the latter were 
Generals Mott, Madill and McDougall, 
as also Colonel Starbird, of the Nine- 
teenth Maine. It was night before Bar- 
low caii^e up ; and it was agreed not to 
repeat tne assault until the morning. 

On the morning of the 7th, Sheridan 
had despatched two mounted divisions 
under Merritt, to Prince Edward Court 
House. The remaining division of his 
cavalr)^, commanded by Crook, he sent 
to Farmville. The bridges having been 
destroyed at Farmville, Crook's troop- 
ers were compelled to wade the stream 
— a task which was not accomplished 
without considerable difficulty. On 
the north side of the Appomattox, they 
fell upon a body of Confederate infan- 
try who were guarding a wagon-train. 
A sharp skirmish ensued. The Con- 
federates, however, were greatly in the 

* BkIGADCEB-QBITBRAI. ThOKAS a. SltTTH -WM 

bom in Ireland. At aK early age he came to the 
United States, and settled at Wilmington, Del., be- 
ooming engaged in course of time in the coach-build- 
Ing business. When the war broke out, he recruited 
a company in Wilmington. Proceeding thence to 
Philadelphia, he joined a three months' regiment, 
then leaving for the Shenandoah VaUey. On his 
return home, a Delaware regiment was just about to 
proceed to the seat of war. Smyth accepted the post 
of major. He rose gradually, becoming successively 
lioutenantcolonel, and colonel, until finally he was 
promoted to tlie rank of brigadier-general, for his 
bravery at Cold Harbor. In the engafr.ment neai 
Farmville. where he received his death wound, he com 
manded the second division of the Second army corps. 



&30 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR 



maj^^iity ; and Crook, after an effectual 
effor*" to dislodge the enemy, found it 
necessary to fall back. In this stmg- 
gle, General Gregg, one of liis brigade 
commanders, was surrounded and cap- 
tured. On Ms arrival at Prince Edward 
Court House, Sheridan, who marched 
with the command of Merritt, found 
General McKenzie, with his division of 
cavalry from the army of the James, 
and ordered him to cross the bridge on 
the Buffalo River, and make a recon- 
noissance in the direction of Prospect 
Station, on the Lynchburg Railroad. 
Information had, in the meantime, been 
received from Crook, that the Confed- 
erate army had crossed to the north 
bank of the Appomattox. Resolved 
to outrun Lee, and to interpose between 
his army and Lynchburg, Sheridan 
ordered Merritt to push forward and 
encamp at Buffalo River, and, at the 
same time, sent instructions to Crook 
to recross the Appomattox and encamp 
at Prospect Station. 

Such was the general situation, at 
nightfall on the 7th. On that same 
evening, and immediately after the re- 
pulse of Miles, as before described, Lee 
received the following letter : — 

" April tth, 1865. 
"Qbiteral: The result of the last week 
must convince you of the hopelessness of fur- 
ther resistance on the part of the Army of 
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that 
it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from 
myself the responsibility of any further effusion 
of blood, by asking of you the surrender of 
that portion of the Confederate States army 
known as the Army of Northern Virginia. 

" U. S. Geant, Lieut-QeneraL 
" Genwal E. B. Lbb." 



To this letter Lee wrote an immedi- 



ate answer : but it was not until 



April 



the following morning that it 8. 
reached Grant at Farmville. It waa 
oOuched in these words : — 

" April 7th, 1865. 

" Genebal : I have received your note Oi 
this date. Though not entertaining the opin- 
ion you express of the hopelessness of further 
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid 
useless eflFusion of blood, and, therefore, before 
considering your proposition, ask the terms 
you will offer, on condition of its surrender. 

" R. E. Lee, General. 

" Lieut.-General U. S. Gbant." 

On the instant Grant replied as 

follows : — 

" April Sth, 1865. 

" General : Your note of last evening, in 
reply to mine of same date, asking the condi- 
tion on which I will accept the surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, is just re- 
ceived. In reply, I would say that peace being 
my first desire, there is but one condition that 
I insist upon, viz. : That the men surrendered 
shall be disqualified for taking up arms against 
the government of the United States until 
properly exchanged. I will meet yon, or des- 
ignate oflBcers to meet any officers you may 
name for the same purpose, at any point agree- 
able to you, for the purpose of arranging defi- 
nitely, the terms upon which the surrender ol 
the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. 
" U. S. Grant, Lieut.-6eneral. 

" General R. E. Lee." 

We left Lee in a strongly intrenched 
position, a few miles to the north of 
the Appomattox. As soon as he in- 
dited his reply to Grant's first message, 
he resumed his retreat under cover of 
the darkness ; and so quietly waa it con 
ducted that Humphreys waa ignorant 
of the fact, until morning, when he was 
prepared to renew the attack. Lee's 



GRANT SUGGESTS TERMS OF SURRENDER. 



931 



skilful generalship was again conspicu- 
ously revealed. Ever vigilant, ever fer- 
tile in resource, and ever active, he had 
again put miles between himself and 
his pursuers. The fact that Lee had 
retreated during the night was at once 
made known to Grant, who immediate- 
ly gave orders for the renewal of the 
pursuit. The Second and Sixth corps, 
ander the immediate direction of Meade, 
w^ho was accompanied by the General- 
in-chief, were pushed forward with all 
possible haste along the north bank of 
the Appomattox. Sheridan, mean- 
while, had made excellent use both of 
his troopers and of his time. Lee was 
pressing along that gradually narrow- 
ing neck of land which Kes between the 
head waters of the Appomattox and the 
affluents of the James. It was of the 
utmost importance that Sheridan should 
be able to interpose his troops between 
Lee's ai-my and Lynchbtirg. If he 
could close the outlet in the direction 
of that city, it would be all ovej v^th 
Lee, pursued closely as he was by the 
Second and Sixth corps, under the direc- 
tion of Meade and the General-in -chief. 
This was precisely what Sheridan was 
aiming at, and what, within a few 
hours, he actually did accomplish. Hav- 
ing learned from one of his scouts, 
early on the morning of the 8th, that 
four trains of cars, with supplies for 
Lee's army, were at Appomattox Sta- 
tion, he at once notified Merritt and 
Crook, and briskly pushed the whole 
command towards that point. Lee was 
not ignorant of the extreme peril of his 
situation ; but he kept pressing eagerly 
forward, still clinging to the skirts of 



hope, and, in spite of almost irresistiblfl 
evidence to the contrary, indulging the 
thought that he might yet find refuge 
among the ranges of the Blue Ridge, 
beyond Lynchburg. In these circum 
stances he received Grant's second let 
ter, and replied as follows : 

" April 8th, 1865. 

" Gexekal : I received at a late hour youj 
note of to-day. In mine of yesterday, I did 
not intend to propose the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the! 
terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do* 
not think the emergency has arisen to call for 
the surrender of this army ; but as the restora- 
tion of peace should be the sole object of all, I 
desire to know whether your proposals would 
tend to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you 
with a view to surrender the Army of Northern 
Virginia ; but so far as your proposition may 
affect the Confederate States forces under my 
command, and tend to the restoration of peace, 
I should be pleased to meet you at ten, a.m., 
to-morrow, on the old stage-road to Richmond, 
between the picket-lines of the two armies. 

"R. E.Lee, General 

"Lieut. -General U. S. Grant." 

This note was received by Grant about 
midnight ; and he replied next morn- 
ing in the following terms : 

" April dth, 1865. 

" General : Your note of yesterday is re- 
ceived. As I have no authority to treat on the 
subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten 
A.M., to-day, could lead to no good. I will 
state, however. General, that I am equally 
anxious for peace with yourself; and the whole 
North entertain the same feeling. The terms up- 
on which peace can be had are well understood. 
By the South laying down their arms they will 
hasten that most desirable event, save thousands 
of human lives, and hundreds of millions of 
property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping 
that all our difficulties may be settled, without 
the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, 

" U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-GeneraL 

" General R. E. Lee." 



tfS% 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



As soon as he had finished this let- 
ter, Grant left Meade in charge of the 
Second and Sixth corps and hurried on 
to join Sheridan and Griffin. While 
the letter was on its way, and before 
the General-in-chief had joined the one 
01 the other, further parley had become 
unnecessary. Sheridan had already 
settled the question. On the morning 
of the 8th, after a forced march of 
about 30 miles, his advance, under 
Custer, had leached Ajjpomattox Sta- 
tion, about four miles to the south of 
A.ppomattox Court House. Lee's van- 
guard had jusi arrived with four trains 
of cars, laden vpith supplies. Custer, 
with lightning-Kke rapidity dashed up- 
on the rear of the trains, and captured 
them. Supported by Devin, who had 
come up, he then rushed with fierce 
energy on the vanguard, and drove it 
back to Appomattox Court House, near 
which was the main body of Lee's 
army. Twenty-five guns, a hospital 
train, a large number of additional 
wagons, with many prisoners, were 
captured by the National cavalry. 
Sheridan, hurrying forward with the 
remainder of his command, flung him- 
self across the line of Lee's retreat, 
with the determination of holding his 
ground at any and every risk until the 
morning, when, he knew, he would be 
joined by Ord, and the army of the 
James, and by Giiffin vrith the Fifth 
3orp8. He knew also that by that time, 
Meade, with the Second and Sixth corps, 
would be well forward and able to faU 
with effect on the Confederate rear. 
Such was the situation of affairs on the 
night of the 8tL Lee was completely 



cut off from his own line of retreat 
Brave and resolute to the last, and be- 
lieving that he had nothing but cavalry 
in front of him, he decided to make an 
attempt, at least, to cut through Sheri- 
dan's lines. 

Early on the morning of the 9th 
Lee was ready to carry out his purpose 
His heart, however, must have ^pri] 
bled vrithin him, when he looked 9 . 
around him, and beheld the wretched 
remnant of what was once the proud 
and invincible army of Northern Vir 
ginia. It consisted of two thin lines — 
t'^e one composed of what was left of 
Hill's, now Gordon's command, the 
other of the wreck of Longstreet's 
corps. Between these lines were the 
debris of the wagon-train, and some 
thousands of miserable creatures who 
were too weak to carry arms. Lee 
gave orders to Gordon to cut his way 
through, at all hazards. The charge 
was made with tremendous energy. 
Such, in ti-uth, was the violence of the 
shock, and so persistent was the pres- 
sure, that Sheridan's men who had dis- 
mounted to resist the attack, were 
forced back. At this critical moment, 
Sheridan, who had been to Appomattox 
Station for the purpose of hurrying for- 
ward Ord, arrived on the scene of action. 
Knowing well the purpose of the en- 
emy, and keenly alive to the value of 
time, he directed his troopers to fall 
back gradually, but to continue to offer 
a firm and steady resistance, so as to 
allow Ord, with his infantry, to come 
up and form his lines. This done, they 
were to move to the right and mount. 
Sheridan's orders were adjnirably 



GRANT AND LEB AT MoLEAN'S HOUSE. 



933 



executed. As soon as the cavalry moved 
towards their own right, the Confed- 
erates beheld to their amazement, the 
glittering arms and serried ranks of the 
infantry. The unlooked for vision had 

11 the effect of a stunning and unex- 
pected blow. The Confederates imme- 
diately discontinued their pressure, and 
began to give way. The National in- 
fantry were now pressing upon the 
confused and bewildered multitude. 
Sheridan had ridden round to the Con- 
federate left flank ; his bagi»H bad 
sounaed the order to remount ; and he 
was just about to fall with all his weight 
on the already disordered mass, when 
a flag of truce was presented to Custer 
who led the advance. Sheridan rode 
to Appomattox Court House, where 
he was met by General Gordon and 
General Wilcox. Gordon asked for a 
suspension of hostilities, and informed 
Sheridan that Grant and Lee were, 
even now, making arrangements for the 
surrender of the army of Northern Vir- 
ginia. There was no more fighting 
between the two great rival armies — 
the army of the Potomac and the army 
of Northern Virginia. 

On the morning of the 9th, a heavy 
fog enveloped the entire country around 
Appomattox Court House. Long be- 
fore that fog dispersed, Lee, clad in a 
new gray uniform, might have been 
seen at a camp-fire with Mahone and 
Longstreet. Care and anxiety were 
written on each of their countenances. 

^ongstreet, his arm in a sling, and a 
cigar in his mouth, sat on the trunk of 
a felled tree. Gordon had been sent 
on his mission. It was agreed that if 

319 



success were denied him there was no 
longer any chance of ef^jape. Of Gor- 
don's failure to penetrate the National 
lines, they were soon made aware. Lee 
mounted his horse. " General Long 
street," he said, " I leave you in charge 
I am going to hold a conference with 
General Grant." He then rode off. On 
his way he received Grant's letter, be- 
fore quoted. He replied immediately : 

" April 9, 1865. 

'•General: I received yoar note of this 
morning, on the picket-line, whither I had come 
to meet you, and ascertain definitely what 
terms were embraced in your proposition of 
yesterday, with reference to the surrender of 
this army. I now ask an interview, in accord- 
ance with the offer contained in your letter ol 
yesterday for that pcrpose. 

" R. E. Lee, General. 

" Lieut-General U. S. Grant." 

To this Grant replied as follows : 

" April 9th, 1865. 

" General : Your note of this date is but 
this moment (11.50 a.m.) received. In conse- 
quence of my having passed from the Rich- 
mond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville 
and Lynchburg road, I am at this writing, 
about four miles west of Walter's Church, and 
will push forward to the front for the purpose 
of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this 
road, where you wish the interview to take 
place, will meet me. 

"U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

" General R. E. Lee." 

The scene and the main features of the 
interview have been preserved for us by 
an eye-witness. It took place at the 
house of Mr. Wilmer McLean — a square 
brick building surrounded with roses, 
violets, and daffodils. Grant — with his 
slouched hat, dark blue frock-coat un. 
buttoned and covered -Vrith mud, gray 



^34. 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



pantaloons tucked in his soiled boots, 
and a dark waistcoat, and with nothing 
to indicate his rank, except the double 
row of brass buttons and the three silver 
stars — walked up to the house, accom- 
panied by Ord, Sheridan, and their re- 
spective staffs. Lee had already ar- 
rived ; and his blooded iron-gray horse, 
'in charge of an orderly, was nibbling at 
the grass. Grant and two aids entered 
the house ; the othera who accompanied 
him, sat down on the porch. Lee was 
standing beside a table, wearing a bright 
bluish-gray imiform, a military hat, with 
a gold cord, buckskin gauntlets, high 
riding-boots, and the splendid dress- 
sword which had been presented to 
him by the State of Virginia. Tall 
and erect, he had a fine soldierly bear- 
ing. It was noticed that his hair was 
long and gray. He was attended only 
by Colonel Marshall, his chief of staff. 
On Grant's entrance the two shook 
hands, sat down and proceeded to busi- 
ness. As Lee made no special request, 
Grant at once wrote out his terms : 

" Appomattox Court Housb, ) 
April 9, 1865. \ 

"Gknebal: Id accordance with the sub- 
stance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I 
propose to receive the surrender of the Army 
of Northern Virginia on the following terms, 
to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be 
made in duplicate, one copy to be giren to an 
officer designated by me, the other to be re- 
tained by such officers as you may designate. 
The officers to give their individual paroles, not 
to taKe up arms against the government of the 
United States until properly exchanged, and 
each company or regimental commander to sign 
alike parole fo. the men of his command. The 
irms. artillery, and public property to be parked 
»nd stacked, and turned over to the officers ap- 
Dointed by me to receive them. This will not 



embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor theii 
private horses or baggage. This done, each 
officer and man will be allowed to return to his 
home, not to be disturbed by United States 
authority so long a,s they observe their paroles 
and the laws in force where they may reside. 
" U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General 
" General R. E. Lee." 

The following is Lee's letter of ac 
ceptance : 

" Headquarters Army of Northern ) 
Virginia, April 9, 1865. \ 

"General: I have received your letter oi 
this date, containing the terms of the surrender 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed 
by you. As they are substantially the same as 
those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., 
they are accepted. I will proceed to designate 
the proper officers to carry the stipulations 
into effect. 

" R. E. Leb, General. 
" Lieut.-General U. S. Grant." 

The signatures had just been at- 
tached, when Lee, after a moment's 
reflection, said that he had forgotten 
one thing. Many of the cavalry and 
artillery horses belonged to the men 
who had charge of them. It was too 
late, however, to speak of that now. 
Grant replied, " I will instruct my pa- 
rolling officers that all tke enlisted men 
of your cavalry and artillery, who own 
horses are to retain them, just as the 
officers do theirs. They will need them 
for their spring ploughing, and other 
farm work." Lee seemed greatly 
pleased with Grant's prompt com- 
pliance with his only half-expressed 
wish. " General," he said earnestly, 
" there is nothing which you could 
have accomplished more for the good 
of the people or of the government." 

Grant's terms were in the last de 
gree magnanimous and liberaL They 



ThjtiJ uJSiOJS SAVED. 



935 



revealed ii')bility of soul and delicacy of 
sentiment on the part of the conqueror 
who granted them, on the pai"t of the 
government which sanctioned them, 
and on the part of the people who 
gave them their approval. The agree- 
ment was such as sufficiently sustained 
the dignity of those who had triumphed 
without unnecessarily wounding the 
feelings of those who had been van- 
quished. It was one of the grandest 
examples yet given to the world of the 
refining and softening influences of 
modern civilization- -an example which 
contrasted strangely and strikingly with 
the barbai'ous habits of the past. Gen- 
eral Grant will live in history as a great 
soldier ; he will be remembered also as 
a high-souled hero in the hour of vic- 
tory. If battles must still be fought, 
blood be shed, and valuable lives sacri- 
ficed, it is gi-atifying to think that 
cruelty, under the guise of justice, is no 
longer to be a necessary adjunct of 
party, sectional, or national triumph. 

After the sun-ender, Lee rode back 
to his troops to bid them farewell. His 
reception was a something unparalleled, 
in such circumstances " Whole lines of 
battle," says an eye-witness, " rushed up 
to their beloved old chief, and choking 
with emotion, struggled vrith each other 
to wring him once more by the hand. 
Men who had fought throughout the 
war, and knew what the agony and hu- 
miliation of the moment must be to 
him, strove with a refinement of un- 
selfishness and tenderness, which he 
alone could fully appreciate, to lighten 
his burden and mitigate his pain. With 
tears pouring down both cheeks. Gen- 



eral Lee, at length, c»>m!'>^anded voice 
enough to say : ' Men, 'T'* have fought 
thi'ough the war together. I have done 
the best that I could for you.' Not an 
eye that looked on that scene was dry." 
On the 12th of April, three d-tys after 
the surrender, the Confederate" march- 
ed by divisions to an appointed place in 
the neighborhood of Appomattox Court 
House, and stacked their arms and de 
posited their accoutrements. Of nearly 
28,000 men, only about 8000 had mus 
kets in theii- hands. Among the sur 
rendered property there were 30 cannoi 
and 350 wagons. Paroles were distri 
buted to the men ; and the army o' 
Northern Virginia passed out of exist 
ence. The war was now practically 
ended. It was impossible for the othei 
armies for any length of time to prolong 
the struggle. The army of Noithera 
Virginia — as Swinton, at the close of his 
masterly history of the army of tht 
Potomac, puts it — was the " keystone ' 
of the Confederate structure. The key 
stone removed, the structure fell with 
"a resounding crash." 

A year, all but three weeks, had 
elapsed since Grant crossed the Rapidan. 
It had been one of the severest and 
most protracted campaigns on record 
When it commenced, Lee had undei 
him 65,000 men. We have seen what 
a miserable remnant was left. Between 
the Rapidan and Appomattox Court 
House, Grant lost, as nearly as possible, 
in killed, wounded and missing 100,000 
men — an enormous sacrifice ; but it 
saved the Union, and perpetuated the 
Republic. 

It was natural, that, in the circum 



936 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



stances, there should be great joy all 
over the North. The secretary of war 
issued the following order : 

" That a salute of two hundred guns be fired, 
t the head-quarters of every army, and at 
Yery post and arsenal in the United States, 
nd at the Military Academy at West Point, 
n the day of the receipt of this order, in com- 
memoration of the surrender of General R. E. 
Lee and the army of Northern Virginia, to 
Lieutenant-General Grant and the army under 
hie command — report of the receipt and exe- 
cution of this order to be made to the Adju- 
tant-General at Washington." 

These orders were gladly obeyed ; 
and In addition to the demonstrations 
thus brought about, there were public 
and voluntary rejoicings in every town- 
ship and every city throughout the 
Noi-thern States. 

On the day of the siirrender of Gen- 
ral Lee, President Lincoln returned to 
Washington. He had been for some 
tlays at City Point, where, as has been 
mentioned in a previous chapter, he 
had a conference with Generals Grant 
and Sherman, and Admiral Porter. 
After the occupation of Richmond, by 
the National troops, Lincoln, on board 
the Malvern, Porter's flag-ship, moved 
up the James. Leaving the Malvern 
near Rocketts, the president and the 
admiral proceeded to Richmond in the 
oi^mmander's gig. Lincoln's reception 
*ras most cordial, the emancipated slaves 
crowding around him to such an ex- 
tent, that a file of soldiers had to be 
called in, to clear the way. Halting 
for a time, and resting at Weitzel's 
quarters, he entered an open carriage 
and rode rapidly through the principal 
sti'eets, and was soon again on board. 



and on his way back to City Point He 
visited Richmond again on the 6th of 
April, two days later, and granted per- 
mission to the Vu'ginia Legislature to 
assemble, on the understanding that 
the members would adopt measures for 
the withdrawal of the Virginia troops 
and all other obstructions, which might 
tend to hinder the action of the general 
government. In a few days, however, 
it was discovered that the gentlemen of 
the State Legislature of Virginia were 
abusing their privilege ; and almost im 
mediately after his return to Washing 
ton, Lincoln directed Weitzel to revoke 
the safeguard which he had granted 
them, and to allow said gentlemen to 
return to private life. Th'3 return ol 
the president to the National capital, 
associated as that return wa/4, with a 
crowning National victory, was made 
the occasion of great rejoicing and fes 
tivity. Each successive day had its 
special excitement. On the 11th, Lin- 
coln issued two proclamations — one 
declaring that certain ports in the 
Southern States 'vould be closed until 
further notice, and another, demanding 
for vessels of the United States, in 
foreign ports, those privileges and im 
munities which, during the war, had 
been denied, on the plea that equai 
rights had to be accorded to each belli- 
gerent. In the evening the city was 
illuminated. At the Executive Man 
sion, which was especially brilliant with 
light, the president addressed a larg 
assemblage of citizens. He spoke hope- 
fully and encouragingly regarding the 
future, and set forth his views regard- 
ing the reconstruction of the South. It 



ASSASSINATION OF LINCOLN. 



93? 



« U) noticed there was nothing like bit- 

ttjness or ill-feeling towards the, now 

ad but subjugated, foe. There were 

no 8 iggestions of vengeance, retaliation, 

or punishment of any kind. It was a 

peech which revealed a heart full of 

oy and satisfaction, because a great 

od destructive war was all but ended, 

and because the sunshine of peace was 

about to rest upon the entire country 

and people. All this joy, howevor, was 

soon to be clouded. The last sad act 

of the protracted drama had yet to be 

witnessed. 

The 14th day of April, 1865, is des- 
tined to immortal memory in the history 
of the United States. On that day, 
with imposing solemnities. General 
Anderson hoisted over Fort Sumter the 
same old flag which, four years before, 
he hitd taken down and stowed away in 
hope of its future usefulness. This 
Btory^ however, has aiready been told 
in its proper place. It wao a gladsome 
day throughout the reputi'c; and pre- 
parations were being maur over the 
length and breadth of the land for a day 
of National thanksgiving. On the 
morning of the 14th, General Grant 
amved in Washington. He was ac- 
companied by Captain Robert Lincoln, 
the president's son, one of his staflf 
officers. A Cabinet council was held 
at eleven o'clock. General Grant was 
present. Lincoln, it was observed, was 
in excellent spirits. Although not ig- 
norant of the reports which were in 
circulation as to the existence of a con- 
spiracy which threatened not only his 
awn kte, out the lives of all the princi- 
pal membera of the government, as well 



as those of Grant and Sherman, he 
seemed to have no forebodings of evil 
Delighted at the course events had 
taken, and pleased with the prospect of 
peace, his conversation turned chiefly 
on the policy of conciliation to be pur- 
sued towards the South. At the close 
of the Cabinet meeting, he made an ar- 
rangement with General Grant to visit 
Ford's Theatre in the evening; and a 
box was immediately eng^iged. The 
news spread like wild-fire ; and when 
the doors were opened, the theatie was 
speedily crowded in every part. The 
play for the night was " Our American 
Cousin." Between eight and nine 
o'clock the presidential party arrived. 
It consisted of Lincoln himself, Mrs. 
Lincoln, Miss Clara Hams, daughter 
of Senator Ira Hai-ris, and Major H. R 
Rathbone. General Grant, it was ob- 
served, was not with them. He had, it 
was afterwards learned, been summoned 
to New York on important and press- 
ing business. The box, prepared for 
and occupied by the party, was in the 
second tier. AJong its spacious front 
was draped the American flag. 

It was now a few minutes after ten 
o'clock. The performance was drawing 
to a close. The attention of the 
audience was completely absorbed. All 
of a sudden, there was heard the sharp 
crack of a pistol. The sound came 
from the president's box. At the same 
instant, there appeared, in front of that 
box, a man, who, brandishing a gleam 
ing dagger, exclaimed "Sic semper 
pyrannia " — so may it be always with 
tyrants — the motto engraven on the 
seal of the State of Virginia Placing 



!^ 



»38 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



his hand on the rail, he sprang from 
the box towards the stage. In his 
descent, one of his spurs — for he was 
booted and spurred on the occasion — 
becoming entangled in the folds of the 
National flag, his leap was broken ; and 
he fell heavily on the floor. Quickly 
pringing to his feet, but showing that 
he was severely injured, especially in 
one of his legs, he again brandished hfe 
weapon in the face of the excited and 
bewildered audience^ and shouted " The 
South is avenged." Rushing to the 
rear of the stage he disappeared, before 
either actors or audience could recover 
themselves or realize what had hap- 
pened. So sudden was the whole affair, 
that it almost seemed as if it formed an 
incident in the play. It was far other- 
wise. The play had become a real 
tragedy. A foul mui'der had been com- 
mitted. The murdered man was Pres- 
ident Lincoln. The assassin was John 
Wilkes Booth. 

Booth was an actor by profession, 
and well acquainted with the building. 
He was well known, also, to all the em- 
ployes, and had no difficulty in gaining 
admission to any part of the house. It 
appeared that immediately before the 
tragedy occurred, he passed near the 
box in which were seated the president 
ind his friends. Presenting a card to 
Mr. Lincoln's messenger he looked, for 
I minute, upon the orchestra and the 
Audience. Then, entering the vestibule 
at the box, he fastened the door with a 
piece of plank, which had evidently 
been provided previously for the pur- 
pose, the object being to make it 
impossible to open the door from with- 



out. Pulling a Derringer pistol froro 
one pocket with his right hand, and a 
dagger from another pocket with hie 
left, he moved into the box, quietly 
and unobserved. The entire party 
were absorbed in the perfonnance 
The president was leaning fo:-ward, 
holding aside the curtain with his left 
hand, his head being turned slightly 
towards the audience. Holding his 
pistol over the back of the president's 
chair. Booth fired. The ball entered 
behind Mr. Lincoln's left ear, passed 
through the brain and lodged behind 
the right eye. The head fell forward ; 
and the eyes closed. He lived for nine 
hours afterwards ; but he was never 
again conscious. Major Rathbone 
startled by the sound of the pistol 
and seeing what had happened, sprang 
upon the assassin ; but Booth, dropping 
his pistol, swung his dagger, inflicting 
a severe wound on the major's left arm, 
and then leaped over the rail. Such 
was the end of Abraham Lincoln — the 
beloved of the people, the emancipator 
of the slave, the man who, of all others, 
was best fitted for the high but delicate 
and difficult position which he held 
during the stormiest period of his 
country's history. His four years of 
unceasing toil and agony saved the 
Union. His life-blood, thus ruthlessly 
shed, sealed it and made it perpetual. 
His name will ever remain one of the 
greatest in American history ; and 
while Washington, to latest ages, will 
be spoken of as the Father, LincolD 
will be remembered as the Saviour of 
his country. 

The death of Lincoln filled the natioc 



ATTEMPT O^J rtlE LIFE OF SEWARD. 



93S 



with woe. and covered it with sack- 
cloth. Every one felt as if he had lost 
a personal friend. No one felt the 
blow more than Stanton, the stem and 
unbending secretary-of-war. Leaning 
Dver the body of the dead president, 
and overwhelmed ^vith grief, he mourn- 
fully said, " No one will ever know the 
anxious hours that you and I have 
spent together. You were my only 
witness. Now, you are gone, and I am 
left alone." Lincoln's funeral in many 
[larticulars was, perhaps, unprecedented 
in modern times. The body having been 
embalmed lay, in state, in the East 
Room of the White House. On the 
19th of April, after the funeral services, 
the remains were removed thence by 
way of BaltiBiore, Philadelphia, New 
'^ jrk, and Albany, to Springfield, Illi- 
'lois, where they were interred. In each 
of those cities multitudes crowded to 
look on the face of the dead president ; 
and it is but truth to say, that the 
entire people of the Noiih were mourn- 
ers on the occasion. No chief-mler of 
any people — no monarch in all the past 
— was ever more loved in life, or more 
honored in death. His grave is now, 
and ever will be, a point of attraction, 
not only to the American people, in 
whose sei-vice he lost his life, but to 
liberty-loving pilgrims from all lands. 
He died a martyr to liberty. His mur- 
der made his name immortaL 

On the same evening on which 
Lincoln was shot, a murderous assault 

vas made on Mr. Seward, the secretary. 

.f-state. Although the assassin, in 
this case, was less successful in the 
accomplishment of his purpose, the 



enterprise was (pxite as daring, and 
revealed, equally with the other, the 
foul character of the conspiracy, and 
the villainous methods, as well as des- 
perate energy, of its agents. Mr. 
Seward, a few days before, h?A been 
thrown from his caniage, and waB, 
in consequence, confined to his bed- 
room. About the same time that the 
tragedy occurred in the theatre, a mar 
called at Mr. Seward's house. On 
being refused admittance, he rushed 
past the porter and flew up two flights 
of stairs straight to Mr. Seward's room. 
At the door of that room, he was met 
and resisted by the secretary's son, Mr. 
Frederick William Seward. With the 
butt-end of his pistol, he struck the 
younger Seward to the floor, fracturing 
his skull. Then, pushing aside Miss 
Seward, who had been attracted by the 
noise, he rushed into the sick-room, 
sprang upon the bed, and inflicted som 
fearful wounds on Mr. Seward's face 
and neck. An invalid soldier named 
Kobinson, who was in attendance on 
Mr. Seward, seized the assassin from 
behind, and struggled with him ; while 
Mr. Seward himself, his arm in a sling, 
and the blood atreaming from his gaping 
woimds, resisted with what energy he 
could command. Meanwhile the cry 
of " Murder ! " rang through the house ; 
and the assassin becoming alanred, and 
shaking himself free of Robinson, made 
hLs way down stairs and into the opcE 
street. Mounting a horse which wa« 
there waiting for him, he was soon out 
of sight. The assassin, in this case, was 
Lewis Payne PowelL He was the son 
of a Florida clergyman ; and he had 



940 



THE LAST DAYS OP THE WAIt. 



served in the war. He belonged to 
the same gang with Booth. 

The principal agents of the conspiracy 
were afterwards captured and brought 
U) trial. Summary justice was dealt 
out to Booth, He was shot and killed 
by his pursuers in a tobacco-barn, at 
Garrett's Farm, some 20 miles below 
Fredericksburg. Harold, who was 
with Booth when he was shot ; Mrs. 
Surratt, who had harbored the con- 
spirators; Atzerott, who had been 
appointed to kill Vice-President John- 
son ; and Payne wno made the attack 
on Mr. Seward — all these were found 
guilty and executed on the 6th of July. 
Several other conspirators — among 
them Dr. Mudd, who set Booth's broken 
limb — were sentenced to imprisonment 
for longer or shorter terms. It was 
suspected, at the time, that the conspii"- 
acy had the encouragement of some of 
the Confederate leaders. This suspi- 
cion has not been justified by any facts, 
hitherto made public. 

The assassination of the president, 
painful as the blow was felt to be by 
the whole people, did not, in any seri- 
ous way, disorganize the government 
machine or impede its working. 
Within six hours after Lincoln's death, 
Andrew Johnson, the vice-president, 
was sworn into office as president. Mr. 
Johnson on taking the chair of 
Washington, and assuming the reins of 
government, requested the members of 
the cabinet to retain their offices. The 
tide of affairs thus rolled on, neither 
checked nor diverted by what had 
happened. 

The reader must now return with us 



to Goldsboro, where we left the army 
of General Sherman, resting, and pre- 
paring for another march which, it 
was hoped, would result in the destruc 
tion or capture of the Confederate army 
under General Johnston. In a previous 
chapter, we have given an account of 
the visit made to City Point by Gen- 
eral Sherman, and of the interview 
which he there had with President 
Lincoln and with General Grant. 
While at City Point, Sherman obtained 
peiTnission from Grant to make some 
radical changes in the organization of 
his forces. On his return to Goldsboro, 
he proceeded at once to the work of 
reconstruction. His left wing he con- 
stituted a distinct army, under the 
title of "the Army of Georgia," 
and entrusted it to the command of 
General Slocum. This army consisted 
of two corps, which were commanded 
respectively by Jeff. C. Davis and Jos. 
A. Mower. The Tenth and Twenty- 
Third corps he named " the Army of 
the Ohio," and placed it under the com- 
mand of General Schofield. The corps 
commanders of General Schofield's 
army were J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry. 
These changes were considered neces- 
sary for various reasons, but mainly for 
the purpose of discipline and efficiency 
in the entire command ; and they were 
made, as we have seen, with the con- 
sent and approval of General Grant 
Sherman had thus, under his direc 
command, three sepaiate armies — the 
army of the Tennessee, under Howard 
the army of Georgia, under Slocum 
and the army of the Ohio, under Scho 
field. Howard was on the right ; Slocuic 



SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON— CORRESPONDENCE. 



941 



w&a on the left ; Schofield was in the 
centre. The cavalry force was under 
the immediate dii-ection of Kilpatrick. 
The effective strength of the entire 
command was 88,948. Of this force 
2443 belonged to the artillery, and 
5537 to the cavalry. 

Sherman's preparations were not 
completed when, on the 6th of April, 
he learned of the victory which had 
been won at Five Forks, and of the 
subsequent evacuation of Richmond 
and Petersburg. Wisely judging that 
Lee would attempt to effect a junction 
with Johnston, he countermanded the 
orders which had already been given, 
and made arrangements to march di- 
rectly on Johnston's army, which was 
at Smithfield, some 35,000 strong. On 
the 10th, Sherman's entire army was 
in motion, towards the point indicat- 
ed. The left wing, supported by the 
centre, moved on the two direct roads, 
leading to Smithfield and Raleigh. 
Howard moved more tc the right, 
feigning the Weldon road Teriy and 
Kilpatrick pushed along the west bank 
9f the Neuse River, in the same general 
direction. Smithfield was reached on 
the 11th, when it was found that John- 
ston had retreated with his whole army 
towards Raleigh, and that he had 
burned the bridges in his rear. The 
bridges, of course, had to be rebuilt — 
a task which consumed the remainder 
of that day. During the night, Sherman 
received a message from Grant, inform- 
ing him of the surrender of Lee and the 
array of Northern Virginia, at Appo- 
mattox Coiirt House. On the morning 
of the 12th, the joyful intelligence 



was communicated to the army, amid 
the wildest demonstrations of delight 
It was felt by all, that the war was April 
all but over. " Glory to God," 12. 
said Sherman, "and our country, and 
all honor to our comrades in arms, 
towards whom we are marchins:. A 
little more labor, a !ittle more toil on 
our part, the great race is won, and om 
government stands regenerated aftei 
four long years of war." 

The pui'suit was resumed on th« 
12th. On the evening of that day, 
Sherman was at GuUey's, ^vith the head 
o* Slocum's column. On the 13th, he 
entered Raleigh, and ordered the sever- 
al heads of column towards Ashville, 
in the direction of Salisbury or Char- 
lotte. It was feared by Sherman and, 
indeed, by all the ofiicers, that Johnston 
would retreat into the hill country of 
South Carolina and Georgia, break up 
his army into small bands, and thua 
indefinitely prolong the war. They 
were all desirous that the surrender oi 
that army should be secured on any 
reasonable terms. It was not, there- 
fore, without a feeling of grateful relief 
that Sherman, on the morning of the 
14th, and while still at Raleigh, April 
received from Johnston a note, 14. 
inquiring whether " in order to stop 
the further effusion of blood and 
devastation of property," he was willing 
to make a temporary suspension of 
active operations, and to communicate 
to General Grant the request that he 
would take like action in regard to 
other armies, the object being to per- 
mit the civil authorities to enter into 
the needful arrangements to terminate 



311 



d4a 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAB. 



tlie existing war. To this note, Sher- 
man replied as follows : 

" April 14th, 1865. 
"Qenkral: I have this moment receiyed 
jour communication of this date. I am fully 
empowered to arrange with you any term? for 
vhe suspension of further hostilities between 
the armies commanded by you and those com- 
m<inded by myself, and will be willing to con- 
er with you to that end. I will limit the 
advance of my main column, to-morrow, to 
Morrisville, and the cavalry to the University, 
and eipect that yon will also maintain the 
present position of your forces until each has 
notice of a failure to agree. That a basis of 
action may be had, I undertake to abide by the 
same terms and conditions as were made by 
Generals Grant and Lee, at Appomattox Court 
House, on the 9th inst., relative to our 
two armies ; and furthermore, to obtain from 
General Grant an order to suspend the move- 
ments of any troops from the direction of 
Virginia. General Stoneman is under my 
command, and my order will suspend any 
devastation or destruction contemplated by 
him. I will add that I really desire to save 
the people of North Carolina the damage they 
would sustain by the march of this army 
through the central or western parts of the 
State. 

" W. T. Shbbman, Major-GeneraL" 

On the 16 th, an answer was received 
from Johnston, agi'eeing to a meeting 
to be held, on the following day, at a 
point midway between the National 
advance at Durham's, and the Confed- 
erate rear at Hillsboro. At eight o'clock 
on the morning of the 17th, a car and a 
ipril locomotive were waiting to con- 
17. vey Sherman and his attendants 
to Durham's Station. The general was 
just entering the car when the tele- 
graph operator approached him in great 
haste, and informed him that he was 
just now receiving in cipher from 



Morehead City, a most important dee. jj 
patch, which, he thought, it might U " 
well for him to see. Sherman delayed 
the train, until the message was trans 
lated and written out. It was fr(iui 
the secretary-of-war ; and it conveyed 
the sad intelligence of the fate which 
had befallen President Lincoln, of the 
attack which had been made on Mr. 
Seward and his son, and of the suspi- 
cions that were entertained, that the 
conspirators had intended to assassin 
ate General Grant and all the princi 
pal officers of the government. The 
operator alone, hitherto, had seen the 
message. Assured of this, Sherman 
enjoined him to preserve the utriost 
secrecy, until he should return. The 
train was then permitted to stait. 
About ten o'clock, the pai'ty reached 
Durham's Station, where General Ki' 
patrick, with a squadron of cara'ry, 
was waiting to receive his chief. Led 
horses had been provided for Sherman 
and his staff. Mounted on these, and 
preceded by a small platoon and the 
bearer of a white flag, they were soon 
on their way to the appointed place of 
meeting. The morning, we are told, 
was exceptionally beautifuL Nature 
was clad in her robes of richest gieeu. 
The ail- was vocal with the songstere of 
the grove, and laden with the fragrance 
of the fiTiit trees, just bursting into 
bloom. Everywhere there was that 
which appealed to and pleased the 
senses ; and there was, besides, an in 
vigorating freshness in the suiTounding 
atmosphere. It was not wonderful 
that in such circumstances, and on such 
a mission, a feeling of elation, a seuM 



THE CONFBEENCB AT BENNETT'S HOCTSK. 



943 



uf gladness, should have been experi- 
enced by the entire party — by Sherman 
quite as much as by the others, soul- 
bm-dened though he was by the sad in- 
telligence which he had just received, 
and which he could not as yet reveal. 

About five miles from Durham's the 
flag-bearers met ; and the announce- 
ment was ma(Je that General John- 
-iton was near at hand. He was soon 
in sisrht. Bv bis side rode General 
Wade Hampton ; and close by, and 
forming {)art of his peraonal staff, were 
jMajor Johnston and Captain Hampton. 
General Sherman had a larger retinue, 
which includeci, among others. General 
Kilpatrick, General Barry, and Colonel 
Poe. ShermaTi and Johnston who, 
although thirteen years in the I'egular 
8rmy, had never met befoi-e, saluted 
nd shook hands, and then introduced 
their respective attendants. This done, 
and still on horseback, they repaired to 
a small fann house, on the Chapel Hill 
road — a wooden sti-ucture situated on 
the brow of a hill, and owned and 
occupied by a Mr. Bennett and his 
family. At the request of the two 
generals, the inmates vacated the 
premises and retired to one of the 
adjoining buildings. Pen, ink and 
paper were brought into one of tlie 
rooms l)y an orderly. The orderly 
having retii-ed, the two generals were 
left alone. " I have just received," said 
Sherman, " bad news — the worst news, 
general, in my judgment, that we have 
had for a long time. It is especially 
damaging to your cause." He then 
handed Johnston the despatch, and 
watched him closely while he read. 



Johnston's exclamations showed how ut- 
terly he was shocked ; and the perspir- 
ation, which came out in large bead like 
drops on his high forehead, revealf>d the 
inner agony of the man. He denounced 
the act as a disgrace to the age, and 
expressed the hope that Sherman did 
not charge it to the Confed/rate gov- 
ernment. SheiTTian wa.s willing to ex- 
onerate Johnston himself ayd Lee, and 
indeed, all the liigher officers of thefc 
Confederate army; but he confessed, 
he had his (ioubts regarding such men 
as Davis, Sanders, and others of that 
stripe. Pie told Johnston that his own 
army was as yet ignorant of what had 
happened, and that he had not revealed 
the painful intelligence even to his own 
staff. He dreaded the result which 
might follow from the communication 
of the newe to the soldiers ; for with 
his army, as indeed, with all the armies 
of the Union, Lincoln was a great 
favorite. If the spirit of retaliation 
seized them, and was by any provoca- 
tion forced into open expression, it 
might be difficult, if not impossible, to 
hold them in restiaint; and the fate of 
Raleigh might be more fearful than the 
fate of Columbia. He expressed the 
belief that Johnston, himself, must be 
convinced of the folly and even cruelty 
of prolonging the contest, and offered 
to accept his sirrrender and that of all 
the troops subject to his orders, on tho 
identical terms which had been granted 
to General Lee. 

Johnston admitted that the cause 
with which he was identifieil, was lost. 
Any further fighting, he said, woiUd be 
" murder." For himseK he asked 



944 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAK. 



nothing. He was anxious only for his 
men. The terms granted to Lee were, 
he thought, in the last degree magnan- 
imous. He wished, however, to obtain 
some general concessions which, he con- 
id ered, were necessary to secure the 
af ety of his followers ; and he insisted 
npon certain guarantees which Sherman 
had no authority to concede. " Why," 
he asked, "can we not make this sur- 
render universal ? " "I know," he said, 
" I can get an order from Mr. Davis 
that all the Confederate armies shall 
disband." It was Johnston's earnest, 
anxious desire that the sun-ender should 
cover not only his own army, but all 
the Confederate forces east and west of 
the Mississippi. The two generals 
could not come to an agreement ; and 
Johnston asked that the conference be 
postponed for some days. Sherman 
would grant one day only. It was ar- 
anged that they should meet at the 
same place the following day at noon ; 
and the interview, which had lasted 
three hours, was brought to a close. 

On his return to Raleigh, Sherman 
issued an order to the army, making 
public the contents of the telegraphic 
message. The impression produced 
was, as he had expected, painful in 
the extreme. Every countenance gave 
evidence of deep and genuine sorrow. 
Sherman watched the effect closely. 
He saw and felt that the slightest cir- 
cumstance might provoke a terrible 
revenge. Happily, however, in no 
single instance was there any attempt 
at retaliation. Summoning together 
his general officers, he conferred with 
them aa to the course to be followed 



with Johnston and his army. It was 
felt by aU that, if the enemy could only 
be brought to bay, he covdd be easily 
destroyed. That, however, was the 
difficulty. The country was peculiarly 
in Johnston's favor. If the worst 
should happen, it would be possible for 
the Confederate leader to break up his 
army into separate bands and scatter 
them in different diroctioiis. Such an 
event was dreaded, as it would lead to 
an indefinite prolongation of the war. 
The general voice was, therefore, in 
favor of leniency. It was, in the last 
degree, desirable that the war should be 
ended at once. On the following day 
the two generals-in-chief met, as April 
agreed upon, at Bennett's house. 18. 
Sherman arrived at noon. Johnston 
did not come up until it was about two 
o'clock. He was accompanied, as on 
the day before, by General Wade 
Hampton. Johnston had not changed 
his mind since the meeting on the pre 
vious day. He had authority, he said 
over all the Confederate armies. He 
wished the surrender to be universal 
He insisted, however, upon obtaining 
some guarantee which would secure the 
political rights of his officers and men 
Sherman argued that all such rights 
were covered by the example which had 
been set at Appomattox Coiui, House. 
Lincoln's proclamation of December 
8th, 1863, was still in force ; and that 
instrument enabled every Confederate 
soldier and officer, below the rank oi 
colonel, to obtain an absolute pardon 
by laying down his arms and taking 
the common oath of allegiance, (ien- 
eral Grant had extended the principle 



THE MEMORANDUM. 



»4£ 



so as to include all the officers, General 
Lee, himself, not excepted. At this 
stage Johnston informed Sherman that 
Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and 
asked whether he might not be per- 
mitted to take part in the conference. 
Sherman, at first, objected, on the 
ground that negotiations should be 
confined strictly to belligerents. It 
was finally agreed, however, that Breck- 
enridge might be allowed to be present 
in the capacity of a major-general, but 
not as the Confederate secretary-of-war. 
Breckenridge confiimed all that John- 
ston had said regarding the state of 
feeling which prevailed among officers 
and men concerning their political 
rights, in case of surrender. After the 
lapse of some hours, Sherman, recalling 
the conversation he had with Mr. Lin- 
coln, at City Point, and anxious to em- 
Dody the views there presented to him, 
as well as to conform somewhat to the 
wishes of his opponents, sat down and 
drew up a "memorandum" or basis of 
agreement. This document, which wil] 
be found below,* was signed by both 

•" Memorandum or Bans of agreement, made thii 19th 
day of April, A. D. 1865, riear Durham') Station, 
in the State of North Carolina, by and between Oen- 
erai Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confed- 
erate army, and Major-OeTieral William T. Sheb- 
UAS, eomnuMiding the army of the United State* in 
North Carolina, both present : 

1. Thecont«cilng armies now in the field to main- 
tain the itatu quo, until notice is given by the Com- 
manding general of either one to its opponent, and 

easonable time — say forty-eight hoars — allowed. 

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be 
disbanded and conducted to their several Stat« capitals, 
there to deposit their arms and public property in the 
State arsenals ; and each officer and man to execute 
and file an agreement to cease from acts of war. and 
abide the action of both State and Federal authority 
The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported 



parties, and sent to Washington for the 
approval of President Johnson. Mean 
while, it was agreed that both armiea 
should remain in statu quo, until an 
answer should be received from Wash 
ington. 

Major Henry Hitchcock reached 
Washington, with the memorandum, on 
the 2l8t of April. The public April 
mind was still intensely excited 21. 
over the assassination of Lincoln, and 
over the binital, although less successful, 
attack which had been made upon the 
life of Secretary Seward. The terms 
which Sherman proposed to grant to 
the South accorded ill with the tone of 
public feeling. The blood of Lincoln 
was calling loudly for vengeance; yet, 
one of the most trusted and honored 
generals of the Union was proposing to 
grant, to the now conquered South, 
terms which implied an utter forgetful- 
ness of all th' "vents of the war. The 
memorandum, in fact, was universally 
condemned. It was disapproved by 
the president, by the secretary-of-war, by 
the Lieutenant-general, and, indeed, by 

to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject 
to the future action of the Congress of the United 
States, and in the mean time, to be used solely to 
maintain peace and order within the borders of the 
States respectively. 

3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United 
States, of the several State governments, on theii 
officers and Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed 
by the Constitution of the United States, and where 
conflicting State governments have resulted from the 
war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 

4. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts 
In the several States, with powers as defined by the 
Constitution of the United States and of the States re 
spectively. 

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States li 
be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, thci' 



*46 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 



every member of the cabinet ; and, later, 
when it found its way into the news- 
papers, it called forth against Sherman 
a perfect howl of indignation. Time, 
however, has set this whole matter forth 

n its true light ; and General Sherman's 
patriotism shines not the less brightly 
that it, temporarily and most unjustly, 
suffered an eclipse. 

General Grant set out immediately 
for Raleigh, with instmctions from the 
secretary-of-war to declare the rejection 
of the memorandum, and to assume 
direction of military affairs. From 
Morehead City, he telegraphed to Sher- 
man the decision of the government ; 
ipril ^^^j ^^ ^^® morning of the 24th, 

24. he reached the head-quarters of 
the army at Raleigh. Grant directed 
Sherman to communicate the decision 

»f the government U Johnston, to 
notify him that the truct would expire 

political rights and franchises, as well as their rights 
•f person and property, as defined by the Constitution 
of the United States and of the States respectively. 

6. The Executive authority of the Government of 
the United States not to disturb any of the people by 
reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace 
»nd quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and 
9)>ey the laws in existence at the place of their resi- 
■ience. 

7. In general terms — the war to cease ; a general 
»mnesty so far as the Executive of the United States 
^HD command, on condition of the disbandment of the 
Confederate armies, the distribution of arms and the 
•eMinii)tii)n of peaceful pursuits by the officers and the 
ut-ii liithiTtn rnmp'ising said armies. 

.N e iiff f\M\ empowered by our respective prln- 

npalt. U) luitill these terms, we individually and 

•-•flicially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the 

necessary authority, and to carry out the above pro^ 

gramme. 

W. T. Shkrmabt, Mn^r-Oeneral, 

CommnnAing Army of t)u United SUiUt in North 

UToUlUi 

J E .loHNSTON, Gerifral 
Omnwuutdt/tg Uott/cdcrale ataUt Ann)/ in NorlA 
Oarciim.a. 



within forty-eight hours after the 
receipt of the message, and to demand, 
at the same time, the immediate sur- 
render of his army. This was the full 
extent of Grant's interference. Sher 
man was permitted to carry on and 
conclude the negotiations with Johnston. 
On receiving Sherman's message announ 
cing the decision of the government at 
Washington, Johnston requested an- 
other interview. It was promptly 
granted; and on the following day, the 
26th of April, the two commanders met 
again, at the same place, when articles 
of agreement were signed. The follow- 
ing is the document as approved and 
signed by General Grant. 

" Terms of a Military Convention, entered inU 
this 2&th day of April, 1865, at Bennetfi 
House, near Durham's Station, North Caro- 
lina, between General Joskph E. Johnston , 
Commanding the Confederate Army, and 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, Command- 
ing the United States Army, in North 
Carolina. 
I. All acts of war on the part of the troops 
under General Johnston's command to cease 
from this date. 2. All arms and public prop- 
erty to be deposited at Greensboro, and de- 
liyered to an ordnance-oflBcer of the Uniteil 
States Army. 3. Rolls of all the oflBcers and 
men to be made in duplicate ; one copy to be 
retained by the commander of the troops, and 
the other to be given to an ofiBcer to be desig 
nated by General Sherman. Each oflBcer and 
man to give his individual obligation, in writing, 
not to take up arms against the Government ol 
the United States, until properly released from 
his obligation. 4. The side-arms of officers, 
and their private horses and baggage to be 
retained by them. 5. This being done, all the 
officers and men will be permitted to return 
to their homes, not to be disturbed by the 
United States authorities, 8o long sb they 



DAVIS AT IRWINSVILLE. 



94^ 



observe their obligation, and the laws in force 
« here they may reside." 

W. T. Sherman, Major- General, 
Commanding United States Forcet in North GaroUna. 

J. E. Johnston, General, 
OommandiTig Gonfederate States Forcet in North 

Carolina, 
ipproved : U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General." 

Wade Hampton, wlio refused to 
abide by the terms of the capitulation, 
dashed off with a body of cavaliy in 
the direction of Charlotte, where were 
Davis and the other members of the 
Confederate government. The remain- 
der of Johnston's army, some 30.000 
strong, after having formally smTen- 
dered arms, were permitted to return to 
their homes. So passed out of exist- 
ence the second great army of the 
Confederacy. 

Surrenders and captures now fol- 
lowed in rapid succession. On the 4th 
of May, at Citronella, Ala., General 
Richard Taylor, who commanded the 
Confederate forces on the east of the 
Mississippi, sun-endered with his entire 
command. At the same time and place 
Commander FaiTand surrendered to 
Rear- Admiral Thatcher, that portion of 
the Confederate n&vj which was in the 
Tombigbee. 

On the 10th of May, the head and 
front of the offending cause was cap- 
tured in the person of Jefferson Davis. 
After the faU of Richmond, Davis had 
attempted to maintain the semblance of 
i government at Danville. On the 
lOth of April, on hearing of the surren- 
ier of Lee, he proceeded to Greensboro, 
accompanied by the different members 
of his cabinet. At Greensboro, where 
he met Johnston and Beauregard, and 



vainly endeavored to induce them to 
attack Sherman, Davis was coldly i-e 
ceived. For three days he and his 
party were compelled to content them 
selves vrith what accommodations could 
be obtained in a railroad car. From 
Greensboro they proceeded to Charlotte, 
where they remained until they werf 
informed of the surrender of John^tni 
Davis was anxious, if possible, to iv.-k . 
Taylor, who was beyond the Chatta 
hoochee ; and it was his hope that a 
vigorous resistance might yet be made, 
if the forces of that general could be 
united with those of KLrby Smith, west 
of the Mississippi. All such hopes 
were soon blasted. At Washington, 
Ga., there was a scramble among Davis' 
ministers for what gold they had been 
able to caiTy with them. Well aware 
that they were being pui-sued, and 
alarmed by the mmors which were 
reaching them of the near presence of 
the National troopers, they now scatter- 
ed — Postmaster-general Reagan alone 
of all the members of the cabinet, re 
maining with Davis. At this stage, 
Mrs. Davis, her children, and her sister, 
Mrs. Howell, were pushing towards the 
Gulf in wagons, on a nearly parallel 
route, about 18 miles distant. Learning 
that they were in danger of being 
attacked and robbed by a band of Con- 
federate soldiers, who imagined that 
Mrs. Davis and her party were carrying 
off a large amount of specie, Davis 
hastened to their assistance. He joined 
them as they were approaching Irwins- 
ville, the capital of Irwin County, Ga., 
nearly due south of Macon. There the 
weary fugitives encamped for the night 



948 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR 



Meanwhile two detachments of General 
Wilson's cavalry — one under Colonel 
Piitchard, the other under Colonel 
Hamden — who for some days had been 
m hot pursuit, were rapidly closing in 
upon them. A prize of $100,000, which 
was to reward the successful captor, 
was, no doubt, lending some intensity 
to the purpose of the pursuers. At 
iay-break, on the 10th of May, the 
camp was surrounded, and the entire 
party were made prisoners. Pritchard's 
men had the honor of the capture. 
Conveyed first to Wilson's headquarters 
at Macon, the prisoners were sent 
thence by way of Savannah to Fortress 
Monroe. Alexander H. Stephens, who 
was captured about the same time, 
was sent to the same prison. He and 
Reagan were afterwards transferred to 
Fort Warren, in Boston harbor. 

On the 11th of May, General Jeff. 
Thompson, who commanded in Arkan- 
sas, surrendered at Chalk Bluff, with 
about 7500 men. One Confederate 
anny still continued to hold out. It 
^^as that of General Kirby Smith. 
Long after the surrender of Lee, Smith 
professed, at least, to be sanguine and 
hopefuL Towards the very last days 
of April he addressed his soldiers as 
" the hope of the nation," and exhorted 
them to fight on for their liberties and 
their homes. " You poosess," he said, 
" the means of long resistance ; you 
have hopes of succor from abroad. 
Protract the struggle, and you vnll 
surely receive the aid of nations who 
already deeply sympathize with you." 
Smith was encouraged in his attitude 
of resistance by the sentiments which 



prevailed among the people of the 
South-west. In Louisiana and in Texas, 
in several of their more populous cen 
tres, public meetings were held and 
resolutions adopted in favor of continu- 
ing the contest. Of the existence of 
this feeling in those States, and of the 
stubborn energy of Kirby Smith, the 
authorities at Washington were not 
ignorant. Preparations were made for 
a vigorous camjiaign in Texas ; meafiuren 
were adopted for the collection of a 
large force at New Orleans ; and Gen- 
eral Sheridan received instructiom to 
hold himself in readiness to assume the 
command. These arrangements, be- 
coming unnecessary, were never fully car- 
ried out. The end, for which all were 
impatiently longing, was rapidly ap- 
proaching. It was not to be deferred 
by the stubbornness of any general, o 
by the wishes of any section of the 
people. 

Meanwhile, collisions were taking 
place between poitions of the rival 
forces on the borders of the Rio Grande. 
One of these, which happened near 
Brazos Santiago, and which resulted 
somewhat unfavorably for the Nationals, 
proved to be the last battle of the war. 
Colonel Theodore H. Barrett, who was 
in command of the National troops at 
Brazos Santiago, was short of horses for 
his men. In order to supply this want, 
he sent Colonel Bronson, on the evening 
of the 11th of May, with some 300 men, 
to surprise and capture a Confederate 
camp on the Rio Grande. The surprise 
was complete. Bronson drove the foe 
before him, captured a number of horses 
and made some prisoners. Having 



THE COST OF THE WAB. 



349 



fallen back, he was joined on the morn- 
ing of the 13th by Colonel Morrison, 
at the head of some 200 men. BaiTett 
now assumed command in person. The 
Confederates, it was discovered, were 
'ollected in considerable force in the 
V icinity of what was known as Palmetto 
May Ranche. Resolved to disperse 
13. them, BaiTett ordered another 
attack. After some skirmishing which 
lasted during the gi'eater part of the 
forenoon, the Confederates were driven 
back some miles, when the Nationals 
halted on a piece of rising ground about 
a mile from the ranche. The National 
left rested on the Rio Grande. In this 
position, about four o'clock in the after- 
noon, Barre+t was fiercely attacked by 
a strong Confederate force, under the 
command of General Slaughter. Bar- 
rett was without guns. Slaughter was 
well supplied with both cavalry and 
artillery. Barrett was compelled to 
fall back. This, however, he did with 
great skill and with very considerable 
success. For three hours the running 
fight was kept up. The Confederates 
made repeated and savage onsets on 
Barrett's front and right flank. The 
recoiling force, however, was admirably 
covered by a body of colored troops 
belonging to the Sixty-Second regiment, 
who boldly and firmly maintained their 
line and successfully repelled every 
attack of the enemy. In the struggle 
some 48 men of the Thirty-Fourth 
Indiana, who had been thrown out as 
skirmishers to protect the flank of their 
regiment, were cut off and captured by 
Slaughter's cavalry. About sunset, 
tlie pressure ceased, and the fighting | 



was discontinued. Such was the battle 
of Palmetto Ranche, famous as beinf 
the last in the Civil War. 

A few days later came the last sui 
render. Kirby Smith had, at length 
discovered the hopelessness of his cause 
He had heard of the surrenders of John 
ston and Taylor and Thompson. He 
had heard also of the arrival of Sheridan 
at New Orleans. The expected foreign 
aid had not yet arrived. Further resist 
ance, he saw, was useless. He sent mes- 
sengers to General Canby, who was at 
Baton Rouge, to t.scertain the terms of 
surrender ; but, before the negotiations 
were completed. Smith had abandoned 
his post and made his escape into 
Texas. General Buckner, who it will 
be remembered, was left in a similar 
plight at Fort Donelson, assumed com- 
mand ; and on the 26th of May, jfay 
all that remained of the Confed- 26. 
erate anny in the Trans-Mississippi De 
partment, was surrendered t* Canby, a1 
New Orleans. The Civil War was ended 

The struggle which extended ovei 
four weaiy years, was as severe as it waa 
protracted. To the entire people, north 
and south, it was a long-continued bap- 
tism of fire. The whole nation, so to 
speak, passed through the burning fiery 
fumaca On both sides the war had 
been conducted at a fearful cost of 
blood and treasure. The total number 
of troops called for by the National 
government, was 2,942,748. The total 
number obtained was 2,690,401. Mak 
ing allowance for the terms of service 
which varied from six months to fouf 
years, it is safe to conclude that there 
were in actual service about 1,500,000 



950 



THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAK. 



men. Of these some 60,000 were killed 
m battle, 35,000 were mortally wound- 
ed, and 184,000 died in the hospitals of 
disease. It is scarcely an exaggeration 
to say, that, on the part of the Nation- 
als alone, 300,000 men died on the 
battle-field or in the hospitals, and that 
as many more were crippled or other- 
wise disabled for life. The Confeder- 
ate armies in point of actual nxmibers, 
were not equal to the National armies ; 
but their losses could hardly be less 
It would certainly not be an over-esti- 
Qoate to say that, through the war, 
the entire countiy sustained an actual 
loss of 1,000,000 able-bodied men. An 
idea of the pecuniary cost of the war 
may be obtained from the fact that the 
National debt, which in June, 1861, 
was only $90,867,828, had, at the be- 
ginning of January, 1866, reached the 
igh figure of $2,749,491,745. On a 
air calculation, it is estimated that the 
expenditures of the government, during 
the last year of the war, exceeded the 
whole expenditures of the government 
from the inauguration of Washington 
to the inauguration of Buchanan. 
These figures do not cover the enor- 
mous sums paid out by individual 
States, and by local bodies, in fitting 
out their several contingents ; they do 
not include the millions volimtarily 
contributed by the people to the Sani- 
ary and Christian Commissions; nor 
do they make any account of the fact 
that the once blooming and wealthy 
South was literally exhausted, prostrat- 
ed, and laid waste. It was a fearful 
sacrifice — one of the greatest ever made 
hy any people. Whether it was a 



necessary sacrifice will probably for 
ever remain a debatable question. One 
thing, however, is certain : it was not 
made in vain. Out of the fiery ordeal 
came forth a regenerated America — a 
grander and more glorious Union 
Great questions, involving ever-recur 
ring, never-ending trouble, were finally 
settled. The Southern Confederacy was 
crushed, and, with it, the spirit of rebel 
lion. Slavery was abolished ; and free 
dom was proclaimed to be the birthright i 
of man, irrespective of race or color. 
And, what will be found to be of equal 
importance to the future of America, 
and, indeed, to the future of mankind, 
the original National Union was saved. 
The end which had, at last, come 
had been foreseen ; and, even before 
the assassination of President lancoln, 
arrangements had been made to discon- 
tinue all drafting and recruiting, to 
curtaU purchases of army supplies, to 
reduce the number of general and staff 
officers, and to remove whatever mil 
itary restrictions had been laid on 
trade and commerce. Preparations 
were made, at Washington, for the re- 
ception of the victorious legions which 
had followed the leadership of Grant 
and Sherman. On the 22d and 23d of 
May, the grand review took place. In 
the presence of multitudes of their re- 
joicing fellow ■ citizens, over 200,000 
veterans, victors in many a hard-won 
fight, marched before the president and 
his cabinet. On those two days, in 
Washington, an element of sadnes. 
mingled with the general joy. One 
prominent figure was missed. Lincoln, 
the beloved of all, was in every map r 



DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMIES. 



Ul 



thoughts ; but he was not there. His 
work, however, had been nobly done ; 
and amid the imposing grandeur and 
magnificence of the spectacle, men's 
minds were impressed with the old 
truths, that " the good which men do 
-ives after them," and that when the 
blessed rest from their laboi-s " their 
works do follow them." 

A diflBcult task had yet to be per- 
formed by the government, before it 
could be said that the nation had fairly 
entered upon the enjoyment of peace. 
In crushing out the rebellious elements 
of the States recently in revolt, and in 
bringing back those States to their 
aUegiance and I'estoriug them to the 
Union, it had been necessary, as we 
have seen, to call into existence and to 
sustain large military and naval organ- 
izations. For the purpose for which 
hey were created, these war forces were 
o longer necessary. What was to be 
done vrith them ? They must be re- 
tained or disbanded ; and each alter- 
native was beset with difficulty. If 
retained, how were they to be em- 
ployed ? If disbanded, might they not 
be provoked into open resistance ? The 
problem to be solved was not entirely 
new; but there was somewhat of nov- 
elty in the circumstances ; and the 
entire civilized world was interested in 
the mode and character of its solu- 
tion. It was not the first time that 
huge armies, after having saved, had 
proved the ruin of the commonwealth, 
rhoughtful men remembered the ex- 
perience and fate of Rome, and, later, 
the experience and fate of France. 
Once more the crucial test was about 



to be applied. What was to be the 
result? The test was applied; and 
the result was in the last degree satis- 
factory. The problem was solved in a 
manner which did honor to the Ameri 
can soldier, to American institutions, 
and, indeed, to the general intelligence 
of the nineteenth century. 

It had never, in truth, been a seiious 
question with the government or with 
the people, what should be done with 
the soldier, when the war was over. 
It was taken for granted by all, the 
soldier himself included, that he should 
return to his home, and resume the 
duties of peaceful citizenship. Accord 
ingly, before the end of May, an'ange 
ments were made for disbanding the 
armies. Sherman, in a touching ad 
dress, bade farewell to his command, 
on the 30th of May ; and, on the June 
2d of June, General Grant issued, 2. 
to all the armies, the following order 

" Soldiers of the Armies op the Unitei) 
States: — By your patriotic devotion to your 
country, in the hour of danger and alarm, 
your magnificent fighting, brayery, and endur- 
ance, you have maintained the supremacy o) 
the Union and the Constitution, overthrown 
all armed opposition to the enforcement of the 
laws and of the proclamation forever abolish- 
ing slavery — the cause and pretext of the 
rebellion — and opened the way to the rightful 
authorities to restore order and inaugurate 
peace, on a permanent and enduring basis, on 
every foot of American soil. Your marches, 
sieges, and battles, in distance, duration) 
resolution, and brilliancy of results, dim the 
lustre of the world's past military achieve- 
ments, and will be the patriots' precedent, i' 
defense of liberty and right, in all time t 
come. In obedience to your country's call, 
you left your homes and families, and volun- 
teered in her defense. Victory has crowna'' 



962 



THE LAST DATS OF THE WAE. 



your Talor, and secured the purpose of your 
patriotic hearts ; and with the gratitude of your 
countrymen, and the highest honors a great and 
free nation can accord, you will soon be per- 
mitted to return to your homes and families, 
conscious of haying discharged the highest 
duty of American citizens. To aobiere these 
glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, 
your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the 
blessings of free institutions, tens of thousands 
of your gallant comrades have fallen, and 
sealed the priceless legacy with their blood. 
The graves of these a grateful nation bedews 
with tears, honors their memories, and will ever 
cherish and support their stricken families." 

The work of disbandment, which 
had been already commenced, was car 
ried on steadily, th'3 government giv 
ing to it a lai-ge shaie of its atten- 
tion; and, a.s early as the 15th of 
November, over 800,000 troops had 
been transported, mustered out and 
paid. At the beginning of November, 
1866, when the musteiing process was 
completed, as many as 1,023,021 sol- 
diers had been restored to their homes, 
and to the avocations of peaceful life. 
There was no jarring, no resistance. 
It was a gi-and experiment ; and it 
resulted in a splendid success. Such 
an expeiiment, attended by such a 
result, had never before been wit- 
oessed. The disbandment, without 
any serious disturbance to the com- 
cn.inity, of so many thousands of men, 
most of them inured to all the habits, 
AS well as hardships of the soldier's 
life, was, at the time and not unjustly, 
regarded as another great victory — a 
victory, in some respects, even greater 
than that which had just been won 
by the sword. It was a real triumph 
of popular government — another gen- 



uine proof of the inherent strength of 
the republic. 

We have now completed the task we 
assigned ourselves at the commencementj 
of this volume. We have traced the] 
History of the Great Civil War from: 
its commencement at Fort Sumter, in 
1861, to its triumphant close in the dis- 
bandment of the Armies of the Union, 
in 1865. We have shown the causes 
whicli brought about the struggle, and 
have traced our troubles to their true 
source. We have swept the whole 
horizon of tlie war, pointing out to the 
reader the various complex movements 
of the contending forces, and seeking 
to separate each, yet so blend all as to 
enable him to understand not only each 
separate operation, but its eeneral bearing 
upon the whole great drama. We have 
seen the tide of victory roll backward 
and forward, at times seeming to en- 
gulf the hopes of those whose prayers 
were for the triumph of the Union, yet 
after all sweeping onward in one grand 
irresistible swell to victory and peace. 
We have seen the Union preserved, the 
contending armies quietly returning; to 
their homes, and a new reign of peace 
and good will inaugurated. 

Such a story, the most sublime and 
thrilling that human pen can relate, can 
point but one moral — that the institu- 
tions which were worth fighting for so 
nobly are worth preserving ; that the 
Union which has cost us so much bloodl 
and treasure, which has brought us free- 
dom and prosperity, must be cherished 
as the most precious possession we can 
transmit to future generations. 



INDEX. 



96« 



INDEX. 

Thb Great CrvTL War. 



A. 
iJJBOTT Gfen., brigade of, at the capture of Fort 
Fisher, 863. 

Abercrombie, Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 238. 

Ackworth Station, Ga. , captured by Gen. Hood, 805. 

Acquis creek, McClellan's army moves towards, 279 ; 
arrlTal of McClellan at, 280 ; deserted by the Na- 
tionals, 801. 

Adairsville, Qa. Gen. Newton skirmishes with Gen. 
Johnston's rear-guard at, 711. 

Adams, Gen. severely wounded at Chlckamauga, 554. 

Aiken, skirmish of Kilpatrick with Wheeler at, 883. 

Alabama. Confederate cruiser, depredations of, 877 ; 
sunk by the Kearsarge oS Cherbourg, 879. 

Albemarle, Confederate ram, at the siege of Ply- 
mouth, 858 ; her fight with the Sassacus — sunk in 
the Roanoke river by Lieut. Gushing, 859. 

Alexander, Gen., brigade of, at Chattanooga, 569. 

Alexandria, Va., occupation of, by National troops, 85. 

Alexandria, La., taken possession of by Admiral Por- 
ter, 438 ; occupied by the Confederates, 597 ; Na- 
tional troops occupy, 624 ; evacuation of, 638. 

Alice Dean and McCombs, steamers, seized by Gen. 
Morgan at Bradenburg, Ky., 595. 

AUatoona Pass, Ga., operations of Gen. Sherman's 
army at, 713 ; heroic defense of, by Gen. Corse, 806 ; 
battle of, 807. 

Allyn, Lieut. S., bravery of, at Port Hudson, 443. 

Alsop's Farm, surprise of the National troops at, 673 ; 
battle of, 674. 

Ames, Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866 ; at 
Fort Anderson, 869. 

Ammen, Gen., re-occupies Strawberry plains, 836. 

Anderson, Col., surrender of Fort Gaines by, to the 
Nutionals, 648. 

Anderson, Gen. G. T., at Santa Rosa, 67 ; at the bat 
tie of Shiloh, 109 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 
457 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 614 ; at the battle 
of the Wilderness, 666 ; severely wounded at the 
battle of Griswoldville, 815. 

^derscn, Major-Gen. , mortally wounded at the bat- 
tle of Jonesboro, 731. 



Anderson, Major R., in command of cTharlestnn har 

bor — headquarters at Fort Moultrie — letter of, re 
lating to Fort Moultrie, 12 ; moves into Fort Sumter 
16 ; his refusal to surrender Fort Sumter, 23 ; sur- 
render of Fort Sumter by, 31 ; (Gen.) hoiots the 
National flag on Fort Sumter, 888. 
Andrews, Gen. , at the battle of Chancellorsville, 467. 
Anthony, Col. D. C, in the affair at Colliers ville, 562. 
Antietam, description of the battle-groun<?. of, 317 ; 
battle of, 319-327 ; Capt. Noyes' description of 
after the battle, 330 ; President Lincoln's story of 
the effect of the battle of (note), 382. 
Antietam creek, bridges on, 319. 
Appomattox court house, Gen. Lee's surrender at, 934. 
Archer, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460 

captured at the battle of Gettysburg, 503. 
Arkadelphia, occupied by the Nationals, 606. 
Arkansas, joins the Confederacy, 33 ; compulsory 
r.ei reat of Gen. Price into — the flag of the Union 
floating in, 97 ; operations of Gen. Curtis in, 97, 
98 ; march of Gen. Curtis through, 855-357 ; opera- 
tions against guerrillas in, 359-306 ; operations of 
Gens. Steele and Davidson in, 605, 606. 
Arkansas, Confederate ram, description of, 429 ; action 
of, with Carondelet, Tyler, and EUet's ram Quees 
of the West, 430 ; destruction of (note), 431. 
Arkansas Post, battle of, 387. 
Arlington heights, occupied by the Nationals, 85. 
Armistead, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Malvern 
hills, 268 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 525 ; taken 
prisoner at Gettysburg, 529. 
Armitage, Gen., fatally wounded at Gettysburg, 628. 
Armstrong, Gen., raids made by, 159. 
Army of the Potomac, effective strength of, undei 
Gen. McClellan, 191 ; address of Gen. McClellan 
to, 270 ; Gen. McClellan takes leave of, 336 ; ad. 
dress of Gen. Burnside to, 337 ; reorganization of, 
338 ; distrust occasioned in, by Gen. Burnside's 
failure at Fredericksbtirg, 354 ; address of Gen. 
Hooker to— demoralization In, 451 ; addresses of 
Gen. Hooker to, 484, 495 ; addressee of Gen. Meade 
to, 496, 500 ; consolidation of, by Gen. Me«d^ 



INDEA. 



668-6<(0 • corps oommanderB of, 658 ; mo7ements 
of. from the Rapidan to Spottejlrania court house, 
660-678 ; address of Gen. Meade to, 683 ; move- 
ments of, from Spottsylvania court house to the 
rhickahominy, 683-704 ; operations of, against 
Petersburg, 735-780. 
my of the United States, condition of, in 1861. 35. 

.irmy of Virginia, under Gen. Pope, how constituted, 
277 ; address of Pope to, 278 ; Pope asks to be 
relieved of command of, 379 ; orders issued by Pope 
to, 281. 283 ; retreat of, to the north fork of the 
Rappaliannock, 287, 388 ; great exhaustion of, 398 ; 
effective force of, after retreating to Centreville, 
301 ; losses of. 304. 

irnold, Gen. Rich., at the sieg; of Fort Morgan, 648. 

Arnold, Major, at the battle of Santa Rosa, 68. 

isboth, Gen., at the battle of Pea Ridge, 97. 

Asht-r, Gen. T., killed at the battle of Cross Keys, 351. 

Ashby's Gap, Va., skirmishes at, 493 ; battle at. 787. 

Ashlan** Station, captured by Gen. Sheridan, 685. 

Assassination of President Lincoln, 937-940. 

Atchafalaya, Gen. A. J. Smith's operations on the, 628. 

Athens, Teun., surrender of, to Gen. Forrest, 838. 

Atlanta, Ga., description of, 707 ; account of Sher- 
man's march to, from Chattanooga, 708 ; occupation 
of, by Sherman's forces, 733 ; civilians removi-d 
from, 733 ; depopulation of, 734 ; disposition of 
Sherman's forces in and around, 803 ; extensive de- 
struction of buildings in, by order of Sherman. 812. 

Tvcanta, iron-clad, captured by Capt. Rodgers, 588. 

ingTir, Qen., operations of, between Port Hud.>ion and 
uimton, 438 ; at Port Hudson, 441 ; sends a brigade 
to cneck Early's advance on Washington, 786. 

Augusia, Qa., Sherman's feint in the direction of, 817. 

Averill, Qen., expedition of, on the Rappahannock— 
displaced by Gen Hooker, 483 ; defeat of, by Gt'U. 
Morgan, 691 ; defeats Gen. Early near Winchester, 
787 ; aefeats Johnson, on the Romney road, 788. 

Averysboro, N. C, battle of, 891. 

Ayrea Qen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 515. 

B. 

Bachi, Livnt., services of, at Pleasant HiU landing. 

Red river, in the gunboat Lexington, 633. 
Bailey, C'api. T., commands a division of the fleet at 

the capture of New Orleans, 150. 
Bailey, Col., Batteries of, at the battle of Fair Oaks , 335. 
Bailey. Lieut. -Col., dam constructed by, on the Red 

river, ne«r Alexandria, G36. 
Baird, Gen., operations of, 538 ; at the battle of 

Chickamauga, 550 ; at the battle of Chattanooga. 572. 
Baker, Col. E. D., killed at Ball's Bluff, Va., 54, 
Baldwin, Col. , operations of, at Liberty gap, 543. 
Baldwin, Fla., Jestruction of property at, 856. 
Ball's Bluff. Va., battle of, 54. 
Baltic, steamer, sent from New York with reinforoe- 

ments to Fort rtumter. 86. 



Baltimore, preparations made at, to resist the threat- 
ened invasion of the Confederates, 493. 

Banks, Gen. N. P., in command on the Maryland 
side of the Potomac, 52 ; commands a corps of the 
army of the Potomac, 193 in command at Har- 
per's ferry. 242 ; retreat of, 347 ; at the battle of 
Cedar mountain, 285 ; in command at Washington, 
310 ; expedition of, arrives at New Orleans. 431 ; 
sends an expedition to Galveston, 432 ; operations 
of. in Lousiana, 434 ; sends an expedition to Bayou 
Teche, 435 ; operations of. against Port Hudson, 
436 ; second expedition of, to Bayou Teche, 437 ; 
attacks Port Hudson, 441, 443 ; failure of his attacks 
on Port Hudson, 444 ; lays siege to Port Hudson, 
445 ; Port Hudson surrenders to, 440. 447 ; ordered 
to the conquest of Texas, 597 ; sends an expedition 
to Sabine city, 598 ; expedition «'f, to Texas, 600 ; 
expedition of, to Shreveport, 621 ; at the battle of 
Sabine cross roads, 628 ; ordered to close he cam- 
paign, 635. 

Earksdale, Geu., at the battle of Chflncellorsviile, 
457 ; in charge of Marye's hill, 473 : killed at th« 
hattle of Gettysburg, 518. 

B&rlow, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Chancel 
lorsviUe, 459 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 
wounded and taken prisoner, 505. 

Barnes, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 512 ; 

Bartlett, Gen. , at the battle of the WUdemess, 672 , 
brigade of, at the battle of Jericho ford. 694. 

Barron, Commodore, surrender of at Fort Hatteras,ft') 

Bassett, Major, killed at capture of Marye's hill, 476. 

Baton Rouge, occupied by Gen. WUliams, 430 ; flee! 
of Admiral Farragut at, 437. 

Battery Harrison, capture of, 769 ; tmsuccessful at 
tempt of the Confederates to regain, 771. 

B.ittery Holmes, abaiidon<-'l by the Confederate*. 867 

Battle of— 
Allatoona Pass. 807. 
Alsop's Farm, 674. 
Antietam. 319-327. 
Arkansas Post, 387. 
Ashby's Gap, 787. 
Atlanta,720, 723-787 
Averysboro, 891. 
Ball's Bluff, 54. 
Baylor's Farm, 737. 
Bean Station, 596. 
Belmont, 01. 
BentonviUe. 893. 
Bermuda Hundred. 887 
Big Bethel, 63. 
Big Black, 413. 
Blackburn's Ford, 87. 
Blakely. 873. 
Boston Mountains, 862 
Boydton Road, 778. 
Bristow Station. 391 



IWDEX, 



855 



Battle of— 
Bull Run, 40 ; 2d battle, 301. 
Cane HUl, 363. 
C»ne River, 635. 
Camifex Ferry, 58. 
Carmck's Fonl, 50. 
Cedar Creek, 802. 
C!hampion Hills, 411. 
Chancellorsville, 461-470 
Chantilly, 303. 
Chapin's Farm, 769. 
Chattanooga, 56&-573. 
Ch-oamacomico, 66. 
CTiickamanga, 550-556. 
Chickasaw Bayou, 879. 
Cold Harbor, 698-703. 
Corinth, 163-167. 
Crooked Run, 791 
Cross Keys, 251. 
Dalton, 708. 
Davis' Farm, 742 
Deep Run, 760. 
Dug Springs, 55. 
Elk Horn, 97. 
Fair Oaks, 230-241. 
Fisher's HUl, 796. 
Five Forks, 916. 
Fort Darling, 689. 
Franklin, 842, 
Fredericksburg, 343-351. 
Gaines' Mill, 259-261. 
Gettysburg, 502-538. 
Gleudale, 265. 
Grand Coteau, 599. 
Gravelly Run, 913. 
Griswoldville, 815. 
Groveton, 295. 
Gumtown, 630. 
Hampton Roads, 207-211. 
Hanov«r Court House, 281. 
Hatcher's Run, 777 ; 2d battle, 908 
Hatchie, 167. 
Huntsville, 602. 
Island Ford, 787. 
luka. 161. 

Jenkins' Ferry, 640. 
Jericho Ford, 694. 
Joueeboro, 731. 
Kenesavr Mountain, 715. 
Kinston, 894. 
Kernstown, 243. 
KirtsvUle, 358. 
Knoiville, 675. 
Kulp House, 715. 
Avergne, 180. 
LAMe Osage Crossing, 832. 
Lookout Mountain, 566. 567. 



Battle of— 

Malvern HUls, 267-369. 

Manassas, 299. 

Marais des Cygnes, 883. 

MechanicsvUle, 258, 359. 

Middletown, 800. 

MUl Spring, 81, 

Missionary Ridge, 568. 

Monocacy, 786. 

Morristown, Tenn. , 886. 

Murfreesboro, 180-186. 

Nashville, 847. 

New Hope Church, 718. 

New Market, 691. 

Ny River, 684. 

Olustee. 858. 

Pea Ridge, 97, 98. 

Peach Tree Creek, 780. 

Perryville, 177. 

Pittsburg Landing, 105. 

Pleasant Hill, 680. 

Port Gibson, 405. 

Prairie Grove, 863, 

Raymond, 407. 

Reams' Station, 760. 

Resaca, 710. 

Rich Mountain, 49. 

Sabine Cross Roads, 08& 

Sabine Pass. 598. 

Sailors' Creek. 927. 

Salem Heights, 478. 

Salisbury, 896. 

Santa Rosa, 67. 

Savage Station, 363. 

Secession ville, 580, £81. 

Seven Pines, 230-341. 

Shiloh, 105-111. 

South Mountain, 815. 

Spottsylvauia Court House, 6Ti-tfSt 

Springfield, 603. 

Trevillian, 703. 

Warrenton Turnpike, 393. 

Wauhatchie, 561. 

Waynesboro, 904. 

Weldon Railroad, 743, 763-766 

West Point, 613. 

Westport, 832. 

White Oak Swamp, 364 

Wilderness, 662-671. 

Williamsburg, 214-225. 

Wilson's Creek, 56. 

Winchester, 796. 
Baxter, Col. , at Gettysburg, 537. 
Baylor's Farm, battle of, 787. 
Bayou Sara, forces of Gen. Banks at, 440. 
Bayou Teche, operations of Banks on th 
Bean Station. Tenn.. battle of. 596. 



966 



INDEX. 



Beanf ort, S. C. , condition of, 75 ; naval force at, 76. 

Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., in command at Charles- 
ton, 26 ; at Manassas junctioo, 36 ; in command at 
Shiloh, 108 retreats to Cormth, 114; Oight of, 
from Cormth, 119; at Tupelo, 190; relieved by 
Gen. Bragg. 121 ; proclamation of, 584 ; at Bermuda 
Hundred, 687 ; placed in command of the Confed- 
erate military division of the west, 809. 

Bee, Gen., at the battle of Bull Run, 41. 

Beecher, Rev. H. W., powerful address given by, at 
Fort Sumter, 888. 

Bell, Capt., commands a division of the fleet at the 
capture of New Orleans. 160. 

Bell, Gen. , at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866 ; mortally 
wounded at Fort Fisher, 887. 

Belgian Consul, arrest of the, at St. Louis, 830. 

Belmont, Mo., battle of, 61. 

Beltzhoover, Col. , at the battle of Belmont, 60. 

Benedict, Col., at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630. 

Benham, Gen., at the battle of SeceBsionville, 580. 

Benjamin, Judah P., circular of, 584. 

Bentonville, battle of, 893 

Bermuda Hundred, battle ol' 687. 

Berry, Gen. , at the battle of WiUiamaburg, 817. 

Berry, Gen., at the battle of Chancellors ville, 468, 
462 ; death of, 470. 

Berryville, Gen. Sheridan's forote at, 789, 794. 

Best, Capt., battery of, at ChancellorsvUle, 462. 

Bethesda Church, attack of Gen. Rodec at 697. 

Big Bethel, Gen. Rerce's attempt on, 62 

Big Black, battle of, 413. 

Big Shanty Station, Ga. , captured by Gen. Hood, 805. 

Big Tybee Island, seized by the Nationals, 75 ; descrip- 
tion of, 139. 

Birge, Gen. , operations of, 636. 

Bimey, Gen. , at the battle of Williamsburg, 218 ; at 
the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Chan- 
tUly, 803 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 346 ; at 
the battle of Chancellorsville, 4B9 ; at the battle of 
Gettysburg, 511 ; raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; division 
of, at Taylor's bridge, 695. 

Blackburn's Ford, battle at, 37. 

Blackman, Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866. 

Blaisdell, Col., at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. 

Blair, Gen. Frank P , at the battle of Chickasaw 
bayou, 378 ; in contact with Gen. S. D. Lee at 
TuBCumbia, 563 ; in command of the seventeenth 
corps under Sherman, 718. 

Blakely, battle of, 873. 

Blockade of the Southern ports by the Nationals, 61 , 62. 

Blockade of Charleston, declared raised by Beaure- 
gard and Ingraham, 584. 
Jlooming Gap, Gen. Jackson surprised at, 242. 

Blue Wing, steamer captured by the Confederates, 385. 

Blunt, Gen. J. G., defeat of Cooper at Fort Wayne, 
Mo., by, 361 ; defeat of Marmaduke by, 363 ; at the 
b»ttle of Prairie grove, 865 : takes possession of 



Van Buren, Ark., 366; defeat of Oen. Cooper oy 
604 ; relieved of his command, 606. 

Boggs, Capt. C. S. , his report of the exploits of the 
gun-boat Varuna, 152. 

Bolivar Heights, affair at, 314 , Sheridan at, 798. 

Boomer, Col. , at the battle of luka, 161. 

Bombshell, gun-boat, capture of, by the Confederates, 
858 ; deserted by the Confederates, 859 

Booth, Major L. F., killed at Fort Pillow, 617. 

Booth, J. Wilkes, assassinates President Lincoln, 
938 ; death of, 940. 

Border States, condition of the, 47. 

Boswell, Capt. , killed at the battle of Chancellorsville 
464 

Boston Mountains, Mo. , battle of, 362. 

Bowling Green, Ky., headquarters of A. 8 Johnston's 
army, 83 ; evacuation of, 94. 

Bowen, Gen. J., at the battle of Charapiou Hills, 410. 

Boyd's Creek, batteries erected at, 76. 

Boydton Road, battle of, 778. 

Bradford, Major W. F., at Fort POlow, 617 ; murdei 
of, by the Confederates, 619. 

Bradley, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Chicks, 
mauga, 551 ; wounded at the battle of Franklin, 842. 

Bragg, Gen. B., forts at Pensacola held by, 68; at 
Shiloh, 106 ; succeeds Beauregard in the command 
of the army of the Mississippi, 120 ; at Chattanooga, 
171 ; proclamation of, to the Kentuckiaus, 172 ; 
inaugurates a provisional governor of Kentucky, 
173 ; battle of Perryville or Chaplin's hills fough 
by, 177 ; retreat of, to Chattanooga, 178 ; cavalry 
raids of, into West Tennessee and Kentucky, 180 ; 
battle of Murfreesboro fought by, 180 ; retreat of, 
187 ; at Shelbyville, 542 ; retreat of, 544 ; retires 
from Chattanooga, 547 ; at the battle of Chicka. 
mauga, 549 ; report of, 552 ; victory of, at Chicka 
mauga, 555 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 , 
defeat of, by Gen. Grant, 573 ; retreat of, to Dal ton, 
574 ; relieved of his command. 578 ; driven over the 
Neuse to Kinston by Schofield, 894. 

Bramhall, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 215. 

Branch, Gen., killed at the battle of Antietam, 327. 

Brannan. Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 550, 
operations of, at Pocotaligo, 581. 

Brashear City, Weitzel's expedition to, 435 ; Gen. 
Banks at, 437 ; capture of, by the Confederates, 445. 

Breckenridge, Gen. J. C, at the batt'e of ShUoh, 107 
at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 at the battle of 
Chickamauga, 551 ; at the battle of Chattanooga 
568 ; defeats Gen. Sigel near New Market, 692 
defeats Gen. GUlem near Morristown, Tenn., 836. 

Breese, Capt. K. R., in command of the sailors and 
marines at the capture of Fort Fisher, 865. 

Bristow Station, battle of, 291 ; Gen. Banks destrore 
property at, 301. 

Brooke, Gen., at the battle of Savage station. 3<0 
at the battle of Gettysburg, 515. 



INDEX 



957 



kfi, Qen., operations of, from Bennuda hun- 
dred, 687. 

Brown, Col., at Chicamacomico, 66. 

Brown, Col. Harvey, at Fort Pickens, 68. 

Brown, Col., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 459. 

Brown, Col., at the battle of Jericho ford, 694 

Brown, CoL , at the battle of Monocacy, 785. 

Brown, Gen., severely wounded at the battle of 
Springfield, Mo., 602. 

Brown, Gen., in charge of militia at St. Louis, 831. 

Brown, Gen. E. B., his encounter with guerrillas and 
Indians, 606. 

Brown, Gov., sends the Georgia militia to Gen. Jos. 
E. Johnston's army, 714. 

Brown's Gap, strength of Early's position at, 797. 

Bruinsburg, Miss., expedition of Gen. Grant at, 408. 

Brunswick, Qa. , taken possession of, by Nationals, 141. 

Buchanan, Commodore McKean, death of, in the 
Calhoun, at Carney's bridge, 435. 

Buchanan, Franklin, Ln command of the Confederate 
iron-clad Merrimac, 203 ; (Admiral) in command of 
iron-clad Tennessee, 642 ; severely wounded ^ ac- 
tion in MobUe bay, 647. 

Buchanan, President James, reply of, to the South 
Carolina commissioners, 19. 

Buckner, Gen. 8. B., at Fort Donelson, 85 ; surrender 
of, 94 J retreats from Knoiville, Tenn., 544. 

Buell, Gen. D. C, in charge of the departmest of the 
Ohio, 80 ; in command of the army of the Cumber- 
land, 83 ; ordered to join Grant at Shiloh, 103 ; hia 
interview with Grant, 105 ; his arrival at Shiloh, 
110 ; at Corinth, 117 ; army of, sent to Chattanooga, 
130 ; approaching Chattanooga, 171 ; moves from 
Louisville, 174 ; at Perryville, 175-177 ; supplanted 
by Gen. Bosecrans, 178. 

Buford, Col., at the battle of Belmont, 60. 

Buford, Gen-, operations of, 616 ; at Columbus, 619 ; 
cavalry attack of, against Murfreesboro, 844 

Bull Run, battle of, 40 ; second battle of, 801. 

Burbridge, Qen., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 
378 ; National standard planted by, on Fort Hind- 
man, Ark., 388 ; at the battle of Grand Coteau, 
699 ; his pursuit of Morgan to Cynthiana, 783 ; hia 
expedition against the Virginia salt works, 885. 

Burns, Gen. , at the battle of Fair Oaks, 238 ; at the 
battle of Savage station, 3G8. 

Bumside, Gen., A. E., at the battle of BuU Bun, 40, 
41, 43 ; biographical sketch of — commands the ex- 
pedition to Pamlico Sound, 123 ; proclamation by, 
and Goldfloorough, to the people of North Carolina, 
181 ; at New Berne, 182, 135 ; at Fort Macon, 136 ; 
capture of Fort Macon by — summoned to Fortress 
Monroe, 137 ; at the battle of Antietam, 325 ; or- 
dered to take command of the army of the Potomac, 
336 ; order of, on assuming command, 337 ; plan 
of, to attack Fredericksburg, 838 ; mortification of, 
uid hid division commanders, S40 : losses of, at the 



battle of Fredericksburg, 351 ; entire army o' 
withdraws to Falmouth, 853 ; letter of, awnunisg 
the entire responsibility for the disaster at Fred 
ericksburg, 854 ; relie red of his command at his 
own request, 354 ; appointed to the command at 
the department of the Ohio (note), 449 ; ordered to 
join Rosecrans, 543 ; enters Knoxville. 545 ; Cum 
berland gap surrenders to, 545, 546 ; encounter of 
with Longstreet, 575 ; his defense of KnoxviUe, 
576 ; in command of the ninth army corps at Cul- 
pepper, 660, repulse of, at the North Anna, 695. 

Burton's Georgia brigade, at Bull Run, 41. 

Butler, Gen. B. F., at Fortress Monroe, 35 ; declaren 
slaves contraband of war, 47 ; ordered to takd 
command at Fortress Monroe, 63 ; relieved of hia 
command at Fortress Monroe, 63 ; success of, a^ 
Hatteras, 65 ; departure of, from Hampton Roads 
with troops for New Orleans, 157 ; moves up the 
James river from Fortress Monroe, 686 ; despatch 
of, to Stanton, 687 ; operations of, against Peters- 
burg, 736 ; additional corps placed under, by Gen. 
Grant, 751 ; joins the expedition against Fort 
Fisher, 861-863 ; superseded by Ord, 868. 

Butterfleld's brigade at the battle of Gaines' Mill, 360. 

C. 
CiBKLL, Gen. W. L., defeat of, at FayetteriUe, 603 , 

operations of, 639. 
Caldwell, Commander, C. H. B. , at the attack on Port 

Hudson, 441. 
Caldwell, Gen. , at the battle of Antietam, 334 ; at the 

battle of Gettysburg, 514. 
Calhoun, J. M., letter of, to Gen. Sherman in relation 

to the removal of civilians from Atlanta, 734. 
Cameron, Brig-Gen. , at the battle of Grand Coteau, 

600 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. 
Cameron, Col., killed at the battle of Bull Bun, 44 
Cameron, Secretary, resigns the war department, 'ill. 
Campbell, Col., surrender of Athens, Tenn. by, to 

Gen. Forrest, 838. 
Canby, Qen., commands the Shreveport exp<Alitiou. 

638 , in command of the western military division. 

641; operations of, against Mobile, 869-87S. 
Cane HiU, battle of, 863. 
Cane River, battle of, 635. 

Carlin's brigade at the battle of PerryvUlo, 177. 
Carnifex Ferry, battle of, 53. 
Carolinas, Gen. Sherman's march through the, 880 

897 ; waste and destruction effected iu the, by 

Sherman's troops, 895. 
Carr, Gen., at Pea Bidge, 97 ; at the battle of B> 

Black, 413 ; at Little Rock, 638. 
Carrack's Ford, Va. , battle of, 50. 
Carroll, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Getty siburx 

530 ; splendid charge of, at the battle of the Wli(l«» 

ness, 671 ; wounded, 672. 
Carter. Qen. S. P., at KnoxviUe, M6. 



»58 



INDEX. 



OMej, Gen., ^^irJidon o( at the battle of Williamsbnrgh, 

830 ; at th« battle of Fair Oaks, 234. 
Cass, Qen. I/>wifl, conduct of, prior to hostilities, 15. 
Oatlett'g Station, Pope's army-train surprised at, 288. 
Ced»r Creek, Qen. Sheridan's army at, 790 ; Early's 
/ temporary victory at, 799 ; battle of, 803. 
I War Mountain, or Cedar Run, Va., battle of, 286. 
,' iemetery Ridge, near Petersburg, unsuccessful as- 
saults upon, from the "crater," 755, 756. 
I Vntreville, Va., Union army under Gen. Pope at, 801. 
Jeanola, Col., driyes the Confederates back from 

their position at White Post, 790. 
Chalmette, Confederate regiment, unconditional sur- 
render of, to Capt. Bailey, 154. 
Chalmers, Qen., at Shiloh, 109 ; at Colliersville, 562. 
Chamberlain, Col., at the battle of Gettysburg, 513. 
Chambers, Col., at the battle of luka, 161. 
Chambersburg, Pa. , capture of, by Gen. Stuart, 338 ; 

burnt by Gen. McCansland, 788. 
Champion HUls, Miss., described, 410 ; battle of, 411. 
Chancellorsville House, Va., headquarters of Gen. 

Hooker, 454 ; takes fire and is abandoned, 470. 
Chancellorsville, Va., first battle of, 461 ; second bat- 
tle of, 467 ; captured by the Confederates, 470, 471. 
Chantmy, Va., battle of, 302. 
Chapin's Farm, Va., battle of, 769. 
Chaplin's Hills, Ky., battle of, 177. 
Charleston, excitement in, 16 ; attempt of Beaure- 
gard and Ingraham to raise the blockade of, 683, 
(584 ; circular of J. P. Benjamin in relation to the 
blockade of, 584 ; Dupont's attack on the fortifica- 
tions of, 584-587 ; operations of Gen. Gillmore against 
the defenses of, 588-592 ; evacuation of, by Qen. 
Hardee, 886 ; surrender of, to Gen. Gillmore, by the 
mayor, 887 ; explosion with loss of life and great 
fire in, 886 ; remarks of Gen. Sherman on the ruin- 
ous condition of — Gen. Anderson sent thither to 
raise the Stars and Stripes again on Fort Sumter, 887. 
Charleston and Savannah Railroad, movements of 

Gen. Foster against, 820. 
Charleston Forts, paper respecting, addressed to 
President Buchanan by South Carolina representa- 
tives, 19. 
Charleston Harbor, condition of, prior to the war, 11 ; 

description of the forts in, 585. 
Chase, Secretary, visit of, to Fortress Monroe, 228. 
Chattahoochee River, Ga., Gen Johnston driven across 

the, by Qen. Sherman, 717, 
Chattanooga, Tenn., strategic importance of, 171 ; its 
position and surroundings, 541 ; battle of, 668-573. 
tlieatham. Gen., at Belmont, 60- at the battle of 
Bhiloh, 109 ; at the battle of Perryville, 176 ; at 
th« battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; at the battle of 
Chickamauga, 551. 
Cheraw, destruction of proonrty at, by Sherman, 889. 
Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, operations of Lieut. 
JeSers on the, 130. 



ChlcamacomJco, battle of, 66. 

Chickahominy, crossed by Qen Grant's army, 703. 
Chickamauga, position of, 549 ; battle of, 660-556. 
Chickamauga, steamship, destroyed by the Confeder. 

ates, 869 ; depredations of, 876. 
Chickasaw Bayou or Haines' Bluff, battle of, 379 : 

sad scenes after the battle of, 381. 
Churchhill, Gen. T. J., in command of Fort Hint 
man. Ark. ,386; surrenders the fort to the mill tar 
authorities, 388. 
City Belle, steamer, captiired by the Confederates, 688 
City of New York, steamer, lost at Hatieras, 124. 
City Point, terrific explosion with loss of life at, 756 
meetings of Gens. Grant and Sherman, AdnUral 
Porter, and President Lincoln at, 895. 
Clark, Gov. H. T., counter-proclamation of, to th« 

people of North Carolina, 131. 
Classen, Capt. , operations of, at Fort Gaines, 648. 
Clayton, Col. P., repulses the attack of Marmadoks, 

at Pine Bluff, Ark. , 607. 
Cleburne, Gen., at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; 

at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. 
Clendennin, Gen. , at the battle of Monocacy, 785. 
Clifton and Arizona, gun-boats, captured by the Con- 
federates, 598. 
Coateg, Col. J. H , operations of, at Yazoo city, 615. 
Cobb. Gen. , at the battle of Gaines' mill, 260 ; at tlw 

battle of Fredericksburg, 344. 
Cobb, guerrilla leader, defeated by Col. Merrill, 358 
Cockerell, Gen., captured at Fort Blakely, 893. 
CockereU's brigade at Missionary Ridge, 569. 
CoggBwell, Col., at the battle of Ball's Bluff, 54. 
Colburn, Qen. , defeated by Van Doru and Forrest, 538. 
Cold Harbor, Va. , battle of, 699-702. 
Colquitt, Gen., at the battle of ChanceUorsvLUe, 460 
Colston, Gen. , at the battle of ChanceUorsvLUe, 460. 
Columbia, Tenn., retreat of Gen. Schofield from, 840. 
Columbia, S. C, surrender of, by the mayor to OoL 
Stone, 884 ; disorderly conduct of drunken soldiers 
in, 884 ; great fire in, 885. 
Columbus, Ga. , captured by Gen. Wilson, 874. 
Columbus, Ky., seized by Qen. Polk, 58 ; Confederate 

post at, 80 ; evacuation of, 94. 
Commissioners, South Carolina, correspondence of 

with President Buchanan, 19 
Congress, destroyed by the iron-clad Merrimac, 204. 
Congress, Southern, assembled at Montgomery, 23. 
Cook, Major, isolated with Col. U. Dahlgren, from 

their command, in the Virginia raid, 657. 
Cooke, Capt., his operations with the ram Albe- 
marle at the siege of Plymouth, 869. 
Cooke, Qen. St. Q., at the bactle of Gaines' mill, 261 
Cool Arbor, Va., headquarters of Gen. McCleUan, 286 
Cooper, Adjt.-Gen , iniquity of, 13. 
Cooper, Qen. , defeat of, by Qen. Blunt, 604. 
Coosaw River, obstructions placed on, 76. 
Coosawhatchie River, Gen Slocum at the, 882. 



IN DEX. 



9SS 



Oarinth, description of, 114 ; ersciutioii of, by Beaa- 
regaid, 119 ; battle of, 163-167. 

Gomjm, Dr. , at the battle of ShUoh, 109. 

Corse, Qen., at the battle of Chattanooga, 569 ; ironnd- 
ed at Chattanooga, 570 ; his defense of Allatoona 
pass, 806 ; services of, near Savannah, Ga., 819. 

Coate, N. L., surrenders the cutter WUliam Alien, 18. 

Cotton, J. A., Confederate steamer, destruction of, 435. 

Couch, Gen. D. N., at the battle of Williamsburg, 
214 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235 ; at the battle 
of Malvern hills, 268 ; at the oattle of Fredericks- 
burg, 348 ; at the battle of ChancellorsviUe, 454. 

Courronne, French iron clad, at the fight between the 
Kearsarge and the Alabama, 878. 

Covington, steamer, set on fire and abandoned, 637. 

(>)X, Geo. , at Kanawha valley, 51 ; at the battle of 
South mountain, 315 ; his capture of Fort Ander- 
son, 869. 

Craft, Col. , in the attack on Fort Donelscn, 91. 

Craig, Col., killed at Deep bottom, 761. 

Crampton's Gap, skirmish at, 316. 

Crater of Petersburg mine, scene inside the, 755. 

Craven, Capt., in the attack on Fort St. Philip, 152. 

Craven, Capt. T. A. M., lost in the Tecumseh in 
Mobile bay — biographical sketch of {note), 644. 

Crawford, Qen. , wounded at the battle of Antietam, 
322 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 518 ; at the bat- 
tle of the Wilderness, 663 ; repulse of the Confed- 
erates by, at Shady grove road, 697. 

Cricket, steamer. Confederate attack on the, 633. 

Crist, Col., at Port Koyal ferry, 76. 

Crittenden, U. S. Senator, devotion of, to the Union, 57. 

Crittenden, Gen. T., at Shiloh, 110 ; at the battle of 
PenyvUle, 174 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; 
takes possession of Lafayette, Tenn., 547 ; at the 
battle of Chickamauga, 550. 

Crocker, Lieut. F., failure of the naval expedition m 
charge of, to Sabine city, 598. 

Croker, Gen., at the battle of Champion hills, 411. 

Crook, Qen., defeats Qen. McCausland at Dublin sta- 
tion, 691 ; drives the Confederates tiirough Snick- 
er's gap — at Island ford, 787. 

Crooked Kun, Va., battle of, 791. 

Cross, Col., at the battle of Antietam, 324. 

Cross, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 616. 

Cross Keys, Va., battle of, 251. 

Crowen and Wheeler, batteries of, at the battle of 
Williamsburg, 218. 

Croxton, Gen., in command at Cyprosa creek, 839. 

Crufts, Gen., division of, at Wauhatchie; 566 : at the 
battle of Chattanooga, 568. 

Orutckfield, Col., wounded at ChancellorsviUe, 463. 

Culpepper Coui-t House, arrival of Qen. Pope at, 385 ; 
Qen. Grant's headquarters at, 658. 

Cumberland sunk by the iron-clad Merrimac, 203. 

(.'urtin, Gov., of Pennsylvania, orders aU able-bodie<l 
men to organize for the defense of the State, 309. 



Curtis, Qen., brigade of, in the attack on Fort Piahar, 
866 ; severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. 

Curtis, Gen. S. R., operations of, against Gen. Price, 
97 ; victory of, at the battle of Pea ridge, 98 ; at 
Batesville, Ark., 355 ; arrives at Helena, 357 ; defeat 
of the Confederates at Fayetteville, Mo., by, 833. 

Cushing, Lieut. W. B., destroys the Confederate ram 
Albemarle, in Plymouth harbor, N. C. , 860. 

Custer, Capt. , death of, at Columbia, Ky. , 596. 

Custer, Gen. G. A., raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; repulae 
of, by the Confederates at Sulphur springs brid|^, 
789 ; at Crooked run, 791. 

Cutler, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 608 ; at the 
battle of Jericho ford, 694. 

Cynthiana, Ky., Morgan routed by Qen. Borbridg* 
near, 783. 

D. 

Dabnxt'b HiiiiiS, battle of, 777 ; second battle of, M3. 

Dahlgren, Admiral, his bombardment of Fort Sumtar 
and Fort Wagner, 589, 590. 

Dahlgren, Col., raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; death of, 867. 

Dallas, Ga., Sherman's movement upon, 713. 

Dalton, Gfa., battle of, 708 ; Qen. Johnston evacuates, 
709 ; surrender of the garrison at, to Qen. 
Hood, 808. 

Dam constructed on the Bed river by Col. Bailey to 
facilitate the escape of Porter's vessels, 636. 

Dana, Gen , at York river, 227 ; wounded at the bat- 
tle of Antietam, 323. 

Dana, Gen. N. J. T., in command of expedition to the 
Rio Grande, Tex., 601. 

Danville Railroad, destruction effected on, by Gena 
Wilson and Kautz, 746. 

Davidson, Qen., surrender of Little Bock, Ark., to, 
60C ; expedition of, from Baton Rouge against 
Hood's communications, 852 

Davis, Gen. A., killed at the battle of Fair Oaks, 288 

Davis, Capt. C. H., his naval engagement near ^em. 
phis, 144 ; Memphis surrenders to, 146. 

Davis, Col. , cavalry exploits of, 483. 

Davis, Gen., at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Corinth, Hi ; at 
Murfreesboro, 180. 

Davis, Gen. Je£E. C, operations of, 537 ; at tL* battle 
of Chickamauga, 551 ; capture of Rome, Gta. by, 
712 ; appointed to succeed Gen. Palmer in command 
of the fourteenth corps, 728. 

Davis, JefEerson, cunning of, 12 ; inaugnratfrJ Presi- 
dent of the Confederacy, 23 ; his despatch from 
BuU Run, 45 ; justifies the seizure of Hickhjan and 
Columbus, 58 ; note to Gen. Polk by, 61 ; ttiograpb 
message of, to Gen. Bragg, 120 ; visit of, «o Gen. 
Bragg, at Murfreesboro, 179 ; visit of, to the army, 
at the battle of White Oak Swamp, 265 ; aodresi 
of, to the army in Eastern Virginia, 271 ; sieeah of, 
at Macon, on de«rtion and absent«eisin. 8(-i ; cap 
tui-o of, near Irwiusvillf, Oa. , 947 ; imprii jned %» 
Fortress Monroe. 948. 



?60 



1 iN U Ji A 



Davis* two MiBsissippi regiments captured at Qettys- 

burg, 503. 
Davis' Farm, battle of, 742. 
Decatur, Mo., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. 
Decatur Tenn., Gen. Hood's demonstration against 

the g^arriaou of, 829. 
De Ourcy's, Gen., brigade at Chickasaw bayou, 379. 
Deep Bottom, Va., severe fighting near, 758-761. 
De»p Kun, Va. , battle of, 760. 
Dfwrhound, steam-yacht, picks up the men and officers 

of the Alabama, off Cherbourg, 879. 
D*'nnis, Gen., at the battle of Raymond, 407. 
Denver, Gen., at Corinth, 118. 

De Trobriand, Gen. , at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; 
Confederate position carried by, at Petersburg, 768. 
Desher, Gen. H. , killed at Chickamauga. 554. 
Devens, Col. Chas. at the battle of Ball's bluff, 53 ; 
(Gen.) at the battle of WUliarasburg, 220 ; wounded 
at the battle of ChancellorsvUle, 461. 
Devereui, Col., at Gettysburg, 537. 
Devin, Gen., occupies Staunton, 904 ; cavalry under, 

at Five forks, 910, 912 ; at Sailor's creek, 926. 
Dickey, Capt., killed at Sabine cross roads, 629. 
Oil, Gen., in command at Fortress Monroe, 594. 
Dodge Gen., operations of, 539 ; in command of the 

sixteenth corps under Sherman, 706. 
Doherty, private, bravery and death of. at the battle 

of WUliamsburg, 216. 
Doles, Gen. , at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460. 
Donaldsonville, occupied by the National troops, 
named Fort Butler, 430 ; attempt by the Confeder- 
ates to recapture, 445. 
Doubleday, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Warren- 
ton turnpike, 293 ; at the battle of Antietam, 319 ; 
at the battle of Fredericksburg, 345 ; at the battle 
of Gettysburg, 503. 
Douglass, Col., killed at the battle of Antietam, 320. 
Dowdall's Tavern, rout of the National right at, 462. 
Draft proclamation for 300,000 militia, 283. 
Draper's Dr. , opinion of the Emancipation proclama- 
tion 391, 392 ; his opinion of the losses in the Over- 
land campaign. 704. 
Drayton, Gen. T. F. , in command of Fort Walker, 73. 
Drayton, Commander, operations of, at Fort McAllis- 
ter, 583 ; at MobUe bay, 644. 
Drewry, steamer, destroyed on the James river, 899. 
Duff, guerrilla chief, brutal action of, towards Ger- 
man Unionists, 367. 
Duffie, Gen., captures a portion of Gen. Early's train 

at Snicker's gap, Va. , 787. 
Dug Springs, battle of, 55. 
Duncan, Gen. J. K., in command of the Confederate 

defenses below New Orleans, 14fi. 
Ditnker Church, focus of the battle of Antietam, 319. 
Dunnington, Col., surrenders Fort Hindman, Ark., 388. 
Danovant, Col. K. G. M., at Bay point, 73. 
Dupont, Commodore, in command of fleet at Hampton 



roads, 70 ; fleet of, enters Port Itoyal, 73 ; angnc- 
cossful attempt of, to reach the Savannah river, 76 ; 
expedition of, along the coast of Florida, 141 ; order 
of, to Worden, to attack Fort McAUister, 582 
ordered to attack Charleston. 684 ; his order of 
battle for an attack on the Charleston forts, 585 ; 
superseded by Admiral Dahlgren, 588. 

Dutch Gap Canal, construction of, conmienced by 
Gen. Butler, 757 ; Major LudloVs movement from, 
761 ; faUure of, 899. 

Dwight, Col., at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. 

Dwight, Gen. W., enters Alexandria, La., 438; at 
the attack on Port Hudson, 443, 444 ; at the battle 
of Pleasant hill, 630. 



Eablt, Gen. Jubal A., at the battle of Bull Run. 48 ; 
at the battle of Williamsburg, 219 ; at the battle of 
Fredericksburg, 347 ; at Marye's lull, 473 ; at Salem 
church, 479 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; at 
the salient, 681 ; his invasion of Maryland, 784 ; 
defeats Gen. Lewis Wallace at the battle of Mono- 
cacy, 785, 786 ; defeat of, by Gen. AveriU, 787 , 
attacks Sheridan's force at Summit point, 793 ; de- 
feated Hy Sheridan at Winchester and Fisher's hill, 
798 , retreats to Woodstock and Brown's gap, 797 
his victory over Sheridan's troops at Cedar creek. 
801 ; Sheridan tiirns his victory into defeat, 802 
routed by Sheridan at Waynesboro, 904. 

Eastport, steamer, blown up by the Nationals, 638. 

Eddy, Col., mortally wounded at luka, 161. 

Edentown, N. C, taken possession of by Lieut. A 
Maury. 130. 

Egan, Col., at the battle of ChantiUy, 303. 

Egypt, Miss., capture of by Gen. Grierson, 853. 

Elizabeth City, N. C, description of — expedition oi 
Commander Rowan against, 129. 

Elk Horn, Confederate name for battle of Pea ridge, 97. 

Ellet, Jr. , Col. C. , ram squadron of, joins flotilla of 
Davis, 144 ; operations of, before Memphis, 145. 

Ellet, Gen. A., in command of marine brigade, in the 
Red river expedition, 623. 

Elliott, Capt. S., in command of Fort Beauregard, 73 

Emancipation proclamation issued by President Lin 
coin, 391 ; diversity of opinion regarding, 392. 

Emory, Gen,, division of, at Berwick, La., 437 ; at th«> 
battle of Sabine cross roads, 629 ; at the battle oJ 
Pleasant hill, 630 ; at Washington, 786. 

Ericsson, Capt John, biographical sketch of, 206. 

Evans, Col. , holds the Stone bridge at Bull Run, 40 ; 
Confederate force under, on Goose creek, 53. 

Ewell, Gen. B. S., at Bull Run, 43; pursues Ge« 
Banks to Strasbiirg, 246 ; at the battle of Cross 
keys, 251 ; defeated by Gen. Hooker near Bristow 
station, 291 ; at the battle of Warrenton turnpike. 
393 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 347 ; at the 
ba*'!" of Gettysburg, 504 ; at the battle of the WU 



INDEX. 



961 



derness, 664 ; captured at the battle of Sailor's 

creek, 927. 
Ewing Gen. H. S. his defense of Pilot Knob, 830. 
Explosion, of the Petersburg mine, 754 ; of ordnance 

stores at City point, 756 ; of the principal magazine 

at Fort Fisher, 867 ; at Charleston, 887. 



Paoah, Gen., defeat of, at Independence, Mo., 832. 

Fair Oaks, Va., battle of, 230-241. 

Falmouth, Va., station and bridges at, destroyed by 
fire, 301 ; description of, 339 ; pontoons at, 840. 

Fanny, steam-tug, captured by Confederates, 66. 

FamsTTorth, Col., killed at Gettysburg, 528. 

?arragTit, Admiral D. G., biographical sketch of, 146 ; 
in command of the western gulf squadron, 147 ; 
fleet of, attacks the Mississippi forts. 151 ; official 
report of, of his operations at New Orleans, 155 ; 
operations of, against Vicksburg, 371 ; attack of, 
on the Arkansas ram — bombardment of Donaldsou- 
Tille by, 430 ; sends a naval force to Sabine pass, 
598 ; fleet of, at Mobile, 614 ; reconnoissance of 
Forts Morgan and Gaines made by, 641 ; operations 
of, against the Mobile bay forts, 644. 

Farrand, Commander, surrenders the Confederate 
navy to Admiral Thatcher, 947. 

Faulkner, Col., surrender of Union city to, 616. 

Faxon, Major, killed at the capture of Marye's hUl, 4T5. 

Fayetteville, Mo., Confederates driven from. 833. 

FayetteviUe, N. C, destruction effected at, by Sher- 
man's forces, 889. 

Femandina, Fla., surrender of, to Dupont, 1.^1. 

Ferrero, Gen., his defense of Ejioxville, 570 ; at the 
battle of Bean station, 597. 

Fessenden, Col., wounded at Cane river, 635. 

Fessenden, Senator, action of, prior to the war, 13. 

Finnegan, Gen., defeats Seymour at Olustee, 856, 857. 

Fisher's Hill, Va., battle of, 796. 

Fitch, Lieut. , operations of, on the Cumberland, 537. 

Five Forks, Va., battle of, 916. 

Flag, of the Union, floating in Arkansa.s, 97 ; United 
States, hoisted at Memphis, 146 ; hoLsted at New 
Orleans, 156 ; the old, restored to Fort Sumter, 887. 

Florida, Confederate cruiser, operations of the, 876. 

Floyd, J. B., strange conduct of, while secretary of 
war, 12 ; implication of, in the Indian trust fund 
defalcation, 19 ; (Qen.) assumes command of the 
Confederate forces, 51 ; outnumbered at Camifei 
ferry, 52 ; at Fort Donelson, 85 ; flight of, 93. 

Foote, Admira. A. H., leaves Cairo, 83 ; capture of 
Fort Henry by, 84 ; moves up the Cumberland, 86 ; 
at Fort Donelson, 88 ; fleet of, returns to Cairo, 89 ; 
expedition of, to Fort Pillow, 143 ; retires from 
Fort Pillow, 144. 

Ford, Col. T. H., in command of forces on Maryland 
heights, 813 ; retires to Harper's ferry — dijmissed 
from the service, 314 



Forrest, Qen. N. B., cavalry of, at Port Donelson, »0 
raids by, in Kentucky and Tennessee, 170 ; plunder, 
ing expeditions of, 188 ; raid by, on Davis' mills, 
374 ; operations of, 538 ; exploit of, 540 ; at the 
battle of Chickamauga, 550 ; in eonunand of the 
cavalry ot North Mississippi, 611 ; his attack on 
Gen. W. S. Smith, 613 ; bis capture of Fort Pillow, 
618 ; defeats Gen. Sturgis, at Gum town, 619 : hi« 
raid upon Memphis, 620 ; operations of, in Middle 
Tennessee, 827, 828, 837, 838 ; routed by Gen. WU- 
son, near Boyle's creek, 874. 

Forman, Major, affair of, with Indians, 368. 

Fort Alexander, Va., capture of, 918. 

Fort Anderson, N. C, siege and capture of, 860. 

Fort Blakely, MobUe, faU of, 873. 

Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, burned and abandoned by 
the Confederates, 141. 

Fort Barton, N. C. , bombardment of, by Goldsborough, 
126 ; capture of, 128. 

Fort Beauregard, S. C. , abandoned by the Confeder- 
ates and the National flag raised over, 74 

Fort Caswell, N. C. , blown up by the Confederates, 867 

Fort Clark, N. C, abandoned, 64. 

Fort Clinch, Fla., surrender of, 141. 

Fort Darling, Va., battle of, 689. 

Fort de Kussy, La., in possession of the Confedermten, 
597 ; capture of, by Gen. A. J. Smith, 624. 

Fort Donelson, Tenn., description of, 85 ; operationa 
against, 88 ; surrender of, 94. 

Fort Esperanza. Tex., taken by Gen. Washburne, 601. 

Fort Fisher, N. C, unsuccessful expedition of Gena. 
Butler and Weitzel and Admiral Porter against, 
861-863 ; capture of, by Gen. Terry and Admiral 
Porter, 864-«67. 

Fort Forrest, N. C, Curlew steamer beached an<! 
blown op at, 126, 128. 

Fort Gaines, Ala., surrender of, by Col. Anderson, 648. 

Fort Gilmer, Va. , repulse of colored brigade at, 770. 

Fort Gregg, S. C. , abandoned by the Confederates, 693 

Fort Gregg, Va., assault and capture of, 918. 

Fort Hatteras, N. C. , surrender of, 65. 

Fort Heiman, on the Tennessee river, steamboats cap- 
tured at, by Forrest, 837. 

Fort Henry, Tenn., in charge of Gen. Tilghman, 83 ; 
capture of, 84. 

Fort Hindman, Ark., commanded by (ien. T. J. Church 
hill — surrender of. to Admiral Porter, 388, 

Fort Huger, Ala., abandoned by the Confederates, 871, 

Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, La., description of, 
149, surrender of, to Capt. Porter, 15."). 

Fort McAllister, Ga., unsuccessful attacks on, 682, 
583 ; capture of by Gen., Hazen. 822. 

Fort Macon, N. C, description of, 135 ; capture of, 137. 

Fort McRae, Pensacola, silenced, 68 ; buraed and 
abandoned by the Confederates, 141. 

Fort McBae, Va., capture of, 772. 

Fort MagTuder Va. occupied by the Na.ioiuJa, 281, 



96S 



INDEX, 



ITort Marion, Fla., surrender of. to ccminaDder C. R. 
P. Rodgere, 141. 

Fort Morgan, N. C, destroyed, 66. 

Fort Morgan, A]a., surrender of, to the Natioual.s, 649. 

Fort Moultrie, S. C, abandoned by Major Ander- 
I son, 16. 

Fort Ocracoke, N. C. , destroyed, 66. 

Fort Pemberton. Miss., unsuccessful attack on, 3!tT. 

Fort Pickena, in charge of Col. Harvey Brown, 68. 

Fort Pillow, Tenn. , abandoned by the Coufedprates, 
114 ; again deserted by the Confederates, 144 ; de- 
scription of. 617 ; capture of, by assault and mas- 
sacre of the garrison by Gen. Forrest, 018. 

Fort Powell, Ala., abandoned and blown up, 647. 

Fort Powell, Miss, captured by the Confederates, 
165 ; retaken by the Nationals, 166. 

Fort Pulaski, Ga., in the hands of the Confederates, 
76 ; capture of, 140. 

Fort Randolph, Tenn., surrender of , 145. 

Fort Richardson, Miss., constructed b^ snppers and 
miners at the battle of ('orinth, 164. 

Fort Robinett, Miss., Van Dom under fire fp^w the 
guns of, at the battle of Corinth, 163. 

Fort St. Philip, La., see Fort Jackson. 

Fort St. Philip, N. C, abandoned, 869. 

Fort Sanders, Tenn,, attacked by the Coufederaif^ 
576 ; death of Gen. W. P. Sanders a'. (;«><«), 578. 

Fort Sedgwick, Va., operations in the neigh borhoor 
o£ 779. 

Fort Steadman, Petersburg, capture and recapture of, 
907. 

Fort Strong. Ala,, deserted by the Confederates, 869. 

Fort Sumter, description of — occupied by Major An- 
derson, 12 , Gen. Beauregard's demand for the sur- 
render of, 26 ; surrendered, 31 ; a shapeless mass 
of ruins, 591 ; abortive attempt of the Nationals to 
take possession of, 592. 

Fort Thompson, N. C, attack of Gen. Foster on, 132 ; 
Confederates driven from, 134. 

Fort Tracy, Ala., abandoned by the Confederates, 871. 

Fort Wagner, S. C., operations of Gen. Oillmore 
against, 589 ; bombardment of, by Admiral Dahl- 
gren, 590 ; evacuation of, by the Confederates, 592. 

Fort Walker, S. C, abandoned, 74. 

Fort Warren, N. C, captured by Gen. Hoke, 868. 

Fort Weasels, N. C, captured by Gen. Hoke, 859. 

Fort William, Miss., Van Dorn under fire from the 
guns of, at the battle of Corinth, 166. 

Fortress Monroe, headquarters of Gen, Butler, 86 ; 
armaments sent to, 194. 

Foster, Gen. J. G., part taken by, in capture of Roa- 
noke, 126 ; at New Berne, 132 ; appointed military 
governor of New Berne, 135 ; operations of, 694 ; 
Uvlsion of, at Deep Bottom, 743 ; his movement 
againjrt the Charleston and Savannah railroad, 830 ; 
dty aad forts of Savannah transferred t - ^y Qen. 
ShDmaii, 881. 



Foster, Major, defeat of, by Coffee and Hughes a^ 
Lone Jack, Mo., 359 

Fouke, Col., at the battle of Belmont, 60. 

Fox, Oustavus O., plan of, to relieve Fort Sumter, 26, 

Franklin, Gen. W. B,, at Bull Run, 43 ; operations on 
the York river, 226 ; at the battle of White Oak 
Swamp, 265 ; at Crampton's gap, 31G ; at the battle 
of Antietam, 332 ; at the battle of Fredericksbuig, 
345 ; relieved of his command, 354 ; at Sabine pass, 
598 ; ordered to Opelousas, 599 ; expedition to 
Shreveport in charge of, 623 ; at the battle of 
Sabine cross roads, 628. 

Franklin, Tenn., Gen. Schofield at, 840; battle of 
843 ; losses at, 843. 

Frazier. Gen., surrender of Cumberland gap by, 545, 

Frederick, Md., Gen. Lee's army encamped near, 308 ; 
Confederates driven from, 785 

Fredericksburg, Va., evacuation of, by Gen. Bumside, 
301 ; absence of pontoons prevents the capture of. 
339 ; demand by Summer for the surrender of, 340 ; 
bombardment of, by order of Gen. Burnside — de- 
scription of, 342 ; battle of, 343-861. 

Fremont, Gen. John C. , appointed to the command of 
the Western department, 55 ; relieved of his com- 
mand, 56 ; in command of the Mountain depart- 
ment, 193 ; advance of, attacked by Gen. Jackson, 
251 ; relieved of his command, 277. 

r-euch, Geu., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239; at 
the battle of Gaines' mill, 260 ; at Antietam, 834 ; 
ft the battle of Fredericksburg, 348 ; at the battle 
of ChancellorsviUe. 470; pursuit of Gen. Le« 
b,'- .'538. 

FreccH, Qen., at Blackwater, 598 • at Brandon, Gil ; 
demardr the surrender of AUatoona pass, 806. 

Front Roy*l irovement of Oen. Jackson against, 248 , 
engagement nenr 790. 

Q. 

Gadbdkn, Ala., ani' of Gen. Hood at, 809. 

Gaines' MUl, battle of, 350-261. 

Gainesville, (or Grove*ou.\ battle of, 295 ; cnlpabl* 

absence of Gen, Porter from, 296. 
Galveston, in charge of Comijiodore Renshaw, 482 

recapture of, by Gen. MagTpd«r, 432-434. 
Gardiner, Col., in command of Cbirlaston harbor, 12 
Gardner, Gen. F., in command at Port Hudson, 441 

entreated to surrender by Oen Baoka 448 ; any 

render of Port Hudson by, 446-447. 
Garesclie, Col., killed at Murtreesboro, 186. 
Garfield, Gen. J. A., appointed chief of staff to Bose 

cranz, 18S ; heroic conduct at Chickamauga, 555. 
Garnett, Gen., at Laurel hill, 49 ; killed at the battl» 

of Carrack's ford, 50. 
Garnett, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 528. 
Geary, Col. J. W., skirmish of, at Harper's ferry, 52; 

occn[iies Harper's ferry, 242; (Gen.) at the battle of 

Gettysburg, 522; at Wauhatchie, 660-566; at th» 



INDEX. 



963 



bstue of Chattanooga, 568 : appointed military 
aommandef of Savannah, 835 
j«orffotown, S. C, evacuated by the Confederates — 

taken posgessinn of by Admiral Dahlpfren, 888. 
-jwirgla. Confederate cruiser, captured by the Na- 
tional frigate Niaa;ara, oflf, Lisbon, 876. 

.1etty, (Jen. , at Suffolk, 594 ; wounded at the battle of 
the Wilderness, 672. 

Gettysburg, Pa., description of, .501 ; battle of. .503-5.33. 

Oholson, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 317 ; 
killed at Egypt, Miss., 8.5.3. 

Oibbon, Gen., at the battle of Warrenton turnpike, 
M3 : at the battle of Fredericksburg, .345 ; at the 
attack on Marye's hill, 47.3 ; at the battle of Gettys- 
burg, 535 ; wounded. 538. 

Glibson, Gen. R., in command of the Confederates 
at Spanish fort, Mobile, 870 ; evacuates the 
fort, 871. 

•9Ubert Gen., at the battle of Perryville, 174 , at 
the battle of Franklin, 538. 

SiUem, Gen., surprise and capture of Morgan at 
Greenville by, 835 ; defeat of, by Breckenridge, 836. 

4tllmore, Gen. Q. A., services of, at the siege of Fort 
Pulaski, 138, 189 ; his defeat of Pegrara. 544 ; su- 
persedes Gen. Hunter at Charleston. 588 ; opera- 
tions of, against the defenses of Charleston, 589 ; 
opens fire on Charleston, 591 ; secures the blockade 
of Charleston, 593 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687 ; his 
movements against Petersburg, 736 ; authorized to 
undertake operations in Florida, 855 ; operations 
of, ag;ainst Charleston, 886 ; surrender of the city 
of Charleston, with all the harbor forts to, 887. 

lUmore, Ijeut., raid of, into Maryland, 786. 

Qilpin, Col. C, drives the Confederates from Freder- 
ick, Md., 785. 

Gist, Gen., at the battle of Chickamanga, 550. 

Gladden, Gen., killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. 

Olendale, or Frazier's Farm, battle of, 265. 

Goldsboro, N. C. junction of Schofield's and Sherman's 
forces at, 894. 

Qoldsborongh, flag officer, biographical sketch of — 
intrusted with the expedition to Pamlico sound, 
133 ; operations of, at Sewall's point, 238. 

Gooding, Col., at the battle of PerryviUe, 177. 

Gordon's Landing, ojwrations of Farragut at, 439. 

Gorman, Gen., expedition of, on the White river, 389. 

Graham, Gen. , at the battle of Gettysburg. 511. 

Grand Coteau. La., battle of, 599. 

Grand Gulf, Miss., operations of Gen. Grant at, 403 ; 
telegram of Gen. Grant to Gen Halleck from, 407 ; 
batteries at, engaged by Farragut, 439. 
hunger. Gen. (i., at Corinth, 119; operations of, 
588. 543 • at the battle of Culckamauga, 556 ; re- 
luctance of, to relieve Buruaide, 577 ; at Mobile 
harbor, 642 ; surrender of Forte Gaines and Morgan 
to, (M8, «4» ; his pursuit of Buford, 828 ; corps of, 
tt tke final operations a^falnst Mobile, 870. 



Grant. Gen. U 8,. in command at Ca'ro — takes poe 
session of Paducah. and attacks Belmont, 59 , pre 
pares to attack Fort Henry. 83 ; marches on Fort 
DoneJson, 86 ; surrender of Fort Donelson to. 94 ' 
in command of the district of West Tennessee, 98 
removed from his command. 99 ; in command at 
Savannah, Tenn., 101 ; at Shiloh. 105 ; becomes 
commander-in-chief in the west, 159 ; Jackson, 
Tenn., headquarters of, 370 ; at La Grange, 371 : 
meeting of, and Sherman at Columbus — head 
quarters of, at Oxford, Miss., 373 ; La Grange re 
entered by, 374 ; operations of, preparatory tt 
attack on Vicksburg, 394-401 ; at the battle of 
Champion hills, 410 ; assault ordered by, on Vicks- 
btirg, 415 ; another assault made by, 417 ; report 
of, 419 ; siege of Vicksburg determined upon by, 
420 ; surrender of Vicksburg to, 434-426 ; (note) 
436 ; appointed to the command of the new military 
division of the Mississippi, 558 ; at Chattanotjga, 
559 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; despatch 
of, 574 ; visit of, to Gen Banks, 597 ; appointed 
lieutenant-general, 651 ; takes command of the 
army of the Potomac, 653 ; command of the ai mies 
of the United States assumed by, 653 ; statf of, 
659 ; operations of. in Virginia, 660-705 ; operations 
of, against Petersburg, 735-781 ; his final operations 
against Petersburg and Richmond, 898-931 ; his 
pursuit of Gen. Lee. till the surrender at Appomat 
tox court house, 922-934 ; his correspondence >ritl 
Lee, relative to terms of surrender. 930, 931, 983 
934 ; his losses during the campaign, 935 ; order of 
on the disbandment of the army, 951, 952. 

Gravelly Run, Va., battle of, 913. 

Graves. Major, mortally wounded at the battle of 
Chickamauga, 554. 

Green, Gen. T. . depredations of, 598 ; at Wiidon'j 
farm, 637 ; killed at Pleasant hill landing, 639. 

Greene, Gen. at the battle of Gettysburg, 519. 

Gregg, Gen., at Port Royal ferry, 76 ; mortally 
wounded at the battle of Fredericksburg, 346. 

Gregg, Col. . cavalry exploits of. 493 ; engageme-'. of, 
with Gen. Stuart. 490 ; at the battle of Gettys- 
burg, 538 ; (Gen.) wounded at the battle of the 
WUdemess, 673 ; at the battle of Trevillian, 708 ; 
his raid to Stony creek station, 779. 

Gregg, Gen. . at the battle of Raymond, Miss, 407. 

Gregory, acting-master, gallant fight of, with 8 Con- 
federate gun-boat, 144. 

Qrierson, Gen. B. H. , cavalry exploit of, 401 ; opera 
tions of, near Port Hudson, 438 ; at Memphis, 613 
at Gum town, 619 ; his expedition from Memphi 
against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 852. 

Griffin, Gen., reconuoissance of, after the battle of 
Antietam, 331 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville 
455 ; at the battle of Jericho ford, 694. 

Qrifflths, Serg. T. , daring action of, at Vickaborg. 41 "3 

ariswoldTille.Ga., battle of. 81S. 



H< 



IMDEX. 



aroTer, (ien., at the battle of Williamsbnig, 216; 
brigade of, at the battle of Gainesville, 296 ; divi- 
sion of, moves up tne Atchafalaya, 437 ; at the at- 
tack on Port Hudson, 441, 443, 444. 

Groveton, Va., or Gainesville, battle of, 295. 

Guerrilla warf.ire, in Missouri, 358 ; in Arkansas, 
859 ; in Texas, 366. 

Muitar, Col., defeats Poindexter, the guerrilla, 358. 

9iun Town, defeat of Gen. Sturgisby Forrest at, 620. 

H. 

EIackblman, Gen., killed at Corinth, Miss., 164 

Hagerstown, Md., stores in, plundered by Early, 784 

Haines' Bluff, abandoned by the Confederates, 414 

Halleck, Gen. H. W., takes charge of the western de- 
partment. 56; in Mis.'^ouri 80: plan of, to attack 
the Confederates, 83 ; takes command of the army 
of the Tennessee. 116 ; advance of, to Corinth, 119 ; 
in command of the troops in the valley of the Mis- 
sissippi, 193 ; generalin-chief of the entire army 
of the United States, 273 : appointed chief of staff 
at Washington, 653. 

Hamilton, Gen., division of, at the battle of luka, 
161 ; at the battle of Corinth, 163. 

Hampton, Col. Wade, at the battle of Bull Run, 43 ; 
(Oen. ) at the battle of Gettysburg, 528; at Hawe's 
store, 697 ; cattle carried off by, from Sycamore 
church, 769 ; compels Gen. Warren to withdraw 
from Hicksford, 781 ; orders all the cotton in Colum- 
bia, S. C, to be burned, 885 ; his refusal to abide 
by the terms of capitulation of Gen. Johnston, 947. 

cl&mpton Koads, land and naval armament in. 70 ; 
fleet in, proceeds to sea, 71 ; expedition of Burnside 
and Qoldsborough leaves, 124 ; naval engagement 
Between the Merrimac and the Monitor in. 307-211. 

Hancock, Gen. W. S., at the battle of Williamsburg 
218 ; biographical sketch of (note), 221 ; at the bat- 
tle of Savage's station, 263 ; at the battle of Fred- 
ericksburg, 348 : at the battle of Chancellorsville. 
469 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 506 ; wounded, 
i28 ; takes command of the Second army corps. 658 ; 
wounded at the Wilderness, 672 ; placed tempo- 
rarily in charge of the Middle military division, 903. 

Sanover Court House, battle of, 231. 

tiardee, Gen., at the battle of Shiloh, 105 ; at Chatta- 
nooga, 171 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 183 ; at 
the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; at the battle of 
Resaca, Ga., 709 ; at the battle of Jonesboro, 732 ; 
his evacuation of Savannah, 823 ; his evacuation of 
Charleston, 886 ; defeated at Averysboro, 891. 

Bardie, Gen., at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344. 

Harding, Col. A. , his defense of Fort Donelson, 587. 

Barker, Gen., killed at Kenesaw mountain, 715. 

Harper's Ferry, Va., seized by the Richmond authori- 
ties, 48 ; Johnston evacuates, 49 ; description of, 
813 ; siege and surrender of, 314 ; Col. Miles mor- 
tallT wounded at the sieffe of, 314 ; fatal effect of 



the surrender of. 314, 315 ; stores at, in tlie pot;««5 
slon of the Confederates, 316 ; Confederates leav* 
317 ; recapture of, by the Nationals, 832. 

Harriet Lane steamer, sent to the relief of Fort Sum 
ter, 26 ; capture of, at Galveston, 433. 

Harris. Col. L. A., at the battle of Perryville, 177 

Harrisburg, Pa., excitement at, 4S2. 

Harrison, Col., defeats Cabell, at Fayetteville, 603 

Harrison, Col., cavalry operations of, against Porter 
fleet, descending the Red river, 632. 

Harrow, Gen., at vhe battle of Gettysburg, 527. 

Hartsuff, Gen., wounded at Antietam, 320, 

Haskell, Col., killed at Cold harbor, 701. 

Hatch, Gen. John P., expedition of, against !:.•>■ 
Charleston and Savannah railroad, 820. 

Hatcher's Run, battle of. 777 ; second battle of, 91)3 

Hatchie, battle of the, 167. 

Uatteras, expedition of Butler and Stringham ,o, 6." 

Hawkins, Col., left in charge at Hatteras, 65. 

Hawkins, Col., surrender of Union city, Tenn. by, 616 

Hawley, Col., at the battle of Olustee, Fla., 857. 

Hay, Major John, with the expedition to Florida, 8.56 

Haycock, Major, killed at Marye'shill, 475. 

Hayes' brigade, at the Weldon railroad, 763. 

Hayne, Col. , in the attack on Fort Donelson, SO. 

Hays, Gen. Alex., at Gettysburg, 519 ; killed at tlv< 
battle of the Wilderness {note), 666. 

Hazard, Capt., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; mot 
tally wounded at White Oak swamp, 265. 

Hazard, Commander 9. G., with expedition of Bum 
side and Goldsboro, 123. 

Hazard, Gen., repulse of, by Gen. Terry, 590. 

Hazel Grove, Va., abandoned by Gen. Hooker, 467 

Hazen, Col., brigade of, at the battle of Shiloh, 110 ; 
at the battle of Murfreesboro, 185 ; at the battle ol 
Chickamauga, 550 ; (Gen.) at Wauhatchie, 559 ; at 
Chattanooga, 572 ; captures Fort McAllister, 822. 

Hazlitt, Capt., killed at Gettysburg, 513. 

Heckman, Gen., made prisoner at Bermuda hundred. 
689. 

Heintzelman, Gen., at Bull Run, 39 ; in command ni 
a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at the 
battle of Williamsburg, 214 ; bandB ordered by. to 
strike up national and martial airs (tioU), 221 ; at 
the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Sav- 
age's station, 263 ; at the battle of Glendale, 265 ; 
at the battle of Gainesville, 295. 

Helena, Aik. , attack on, by Price and Marmadnke, 605 

Henry, Col., repulse by, of Hoke's brigade, before 
Petersburg, 745 ; at the battle of Olustee, &57. 

Herbert, Gen. h.. at the battle of Corinth, 164 

Herron, Gen. F. I. , at the battle of Prairie grove, 362 
operations of, 598 ; operations of (note), 607. 

Heth, Gen., at Gettysburg, 525 ; at the battle of tb« 
Wilderness, 666 ; at the battle of Jericho ford, 994 

Hickman, Ky., seized by Gen. Polk, 58. 

Hicbman. Miss., capture of, by the Confederates. 618 



INDEX. 



965 



BiekB, CoL S. Q., afiair of, at Fort Anderson, 616. 

Hicksford, Va., Gen. Warren withdraws from, 781. 

Biggins, Col. , in command of Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip, 148 ; surrenders to Porter, 155. 

Higginson, CoL, at Edisto, S. C, 589. 

Highlanders, 7»th N. T., at Bull Run, 44; at Port 
Royal, 76 ; at ChantUly, 303 ; at KnoxTille (note), 578. 

Hildebrand's brigade, at the battle of Shiloh, 106. 

Hill, Gen. A. P. , at the battle of MechanicsviUe, 258 ; 
at the battle of Gaines" mill, 259 ; at the battle of 
Glendale, 265 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 296 ; at 
the battle of Antietam, 327 ; at the battle of 
Fredericksburg, 343 ; wounded at batWe of Chan- 
ceUorsrille, 464 ; at battle of Gettysburg, 503 ; at 
battle of the Wilderness, 666 ; killed at the final 
assault on the lines before Petersburg (note), 919. 

nil. Gen. D. H., at ihe battle of Williamsburg, 219 ; 
at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234 ; at the battle of 
Gaines' mill, 260 ; at battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; 
at battle of Antietam, 818 ; ordered to attack Little 
Washington, 594. 

Hilton Head, 8. C, Gen. Thos. W. Sherman makes 
improvements at, 75 ; Gen. W. T. Sherman at, 882. 

Hindman, Gen., killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. 

Hindman, Gen. T. C, guerrillas commanded by, 359 ; 
at the battle of Prairie grove, 363 ; retreat of, 366. 

Hlnks, Gen., division of, at City point, Va., 686. 

Hobson, Gen., his pursuit of Gen. Morgan, 595 ; his 
entire command captured by Morgan, 783. 

Holland, Gen., at battle of Springfield, Mo., 602. 

Hollins, Capt., boast of, 68 ; at Fort Pillow, 148. 

Holmee, Gen., at Bull Run, 43. 

Sood, (Jen. J. B. , at the battle of Fredericksburg, 
843 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; at the battle 
of Chickamauga, 549 ; at the battle of Resaca, 709 ; 
supersedes Johnston on Sherman's approach to 
Atlanta, 719 ; evacuates Atlanta, 732 ; protests 
against Sherman's order for the removal of civilians 
from Atlanta, 734 ; reorganizes his forces at Jonee- 
boro, 804 ; moves westward on Sherman's commun- 
ications, 805 ; retreats into Northern Alabama, 808; 
his disastrous campaign against Thomas, 837-851 , 
hJB total defeat at Nashville, 843-847 ; pursued by 
Wilson's cavalry to the Tennessee river, 847-849 ; 
pursued by CoL Palmer, 849 ; his losses in the Ten- 
nessee campaign, 860; relieved of his command, 851. 

hoKe Gen. , at the battle of Gettysburg, 519 ; atti'mpts 
H) regain possession of Cold harbor, 698 ; his 
anack upon Forts Warren and Wessels, 858 ; his 
(lege of Plymouth, N. C, 868 ; captures Ply- 
month — abandons the siege of New Berne, 859 ; 
attempts to relieve Fort Fisher, 867 ; evacuates 
Wilmington, 869. 

Hooker, Gen. Jos., at the battle of Williamsburg, 
214 ; vain appeal of, to Gen. Sunmer for help, 217 ; 
biographical sketch of (Twte), 220 ; division of, sus- 
'«in8 severe loss, 221 ; at the battle of Fair Oaka, 



889 ; at the battle of Glendale, 266 ; defeats EweU 
near Bristow station, 291 ; at the battle of Gaises- 
ville, 295 ; wounded at the battle of Antietam, 821; 
at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344-849 ; grand 
charge of, 350 ; assumes command of the anny of 
the Potomac, 364 ; past career and personal appear 
ance of, 449, 450 ; address of, to the army of the 
Potomac, 451 ; army of, takes posit' on at Chancel 
lorsville, 454 ; boast of (note), 4!k. ; fatal blunde? 
of, 456 ; struck by a cannon ball, 470 ; retreats 
across the Rappahannock, 481 ; address of, to the 
army of the Potomac, 484 ; relieved of his com- 
mand, 495 ; farewell address of, to the army, 495, 
496 ; at Nashville, 559 ; at Wauhatchie. 556 , *t 
Lookout mountain, 566, 567 ; at the battle of Chat 
tanooga. 568 ; in command of the twentieth corpf 
under Sherman, 706 ; resigns his command, 728. 

Houston, Col. , at the battle of Prairie grove, 365. 

Hovey, Gen A. P., defeats Gen. Rust on the White 
river, 356 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 381 ; wounded at 
Arkansas post, 387 ; at Champion hills, 410. 

Howe, Gen., at the attack on Marye's hUl, 473. 

Howard, Gen. O. O., brigade of, at the battle of Bull 
Run, 43 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; wounded 
at Fair Oaks, 240 ; at the battle of Fredericksbivrg, 
348 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville, 453 ; at the 
battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; at Wauhatchie, 560 ; 
commands the fourth corps under Sherman, 706 ; 
in command of the army of the Tennessee, 727. 

Huger, Gen., flight of, from Norfolk, Va., 2?9 ; at 
Fair Oaks, 234-239 ; at White Oak swamp, ?65. 

Hughes, guerrilla chief, surprises the garrison of In 
dependence. Mo., 359. 

Humphrey, Gen. Andrew A, at the battle of Chan 
cellorsville, 455 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 

Hunter. Gen. David, succeeds Gen. T. W. Sherman. 
139 ; surrender of Fort Pulaski to, 140 ; at Jamee 
island, 580 ; superseded by Gen. Mitchell. 581 ; 
resumes command of the department of the South, 
582 ■ ordered to attack Charleston, 584 ; unable tt 
a.ssist Dupont, 587 ; removed from command, 588 
defeats Jones and McCauslaud at Piedmont, 69£ 

Huntsville. Mo., battle of, 602. 

Huntsville, Tenn., threatened by Gen. Buford, 828. 

Huntsville, ram, sunk by the Confederates, 873, 

Hurlbut, Gen. Stephen A., at Pittsburg landing, 101 ' 
at Corinth, 118 ; near Pocahontas, 162 ; victory 
at the Hatchie, 167 ; at Memphis, 609 ; le 
charge of expedition, at Meridian, 614 

I. 
Ihboden, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 681. 
Immel's battery, at the battle of Corinth, 166. 
Independence, Mo., captured by guerrillas, 859. 
Indian Territory, active hostUities in, 367. 
IngaUs, Chief Quarter-master, at Port Royal, S. 
Tngraham, flag-officer, proclamation of 584. 



d66 



INDEX. 



Island Ford, Va., battle of, 787. 

Island No. 10, in charge of PoUc, 83 ; Burrender of, 96. 

[uks. Miss.. de8<«i|>tion of, 159 ; abandoned by the 

Nationala, 160 ; battle of, 161. 
Irerson, Uen., at the battle of ChancelloreTille, 46U. 



'ACK80N, Gen. J. S., killed at Perryrille, Ey., 176. 

fsckson, Gen. T. J. (Stonewall), at Bull Kun, 43 ; 
operations of, in the valley of the Shenandoah, 243- 
345 ; retreat of, before the forces of Fremont and 
Shields, 249 ; biograpliical sketch of {note), 253 , at 
Hanover court house, 257 ; at the battle of Gaines' 
mill, 260 ; at the battle of White Oak swamp, 265 ; 
retreat of, after the battle of Cedar mountain, 287 ; 
at the battle of Antietam, 319 ; at the battle of 
Fredericksburp. 340 ; attack of, on Gen. Hooker at 
Chancellorsville, 461 ; mortally wounded, 463 ; re- 
marks on the character of (note), 464. 

Jackson, Confederate ram, destruction of, 874. 

Jackson, Miss., capture of, by Gen. Grant's forces, 
409 ; evacuation of, by Gen. Johnston (note), 427 ; 
precipitate retreat of the Confederates from, 611. 

Jacksonville, Fla., taken possession of by the Na- 
tionals, 141 ; occupied by Gen. c<eyinour, 856 ; stores 
at, destroyed by Seymo ir, 858. 

James Island, occupied, 580 ; abandoned, 681. 

James River, Magruder'e forces on the, 195 ; National 
gun boats on the, 229 ; Butler moves up the, 686 ; 
crossed by the army of the Potomac, 704. 

James River Canal, damaged by CoL Wyndham, 488' 
locks and banks of, destroyed by Sheridan, 905. 

Jameson, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 218. 

Jeffers, Lieut., operations of, at the mouth of the 
Chesapeake and Albemarle canal, ISO. 

Jenkins, Gen. A. G., at Chambersburg, Pa., 494; 
killed at the battle of the Wilderness, 673. 

Jenkins' Ferry, Ark., battle of, 640. 

Jericho Ford, Va., battle of, 694. 

Jettersville, Oen. Sheridan at, 924. 

Johnson, Andrew, sworn into office as president, 940. 

Johnsonville, Tenn., destruction of stores at, caused 
by Forrest — arrival of Schofield at, 838. 

Johnson, Gen. B. T., encounters Kilpatrick at Beaver 
dam station, 656 ; his raid towards Baltimore, 786. 

Johnson, Uen. E., at the battle of Gettysburg, 519 ; 
captured at Spottsylvania, 681. 

Johnson, Gen. K. W., at the battle of Murfreeaboro, 
180 ; operations of, 542 ; at the battle of CTiicka- 
mauga, 550 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 572. 

'ohnston, Col., surrenders the fort at Dalton. 808. 

'ohnston. Gen. A. S., strong position held by, 80 ; 
strength of his army, 83 ; his letter to Jefferson 
Davis, 95 ; proclamation of, on assuming command 
of the Confederate army, 103 ; killed at the battle 
of ShUoh, 108. 

Johaston, Gen. Jos. E. in the vallev of the Shenan- 



doah, 86 ; in command at Winchester, 36 ; deeeivet 
Patterson, 89 ; gains the battle of Bull Bun, 46 
at Harper's ferry, 48 ; evacuates Harper's ferry, 49 
Manassas evacuated by, 193 ; at the battle of Wil 
liamsburg, 217 ; retreat of, 223 ; at the battle oi 
Fair Oaks, 234 ; instructions of, to Pemberton, 
408; forces of, at Dalton, Ga., 707, tivacuation of 
Daltou by, 709 ; retreat of, to Besaca, 711 ; at Alia 
toons pa.ss, 713 ; at Kenesaw mountain, 714 ; at 
the Chattahoochee river, 717 ; retires to Atlanta, 
718 ; removed from his command, 719 ; defeat of 
by Slocum near Bentonville — retreats t" "mithfic'd 
893 ; surrenders his army to Sherman, •„ i". 

Joinville, Prince de at Williamsburg. 224. 

Jones, Gen. Sam., killed in the Wilderness, 672. 

Jones, Gen. W. E., killed at Piedmont, 692. 

Jonesboro, Ga. , battle of, 731. 

Jouett, Capt., captures the Selma in Mobile Bay, 64& 

Jnda, schooner, burning of the, at Santa Rosa, 67 

Judah, Gen. his pursuit of Gen. Morgan, 696 : at fht 
battle of Resaca, Ga., 710. 



Kautz, Gen. A. V., operations of, against the Weldon 
railroad, 686 ; raid of, 691 , movement of, against 
Petersburg, 737 ; his command surprised and routed 
on the Charles City road, 773 

Kearney, Gen. Phil., at the battle of Williamsburg, 
214 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle 
of Glendale, 266 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 295 : 
killed at the battle of ChantiUy, 803 ; biographical 
sketch of (note), 305. 

Kearsarge, corvette, sinks the Alabama, 879. 

KeUy, Gen. B. F., valor of, at Philippi, W. Va., 49 
reoocupies Marttnsburg, Va., 788. 

Kemper, Gen., at Qettysbtirg, 525 ; wounded, 528. 

Keneaaw Mountain, situation of, 713 ; battle of, 715. 

Kenly, Gen. J. R., defeat of, at Front Royal, a47 
brigade of, panic stricken at Berryville, 791 . 

Kentucky, coveted by the Confederacy — legislature 
of, refuses to call a convention, 56 ; loyalty of, 57 

Keokuk, iron clad, destruction of the, 587. 

Kernstown, battle of, 243 ; skirmishing at, 788. 

Kershaw, Gen., defeat of, at Strawberry plains, 754 

Keyes, Gen. E. D., at Bull Ron, 43 ; in command oi 
a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at the 
battle of Fair Oaks, 236. 

Kilpatrick, Gen. Judflon, cavalry exploits of, 483 ; a 
the battle of Gettysburg, 528 ; raid of in Virgiuir 
656 ; wounded at Sugar valley, Ga., 709 ; his at, 
tempt on West Point and Macon railroads, 729 
defeats Wheeler at Waynesboro, 818 ; skirmish of 
with Wheeler at Aiken, 883 ; narrow escape of 
from Wade Hampton, at Fayetteville, 889. 

King, Gen. Rnfus, joins Pope at Culpepper, 284 
at Warrenton turnpike, 293 ; at GaineeviUe, 896 

Kinston, N. C, battle of, 884. 



INUEA. 



KirkBvlUe, Mo., battle of, 358. 
Kleim, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 230. 
" Knights of the Golden Circle," in Missouri, 829. 
Knoxville Tenn., occupied by the Nationals, 544 ; 

siege of, by Longstreet, 575 ; siege raised. 578. 
Kulp House, near Marietta, Ga., battle of, 715. 



LAtfB, Col., captured at Fort Fisher, N. C, 867. 

Lamar, G. B., purchase of arms by, 14. 

Lamar, Col. J. G., in command at Secessionville, S. C, 
580 ; his repulse of Gen. Benham, 581. 

Lancaster, ram, destroyed at Vicksburg, 439. 

Lander. Gen., his surprise of Jackson at Blooming 
gap — mortally wounded at Balls' bluff, 242. 

Landrum's brigade at Sabine cross roads. 627. 

Lanman's brigade at Fort Donelson, 86; at Jackson, 427. 

Laurel Hill, Va. , two unsuccessful attempts on, 677. 

Lawler, Qen., gallant conduct of, at the Big Black, 413. 

Lawton, Gen., severely wounded at Antietam, 320. 

Lee, Gen. A. L. , in the expedition to Shreveport, 624; 
at Wilson's farm, 627 ; at Sabine cross roads, 628. 

Lee, Admiral S. P., in the battle below New Orleans, 
152 ; sends gun-boats up the Nansemond, 594 

Lee, Gen. Fitz Hugh, encounters Gen. Sheridan at 
Hawe's store, 697 ; cavalry of, at Deep bottom, 760; 

Lee, Gen. R. E. his plan of campaign. 51 ; sent to 
take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina, 
52 ; pursuit of McClellan by, 263 ; at the battle of 
Glondale, 265 ; at the battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; 
report of, 272 ; biographical sketch of (note), 275 ; 
report of (note), 301 ; his losses in Virginia, 304 ; 
his proclamation to the people of Maryland. 308 ; 
invades Maryland — his plan discovered. 310 ; his 
losses at Antietam, 827 ; retreats to Virginia, 331 ; 
at the battle of Fredericksburg, 340 ; army of, near 
Fredericksburg, 452 ; plans and movements of, 
457-459 ; congratulates his army, 485 ; address of, 
to his army, 498 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 508 ; 
retreat of, 531 ; his operations in Virginia, 661-705 ; 
operations of, in defense of Petersburg, 735-781 ; 
retreats after the fall of Petersburg. 922 ; his cor- 
respondence with Grant relative to surrender, 930- 
9*4 ; bid^ bis army farewell, 935 ; his losses, 935. 

Lee, Gen. S. D., in the afEair at Tuscumbia, Ala., 503. 

Lee, Gen. W H. F., at Bapidan station, Va., 4S3 ; 
wound wl at Brandy station, 490. 

Ijee, Lisut. -Commander, mortally wounded, on board 
the Harriet Lane, at Galveston, 433. 

Lexington, Mo., strrender of, 66. 

Lidole, Qen. , division of. at Chickamauga, 660. 

UdeU, Qen. St. J. , captured at Blakely, AJt . 873. 

Ufeof— 
Bumside, Qen. Ambrose E., 133. 
Cravei. Capt. Tunis A. (iwte), 644 
Dup'.nt, Commodore Samuel F., 70. 
QpldatKirongh, Capt. Louis M.. 18S 



Hancock, Qen. Winfield S. [note), 221. 

Hays, Qen. Alexander (note), 666. 

Hill, Gen. Ambrose P. (note), 919. 

Hooker, Gen. Joseph (note), 230. 

Jackson, Gen. Thomas J. (Stonewall). (noU), 3S9 

Kearney, Gen. Philip (Tiote), 805. 

Lee, Gen. Robert E. (note), 275. 

McPherson, Gen. James B. (note), 735 

Meade, Gen. George Q., 496. 

Pope, Gen. John, 277. 

Head, Gen. S. T. (note), 926. 

Reynolds, Qen. John F. (note), 536. 

Rice, Gen. James C. (note), 678. 

Sanders, Qen. William P. (jiote), 578. 

Sedgwick, Gen. John (note), 676. 

Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., 70. 

Shields, Gen. James (note). 345. 

Smyth, Gen. Thomas A. (note). 929. 

Stringham, Commodore Silas H. , 63. 

Stuart, Gen. James E. B. (note), 685. 

Thomas, Gen. George H., 82. 

Wadsworth, Gen James S. (note), 669. 

Zollikoffer, Gen, Felix K., 81, 

Lincoln, President Abraham, his opinion on the sit 
nation, 24 ; caUs out the militia, and summoni 
Congress, 33 ; calls for additional troops, 46 ; mes- 
sage of, to Congress, 47 ; caUs for troops from 
Kentucky, 56 ; letter of, to the governor of Ken- 
tucky, 57 ; order of, for forward movement of land 
and naval forces, 80 ; proclamation of, announcing 
National victories, 157 ; telegram of, to Rosecrans, 
188 ; orders the army to move towards Manassas, 
193, letter of, to McClellan, 194 ; prophetic words 
of, 200 ; visits Fortress Monroe, 228 ; visit of, lo 
McClellan at Harrison ',s landing, 272 ; visit of, to 
the army, 332 ; letter of, to the people of Missouri, 
357 ; weakness of, 876 ; issues his famous emanci- 
pation proclamation, 891 ; proclamation of, an 
nonncing the enforcement of the law of enrolment 
and draft, 486 ; calls out the militia, 492 ; announce 
ment of, 530 ; a call for militia, 784 ; visits Rich- 
mond, 936 ; assassination of, 937, 938. 

Little Bethel, attempt to surprise, 62. 

Little Crow, shot near Hutchinson, Minn. 607. 

Little, Qen. L. H., killed at the battle of Iiika, 162, 

Little Osage Crossing, Mo., battle of, 832. 

Little Rock, Ark,, head-quarters of the guerrillas 
355 ; Curtis prepares to move against, 356 ; erpa 
dition against, 889 ; surrendered to Qen. Davidson 
606 ; Steele departs from, to co-operate with Banki 
against Shreveport, 638 ; return of Steele to, 640. 

Lockwood's Maryland Brigade, at Gettysburg, 618 

Logan, Gen. John A. , at Belmont, 60 ; at Fort Donelsoa 
90; at the battle of Raymond, Miss., 407 ; at th« 
battle of Champion hills, 411 ; in command of tJ>- 
fifteenth corps under Sherman, 706. 

Lone Jack, Mo. , defeat of Major Foster at, 369. 



968 



INDEX. 



'vongstreet, Qen. Jas., at Willl&msbarg, 216 ; at Fair 
Oaka, 334 ; at MechauicsvUle, 358 ; at Gaines' mill, 
269 ; at Qaineaville, 29S ; at South mountam, 816 ; 
at Antietam, 318 ; at Fredericksburg, 34H ; at 
Gettysburg, 508 ; at Chickamauga, 551 ; lays siege 
to Knoxrille, Tenn. 577 ; retreats from Knoxville, 
677 ; invests Suflolk, Va. 594 ; at Bean station, 
596 ; wounded in the Wilderness, 670 ; in the lines 
before Richmond, 910 ; joins Lee at Petersburg, 918. 

Lookout Mountain, Qa., battle of, 566, 567. 

Lortng, Gen. W. W., at Champion hills, 410 ; in com- 
mand at Canton, Miss., 611. 

Lost Mountain, Ga. operations of Schofield at, 714. 

Louisa Court House, Va., surprise and capture of 
Confederate cavalry at, 387. 

LoreU, Gen. M., Confederate troops at New Orleans in 
eommand of, 148 ; evacuates New Orleans, 156 ; 
Joins Price and Van Dom near Corinth, Miss. , 168. 

Lovell, steamer, sunk by the Nationals, 146. 

Lowe, Col. J. W., killed at Camifei ferry, 53. 

Lynch, Capt. W. F., in charge of the coast defense of 
North Carolina, 135 ; flies from Elizabeth city, 129. 

Lyon, Qen. Nat., in command at Springfield, Mo., 65 ; 
kiUed at the battle of Wilson's creek. Mo., 56. 

Lyon, Qen., cavalry raid of. Into Kentucky, 850. 

Lytle, Col. W. H. wounded at Camifex ferry, 62 ; 
wounded at the battle of Perryvllle, 177. 

M. 

McArthur, Gen. John, brigade of, at Fort Donelson, 
86 ; at the battle of Corinth, 164. 

McCall, Qen. Geo. A., at the battle of Mechanicsvllle, 
258 ; capture of, at the battle of G^lendale. 866 

McCallum, Col. D. C, superintendent ot military 
railroads, energy of, 558 ; (note), 781. 

McCausland, Gen., affair of, with Gen. Crook near 
Dublin station, 691 ; defeated by Gen. Hunter at 
Piedmont, 693 ; sets fire to Chambersburg, Pa., 788. 

iVlcClellan, Qen. Geo. B. , in Western Virginia, 35 ; in 
Northeastern Virginia. 47 ; issues an address to 
the people and his soldiers, 48 ; head-quarters of, 
at Waahington, 60 ; appointed commander-in-chief, 
79 ; inactivity of, 191 ; Lincoln dissatisfied with — 
liis army on the peninsula, 194 ; at Torktown, 196- 
201 ; at Williamsburg, 234 ; at Fair Oaks, 238 ; at 
MechanicsviUe, 258 ; his letter to the secretary of 
war. 262 ; at Savage's station, 262 ; at Malvern 
hills, 264 ; his report of the battle of Malvern hills, 
269 ; at Harrison's landing — his address to the 
army, 270 • his correspondence with the government, 
272 ; at Acquia creek, 275 ; in command of the 
reconstrncted army of the Potomac, 304 ; at South 
mountain, 315 ; at Antietam, 313-333 ; superseded 
by Bumside, 333 ; bids adieu to his troops, 836. 

tfcClernand, Gen. John A., at Fort Donelson, 86 ; 
at Pittsburg landing, 102 ; assumes command of the 
arm^ of the Mississippi, 383 ; at the battle of 



Champion hilU, 410 ; pursues the ^nfederatea 
413 ; conduct of, at the siege of Vicksburg, 417 
removed from command of the thirteenth corps, 
420 ; at Alexandria, La., 637. 

McCook, Col. Dan., at Doctor's creek, 175 ; at Chick 
amauga, 550 ; his raid on the railroad south o> 
Atlanta, 736 ; his movement against Lyon. 826. 

McCook, Col. R. L. , at Camifex ferry, 52. 

McCook, Gen. A McD., at the battle of Shiloh, 110 
at PerryvUle, 174-177 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 : al 
Ijberty gap. 543 ; at Chickamauga, 550. 

McCown. Gen., at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180. 

McCuUoch. Gen., mortally wounded at Pea ridge, 97 

McCullough. Col., murder of, at KirksvUle. Mo , 35b 

McDowell. Gen. Irwin, occupies Arlin^on heights 
and Alexandria, 35 ; in conmand of the forces 
in Virgfinia, 86 ; ordered t; attack the Confed- 
erate position at Manassas junction, 36 ; his 
first plan, 87 - his second plan, 38 ; defeated at 
Bull Run, 45, 46 : his removal, 46 ; in command 
of a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; hi> 
corps detached apd detained to defend the capital 
194 ; at Fredericksburg. 246 ; at Gainesville, 396 
at Manassas, 299. 

McGUvray, Col. F., batterios «*, at Gettysburg, 636 

McGinnis, Gen., at the b»tUe of Champion hUb 
411 ; at the battle of Grand Cotean. 51)9. 

Mcintosh, Gen., mortally wounded at Pea ndge, 97 

McKean, Gen. Thos. J., at the battle of Corinth, 16S 

McKee, Major, operations of, at Yazoo citv, 615. 

McKeen, Col., killed at Cold harbor, 701. 

McLaws, Qen. Laf., at Malvern hills, 268; at Fre 
dericksbnrg, 343 ; at Salem church, 479 ; at Qetv?* 
burg, 514 ; division of, at Taylor's bridge, 604- 

McMahon, Col., death of, at Cold harbor, 701. 

McMillan, Gen., at the battle of Pleasant hill 630 

McNeil, Gen. John defeats Porter at Kirksville. Mo 
358 ; defends Cape Girardeau, 603 ; commands tl 
army of the frontier, 606. 

McPheeters, Gen., defeat of, by Gen. Weitzel, 431. 

Mcpherson, Gen. J. B., drives the Confederates from 
Lamar to Holly springs, 371 ; at the battle of Ray- 
mond, Miss., 407 ; capture of Clinton by, 408 ; 
Jackson occupied by, 409 ; at Champion hUls, 410 ■ 
at the Big Black, 413 ; at the investment of Vicks- 
burg, 415 ; in charge of Vicksburg, 427 ; join* 
the expedition to Meridian, 609 ; at Meridian, 612 ■ 
commands the army of the Tennessee under Sher 
man, 706 ; death of, 723 ; biographical notice ol 
{■note), 725. 

Macomb, Commodore, recaptures PLvmouth, 860. 

Macon, Ga. surrendered to Gen. WUaon. 874. 

Magoffin, Gov., of Kentucky, refuses to raiae troops foi 
the Union, 66 : letter of, to the President. 57. 

Magruder, Qen. John on the Peninsula, 35 ; his opin 
ions of McClellan'B oi>eration«. 199 : at WUliams. 
bur£, 219 ; retreat of, tSA ■ attacks Sed^n^lM <) 



IJN ilJiX. 



96S 



Savag* station, 263 - 91endale, 265 ; at Malvern 
hills, 268 ; recaptm^ Galveston, 432-434. 

Mahone, Gen., at Fair Oaks, 240 ; at Gettysburg, 517. 

Malvern Hills, battle of, 264-269. 

Manassas, battle of (second battle of Bnll Run), 299. 

Manassas, ram, 69; at New Orleans, 151 ; destroyed, 163. 

Mansfield, Gen, Joseph K. F., at Ocean view and 
Norfolk, Va., 228 ; killed at Antietam, 321. 

Mansura, La., attack on the Nationals at, 638. 

Marais des Cygnes, Mo. , battle of, 832. 

Marland, Lieut., bravery of, at Grand Coteau, 600. 

Marmaduke, Gen., at Corinth, 118 ; defp'ited at Bo«i- 
ton mountains, 362 ; at Prairie g^rove, 864 ; at 
Springfield, Mo., 602; at Hunts vilie. Mo., 6U2 ; at 
Cape Girardeau, 603 ; repulsed at Helena, Ark. 605; 
repulsed at Pine bluff, 607 ; operations of, 639. 

Martinsburg, Banks' forces at, 348 ; panic at, caused 
by Early's invasion, 784 ; AverUl abandons, 792. 

Marye's Hill, Va., ca| 'ire of, by the Nationals, 472- 
475 ; recapture of, i/ the Confederates, 479. 

Maryland, its weakness geographically, 48 ; Lee'a 
proclamjt'on to the people of, 309 ; all able-bodied 
men ordered out for the defense of, 309. 

Massacres, at Fort Pillow, 618 ; at Snicker's gap, 792. 

Maury, Gen. Dabney, at the battle of Corinth, 164 ; in 
charge of the defenses of Mobile, 870 ; retreats up 
the Alabama river, 873. 

Meade, Gen. G«o. G., severely wounded at Qlendale, 
266 ; at Antintam, 319 ; at Fredericksburg, 346 ; at 
Chancellorsville, 463 ; takes command of the army 
of the Potomac, 495 ; his address to the army, 496 ; 
biographical sketch of, 496, 497 ; telegraphs to the 
war department, 498 ; his order to the army, 500 ; 
at Gettysburg, 507 ; his address to the army, 529, 
530 ; consolidates the army of the Potomac, 658 ; 
his staff, 659 ; epistle of, to his troops, 683. 

Meagher, Gen. T. F., at Fair Oaks, 239 ; at Gaines' 
mill, 260 ; at Glendale, 266 ; his bravery at Antie- 
tam, 324 ; wounded, 325 ; at Fredericksburg, 848. 

MrK;hanlc8ville, Va., battle of, 258, 259. 

Meigs. Lieut. J. , murdered near Harrisonburg, Va. , 797. 

Memphis, Tenn. , naval engagement before, 145 ; 
taken possession of by the National troops. 146. 

Memphis and Charleston Railroad, plant of, destroyed 
by Geu. Mitchell, 115. 

Mercedita, steamer, disabled by the Confederate 
ram. Palmetto State, off Charleston, 584. 

Meridian, expedition of Sherman to 610 ; Confeder- 
ates retreat from, 611 ; destroyed property at, 612. 

Merrill, Col., compels Porter and Cobb to retreat, 
358 ; skirmish of, with Marmaduke, 602. 

ierrimac, iron-clad, in Hampton Roads, 201 ; sinks 
the Cumberland, 203 ; destroys the Congress, 204 ; 
her contest with the Monitor, 207-211 ; blown up 
by the Confederates, 213 ; explosion of, 229. 

Mlddletown, Va., battle of, 800. 

UUm. Col. D. S., at Bull Ron, 39 ; remissness of, at 



Harper's Ferry, 313 ; mortally wouiided, 314 

MUitia, caU of President Lincoln for 75.000, after th« 
faU of Fort Sumter, 33 ; call for 120,000, 492 ; call 
for 29,000, from the states of New York, Pennsyl 
vania and Massachusetts, 784. 

MUledgeville, Ga., occupied by Gen. Sherman, 816. 

Mill Spring, Ky., battle of, 81, 

Milroy, Gen. R. H., at the battle of Cross keys, 251 
at Gainesville, 295 ; retreats from Winchester, 491 
defeats the Confederates on Wilkeson turnpike, 844. 

Mine at Petersburg, construction of, commenced by 
Burnside, 751; description of, 752; explosion of, 755 

Mine at Petersburg, sprang by the Confederates, 756 

Missionary Ridge, Ga., battle of, 568. 

Mississippi River, operations of Foote on the, 143 
Porter's services on the, 149 ; Farragut's operation? 
on the, 161-157. 

Mississippi, steamer, destroyed at Port Hudson, 437 

Missouri, division of sentiment in, 357 ; guerrilla 
warfare in, 358, 359 ; Price's invasion of, 829-833. 

Mitchell, Capt., sets fire to the floating battery 
Louisiana — sent prisoner to the North. 155. 

Mitchell, Gen. O. M., operations of, in Tennessee, 
115 ; joins Buell's army, 171 ; succeeds Gen. Hunter 
in the department of the South — death of, 581. 

Mitchell, Gen. R. P., at the battle of Perryville, 177 ; 
at the battle of Chickamauga, 556. 

Blobile, Ala., description of, 642 ; operations of Canby 
and Thatcher against, 869-873 ; surrender of, 873. 

Mobile and Ohio Railroad, fight by Gen. Smith, vritb 
Confederates on the, 118. 

Mobile Bay, operations of Farragut in, 641-649. 

Monitor, contest of the, with the Merrimac, 207-211 i 
founders off Cape Hatteras, 213. 

Monocacy, Md., battle of, 786. 

Sfonroe, Mayor, refuses to surrender the city of New 
Orleans, or take down the Confederate flag, 156. 

Montauk, iron-clad, attacks Fort McAllister, 582. 

Montgomery, Ala,, gathering of Southern delegates 
at, 23 ; surrender of, to Gen. Wilson, 874. 

Moorefield, Va., Confederate force defeated at, 788. 

Morell, Gen., at the battle of Mechanics ville 258 

Morgan, Gen. J. H. , raids by, in Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee, 170 ; marriage of, at Murfreesboro, 179 
raids by, in Tennessee and Kentucky, 188 ; raids 
by, in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, 595, 596 ; de 
feats Gen. Averill, 591 ; his raid in Kentucky tc 
Cynthiana, 783 ; killed at Greenville, Tenn., 835. 

Morgan, Gen. Geo. W., at Cumberland gap, 171 : 
at Fair Oaks, 238 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 878 ; a« 
Arkansas post, 887 ; bis pursuit of Forrest, 828. 

Morning Light, gun-boat, captured off Oaiveston,434 

Morris, Col., killed at the battle of Cold harbor, 701 

Morris, Gen., at the battle of Carrack's ford, 50. 

Morrison, Major, at Port Royal ferry, S. C, 76 ; ax 
the battle of Secessionville, 8. C, 581. 

Morristown, Tenn., battle of, 835. 



970 



INDEX 



J^orton, (ion., operations of, at Chattanooga, 657. 
MoBby, Opt. J. S., raid of, at Cheat's ferry, 788; 

Bupplr train captured by, at Berry ville, 791. 
Mower. Gen., distinguished services of, at the battle 

of t'joasant hill, 031 ; at Clouterville, 635. 
Md1>«/ #, Capt., killed in action at Mobile bay, 647. 
^nU'ran, Col., surrender of Lexington, Mo., by, 56 ; 

lL>"Jed at Bunker hUl, Va. ; 788. 
[r rfreesboro, Tenn., battle of. 180-186 ; retreat of 

Bragg from, 187 ; Buford's cavalry threatens, 844. 
Murphy, Col. K. C. , in charge at luka, 160 ; surrenders 

P.-"\y springs to Van Dom, 374. 

N. 

<AOLEE, Gen. , at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235. 

Nansemond River, gun-boats sent up the, to co-operate 
with the land forces, 594. 

Sash ville, Tenn., held by the Confederates, 82 ; 
abandoned by the Confederates. 95 ; held by Gen. 
Negley, 179 ; forces of Gen. Thomas concentrated 
at, 842 , Hood defeated at, 847. 

Sashville, Confederate steamer, burning of, 582. 

Navy, United States, condition of the, 25 ; strength 
of the, in 1863 and 1864, 855. 

N'egley, Gen. Jas. S., holds Nashville, 179 ; at Mur- 
freesboro, 180 ; letter of, to Gen. Thomas, 549 ; at 
Chickamauga, 552. 

\egTO troops, bravery of, at Port Hudson, 441 ; mas- 
sacre of, at Fort Pillow, 618 ; at the assault on 
Cemetery hill, Petersburg, 755 ; gallantry of, at 
New Market heights, 770 ; heroic conduct of, at 
Olustee, 857 ; war-cry of, at Blakely, 873, 873. 

Nelson, Gen., at Shiloh, 105 ; at Richmond, Ky., 170. 

Newark, Mo., captured by Porter, the guerrilla, 358. 

New Berne, N. C, expedition to, 131 ; description of, 
132 ; capture of, 134 ; flight of the inhabitants of, 
135 ; besieged by Gen. Hoke — siege raised, 859. 

New Falls City, steamer, sunk at Springfield, La ,626. 

New Hope Church, Ga., battle of, 712. 

New Madrid, Mo., evacuated by the Confederates, 96. 

New Market, Va., battle of, 691. 

New Orleans, description of, 147, 148 ; defenseless 
condition of, 155 ; capture of, 156. 

Newton, Gen., at York river, 226 ; at the attack on 
Marye's hiU, 474 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 008. 

Newtonia, Mo., Confederates driven out of, 833. 

NichoLs, Gen., brigade of, at Chancellorsville 460. 

Sim's battery, at the battle of Grand Coteau, 599 ; at 
the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. 

Norfolk, Va., surrendered to Gen. Wool, 229. 

North Anna, crossed and recrossed by Grant, 693, 696. 

Noyes, Capt , depicts Antietam after the battle, 830. 

Ny River, Va., battle of the. C84 

O. 
Oak Grove, Va., severe fight at, 257. 
Ocean View, V». , landing of National troops at, 828. 



Oglesby, Gen. Rich J., in the attack on Fort Done 

BOQ, 8G ; severely wounded at Corinth, 164. 
Olmstead, Col. C. H., surrenders Fort Pulaski, 140 
Olustee, Fla., battle of, 858. 
Olustee, cruiser, depredations of, 876. 
" On to Richmond I " 191, 206. 
" On to Vicksburg I ■' 393. 
Opdyke, Gen., at the battle of Franklin, 842. 
Opelousas, La., captured by Gen. Banks 438; ri 

occupied by Gen. Richard •. »ylor, 445. 
Orangeburg, S. C. , occupation of by Gen. Blair 88! 
Orchard Knob, Tenn., capiL.red y J"!!. Wood, 505 

Grant's head quarters at, 568. 
Ord. Gen , ordered to luka, 160 ; victo.-y of, at tli 

Hatchie, 167 ; in command of the thirteenth corj 

at Vicksburg, 420. 
" Order of American Knights," secret aEsociation, i 

Missouri, 829. 
Osband, Col., reconnoissance of, 615 ; expedition o 

fromVicksburg against Hood's communications, 851 
Osterhaus, Gen., wounded at the Big Black, 418 

at Wauhatchie, 566 ; at Chattanooga, 568. 
Overall's Creek, Tenn,, attack on blockhouse at, 84J 
Owen, Gen., at (Gettysburg, 626;ln the Wilderness, 671 
Owen, Lieut., with gun boats at Yazoo city, 615. 

P. 

Page, Gen. R. L., surrenders Fort Morgan, Ala , 641 

Paine, Gen., at Corinth. 118 ; wounded at Port Hui 
son, 444 ; at Fort Fisher, 866. 

Palmer, Gen. Innis A , at Corinth, 118 ; atMurfreei 
boro 180; at Chickamauga, 530 ; at Wauhatchi 
559 ; commands the fourteenth corps under Shu 
man, 706 ; resigns his command, 728. 

Palmer, Col., cavalry under, captures Hood's ponvoc 
train after the battle of 'ish ville, 849 ; capiuj< 
Gen. Lyon in camp at Red ni.l, 850, 

Palmetto Flag, unfurled over Castle Pinckney, I7. 

Palmetto Ranche, Tex , last battle of the wi.i 948. 

Pamlico Sound, expedition to, 125. 

Paris, Comte de, on the battle of Antietam .188. 

Parke, Gen. J. G., at Roanoke Island, 130 , at Ne 
Berne, 132 ; expedition of, to Fon Macon. 13C 
invests Moorehead City, 136 , at I'ltwiddie coa 
house, 909 ; penetrates the lines av Petersl>urg. 91! 

Parkersburg, Va., occupied by Gen. McClellan. 48 

Patten, Capt. , courage of, at the W eldon railroad 74- 

Pai'.erson, (ien., posted near Harper's ferry, 35 ; ou 
generalled by Johnston, 39 ; blunder of, 46 ; at tli 
battle of Williamsburg, 216 ; at Fair Oaks, 239. 

Pawnee, sent with reinforcements to Fort Sumter, 2i 

Peach Tree Creek, Ga., battle of, 720. 

Pea Ridge, Mo. , battle of, 97-98. 

Peck. Gen. J. J., operations of, at Suffolk. Va., 593. 

Pegram, Gen , surrenders at Rich mountain, 49 ; Qi 
feated at Somerset, Ky. , 544 ; wounded in th 
WiHerness, 672 ; killed at Hatcher's run, 903, 



INDEX 



»?1 



Pemberton, Gen. J. C, position of, at the Tallabnsha 
and Tallahatchie, 371 ; instructions from Gen. John- 
ston to, 408 ; his views on the situation, 409 ; at 
Champion hills, 410 ; retreat of, 411 ; shut up in 
Vicksburg, 421-423 ; surrenders Vicksburg, 424- 
436 , defeated at Salisbury, N. C, 896. 

Pender, Gen., at Gettysburg:, 503. 

I'endleton, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 457; advises 
Lee to surrender, 928 

Pennsylvania, prepares to resist invasion, 309. 

Penny backer. Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 
N. C. 866 ; severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. 

Pensarola. Fla , abandoned by Gen T. N. Jones, 141. 

Perryville, or Chaplin's Hills, Ky., battle of, 177. 

Petersburg-, description of, 736 ; operations of Gen. 
Grant against, 73G-782 , assaults upon the defenses 
of, 728-741 ; the great mine at, 751 ; explosion of 
the mine at, 764 ; disastrous assault at 756 ; opera- 
tions of Grant at, its downfall, 898-921. 

Pettigrew, Col J. J., landing of, at Castle Pinckney, 
17 ; taken prisoner at Fair Oaks, 238 ; (Gen.) at 
Gettysburg, 525 ; at Blackwater, 593. 

Petrel, privateer, destroyed by the St. Lawrence, 875. 

Phelps, Lieut., on Tennessee river, 85 ; in command 
of the Eastport when blown up, 633 ; operations of 
with the gun-boats Juliet and Fort Hindman, 634. 

Phillips, Col., defeats Col, Taylor, 309 ; defends Fort 
Blunt, 604 ; defeats Quantrell at Fort Gibson. 607. 

Pickett, Gen, at Williamsburg. 216; at Fredericks- 
burg, 343 ; at Gettysburg, 523 ; wounded iii the 
Wilderness, 672. 

Pillow, Gen. G. J., plan of, to seize CoKmbos, Kv ,58 ; 
at Fort Donelson, 85 ; flight from Foii Donelson, 93. 

Pilot Enob, Mo., defense of, by Gen. H. S. Ewing, 830. 

Pittsburgh Landing, described, 101 ; battle of, 105. 

Plaquemine, La., attacked by Gen. Taylo'. 445. 

Pleasant HUl, La. , battle of, 630. 

Pleasonton, Gen., cavalry of, at Chancellorsville, 457 ; 
his encounter with Gen Stuart, 490 ; his operations 
against Price in Missouri, 831-834. 

Plymouth, N. C, expedition against, 131 ; siege of, 
858 ; surrender of, to Gen. Hoke, 859 ; recaptured 
by the Nationals, 860. 

Polk, Gen., Hickman and Columbus, Ky , seized by 
58 ; at Belmont, 60 ; in commani Columbus, 82 ; 
evacuates Coltimous, 94 ; at Shilon, 106 ; at Chat- 
tanooga, 171 ; at Murfreesboro, 183 ; joins Bragg's 
army, 546 ; at Chickamauga, 550 ; in command at 
Meridian, 611 ; retreats to Demopolis, Ala., 611 ; at 
Res&ca, Qa. , 709 ; killed at Pine mountain, 714. 
ope, Gen. John, operations of, against Island 
No. 10, 96 ; at Corinth, 118 ; at Fort Pillow, 
143 ; recalled to Corinth, 144 ; ordered to Virginia, 
159 ; biographical sKetch of, 277 ; address of, to 
the army of Virgiuia, 278 ; orders issued by, 
281 Confederate reply toordersof. 2H2 ; at Gaines- 
ville 295 ; his cUargtss against Gen. Porter. 297 ; 



report of (note), 801 ; his losses in Virginia 304 
relieved from command, 804 ; operations of, against 
Sioux Indians, 607. 

Porter, Admiral David D., in command of mortar 
boats below New Orleans, 147 ; at Haines' Bluff, 
381 ; his attack on Fort Hindman, Ark., 386 ; hi* 
fleet in the Mississippi, 395 ; passes the batteries at 
Vicksburg, 401 ; his services at the siege of Vicks 
burg, 417 ; bombards Vicksburg 4'^1 . Arkansas- 
ram destroyed by (note). 431 ; on the Yazoo river 
614 ; on the Red river, 622 ; his letter to the secrt- 
tary of the navy, 624 ; at Springfield landing, K27 
his perilous return down the Red river 632 637 
his expeditions against Fort Fisher, N. C, 861 8il7 

Porter, Gen. Fitz John, at BuU Run. 41 : at Yorh 
river, 226 ; occupies Hanover cojrt house, 232 , at 
Mechanisville. 258 :at Gainas' mOI. 260 , at Malvern 
hills, 268 ; at Manassas, 299 ; ut Antietam 319 
pursues Hen. Lee. 331, 

Porterfield, Gen., issues an address at Grafton 48 

Port Gibson, Miss., battle of, JOS, 

Port Hudson, the Hartford and Albatross pass tht 
batteries of, 436; situation and defenses ol, 440; 
bravery of the garrison of, 445 ; surrender of, 446, 

Port Republic, bridge at, carried by Gen. Jackson, 2.53. 

Port Royal, S. C , operations of expedition to, 72-75. 

Port Royal Ferry, fortified camp of Confederates at, 
76 ; result of expedition to, 77. 

Posey, Gen., at the battle of Getty burg, 517. 

Potter. Gen., repulse of, near Foi JIcRae. Va., 772 

Powder ship, exploded near Fort Visher, N C. , 862. 

Powell, ijow^ Payne, his attempt to assassinate 
Secretary Seward, 939. 

Prairie Grove, Mo., battle of, 363. 

Prentiss, Gen. , at Pittsburg landing, 103 ; made pris- 
oner at Shiloh. 107. 

Preston, Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. 

Price, Gen. Sterling, surrender of Lexington, Mo. 
to, 56 ; retreat of, 97 ; at Corinth, 118 ; defeat of, 
at luka, 161 ; retreat of, 162 ; at Corinth, 1G3 ; re- 
pulsed at Helena. Ark , 605 ; at Prairie O'Aan, 639 
his disastrous invasion of Missouri, 829-8B3. 

Prime, Major, constructs redoubts at Corinth. 164 

Pryor, Gen. Roger A, conveys proposal to Majn' 
Anderson in Fort Sumter, 27 ; at Williamsburg, 21 7 
at Fair Oaks, 239. 

Pumpkin Vine Creek, Ga., Gen. Hooker's oiicountei 
with Hood and Hardee's corps at. 712. 

Putnam, (ten., killed at Fort Wagner, S C. 691. 



Qn&NTRBlX. guerrilla, raid of, on Lawrence, Kkn. 
606 ; defeated by Col. Phillips at Fort Giwwn. 607 

R. 
Rains. Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks. 235 
Itaudolpli » battery at Chancellorgville, 4S9. 



97S 



INDEX. 



R&DBom, Gen., captures Aransas pass, lex., 601 ; at 
the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. 

Rappahannock, retreat of Pope's army over the, 288. 

Elaymond, Miss., battle of, 407. 

Bead, Gen. S. T., killed near Farmville (note), 926. 

Beams' Station, battle of, 766. 

Bed River expedition, see Shreveport, 621-638. 

Heno, Gen. Jesse L., at Roanoke, 126 ; at New Berne, 
132 ; expedition of, to Fort Macon, 135 ; at Gaines 
rtlle, 295 ; gallantry of his brigade, 300 ; at Chan- 
tilly, 803 ; killed at South mountain, 316. 

Renshaw, Commodore W. B., in command at Galves- 
ton, 432 ; killed on board the Westfield, 433. 

Resaca, Ua., description of, 709 ; battle of, 710 ; Gen. 
Johnston retreats from, 711 ; Hood repulsed at, 808. 

Reynolds, Gen., at MechanicsvUle, 259 ; at Gainesville. 
295 ; at Manassas, 299 ; at Fredericksburg, 345 ; first 
corps of, below Fredericksburg, 454 ; kUled at Qet- 
tysburg, 503 ; biographical sketch of (note), 535. 

Rice, Gen. James C, at Gettysburg, 513; killed at 
the assault on Laurel hiU, Va. , (note), 678. 

Richardson, Gen., at York river, 226 ; at Fair Oaks, 
237 ; killed at Antietam, 324. 

Richardson, Gen., operations of, at Tazoo city, 616. 

Rich Moun'ai- Va., battle of, 49. 

Richmond, , defeat of Gen. Nelson at, 170. 

Richmond Va., capital of the Confederacy, 33 ; Gen. 
Butler's scheme for the capture of, 655 ; movement 
of Gen. Grant against, 753, 754 ; demonstration 
against, by the second and tenth army corps, 
758-761 ; movements of the army of the James, 
towards, 769-779 ; evacuation of, 919-921. 

Bicketts, Gen. Jas. B , at Antietam, 319 ; at Gettys- 
burg, 519 ; at the battle of Monocacy, Md., 785. 

Roanoke Island, surrender of, 128. 

Robinson, Gen. J. C, at the battle of Gettysburg, 
503 ; severely wounded near Alsop's Farm, Va., 678. 

Bodes, Gen. R. E., at Fair Oaks, 235; at Chancel- 
lorsvUle, 465 ; at Gettysburg, 504 ; in the Wilder- 
ness, 664 ; killed at Winchester, 796. 

Rodgers. Commander C. B. P. , at Port Royal ferry, 76. 

Elodgers, Commodore John, commands the gunboats 
on the James :'7er, 264 ; at Malvern hills, 26S. 

Rodman, Gen., mortally wounded at Antietam, 327. 

Rodney, Miss., attack on the batteries opposite, 403. 

Rogers, Col., killed at Fort Robinett, Corinth, 166. 

Etome, Ga., capture of, by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, 712 ; 
Gen. Corse at, with the fifteenth corps, 806. 

Bomney, Va. , occupied by Confederates, 48. 

Sosecranz, Gen. W. S., at Rich mountain, 49; at 
Carnifei ferry, 52 ; takes charge of the army of 
the Mississippi, 159 ; defeats Price and Van Dom 
at Corinth, 166 ; takes command of the army of 
the Cumberland, 167 ; at Nashville, 179 ; at Mur 
freesboro, 180 ; receives the thanks of the presi- 
dent, 188 ; at Chickamauga, 549 ; defeat of, 555 ; 
withdraws his army to Chattanooga, 556 • relieved 



of his command, 658 ; in command of the depart 

ment of the Missouri, 829 ; measures taken by, to 

repel the invasion of Price, 829-834. 
Ross, Gen. L F., operations of, at Yazoo cdty, 615. 
Rousseau, Gen. L. H., at Perryville, 176 ■ at Mur 

freesboro, 180 ; his cavalry raid from P«catur tf 

Marietta, 719 ; at Tullahoma, 838. 
Rowan, riommander Stephen H., destroys a flotill 

in the harbor of Elizabeth city, 129. 
Rowley, Gen , at the battle of Gettysburg, 503. 
Rucker, Gen., taken prisoner at Nashville, 847. 
Ruger, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 522. 
Ruggles, Gen., at Santa Rosa, 67 ; at Philoh, 109 ; 

New Orleans, 148. 
Russel, Lieut. J. H., exploit of. at Santu Rjsa, 67. 
Bussell, Gen. D. A., killed at Winchester, 796. 



Sabine Pabb. capture of, 434 ; battle of, 898. 

Sabine Cross Roads, battle of, 629. 

St. Augustine, Fla., surrender of, 141. 

St. Helena Bay, occupied by the Nationals, 76. 

Sailor's Creek, Va., battle of, 927. 

Salisbury, N. C, battle at Grant's creek, near 896 

Balkahatchie River, the passage of, forced, 883. 

iaitworks in Virginia, expedition of Burbridge agiilnat 
SS."! ; destroyed by Stoneman's troops, 837. 

Sanborn, Gen., his pursuit of Gen. Price, 831-833. 

Sanders, Gen , operations of, 544 ; death of (note), 678 

Santa Rosa Island, night attack on troops at, 67. 

Saunders. Gen., killed at the Weldon railroad, 764. 

Savage Station, Va., battle of, 263. 

Savannah, Ga., Sherman's approach to, on thf 
march from Atlanta, 819 ; investment of, by Sher- 
man, 823 ; escape of Gen. Hardee from, 823 ; 
occupation of, by Sherman, 824 ; Sherman's despatcL 
announcing the fall of, 824 ; Gen. Geary appouiteri 
military governor of, 825 ; left in charge of Gee 
Foster, 881 

Savannah, privateer, surrenders to the Perry, 870. 

Schenck, Gen. R. C, at Bull Run, 48 ; at Cross kcyt> 
251 ; at Gainesville, 295. 

Schimmelpfenig, Geo., at Gettysburg, 504, 606. 

Schofield, Gen. J. M., in command of the Missour 
military district, 357 ; his report of operations ic 
Missouri and Arkansas, 358 ; defeat of Rains by, 
361 ; resignation of, 862 ; commands the army o' 
the Ohio, 706 ; retreats from Pulaski to Frank 
lin, 840 ; his repulse of Hood at Franklin, 842 
falls back to Nashville, 843 ; at the battle of Nash 
ville, 845 ; sent to North Carolina with his corps 
868 ; occupies Wilmington, 869 ; movements ol 
from Wilmington to Goldsboro, 893, 894. 

Schurz, Gen. C, at Gainesville, 295 ; at Chancellors 
ville, 461 ; at Gettysburg, 504 ; at Wauhatchie, 561 

Scott, Gen. Winfield, statement of, regarding pur 
cha.se of arms by the States. 14 : advice of, k 



INDEX 



9n 



eominanders of Soathem forts, 16 ; mistake of, at 
Bull Enn, 46 ; resignation of, 79. 

Sesibrook, S. C, batteries erected at, 76. 

Sears Lieut., noble work of, at the battle of luka, 161. 

Seoessionville, 8. C, battle of, 580 ; (note). 581. 

Sedgwick, Gen. John, at York River, 326 , at Fair 
Oaks, 237 ; at Savage station, 263 ; wounded at 
\ Dtietam, 322 ; attack of. on Marye's hill, 473 ; 
repulsed at Salem church, 478 ; retreat of ,(»o<£), 480; 
at Gettysburg, 510 ; raid of , in Virginia, 656 ; com- 
mands the sixth corps, 659; death of, 675; (note), 676. 

Selma, gun-boat, captured by the Melacomet, 645. 

8«lm», Ala., capture of. by Gen. Wilson, 874. 

Selfridge, Lieut. T. O., at Pleasant hill landing, 633. 

Semmes, Capt. Raphael, commands the cruiser 
Sumter, 875 ; takes command of the Alabama, 877 ; 
his disastrous encounter with the Kearsarge, 878. 

Seward, Secretary \V. H., advice given by, 391 ; L. 
Payne Powell's attempt to assassinate, 939 

Seymour, Gen., at Mechanicsville, 259 ; at Giendale, 
266 ; captured in the WOderness, 671 ; his opera- 
tions in Florida, 856-858 ; defeat of, at Olustee, 858. 

Shackelford, Gen., at Cumberland gap, 545 ; surrender 
of Gen. Morgan to, 590 ; at Bean Station, 596. 

Shaeffer, Gen. J. W., killed at Murfreesbnro 184. 

Shaler, Gen., at the capture of Marye's Hiil, 474; 
captured at the battle of the Wilderness. 671. 

Shaw's brigade at the battle of Pleasant hul, 680. 

Shelby viUe, Tenn., taken by the Nationals, 543. 

SJnenandoah, cruiser, depredations •f, 876. 

Shenandoah Valley, operations of Gen. Banks in, 243 ; 
operations of Gen. Jackson in. 247 ; operations 
of Gen. Sheridan in, 789-802. 

•Iheridan, Gen. P. H., at Perryville, Ky., 177 ; at 
Murfreesboro 180 ; operations of, 538 ; at Chatta- 
nooga, 572 ; raid of, in Virginia, 685, 686 ; encounter 
of, with Fitz Hugh Lee and Hampton, 697 ; at 
Trevillian, 703 ; commands the Middle military 
division, 789 ; operations of, in the Shenandoah val- 
ley, 789-802; his great raid fromWinchester, 903-906; 
at Five forks, 910-917 ; pursues Lee to Jettersville, 
923-826 ; at Deatonsville, 926 ; at Appomattox 
station, 933 ; ordered to proceed to Texas, 948. 

Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., at Bull Run, 41 ; with 
the army of the Cumberland, 58 ; commands the 
land forces in the South Carolina expedition — bio- 
graphical sketch of, 70 ; occupies and strengthens 
Hilton head. 75. 

tlherman. Gen. William T., gallantry of, at Shiloh, 
101 ; at CoUege hiU, 872 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 376 ; 
at MUliken's bend, 383 ; order of, to his army corps, 
384 ; at Arkansas post, 887 ; demonstration of, at 
Haines' bluff. 404 ; operations of, at Jackson, 4f)9 ; 
ordered to Bridgeport, 413 ; onward march to Vicks- 
burg — takes possession of Haines' bluff, 414 ; opera- 
tions of, near Lake Pontchartrain, 438 ; at Port 
Badt.0D 441 ; In command of the department of 



the Tennessee, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 568 ; at the 
battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; relieves Bumside at 
KnoxvUle, 577 ; his expedition to Meridian, 610 ; 
his return to Vicksburg, 614 ; assumes command of 
the military division of the Mississippi, 653 ; details 
of his Atlanta campaign, 706-734 ; turns Johnston's 
position at Dalton, 709 ; attacks Johnston at Resaca, 
710 ; compels Johnston to evacuate Resaca, 711 ; 
captures Allatoona pass, 713 ; compels Johnston to 
evacuate his positions on Kenesaw. Pine and Lost 
mountains, 714-717; his march to the Chattahoochee, 
717; his series of operations ag» -st Atlanta, 718- 
734 ; his operations against Hnt . ,3-809 ; pursues 
Hood to Resaca, 808 ; his new ^lan of campaign, 

810 ; prepares for the great march through Georgia, 

811 ; burns Atlanta, 812 ; his order of march, 813 ;. 
threatens Macon, 815 ; his troops enter Milledge- 
ville, 81 6 ; crosses the Oconee 817 ; his cavalry 
ieleats Wheeler at Waynesboro, 818 . crosses the 
Ogeechee, 818 ; approaches Savannah, 819 ; captures 
Fort McAllister — communicates with the fleet, 
822 ; invests Savannah, 823 ; destruction effected by 
his army on the march from Atlanta to Savannah, 
824, 825 ; his march through the Carolinas, 881- 
894 ; detention of, by floods, 882 ; crosses the Sal- 
kahalchie — moves on Orangeburg — drives the 
Confederates across the Congaree, 883 ; occupies 
Columbia, 884, 885 ; advances to Cheraw, 888 ; his 
cavalry surprised by Wade Hampton — destroys 
the old arsenal at Fayetteville, 889 ; at Averysboro 
891 ; at Bentonville, 893 ; joins Schofield at Golds 
boro, 893 ; his final operations against Gen. John 
ston in North Carolina, 940-943, his pursuit of 
Johnston to Smithfield, 941 ; his conferences with 
Johnston, and basis of agreement for surrender, 
943, 944, {note) 94") ; Johnston surrenders to, 947. 

Shields, Gen. J., takes command of Lander's troops, 
242 • operations of, in the valley of the Shenan 
doali, 243, 244 ; biographical sketch of {note), 245. 

Shiloh, first battle of, 105 ; second "r lie of, 111. 

Sibley, Col., inflicts punishment on tne Sioux, 369. 

Sickles, Gen. Dan. E. , at Fair Oaks, 239 ; skii-mish of 
with Gen. Jackson at the Furnace — at ChanceUois 
ville, 469 ; at Gettysburg, 507 ; wounded, 514. 

Sigel, Gen. Franz, at Dug springs. Mo., 55; retreats to 
RoUa, 56 ; at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Cedar mountain, 
Va., 286 ; defeated at New market, 691 ; relieved 
of his command, 692 ; retires from .Martinsburg,784. 

Sill, Gen, J. W., division of, sent to Frankfort, 178 : 
death of, at the battle of Murfreesboro, 183. 

Simmons, C«l., mortally wounded at Giendale, Vi»., 266 

Sioux Indians, savage attack of, on the village of New 
Ulm, 369 ; execution of a party of, 607. 

Slaves, conduct of the, prior to the declaration o 
eimancipation, 392 ; flocking of, to Gen. Sherman's 
army, in the Meridian expedition, 613 

Blocum, Col. J. S. , killed at the battle of Bull Ron, V 



A 



974 



ttJDBA. 



Bloewn, Gen. Henry W., at the battle of Gaines' mill, 
360 ; at Chancello sville, 455, 469 ; at Gettysburg, 
607 ; in command of the twentieth corps, 738 ; enters 
Atlanta, 732; defeats Hardee near Averysboro, N. C, 
891 ; repulses Johnston near BentonvUle, 893. 

Smith Col. O. , gallant charge of, at Wauhatchie, 561. 

f^mith. Gen. A. J., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 
378 • post of honor given to, after the capture of 
Fort Hindman, Ark. , 388 ; at Gumtown, 619 ; 
axpeditions of. against Gen, Forrest, 620 ; in the 
Shreveport expedition, 622 ; his capture of Fort de 
Rnssey, 624 ; at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630 ; at 
Clonterville, 635 ; at the battle of Nashville, 846 ; 
corps of, at the operations against Mobile 870. 

ismith, Gen. C. F., at Belmont, Mo., 60 ; at Fort Don- 
elson, 86-93 ; supersedes Grant, 99 ; death of, 101. 

Smith, Gen. G. C, operations of, 538. 

Smitj, Gen. G. \V., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234 ; 
brigade of, at the battle of Antietam, 323. 

Smith, Gen. J. E., at the battle of Chattanooga, 669. 

Smith, Gen. Kirby, at Bull Run, 45 ; defeats Gen. 
Nelson at Richmond, Ky., 170 ; at the battle of 
Jenkins' ferry, 639 ; surrender of, 949. 

Smith, Gen. M. L., division of, at Fort Donelson, 86 ; 
at Corinth, 118 ; severely wounded at Chickasaw 
bayou, 378 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 569. 

Smith, Gen. T. K., in the Shreveport expedition, 636 ; 
at Pleasant hill landing, 632 ; at Clonterville, 635. 

Smith, Gen. W. F., at Williamsburg, 214 ; at Chatta- 
nooga, 559 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687. 

Smith, Gen. W. S., at Memphis. 609 ; retrejitof, 618. 

Smyth, Gen. T. A., killed near Farmville (note), 929. 

Snake Creek Va. , affair at, 688. 

Snake Creek Gap, McPherson's movement on, 708. 

Snieker's Gap, Va., massacre at, 793. 

" Sons of Liberty," secret association in Missouri, 829. 

Southfield, gun-boat, sunk by the Albemarle, 858. 

South Mountain, Md., battle of, 315. 

Spanish Fort, Mobile, invested, 870 ; surrenders, 871 . 

Spear, Col. , killed at the capture of Marye's hUl, 474. 

Spottsylvania Court House, battles around, 675-683. 

Springfield, Mo., battle of, 603. 

Stafford, Gen., killed Ln the WUdemess, 673. 

Stahl, Gen., at the battle of Cross keys, 251. 

Stanley, Gen. D. S., at luka, 161 ; at Corinth, 165 ; 
operations of, on the Harpeth river, 538 ; at Chick- 
amauga, 554 ; in command of the fourth corps 
nnder Sherman, 728 ; wounded at Franklin, 842. 

Stannard's, brigade at Gettysburg, 525. 

Stanton. Edwin M., made secretary of war, 79 ; visita 
Fortress Monroe, 328 ; his draft orders of 1862, 283 ; 
his despatch to the governors of the Northern 
States, 485 ; meets Gen. Grant at Indianapolis, 558 ; 
his lamentation at the death-bed of Lincoln, 939. 

(Star of the West, attempts to relieve Fort Sumter, 31. 

Starke, Gen., killed at the battle of Antietam. 320. 

Starkweather's brigade, at Perryville, Ky., 177. 



Steadman, Gen., charge of, at Chickamauga, 560. 

Steedman, Gen. James B., at Nashville, 844. 

Steele, Gen. F. , his operations on the eastern banks 
of the Mississippi, 372 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 878 
at Helena, 605 ; captures Little Rock, 606 ; at Cam 
den, 639 ; at Jenkins' ferry, 640 ; at Mobile, 870 

Stein, Gen., killed at the battle of Prairie grove, 366 

Steinwehr, Gen. , at the batvle of Gainesville, 295 ; a' 
Chancellorsville, 461 ; at Wauhatchie, 561. 

Stephens, Commander, disastrous enterprise of, tr 
take possession of Fort Sumter, 592. 

Stevens, Gen. I. I., occupies Fort BeauregarO, 75 
expedition of, to Port Royal, 76 ; raid of, neat 
Pocotaligo^at Secession ville, 580 ; death of, at 
Chantilly, 803 ; biographical sketch of (7U>te), 806. 

Stevens, Gen., at the battle of Shiloh, 109. 

Stevens' Maine battery, at Gettysburg. 519. 

Stevenson, Ala., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. 

Stevenson, Gen. Carter L., at Champion hills, 410. 

Stevenson, Gen. Thomas G., killed near Spottsyl 
vania. 678 ; biographical sketch of (ru)te), 705. 

Stewart, (Jen. G. H., captured by Gen. Hancock, 681 

Stewart's brigade, at the battle of Shiloh, 106. 

Stone, Gen. C. P., at PoolesviUe, Md., at Ball's Bluff. 
53 ; in the Shreveport expedition, 624. 

Stoneman, Gen. Geo , repulsed at Williamsburg, 214 . 
in command of the four divisions of cavalry, 451 ; 
expedition of, to destroy railroads — taken prisone . 
736 ; his operations against Breckenridge in East 
Tenne3.see,836 ; raid of, into South Carolina. 85>5-897 

Su^ny Creek Station, Gen. Gregg's raid against, 770. 

Strasburg, Va.. advance of Sheridan's army vo, 790. 

Streight, Col. A. D, expedition of, 539 ; capture of , 540 

Stringham, Commodore S. H., commands tne fleet 
in the expedition to Hatteras, 63. 

Strong, Gen., severely wounded at Fort Wagner, 590. 

Stuart, Gen., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 378. 

Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., raid of, at Hanover court 
house, 257 ; at Catletts station, 288 ; posi. at Man- 
assas surprised by, 290 ; raid of, into Pennsylvania, 
332 ; at Chancellorsville, 464 ; cavalry engagement 
with Gregg, 490 ; at Gettysburg, 623 ; surpriseii 
by Gen. Custer, 656 ; death of (riote), 685. 

Sturgis, Col., gallantry of, at the battle of Raymond 
Miss., 407 ; (Gen.) defeat of, at Gumtown. 620 

Suffolk, Va., siege of, 594. 

Sumner, Gen. E. V., in command of a corps in th- 
army of the Potomac, 193 ; at WUliamsburg, 2l4 , 
at Fair Oaks, 237 ; at White Oak swamp, 265 ; at 
Antietam, 322 ; at Fredericksburg, 347 ; relieved ot 
his command, 354 ; death of (note), 449. 

Sumter, privateer, blockaded at Gibraltar, 875. 

Surrender of, Gen. Jeff. Thomson in Arkan.sa«, 948 
Gen. Joseph Johnston in North CaroUns,, 947 ; Gen 
Kirby Smith in Texas, 949 ; Gen. R. E. Leo ir 
Virginia, 934. 

" Swamp Angel," a hu£e Parrott gxm. g» c«uled. 691 



INDEX. 



976 



Svreitzer. Gen., at Gettysburg, 514. 
Sweitzer's Texan cavalry at Pleasant hill, 630. 
Swinton, William, his opinion of the losses in the 

overland campaign, 704. 
Sykes, Gen. at Mechanicsville, 258 ; at Gaines' mill , 

269 ; at ChancellorsvUle, 456 ; at Gettysburg, 507. 

T. 

ALLAHAS8EE, Confederate cruiser, depredations of, 
876 ; destroyed by the Confederates, 869. 

Taliaferro, Gen. wounded at Warrenton turnpike, 293. 

Tatnall, Commodore Josiah, at Beaufort, S. C, 73. 

Taylor, Gen. Richard in command of Confederates in 
Louisiana, 437 ; defeat of, 438 ; operations of, 597 ; 
in command of the Confederate department of the 
South, P70 ; surrender of, at Citronella, Ala. , 947. 

Taylor's Bridge, Gen. Hancock at, 694. 

Tecumseh, monitor, strikes a torpedo and sinks, 644. 

Tennessee, Confederate ram, in Mobile hay, 641 ■ de- 
scription of, 643 ; surrenders to Farragut, 647. 

TerriU, Qeu. , battery of, at Shiloh, 110 ; at Perry ville, 
Ky., 176 ; mortally wounded, 177. 

Terry, Gen. , A. H., at Stono river, 589 reconnoissance 
made by, towards Richmond, 773 ; his capture of 
Fort Fisher, 864-807 ; joins Sherman's army near 
Goldsboro, N. C.,894. 

Texan Martyrs, 867. 

Thatcher, Admiral, operates against Mobile, 870. 

Thayer, Col., at Fort Donelson, 91 ; at Chickasaw 
bayou, 380 ; (Gen.) at Prairie D'Ann, 639. 
"homas. Gen. Geo. H., defeats Zollikoffer at Mill 
spring. 81 ; antecedents of, 82 ; at Perryville, 174 ; 
at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Chickamauga, 550 ; firm- 
ness of, at Chickamauga, 555 ; in charge of the 
department of the Cumberland, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 
565 ; commands the army of the Cumberland under 
Sherman, 706 ; sent to Nashville by Sherman, 805 ; 
left to cope with Hood in Tennessee, 811 ; his avail- 
able force when Hood entered Tennessee, 838 ; his 
campaign against Hood, 837-851 ; favored by Hood's 
delay, 839 ; fights at Spring hill — evacuates Co- 
lumbia, 840 ; takes the offensive against Hood, 844 ; 
commands in front of Nashville, 844-847 ; defeats 
Hood, 847 ; appointed major-general in the regular 
army, 851 ; his instructions to Gen, Wilson, 873. 
iTjomas, Gen., captured at Blakely, Ala., 872. 

Thompson, Gen. Jeff., at Fort PUlow, 143 ; retreat of, 
146 ; surrenders at Chalk bluff. Ark., 948. 

["homptton, Gen. A. P , killed at Fort Anderson, 617. 

ridball, Col., artillery of, at Taylor's bridge, 695. 

Widen, Major, kiUed at Chantilly, 304. 

Tilghman, Gen., surrenders Fort Henry to Foote, 84. 

rilton. Gen., at Gettysburg. 514. 

Tilton, Oa., capture of a blockhouse at, 808. 

Tolopotomy Creek, Va., Gen. Hancock at, 697. 

Torbert G«n., capture of Cold harbor by, 098, at 
Trevillian, 708 ; engagement of, at Luray 797. 



Totten, Gen. , at the battle of Prairie grove, 368. 

TourteUotte, Col , In charge at Allatoona paae, 806 

Towers' brigade, gallantry of, at Manassas, 800. 

Trevillian, Va., battle of, 703. 

Tullahoma, abandoned by the Confederates, 543. 

Tupelo, Miss., Gen. Hood's broken army at, 851. 

Turchin, Gen., at Wauhatchie, 560. 

Tuscaloosa, Ala., captured by the Nationals, 874. 

Tuscaloosa, ram, sunk by the Confederates. 873. 

Tuscumbia, Mo., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. 

Tyler, Gen. E. B., at Blackburn's ford, 87 : at Por 

Republic, 252 ; at Monocacy, 785. 
Tyler, Gen. R. O., in command of artillerists, 684 

wounded at Cold harbor, 701. 
Tyner's Station, Tenn., burned by the Nationals, 585 
Tyndall'B brigade at Wauhatchie, 561. 

IT. 
Uhion Citt, Tenn., captured by Gen. Forrest, 616. 
Underwriter, gun-boat, set on flre at New Berne, 856. 
Upton, Col., at Spottsylvania court house, 678. 

V. 
Van BtlRKN, Ark., captured by Gen. Blunt, 366. 
Vance, Col. , killed at Sabine cross roads, 629. 
Van Cleve, Gen., at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Chicka 

manga, 550. 
Vandever's brigade at Chickamau^, 554. 
Van Dorn, Gen. Earl, at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Corinth 

118 ; at Pocahontas, 163 ; defeated at Corinth. 186 

captures Holly springs, 374 ; operations of 538. 
Van Pelt, Lieut., killed at Chickamauga, 550. 
Vaughan, Gen., defeat of, by Gen. Gillem, 835, 836 
Velocity, gun-boat, captured off Galveston, 484. 
Verona, Miss. , destruction of property at, 852. 
Vicksburg, situation of, 376 ; operations previous tc 

the attack on, 394r401 ; assaults on, 415-419 ; sui 

render of, to Gen. Grant, 427. 
Viele, Gen. Egbert L., at the siege of Fort Pulaski 

139 ; at Ocean view and Norfolk, Va., 228, 229. 
VUlepigue, Gen., at Fort Pillow, 143 ; at Corii.th, 164 
Vincent, Gen., killed at Gettysburg, 513. 

W. 

Wadsworth, Gen., at Gettysburg, 503 ; killed in tUt 
Wilderness — biographical sketch of (note), 669. 

Wainwright. Commander, death of, on board the Har 
net Lane, at Galveston, 433. 

Walcott, Gen., his victory at GriswoldvUle, Ga., 815. 

Walker, Gen., at Raymond, Miss., 407 ; joins Bragg'* 
army, 546 ; at Chickamauga, 550. 

Wallace, Gen. W. H. L. , at Fort Donelson, 90 ; mo» 
tally wounded at the cattle of Shiloh, 107. 

Wallace, Col. Lewis, defeats the Confederates •■ 
Romney, 49 ; (Gen.) at Fort Donelson, 87 ; D'/fim 
conduct of, 93 ; in command at Fort Henry, 98 ; a» 
Crump's landing, 102 ; at Shiloh, 105 ; at Corinth 
118 : defeat of, at the battle of Monocacy, 786. 



976 



INDEX 



Ward. Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 465 ; at 
the battle o< Gettysl ■org, 511. 

Warren, Gen. G. K., at Manassas, 300 ; at the attack, 
on Marye'B hill, 472 ; at Gettysburg, 613 ; commands 
the fifth army corps, 658 ; at Jericho ford, 094 ; at 
the Weldon railroad, 780 ; at Five forks, 916 ; in 
command of the department of the MissiBsippi, 917. 

^''arrenton Turnpike, Va. , battle of, 293. 

Warrenton, Miss., fleet passes the batteries of, 401. 

Warrington, near Pensacola, burning of, 68. 

Warsaw Sound, occupied by the Nationals, 75. 

Wasnburne, Gen. C. C. , at Jacksonport, Ark., 356 ; 
at Helena, 857 ; at Grand Coteau, 599 ; captures 
Fort Esperanza, 601 ; pursues Forrest, 828. 

Washington, D. C, contemplated seizure of, by the 
Confederates, 34 ; arrangements for the defense of, 
80 ; troops left for the defense of, 192-194 ; measures 
taken for the safety of, 349 ; Gen. Pope charged with 
the protection of, 278 ; threatened by Early, 786. 

Wauhatchie, Ga., battle of, 561. 

Waynesboro, Qa. , battle of, 904. 

Webb, Gen., at Gettysburg, 527; killed in the Wil- 
demesa, 672. 

Weber, Gen., at the battle of Antietam, 334. 

Weed, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 518. 

Weitiel, Gen. G. , his victory at I.A>)adieTilIe, La. , 481 ; 
at B^^ck, La., 437 ; at Port Hudson, 441 ; at 
Bermuda hundred, 687 ; at Fort Fisher, 861-863. 

Weldon RaUroad, movements of Grant's forces against, 
741-745 ; series of battles for the possession of, 
743, 763-706 ; Warren's expedition against, 779-781. 

"Vessels, Hen., bis defense of Plymouth, N. C, 859. 

Westfield, gun-boat, at Galveston, 433 ; blown up, 433. 

West Point, Miss., battle of, 613. 

Westport, battle of, 833. 

Wheeler, Gen., attempts to recapture Fort Donelson, 
537 ; at Chickamauga, 549 ; his raid against Sher- 
man's communications, 739 ; repulsed at Dalton, 
Ga., 733 ; defeated at Waynesboro, 818. 

White, Gen. J., surrenders Harper's ferry, 314. 

Whit« House, Va., Sheridan's cavalry attacked at, 745. 

White Oak Swamp, Va., battle of, 264. 

White River, expedition of McClemand up, 886. 

Whiting, Gen. W. H. C, at Gaines' mill, 360 ; taken 
prisoner at the capture of Fort Fisher, 867. 

Whitn^, Gen., severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867 

Whipple, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 459. 

Wbittaker, Gen., brigade of, at Chickamauga, 566 ; 
at Wauhatchie, 566. 

Wilcox, Gen., repulse of the Nationals at Salem 
heights by, 476-478 ; at Gettysburg, 617, 525 ; in 
the Wilderness, 666. 
iVlloox, Gen. O. B., brigade of, at Bull Bun, 4S; at 
Fredericksbori; 848. 



Wild, Gen., in command of colored troops on th( 
James river, 686. 

Wilder, Gen., operations of, 543, 54S. 

Wilderness, Va. , the battles in the, 664-673. 

Williams, Gen. A. L., at Chancellorsville, 469 , at 
Gettysburg, 518 ; at Averyaboro, 890. 

Williams, (Jen. F., operations of , against Vicksburg 
371 , death of, defending Baton Bouge, 430. 

Williamsburg, Va., battle of, 214-235. 

Willich, Gen., operations of, 542 ; at Chattanooga, 678 

Wilmington, N. C, occupied by Gen Schofield, 869. 

Wilson, Gen. Jas. H., encounters Wade Hampton's 
cavalry and routs Heth's infantry, 701 ; his expedi- 
tion against the Weldon and Danville railroads, 
746 ; pursues Hood from Nashville, 847 -849 ; hid 
raid in Alabama and Georgia, 873-875. 

Wilson, Col. WUliam, Zouaves of, on Santa Rost 
island, 67. 

Wilson's Creek, Mo., battle of, 56. 

Winchester, Va. . Banks attacked by Jackson at, 347 
Early defeated near, 787 ; battle of, 796. 

Winslow, C»pt., sinks the cruiser Alabama, 877. 

Winthrop, Major Theo., killed at Big Bethel, 63. 

Wistar, Gen , attempts to take Richmond by surprise. 
655 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687. 

Withers, Gen., at Shiloh, 109 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 

Wood, Gen., at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Orchard knob 
503 ; at Chattanooga, 672 ; at Naabville, 845. 

Wool, Gen. J. E., 'n command at Fortress Monroe, 
63 ; at Ocean Vie« and Norfolk, Va., 238, 229. 

Worden, Lieut. J. L., in command of the Monitor, 
306 ; operations of, at Fort McAllister, 582. 

Wright, Gen. G. H., captures Fort Walker, 75 ; his 
expedition to Florida, 141 ; at SecessionviUe, 580 ; 
commands tirst division of sixth corps, 659 ; suc- 
ceeds Sedgwick in command of sixth corps, 676 
at Spottsylvania, 683 ; at Cold harbor, 699 ; move* 
on the Weldon railroad, 743 ; in command of tht 
trotips around Washington and pursues Early, 786 
his successful attack on the Confederate lines, 918 
at SiUor's creek, 9*7. 

Wytheville, Va., Stoneman's great raid on, 836. 

Y. 
Yazoo Cttt, Mias., failure of operations at, 615 
Yazoo Pass experiment, 396, 397. 
Yazoo River, situation of, 377 ; Porter's fleet In, 414 
York, Pa., exactions of the Confederates at, 499. 
Yorktown, Va., operations at. 195-199. 

Z. 

ZOIXTKOFFBR, Gen, Felix K., enters Kentucky fr 

the east, 58 ; kiUed at MiU spring, Ky., 81. 
Zook. Gen., mortally wounded at Gettysburg, 61P 



.i'OO 



^-^ -^^^ 






>r: 



<<■■ •■^•-. 



.^^ % 



■^/. .^^^ 



<^ •■'■:. 



,-Y 



>a' -S>. 



^■^• 






.-.<■■ 



^ V 



,\^ ■^■- 



^^' 

.>^% 



•^^ 



>-N , 1 ' « 



^^ v^^ 



■•/ .<\' 






' • " ^ \\ 



vN^" 



■>- » » , V ' 






^> ,^^^ 






>0 C' 






>"^ ■''^ 









^'^ 



.-^ '^. 



^^ '■^ 



^' -i^. 






^.. .-^^ 



•.V 






,0o. 



X''- 



. ,^' 



X^"^ -•^ct 



%0o. 



"^/. <^'' 



'':>- V'' 



